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A reasonable man

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I would like to commend Thomas Cudworth for his latest attempt to engage ID critic Professor Edward Feser in dialogue. Over the past few weeks, I have been greatly heartened by Professor Feser’s clarifications of his position vis-a-vis Intelligent Design. For instance, in a recent post on his blog site, he wrote:

The dispute between Thomism on the one hand and Paley (and ID theory) on the other is not over whether God is in some sense the “designer” of the universe and of living things – both sides agree that He is – but rather over what exactly it means to say that He is, and in particular over the metaphysics of life and of creation.

Moreover, in an email sent to me last month, Professor Feser wrote:

I have never accused any ID defender of heresy, and would never do so. To say to a theological opponent “Your views have implications you may not like, including ones that I believe are hard to reconcile with what we both agree to be definitive of orthodoxy” is simply not the same thing as saying “You are a heretic!” Rather, it’s what theologians do all the time in debate with their fellow orthodox believers.

I welcome Professor Feser’s statements that he regards the Intelligent Design movement as theologically orthodox, and that he believes God is the designer of living things.

In his latest post, Thomas Cudworth put a question to Professor Feser. He asked Professor Feser whether, in his view, God could have possibly planned to create a universe in which intelligent beings could infer His existence from studying nature – in particular, from observing clues such as cosmic fine-tuning and irreducible complexity, which would show that the evolutionary process must have been intelligently planned. I know that Professor Feser is a very busy man with a lot of work on his hands, so I’d like to attempt a reply on his behalf.

Recently, I’ve been closely studying Professor Feser’s books, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism. Aquinas. One thing that Feser makes abundantly clear in his books is that he thinks the existence of God can be proved with certainty. So in response to Thomas Cudworth’s question, Professor Feser would never say: “No, I know that God would never have hatched such a plan, would never have wanted human beings to have the ability to infer his existence in this way, and would never have created a universe in which such inferences from nature are possible.”

Instead, the answer which Professor Feser would give is:

“God did in fact create a universe in which intelligent beings could infer His existence from studying nature. But we don’t need cosmic fine-tuning and irreducible complexity to make that inference. Any old law of nature would be enough – even a simple one like ‘Protons and electrons tend to be attracted to one another.’ What’s more, the laws of nature allow us to deduce that the Creator of the universe is the God of classical theism.”

How can I be sure that Professor Feser would respond in this way? In his book, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism, Professor Feser describes Aquinas’ Fifth Way as “a strict and airtight metaphysical demonstration of the existence of God” (p. 112) and adds:

Even if the universe consisted of nothing but an electron orbiting a nucleus, that would suffice for the Fifth Way… All that matters is that there are various causes here and now which are directed to certain ends, and the argument is that these couldn’t possibly exist at all if there were not a Supreme Intellect here and now ordering them to those ends… Nor is this a matter of “probability,” but of conceptual necessity: it is not just unlikely, but conceptually impossible that there could be genuine final causation without a sustaining intellect. (p. 116)

Could such a Supreme Intelligence possibly be anything less than God? It could not. For whatever ultimately orders things to their ends must also be the ultimate cause of those things: To have an end is just part of having a certain nature or essence; for that nature or essence to be the nature or essence of something real, it must be conjoined with existence; and thus whatever determines that these things exist with a certain end is the same as what conjoins their essence and existence. But as we have seen, the ultimate or First Cause of things must be Being Itself. Hence the Supreme Intelligence cannot fail to be identical with the First Cause and thus with the Unmoved Mover, with all the divine attributes. The arguments all converge on one and the same point: God, as conceived of in the monotheistic religions.

There can be no doubt, then, that the Supreme Intelligence which orders things to their ends cannot fail to be Pure Being and therefore cannot fail to be absolutely simple. (p. 116)
(Emphasis mine – VJT.)

It is evident from the foregoing quotes that Professor Feser has great confidence in Aquinas’ Fifth Way, and that he believes it leads straight to the God of classical theism. Where he and I differ is that he thinks that Intelligent Design detracts from the Fifth Way (which is why he regards ID as a theological distraction), whereas I think that Intelligent Design actually reinforces the Fifth Way, making Aquinas’ argument much stronger, and much easier to defend from the attacks of modern skeptics. But that will be the subject of a future post.

Comments
Mung (#66) Thank you for your post. Just to be clear: when I speak of formal causes, I don't mean that forms go round making things happen, as if they could push things around or something. Only efficient causes make things happen. What I mean is that in order to understand Nature properly, we need to understand the forms that we find in things, and that grasping the different kinds of materials and the causal agents we find in the world will not enable us to do that. The sceintific community is still resisting this conclusion - hence their futile attempt to "dumb down" specified complexity into either Shannon complexity or ordered sequence complexity. I would also agree that formal and final causes are inseparable. But I would add that in order to be able to infer an intelligent Creator, a grasp of form is even more important than a grasp of finality, as it reveals something that is unambiguously the product of intelligence.vjtorley
April 29, 2011
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It might help if you tell me what you think Feser means with the quote in question, how that differs from my interpretation of what he means, and why he brought it up in the context of his claim that Thomism is incompatible with Intelligent Design.
I that HERE in the post you quoted from. If you don't understand or see any difference just say so. But don't pretend like I didn't address it.Mung
April 29, 2011
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---Mung: "But I’m willing to wager you think it means something other than what Feser intends it to mean." It might help if you tell me what you think Feser means with the quote in question, how that differs from my interpretation of what he means, and why he brought it up in the context of his claim that Thomism is incompatible with Intelligent Design.StephenB
April 29, 2011
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Alastair Noble, director of the Centre for Intelligent Design, said if the message of the research was that students should have more opportunity to assess the scientific evidence for the various positions around origins, no one would disagree with that. He said the study's definition of intelligent design was inaccurate and over-simplistic, although he was not surprised by the high levels of awareness of intelligent design - unlike evolution, it was intuitive and "a non-dogmatic, non-religious position which attempts to account for the sophistication we find in natural and living systems in terms of mind, as well as matter and energy". ENV
What does it mean to account for something in terms of mind? Is it a mind which resorts solely to material and efficient causes?Mung
April 29, 2011
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hi VJT, Doesn't Feser also argue that you cannot have a formal cause without a final cause? My view of the mechanistic philosophy (and for all I know I could be way off, I'm just offering this for discussion) is that it rejects formal and final causes and attempt to reduce all explanations to material and efficient causes. Now it seems to me that for ID to distinguish itself from the mechanistic philosophy it would need to assert formal and/or final causes. And if I am right above, asserting one is as good as asserting the other. As such, how can ID be scientific unless one makes the case that science must once again admit formal and final causes?Mung
April 29, 2011
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I think that Feser’s phrase “the way God creates” coupled with the phrase, “is not to be understood” can be safely interpreted to mean that God, as Creator, does not assume the role of an artistic shipbuilder.
But I'm willing to wager you think it means something other than what Feser intends it to mean. Let me see if I can develop an analogy, no matter how poor or incomplete. Say I take a hunk of ice and carve a sculpture. Now say I take some cubes of ice, and use them to cool my drink. Is there a difference?Mung
April 29, 2011
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Mr. Green (#61) Thank you for your post. You write:
It’s not that ID per se dispenses with formal and final causes, but “mechanistic” philosophies do, and ID is typically presented in mechanistic terms.
It would be impossible to explicate the concept of complex specified information without some appeal to formal causes. If you look at David Abel's papers on information (see for instance here and here ) you will see that he carefully delineates Functional Sequence Complexity (FSC) from mere Random Sequence Complexity (RSC) as well as Ordered Sequence Complexity (OSC), and provides a mathematical measure for Functional Sequence Complexity - which is something you cannot do for finality as such. Science requires rigorous quantification, or otherwise it degenerates into woolly-minded hand-waving and speculation. What the ID movement is basically saying to the scientific community is that the origin of the forms we see in living things remains an unexplained mystery, and that a designing Intelligence is the only explanation in principle which is capable of accounting for life. Ditto for the specificity of the cosmos as a whole. You argue that Thomists embrace an argument from form as well:
Now if you want to argue from form rather than finality, a parallel argument applies: only God can unite a form with prime matter, so again what exactly the form is does not come into it.
But this kind of argument only shows that material entities possessing a form require something to keep this form united to prime matter. It does not show that this "something" must be intelligent. This is the argumentative gap that ID attempts to plug. Finally, in response to my earlier point about final causes directed at currently existing ends, you write:
"Currently existing end" doesn’t sound like an oxymoron to me, in that something could have finality even if it existed for only a single instant of time ... A rock sitting motionless on the ground without change is still subject to the forces of gravity and electromagnetism, or, equivalently, to the final ends of gravitation and electromagnetism. So I’m not sure what distinction you want to make.
My point is that if the goal is already present and not distant, then intelligence is not required to reach it. Feser's exposition of Aquinas' Fifth Way makes it quite clear that he invokes an Intelligence to explain the fact that things have future-directed tendencies, towards goals which do not yet exist. As he puts it in The Last Superstition (p. 115):
One of the raps against final causation is that it seems clearly to entail that a thing can produce an effect even before that thing exists. Hence to say that an oak tree is the final cause of an acorn seems to entail that the oak tree - which doesn't yet exist - in some sense causes the acorn to go through every state it passes through as it grows into an oak, since the oak is the "goal" or natural end of the acorn. But how can this be? Well, consider those cases where goal-directedness is associated with consciousness, viz. in us. A builder builds a house; he is a cause that generates a specific kind of effect. But the reason he is able to do this is that the effect, the house, exists as an idea in his intellect before it exists in reality. That is precisely how the not-yet-existent house can serve as a final cause - by means of its form or essence existing in someone's intellect, if not (yet) in reality. And that seems clearly to be the only way something not yet existent in reality can exist in any other sense at all, and thus have any effects at all: that is, if it exists in an intellect. (Bold emphases mine - VJT.)
Thus the assumption that the intrinsic ends towards which things tend are in the future, and as yet non-existent, is absolutely vital to Feser's argument. Without it, his whole argument for an Intelligence directing Nature collapses. But if the ends we find in Nature are not distant, future ends, but currently existing ones (as you yourself concede in the cases of gravity and electromagnetism) then the inference to an Intelligence is unwarranted. To be sure, it would still remain very odd that things have tendencies at all - even tendencies directed towards currently existing ends. Things behave in accordance with rules (the laws of Nature). Rules, it seems, can only be created by a Mind. But that's a very different argument from Feser's; it's more like a transcendentalist argument. In brief: you have to either accept that things genuinely obey rules or norms (which are by definition the product of a mind), or else you have to deny the existence of any norms in Nature - in which case, what grounds can you possibly have for believing that the sun will rise tomorrow (the old problem of induction)?vjtorley
April 29, 2011
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---Mr. Green: "He’s criticised the actual equations? Please show me where he attacks the science. I’ve never seen Feser discuss anything but philosophical interpretations of ID." To be sure, Feser does not characterize ID's approach as bad science. Indeed, for some strange reason, he appears not to care much one way or the other either about the validity of its methods or the soundness of its conclusions. He does, though, criticiize the ID approach on the grounds that it assumes a completely mechanistic universe. Such is not the case. Further, as Jay Richards points out, "mechanistic" means different things to different people and Feser does not sort any of this out. ---"No, he’s never said that. You’re quite right that such an interpretation of Aquinas would be obviously false, and in fact Feser has commented on that very point." Feser writes this: "The point is rather that for A-T, the way God creates a natural substance is not to be understood on the model of a shipbuilder or sculptor who takes pre-existing bits of matter and rearranges them to serve an end they have no tendency otherwise to serve." I think that Feser's phrase "the way God creates" coupled with the phrase, "is not to be understood" can be safely interpreted to mean that God, as Creator, does not assume the role of an artistic shipbuilder. Thus, when St. Thomas indicates that God did create Adam and Eve in exactly that way, he is leaving a door open that Feser has closed in his name. Feser is here misunderstanding Aquinas in a very serious way, and much of his criticism of the ID paradigms is based on this misunderstanding. Never mind the fact that Feser also misunderstands ID on its own, as I pointed out in the first paragraph. Only someone who misuderstands both views at the same time could fall into the error of believing that Thomism and ID are incompatible. As I pointed out earlier... "Neither false claim alone would be sufficient to make Thomism inconsistent with ID. Thomism properly understood could be reconciled with ID even if ID DID rule out intrinsic causality, which it doesn’t; ID, properly understood, could be reconciled with Thomism even if Thomism DID require intrinsic causality, which it doesn’t."StephenB
April 29, 2011
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It’s not that ID per se dispenses with formal and final causes, but “mechanistic” philosophies do, and ID is typically presented in mechanistic terms. I think this is the crux of the matter. How does ID manage to qualify as science without embracing the mechanistic philosophy of science?
Mung
April 29, 2011
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VJ Torley: What distinguishes us from Thomist philosophers is our insistence that: (i) the forms that we find in Nature can take us to Nature’s Creator, just as surely as the intrinsic finality that exists in Nature; (ii) form cannot be reduced or boiled down to finality; both are vital for understanding the “whatness” of a thing.
But I don't imagine a Thomist could disagree with either point. It's not that ID per se dispenses with formal and final causes, but "mechanistic" philosophies do, and ID is typically presented in mechanistic terms. Now, if we start from an A-T position, then some things can be mechanisms (externally-imposed form) and some can be organisms (intrinsically). But then specificity is irrelevant; as soon as you have laws (final causes), then no matter how simple, they point directly to God via the Fifth Way. Now if you want to argue from form rather than finality, a parallel argument applies: only God can unite a form with prime matter, so again what exactly the form is does not come into it.
Future ends would certainly warrant Feser’s inference to an intelligent Creator; but currently existing ends would not.
"Currently existing end" doesn't sound like an oxymoron to me, in that something could have finality even if it existed for only a single instant of time; also a timeless intelligence having an intended goal. In fact, I'm not sure the future plays a part, strictly speaking, although it's obviously a natural way to imagine a final cause at work (a mass falling and coming to rest on the ground, or salt molecules coming apart in water). A rock sitting motionless on the ground without change is still subject to the forces of gravity and electromagnetism, or, equivalently, to the final ends of gravitation and electromagnetism. So I'm not sure what distinction you want to make.Mr. Green
April 29, 2011
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Mr. Green: Thanks for your further reply. I think we are now understanding each other, and have moved somewhat closer together. I want to wrap this up, so let me make a few final points: I am glad you agree with me about Feser's statement regarding mechanism and the wrong kind of God. Now, on Aristotle. You write: "I don’t think necessity has dropped out — I think Aristotle considers it equivalent to directedness. The fact that he doesn’t continue to draw out a separate thread about necessity in this context indicates that he thinks he is still talking about it." I agree that this would explain his procedure in the passage we are discussing. But my point (aside from my complaint about unclear writing on Aristotle's part) is that, if that *is* Aristotle's meaning, Aristotle is wrong. There is no *need* to interpret gravity, charge, etc. in terms of any intrinsic finality. They can be interpreted as external compulsions. Now, you go on to say: (And yes, Feser does interpret charge/etc. to be final causes.) I won't deny that this is Feser's meaning, since it does seem consistent with what he says about the electron "orbiting" the atom. But of course I'm questioning the propriety of this. "The point is not that Aristotle anticipated “natural laws” in the same sense as modern science, but that his metaphysical background (in particular, the four causes) can be naturally applied to describe modern science." Understood, but again, I think this would be an act of desperation, by someone determined to hang onto both Aristotle and modern science. You write: "Given a “law” of gravity, according to which any mass uncontingently and in a fixed way is disposed to attract and be attracted to another mass, how could that not be described as 'natural things tend to determinate ends.'" Easily. You just recognize that in Aristotelian thought, the "determinate ends" are substance-specific (ousia-specific), whereas in modern physics the natural tendencies of matter have nothing to do with the properties of the particular ousia or entity. They belong to "matter as such" or "body as such." It is because Aristotle has not fully understood the notion of "body as such" and that all substances, *qua* bodies, may have natural tendencies that have nothing to do with the natural ends (intrinsic finality) they have *qua* substances (entities), that he makes the illegitimate jump that he makes in this passage. In Aristotle's thought, intrinsic finality (which is what Feser is championing, as opposed to extrinsic finality) belongs to a thing in virtue of the specific kind of thing that it is. A dog, a cat, a cactus, a rock, each has a different telos or intrinsic finality. Modern science, and indeed modern philosophy, denies this. Of course modern science can recognize that cat embryos have a natural tendency to become cats, and in that sense can agree with Aristotle, but Aristotle applies that kind of thinking even to inanimate objects, and that's what creates the huge gulf between Aristotle and modern thinking. In modern thinking, the rock, when it falls, or the planet, when it orbits, or the electron, when it is attracted, is behaving as a body under compulsion, not as a particular kind of entity striving to attain an end. Intrinsic finality is a useless conception for inanimate objects in modern thought. I don't see how it can be rescued, without doing violence to the original Aristotelian context, in which expressions such as *telos* and *to tou heneka* have senses which are ill-suited to the project of modern science. I'm not of course denying that one can think of the whole system of nature as revealed in modern science -- governed by the four fundamental forces, as displaying some sort of purposive intent. But in thinking that way I'm not thinking as an Aristotelian, but as a design theorist. I see what looks like a brilliant design which allows the whole complex universe -- from molecules to man -- to be generated from four simple forces. This is certainly teleological reasoning, but it has nothing to do with the ends or intrinsic finality of particular natural things. It implies a form of extrinsic finality. God as it were designed natural forces so that they would by virtue of their own power assemble the universe. Thus, God does not literally put together parts to make a machine, but rather creates a natural world which is itself creative. Admittedly this is different from what Paley had in mind, because it is a much more subtle notion of design, and not so narrowly tied to biological examples. But it's equally different from what Aristotle had in mind. I'll close with one more point, and then you can have the last word. The problem with Thomists is that they, like Aquinas, start from the presupposition that Aristotle constitutes a body of internally consistent thought, which just has to be adjusted a bit (get rid of that error about the eternity of the world, etc.) to be harmonized with Christian thought. But specialists in Greek philosophy (who unlike Aquinas can read Aristotle in the original language, and who have in addition a much superior understanding of the Greek philosophical context in which Aristotle wrote) know that Aristotle's thought is riddled with internal tensions, and they constantly debate what he means and whether or not his thought on a number of questions is finally coherent. I would recommend to you, and to Feser, Sedley's book, *Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity*. It gives an idea of just how difficult it is to come up with a fully consistent interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of nature. The internal tensions over Aristotle's use of the "craft" analogy in nature are particularly revealing; Aristotle is no Paleyan, yet his thinking in some sense cannot escape the craft analogy which Feser is condemning. Thomism tends to smooth over all such difficulties. Thus, it is oblivious to the difficulty I'm raising about Aquinas's argument in the Fifth Way. It appears that one of Aquinas's crucial premises there is trustworthy only if one turns a blind eye to the very difficulty in Aristotle that I've been discussing. By the way, we discussed many of these issues in depth on this site, last year. See the 18 April 2010 thread: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/professor-feser%e2%80%99s-puzzling-assault-on-id/Thomas Cudworth
April 29, 2011
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StephenB: Feser’s has criticized ID’s “arguments,” all of which are scientific.
He's criticised the actual equations? Please show me where he attacks the science. I've never seen Feser discuss anything but philosophical interpretations of ID.
According to Feser, Aquinas would have insisted that all living things CAME INTO EXISTENCE as a result of intrinsic final causes.
No, he's never said that. You're quite right that such an interpretation of Aquinas would be obviously false, and in fact Feser has commented on that very point.
Feser is blundering because he speaks with apodictic certainly on matters about which he is, in fact, wrong.
I think rather that you seem to have misunderstood him.Mr. Green
April 29, 2011
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Look what I found =P This paper is excerpted and adapted from the article, Francis J. Beckwith, “How to Be An Anti-Intelligent Design Advocate,” University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy 4.1 (2010)Mung
April 29, 2011
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VJT @54
Aristotle’s four causes: efficient and material causes. We’re very big on formal causes.
I've hinted at this elsewhere, pointing out the potential connection between form and information. What if ID were phrased differently, as the argument that material and efficient causes are insufficeint in themselves to explain the natural world, and that another cause is needed. What if they referend to this additional needed cause as "the formal cause (or the informational cause, or even just information)" rather than "an intelligent cause" or "an intelligent designer"? Would ID still be science? What would they call us then? Isn't each of the Five Ways in some way connected to the four causus? Does the Fourth Way map to the Formal Cause? The Four CausesMung
April 29, 2011
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@55 should read: "By ID I mean the scientific paradigms used to analyze or [measure] patterns in nature for the purpose of detecting design."StephenB
April 28, 2011
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---Mr. Green: "What do you mean by “ID”?" By ID I mean the scientific paradigms used to analyze or patterns in nature and draw inferences to design ["Irreducible complexity, Specified Complexity, Counterflow etc]. ---"ID in a scientific sense certainly does not, and scientifically is not incompatible with Thomism. Feser never said it was." Feser's has criticized ID's "arguments," all of which are scientific. In fact, good science confirms good philosophy, even though its methods are different and its conclusions are provisional. --"If you mean ID-philosophy, then any philosophical foundation that denies intrinsic ends (like a mechanistic approach) obviously does preclude it." ID doesn't deny intrinsic ends. ---"And if you start from, say, a Thomistic approach, then you’ve got a different kind of argument." Different does not mean incompatible. Thomas' second way, for example, is different from the Big Bang theory, that doesn't make the the two arguments incompatible. Quite the contrary. They complement one another. ---"I don’t know what you mean by “product”. For Thomists, all living organisms possess intrinsic final causes, up to and including Adam and Eve." ID doesn't deny that living organisms possess instrinsic final causes. You seem to have missed the point of my example. According to Feser, Aquinas would have insisted that all living things CAME INTO EXISTENCE as a result of intrinsic final causes. Obviously, that interpretation of Aquinas is false since St. Thomas attributed the coming into existence of Adam and Eve to an EXTRINSIC cause. Again, recall my earlier comment: St. Thomas taught that God CAN create through intrinsic causes, not that he MUST or that he always DID. By claiming otherwise, Feser is simply putting words in Aquinas' mouth that should not be there. ---Otherwise they would be machines, not living organisms." Again, ID does not deny intrinsic causality. ---Any version of ID that denies that is clearly at odds with Thomism; and if you accept the intrinsic finality, then you basically end up at the Fifth Way." ID does not deny that living things are organisms. ---"Either way, Feser is hardly “blundering”. Feser is blundering because he speaks with apodictic certainly on matters about which he is, in fact, wrong.StephenB
April 28, 2011
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Mr. Green (#53) I'd like to address your statement:
Mechanism yields not just the possibility of a deist-god, but the inevitability — because the very nature of a mechanist world is one that exists on its own (after God winds it up, perhaps), and so is fundamentally at odds with the transcendent sustaining God.
You appear to be laboring under the misconception that ID proponents have dispensed with all but two of Aristotle's four causes: efficient and material causes. Wrong. We're very big on formal causes. What distinguishes us from Thomist philosophers is our insistence that: (i) the forms that we find in Nature can take us to Nature's Creator, just as surely as the intrinsic finality that exists in Nature; (ii) form cannot be reduced or boiled down to finality; both are vital for understanding the "whatness" of a thing. The charge of mechanism would be justified only if forms were envisaged as being imposed on a preexisting subject, with a nature of its own. I have already shown in a recent post of mine that ID does not conceive of the design of life in this fashion, and that a living thing’s being designed is perfectly compatible with it having built-in, goal-directed processes that terminate in and benefit the living thing itself (i.e. immanent final causation, in Aristotelian terminology). I'd like to quote a brief passage:
Dembski is not saying that when the form of a designed object is imposed on a pre-existing object, that object retains its nature. Rather, he is simply saying that the form of a designed object is conferred on it from outside. This form could be an accidental form (e.g. the shape of a statue, or the structure of a ship). In these cases, the raw materials (stone and wood respectively) upon which the form is imposed undergo no change of nature. Alternatively, the form might be a substantial form, giving the object a new nature. That would be a more radical act of design, but it would still be a perfectly legitimate example of design, since the form is conferred from outside by an intelligent agent... In this radical act of transformation, nothing from the old object would remain except for the “prime matter” underlying the change. From the perspective of the “prime matter”, the powers of the new object would be imposed from outside. However, since the powers of the new object arise from its new nature (which includes its new substantial form), these powers would still be natural to the object itself.
As regards the design of the universe itself (i.e. the fine-tuning of the laws of Nature), once again, ID does not conceive of the laws as being imposed on some pre-existing "stuff" or matter, which is capable of existing without God. As far as scientists can tell, laws make up the very "warp and woof" of the universe; it is impossible to conceive of there being any universe in their absence. Consequently, whatever is responsible for the laws of Nature is also responsible for its very being. The difference between the A-T approach and the ID approach is that the former focuses on the directedness of laws in order to infer a Creator; whereas the latter focuses on the high degree of specificity of these laws in order to infer a Designer of Nature. Both paths - finality and form - arrive at the same terminus. I would like to add that one needs to be careful when arguing from the Thomistic premise that "natural things tend to determinate ends." For the crucial question is: are these ends future ends, or merely currently existing ones? Feser's argument for an Intelligent Creator assumes that things have a "future-directedness" about them, when they are obeying the laws of Nature. Only such a Being could direct mindless objects towards distant future goals, of which they know nothing. Future ends would certainly warrant Feser's inference to an intelligent Creator; but currently existing ends would not. In case "currently existing ends" sounds like an oxymoron to you, try replacing the word "end" with "disposition" or "tendency", and you'll see my point. Salt dissolving in water does not have any future-directed tendencies.vjtorley
April 28, 2011
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Thomas Cudworth: You make out as if Feser is saying that a “watchmaker” argument for God is, while perhaps not heretical in itself, the sort of argument that could lead the philosophically careless to a heretical theology, and that therefore Christians are better off with the Thomist sort of argument for God’s existence than with the Paleyan sort. [...] But ID proponents have never claimed that design arguments can get one to a Christian God. They have claimed only that design arguments can refute explanations of origins that are rooted in chance
You're right, I think my account was too mild. According to Feser, it's not merely that one "might" go wrong with the Superwatchmaker, but that given a mechanistic-type metaphysics (which is whence Superdesigners typically spring), one is guaranteed to go wrong. Mechanism yields not just the possibility of a deist-god, but the inevitability — because the very nature of a mechanist world is one that exists on its own (after God winds it up, perhaps), and so is fundamentally at odds with the transcendent sustaining God. To claim that the "mechanical" world happened, as a matter of historical fact, to have been created by the classical God is something Feser rejects, because if classical theology is right, there is no such as a "mechanical world", not even one that in fact happened to be created by God. On the other hand, if you grant Thomistic philosophy, with the classical God and fundamentally teleological cosmos, then refuting "chance" in this way doesn't make a lot of sense: a Thomistic world doesn't have "chance" (in the relevant sense) in the first place, so there's nothing left to refute. Now I guess you could argue that, having established the existence of the classical creator God, we can also establish the weaker conclusion that "something" must have designed the cosmos, but it doesn't seem a very interesting conclusion given what must precede it. (I don't want to put words into Feser's mouth, but I myself do not see a problem with this — just no advantage to it either.)
But why is one forced to choose between two options [chance and directedness], when in fact, a third option is available: necessity? Aristotle started the passage taking necessity seriously, but by the end it has dropped out of sight. Does he think that he has disposed of it by disposing of chance/coincidence?
I don't think necessity has dropped out — I think Aristotle considers it equivalent to directedness. The fact that he doesn't continue to draw out a separate thread about necessity in this context indicates that he thinks he is still talking about it. (And yes, Feser does interpret charge/etc. to be final causes.) The point is not that Aristotle anticipated "natural laws" in the same sense as modern science, but that his metaphysical background (in particular, the four causes) can be naturally applied to describe modern science. (It's certainly debatable what Aristotle or Thomas would say about science, or whether Feser is actually some kind of neo-Thomist, but it seems exceedingly reasonable to me to suppose that either of them would fit modern physics into their philosophies this way.) Given a "law" of gravity, according to which any mass uncontingently and in a fixed way is disposed to attract and be attracted to another mass, how could that not be described as "natural things tend to determinate ends. They do not fulfill their natural needs by chance, since they would not do so always or for the most part, but rarely, which is the domain of chance." (SCG I, ch44 q7) A-T descriptions of final causality do not depict the "end" in question as the achieving of some sort of external function, or something by means of which something else can occur. The fact that the mass or charge starts here and then moves to there is sufficient to qualify: the end is "moving from here to there". (Given how much physics we know, we can be more precise as to the direction, acceleration, and so on — in particular, modern science has mathematically precise descriptions to specify the end of how the masses will behave.) Again, the point is not that there are two things, end-directedness and lawful-necessity, and one is brought in to explain the other; instead, natural laws simply are end-directedness. We can certainly subdivide these final causes (e.g. inanimate gravity vs. the carpenter's conscious purpose), and maybe that distinction is useful, or more useful than Aquinas or Aristotle thought; but sometimes that distinction will not necessarily be relevant. I don't see how any of this is a problem for science. I'm no expert on the historical details of the development of the scientific method, but there are obviously many issues involved: Aristotelian metaphysics, Aristotelian physics, various misunderstandings of both, deference to Aristotle's claims, and so on. One critical issue is the conception of creation (as you referred to), the accepting that the terrestrial and celestial worlds are not opposites, the one the domain of chaos, the other the domain of mathematical perfection: understanding that the whole cosmos is a good creation of God means that math can apply as much down here as to heavenly bodies — but that doesn't entail rejecting Aristotelian metaphysics, or certainly not as much of it as fits into Thomism. Also critical was the method, the actual approach to doing science, which is neutral in many ways to metaphysical interpretations in which it can be situated. Again, nothing in Thomism contradicts anything about the scientific method.Mr. Green
April 28, 2011
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StephenB: False argument [A] ID precludes the possibility that life could be the result of intrinsic causality. (Not true) Fact: ID has no problem with intrinsic causality
What do you mean by "ID"? ID in a scientific sense certainly does not, and scientifically is not incompatible with Thomism. Feser never said it was. If you mean ID-philosophy, then any philosophical foundation that denies intrinsic ends (like a mechanistic approach) obviously does preclude it. And if you start from, say, a Thomistic approach, then you've got a different kind of argument.
False argument [B] Thomistic philosophy requires that all life be the product of intrinsic causality (also not true). Fact: Aquinas argued that Adam and Eve were the product of extrinsic finality. Aquinas only argued that God CAN create through intrinsic causality, not that HE MUST.
I don't know what you mean by "product". For Thomists, all living organisms possess intrinsic final causes, up to and including Adam and Eve. Otherwise they would be machines, not living organisms. Any version of ID that denies that is clearly at odds with Thomism; and if you accept the intrinsic finality, then you basically end up at the Fifth Way. Either way, Feser is hardly "blundering".Mr. Green
April 28, 2011
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---Mr. Green: "Whether Feser is a trustworthy interpreter of Aristotle and Aquinas is a different question (I’ve found no reason to distrust him)..... Keep in mind that Feser presents not one but two false arguments, each of which conveniently provides cover for and reinforces the other. False argument [A] ID precludes the possibility that life could be the result of intrinsic causality. (Not true) Fact: ID has no problem with intrinsic causality False argument [B] Thomistic philosophy requires that all life be the product of intrinsic causality (also not true). Fact: Aquinas argued that Adam and Eve were the product of extrinsic finality. Aquinas only argued that God CAN create through intrinsic causality, not that HE MUST. Neither false claim alone would be sufficient to make Thomism inconsistent with ID. Thomism properly understood could be reconciled with ID even if ID DID rule out intrinsic causality, which it doesn’t; ID, properly understood, could be reconciled with Thomism even if Thomism DID require intrinsic causality, which it doesn’t. In other words, Feser can make his claims [ID is incompatible with Thomism] seem plausible only by committing a double blunder, misunderstanding both his own philosophy and the one he presumes to criticize. The problem with his A-T philosophy is that it contains too much A and not enough T.StephenB
April 27, 2011
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Thomas Cudworth, Just to jump in here... It conflates Aristotelian and modern science and makes mock of the efforts of Descartes etc. to break from Aristotelian science and in particular from final causality. I'm not sure what you're saying here. If you're accusing Feser and company of taking modern science and reinterpreting it through an Aristotilean lens, I suspect the response on their part would be a shrug and their saying, "Guilty." Their stance is that the findings of modern science aren't in conflict with A-T metaphysics, even if A-Ts would treat the data and theories in a different way from, say... Cartesians, or materialists, or.. etc. In other words, what's going on here isn't "conflating", as if looking at modern science with an A-T understanding was accidental. That seems to be very intentional. It does not take into account the possibility of impersonal natural laws which cause objects to move, not toward some end, but simply under compulsion. And on the flipside, the person advocating impersonal natural laws does not take into account the possibility of substances directed by a telos. I don't think Feser, or any other A-T proponent, operates with the understanding that there are no rival metaphysical schools. They'd argue that ultimately those schools are simply wrong, or inferior, and that thus the A-T metaphysic should be preferred. A good example would be the various interpretations of quantum mechanics. There may be one or two very popular, even historically adhered to, interpretations. But I don't think those who subscribe to (say) the Copenhagen Interpretation are going to think their commitment is very damaged when someone pipes up with "However, there's also the Bohmian interpretation." Their reply will likely be, "Yes, there it is. Here's what it can account for, and here's why we consider it to ultimately be wrong." It's not like they think Copenhagen is the only idea on offer. Thus, I find the suggestion by some commenters here — that Aristotle was really talking about what modern science is talking about, but using different terminology — to be unsubstantiated. I'm not sure that's what people here are claiming. (Really, one complaint Feser has is the tendency to view the ancient greeks through a modern lens, where Aristotle becomes a proto-Functionalist and Plato is just a Cartesian Dualist, etc.) The impression I get is that A-T proponents contend that their metaphysic is the superior one for understanding a variety of topics - the mind, matter, the findings of science, and so on. It's not that they aren't aware of competition, as if A-T is "the only game in town". They just think their competitors are mistaken.nullasalus
April 27, 2011
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Mr. Green (48): I thank you for your substantial and pertinent remarks. Regarding Feser, I want to make it clear that I am not trying to wage a war against him or his overall thought. I haven't read his books, which I'm sure contain much that is of value. I think I would endorse a good deal of his criticism of modern philosophy. In raising my objections, I'm concerned only with statements he has made in his blogs and in his comments to readers on his site, regarding the allegedly inadequate theology of Paley and of ID proponents. To take your last point first, it seems to me that you are representing Feser's argument as much milder than it is. You make out as if Feser is saying that a "watchmaker" argument for God is, while perhaps not heretical in itself, the sort of argument that could lead the philosophically careless to a heretical theology, and that therefore Christians are better off with the Thomist sort of argument for God's existence than with the Paleyan sort. But I have seen statements on Feser's site that are considerably stronger than that. He has indicated that the Paleyan line of argument not just potentially but by logical necessity leads one to an incorrect notion of God, and therefore that Paleyan arguments are not just potentially but inherently dangerous to orthodox belief. Put crudely, the drawing of Paleyan design inferences, no matter how carefully hedged about with qualifications, is dangerous to one's theological health. I do not agree with Feser about this, nor do other ID proponents, including ID proponents such as Vincent Torley who are Thomists. I agree with you that in principle, design arguments of a Paleyan sort do not necessarily indicate a Christian God. They could indicate a Demiurge or some other non-Christian conception of deity. But ID proponents have never claimed that design arguments can get one to a Christian God. They have claimed only that design arguments can refute explanations of origins that are rooted in chance, and can make the conclusion of a superintending mind the most rational explanation for the world we experience. How such a minimalist claim, which sets only a lower bound to the nature of God (he is at least a designer) but sets no upper bound (he can be all that "classic theism" claims he is), is *inherently* theologically wrong or misguided, is beyond me. On your earlier points: I do not know whether Feser interprets "charge" and "gravity" as examples of final causality or not. I certainly would reject this extension of the notion of final causality to include such things. It indicates a massive confusion between a science centered on *substances* (ousia) which are directed to *ends* (telos) and a science centered on *bodies* which are subject to *natural laws*. It conflates Aristotelian and modern science and makes mock of the efforts of Descartes etc. to break from Aristotelian science and in particular from final causality. I have looked at the passage of Aristotle which you cite. I now understand the basis of your claim. However, this passage is problematic in a number of ways. To do a proper analysis of it (paying careful attention to Aristotle's fluctuating and not always consistent use of Greek terms) would take up more than one graduate seminar period. Let me mention just one of many problems. Aristotle starts off by talking about "necessity". Then he brings in the notion of chance, via the notion of coincidence. Eventually necessity drops out of sight, and he is comparing chance or coincidence with action done "for the sake of" something (interestingly enough, in the context of a quasi-Darwinian theory of origins). He then indicates that, if one is forced to choose between two possible causes of regular behavior in nature, chance and end-directed tendency, and one has eliminated chance, one must conclude that regularity in nature establishes end-directedness (amusingly, a simplified version of Dembski's design filter). But why is one forced to choose between two options, when in fact, a third option is available: necessity? Aristotle started the passage taking necessity seriously, but by the end it has dropped out of sight. Does he think that he has disposed of it by disposing of chance/coincidence? If so, he is mistaken. Necessity is a different kind of cause, neither chance, nor end-directed tendency. (Note that Dembski outdoes Aristotle in clarity and precision, on this point at least, by giving necessity a well-defined place in his filter.) And it was a modern version of necessity -- what came to be called the laws of nature -- upon which modern science (at least, up to the time of quantum theory) was based. So one does not need end-directedness (telos, to hou heneka) in order to account for regularity in nature. Aristotle's inference from regularity in nature to end-directed behavior, at least in this passage, is illegitimate. And to the extent that Aquinas follows Aristotle on this -- which in the Five Ways he appears to do -- Aquinas's conclusion is equally illegitimate. I want to make it clear that I am not opposed to arguments which show that there is end-directed behavior in nature. I am no modern anti-teleologist, determined to purge nature of final causes. Quite the opposite. But I will not accept invalid arguments for end-directed behavior. And Aristotle's argument for end-directed behavior, in the passage you cite, is simply invalid. It does not take into account the possibility of impersonal natural laws which cause objects to move, not toward some end, but simply under compulsion. Of course, one can ask why such mathematical laws should exist, and from there try to arrive at a creative mind which governs the universe. I find this a very good line of argument. But that is not what Aristotle was about. He did not think in terms of natural laws. He thought in terms of substances (ousiai, entitities), directed to their natural ends, natural ends which were substance-specific and therefore not generalizable into laws applying to all bodies as such. Thus, I find the suggestion by some commenters here -- that Aristotle was really talking about what modern science is talking about, but using different terminology -- to be unsubstantiated.Thomas Cudworth
April 27, 2011
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Thomas Cudworth: You are arguing that because objects tend to be attracted to each other, there must be final causes; you are arguing that because electrons behave the way they do, there must be final causes. But this is only true with a vacuous definition of final causation. If final causation can explain everything, it can explain nothing. I don't see how "ends" are any more vacuous than "charge". Charges are attracted to (or repel) one another, therefore there must be such a thing as electromagnetic charge. "Final cause" is just the common name for tendencies like electromagnetism, gravity, etc. To allude to NullaSalus's points (which I appreciate), Aristotle's physics could be all wrong but his metaphysics right, just as his (meta)physics could be wrong but his logic right. The physics depends on the metaphysics depends on the logic, but not the other way around. In any case, modern science certainly does rely on the concept of certain things having certain fixed tendencies or behaviours in this sense. Why do electrons behave the way that they do? Modern physics would explain that in terms of phenomena such as “charge.” Does the existence of “charge” prove the existence of final cause as Aristotle and Aquinas understood it? How so? Do explain. And explain not by citing the authority of Feser, but by citing passages of Aristotle and Aquinas, and providing a competent academic exegesis of them. "Charge" and "gravitation" are just particular cases of final causality. Citing Feser would be appropriate here, since his claims are under discussion, but I take it there's no disagreement that he interprets final causes this way. Whether Feser is a trustworthy interpreter of Aristotle and Aquinas is a different question (I've found no reason to distrust him), but here are a couple of passages that are directly relevant: Physics II, 8: Aristotle discusses final causes, and deals explicitly with the question of whether inanimate objects act for ends (and not merely by, say, efficient causality, as the rain evaporates and cools, without regard to any end of watering crops). But things that happen regularly — that "we do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence" — are the signs of nature's acting for the given specific end. "But when an event takes place always or for the most part, it is not incidental or by chance. In natural products the sequence is invariable, if there is no impediment." ST 1a2ae, Q1 a2: Aquinas considers whether only rational creatures act for an end. Nothing changes without a tendency to some end, "For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end." Our modern conceptions of charge, gravity, etc. certainly fit this description. Charge or mass determine that an object will behave in a specific and fixed way (e.g. attracted towards another mass or repelled from a like charge). Thomas’s Five Ways don’t get one anywhere near the Biblical God. They get one to the God of the philosophers, not the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. [...] The point is that neither watchmaker analogies (like Paley’s) nor abstract metaphysical arguments (like Aquinas’s) can adequately express the reality of the Biblical God. Thomists would be the first to insist that nothing can "adequately" express the reality of God. But there is a crucial difference between the Ultimate Watchmaker and the God of the philosophers: the Superwatchmaker could, in principle, be Odin or Plato's Demiurge (if they existed), whereas the classical God could only be Yahweh, and Yahweh could be only the classical God. It's not just that philosophy points to some superbeing, and the Bible points to some superbeing, and so if you accept both you obviously identify them with each other; rather, Yahweh has to be the being described by classical theism (there's no possibility, even hypothetically, that one could be created by the other, say, or that one could exist without the other). In this regard, Thomism (or other classical philosophies) will not encompass all the Scriptural aspects that are important (any more than doing biology or doing the laundry will), but they will also never contradict anything Biblical. On the other hand, if all you're starting with is a Superwatchmaker, you can get into heresy without ever drawing any invalid conclusion about said superbeing. That, I think, is where Feser objects to such a line of argument. You can of course supplement your argument with additional philosophy, such as traditional arguments for God, to try to prevent heretical extrapolations, but Feser would reply, why not start with those better arguments in the first place? And that is where I think a useful response lies: it is valid to see what metaphysical implications follow from [scientific] ID regardless of how much they can or cannot prove; but what the limits are should be clearly and precisely laid out. If it is claimed that such lines of thought can be used pragmatically to at least get people to start thinking about more rigorous philosophy, then that needs to be carefully delineated as well. As long as these points are conflated or presented sloppily, it's fair enough for Feser to complain, qua philosopher, about the sloppiness.Mr. Green
April 26, 2011
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Mung @ 43: The difference between quantum physics and Newtonian physics doesn't come into play where ID is concerned. ID is concerned about the organization of biological structures, which are all at the superatomic level. We aren't dealing with stuff on the subatomic level of the electron or the radioactive nucleus, where quantum effects can be considerable. The question is whether random-with-respect-to-outcome mutations (and random-with-respect-to-outcome lateral gene transfers, etc.), filtered by natural selection, can produce the integrated complex structures that we see in the time given by the fossil record. If it appears that they cannot, then design is the best explanation for the integrated complexity of the structures. Quantum theory has nothing to do with it. (By the way, I know an ID proponent who has a Ph.D. in theoretical physics, and talks with ease about the writings of Hawking, etc.; he obviously doesn't think that modern developments in the view of nature have invalidated ID arguments.) Regarding your comments in @45, while I don't belittle the possible application of Aristotelian insights in modern physics, I think it's fair to say that modern physicists are generally much closer to Platonism than to Aristotelianism. And of course, modern science's success generally has been due to its shift towards a "Platonic" mathematical approach to nature, and away from the older, mainly qualitative Aristotelian approach. God geometrizes; God does calculus. God as mathematician is of course very much in line with ID thinking. T.Timaeus
April 26, 2011
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This quote brings out an important distinction:
In order to make the choices required to achieve his goals, a man needs the constant, automatized awareness of the principle which the anti-concept “duty” has all but obliterated in his mind: the principle of causality—specifically, of Aristotelian final causation (which, in fact, applies only to a conscious being), i.e., the process by which an end determines the means, i.e., the process of choosing a goal and taking the actions necessary to achieve it. Final Causation — Ayn Rand Lexicon
IOW, the way I understand it, a "final cause" is not inherent in the thing itself. And this is why in the view of Aquinas, in the case of non-conscious entities, they lead to God.Mung
April 26, 2011
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Continuing from Minds and values in the quantum universe: The quantum structure is easily understood if we follow Heisenberg's idea of introducing the Aristotelian idea of potentia. A potentia, in Heisenberg's words, is an 'objective tendency' for some event to happen. Everything falls neatly in place if we assert - or simply recognize - that the quantum state of a system specifies the 'objective tendency' for a quantum event to happen, where a quantum event is the occurrence of some particular outcome of some particular action performed upon the system. In short, the quantum state is best conceived in principle exactly as it is conceived in actual practice, namely as a compendium of the objective tendencies for the appearances of the various physically possible outcomes of the various physically possible probing actions. Once the action to be performed upon the system is selected, the objective tendencies are expressed as probabilities assigned to the various alternative possible outcomes of that chosen action. If one accepts as fundamental this Aristotelian idea of potentia - of objective tendencies - then the whole scheme of things becomes intuitively understandable. There is nothing intrinsically incomprehensible about the idea of 'tendencies'. Indeed, we build our lives upon this concept. However, three centuries of false thinking has brought many physicists and philosophers to expect and desire an understanding of nature in which everything is completely predetermined in terms of the physically described aspects of nature alone. Contemporary physics violates that classical ideal.Mung
April 26, 2011
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Feser regularly writes as if he is a professor teaching a particularly thick group of students with no natural talent for metaphysics...
Maybe that's why I like his stuff!Mung
April 26, 2011
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So how important is the physics?
Unfortunately, most of the prevailing descriptions of quantum theory tend to emphasize puzzles and paradoxes in a way that makes philosophers, theologians, and even non-physicist scientists leery of actually using in any deep way the profound changes in our understanding of human beings in nature wrought by the quantum revolution. Yet, properly presented, quantum mechanics is thoroughly in line with our deep human intuitions. It is the 300 years of indoctrination with basically false ideas about how nature works that now makes puzzling a process that is completely in line with normal human intuition. Henry Stapp. Minds and values in the quantum universe. In Information and the Nature of Reality.
So I read this just now, and had to ask myself, is ID based upon "basically false ideas about how nature works"?Mung
April 26, 2011
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And explain not by citing the authority of Feser, but by citing passages of Aristotle and Aquinas, and providing a competent academic exegesis of them.
Here's where I have to bow out. :DMung
April 26, 2011
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Thomas Cudworth, So I would appreciate it if you would provide passages from Aristotle and Aquinas, with your commentary added, to show me where you are getting these equations. Let's look at the fifth way itself to start with. "The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God." The regular patterns and effects of natural bodies implying direction by God, Aquinas is saying, itself constitutes proof of God and teleology. Or at least that seems like an extremely plausible reading. Likewise he's not singling out living things, or complex things here - simply the regular results of natural bodies. (I also recall, but cannot quickly find, the claim given that "chance" implies "order" - and it's this order, Aquinas argues, that proves God. The stock example is of a farmer plowing a field and happening upon treasure - the finding of treasure is a chance event, but the other activities involved are not.) That isn't to say final causes are "nothing but" regular results of mundane things. But they are at least that by Aquinas. But a complete separation of the science from the philosophy? I don’t believe it can be done. Take the “four causes”? Is that science, or metaphysics? If you're saying that neither Aquinas nor Aristotle had these clean, crisp categories of "science" here and "metaphysics" there, I'd probably agree with you. But I also don't think that matters much for our purposes, nor would I think that Thomists themselves would treat those categories the way many modern people do (thinking of science as utterly free-floating, and you simply graft the metaphysics on as needed, or vice versa.) If you want to put it in combined terms: Newton was right about numerous things, even if he was wrong (or at least in conflict with modern scientific views) on particulars. Likewise, Aristotle may have been overturned on the orbits of planets - but not on the four causes, or the laws of logic. Is the simplicity, unicity, ubiquity, etc. of God more important to Beckwith and Feser than God’s active involvement, his harsh judgments, his humanlike responses (grief, anger, repentance, jealousy, in some cases apparent learning from observation rather than knowing all in advance), his seeming overridings of human free will, etc.? Why is so much Biblical data simply left out of their account? I don't want to speak for them - I hope I'm not giving the impression of doing so now, as opposed to voicing what I take from their writings - but I suppose two replies could be this: First, because they view the old philosophical arguments about classical theism as not only important, but in this modern world neglected (or worse, mangled). Second, because while they are Christians, they are not Christian apologists and aren't trying to be. Feser at the very least admits explicitly that "The Last Superstition" is not a work of strictly Christian apologetics, and if the arguments in TLS work, they prove a God that could well be the God of Christianity, Islam, Neo-Platonism, Aristotle, etc. I suppose one could make the argument of "Why is ID obsessed with such - in an ultimate sense - minutae, like protein folding, and bacterial flagella, what natural selection can do? What does any of this have to do with salvation?" And one very fair response would be, "It may be indirectly related, but it's still important, and worst of all most people have a botched view of these things that cause trouble for their religious views down the road."nullasalus
April 26, 2011
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