Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Bait And Switch (Intuition, Part Deux)

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Once upon a time people thought that the sun revolved around the earth because this was intuitive. They were wrong. Once upon a time people thought that the moon revolved around the earth because it was intuitive. They were right. Therefore, intuition can’t be trusted.

Good enough. Evidence eventually confirmed the truth in both cases.

Then along came neo-Darwinism in the 20th century. Intuition and the simple mathematics of combinatorics suggest that random errors and throwing out stuff that doesn’t work can’t account for highly complex information-processing machinery and the information it processes in biological systems. There is no evidence, hard science, or mathematical analysis that can give any credibility to the proposed power of the Darwinian mechanism in this regard.

Intuition suggests that step-by-tiny-step Darwinian gradualism could not have happened, because the intermediates would not be viable. A lizard with proto-feathers on its forelimbs would be a lousy aviator and an equally incompetent runner. We find no such creatures in the fossil record, for obvious reasons. We find long periods of stasis, and the emergence of fully developed creatures with entirely new and innovative capabilities.

So, the Darwinian argument essentially goes as follows: Because human intuition is sometimes wrong, we can ignore intuition, basic reasoning, historical evidence, and the lack of empirical evidence — but only in the case of the claims of the creative power of the Darwinian mechanism.

This is classic bait-and-switch con-artistry: Intuition can be wrong, therefore evidence, the lack thereof, and logic can be ignored or assumed to be wrong as well.

Comments
StephenB: It seems absurd if, in an abstract language, we cannot distinguish between the natural and the deliberate. But for the issue to come up in the terminology is a reflection of the underlying problem. We can't agree to distinguish between natural and deliberate in reality. I don't know how to solve that problem with words. One could choose different terms, but some will still insist that the new word for "artificial" is encompassed by the new word for "natural." Styrofoam is artificial, but it's still natural as a beehive because it was produced by naturally evolved humans acting out their naturally evolved behaviors billions of years after their naturally occurring abiogenesis.ScottAndrews
August 10, 2009
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---Diffaxial: "Only claims are testable." Claims must be defined in formal terms in order to be tested. ----"Your argument that your “definition” is “testable” makes my point: it is more than a definition." ---I have already explained several times that your assumption here is flawed, which I will now make clear [again]. ----"It is a claim. [ID's definition] Supporting a claim (”intelligence cannot be natural”) by reciting a definition that includes within it the same claim (”by definition, intelligence cannot be natural”), accomplishes nothing; all you’ve done is repeat your claim." It is not a claim; it is a definition. The difference is only everything. I define a unicorn as a horse with a horn coming out of its forehead. Did I claim that unicorns exist? By your standard, I may not investigate whether my defined unicorns exist until I prove that they exist. I am sorry, but your logic is failing you spectacularly.StephenB
August 10, 2009
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---Scott Andrews: "It seems that an accurate, relevant definition of the word cannot be agreed upon until the underlying question – can intelligence occur naturally – has been resolved." How can you show the existence of an intelligent agency apart from law and chance without positing an intelligent agency apart from chance. You cannot. If you can't define your terms in the abstract, you can't show that the objects of your references manifest themselves in the real world. That is why Darwinists avoids discussing ALL concrete examples: Can you infer that a burglar {Intelligent agent} ransacked your living room by noticing the open drawers in your cabinet, and, therefore conclude that the event was likely not caused by inclement weather {Natural causes} Of course, you can, but Diffaxial will not discuss the point. He thinks that the burglar can be classified as just one more in a series of natural causes, not substantially different from any other natural cause. That is obvious nonsense. Can you conclude that if person [A] releases a ball, allowing it to descent toward the ground and, if person [B] interrupts that process by snatching the ball out of thin air, that a scientist might legitimately hypothesize that cause [A] is of a different category than cause [B] Of course he can. But diffaxial insists that you must prove they are different before you may hypothesize that they are. Nonsense. If you observe what appears to be design in an ancient hunters spear, can you reasonably conclude that the formation was caused by an intelligent agency and was not likely the result of wind, water, erosion, etc. Of course you can. Diffaxial says no, you may not. For him, the spear was constructed by natural causes and until we can prove that agency causes are different from natural causes, we may not posit that agency causes are different from natural cause. Still more nonsense.StephenB
August 10, 2009
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I stand by the statement as-is. One wants to include intelligence in "natural," one doesn't. Which is correct? It depends on whether or not intelligence occurs naturally. The disagreement over the word cannot be resolved independently, because it stems from the underlying debate over how human intelligence came about. In this post, and in the last, I'm attempting to be neutral.ScottAndrews
August 10, 2009
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Scott @ 349:
My head is spinning...It seems that an accurate, relevant definition of the word [natural] cannot be agreed upon until the underlying question – can intelligence occur naturally – has been resolved.
No wonder your head is spinning!Diffaxial
August 10, 2009
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My head is spinning. If I understand correctly, the debate is not over the meaning of "natural." It is over whether the word should exist at all. Because, depending one's point of view, intelligence and its effects may be natural, which means that everything is natural, which means we don't need a word for it. (This is an honest attempt to grasp the opposing position, not to argue against it.) It seems that an accurate, relevant definition of the word cannot be agreed upon until the underlying question - can intelligence occur naturally - has been resolved.ScottAndrews
August 10, 2009
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Nak, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_O-QqC9yM28bornagain77
August 10, 2009
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Mr BA^77, You'd think that if quantum teleportation proved God's existence, it would be bigger news than one YouTube video. Is there a conspiracy to ignore this startling evidence, or are you wrong? BTW, I like the quote from Dr Meyer at the beginning of the video. He says "physicists and cosmologists" say there was no matter or energy at time zero of the Big Bang. Er, no. And exactly how does quantum teleportation explain life? I must have glanced away for that part of the video.Nakashima
August 10, 2009
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BTW, you are free to make claims. You can even claim, "chance, necessity and agency are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, chance and necessity define nature, and agency is therefore by definition necessarily non natural." Then you can see where it goes. (Nowhere, so far, as it happened).Diffaxial
August 10, 2009
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StephenB @ 344:
It is a precise definition that is both comprehensible and testable.
Only claims are testable. Your argument that your "definition" is "testable" makes my point: it is more than a definition. It is a claim. Supporting a claim ("intelligence cannot be natural") by reciting a definition that includes within it the same claim ("by definition, intelligence cannot be natural"), accomplishes nothing; all you've done is repeat your claim. Bzzzzt.Diffaxial
August 10, 2009
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----Diffaxial: "You may postulate intelligent agents all you like. You may postulate that intelligence must be something other than “natural” all you like. What you cannot do is recite in support of these notions a definition that compels, “by definition,” the conclusion that “intelligence cannot be natural.” Which is precisely what you did in your post @ 259 above. Twice. That is my objection, repeatedly laid out above in clear terms. Stop it." Sorry Diffaxial, but your comments do not pass the test of reason. The whole purpose of a definition is to create boundaries, to say, I mean this, and not that. Anyone can define anything at any time and that definition need not be verified by anything else, including reality itself, so long as it is comprehensible. Indeed, many definitions begin by saying A is not B or not C or not D, but is in fact E, allowing the listener or observer understand more fully exactly what is meant and what is not meant. Rational discourse is possible only when words mean things, and to mean things they must also not mean other things. By your lights, I may not exclude anything from a definition that you would prefer that I include, meaning that unless you approve of its contents, it cannot constitute legitimate expression. Excuse me, but that is pure nonsense. For you, even if scientist says "by Natural causes I mean repetitive laws and chance events, and by agency I mean intelligent agency," your answer is, "Sorry, but I won’t have it; you may not define your terms that way." Nothing could be more irrational. ----"This is rather like the debate we had last week over the composition of the moon. I asserted that the moon is made of green cheese, but you disagreed. In support of my assertion I stated “the Intelligent Diffaxial movement defines green cheese as ‘that substance of which the moon is made.’” This is an extremely precise definition, and onlookers will all agree that it follows that the moon is made of green cheese." OK, I just for fun, I’ll play. As I have said many times, apparently to no avail, the definition need not reflect reality. The purpose of a definition is to provide a rational report to others about what you are talking about. So, if you define the moon as something that is made out of green cheese, you can do that. However, when we test your claim against reality, then we find that the assertion was false, and everyone goes away much edified. But last week you said, "in one way, the moon is made of green cheese, but in another way, it is not made of green cheese; on the other hand, it is a kind of greenish yellow that may not be truly green after all; yet it has a history of being green in a specific sense but not in a general sense; surprisingly though, it has come to be green at last, except for the fact that it is, in the final analysis, also not green given its capacity to appear colorless." It was at that point that I felt I needed to step in and restore some semblance of order to the proceedings. The issue is not whether the definition is sound with respect to reality; the issue is rather-----is it comprehensible, and, if it pertains to science, is it testable? ----"As far as I can tell that settles the question, but you inexplicably raised objections. Like all you guys you wriggled and squirmed in an attempt to avoid the obvious. It was clear that you wished to suppress debate by denying my right to define terms to attain rigor and precision. Your continued objections reflected nothing other than your poor grasp of logic and rejection of right reason." Quite the contrary, I celebrated your precise definition and praised you for finally agreeing that it is not rational to say that the moon is, AND IS NOT, made of green cheese. ---"Honestly, your use of “chance/necessity/agency” triad to support the assertion that agency can’t arise from nature is no less… something." It is a precise definition that is both comprehensible and testable. Go thou and do likewise with your definitions and your arguments.StephenB
August 9, 2009
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Is that your objection? Are you questioning the fact that intelligent agents exist or that they create functional information, as evidenced by the paragraph that you just wrote.
No Stephen, that's not my objection. Nor does anything resembling this statement (or the balance of your post) appear in the paragraph I just wrote, in any other of my posts above, nor any other post I have made on this or any other blog. You may postulate intelligent agents all you like. You may postulate that intelligence must be something other than "natural" all you like. What you cannot do is recite in support of these notions a definition that compels, "by definition," the conclusion that "intelligence cannot be natural." Which is precisely what you did in your post @ 259 above. Twice. That is my objection, repeatedly laid out above in clear terms. Stop it. This is rather like the debate we had last week over the composition of the moon. I asserted that the moon is made of green cheese, but you disagreed. In support of my assertion I stated "the Intelligent Diffaxial movement defines green cheese as 'that substance of which the moon is made.'" This is an extremely precise definition, and onlookers will all agree that it follows that the moon is made of green cheese. As far as I can tell that settles the question, but you inexplicably raised objections. Like all you guys you wriggled and squirmed in an attempt to avoid the obvious. It was clear that you wished to suppress debate by denying my right to define terms to attain rigor and precision. Your continued objections reflected nothing other than your poor grasp of logic and rejection of right reason. Honestly, your use of "chance/necessity/agency" triad to support the assertion that agency can't arise from nature is no less... something.Diffaxial
August 9, 2009
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Prediction: John 1:1 Verification: Scientific Evidence For God Creating The Universe - 2008 - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQhO906v0VM As well I know for a fact there is much more going on than materialism (a falsified philosophy) would lead us to believe.. Miracle Testimony - One Easter Sunday Sunrise Service - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tj0L5dwuX0gbornagain77
August 9, 2009
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One cannot test for agency in a given situation without acknowledging the possibility that agency exists.
StephenB, Diffaxial can speak for himself far more eloquently than I, but it seems to me that the nub of the matter is that the only "agency" that any of us has experienced displays, as its sphere of activity, the empirically detectable world. Most commonly we observe human agency, though animal agencies are also encountered: beaver dams, termite mounds, etc. Although one may postulate any number of alternative agencies above and beyond the empirically observable, such postulation must lead to empirically verifiable predictions, if such postulates are to be scientifically fruitful. At least that's what history has shown so far.Adel DiBagno
August 9, 2009
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----Diffaxial: "The ID definition unequivocally compels “by definition” a conclusion with respect to the question at hand." That is my objection to the use of your definition in this discussion. One does not settle matters such as these “by definition.” We are repeating ourselves. One cannot test for agency in a given situation without acknowledging the possibility that agency exists. To hypothesize the existence of an intelligenct agent in a new situaion that has not yet been studied is not to assume the conclusion. On the other hand, to assume the existence that intelligent agents already exist and have, in that context, already provided instances of information, is an empirically verifiable fact. Is that your objection? Are you questioning the fact that intelligent agents exist or that they create functional information, as evidenced by the paragraph that you just wrote. Or, will you likely say that they exist, but then go on to define them as "natural," thereby cancelling out their status as intelligent agents, merging them with natural laws, and descending once again into intellectual quicksand.StephenB
August 9, 2009
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StephenB @ 336:
Yes, which is why ID’s definition of natural causes is comprehensible and yours, which includes multiple meanings, and Diffaxial’s which offers two contradictory meanings, is not.
The debate at hand began with the following: Jerry @ 242:
Every willful act by an intelligent agent defies the natural laws as we see here by most commenters.
Note that the word "natural" is already in play. I remarked @ 250:
This only works because you assume your conclusions, namely that human beings, human behavior, and human intelligence are not natural phenomena.
StephenB weighed in @ 259 with the following, referencing the law/chance/agency definition:
Second, you will notice that he used the phrase “willful act,” which, again, must be characterized as “agency,” and cannot, therefore be a natural phenomenon. Nature, defined exclusively as law and chance, leaves no room for the willful act of an intelligent agent acting on and influencing nature.
And again @ 259:
By definition, ID defines “natural” to mean either law or chance, which means that, in that context, intelligence cannot be natural.
StephenB claims for his definition precision. My objection, however, doesn't concern precision, but rather the obvious fact that this definition contains within it a forced conclusion with respect to the assertion, "human beings, human behavior, and human intelligence are natural phenomena." Accordingly, I observed @ 260:
The above simply reduces to “by definition…intelligence cannot be natural.”
The ID definition unequivocally compels "by definition" a conclusion with respect to the question at hand. That is my objection to the use of your definition in this discussion. One does not settle matters such as these "by definition." Hence my remark @ 301:
Argumentum ad definitium.
------ It is apparent that the word "natural," which arises so often in these discussions, is problematic. I described "different senses" of natural (two) in an attempt to address that problem, as I discussed in 325. (I disagree that they are contradictory; rather, they have different scope and applicability. That's why there are two senses.) Doomsday Smith's reproduction of the OED entry for "natural" makes plain the problem: it "natural" has long been in use with many different senses in different contexts. The ID definition, which StephenB advances as superior due to its "precision," is even more problematic: it is completely disqualified, because it flatly compels a conclusion with respect to that question at hand. I'd argue that it has been contrived TO compel that particular conclusion, but that is another conversation. Since we cannot agree on a definition of "natural" to which all can subscribe, the challenge is to articulate one's notions another way.Diffaxial
August 9, 2009
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Onlookers: It is very useful to set the above in the context of the discussionthat Diff et al would suppress. Namely, the reason why it is legitimate and empirically objective to distinguish in a scientific context, between:
[a] nature acting freely relative to whatever initial circumstances just happen to be there, through chance + mechanical necessity (cf SB's dropped ball or a rock that happens to begin to fall then triggers an avalanche down a volcanic dome), and [b] intelligence acting through purposefully directed choice and action that diverts the usual course of nature (e.g. a man who catches the ball or the rock before it hits the ground).
1 --> When events are such that under given initial circumstances, a reliably repeatable outcome occurs, we explain by natural law and look for forces and initial conditions and constraints. [That is how the corpus of natural law was built up by induction from predictively successful explanatory constructs] 2 --> When we see high contingency so that under evidently similar initial conditions, diverse outcomes tend to happen, we can see two possible causal factors: [a] chance leading to stochastic patterns in outcomes (e.g. a fair die is tossed many times), and [b] choice, leading to intelligently directed outcomes 9e.g. a loaded die is tossed, or even if a die is simply set to a reading). 3 --> All of this is easily empirically verified glorified commonsense, much belabouring on "definitions" of "nature" by those who don't want to go where it points notwithstanding. 4 --> Now, highly contingent outcomes may come in two flavours and in blends of the two, so the key design theory issue is whether we can reliably detect at least some cases of the latter factor, intelligence. 5 --> This is practically important and in fact a routinely met issue, e.g. we need to know whether it was accident or arson, or on SB's example a tornado or a thief. 6 --> Design theory extends the common-sense we usually use in managerial contexts or courtrooms, by observing that there are certain reliable signs of intelligent cause. 7 --> For instance, long enough -- 143 characters is long enough, about 18 - 20 words of typical English -- strings of ASCII text in contextually responsive English are routinely seen to be made by intelligences, but are not seen to be produced by random processes such as deriving a binary code string from a Zener noise source. [This gives a REALLY random seed to the string.] (Those who have monitored recetn threads here will recall that after all the rhetorical huffing and puffing and red herrings were over, it remained th case that objectors to this example could not cite a credible counter-instance. in short we have an empirically reliable sign of intelligence here.) 8 --> Similarly, digital, prescriptive code-based languages such as are used by digital processors, programmed algorithms that execute instructions step by step yielding a definite output and then complete, the irreducibly complex sets of machinery to take in inputs, store relevant information, execute and output results, etc are OBSERVED as the product of intelligences, but not as spontaneous creations of nature acting freely. 9 --> On examining the explicit or implicit information strings in bits [1 bit = 1 yes/no decision], cases such as the above easily run past the limit of 1,000 bits which is a level of complexity such that once we identify a specific function that uses the information and is vulnerable to perturbation of the pattern, we see that he 10^80 or so atoms of he observed universe acting as a search engine could not sample as much as 1 in 10^150 of the possible configurations of the 1,000 bits. 10 --> That is, blind search that happens to land us by luck on a shoreline of functionality is not a credible explanation for such phenomena. So, hill climbing to peaks of function by differential functional performance etc is not credibly able to START, as there is no grounds to get us reasonably to initial levels of even crude function. 11 --> The problem for the evolutionary materialists is that this points right to the heart of cell based life, which is just such a complex functional digital information system, indeed incorporating an irreducibly complex von Neumann set of blueprint storage, reader and instruction executer that allows autonomous self-replication. 12 --> So, it is inherently very credible that life was designed. But since -- in a cosmos that looks very much fine tuned for life based on cells and Carbon chemistry [notice the second level of design inference here] -- that means that a credible candidate for such design is a powerful intelligence who sounds a lot like the God of traditional theism. 13 --> And since we are dealing with committed materialists, that is verboten, so all sorts of hyperskeptical objections thast would never be appealed to on anotehr matter are trotted out, to make wha tis in reality a matter of worldvierwe imposition SEMEM to be a quesiton of "science" to the uninitiated. 14 --> If you doubt me on that, here is the well known biologist and US national Academy of Sciences member, Lewontin in an infamous 1997 NYRB article, inadvertently letting the cat out of the bag that was supposed to have a piglet in it:
It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.
So, that is what is really going on. GEM of TKI PS: my always linked has a quick look at the trichotomy of causal factors here, and uses it to build up the ID explantory filter as a legitimate form of the scientific methodology, here. PPS: One of the common objections is that the above chain of reasoning is not in the peer reviewed literature. That is now decisively answered by the very similar line of argument in a series of peer reviewed articles summed up in the 2009 review by Abel on the Capabilities of Chaos and Complexity. Must reading, through a bit dense on first pass, and though a 45 pp PDF, though pp 276 - 291 [15 pp] are more or less references, altogether 335 of them.kairosfocus
August 9, 2009
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Doomsday, I read your post with great interest. Please explain to the ID crowd which of these definitions of "natural" describes how the decoding process knows what the arrangement of nucleic acids mean? In other words, what is the "natural" process by which DNA is decoded? For instance, T-A-G means "stop the addition of amino acids to the protein chain" yet we are unclear as to the natural causes (within the scope of the material properties of the chemical compounds involved) that are the origin of this emprically observable phenomena. Given the great depth of your definitions, I am certain that you have the answer, so please share your knowledge with us so that we may know. What are the "natural" material forces that suggest that Thymine followed by Adenine, followed by Guanine in the linear code means "stop".Upright BiPed
August 9, 2009
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----Doomsday: "Tricky word, that natural. Especially considering that I left out the 49 special uses (and one adverbial defintion)." Yes, which is why ID's definition of natural causes is comprehensible and yours, which includes multiple meanings, and Diffaxial's which offers two contradictory meanings, is not. Scientists need to define their terms cafefully and precisely, and ID has defined what it means by natural causes, [lawlike regularity, expressed as necessity and chance, expressed as contingency] with perfect exactness, and that definition should be respected for that very reason. Unfortunately, our adversaries would prefer not to allow us that privilege, choosing to muddy the debate waters with confused language formulations.StephenB
August 8, 2009
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Doomsday Smith, You might also want to read C.S. Lewis's book Studies in Words here, http://books.google.com/books?id=Siem4vFffHcC&dq=c.s.+lewis+studies+in+words&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=rmd-SuiBKYrEMMfhqOoC&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4#v=onepage&q=&f=false He dedicates an entire chapter to the word Nature.Clive Hayden
August 8, 2009
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StephenB @ 332:
—-[Diffaxial]:”The first conforms to ordinary parlance: my dictionary tells me that “natural” is defined as “existing in or caused by nature; not made or caused by human kind.” Yes, that is a very good definition, and you should have stopped with your dictionary.
OK, Stephen, but what about my dictionary? It happens to be the OED (sorry, it does require a subscription):
Natural A. adj. I. Existing in, determined by, conforming to, or based on nature.
1. Existing or present by nature; inherent in the very constitution of a person or thing; innate; not acquired or assumed. 2. Consistent with nature; normal, expected.
a. Ordinary; conforming to a usual or normal character (or constitution). b. Of an emotion, reaction, event, etc.: naturally arising or resulting from, fully consonant with, or appropriate to the circumstances; predictable, understandable. c. Being such by the nature of things or force of circumstances; inevitably or obviously such. d. Normally or essentially connected with, relating to, or belonging to a person or thing; consonant with or inherent or proper to the nature or character of the person or thing. e. With to. Of a quality, attribute, emotion, etc.: that belongs intrinsically to a person or thing; that comes easily or spontaneously to a person. f. Of a condition, environment, etc.: naturally adapted for, or applicable to, something. Obs. g. as natural as breathing and variants: designating activities or circumstances which seem entirely natural or instinctive; second nature.
3. Having a real or physical existence.
a. Belonging to, operating, or taking place in, the physical (as opposed to the spiritual or intellectual) world. Now rare. b. Actually existent, as opposed to what is spiritual, intellectual, fictitious, etc. In later use only in natural body n. at Special uses 2 and NATURAL PERSON n. Obs. c. Belonging to the inanimate part of the natural world. Obs. rare
4. Based upon innate moral feeling; instinctively or immediately felt to be right and fair, though not prescribed by any enactment or formal compact; having a claim to be followed or acted on even if not legally prescribed. Cf. NATURAL LAW n., NATURAL JUSTICE n. Obs. 5. Based on nature or the intrinsic properties of a thing.
a. Of a period of time: determined by cycles in nature. b. Of a quantity, number, measure, etc.: arising from or based on fundamental or intrinsic properties of an object or entity. c. Of a branch of science, or a method of arrangement, classification, etc.: having a basis in the normal constitution of things; arising from intrinsic properties. Chiefly in Biol.: (of a classification system or its groups) intended to correspond to the relationships presumed or inferred to exist between the organisms classified, rather than being based on an arbitrary or convenient principle; not artificial. d. Math. Designating a standard trigonometric function of an angle, as opposed to the logarithm of such a function (see LOGARITHMIC adj. a).
6.
a. Not unusual, exceptional, irregular, or miraculous; explicable in terms of natural phenomena. b. Of a function, characteristic, disease, etc., of the human body: occurring or appearing spontaneously or in the course of nature. c. Of death: resulting from old age or disease, not brought about by accident, violence, poison, etc. Also, in extended use, in (to die) a natural death: to fade away, become forgotten.
7. Formed by nature; not subject to human intervention, not artificial.
a. Of a substance or article: not manufactured or processed; not obtained by artificial processes; made only from natural products. Also: manufactured using only simple or minimal processes; made so as to imitate or blend with the naturally occurring article. b. Occurring in, or part of, the environment; inherent in the form of an organism, etc. c. Of vegetation: growing of itself; self-sown, self-propagated; not introduced artificially. Also of land or a landscape: not cultivated or altered. d. Of a medicine, treatment, etc.: avoiding the use of pharmaceuticals and other artificial or manufactured substances; alternative, complementary, or homeopathic. e. Involving no artificial or man-made ingredients, chemicals, etc.; ecological, organic; spec. (of food and drink) containing no artificial colourings, flavourings, or preservatives. f. Designating or relating to methods of birth control which rely on recognition of the fertile phase of a woman's menstrual cycle, esp. a method in which couples abstain from intercourse during this phase rather than use contraceptives (also called rhythm method)
8.
a. Sc[ots] Having innate abilities and gifts. Obs. rare. b. Having the innate ability to fill the specified role, adopt the specified profession, display a particular character, etc.
9.
a. Theol. Of a person: spiritually unenlightened; unregenerate; having a belief system or world view uninformed by revelation. Obs. b. Philos. and Theol. Of a system of belief, etc.: derived entirely from experience of the natural world; arrived at by reason and observation rather than through revelation or enlightenment c. Having only the wisdom given by nature; not educated by study. Obs. rare.
10.
a. Of thought, behaviour, or expression: having the ease or simplicity of nature; free from affectation, artificiality, or constraint; simple, unaffected, easy. b. Of a person: acting in accordance with one's innate character; not dissimulating, deceiving, or affected. c. U.S. Wild, savage. Obs. rare
11. Unaltered, not enhanced.
a. Of a person, his or her appearance, attributes, etc.: having the normal form, colour, etc.; not disfigured, disguised, or altered in any way. Of a style of hairdressing: having the appearance of being unstyled b. Of a fabric: having the colour of its unbleached and undyed state. Of a colour: that of the unbleached and undyed fabric c. Of a decorative finish: that retains or enhances the colour and texture of the original material. Also of wood, etc.: not painted, stained, or otherwise artificially coloured.
12. Of appearance.
a. Of pictorial representation or visual effect: closely imitating nature; life-like, exact. b. (as) natural as life: entirely natural, esp. in appearance or behaviour; appearing as if alive.
13. Music. Designating a note in the western musical system that is uninflected by a sharp or flat or any sign indicating a modification of diatonic pitch. Also of a key, harmony, etc.
II. Relating to birth or family; native.
14.
a. Of a person: having a status (esp. of allegiance or authority) by birth; natural-born. Cf. natural subject n. at Special uses 2. Obs. (hist. in later use). b. Of the transfer of a privilege, property, etc.: according to right of heredity. Hence of property, a privilege, etc. (later also a trait): hereditary; possessed by right of birth.
15.
a. Of a person: related genetically but not legally to his or her father; born outside marriage, illegitimate. b. Of a person's child: genetically related (without reference to legal recognition). Formerly also: esp. {dag}born in lawful wedlock, legitimate (obs.). Also in extended use. c. Of any other relation: genetically related, related by birth.
16.
a. Observant of familial obligations; appropriately affectionate towards a close relative. Obs. b. Feeling or exhibiting innate or spontaneous kindness, affection, or gratitude. See also natural-hearted at Special uses 1. Now rare (regional). c. Showing, or behaving so as to show, such a feeling to or towards a person, etc. Obs.
17.
a. Of a country or language: being that of a person's birth; native. b. Of a person: native to a country; native-born. Obs. c. With names of specific nationalities, as natural Englishman, etc. Also designating words of the specified language. Obs. d. That is a native of the specified place. Obs.
III. Relating to nature as an object of study.
18.
a. Of a person: given to the study of the natural world and natural phenomena. Now only in NATURAL HISTORIAN n., NATURAL PHILOSOPHER n., NATURAL SCIENTIST n. b. Dealing with, concerned with, or relating to the natural world and natural phenomena as objects of study or research. Now chiefly in natural knowledge and NATURAL HISTORY n., NATURAL PHILOSOPHY n., NATURAL SCIENCE n.
Tricky word, that natural. Especially considering that I left out the 49 special uses (and one adverbial defintion).Doomsday Smith
August 8, 2009
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Diffaxial does what he always does. He assumes his conclusions upfront by arbitrarily removing agency as a legitimate cause within the natural world, one whose effects are observable. Why agency is in need of his super-duper special treatment, he does not say, but being a delightful ideologue, he regularly complains that it is his opponents who to assume their conclusions.Upright BiPed
August 8, 2009
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---Diffaxial: "I hope you sweethearts someday get a sense of how ridiculous your self-congratulatory pillow talk is." Sorry, I rattled your chain with my correspondence with Jerry. Maybe it was a bit too facile. Still, your varied definitions of natural (two by your count, more by mine) really do tug away at one another. ----"The first conforms to ordinary parlance: my dictionary tells me that “natural” is defined as “existing in or caused by nature; not made or caused by human kind.” Yes, that is a very good definition, and you should have stopped with your dictionary. "Not made or caused by human nature is correct." But you go on. ----"This stands in distinction to objects that are in fact made or caused by human kind, e.g. artifacts such as buildings. This scheme of categorization applies without difficulty to the examples you cite – say the derangements caused by a vandal versus those caused by a tornado." No. Nature applies to the formation of a tornado, not the formation of a city building. ---"The second refers to the more general sense in which humankind can itself be said to be natural or non-natural." At this point you have already gone off the deep end, and you are clearly trying to have it both ways. ---"Although related to the first sense above, it takes a step back. Non-natural at this level cannot mean “made or caused by human kind” (we seem to agree that human beings didn’t cause themselves)." Your definition keeps morphing and morphing. ----"At this level “non-natural” apparently denotes a more general kind of contrivance at the “hands” of a more general kind of agent." What in the name of sense is a general kind of agent. ----"This introduces a huge problem for those who wish to posit there is such an agency, namely, what agent? However, those who postulate that human beings themselves “exist in and were caused by nature” are not burdened by that difficulty." I'm sorry, Diffaxial, but this just doesn't add up. ----"Their challenge is to get busy supplying that natural account. (You may want to say here that nature itself is the product of an agent, but that is tantamount to stating that nothing is natural. If that is the case, the distinction you value so much between human agency and natural events is again dissolved.) It isn't making sense. Not at all. ----There you have it. Two senses of “natural,” not multiple. Yes, two definitions one completely incompatible with the other. One indicates that humans are not involved while the other indicates that they are. ---"The scope and applicability of these two senses of “natural” and “non-natural” differ." Yes, in the same sense that the North and the South differed during the Civil War. ----"This is consistent with my posts throughout above. For clarity it is important to be clear which sense is being invoked when using “natural” and “non-natural,” as confusion may otherwise arise." There does seem to be a certain continuity in the contradictions. ----Given the above, I say that it is unproblematic to assert both that that human kind itself is a natural phenomenon (in the second sense), and that we may nevertheless intelligibly classify objects and events as “natural” and “non-natural” (in the first.) Using the above definitions, here is how it comes out: If I grant you your incompatible premises, then I would surely have to grant you your incomprehensible conclusions. But alas, I cannot. ---“Human kind exists in and was caused by nature. It is not the product of an agent." It is over that claim that all the fuss is being made. ----"Some objects/events in the world are made or caused by human kind. Some are not.” Yes, that's true, but you would never know it from what you have been saying. Let's go back to the dictionary definition: “natural” is defined as “existing in or caused by nature; not made or caused by human kind.” ---as in tornados, not in buildings. I don't care to much for the term "in nature," but then one can't have everything. If you will not accept the dictionary definition, then let's quit for a while.StephenB
August 8, 2009
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I hope you sweethearts someday get a sense of how ridiculous your self-congratulatory pillow talk is. To wit: StephenB @ 324:
You have used the word “natural” in a multitude of ways without ever really defining it. It would help if you would assume the burden of that task.
(Diffaxial supplies a definition @ 325) Jerry @ 326:
That is why they try to get the discussion hung up on what is the definition of information or natural or some other such irrelevancy.
StephenB @ 330:
I know what you are saying here and I agree.
Diffaxial
August 8, 2009
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----Jerry: "That is why they try to get the discussion hung up on what is the definition of information or natural or some other such irrelevancy." I know what you are saying here and I agree. I also think that even these exhibitions on terms and definitions serve a good purpose for onlookers. They are no substitute for the scienfitic discussions, of course, but they illustrate something that the more in-depth debates on evolutionary processes sometimes leave out. On the one hand, only the well-initiated can spot the Darwinists' logical errors when they debate ID on matters of statistics, natural processes, design methodology, or other technical matters. On the other hand, everyone, even a beginner, can appreciate the logical lapses coming from those who say that ID should not even be permitted to define its own terms, or that logic doesn't apply to the real world, or that a tornado's destructive winds should be placed in the same category of causes as a burglar's disruption. It is at these times that the fence sitters take pause and say, "are you kidding me?"StephenB
August 8, 2009
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Stephen @ 328:
Everyone understands that a man coming home to find his house ransacked can rule out natural causes and infer the activity of a design agent. Everyone understands the difference between a man releasing a ball and allowing a ball to drop to the ground [natural cause] and another man snatching it in mid air to interrupt the fall [agency]. Everyone understands that an agent cause is significantly different from a natural cause and can, as a matter of fact, use natural causes for a willful and rational end. To deny that fact is to deny the clearest reality available to sentient beings.
Not everyone understands the distinctions drawn in my post, however. So it goes. Good place to stop.Diffaxial
August 8, 2009
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----Diffaxial: "The problem, for you no less than for me, is to articulate what it means for human beings to be agents in a causal world. I don’t see that your position resolves the issue any more effectively than mine (simply asserting that we “have agency” or “are agents” doesn’t really accomplish anything), and in fact argue that it introduces insoluble complications that can have no contact with the empirical tools of science. In contrast, placing the question of the origins of the suite of human cognitive and behavioral talents we refer to collectively as “volition” into an evolutionary context supplies a very interesting framework and a number of avenues of empirical investigation (comparative psychology and primatology, developmental psychology, neuroscience, etc.) that have already, in fact, yielded very important observations with clear bearing on the issue. Of course, the most vexing of these puzzles will not be dissolved in this way because they are philosophical rather than scientific questions." Everyone understands that a man coming home to find his house ransacked can rule out natural causes and infer the activity of a design agent. Everyone understands the difference between a man releasing a ball and allowing a ball to drop to the ground [natural cause] and another man snatching it in mid air to interrupt the fall [agency]. Everyone understands that an agent cause is significantly different from a natural cause and can, as a matter of fact, use natural causes for a willful and rational end. To deny that fact is to deny the clearest reality available to sentient beings. Indeed, materialist Darwinists do not even live by their own alleged philosophy, as they prove each time they look both ways before crossing the street.StephenB
August 8, 2009
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Jerry @ 326:
There is no mutual attempt to understand each other with them.
Yet, Jerry, I can just feel you striving to understand and comment upon my post above, as reflected in this thoughtful, contentful comment. You've shamed me by example.Diffaxial
August 8, 2009
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"rational discourse is possible…" StephenB, this is a nonsense assumption when dealing with the anti ID people here. Occasionally there is one who wants to have a rational discourse but it is an infrequent event and usually only if they think it is to their advantage. There is no mutual attempt to understand each other with them. When the discussion gets irrational or hung up in irrelevancies you can bet they understand they haven't anything to stand on. So all the nonsense that Diffaxial provides is just an admission by him that he hasn't a rational argument to counter the obvious. When he does have a rational argument he can muster one but not when the issue is evolution or origin of life. He has no answers to the obvious in these areas. That is why they try to get the discussion hung up on what is the definition of information or natural or some other such irrelevancy.jerry
August 8, 2009
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StephenB @ 324:
You have used the word “natural” in a multitude of ways without ever really defining it. It would help if you would assume the burden of that task.
I've used the word in two ways. The first conforms to ordinary parlance: my dictionary tells me that "natural" is defined as "existing in or caused by nature; not made or caused by human kind." This stands in distinction to objects that are in fact made or caused by human kind, e.g. artifacts such as buildings. This scheme of categorization applies without difficulty to the examples you cite - say the derangements caused by a vandal versus those caused by a tornado. The second refers to the more general sense in which humankind can itself be said to be natural or non-natural. Although related to the first sense above, it takes a step back. Non-natural at this level cannot mean "made or caused by human kind" (we seem to agree that human beings didn't cause themselves). At this level "non-natural" apparently denotes a more general kind of contrivance at the "hands" of a more general kind of agent. This introduces a huge problem for those who wish to posit there is such an agency, namely, what agent? However, those who postulate that human beings themselves "exist in and were caused by nature" are not burdened by that difficulty. Their challenge is to get busy supplying that natural account. (You may want to say here that nature itself is the product of an agent, but that is tantamount to stating that nothing is natural. If that is the case, the distinction you value so much between human agency and natural events is again dissolved.) There you have it. Two senses of "natural," not multiple. The scope and applicability of these two senses of "natural" and "non-natural" differ. This is consistent with my posts throughout above. For clarity it is important to be clear which sense is being invoked when using "natural" and "non-natural," as confusion may otherwise arise. Given the above, I say that it is unproblematic to assert both that that human kind itself is a natural phenomenon (in the second sense), and that we may nevertheless intelligibly classify objects and events as "natural" and "non-natural" (in the first.) Using the above definitions, here is how it comes out: "Human kind exists in and was caused by nature. It is not the product of an agent. Some objects/events in the world are made or caused by human kind. Some are not." I don't see that this, as far as it goes, is paradoxical or problematic. The forgoing doesn't entail entanglement in the complications of agency, freedom, responsibility, etc. To classify an object or event employing the first sense of natural, above, one need only decide whether or not it was "made or caused by human kind." That decision can be made without becoming concerned with paradoxical questions vis agency, volition, intentionality, freedom and determinism, etc. For example, it is fully intelligible to determine that Empire State Building is a non-natural object (in the first sense) without grappling with questions such as whether those who made it were free not to make it. Similarly, upon asserting that human kind is itself of natural origins in the second sense (as when I say "human beings arose in and are part of the natural world"), those problems continue to have only tangential relevance, because I am not invoking agency to explain those origins. Now, assuredly, there are other reasons to raise these questions, but the conclusion that human kind has natural origins and, in turn, causes or makes things is not one of them. ------- When one asserts that human beings arose by non-natural means things become more complicated, because there is no ready, observable agent to invoke, as there is when classifying an object in light of the first sense of natural, above. Absent any direct or reliable indirect experience with this putative agent we are left with a disembodied abstraction, namely "agency." The abstracted characteristics and powers of "agency" then need be specified, raising many problems. You may wish to refer to human agency as a model, but "human agency," as distinct from the observables of human behavior, is itself an abstraction, the characteristics of which have been the object of thousands of years of largely unfruitful debate. Therefore there is nothing dispositive about citing human agency as a model for this larger agency, and, given that this larger agency must remain an abstraction of our own devising, nothing in this larger agency that settles these abstract and vexing questions of human agency. Moreover, the vexing questions that may be raised regarding, for example, the "reality" of agency, freedom and responsibility in the light of a closed causal picture of the world, and the corollary questions vis the punishment of criminals, and so forth, arise whether or not you regard human kind itself as of "natural" or "non-natural" phenomenon. Most arise as a consequence of determinism, not natural origins: the reality and or meaning of choice and responsiblity in a causally closed world (to which, I gather, you firmly subscribe) is a knotty problem for anyone regardless of the origin story to which they subscribe. So far as I can tell, those problems are intensified and further complicated rather than resolved upon the assumption of the agent most people invoke when they assert that human beings are creations rather than natural objects (God). ------- That said:
To be as clear as possible, I accept common ancestry as a fact and allow for the strong possibility of universal common descent, while holding some reservations. Call that open-minded posture delusional if you like.
No, I call that a reasonable position.
However, the term “evolutionary pathway to complexity,” as I use it, implies much more, namely that purposeless, undirected, gradualistic forces, as set forth in the neo-Darwinist paradigm, could have ushered in the transition from OOL to consciousness in 4 billion years. Random variation, natural selection and other naturalistic forces can do many things, but there is no evidence at all that they have done that or could ever do that. Quite the contrary, there is no evidence at all that they did it. That isn’t delusional; it is fact. If you want to challenge the point, you have the floor and all relevant evidence will be accepted without fuss.
Of course, I'd argue that there is a mountain of evidence to the contrary. However, I'll simply ask that the entirety of research and theory in evolutionary biology and related fields be read into the record ("so ordered, without fuss") and note that if you don't find that persuasive, and find that it amounts to "no evidence at all," then there is no point in my making an effort here.
That doesn’t really solve the problem, though, does it? The problem is this: Are agent causes different from natural causes? I don’t want to misrepresent your position, but if you are declaring that agency is real but indistinguishable from non-agency, then you are playing with words.
My opening paragraphs are intended to address this general set of questions, and the paragraphs that remain.
To say, as you do, that both are natural causes, is to make a mockery of the human agent’s capacity to be his/her own cause apart from nature.
Now you aren't tracking the discussion. My response was that both actions (dropping a ball; snatching a ball out of the air) reflect human agency. (I often feel that you are responding to what you expect I would say, rather than to my actual words). The problem, for you no less than for me, is to articulate what it means for human beings to be agents in a causal world. I don't see that your position resolves the issue any more effectively than mine (simply asserting that we "have agency" or "are agents" doesn't really accomplish anything), and in fact argue that it introduces insoluble complications that can have no contact with the empirical tools of science. In contrast, placing the question of the origins of the suite of human cognitive and behavioral talents we refer to collectively as "volition" into an evolutionary context supplies a very interesting framework and a number of avenues of empirical investigation (comparative psychology and primatology, developmental psychology, neuroscience, etc.) that have already, in fact, yielded very important observations with clear bearing on the issue. Of course, the most vexing of these puzzles will not be dissolved in this way because they are philosophical rather than scientific questions.Diffaxial
August 8, 2009
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