Autumn Reading for Jerry and friends

_{Vincent Torley

October 20, 2010

Intelligent Design}

Share: Facebook; Twitter; LinkedIn; Flipboard; Print; Email

Japanese maple leaves.

Over at Why Evolution is True, Professor Jerry Coyne has been busy at work. He has not only outlined a scenario that would convince him of God’s existence, but he has written an article entitled On P. Z. Myers on evidence for a god with a point-by-point rebuttal of P. Z. Myers’ assertion (backed up by eight supporting arguments) that there was no amount of evidence that could convince him of the existence of any kind of God. I believe in giving credit where credit is due, so I would like to congratulate Professor Coyne. Let me hasten to add that Professor Coyne is still a convinced atheist. As he writes: “To me, the proper stance is, ‘I haven’t seen a smidgen of evidence for God, so I don’t think he exists. But I suppose it’s a theoretical possibility.'” In the final paragraph of his post, Coyne declares: “I’m writing this post simply to continue a conversation that I don’t think has yet run its course…”

Well, Professor, I’m something of a magpie. I collect good articles. The 200 or so articles I’ve listed below are the “creme-de-la-creme” so to speak, of what’s available on the Web. Taken together, they make a strong cumulative case, on philosophical and empirical grounds, that God does indeed exist, and that the benefits of religion vastly outweigh the multitude of harms inflicted in its name. (There’s even a case where an amputee gets healed! Curious? Thought you might be.) I’ve also included some good articles on God, morality and evil, which will interest you. The arguments for the immateriality of the mind are also significant: they serve to undermine the materialist argument that there can never be a good argument for the existence of an immaterial Intelligence, since all the minds we know of are embodied and complex. Interested? Please read on.

Table of Contents

Section 1 – Philosophical Arguments for God’s existence
Section 2 – Miracles
Section 3 – The Attributes of God
Section 4 – God, Morality, Goodness and Evil
Section 5 – Arguments for the Immateriality of the Mind
Section 6 – Mysteries of the Christian Faith (The Trinity, the Incarnation and the Atonement)
Section 7 – Religion: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

For the list of articles, click here.

Enjoy!

Comments

---molch: "Like I have pointed out earlier: I have a very rich repertoire of reference points in the form of beliefs/concluded truths about the world to compare opposing truth claims and evaluate their relative validity against." If your repertoire of concluded truths is arbitrary, incompatible with reason, and unworthy of being subjected to the light of scrutiny, it must not be very "rich."StephenB_{November 1, 2010
November
11
Nov
1
01
2010
11:46 AM
11
11
46
AM
PDT}

CY: "I don’t believe my statement is “exactly parallel” with molch’s statement, since I have a reference point in the evidence for the existence of God, and the veracity of the Judeo-Christian scriptures as foundational anf authoritative. Molch’s reference point appears to be the incompatibility of other truth claims with his a priori world-view foundation. My world-view foundation is not a priori, but based on that evidence." Well, you finally clarified why you hold your position: you postulate that everybody's world-view that is NOT Christian is "a priori", and not based on evidence. Of course, this conclusion of yours is obviously "a priori", since you conveniently omitted addressing my point I exemplified on re-incarnation and/or Hinduism: "As you might notice, both a theist and an atheist can be either a re-incarnationist or an anti-re-incarnationist. But Christians are usually not re-incarnationists. And, as you have pointed out yourself, that is not because all Christians have actually examined all the positive arguments for re-incarnation and rejected them, but because they use truth claims of the world-view they have accepted as true to judge other truth claims against. Just like a Hindu usually rejects the existence of the Judeao-Christian god based on the incompatibility with the truth claims of Hinduism, I reject the existence of the Judeao-Christian god based on the incompatibility with my beliefs and concluded truths about the world. Which is exactly parallel to this statement of yours: “Since I have evidence that the God of the scriptures exists, and that He transcends all else that exists, many of the truth claims based on Vishnu are probably untrue insofar as they are at odds with the God of scripture, who exists.” So it's fine for you to NOT investigate the positive arguments / EVIDENCE for re-incarnation/Hunduism/all-the-other truth claims you disagree with. You simply postulate that that evidence does not exist (without ever looking at it, thus A PRIORI), and that thus you can call your own world-view the only one that is based on evidence, which would make everyone else who claims to HAVE evidence for their world-view obviously a liar or delusional. So, I wish you happiness in your rock-solid belief that non-Christian world-views are "a priori", with no evidence to support their truth-claims, and that any non-Christian who claims to have evidence to support their concluded truths MUST, a priori, be wrong. Thanks for the discussion.molch_{November 1, 2010
November
11
Nov
1
01
2010
10:09 AM
10
10
09
AM
PDT}

CY: To "know" that you cannot know, is to claim to know. Gkairosfocus_{November 1, 2010
November
11
Nov
1
01
2010
07:09 AM
7
07
09
AM
PDT}

KF, "From M’s remarks on “concluded truth” he seems to be interpreting what we say by how he has arrived at his conclusions. (I would very much like to see how he addresses the foundational history on primary sources of the C1 Christian faith, and the onward consistent experience of transforming encounter with the Living God, the Most High, in the face of the risen Jesus of Nazareth.)" It seems that if one discounts the Judeo-Christian reference point found in the propensity of Christian witness, the only alternative is relativism; which we know to be false by right reason. The beginning to all of this - and the foundation is God Himself - the author of reason. Without God there is essentially no reason. There is reason. Therefore God exists, and we can come to some decisive conclusions about the universe, the things in it, and the phenomenon of life within it. So molch's conclusion criteria is met by theism. However, theism goes much further, which is what I think he/she misunderstands, or perhaps simply disregards on principle. The universe is a puzzle for which we do not currently have all pieces in place. However, the pieces we do have in place are sufficient to be able to see and know what the image is and what it is not. I think the materialist atheist views the universe more as a puzzle for which we have no idea even how the pieces can be put together, let alone what the image might be. Thus, "your guess is as good as mine" - translated to "your truth is as good as mine." This would seem to contradict, however the truth claims made by Darwinism - particularly that all life is the result of chance and necessity acting on random variation and cumulative natural selection. And in case anyone has doubts about this, I refer back to BA's post at 91 with regard to a typical materialist's answer to the questions: "why is there anything?" Answer: "I don't know." "What caused the universe?" Answer: "I don't know." "Why is there regularity (law) in nature?" Answer: "I don't know." "Of the Four Causes in nature proposed by Aristotle (material, formal, efficient, and final), which of them are real?" Answer: "I don't know." "Do final causes exist?" Answer: "I don't know." "Why do we have subjective experience, and not merely objective existence?" Answer: "Subjective experience seems to be what you perceive in your mind. I presume that's an epiphenomenon but it's a very pleasant one." in other words: "I don't know." "Why is the human mind intentional, in the technical philosophical sense of aboutness, which is the referral to something besides itself? How can mental states be about something?" Answer: What? What?" in other words: "I don't know" and "I don't know." "Does Moral Law exist in itself, or is it an artifact of nature (natural selection, etc.)" Answer: "I don't think there's any such thing as 'Moral Law.'" in other words: "I don't know." "Why is there evil?" Answer: "All animals exhibit a range of behaviors. Sometimes those behaviors are clearly beneficial to themselves, or the group, and sometimes they aren't. There's no rule that says every animal always has to act perfectly all the time. Some humans, for example, would restrict a woman's right to choose and would discriminate against gays and lesbians. I wish those people weren't evil but their behavior isn't a big surprise to me." In other words: "I don't know." PZ Meyers' answers were to ridicule the person asking them. It seems that the materialist doesn't know a whole lot while claiming to know a whole lot. Notice the answer to the question regarding mind refers to it as an "epiphenomenon." The things the materialist claims to know are in regard to the a priori materialistic metaphysic, which are in relation to the non-existence of God, which is in relation to the materialist claiming no evidence for the existence of God, which is in direct relation to the materialist disregarding the evidence at hand for the existence of God, which brings us back to, and is in relation to the a priori materialistic metaphysic. So it would be apparent that it is in the interest of the materialist metaphysic to be careful regarding claiming knowledge about anything. So I would agree with mulch on this much - he/she can't "know" from his/her perspective, he/she can only "conclude" from the point of reference of materialism, which is essentially not to conclude anything, so it is really not in the strictest sense, a point of reference. The theist can both conclude and know because he/she has a broader point of reference.CannuckianYankee_{November 1, 2010
November
11
Nov
1
01
2010
06:42 AM
6
06
42
AM
PDT}

CY Understood, and thanks. You are quite right to object that your position is not an a priori rejection of what differs from what you believe, but is rooted in your own experience of God [I recall your testimony here at UD some time back], and the general positive case for the Christian form of the Judaeo-Christian Most High God based worldview. From M's remarks on "concluded truth" he seems to be interpreting what we say by how he has arrived at his conclusions. (I would very much like to see how he addresses the foundational history on primary sources of the C1 Christian faith, and the onward consistent experience of transforming encounter with the Living God, the Most High, in the face of the risen Jesus of Nazareth.) GEM of TKI Gkairosfocus_{November 1, 2010
November
11
Nov
1
01
2010
03:32 AM
3
03
32
AM
PDT}

KF, Disregard my next to last post. I was reading it wrong. The clarification regarding that particular statement of mine should go to molch, and not to you, since it was entirely within his own statement, which you quoted. I misread the quote as being your own comparison.CannuckianYankee_{November 1, 2010
November
11
Nov
1
01
2010
01:51 AM
1
01
51
AM
PDT}

KF, Regarding "The Most High God." Excellent point. A book of related interest would be "From Jerusalem to Irian Jaya: A Biographical History of Christian Missions" by Ruth A. Tucker. http://www.amazon.com/Jerusalem-Irian-Jaya-Biographical-Christian/dp/0310239370/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1288599195&sr=1-1 This book was used as a text in a course I took many years ago at the college level on Christian World Missions. She begins with Paul, and accounts the major missionary movements of the church up until the 1980s. I highly recommend itCannuckianYankee_{November 1, 2010
November
11
Nov
1
01
2010
01:19 AM
1
01
19
AM
PDT}

KF, Perhaps I'm not understanding you here: "Earlier, he had said: "M, 125: I reject the existence of the Judeao-Christian god based on the incompatibility with my beliefs and concluded truths about the world. Which is exactly parallel to this statement of yours: 'Since I have evidence that the God of the scriptures exists, and that He transcends all else that exists, many of the truth claims based on Vishnu are probably untrue insofar as they are at odds with the God of scripture, who exists.'” I don't believe my statement is "exactly parallel" with molch's statement, since I have a reference point in the evidence for the existence of God, and the veracity of the Judeo-Christian scriptures as foundational anf authoritative. Molch's reference point appears to be the incompatibility of other truth claims with his a priori world-view foundation. My world-view foundation is not a priori, but based on that evidence. Perhaps this is not what you meant by the comparison, but I couldn't help but notice this, and perhaps others noticed it as well. Perhaps I could have been more clear by stating: 'Since I have verifiable evidence that the God of the scriptures exists, and that the scriptures themselves are foundational and authoritative for that view; further that God transcends all else that exists according to that foundation and authority, many of the truth claims based on Vishnu are probably untrue insofar as they conflict with the truth claims of scripture."CannuckianYankee_{November 1, 2010
November
11
Nov
1
01
2010
12:23 AM
12
12
23
AM
PDT}

PPS: Those interested in exploring the significance of the theistic arguments and attempted rebuttals will find the discussions here, here, here, and here useful. (I already pointed to NWE's excellent introduction here. I do NOT recommend Wikipedia's survey, and for instance find its treatment of Plantinga and the question of warrant relative to knowledge utterly unsatisfactory.) --> More useful autumn reading . . . --> The real challenge for rejecters of the arguments to God as a comparative difficulties exercise on inference to best explanation [note I am not claiming to be giving deductively valid and sound proofs . . . one may always reject a proof by denying he conclusion and challenging the premises on that basis], is that the rejection of key premises, in aggregate puts one in a very tight corner. [Cf the introductory discussion here.]kairosfocus_{November 1, 2010
November
11
Nov
1
01
2010
12:18 AM
12
12
18
AM
PDT}

5 --> Turning to Judaeo-Christian theism, the positive evidence -- notice how we have not seen so much as a link in point by point rebuttal -- focuses on two main themes: (i) the authenticity, truthfulness and manifested power of the C1 testimony to the risen, crucified Christ, (ii) the continued manifestation of that miracle-working power through millions down to today whose lives and testimony reflect the transforming impact of encountering and coming to personally know God in the face of the Risen Christ. 6 --> The skeptical case has to first account for millions of people being utterly delusional but experiencing positive life-transformation that in many cases has been pivotal in history. (Think of the likes of a Wilberforce, or a General Booth, or a Pascal, or a Lincoln [notice his testimony on this], or a Colson [read his The Body!!], or a Mother Theresa etc. Then, spend some time listening to the thousands of testimonies of say an Unshackled. Similarly, if you can get a copy of Don Richardson's Eternity in their Hearts, read it and ask yourself about the evidence of a preserved witness to the Most High God from cultures all over the world, and how the devotees of that Most High responded when the gospel came to them -- or even before the gospel reached them. The Karen of Burma and their neighbours are especially striking. [Notice, the Christian faith is by no means committed to dismissing the authenticity of a great many such cases of people knowing the Most High God, or preserving a memory of him in their culture. And, on abundant testimony, that Most High God has a strange habit of sending his devotees to listen to the gospel; starting with Cornelius in Ac 9 - 10.]) 7 --> This, without ending up in the implication that our minds are so delusional that they are utterly untrustworthy. (Cf the onward discussion for the linked UD post here, esp. point f in context.) 8 --> Then, the skeptical case has to address and credibly account for the evidence that supports a C1 provenance of the NT -- far too short for myth-making to prevail in the teeth of many still living witnesses, friendly and hostile -- and the traceability of the key official testimony of the leading witnesses in 1 Cor 15:1 - 11 [cf the previously linked main positive case], to 20+ identifiable individuals among a circle of 500+ witnesses, and to the period 35 - 38 AD in Jerusalem. 9 --> Worse, this is backed up by the historical backbone provided by Lk-Ac, which can be reasonably shown to have been originally composed ~ 60 - 62 AD, and based on eyewitness testimony [especially that of women involved in or with a ringside view of the key events]; which has also been repeatedly shown to be habitually accurate down to fine incidental details that Luke simply could not have known were likely to be tested. 10 --> The dilemma here is that if classical studies in general is treated as roughly as the NT has often been, the history of classical times -- not generally disputed -- would collapse. If the NT instead is treated as we treat other reasonably authenticated prime sources, then we have some very powerful sincere testimony indeed to the believed and perceived impact of God on the stage of history, and shaping the course of our civilisation. 11 --> Those eyewitnesses, and the millions since who have encountered God through taking their testimony seriously, build a powerful cumulative case that people can and do have real, life-transforming, miracle working encounters with God in the face of Christ. And, such people are not that hard to find today, either. 12 --> Can skeptics show credible, non- question- begging evidence that ALL such people are or were delusional? (And if we all are or were delusional, what does that imply about the general quality of the human mind to experience and accurately perceive or understand reality?) 13 --> Thus we come back to the nature of knowledge as well-warranted, credibly true belief, here on inference to best explanation in light of the well-known challenges of authenticating witness and record, and broader comparative difficulties analysis. This, without falling into selective hyperskepticism. 14 --> I contend that, on the balance, once we avoid hyperskeptical dismissals, the warrant for a design oriented understanding of science is strong, the warrant for theism is strong, and the warrant for Judaeo-Christian theism on positive evidence is actually stronger still, especially for those who have met God in life-transforming power, in the face of Christ. 13 --> And, we can observe: my ability to confidently know such things is not hostage to your skeptical doubts. ______________ So, we can evaluate and conclude for ourselves. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{October 31, 2010
October
10
Oct
31
31
2010
11:19 PM
11
11
19
PM
PDT}

Onlookers: Skimming through the above, we can see M's bottomline (and a good case of the proverbial "slice of the cake with all the ingredients" in it):
M, 125: I reject the existence of the Judeao-Christian god based on the incompatibility with my beliefs and concluded truths about the world. Which is exactly parallel to this statement of yours: “Since I have evidence that the God of the scriptures exists, and that He transcends all else that exists, many of the truth claims based on Vishnu are probably untrue insofar as they are at odds with the God of scripture, who exists.”
Earlier, he had said:
M, 53: I might be the kind of atheist you have not met before. And I think I am in good company . . . . a lot of philosophers HAVE contended with those positive arguments for the existence of deities. I am surprised that you seem utterly unaware of the rich philosophical literature criticizing them . . . . I might be different from all the other atheists that you know, but I have personally spent quite some time contending with these arguments myself. So far, I haven’t encountered any that convinced me after serious philosophical, logical and scientific investigation.
1 --> M, here, after repeated requests, still will not give an actual substantial summary of his case, or even give links to an outline acceptable to him. However, his emphasis on "scientific investigation" tells us that his position is naturalistic-evolutionary materialist, which I have critiqued recently here. (Observe the absence of naturalists or explicit materialists with cogent refutations. If they had knock-down refutations, they would have trumpeted them.) 2 --> In brief summary, naturalism as worldview pivots on Lewontinian a priori evolutionary materialistic "science", which:
a: by that a priori imposition begs the question in creating and evaluating scientific explanations [undercutting the ability of science to seek the empirically supported truth about our world], b: specifically, by its unfortunate resort to institutional "expulsion" tactics, it censors science from making/accepting an otherwise well-warranted inference to design on the evidence of dFSCI in the DNA etc of the living cell, and the finely tuned operating point of the observed cosmos that sets up an observed cosmos that facilitates C-chemistry cell based life, c: is self-referentially incoherent on the credibility of the mind, as it ends up trying to account for a system that operates by ground-consequent links on forces of chance and blind necessity that are irrelevant to logic, and truth d: has no grounding IS in it that can ground the oughtness we experience as morally bound agents, and so is inherently amoral (as several spokesmen have publicly admitted, and as has been pointed out by Plato ever since 360 BC, cf discussion here)
3 --> M's use of "concluded truths" and technique of dealing with the positive arguments for theism piecemeal fail to adequately respond to the challenge of comparative difficulties and the implication of cumulative warrant for a generic worldview: e.g. to reject ALL the theistic arguments requires adoption of premises that put one on a sticky comparative difficulty wicket indeed. (Cf remarks above on that.) 4 --> Fair comment: The difficulty of defending such an evolutionary materialist view joined to rejection of the key premises of all the main theistic arguments, protests notwithstanding, easily explains the commonplace reluctance of skeptics to detail their own premises, rationale and answers to those difficult questions. (NB: Hard questions are hard because there are no easy answers, so one compares difficulties and selects on a grand inference to best warranted explanation across factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power. For this, the warranted credible truths approach is very helpful.) [ . . . ]kairosfocus_{October 31, 2010
October
10
Oct
31
31
2010
11:18 PM
11
11
18
PM
PDT}

moch, So in the interest of brevity, why not provide us with some links to references that you appeal to for your world-view, rather than you yourself needing to give a thorough answer to the questions.CannuckianYankee_{October 31, 2010
October
10
Oct
31
31
2010
10:55 PM
10
10
55
PM
PDT}

molch, Having read your last post, I guess some clarification on my views is needed here. The main thrust of my argument is the presence of a reference point for determining a coherent world-view for theists, and an absence of one for atheists. I (and others) based this on the fact that theists refer to what exists in order to form their world-view. On the other hand, the atheist position (for both "new atheists" and others) entirely rests on the ability to prove a negative - the absence of god or gods, and the absence of evidence for a god or gods, and further, the absence of evidence for the veracity of the Christian faith. Now you then implied in not so many words that I was being inconsistent, in that I don't hold the atheist to the same standard as I hold my own basis for a world-view. I certainly do so. If the atheist charges that there is no evidence, while the theist (God, for that matter), HAS provided evidence, it is then placed upon the atheist to deal with that evidence, such that it can be discounted on warrant, based on other present and verifiable evidential factors. Furthermore, although it might appear that my standard concerning there being an absence of an argument from atheists is inconsistent with my charge that one cannot base an argument on absence; I don't base the argument for theism and Christianity on the absence of evidence, but on the presence of evidence. I contend that from my experience with the literature, atheists have not dealt with the evidence for the existence of God and the veracity of Christianity in any coherent way. I reserve the possibility that they could in-fact do so. But the fact remains that the theistic arguments have dealt with the charges of atheists against the theistic arguments. In fact, I pointed out that much of the arguments for God are in relation to arguments against. If there is no god or gods, the universe could not exist as it does. Such a charge is consistent with the first principles of reason and logic, and for the Christian theist, is further emphasized by, and predicated upon a passage of scripture: http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20Peter+3:15&version=NIV The reference point for theists, in fact, is the subject matter of this now very lengthy thread, who's necessity was enlightened upon a statement by Jerry Coyne: "To me, the proper stance is, ‘I haven’t seen a smidgen of evidence for God, so I don’t think he exists. But I suppose it’s a theoretical possibility." In respect for Dr. Coyne allowing for the "theoretical possibility," VJT submitted a thorough, though not exhaustive list of the arguments for the existence of God. If you will notice, from the list, it also entails arguments for the truth of Christianity based on historical accounts, (and several, myself included, suggested the inclusion of fulfilled prophecy), and the too vast to accurately enumerate accounts of God's presence and work in the lives of believers throughout the age of the Church (not an institution, but the family of those who claim Christ as Savior). So when Christians deal with other truth claims, which conflict with theism and Christianity, they have a very rich and coherent reference point from which to compare and determine truth over non-truth. This is the thrust of what is called Christian Apologetics, and is the foundation for a Christian world-view. It then becomes not an issue of preference for the Christian world-view over others, but of warrant for the Christian world-view over others. I think this distinction needs to be made, since you seem to believe that Christianity and theism are simply world-view preferences without warrant to compel a commitment. Correct me if I am wrong. And this is precisely why I emphasized that the Christian faith's falsifiability rests on the historicity of the resurrection, for which we have insurmountable historical evidence in accord with long established criteria for historical authentication, as KF pointed out. Since atheism is predicated on the charge that there is no evidence for the existence of a god or gods, thus there probably (or for some 'possibly') is no god or gods, it then becomes essential that an atheist deal with the arguments from Christians and other theists that God does in fact exist, in order on warrant, to maintain that there is no such evidence. This is exactly my concern with the particular statement of mine by which you entered this discussion; which I repeat here: "But honestly, if anyone wants to be a true atheist and deny God, they really have to contend with all the arguments for His existence, and not simply the carefully constructed so as to avoid the positive, denialist arguments." My argument here is that the "new atheists" have not done this. What they challenge is based on an a priori metaphysical assumption of materialism, which does not deal with the arguments for God's existence, rather begs the question of God's existence. The denialist arguments I refer to are clearly thus. You then pointed out that there are atheist philosophers who have contended with the theistic arguments for the existence of God, and I agreed with you. Based on that, and subsequent clarifications in your posts, it became clear to me that you defend your word-view position based on those types of arguments, rather than on the arguments coming from the "new atheists," which I commend you for, but which I still have not seen you exemplify by submitting at least some references that we can examine here. So in that respect, I challenged you to answer three basic questions regarding how the universe could exist without God, since in my estimation, the answer to these three basic questions is probably the basis (or at least part of the basis) for your world-view. So far in this thread you have not provided an answer to these questions. So on that omission alone, I fail to see any basis for your initial objection to my statement. However, in fairness, if you were to provide us with answers to those questions, I will be prepared to readjust my stance based on any clarification your answers could provide.CannuckianYankee_{October 31, 2010
October
10
Oct
31
31
2010
10:46 PM
10
10
46
PM
PDT}

Clive @ 122: My "compressed summary remark" was compressed sarcasm.molch_{October 31, 2010
October
10
Oct
31
31
2010
04:03 PM
4
04
03
PM
PDT}

CY: “You’ve challenged others’ world-views but apparently don’t have the integrity to back up your claims of having painstakingly developed one yourself.” Let me repeat it, again: I have not challenged anybody’s world-views (if you disagree, I’d like you to point out where exactly you think I challenged your world-view). “One wonders why you’re here then.” ???? How many times do I need to repeat it? My purpose of entering this discussion was to challenge this statement of yours: “if anyone wants to be a true atheist and deny God, they really have to contend with all the arguments for His existence, and not simply the carefully constructed so as to avoid the positive, denialist arguments.” “it seems that you’re more content to engage in a tangential game of semantics regarding knowledge and belief with KF.” Notice that it wasn’t me who started running on that tangent. And I am quite content to drop it. “I’m not asking you to give a defense of your rejection of Christianity, but simply to account for how the universe could exist as it does without a necessary first cause.” 1) It is a completely unwarranted assumption on your part that my world-view does not account for a first cause. 2) This question has no bearing whatsoever on my challenge of your statement. “many of whom are sure to share your views, will find your posts here as a mere distraction from the points raised in the OP and the subsequent discussion.” If you find my point (the challenge to your statement) a distraction and do no longer wish to address it, that’s fine by me. It seemed like you enjoyed the discussion earlier. But I have no problem to end it by agreeing to disagree and be on my way. Just say so. “I couldn’t help but notice in your response, your attempt to steer the issue away from belief in God as though it’s not a crucial issue – which was the premise of all our other exchanges. So I have to stress that I’m not interested per se what your world-view has to say about issues not pertaining to belief in God, but what you have to say in order to defend your position of not believing in God. Certainly this is the issue, and not what Eastern religions believe regarding belief in God.” I disagree. And that’s exactly the core point of what I have been trying to discuss with you. Let me use another, grossly simplified example: If somebody’s core world-view centers around re-incarnation, the implications and conditions of the truth of re-incarnation are their point of reference for the comparative difficulties with opposing world-view truth claims. Just like you have a point of reference in the implications and conditions of the truth of the Judeao-Christian god for the comparative difficulties between two opposing truth claims. Since you are Christian, I assume that you deny re-incarnation (please correct me if I am wrong, but the point of my argument is not WHICH truth claims you actually accept or reject, but that there are many many truth claims of other world-views that you DO reject; so if re-incarnation doesn’t work for you here, just substitute some other concept that you DO disagree with). According to your standard (which I am challenging), you are required to answer the re-incarnationist how and why you have answered all the positive arguments for re-incarnation, before you can claim to be a true “anti-re-incarnationist” and deny re-incarnation. As you might notice, both a theist and an atheist can be either a re-incarnationist or an anti-re-incarnationist. But Christians are usually not re-incarnationists. And, as you have pointed out yourself, that is not because all Christians have actually examined all the positive arguments for re-incarnation and rejected them, but because they use truth claims of the world-view they have accepted as true to judge other truth claims against. And that’s exactly why this assessment of yours is incorrect: “it became quite clear that your points are founded on your claim that you have considered the arguments for theism and have determined or rather “concluded” that they are found wanting.” Like I have pointed out earlier: I have a very rich repertoire of reference points in the form of beliefs/concluded truths about the world to compare opposing truth claims and evaluate their relative validity against. My rejection of the existence of the Judaeo-Christian god is not solely, or even primarily, founded on my assessment of the Christian arguments for his existence. Just like a Hindu usually rejects the existence of the Judeao-Christian god based on the incompatibility with the truth claims of Hinduism, I reject the existence of the Judeao-Christian god based on the incompatibility with my beliefs and concluded truths about the world. Which is exactly parallel to this statement of yours: “Since I have evidence that the God of the scriptures exists, and that He transcends all else that exists, many of the truth claims based on Vishnu are probably untrue insofar as they are at odds with the God of scripture, who exists.” This also entails another important point: whereas there are some beliefs about the world that I hold that contribute to my finding the existence of deities in general unlikely, I do not find any and all deities EQUALLY unlikely. That is because the claimed traits of different deities are obviously rather different and thus compatible or incompatible to widely differing degrees with my beliefs about the world. So, this claim of yours is clearly not true for many atheists, including me: “For the atheist though, as I pointed out, there is no point of reference for “I find no experiential evidence for a god or gods, therefore a god or gods probably (or for some ‘possibly’) do(es) not exist,” other than inexperience.”molch_{October 31, 2010
October
10
Oct
31
31
2010
03:56 PM
3
03
56
PM
PDT}

PS: Onlookers, I took a look around for a good 101 on the theistic arguments, as some more reading to add to the VJT list. NWE's article on Arguments for the existence of God seems to be a pretty useful point of departure, much better than Wikipedia. I think that whether or no M -- a self-described atheist who claims to have found on serious investigation, that theism and the Christian faith are seriously wanting on logic and phil etc, CH -- or someone of like ilk (a wonderful scotch word) summarises the Atheist's case, someone will have to, so it can be addressed for the onlookers.kairosfocus_{October 31, 2010
October
10
Oct
31
31
2010
11:23 AM
11
11
23
AM
PDT}

CH: Pardon. With all due respect, I have laboured precisely to be as civil and on-point as possible. If I have failed at points, I regret that. (I do however hold as fair comment, that at points offence has plainly been taken where on an objective examination, none was offered by the undersigned; especially, where -- to blunt their effectiveness -- I have felt it necessary to describe the tactics being used to try to denigrate and dismiss me.) Gkairosfocus_{October 31, 2010
October
10
Oct
31
31
2010
11:14 AM
11
11
14
AM
PDT}

molch,
Let’s see – how about some highly compressed summary remark that I find Christianity an ethically highly questionable, internally inconsistent cult for a barbaric god, and Alvin Plantinga outdated and far from the mark in addressing the problem of evil.
There is no "problem of evil" unless there actually is a God. Without God, your "problem of evil" becomes "your personal preference of things you don't happen to like." And why should your personal preferences have pre-eminence in anyone else's opinion? You may as well exhort others to have a grave and deep commitment to disliking spam and loving pancakes. When you make yourself the standard (and the community's standard is only individual standards multiplied), then there really is no objective standard outside of personal preference. And this is nothing to then use to make a moral argument against God, much less to conclude that God doesn't really exist, which is a non sequitor. It takes a lot of unpacking of your assumptions, to get at the heart of the matter, which is why it is indeed valuable to the discussion that you do explain your presuppositions making up the foundation of your worldview.Clive Hayden_{October 31, 2010
October
10
Oct
31
31
2010
10:48 AM
10
10
48
AM
PDT}

molch, kf, Keep it civil, no more name calling and/or sarcasm.Clive Hayden_{October 31, 2010
October
10
Oct
31
31
2010
10:04 AM
10
10
04
AM
PDT}

Multiplying by the cumulative case rope principle of mutual reinforcement and integration of an overall case, we can see why there is a large base of common-sense knowledge of the world that is practically speaking certain. But, beyond that, is a penumbra of opinions that may be more or less probable, but are not knowledge, and should not be confused with it. This brings us to the case of the warrant for the Judaeo-Christian theistic world view, and wider theism. For that wider context, the claim is that the cumulative evidence sufficiently warrants the conclusion that God is, as the author of reality and ground of being, that we are responsible before the cumulative strength of the evidence. That is, to deny ALL of it [which is what atheism as claimed or implied warranted conclusion -- as opposed to agnosticism as confessed state of provisional ignorance -- is], paints one into such a worldview corner that the result is more or less absurd. This is perhaps most easily seen in the case of facing the universal sense of moral obligation and fairness that gives rhetorical force tot eh favourite atheist argument from evil against God. For, for evil to count against God, it must be real, but evil plainly is not a matter-energy, physical entity, nor is it being argued as mere potentially delusional and optional perception. As Koukl observes, much hangs by that:
Evil is real . . . That's why people object to it. Therefore, objective moral standards must exist as well [i.e. as that which evil offends and violates] . . . . The first thing we observe about [such] moral rules is that, though they exist, they are not physical because they don't seem to have physical properties. We won't bump into them in the dark. They don't extend into space. They have no weight. They have no chemical characteristics. Instead, they are immaterial things we discover through the process of thought, introspection, and reflection without the aid of our five senses . . . . We have, with a high degree of certainty, stumbled upon something real. Yet it's something that can't be proven empirically or described in terms of natural laws. This teaches us there's more to the world than just the physical universe. If non-physical things--like moral rules--truly exist, then materialism as a world view is false. There seem to be many other things that populate the world, things like propositions, numbers, and the laws of logic. Values like happiness, friendship, and faithfulness are there, too, along with meanings and language. There may even be persons--souls, angels, and other divine beings. Our discovery also tells us some things really exist that science has no access to, even in principle. Some things are not governed by natural laws. Science, therefore, is not the only discipline giving us true information about the world. It follows, then, that naturalism as a world view is also false. Our discovery of moral rules forces us to expand our understanding of the nature of reality and open our minds to the possibility of a host of new things that populate the world in the invisible realm.
Food for thought. Similarly, the evolutionary materialism that lies at the heart of modern "scientific" atheism, is arguably self-referentially incoherent AND amoral, so it fails to account credibly for mannnishness as we experience it. And so on. In this context, it would be indeed interesting to see the case that is claimed to warrant the conclusion that the arguments that point to theism in general and the NT-based Christian faith in particular, are unwarranted, and that by contrast the "conclusion" of atheism is well warranted. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{October 31, 2010
October
10
Oct
31
31
2010
04:30 AM
4
04
30
AM
PDT}

F/N 2: Pardon, a mildly OT clarifying expansion on justification vs warrant (but which will link back to the present focus, CY). Above, I have used warrant in a way that is distinct from justification. This is driven by the point that it is possible for an act of believing to be subjectively justified -- i.e. you (an individual in a particular circumstance, with particular senses and background knowledge and belief, much of it tacit) have a proper right to the belief -- but such belief is not objectively well-warranted. On the other hand, unless one is justified in holding a belief, that belief cannot be warranted for that person. (That is, justification, here, is seen as a necessary condition for, but not equivalent to, warrant regarded as a key component of knowledge.) I have already noted that knowledge understood as warranted, credibly true belief comes in a tight and a loose sense:
tight: the warrant makes the knowledge demonstratively certain, insofar as such is achievable, loose: the degree of warrant, by the nature of the case, is less than certain, and the knowledge-claim is objectively grounded, but provisional
Obviously, on most matters of practical affairs, and fact, knowledge is in fact used in sense 2. Some would argue that on the strength of Godel's strictures on Mathematics, the tighter sense may not be achievable for finite, fallible thinkers such as ourselves. But in fact, where we are willing to accept that some truths can be self-evident, and where we accept that we may in fact receive truth on the authenticated authority of a perfect knower, i.e. God, we may indeed know things to certainty. 2 + 2 = 4 as a fact self-evident on reflection, does not seem to be dependent on any particular set of axioms for mathematics. "Error exists" and "knowledge is possible" are undeniably true, on pain of immediate self-refutation. Similarly, on the credible communication of God, we may rest assured, but we need to first be in that happy state of grace that allows us to be confident of such communication. But so soon as we turn to the world of practical affairs and science, we see that we are reduced to the looser, provisional sense of knowledge, and are forced to act in the face of the abstract but very real possibility of error. In these contexts, when something is objectively warranted to sufficient certainty -- this is not about mere probability and calculated risk -- that we have a right to act on it, or indeed may even have a duty to act on it, then it is reasonable to accept it as [to be pedantic: provisional] knowledge; even, if we must act with fear and trembling on the consequences of that possibility of error. We cannot prove that our mothers love us or have minds and hearts to the tight sense of knowledge, but only a madman would infer from that that we do not credibly know that our mothers are minded persons with loving hearts. Only another sort of madman would imagine that since our senses sometimes mislead us, we are free to regard the screeching car we see and hear trying to brake in front of us as real or unreal to suit our whims, so there is no need to jump out of the way. Only a madman of a third kind would regard the overwhelming evidence of potentially bankrupting embezzlement by good old cousin Tom, the family firm's longstanding book-keeper, as ignorable since it is not proof beyond all doubt. And only a madman of a fourth kind would imagine that since the laws of gravity and aerodynamics rest on fallible observations and analysis, one may freely leap off a 15 story building's roof and flap one's arms, to fly off like a bird. And so on. [ . . . ]kairosfocus_{October 31, 2010
October
10
Oct
31
31
2010
04:29 AM
4
04
29
AM
PDT}

F/N: W. Jay Wood summarises on the importance of epistemic virtues: ______________ >> Intellectual virtues . . . include character traits such as wisdom, prudence, foresight, understanding, discernment, truthfulness and studiousness, among others. Here too are to be found their opposite vices: folly, obtuseness, gullibility, dishonesty, willful naiveté and vicious curiosity, to name a few. Certain excellences and deficiencies, then, shape our intellectual as well as our moral lives. An epistemology that takes the virtues seriously claims that our ability to lay hold of the truth about important matters turns on more than our IQ or the caliber of school we attend; it also depends on whether we have fostered within ourselves virtuous habits of mind. Our careers as cognitive agents, as persons concerned to lay hold of the truth and pursue other important intellectual goals, will in large measure succeed or fail as we cultivate our intellectual virtues . . . . Careful oversight of our intellectual lives is imperative if we are to think well, and thinking well is an indispensable ingredient in living well . . . only by superintending our cognitive life (the way, for example, we form, defend, maintain, revise, abandon and act on our beliefs about important matters) can we become excellent as thinkers and, ultimately, excellent as persons. If we fail to oversee our intellectual life and cultivate virtue, the likely consequences will be a maimed and stunted mind that thwarts our prospects for living a flourishing life. [Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous pp. 16 - 17] >> ______________ So, let us reflect, soberly, on where we stand, why. Gkairosfocus_{October 31, 2010
October
10
Oct
31
31
2010
02:33 AM
2
02
33
AM
PDT}

8 --> So, far, we have inferred on observation and best explanation across causal factors to intelligence. However, a cosmos-generating intelligence sounds rather familiar, once we put on worldview hats. 9 --> That is, a highly intelligent and knowledgeable, enormously powerful designing intelligence forming a cosmos suitable for C-chemistry, cell based life sounds much like the grounding entity of theism. God. 10 --> How do objectors, then, rebut? Can they identify that functionally specific, complex organisation and information are routinely produced by chance plus necessity, without any need for a designer? Not at all. (The data does in fact support the point that FSCI is the product of intelligence.) 11 --> Lewontin, in his notorious 1997 NYRB article, epitomises the actual response:
It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material [= chance + necessity only] explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door . . .
12 --> In short, on frankly metaphysical prejudice, the question is begged and science is subverted into applied materialist ideology. 13 --> That is, as the discussion the skeletal argument was excerpted from notes:
Objections try to deny the link between the observed complexity of the universe or objects in it and the existence of an Intelligent Designer, [in this context] aka God. Or, they may point to the gap between the Designer and the God people wish to worship. (The latter is largely irrelevant: teleological arguments do not set out as a rule, to prove ALL that we may wish to know about God, just to argue that the design in the cosmos implies a Designer. The former hinge on providing alternative explanations for complexity in the cosmos, in effect asserting that even very improbable complex systems, given enough time will happen by chance . . . )
14 --> So, we come to the problem and fallacy of selective hyperskepticism, as a major -- but often overlooked or even hotly dismissed -- reason why people subjectively deny the objectively warranted conclusion that a particular potential belief is well-grounded and credibly true:
The fallacy of selective hyperskepticism occurs when one exerts (perhaps inadvertently) a double-standard on the degree of warrant demanded for accepting testimony, claims or reports on matters of fact; matters which as Havard's Simon Greenleaf (one of the fathers of the modern theory of evidence) observed, can only be shown to be so beyond reasonable doubt, i.e. to moral rather than demonstrative certainty. [NB: when one has a conclusion to moral certainty, one has a well-grounded right and maybe even a duty of care to act on its presumed truth, even though the matter falls short of demonstrative proof on universally accepted premises and axioms . . . if such exist.] Also, given Kurt Godel's work in the 1930's even mathematical demonstrations fail of absolute certainty, as -- for sufficiently rich axiomatic mathematical systems -- complete sets of axioms will be inconsistent and there is no constructive procedure to create sets of axioms which are known to be consistent. The fallacy is rooted in the problem that if radical skepticism is universally applied, it ends in self-referential absurdity, through corroding confidence in ALL claims; thus, itself as well. That is, subtly, it contradicts and so refutes itself. However, sometimes, when a claim does not sit well with one's worldview, one is tempted to dismiss it through selectively -- thus inconsistently -- requiring a degree of evidence that, by the very nature of the case, a matter of fact cannot attain; perhaps through the slogan, "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence."
15 --> And, given this problem, we cannot allow personal or even institutionalised denial of what is objectively warranted as credibly true, to block us from recognising that those who are willing to accept as so that which is objectively well-warranted and credibly true KNOW what they accept. 16 --> The same pattern of selective hyperskepticism repeats itself with the cluster of arguments that provide a cumulative, inference to best explanation case pointing to the reality of God. 17 --> NB: it is helpful here to think of a rope: individual fibres are often weak and short, but by twirling such together we gain both length and strength, then using a counter-twist we make a rope that has integrity as the strands lock together. 18 --> Just so, a cumulative case is far stronger than the individual elements that make it up, due to how the different parts of the case interact. And, it can be far harder to warrant rejecting the whole than to question individual parts in isolation, as the alternative worldview commitments to do that, in aggregate may be extreme and implausible indeed. (Think about the atheist's dilemma of having to assume the reality of evil to pose the problem of evil seriously.) 19 --> Which is one reason why the exercise of comparative difficulties across live worldview options is so useful. _________________ GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{October 30, 2010
October
10
Oct
30
30
2010
11:24 PM
11
11
24
PM
PDT}

Onlookers: It is unfortunately clear that failure to adequately address the preliminary question of what knowledge is and how its relationship to what is believed [= accepted as so] has been more or less understood in one form or another for 2,300+ years has led to much of the strain in the exchange above. So, I must repeat, in the hope that the specific phrasing will sink in: knowledge is warranted, credibly true belief. It is particularly sad, then, that, despite repeated highlighting of the significance of the subset-specifying modifiers "warranted" and "credibly true," we may read in Molch's last missive:
Here was my forecast: “But I am sure KF will continue raging on and on about why he “knows” that I am not entitled to this distinction between knowledge and belief in defining my world-view” . . . . a belief that seems credible, true and justified/warranted to one person does not seem so to another
But plainly, starting with Plato and many others (not just the strawmannish caricature of the undersigned), knowledge has for 2,300 years been distinguished from belief in simple, as we only know what we accept as so [i.e. believe], and have good warrant -- and, that term reflects the major discussion in recent decades on Gettier counter-examples, e.g. personal subjective justification is not objective warrant -- for accepting as credibly true. That definition implies a duty to believe that which is well-warranted as credibly true. This issue of epistemic virtue is central. We may especially see this, when it is multiplied by the classic observation in Rom 1:19 - 20, which was alluded to by John Locke in his remarks in Section 5 of his introduction to his essay on human understanding:
Rom 1:19 . . . what may be known about God is plain to [men], because God has made it plain to them. 20For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse.
That is, the classic Judaeo-Christian view has been that there is adequate -- as opposed to "extraordinary" -- evidence from the structure of the world-order without, and from the conscious, minded, reasoning enconscienced soul within that we know or should know that we are creatures of a Divine Creator, and inhabit a Creation. On this view, to reject and suppress such a well warranted conclusion will therefore require at least one exercise in selective hyperskepticism: unwarranted rejection of what one should know, through inconsistent and self- or agenda- serving standards of warrant on pivotal worldview level issues. In a design theory blog [and since relevant 101;level readings have already been linked], this can best be drawn out by looking at the inference to design, and where it points, first on a scientific basis, then on a worldviews basis: 1 --> Let us observe -- and this is one of the cases that fits under CY's questions! -- a skeletal, modern form of the classic teleological argument, as previously linked. (NB: To fix a strawmannish distortion: as already cited and responded to, M has not only debated over Buddhism etc, but has specifically contrasted what he implied is the well-warranted conclusion of atheism, on rejecting the cluster of theistic arguments CY raised). Citing:
1. Highly complex objects with intricate, interacting parts are produced by intelligent designers, at least so far as we can determine from cases where we do directly know the cause. 2. The universe (and/or a specific part of it) is just such a highly complex object. __________________________ 3. Probably, it is the result of intelligent design. 4. But, the scope/complexity of the universe is such that only God could be its designer. _____________________________ 5. Probably, there is a God.
2 --> This argument pivots on a massively supported fact: in the cases where we directly observe, functionally specific complex organisation and linked information trace to intelligence as key causal factor. (E.g. posts in this thread.) 3 --> Implicit, is the point that the other relevant causal factors, chance and/or mechanical necessity, are causally inadequate to account for such entities. 4 --> We then consider relevant natural objects such as cell based life, body plans based on elaboration of the functionally specific complex information in such life, and the observed cosmos as a whole; which is found to be complex and delicately balanced at a multiply fine-tuned operating point. 5 --> Individually and collectively, on inductive inference to best explanation, these features of our natural world and conscious existence as intelligent beings based on the living cell, on scientific principles, warrant the conclusion that the world and life within it, up to and including our own life, are artifacts of intelligently directed configuration. That is, design. 6 --> In the case of the cosmos, that inferred designer is extra-cosmic, exhibits sophisticated knowledge and skill, and is enormously powerful [multiply even the cosmological constant's energy per cc by the cosmic volume and you see that space itself contains an enormous quantum of energy]. 7 --> Moreover, the apparent finetuning that sets the observed cosmos to an operating point, one that facilitates C-chemistry, cell based life, points to a purpose for the cosmos: to contain C-chemistry cell based life, such as we are. [ . . . ]kairosfocus_{October 30, 2010
October
10
Oct
30
30
2010
11:24 PM
11
11
24
PM
PDT}

molch, "CY, since it seems like you are not actually done commenting, I would appreciate a response to 94, so as to maybe close the (still open) point I was discussing with you in the first place?" Well, actually I was done commenting for the day, but I revisited this thread today and found that there were still issues unsettled. I was going to respond to your last post with "fair enough," and procede with answering your points in 94, but as I revisited the post it became quite clear that your points are founded on your claim that you have considered the arguments for theism and have determined or rather "concluded" that they are found wanting. "I have a very rich repertoire of reference points in the form of beliefs/concluded truths about the world to compare opposing truth claims and evaluate their relative validity against. The existence of a deity is incredibly far from being the only relevant point of reference in any belief system, and if you know anything about Eastern religions, then you know that from their perspective, it is even farther from being the most important one." Also, this is your answer to my charge: "I see no problem except in your firmly held belief that there is (possibly or probably) no God. This is partly why I challenge atheists towards a(n) (re-)examination of the evidence." I couldn't help but notice in your response, your attempt to steer the issue away from belief in God as though it's not a crucial issue - which was the premise of all our other exchanges. So I have to stress that I'm not interested per se what your world-view has to say about issues not pertaining to belief in God, but what you have to say in order to defend your position of not believing in God. Certainly this is the issue, and not what Eastern religions believe regarding belief in God.CannuckianYankee_{October 30, 2010
October
10
Oct
30
30
2010
04:45 PM
4
04
45
PM
PDT}

---molch: "I extend the same invitation to you as I did earlier to CY: If you are actually interested in my views on these issues I would move the conversation to private e-mail, because it has the scope to fill books. Let me know. Do you know if there is a way to exchange e-mail adresses without making them public on the blog?" The rational arguments for a Christian God can be enumerated in a few paragraphs, and they are not unrelated to the pre-dominant topic being discussed. Why not summarize your objections to the arguments for a Christian God and I will follow with a summary of the answers to those objections?StephenB_{October 30, 2010
October
10
Oct
30
30
2010
04:36 PM
4
04
36
PM
PDT}

mulch, "See, that’s the problem: any insight I could possibly give into my world-view in this forum is necessarily extreme piece-meal and won’t really result in any meaningful conclusions. That’s exactly why I don’t discuss my, or your, or anybody’s worldview per se here." One wonders why you're here then. You've challenged others' world-views but apparently don't have the integrity to back up your claims of having painstakingly developed one yourself. It's easy to say that you disagree with us, but I think most of us on here would like to know what specifically you have "concluded," which makes your world-view more congruous with the evidence. If I'm going to go into a forum where my views will most likely be opposed and challenged, I should expect to back up my views with coherent arguments and references. So far you've done neither here, and that's why I offered the opportunity to come clean by answering three basic questions. Instead, it seems that you're more content to engage in a tangential game of semantics regarding knowledge and belief with KF. I'm not asking you to give a defense of your rejection of Christianity, but simply to account for how the universe could exist as it does without a necessary first cause. Answering those related questions in my view would not necessitate a lengthy post. Surely you can give us a brief synopsis of your argument so we can see that you have at least considered the questions at hand, as you've stated you have. This will help with the integrity by which you yourself hold firmly to a particular world-view, while it may not help with your charge that I and others have insufficient grounds for our own. Until you do, I can't help but surmise that the contributors as well as the onlookers - many of whom are sure to share your views, will find your posts here as a mere distraction from the points raised in the OP and the subsequent discussion.CannuckianYankee_{October 30, 2010
October
10
Oct
30
30
2010
04:28 PM
4
04
28
PM
PDT}

CY, since it seems like you are not actually done commenting, I would appreciate a response to 94, so as to maybe close the (still open) point I was discussing with you in the first place?molch_{October 30, 2010
October
10
Oct
30
30
2010
04:10 PM
4
04
10
PM
PDT}

CY: "it might be beneficial if you simply give us your answers (in brief) to the three questions I asked." My answers are not brief. They are the result of serious, in-depth investigation into many interrelated issues. "it is only fitting that you demonstrate this here so we can come to some conclusions – although perhaps limited here." See, that's the problem: any insight I could possibly give into my world-view in this forum is necessarily extreme piece-meal and won't really result in any meaningful conclusions. That's exactly why I don't discuss my, or your, or anybody's worldview per se here. Hence, I'll repeat my invitation to anyone to take these questions to a personal e-mail level, if they are truly interested.molch_{October 30, 2010
October
10
Oct
30
30
2010
04:00 PM
4
04
00
PM
PDT}

Cheez, I hate it when people disappoint even my most modest expectations: Here was my forecast: “But I am sure KF will continue raging on and on about why he “knows” that I am not entitled to this distinction between knowledge and belief in defining my world-view” And here goes KF: “He seems dead set against the link between acceptance as true sufficient to act on a claim, i.e. belief, and knowledge.” … followed by a re-iteration of the same points he already stated countless times before. Oh, he adds that he replaced the word “justified” with the word “warranted”. Awesome. Except that every dictionary I look at tells me that “warranted” is a synonym with “justified”. I am sure that he will come up with some minute subtleties in the use of the word warrant (which I, fallible and imperfect and not-a-native-english-speaker that I am, will have missed), and somehow construe that into not-having-to-address-my-actual-point-at-all. But I digress. Where I thought he was going to address my justification for the distinction between knowledge and belief and the way I use them (that in the realm of philosophy and world-views, a belief that seems credible, true and justified/warranted to one person does not seem so to another), and then find something wrong with that observation of mine, he doesn’t even get that far. He simply ignores my point and goes back to repeating the same definitions in the umpteenth version. Unfortunately for him, a gazillion versions of the same definition do not make my criticism of that definition go away. But, of course, that circle-running gives him an opportunity to repeat his main point: that I must be stupid and/or ignorant: “Even more unfortunately, if M so struggles over a basic point, knowledge” Thanks for not missing an opportunity to point that out, so that we don’t forget how intellectually deficient we are, we stupid, ignorant non-Christians!!! “that tells us a lot about the way in which he has addressed the more complex issues on the table about worldview choice.” And: “And, in turn this tells us much, and none of it happy, about his response tot he positive evidence and worldview options on comparative difficulties challenges implicit in accepting or rejecting the evidence regarding Christian foundations and broader theism.” Ah, no. It still tells you exactly nothing about that. But you confirm this assessment of mine from above: I know it makes you feel better to question my mental capabilities and philosophical investigations – too bad you don’t know the first thing about either of them. “none of it happy” Sorry I make you sad. Since you seem to be running out of new points to bring to the table anyway, I promise to go away soon and not make you sad no more. Just one more thing before I stop making you sad: “I note that — contrary to his ad hominem-laced allegations — I have not put words into Molch’s mouth” Of course, that’s a lie, KF. You said: ”So, Molch, your assertion just above of an “obvious” entailment of a symmetrical challenge to theism fails”. Do I need to spell it out? You SAID, that I ASSERTED an obvious entailment of a symmetrical challenge to theism. I didn’t assert anything like that. I clarified for you what I actually SAID. You took the opportunity of my clarification to put words into my mouth AGAIN: “M is underscoring the old fashioned Atheistical denial of the reality of God, using the classic, “Christians deny the reality of gods a though y, well we add to that, god z.”” I didn’t underscore the ”old-fashioned denial” one iota. I never even mentioned it. Double-comprehension-fail, that you use to lie about what I am saying. Good job, KF.molch_{October 30, 2010
October
10
Oct
30
30
2010
03:46 PM
3
03
46
PM
PDT}

Prev 1 … 3 4 5 6 7 … 9 Next

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Leave a Reply