Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

A robust defense of intelligent design in a liberal Catholic mag?

Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

From National Catholic Register:

The Half-Truths of Materialist Evolution

COMMENTARY: Scientific study of the brain’s evolution exposes the non sequitur of mind-less evolution.

“The thing from which the world suffers just now more than any other evil,” wrote author and Catholic convert G.K. Chesterton, “is not the assertion of falsehood, but the endless and irrepressible repetition of half-truths.”

Jean-Paul Sartre emphasized freedom, but denied morality. Sigmund Freud stressed instinct, but suppressed the spiritual. Friedrich Nietzsche glorified the individual, but disdained the community. Karl Marx celebrated the community, but rejected the individual. Charles Darwin was enamored of empirical science, but excluded metaphysics.

It is an all-too common theme. Chesterton, himself, I am happy to note, was not speaking in half-truths. More.

The notion of intelligent design is the logical complement of scientific research. It offers a truth that has the salutary merit of not being a half-truth.

I hope the Catholic casuistry for naturalism crowd doesn’t get their hands on Donald Demarco.

Incidentally, Chesterton wrote an anti-Darwinism book as well.

Update: A friend advises that the  Register is actually a fairly  conservative Catholic newspaper, by comparison with  the liberal National Catholic Reporter, but that said, conservative Catholic papers have hardly been very sympathetic to ID either.  This is an unusually robust defense for any Catholic venue. 

Follow UD News at Twitter!

Comments
RDFish refuses to engage cogent criticisms of his views. He has no objective reason for doing so. But isn't that the point? At least RDFish is consistent with his subjectivism, except when he isn't.Mung
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
08:52 PM
8
08
52
PM
PDT
Hi StephenB,
I have explained several times why that isn’t true. Your analogy is not apt. My definition does not limit the discussion. You can easily try to argue that my definition does not correspond to reality.
Some philosophers think that a "mind" is what we call the operation of the brain. That is a perfectly coherent position; there is nothing nonsensical about it, just as there is nothing nonsensical about saying that a "program" is what we call the operation of a computer. But using your definition of "mind", they would be saying the the operation of the brain is an immaterial faculty, which is incoherent. That is what I mean by saying we can't use your definition to discuss the issue.
Meanwhile, I have asked you several times to tell me specifically what you mean by “mind.”
I gave you my definition. You are now asking me not for a definition, but rather for my solution to the mind/body problem. My answer is that thought is information processing that is accomplished in the brain via neural activity, but we do not understand the details of that activity. As for consciousness, however, there is not even a hint of what sort of explanation might account for it - we can't even describe what it is, nor can we determine if it is causal or perceptual.
RDF: Hold the phone… are you saying that subatomic particles are “wet”? SB: No. Not even close.
??? You said, "The point is that wetness cannot emerge from non-wetness." But water is wet and atoms are not, so wetness obviously DOES emerge from non-wetness.
Why, then, did you ask what it means to say that a cause cannot give what it does not have to give?
Because that sentence doesn't make any sense.
It’s more like this: Matter cannot reflect on itself, therefore non matter must also play a role. Matter alone–as a cause–just doesn’t have the stuff to perform the task.
OK, Stephen. Frankly - and I'm not trying to insult you here - you don't seem to understand what the issues are here. You make these assertions, and think you are making arguments, but you aren't. In your style of "argument", you say stuff like "There can be no interaction between a process and a thing". Well, I can say stuff like that too: "The immaterial cannot interact with the material". OK? So now I have demonstrated that dualist interactionism is false. Wow - that was easy! I wonder why philosophers didn't think of that a couple of thousand years ago!
RDF: Well, I’m very sorry, but I am unable to accommodate your request, because I do not know how causality was born. SB: I didn’t ask you how it was born. I asked you when it was born, given the fact that you don’t think it is logically prior to the birth of the universe.
Sorry but I don't know when causality was born either. Oh - and neither do you. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
06:06 PM
6
06
06
PM
PDT
StephenB:
The point is that wetness cannot emerge from non-wetness.
What does this mean, exactly? A molecule of water is not wet. Furthermore, a collection of molecules can be wet (water) or not wet (ice). Can you pin down at which stage wetness emerges? What is the logical chain from molecules (which are not wet) to water (which is)?skram
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
06:01 PM
6
06
01
PM
PDT
RDFish
Once you define the term to suit your own theory, we can no longer debate the issue. Perhaps an analogous example will help here:
I have explained several times why that isn't true. Your analogy is not apt. My definition does not limit the discussion. You can easily try to argue that my definition does not correspond to reality. Meanwhile, I have asked you several times to tell me specifically what you mean by "mind." I have even provided some of the possible criteria. Is it a state, an event, a process, or a thing? You chose to remain vague. So be it.
There is no confusion regarding the meaning of “sufficient”;
Why, then, did you ask what it means to say that a cause cannot give what it does not have to give?
Hold the phone… are you saying that subatomic particles are “wet”?
No. Not even close.
For our discussion, the effect is “able to think”, and you are arguing that since atoms can’t think, then a brain can’t think? That’s like saying atoms can’t fetch a ball, so my dog can’t fetch a ball.
It's more like this: Matter cannot reflect on itself, therefore non matter must also play a role. Matter alone--as a cause--just doesn't have the stuff to perform the task.
Well, I’m very sorry, but I am unable to accommodate your request, because I do not know how causality was born.
I didn't ask you how it was born. I asked you when it was born, given the fact that you don't think it is logically prior to the birth of the universe. Apparently, you think that causality, which you believe to have been unavailable as a cause for the universe, must have come into existence sometime after the beginning of the universe. It seems like a reasonable question to me.
I don’t think you do either, of course :-)
Of course, I do know. The universe was caused because everything that ever began to exist was caused. Therefore, the principle of causation is logically prior to the beginning of the universe. That was easy.StephenB
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
05:27 PM
5
05
27
PM
PDT
So what is the argument?
I provide several reasons why monistic physicalism cannot be true: There can be no logical pathway from matter to mind, There can be no interaction between a process and thing, There can be no emergence from a materialistic cause, There can be no effect without a proportional cause....StephenB
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
04:26 PM
4
04
26
PM
PDT
Hi StephenB,
The word “that” is too imprecise. It doesn’t tell me if you are referring to a state, an event, or a thing.
Of course, Stephen, that is the whole point of course - to have a definition for what the question we are talking about without committing by definition to one or another particular answers!
I define a mind as particular “that,” namely, an immaterial faculty. I am prepared to argue that my definition corresponds to reality, but the definition itself is not an argument.
Once you define the term to suit your own theory, we can no longer debate the issue. Perhaps an analogous example will help here:
SB: I define "defendant" as "the person who committed the crime" RD: But we haven't determined if the defendant committed the crime or not! That is what the trial is for! SB: Of course he did it - that is the very definition of "defendant"!
Get it?
SB: I define "mind" as "an immaterial faculty" RD: But we haven't determined if "mind" is an immaterial faculty or not! That is what this debate is for! SB: Of course mind is an immaterial faculty - that is the very definition of "mind"!
See? So instead, we should say that mind is that which (whatever it is) can think and experience conscious awareness. That way we can start talking about if mind is an immaterial faculty, an abstract description of physical processes, a property of matter, a different substance, a pattern... whatever.
Only arguments can be circular. Your claims to the contrary, therefore, are simply false.
What I'm saying is that your definition simply assumes your conclusion.
So far, you have not defined the mind to my satisfaction. If Barry is satisfied, more power to him. Perhaps he can work with your definition. I cannot.
First, there is no "perhaps" about it - he said he was fine with these definitions on this very page. Here is the problem: You are trying to win the debate at the initial stage of defining our terms, so you won't be satisfied until the definitions reflect the position that you are trying to defend (some sort of dualism). Instead, you need to accept definitions that are neutral with regard to the positions we are debating, so we can proceed to debate.
How can a brain, which is a thing, interact with a “process?”
That is a good topic for our debate. If you would agree to a useful working definition of "mind" like the one I offered, then we could talk about that. For example, I might say that computers process information by running "processes" (that is actually what they're called), and the computer, which is a thing, interacts with these processes. If a computer can run software as a process, perhaps brains could run minds as a process. I'm not saying that this is the case (I actually don't believe this), but at least with a useful definition of "mind" we can at least debate the issue. With your definition of "mind" we couldn't.
The interaction could be a process, but that is a totally different kind of claim. This is why I am asking for a specific definition of brain and mind. I want to know what you think is interacting with what.
I have provided perfectly good working definitions of brain and mind. These are definitions of the terms, not answers to the questions of "what is mind" or "what is the relationship between mind and matter" and so on. That is what we are trying to debate.
I define the mind to explain what I mean when I use that term.
Yes I realize that, but in doing so you preclude our debate since you've already loaded the word with your particular viewpoint.
I don’t think people should use words with fluid meanings.
Yes, that's right - we should settle on one particular working definition and stick with it. I've been trying to do that all along, right from the beginning.
My objection concerns those who use that word as if they were referring to a thing when they really mean a process. A process is a series of steps, not a faculty or a thing.
We can discuss if the mind is a thing, or a process, or a substance, or a property, or a pattern, or a faculty, or an illusion - whatever we'd like to discuss. But we can't discuss any of this if you've decided before we start that it is an immaterial faculty. I don't think I can make this any clearer than I already have, so if you insist that before our debate begins you need to define mind as an immaterial faculty (and in doing so, declare that dualism is true), then we'll just stop here.
RDF: What I mean is that you can’t use logic to determine facts about the world. What logic, Stephen, tells us that while molecules are not wet, and water is made of molecules, water is wet? Answer: Logic cannot decide questions like this. SB: Logic doesn’t uncover those kinds of facts.
Hallelujah, we agree.
Really? You don’t know what it means to say that a cause cannot give what it does not have to give?
I don’t understand what you mean by a cause “giving” things. A cause causes things. Water molecules have properties that cause water to be wet – they don’t “give water its wetness”. So I don’t think this point about causes "giving what they have to give" makes any sense at all.
Apparently, you do not appreciate the significance of the word “sufficient” in reference to sufficient cause. Why do you think they chose that term?
Huh? Who are you talking about? Were we talking about "sufficient cause" somewhere? Are you mixing up this conversation with another one you are having?
If a cause if sufficient, it is up to the task. Either the thing or conditions being referred to contain something that is capable of producing the effect or they do not. If a cause doesn’t have that something, then it cannot “give” it to the effect.
Either a cause is sufficient for something, or it is necessary for something, or both, or neither. Please read this (I present for the third time) if you don't understand the difference between these common and meaningful concepts, and your concept of causes "giving" things, which makes no sense at all: Water molecules have properties that cause water to be wet – they don’t “give water its wetness”.
A sufficient cause is one that is “adequate.” It has” enough” of what it needs to produce the effect. By contrast, if that thing or those conditions do not have enough of what it takes to produce the effect, that is, if they are not adequate, then the effect will not materialize. The cause is not “sufficient” to produce it—or, if you like, purchase it.
There is no confusion regarding the meaning of "sufficient"; what I am pointing out is that you are simply declaring the neural processes are not sufficient for thought and consciousness, rather than arguing the point.
Using your example of billiards, if I replace the cue ball with a giant cotton ball, the replacement will not be up to the task: The new ball will not move the object ball. It does not have what it needs to give to the effect, namely the necessary amount of force to do the moving. Does that help?
Sure, that helps. In that case, pretend that you don't actually know if a cotton ball can or can't cause a billiard ball to move. Pretend that is the question we are trying to answer. OK? Now replace "cotton ball" with "brain" and "billard ball moving" with "thinking and conscious awareness" and you should now understand what we are trying to talk about here.
The point is that wetness cannot emerge from non-wetness.
Hold the phone... are you saying that subatomic particles are "wet"? My apple is made of subatomic particles - are these particles red, or delicious? My dog is made of subatomic particles - do you believe that these subatomic particles are hungry or playful? Have you never heard of the fallacies of division or of composition?
If there are no water molecules in the cause, then there will be no water molecules in the effect.
Huh? The effect is "wetness". Water is "wet". Atoms are not "wet". For our discussion, the effect is "able to think", and you are arguing that since atoms can't think, then a brain can't think? That's like saying atoms can't fetch a ball, so my dog can't fetch a ball.
It’s basic logic.
Sorry, but it's basic rubbish.
You don’t recall this interchange?
No, I don't, but it appears that we were talking about causality, rather than the mind/body problem.
You need to account for the birth of causality
Well, I'm very sorry, but I am unable to accommodate your request, because I do not know how causality was born. I don't think you do either, of course :-) Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
03:22 PM
3
03
22
PM
PDT
StephenB: My argument is different from my definition and is found in a different place. Try to read for comprehenson. Will do. So what is the argument?Zachriel
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
02:06 PM
2
02
06
PM
PDT
Zachriel
Of course you are assuming it. You define mind as immaterial to show the existence of the immaterial. To demonstrate dualism, you have to show the existence of something immaterial, not merely define it so.
Quote mining. My argument is different from my definition and is found in a different place. Try to read for comprehenson.StephenB
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
01:57 PM
1
01
57
PM
PDT
StephenB: I define the mind as an immaterial faculty... I am demonstrating that dualism is true; I am not assuming it. Of course you are assuming it. You define mind as immaterial to show the existence of the immaterial. To demonstrate dualism, you have to show the existence of something immaterial, not merely define it so.Zachriel
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
01:24 PM
1
01
24
PM
PDT
RDFish
In the definitions Barry and I are using, “mind” is defined as “that which thinks and experiences consciousness”.
The word “that” is too imprecise. It doesn’t tell me if you are referring to a state, an event, or a thing. I define a mind as particular “that,” namely, an immaterial faculty. I am prepared to argue that my definition corresponds to reality, but the definition itself is not an argument. Only arguments can be circular. Your claims to the contrary, therefore, are simply false. So far, you have not defined the mind to my satisfaction. If Barry is satisfied, more power to him. Perhaps he can work with your definition. I cannot.
For a dualist like Barry, this means that an immaterial mind does the thinking (originates ideas, makes plans and decisions, and so on) and is a conscious, immaterial self. For a physicalist like, say, Pat Churchland, who is an eliminative reductionist, this definition would mean that mind is a reference to the brain processes which think and experience consciousness, much like “software” is a reference to patterns of electrical current in a computer.
I understand. Again, however, the problem persists. How can a brain, which is a thing, interact with a “process?” The interaction could be a process, but that is a totally different kind of claim. This is why I am asking for a specific definition of brain and mind. I want to know what you think is interacting with what.
You simply define the word “mind” to suit your own position, and tell everyone else that if they disagree with you, they have “hijacked” your word.
I define the mind to explain what I mean when I use that term. I don’t think people should use words with fluid meanings. My objection concerns those who use that word as if they were referring to a thing when they really mean a process. A process is a series of steps, not a faculty or a thing.
What I mean is that you can’t use logic to determine facts about the world. What logic, Stephen, tells us that while molecules are not wet, and water is made of molecules, water is wet? Answer: Logic cannot decide questions like this.
Logic doesn’t uncover those kinds of facts. It tells us how to interpret them in a rational way. Logic helps us to know which things are possible and not possible, given the facts. Accordingly, you have not yet responded to my point. A cause cannot give what it does not have to give. Yes or no?
I don’t understand what you mean by a cause “giving” things.
Really? You don’t know what it means to say that a cause cannot give what it does not have to give? Apparently, you do not appreciate the significance of the word “sufficient” in reference to sufficient cause. Why do you think they chose that term? If a cause if sufficient, it is up to the task. Either the thing or conditions being referred to contain something that is capable of producing the effect or they do not. If a cause doesn’t have that something, then it cannot “give” it to the effect. Sufficient adjective enough; adequate. A sufficient cause is one that is “adequate.” It has” enough” of what it needs to produce the effect. By contrast, if that thing or those conditions do not have enough of what it takes to produce the effect, that is, if they are not adequate, then the effect will not materialize. The cause is not “sufficient” to produce it—or, if you like, purchase it. Using your example of billiards, if I replace the cue ball with a giant cotton ball, the replacement will not be up to the task: The new ball will not move the object ball. It does not have what it needs to give to the effect, namely the necessary amount of force to do the moving. Does that help?
You cannot decide whether or not the property of “wetness” can emerge from water molecules by using logic. Rather, it is an empirical fact that must be discovered. Likewise, you cannot decide whether or not the property of “consciousness” can emerge from neural activity by using logic. Rather, it is an empirical fact too.
The point is that wetness cannot emerge from non-wetness. If there are no water molecules in the cause, then there will be no water molecules in the effect. It’s basic logic. If you are waiting for empirical verification to confirm the point, you will miss out on a great deal of knowledge. Why are you dodging the critical point about causality?
Because I don’t understand what you are talking about.
You don’t recall this interchange? SB: You are here indicating that causality may not apply to the origin of the universe? RDF
Yes, that’s exactly right. The concept of causality is connected to the concept of time: The cause must temporally precede the effect in a cause-effect relationship. But how can there be a cause that temporally precedes the beginning of time?
This is, of course, false. Causality if not necessarily connected to time. An eternal universe still requires a sustaining cause. Meanwhile, my question remains unanswered. You need to account for the birth of causality inasmuch as you don’t think it was a logical requirement for the birth of time/space/history. If it didn’t exist as a cause for that event, when did the principle of causality come into play?StephenB
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
01:17 PM
1
01
17
PM
PDT
RDF, Causality only constrains that an effect cannot temporally precede its cause. So long as cause is there when effect is there, conditions are satisfied. And, philosophical issues are antecedent to scientific ones, which must use results of such phil to sensibly and reasonably discuss its subject matter. KFkairosfocus
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
10:22 AM
10
10
22
AM
PDT
Hi StephenB,
A definition is not an argument. I define the mind as an immaterial faculty. I don’t think your notion of an organ interacting with an event makes any sense, so I am not willing to grant it for the sake of argument.
In the definitions Barry and I are using, "mind" is defined as "that which thinks and experiences consciousness". For a dualist like Barry, this means that an immaterial mind does the thinking (originates ideas, makes plans and decisions, and so on) and is a conscious, immaterial self. For a physicalist like, say, Pat Churchland, who is an eliminative reductionist, this definition would mean that mind is a reference to the brain processes which think and experience consciousness, much like "software" is a reference to patterns of electrical current in a computer. So our definition allows us to argue about whether either of these views is correct, or consistent, or substantiated, and so on. Using your definition, we can't even talk about physicalist theories. You simply define the word "mind" to suit your own position, and tell everyone else that if they disagree with you, they have "hijacked" your word. I hope this is now clear.
I realize that you want to disconnect logic from reality in order to say illogical things about reality, but I cannot go along with that program. Sorry.
That is not what I mean of course. What I mean is that you can't use logic to determine facts about the world. What logic, Stephen, tells us that while molecules are not wet, and water is made of molecules, water is wet? Answer: Logic cannot decide questions like this.
Accordingly, you have not yet responded to my point. A cause cannot give what it does not have to give. Yes or no?
I don't understand what you mean by a cause "giving" things. A cause causes things. Water molecules have properties that cause water to be wet - they don't "give water its wetness". So I don't think this point about causes giving what they have to give makes any sense at all.
If “something” emerges from “something else,” then the wetness is not doing the emerging, it is simply a quality of the thing that emerges.
Fine, in that sense the physicalist would say that consciousness is not doing the emerging, it is simply a quality of the thing that emerges. Many mind/body theories view consciousness as a property - there is even property dualism of course (and one example of that is epiphenomenalism). So again, the analogy to wetness is perfectly apt: You cannot decide whether or not the property of "wetness" can emerge from water molecules by using logic. Rather, it is an empirical fact that must be discovered. Likewise, you cannot decide whether or not the property of "consciousness" can emerge from neural activity by using logic. Rather, it is an empirical fact too.
IF mind is made of matter, (you do understand what a hypothetical is, right?) then it can produce nothing other than matter (it cannot produce mind)
First of all, nobody argues that mind is made of matter - that would be reifying mind and then saying it is constructed from matter. Instead, materialists say that mind reduces to matter, or that mind supervenes upon matter, or that mind is the operation of matter. Nobody thinks that minds "produce matter" - physicalists think that mind is a pattern, configuration, or system of matter, perhaps the way software is. But beyond that, your statement here is just another assertion, not an argument, and not a demonstration. Observe an analogous statement: IF water is made of hydrogen and oxygen, then it can produce nothing other than hydrogen and oxygen. Is that a demonstration, or an argument? No - it's just an assertion. In order to substantiate that statement one would actually have to say why it is true... and of course it is not true at all. Same with your pronouncement that if mind is the operation of matter, the only thing it can produce is matter - you would have to explain why you think that is true.
Why are you dodging the critical point about causality?
Because I don't understand what you are talking about. It seems you've brought up some version of the cosmological argument for God here, but I don't see the relevance. I haven't said anything about whether or not the universe has a cause, and if it did have a cause, what that cause might have been. It seems to me that causality entails temporal ordering, and it may be that this concept can't apply to the beginning of the universe, so it may not make any sense to talk about the cause of the universe at all using our notion of causality. Our notions of causality also entail realism and locality, and both of these assumptions seem to be violated in certain quantum phenomena, so it isn't altogether unfounded to believe that classical causality would not apply if spacetime did not exist. It's all very mysterious of course, and there is currently no science to resolve these questions. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
09:27 AM
9
09
27
AM
PDT
SB: Much of this pivots on the gap between I: blindly mechanical GIGO-limited computation -- which is a non-rational, purely physical process dependent for relevant results on externally imposed functionally correct organisation and II: self aware, rationally insightful contemplative analysis: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/self-aware-mindedness-and-the-problem-of-trying-to-get-north-by-going-west/ As has been pointed out to RDF et al with examples and reasoning (but of course repeatedly brushed aside), there is a categorical and utterly unbridged gap between the two, such that to try to derive the latter from the former is to try to get north by heading due west. But of course, the problem is, this speaks directly to a major ideological commitment of evolutionary materialism and its fellow travellers so the attempt or even insistence is made that he answer must only come in the same ideological circle. The result is, the implications are ignored and there is an attempt to dismiss pointing them out as abandoning or attacking "science." Where, an interesting observation is, that science is not applied materialist ideology dressed up in a lab coat, but should instead be summed up:
science, at its best, is the unfettered — but ethically and intellectually responsible — progressive, observational evidence-led pursuit of the truth about our world (i.e. an accurate and reliable description and explanation of it), based on:
a: collecting, recording, indexing, collating and reporting accurate, reliable (and where feasible, repeatable) empirical -- real-world, on the ground -- observations and measurements, b: inference to best current -- thus, always provisional -- abductive explanation of the observed facts, c: thus producing hypotheses, laws, theories and models, using logical-mathematical analysis, intuition and creative, rational imagination [[including Einstein's favourite gedankenexperiment, i.e thought experiments], d: continual empirical testing through further experiments, observations and measurement; and, e: uncensored but mutually respectful discussion on the merits of fact, alternative assumptions and logic among the informed. (And, especially in wide-ranging areas that cut across traditional dividing lines between fields of study, or on controversial subjects, "the informed" is not to be confused with the eminent members of the guild of scholars and their publicists or popularisers who dominate a particular field at any given time.)
As a result, science enables us to ever more effectively (albeit provisionally) describe, explain, understand, predict and influence or control objects, phenomena and processes in our world.
In my view, per the above, the more/less closely science at any time or in an area approximates tot he ideals outlined, the more/less trustworthy and conservative in stating findings will it be. KFkairosfocus
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
09:07 AM
9
09
07
AM
PDT
RDFish
You’ve again assumed your conclusion that there are two distinct sorts of things to interact. You have yet to provide any reason to believe that is the case.
A definition is not an argument. I define the mind as an immaterial faculty. I don’t think your notion of an organ interacting with an event makes any sense, so I am not willing to grant it for the sake of argument. There is no logical pathway from matter extended in space to mind that is not extended in space. If you disagree, feel free to articulate the way forward. Perhaps you disagree with the proposition that a cause cannot give what it does not have to give. Is that your objection
For the third time: One of my objections to your reasoning is that you mistakenly frame this as a matter of logic, when it is not; it is a question about the nature of reality.
I realize that you want to disconnect logic from reality in order to say illogical things about reality, but I cannot go along with that program. Sorry. Accordingly, you have not yet responded to my point. A cause cannot give what it does not have to give. Yes or no?
The second objection is that you assume your conclusion: You assume dualism is true, than declare that since dualism is true, physicalism must be false. This is not an argument, since you forgot to say why anyone should believe dualism is true in the first place.
I am demonstrating that dualism is true; I am not assuming it. You just don’t like the demonstration, insisting that logic has nothing to do with reality. That will not work.
The third objection is that you declare that something that is not extended in space cannot (logically!) come from something that is extended in space. But yet again you simply pull these assertions out of thin air and declare them to be true – why should anyone believe you? You actually have to tell us why you think this.
I have explained it numerous times, but you glossed over it. The cause (matter) contains nothing that can produce the effect (non-matter). I realize that you don’t accept causation as a principle, but that is your gig, not mine.
I have told you twice that one could just as easily say something wet cannot emerage from something not wet, and yet you dodge that point completely. Come on, StephenB – can you at least try here?
It is a confused statement. If “something” emerges from “something else,” then the wetness is not doing the emerging, it is simply a quality of the thing that emerges. SB:I am saying that if mind is immaterial, then matter cannot be its source, or if mind is material, then it is simply material and nothing more.
You started this by defining “mind” as immaterial. That is called “assuming your conclusion”. Now you are saying that IF mind is immaterial, then matter cannot be its source – but you haven’t explained why you think this is true or why it is relevant. You also say that IF mind is material, then it is material, duh.
Yes, of course. I define the mind as an immaterial faculty. However, I am willing to point out the absurdity in other definitions of “mind.” IF mind is made of matter, (you do understand what a hypothetical is, right?) then it can produce nothing other than matter (it cannot produce mind) Why are you dodging the critical point about causality? If the universe came into existence without a cause, then everything in the universe also came into existence without a cause. If you don’t need a cause for the whole universe, then you certainly don’t need a cause for any part of it–or for any event that follows. Of course, we know that causality does exist, which means that your proposition about a causeless universe is misguided. Accordingly, you need to account for the birth of causality inasmuch as you don’t think it was logically prior to the birth of time/space/history. So, when did the principle of causality come into play? Please respond, Cheers.StephenB
February 13, 2015
February
02
Feb
13
13
2015
07:28 AM
7
07
28
AM
PDT
Hi StephenB,
RDF: Again, Barry had no trouble using these definitions to debate his position. SB: What does that have to do with the fact that I find the definition of “mind” unacceptable? Nothing as far as I can tell.
I already explained this to you as well, right before I explained why you were wrong about epiphenomenalism: The point here was that your solution to all this must not be too obvious if you and Barry disagree about how these words can be defined.
With respect to the mind/body problem, I don’t think we will ever know how one interacts with the other.
You've again assumed your conclusion that there are two distinct sorts of things to interact. You have yet to provide any reason to believe that is the case.
I am interested, however, in any discussion about the mind’s capacity to affect the brain.
That is perfectly compatible with any mind/body position I can think of. In identity theory, for example, it would mean that some systems in the brain control other systems in the brain, which would certainly be expected.
SB: You have not addressed the issue.
Yes I did, twice now.
You very much want to reduce all difficult questions to matters of absolute certainty, even to logic itself. Irrelevant to the argument. There is no logical pathway from matter extended in space to mind that is not extended in space. If you disagree, feel free to articulate the way forward. Perhaps you disagree with the proposition that a cause cannot give what it does not have to give. Is that your objection
For the third time: One of my objections to your reasoning is that you mistakenly frame this as a matter of logic, when it is not; it is a question about the nature of reality. The second objection is that you assume your conclusion: You assume dualism is true, than declare that since dualism is true, physicalism must be false. This is not an argument, since you forgot to say why anyone should believe dualism is true in the first place. The third objection is that you declare that something that is not extended in space cannot (logically!) come from something that is extended in space. But yet again you simply pull these assertions out of thin air and declare them to be true - why should anyone believe you? You actually have to tell us why you think this.
RDF: By your reasoning, there is nothing in subatomic particles, atoms of hydrogen or oxygen, or molecules of water that can produce wetness – it isn’t logically possible. But there it is. SB: Irrelevant and inappropriate.
And there we have it - rather than respond to any of my rebuttals, you simply pound the table and make declarations. You actually haven't made a single argument here - you just assert things for no reason at all. I have asked you twice how you justify this assertion that something not extended cannot emerge from something extended, and you have failed to respond. I have told you twice that one could just as easily say something wet cannot emerage from something not wet, and yet you dodge that point completely. Come on, StephenB - can you at least try here?
I am saying that if mind is immaterial, then matter cannot be its source, or if mind is material, then it is simply material and nothing more.
Huh? You started this by defining "mind" as immaterial. That is called "assuming your conclusion". Now you are saying that IF mind is immaterial, then matter cannot be its source - but you haven't explained why you think this is true or why it is relevant. You also say that IF mind is material, then it is material, duh. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
10:24 PM
10
10
24
PM
PDT
RDFish
Again, Barry had no trouble using these definitions to debate his position.
What does that have to do with the fact that I find the definition of "mind" unacceptable? Nothing as far as I can tell. With respect to the mind/body problem, I don't think we will ever know how one interacts with the other. I have no interest in speculating about that phase of it. I am interested, however, in any discussion about the mind's capacity to affect the brain. SB: You can’t get from brain to mind via a causal process. There is no logical pathway. There is nothing in matter by which that transition can be made. (No logical route from physical brain and processes extended in space to non material mind not extended in space).
I’ve already rebutted this, perhaps you didn’t see it:
You have not addressed the issue.
You very much want to reduce all difficult questions to matters of absolute certainty, even to logic itself.
Irrelevant to the argument. There is no logical pathway from matter extended in space to mind that is not extended in space. If you disagree, feel free to articulate the way forward. Perhaps you disagree with the proposition that a cause cannot give what it does not have to give. Is that your objection?
By your reasoning, there is nothing in subatomic particles, atoms of hydrogen or oxygen, or molecules of water that can produce wetness – it isn’t logically possible. But there it is.
Irrelevant and inappropriate.
But that is question-begging – you’re just assuming your conclusion that consciousness is not a physical property.
Incorrect. You are not following the argument. I am saying that if mind is immaterial, then matter cannot be its source, or if mind is material, then it is simply material and nothing more. The problem of causation looms large and transcends the mind/body problem by a mile. As I recall, you have often argued that the Universe may have come into existence without a cause. But if the universe was uncaused, it follows that everything associated with it, including space, matter, time, life, and humanity, also came into existence without a cause.
No, that doesn’t follow at all of course.
It follows as surely as the night follows the day.
Billiard ball A appears without a cause, pool cue B appears without a cause, and then once they are already in existence, B hits A and A begins to move. What was the cause of A moving? Why, B hit it of course!
Irrelevant. All that means is that what we observe after the universe came into existence is inconsistent with your account of how the universe came to be. If the universe came into existence without a cause, then everything in the universe also came into existence without a cause. If you don't need a cause for the whole universe, then you certainly don't need a cause for any part of it--or for any event that follows. Of course, we know that causality does exist, which means that your proposition about a causeless universe is misguided. Accordingly, you need to account for the birth of causality inasmuch as you don't think it was logically prior to the birth of time/space/history. So, when did the principle of causality come into play?
In any event, this thread was about BA77?s goofy notion that consciousness collapses the waveform, and then about the relative merits of the dualism entailed by that view. You seem to want to debate causality instead, which would take this in a very different direction.
No, actually this thread is about Intelligent Design in a liberal Catholic college.StephenB
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
07:22 PM
7
07
22
PM
PDT
When did RDFish start believing in objective truth? That 's a major news story.Mung
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
07:16 PM
7
07
16
PM
PDT
as to: "In any event, this thread was about BA77?s goofy notion that consciousness collapses the waveform, and then about the relative merits of the dualism entailed by that view. You seem to want to debate causality instead, which would take this in a very different direction." And since you are the one denying consciousness has any causal power, then that would be a 'very different direction' in terms of causality for what reason exactly? (other than just you saying so?) As pointed out before in this thread, the 'agent causality' of theists has always been a much superior explanation in modern science compared to the 'blind, (i.e. it just happened), causality' of atheists:
“God is not a “God of the gaps”, he is God of the whole show.,,, C. S. Lewis put it this way: “Men became scientific because they expected law in nature and they expected law in nature because they believed in a lawgiver.” John Lennox – Not the God of the Gaps, But the Whole Show – 2012 “In the whole history of the universe the laws of nature have never produced, (i.e. caused), a single event.” C.S. Lewis – doodle video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_20yiBQAIlk “to say that a stone falls to earth because it’s obeying a law, makes it a man and even a citizen” - CS Lewis A Professor’s Journey out of Nihilism: Why I am not an Atheist – University of Wyoming – J. Budziszewski Excerpt page12: “There were two great holes in the argument about the irrelevance of God. The first is that in order to attack free will, I supposed that I understood cause and effect; I supposed causation to be less mysterious than volition. If anything, it is the other way around. I can perceive a logical connection between premises and valid conclusions. I can perceive at least a rational connection between my willing to do something and my doing it. But between the apple and the earth, I can perceive no connection at all. Why does the apple fall? We don’t know. “But there is gravity,” you say. No, “gravity” is merely the name of the phenomenon, not its explanation. “But there are laws of gravity,” you say. No, the “laws” are not its explanation either; they are merely a more precise description of the thing to be explained, which remains as mysterious as before. For just this reason, philosophers of science are shy of the term “laws”; they prefer “lawlike regularities.” To call the equations of gravity “laws” and speak of the apple as “obeying” them is to speak as though, like the traffic laws, the “laws” of gravity are addressed to rational agents capable of conforming their wills to the command. This is cheating, because it makes mechanical causality (the more opaque of the two phenomena) seem like volition (the less). In my own way of thinking the cheating was even graver, because I attacked the less opaque in the name of the more. The other hole in my reasoning was cruder. If my imprisonment in a blind causality made my reasoning so unreliable that I couldn’t trust my beliefs, then by the same token I shouldn’t have trusted my beliefs about imprisonment in a blind causality. But in that case I had no business denying free will in the first place.” http://www.undergroundthomist.org/sites/default/files/WhyIAmNotAnAtheist.pdf
bornagain77
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
04:30 PM
4
04
30
PM
PDT
Well thanks StephenB, that's quite a compliment coming from you. I suppose you are talking about these findings that support the proposition that the mind can influence the brain and other parts of the body: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/a-robust-defense-of-intelligent-design-in-a-liberal-catholic-mag/#comment-547863 I would like to thank you StephenB for your philosophical work on UD. I guess I lean primarily on empirical evidence because I'm not really cut out for all the philosophical back and forth at which you excel.bornagain77
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
04:23 PM
4
04
23
PM
PDT
Hi StephenB,
It doesn’t quite work for me.
Hmm, Barry found it OK. Guess you anti-materialists haven't worked it all out yet :-)
The word “that” doesn’t define what it is.
Right, which is why I added those other words after it.
Mind = immaterial faculty by which we think and experience consciousness.
That doesn't say what it is either, of course. But worse than that, what you've done is tried to rig the definitions so that we can't talk about different potential solutions to the mind/body problem - only yours. It's like a physicalist defining mind as "the operation of the brain", and then complaining when you hijack his word to mean something different. If you just want to declare that dualism is true because you want it to be, or because you find it "self-evident", then say so and we can leave it at that. But if you'd like to debate the relative merits and problems with each of the mind/body solutions, and what position is the most intellectually honest one, then we need to have a vocabulary that allows us to debate this. Again, Barry had no trouble using these definitions to debate his position.
Granted that epiphenomenalism allows for “mind” in some sense.
As I pointed out, it's more than that: Epiphenomenalism doesn’t hijack any language, and it actually is a form of (property) dualism. It just denies that consciousness is causal. So you probably are talking about some other, physicalist position and not epiphenomenalism.
You can’t get from brain to mind via a causal process. There is no logical pathway. There is nothing in matter by which that transition can be made. (No logical route from physical brain and processes extended in space to non material mind not extended in space).
I've already rebutted this, perhaps you didn't see it: You very much want to reduce all difficult questions to matters of absolute certainty, even to logic itself. But you can’t. By your reasoning, there is nothing in subatomic particles, atoms of hydrogen or oxygen, or molecules of water that can produce wetness – it isn’t logically possible. But there it is. You might object that wetness is still a physical property, even if its constituents lack anything resembling wetness. But that is question-begging – you’re just assuming your conclusion that consciousness is not a physical property.
The problem of causation looms large and transcends the mind/body problem by a mile. As I recall, you have often argued that the Universe may have come into existence without a cause. But if the universe was uncaused, it follows that everything associated with it, including space, matter, time, life, and humanity, also came into existence without a cause.
No, that doesn't follow at all of course. Billiard ball A appears without a cause, pool cue B appears without a cause, and then once they are already in existence, B hits A and A begins to move. What was the cause of A moving? Why, B hit it of course! In any event, this thread was about BA77's goofy notion that consciousness collapses the waveform, and then about the relative merits of the dualism entailed by that view. You seem to want to debate causality instead, which would take this in a very different direction. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
04:21 PM
4
04
21
PM
PDT
Bornagain 77, I must say that you have provided a great deal of scientific evidence to support the proposition that the mind can influence the brain and other parts of the body. You are a great resource for anyone who is interested in the facts. Keep up the good work.StephenB
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
03:58 PM
3
03
58
PM
PDT
RDFish
Definitions:
1) Brain – the physical organ in our heads 2) Consciousness – our subjective phenomenological experience of awareness 3) Thought – our mental abilities (reasoning, problem solving, language, planning, etc) 4) Mind – that which thinks(3) and experiences consciousness(2)
It doesn't quite work for me. The word "that" doesn't define what it is. Mind = immaterial faculty by which we think and experience consciousness. We need the counterpoise to brain as physical organ. Its faculty vs. organ. Granted that epiphenomenalism allows for "mind" in some sense. Here, though, is the issue. You can't get from brain to mind via a causal process. There is no logical pathway. There is nothing in matter by which that transition can be made. (No logical route from physical brain and processes extended in space to non material mind not extended in space). The problem of causation looms large and transcends the mind/body problem by a mile. As I recall, you have often argued that the Universe may have come into existence without a cause. But if the universe was uncaused, it follows that everything associated with it, including space, matter, time, life, and humanity, also came into existence without a cause. Or, (even crazier) the universe came into existence without a cause and then the principle of causality emerged from that same causeless universe. This is not—how can I put it charitably—a richly conceived world view.
StephenB
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
03:07 PM
3
03
07
PM
PDT
RED Herring Fish, nope you are the one who is wrong and are always wrong.,, (why do I feel like I'm in third grade with you having a argument?). You tried to contend that the observer had no role in quantum mechanics and were shown to be wrong by empirical evidence. You were too dishonest to admit it and too impolite to thank me for correcting you.
https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/a-robust-defense-of-intelligent-design-in-a-liberal-catholic-mag/#comment-547309
The evidence on this thread speaks for itself. Quantum mechanics is true for you as long as the observer has no role in it, but as soon as the observer is shown to unequivocally have a role you retreat into calling the findings 'quantum woo'. I suppose that you think that the shear fantasy of the Many Worlds Interpretation is not 'quantum woo' at all since it supposedly does away with the 'observer problem'? Yet, if there were ever anything in Quantum Mechanics that deserved to be called 'quantum woo' it is certainly the Many Worlds Interpretation. Here is a concise refutation of Many Worlds (instead of just refutation by 'name calling' as you do):
A Critique of the Many Worlds Interpretation - video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_42skzOHjtA
Calling something 'woo' only when you don't like the philosophical implications does not a empirical refutation make. It instead clearly exposes your irrational bias against Theism. The empirical evidence (much like me) could care less that you don't personally like the Theistic implications of quantum mechanics:
Alain Aspect and Anton Zeilinger by Richard Conn Henry - Physics Professor - John Hopkins University Excerpt: Why do people cling with such ferocity to belief in a mind-independent reality? It is surely because if there is no such reality, then ultimately (as far as we can know) mind alone exists. And if mind is not a product of real matter, but rather is the creator of the "illusion" of material reality (which has, in fact, despite the materialists, been known to be the case, since the discovery of quantum mechanics in 1925), then a theistic view of our existence becomes the only rational alternative to solipsism (solipsism is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist). (Dr. Henry's referenced experiment and paper - “An experimental test of non-local realism” by S. Gröblacher et. al., Nature 446, 871, April 2007 - “To be or not to be local” by Alain Aspect, Nature 446, 866, April 2007 (Leggett's Inequality: Verified, as of 2011, to 120 standard deviations) http://henry.pha.jhu.edu/aspect.html Experimental non-classicality of an indivisible quantum system - Zeilinger 2011 Excerpt: Page 491: "This represents a violation of (Leggett's) inequality (3) by more than 120 standard deviations, demonstrating that no joint probability distribution is capable of describing our results." The violation also excludes any non-contextual hidden-variable model. The result does, however, agree well with quantum mechanical predictions, as we will show now.,,, https://vcq.quantum.at/fileadmin/Publications/Experimental%20non-classicality%20of%20an%20indivisible.pdf
The preceding experiment, and the mathematics behind it, are discussed beginning at the 24:15 minute mark of the following video:
Quantum Weirdness and God 8-9-2014 by Paul Giem - video https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=N7HHz14tS1c#t=1449 The Scientific Method - Richard Feynman - video Quote: 'If it disagrees with experiment, it’s wrong. In that simple statement is the key to science. It doesn’t make any difference how beautiful your guess is, it doesn’t matter how smart you are who made the guess, or what his name is… If it disagrees with experiment, it’s wrong. That’s all there is to it.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OL6-x0modwY
Music:
Today Is The Day http://myktis.com/songs/today-is-the-day/
bornagain77
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
03:00 PM
3
03
00
PM
PDT
Hi StephenB,
The argument is that every effect requires a proportional cause. There is nothing in matter (whatever its mysteries) that can produce spirit. It isn’t logically possible.
Here are the terms Barry and I have agreed to use as working definitions here: 1) Brain – the physical organ in our heads 2) Consciousness – our subjective phenomenological experience of awareness 3) Thought – our mental abilities (reasoning, problem solving, language, planning, etc) 4) Mind – that which thinks(3) and experiences consciousness(2) When you say "spirit" are you referring to any of these? Anyway, of course I disagree that this is a matter of logic. You very much want to reduce all difficult questions to matters of absolute certainty, even to logic itself. But you can't. By your reasoning, there is nothing in subatomic particles, atoms of hydrogen or oxygen, or molecules of water that can produce wetness - it isn't logically possible. But there it is. You might object that wetness is still a physical property, even if its constituents lack anything resembling wetness. But that is question-begging - you're just assuming your conclusion that consciousness is not a physical property. As perhaps you'll remember, I have often said that I find the hard problem of consciousness to be very real and very unsolved, so of course I'm not saying that consciousness is some emergent physical property. But you can't simply declare that the mind/body problem has been solved - especially by applying mere logic!
Mind, as understood by the dualist, is unchanging non matter (or spirit). Thus, changing matter with physical features that are extended in space (whatever other mysteries it contains) cannot produce unchanging spirit, which does not have physical features and is not extended in space. The alleged cause (matter) simply doesn’t have the stuff to accomplish the task (produce spirit). So, by the dualist definition, mind cannot logically come from matter.
Ok, I see. But you can't solve the mind/body problem simply by defining words either! If all you are saying is that dualism holds that mind doesn't arise from matter, then you needn't have - Barry and I both knew that already.
The epiphenominalist, on the other hand, wants to Hijack the language of spirit (mind) to create the illusion that he is talking about something different than the brain, while at the same time, arguing for the non-existence of spirit, and claiming that the mind is really made out of the same stuff (matter).
First, epiphenomenalism doesn't hijack any language, and it actually is a form of (property) dualism. It just denies that consciousness is causal. So you probably are talking about some other, physicalist position and not epiphenomenalism.
In order to be logical and consistent (insofar as it is possible for a materialist to be rational and consistent), he must say that the brain and its processes is (are) all there is and refrain from using the word, “mind.”
That's nonsense. Let's say by "materialist" (which you seem to have equated with epiphenomenalist?) you are actually talking about, say, a biological naturalist like John Searle. He believes that a computer could never be conscious, but that all mental phenomena and experience are caused by biological processes in the brain, and that the word "mind" refers to the operation of the these processes, just as "digestion" refers to the operation of processes in the intestines. The point is that what philosophers are trying to do is figure out what the relationship is between our thinking, our experiencing, and our physical being, and depending on what you think about those relationships, you will mean different things by the word "mind". You can't just forbid everyone who you disagree with from using that word, and then declare that your favored theory has somehow been proven by logic. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
02:20 PM
2
02
20
PM
PDT
Hi BA77,
Since you agree with me that, via QM, materialism is false, ...
Nope, you're still wrong. You're always wrong. Materialism/physicalism holds that the universe is as physics says it is, and physics says that QM is true. What you mean by "materialism" hasn't been believed for over 100 years - get over it, everyone else has. The best argument you've come up with is making fun of my name here. Why not just stick with that one, and stop cluttering up these threads with your interminable posts? It makes it hard to scroll through all your crap to get to the next interesting post. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
02:17 PM
2
02
17
PM
PDT
RDFish
Assertion is not an argument.
The argument is that every effect requires a proportional cause. There is nothing in matter (whatever its mysteries) that can produce spirit. It isn't logically possible.
You assume that we understand “matter”, and how brains work, and we don’t. There is certainly something very mysterious about consciousness, and we have no explanation for it. There are also very mysterious things about matter that we have no explanation for. Perhaps these two types of mysteries are connected; perhaps they aren’t!
That is not really the substance of my point. Mind, as understood by the dualist, is unchanging non matter (or spirit). Thus, changing matter with physical features that are extended in space (whatever other mysteries it contains) cannot produce unchanging spirit, which does not have physical features and is not extended in space. The alleged cause (matter) simply doesn't have the stuff to accomplish the task (produce spirit). So, by the dualist definition, mind cannot logically come from matter. The epiphenominalist, on the other hand, wants to Hijack the language of spirit (mind) to create the illusion that he is talking about something different than the brain, while at the same time, arguing for the non-existence of spirit, and claiming that the mind is really made out of the same stuff (matter). In order to be logical and consistent (insofar as it is possible for a materialist to be rational and consistent), he must say that the brain and its processes is (are) all there is and refrain from using the word, "mind."StephenB
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
01:17 PM
1
01
17
PM
PDT
Red Herring Fish
"1) BA77 spends his life plastering these pages with post after post of quotes about how quantum physics defeats materialism. I point out to him that by his reasoning, “materialism” hasn’t existed for 100 years+, because physicists completely discarded the model of “particles in motion” at the beginning of the 20th century. That doesn’t stop BA77 though, and he keeps railing at “materialists” that don’t exist, and claiming that by falsifying the Leibnizian clockwork physics has somehow proven theism."
Red Herring Fish, although materialism has indeed been falsified for almost 100 years through quantum mechanics, neo-Darwinian evolution is still built upon the reductive materialistic view of reality. Yet you said that materialists do not exist today, yet I debate them practically every day. Are you saying that neo-Darwinists are not reductive materialists or are you saying that neo-Darwinists do not exist? :) Moreover quantum mechanics, via teleportation, shows us that not only is information not reducible to a energy-matter basis, as is presupposed in neo-Darwinism, but in actuality both energy and matter ultimately reduce to a information basis as is presupposed in Christian Theism (John1:1-4). https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/a-robust-defense-of-intelligent-design-in-a-liberal-catholic-mag/#comment-547775 And this quantum information/entanglement which can't possibly arise from material particles, in now found in DNA (and Proteins)"
Quantum Information/Entanglement In DNA – short video https://vimeo.com/92405752
Since you agree with me that, via QM, materialism is false, then I suggest you quit fighting us and concern yourself with informing the neo-Darwinists that their theory is falsified empirically and philosophically. Then Darwin, one step at a time, may finally go the way of Marx and Freud into the ash heap of materialistic history!bornagain77
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
12:17 PM
12
12
17
PM
PDT
Hi StephenB,
First, the issue is not “how” the mind could arise from matter (it can’t). There is nothing in the cause (the brain or its physical processes) that could produce the effect.
Assertion is not argument.
The issue is whether or not the “arisen mind” is a substantially different entity than the brain that is alleged to have produced it. If the mind is substantially different from the brain, then matter cannot explain it; if it is not substantially different, then there are no minds.
You assume that we understand "matter", and how brains work, and we don't. There is certainly something very mysterious about consciousness, and we have no explanation for it. There are also very mysterious things about matter that we have no explanation for. Perhaps these two types of mysteries are connected; perhaps they aren't!
Second, what matters is not whether or not we think with our brain. Obviously, we do. What matters is where thoughts originate, which is the mind.
Actually the question is, "What is the relationship between the brain (the organ in our head) and our mind (our ability to think, plan, design, use language, etc) and our consciousness (our subjective phenomenological experience of awareness and self-awareness)." That is the question. Nobody knows the answer yet. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
11:37 AM
11
11
37
AM
PDT
Hi Barry,
OK, let’s review. The materialist has (1) matter/energy; (2) space; and (3) time Dark matter is (1) Dark energy is (1)
Actually they're not (they do not obey the same laws - physicists simply don't know what they are, actually), but I don't think that's directly relevant to our discussion.
“A few forces” so vague as to be meaningless; I grant that there are “forces” out there. Four fundamental ones to be precise.
No, the forces are neither vague nor meaningless - they are described with complete precision and experimentally confirmed. And to be even more precise, there are only three (the weak and electro-magnetic have been shown to be the same). We don't understand gravity the same way we understand the other two; we hypothesize a graviton but haven't observed one, and we have general relativity that explains gravity in a way that is incompatible with its description as a particle-mediated force. But again, I don't see how this bears on our discussion.
And all they are is observed regularities about how particles move through space time. They are not some “thing” in addition to (1), (2) and (3). Physical constants. Again, not some “thing” in addition to (1), (2) and (3). Equations. Ditto.
I don't agree at all. The equations of QM describe things that are not at all about how particles move through spacetime - in particular, they describe entanglement effects that cannot possibly be due to particles moving through spacetime! (I guess you don't read ba77's links either :-)) But I still don't see why you think this is relevant.
I expected an answer like this. After all of the dust settles the materialist is left with particles in motion through space/time.
Ah, ok I think I see. You see "materialism" as the 19th century belief that the world is nothing but matter in motion, and you don't see how that could yield phenomena such as consciousness or intelligence. So this is actually a very interesting thing about the folks here: 1) BA77 spends his life plastering these pages with post after post of quotes about how quantum physics defeats materialism. I point out to him that by his reasoning, "materialism" hasn't existed for 100 years+, because physicists completely discarded the model of "particles in motion" at the beginning of the 20th century. That doesn't stop BA77 though, and he keeps railing at "materialists" that don't exist, and claiming that by falsifying the Leibnizian clockwork physics has somehow proven theism. 2) You actually take the opposite tack: Rather than present modern physics as an antidote to "materialism", you actually try to discount the fact that physics was completely revolutionized and that nobody believes that the world operates as "matter in motion" any more! So while BA77 argues that modern physics proves God because it disproves old-fashioned matter-in-motion materialism, you argue that modern physics is essentially still nothing but matter-in-motion materialism, and that this also supports theism because how could mere matter-in-motion account for consciousness, etc? Hmmm, this really is extremely interesting!
Now we need to account for your resistance to that rather obvious conclusion. My theory — you know your monism cannot hold up under scrutiny.
I don't really know what you mean here. My monism is neither physicalism nor idealism, because neither of those hold up to scrutiny. What is left is to simply say "We do not - and perhaps can not - understand the nature of reality at the level of fundamental ontology. It appears that neither our conception of the physical nor the mental is sufficient to account for what we collectively observe. So our conceptions must be lacking, and so for now the intellectually honest position is to say that we should be "neutral" with respect to what reality is made of.
Your options: (1) become a dualist.
I've already presented you with some of the traditional problems associated with dualism (you neglected to respond).
(2) Resort to woo and speculation about esoteric but unspecified “forces” to do the heavy lifting that spirit does for the dualist.
Again, it is BA77 who resorts to woo, but hilariously thinks that woo somehow proves a Christian God.
Both require faith.
Yes these sorts of answers require faith, and also a tolerance for incoherence and ambiguity.
You prefer the more irrational kind. OK. To each his own.
Hahahaha. On the contrary, Barry - I am the only one here honest enough to admit that none of us - nor anyone else - knows the answers to these questions. The mind/body problem, the problem of free will, and the measurement problem all remain unsolved. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
11:31 AM
11
11
31
AM
PDT
RDFish
1) “Easy” problem: thought, by which I mean mental abilities (reasoning, problem solving, language, etc)
RD, you are missing two points. First, the issue is not "how" the mind could arise from matter (it can't). There is nothing in the cause (the brain or its physical processes) that could produce the effect. The issue is whether or not the "arisen mind" is a substantially different entity than the brain that is alleged to have produced it. If the mind is substantially different from the brain, then matter cannot explain it; if it is not substantially different, then there are no minds. If, indeed, the mind "is grounded in matter," as the epiphenominalists say, then it cannot be different from matter or do something that matter cannot do. The physico-chemical "process" alluded to cannot substitue for a faculty. It is simply a description of what the faculty or organ is doing. It cannot be the cause of mind. The idea that matter can reflect on itself is nonsensical in the extreme. Second, what matters is not whether or not we think with our brain. Obviously, we do. What matters is where thoughts originate, which is the mind. It is the materialist claim that our thoughts originate in the brain and that they contain matter or can be defined in materialistic terms that cannot be defended. Accordingly, thoughts have no size and weight and are not physically extended in time and space. At the moment of death, you will weigh no less than you weighed a minute earlier. Thoughts are immaterial realities that can be processed through the physical brain, though they need not be. Evidence for NDE's, which you dismiss for obvious reasons, provide strong evidence that the mind, as a faculty, can operate without the brain as an organ. That makes sense since the mind (and the will) are faculties and the brain is an organ. No other formulation can explain human thought and volition.StephenB
February 12, 2015
February
02
Feb
12
12
2015
08:35 AM
8
08
35
AM
PDT
1 2 3 4

Leave a Reply