Brief excerpt from Bill Dembski’s new book, Being as Communion: What is intelligent design?

_{Denyse O'Leary

January 13, 2014

Intelligent Design}

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William Dembski: Being as Communion: a Metaphysics of Information will be published later this year by Ashgate Publishing (UK):

Intelligent design is the study of patterns (hence “design”) in nature that give empirical evidence of resulting from real teleology (hence “intelligent”). In this definition, real 37 teleology is not reducible to purely material processes. At the same time, in this definition, real teleology is not simply presupposed as a consequence of prior metaphysical commitments. Intelligent design asks teleology to prove itself scientifically. In the context of biology, intelligent design looks for patterns in biological systems that confirm real teleology. The definition of intelligent design given here is in fact how its proponents understand the term. This definition avoids two common linguistic pitfalls associated with it: intelligent design’s critics tend to assume that the reference to “design” in “intelligent design” commits it to an external-design view of teleology; moreover, they tend to assume that the reference to “intelligent” in “intelligent design” makes any such external design the product of a conscious personal intelligent agent. Both assumptions are false.

Granted, intelligent design is compatible with external design imposed by a conscious personal intelligent agent. But it is not limited to this understanding of teleology in nature. In fact, it is open to whatever form teleology in nature may take provided that the teleology is real. The principle of charity in interpretation demands that, so long as speakers are not simply making up meanings as they go along, terms are to be interpreted in line with speakers’ intent and recognized linguistic usage. The definition of intelligent design just given, which explicitly cites real teleology and does not restrict itself to external design, is consistent with recognized meanings of both words that make up the term intelligent design. Design includes among its recognized meanings pattern, arrangement, or form, and thus can be a synonym for information. Moreover, intelligence can be a general term for denoting causes that have teleological effects. Intelligence therefore need not merely refer to conscious personal intelligent agents like us, but can also refer to teleology quite generally. quoted with permission from final pages

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Comments

Hi nightlight, I've made the identical arguments many times - both the empirically unsupportable predication of ID on libertarianism, and the fallacy of rejecting machine intelligence because of its human source (both because of the possible regress of material causes that you point out, and because of ID's very own arguments against the value of asking "Who designed the Designer?"). I hadn't made them as well as you have, though - nice job! Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{January 14, 2014
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UB @22, By some strange coincidence, I am having the same difficulty. I do sense some dim adumbration of two ships passing in the night, but I cannot really be sure if there was any thematic conflict to speak of.StephenB_{January 14, 2014
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@Barry Arrington #7
Nightlight, your chess example fails. The computer on which the program runs and the program itself drip with teleology.
The point was to provide a simple explicit counterexample to Dembski's proposition quoted -- everything that chess computer program does is explicable and predictable in full detail from its physical properties (distribution of electric charges, currents and particles in the volume occupied by the computer). Therefore a purely material system exists which strongly and clearly exhibits teleological behavior observed in the chess playing computer. As predicted in my initial post, the escape clause you are now using is the "no true Scotsman" fallacy -- you are relaying on the attribute "real" of the teleology in the Dembski's statement to reshape the semantics of 'teleology by the purely material process'. In this new semantics (which wasn't evident in Dembski's original pronouncement), afforded by the undefined attribute "real" used by Dembski, you are now saying that whatever had set up the initial conditions of those charges, currents and particles has "injected" teleology into the "purely material process" which didn't have any such teleology by itself. From that you conclude that there must be non-material process that was involved in that initial setup, which appears to save at least the refined/redefined assertion of Dembski. That obviously doesn't work either. The chess playing computer in question could have well been made entirely by another program with robotic features (to physically assemble the unit and write or copy the programs needed). In fact much of the unit was probably already assembled by the robotic programs. In principle, though, the entire chess playing computer, hardware and software, could have been made that way. So we are back where we started after I provided the first counterexample. Of course, you can now invoke the "true Scotsman" escape clause once more, and reshape the semantics of the teleology by a "purely material process" again, this time claiming that what he really meant is a material process which wasn't set up by another purely material process which in turn was set up by a non-material process (the minds of designers and programmers who came up with robotic assembly system that assembled the chess playing computer). With refined definition, we exclude this case, too from the semantics of the Dembski's "real teleology." In turn, nothing in principle precludes an entirely robotic assembly of that previous robotic system that assembled the original chess computer. And so on. Any time you invoke Dembski's escape clause "real" to redefine the previous semantics of his teleology by "purely material process" into the next more "refined" version that encloses ever longer series of the initial conditions, I can easily provide a counterexample for this new definition by simply adding another stage of another 'purely material process' performing the assembly of the immediate previous stage. Hence, the entire series of Dembski's redefined assertion is still falsified by direct counterexamples no matter how many times you redefine the semantics of his teleology by "purely material process." Of course, I am generously ignoring the fact that redefining your clauses even once, automatically concedes the falsification of the previous version of the statement. So, along this path he ends having to make an endless series of concessions of falsity of his propositions. But, even along the alternative path, I could have agreed for the sake of argument to allow a human designer of the initial chess playing computer (hence without invoking the computer assembly as I did). As far as the present natural science (laws of matter-energy) goes, everything that these human designers did to put together that chess computer is fully explicable, at least in principle, by the activity of the electric charges, currents and particles of those humans. In other words, you cannot even make a valid or legitimate scientific argument that the "mind stuff" (or something non-material) of these designers did anything at all that electric fields and particles didn't do on their own anyway (from whatever initial state they had). Namely, there is no such postulate or theorem in the laws of natural science which can establish even the bare existence of the "mind stuff" (or anything non-material), let alone empower "it" to do anything at all, such as set up somehow the initial state of the charges, currents and particles of any system. What you are left with then, even if I didn't introduce the robotic assembly of the chess computer, is not a scientific statement or logical deduction, but merely a statement of your personal faith that a "mind" somehow moved the electric charges and pulses in the neurons of the human designers (so they could design and build that chess computer). But then, if all you are left with is the statement of your personal faith, why bother with intelligent design argument at all, when you could have as well simply laid down the scripture on the table and declared your firm personal faith in that, saving yourself and everyone else all the effort and trouble of debating the variants of ID. In short, even by generously allowing all the concession above for the sake of argument, taking one path or the other, Dembski is still headed into a dead end with that particular proposition.nightlight_{January 14, 2014
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SB at 20, Very nice post. I seem to remember you having a dialogue with someone here recently who just could not - even for the life of himself - stop violating the very things being talked about in your post. The memory is just so vague, perhaps I'll think of it later.Upright BiPed_{January 14, 2014
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niwrad:
Nature cannot give laws to itself. Nihil agit se ipsum. To greater reason nature cannot give teleology/design to itself, because teleology is even more higher, superior, essential and qualitative than laws. A Law-giver/Designer transcending nature gives nature laws and teleology
Box
niwrad, when you mean by nature “fermions and bosons” I fully agree. However, organisms are more than just that, more than fermions, bosons and more than information. Organisms are ontologically distinct from computers. Organisms are agents with their own teleology. God is not the only source of teleology surrounded by wind up toys.
Interestingly, I agree with both comments as I understand them. I agree with Box's point that intrinsic teleology exists and I agree with niwrads point that it must ultimately be explained by external teleology. Humans, for example, are legitimate independent causal agents (Box's point) by virtue of their immaterial minds and wills, yet some outside source had to instill in those humans the power to be independent causal agents by creating their minds and wills (niwrad's point).StephenB_{January 14, 2014
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I am going to have a go at interpreting Dembski’s comments one section at a time:
Intelligent design is the study of patterns (hence “design”) in nature that give empirical evidence of resulting from real teleology (hence “intelligent”). In this definition, real 37 teleology is not reducible to purely material processes. At the same time, in this definition, real teleology is not simply presupposed as a consequence of prior metaphysical commitments.
Because Intelligent Design studies patterns solely for the purpose of confirming teleology in nature, it cannot commit either to the dualistic metaphysic of spirit and matter or the monistic metaphysic of matter alone. It recognizes its compatibility with philosophical arguments for a first cause, but it withholds judgment on the matter recognizing its own methodological limitations.
Intelligent design asks teleology to prove itself scientifically. In the context of biology, intelligent design looks for patterns in biological systems that confirm real teleology. The definition of intelligent design given here is in fact how its proponents understand the term. This definition avoids two common linguistic pitfalls associated with it: intelligent design’s critics tend to assume that the reference to “design” in “intelligent design” commits it to an external-design view of teleology; moreover, they tend to assume that the reference to “intelligent” in “intelligent design” makes any such external design the product of a conscious personal intelligent agent. Both assumptions are false.
ID, by this definition, does not try to explain teleology either as a product of extrinsic causality or intrinsic causality, much less does it argue for the existence of a transcendent personal designer or an immanent impersonal designer.
Granted, intelligent design is compatible with external design imposed by a conscious personal intelligent agent. But it is not limited to this understanding of teleology in nature. In fact, it is open to whatever form teleology in nature may take provided that the teleology is real.
ID does not argue for a transcendent agent, a personal agent, a conscious agent, or any agent at all, but it is open to any of these prospects.
The principle of charity in interpretation demands that, so long as speakers are not simply making up meanings as they go along, terms are to be interpreted in line with speakers’ intent and recognized linguistic usage.
ID’s critics should respect the meaning of our terms as we define them and use them. Accordingly, they should refrain from redefining those terms as a perverse strategy for judging ID on the basis of their own false characterizations. Put simply, should stop putting words in our mouth.
The definition of intelligent design just given, which explicitly cites real teleology and does not restrict itself to external design, is consistent with recognized meanings of both words that make up the term intelligent design.
We are being faithful with the common usage of these terms. The word design is ordinarily used to convey the meaning of a plan, blueprint, or representation, all of which convey the idea of causation without referring to an outside agent. Of course, the notion of apriori intent and outside agency is perfectly consistent with ID, but it is, by no means, a requirement.StephenB_{January 14, 2014
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niwrad, when you mean by nature "fermions and bosons" I fully agree. However, organisms are more than just that, more than fermions, bosons and more than information. Organisms are ontologically distinct from computers. Organisms are agents with their own teleology. God is not the only source of teleology surrounded by wind up toys.Box_{January 14, 2014
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Nature cannot give laws to itself. Nihil agit se ipsum. To greater reason nature cannot give teleology/design to itself, because teleology is even more higher, superior, essential and qualitative than laws. A Law-giver/Designer transcending nature gives nature laws and teleology.niwrad_{January 14, 2014
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Box, I'm not trying to ignore your example. I've stated why I'm not sure it gets us anywhere in terms of the design inference. The only reason the cell demonstrates teleology (as opposed to a rock or random soup of chemicals) is that it operates by means of a 4-bit digital code, a sophisticated storage and retrieval system, bit parity and concatenation algorithms, all under the direction of top-down protocol hierarchies. I presume to this point we are on the same page. So then what does it teach us to say that this teleology "emanates" from nature? That doesn't make any sense to me. The only reason it is in nature is because it was designed to be there. So, no, the teleology manifested by the cell doesn't just emanate from nature, like the natural chemical and physical reactions we regularly see in non-living systems. It is there due to some other cause, something separate from the physical and the material "nature." Again, I'm open to someone explaining what the idea really means, not just repeating the words "teleology in nature" and saying it is there to behold. But I'm growing very suspicious that the idea of "teleology emanating from nature" only has legs so long as we fail to define what we mean by "teleology" and "nature."Eric Anderson_{January 14, 2014
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EA: I don’t even know what that means. (Not blaming you, I know you’re just the messenger.) What does it mean that teleology originates from nature?
It simply means that teleology originates from nature itself as opposed to an external designer. You have ignored my examples, so I don't know what is unclear about them. Allow me to repeat: Shapiro's concept of an intelligent cell and Nagel’s concept of natural teleological law are examples of teleology emanating from nature itself - internal if you will. Last but not least there is the holistic view on the organism - propagated by S.L.Talbott. The view that the organism is a monad - irreducible to its parts - which gives hands and feet to the notion that an organism is not just a artifact.Box_{January 14, 2014
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Thanks Mark Frank- I don't have a mobile device but when I am finished updating my house I will buy a copy for my PC and have a goJoe_{January 14, 2014
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Box:
Shapiro’s concept is about teleology originating from nature –
I don't even know what that means. (Not blaming you, I know you're just the messenger.) What does it mean that teleology originates from nature? Presumably it must mean something roughly akin to the idea that teleology originates from matter and energy bumping into each other and interacting? Unfortunately, this doesn't sound any more substantive than the old "emergence" school of thought, a la Kauffmann. This 'teleology emerging from nature' concept is a nice idea -- at least in the sense that it recognizes the need for teleology, while at the same time satisfying those who don't want to leave the materialistic club by dispensing with the need for an actual designer. It suffers from one minor flaw, however. Namely, there is no evidence it is true.Eric Anderson_{January 14, 2014
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Joe #5
nightlight- I have never lost a game of chess to any computer. If you know of one that you think can beat me, please reference it and I will have a go.
Try HIARCS on a mobile phone. It has beaten several Grandmasters. Of course you may be a chess genius.Mark Frank_{January 14, 2014
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Dembski: The definition of intelligent design just given, which explicitly cites real teleology and does not restrict itself to external design, (…)
Does this mean that we are no longer creationists? :)Box_{January 14, 2014
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yet everything it does is fully reducible (explicable) in terms of physical events in the computer (charge distribution and electric pulses).
No ... its not. There is no inexorable relationship between an electromagnetic impulse and the movement of a bishop. That discontinuity must be bridged by a protocol within the system - while maintaining the discontinuity.Upright BiPed_{January 14, 2014
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Nightlight: ... a computer running a program that plays chess, is a real teleological process, pursuing objectives in an intelligent manner, yet everything it does is fully reducible (explicable) in terms of physical events in the computer (charge distribution and electric pulses).
But you have you account for the initial arrangement of matter that contains the information that makes the chess game do what it does. The software for the chess game didn't arrange itself. It's the particular sequence of bits expressed on those "charge distributions and electric pulses" that convey the non-physical information, that is, the intent of the arranger.CentralScrutinizer_{January 14, 2014
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EA #8, Shapiro's concept is about teleology originating from nature - the cell's intelligence as the source of teleology. Obviously this is categorically distinct from a computer chess program. The same can be said of Nagel's concept of "natural teleological law" which also originates from nature. Personally, as a holistic thinker, I'm rather sympathetic to the view of an organism as self-designing.Box_{January 14, 2014
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With all due respect, I think you guys are missing nightlight's point (and perhaps my question as well). If we are willing to say that there is "teleology in nature," what does that mean? I think nightlight specifically acknowledged the chess program is teleological, and yet there is no consciousness involved as the program runs, no agent acting, but, rather, a series of electronic pulses, switches and so on -- all physical and material, nothing more than matter and energy interacting. Box mentioned Shapiro's reference to the cell as another example, if we prefer a living system to look at, rather than a computer program. So I ask again, what is meant by "teleology in nature"? Does it really change anything about our understanding of intelligent design? Don't we still have to look back through any artifact that manifests this "teleology" to find the real source of the teleology (which as far as we know, is always a mind)? What do you guys understand by the idea of "teleology in nature"?Eric Anderson_{January 14, 2014
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Nightlight, your chess example fails. The computer on which the program runs and the program itself drip with teleology.Barry Arrington_{January 14, 2014
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Nightlight #3: For example, a computer running a program that plays chess, is a real teleological process, pursuing objectives in an intelligent manner, yet everything it does is fully reducible (explicable) in terms of physical events in the computer (charge distribution and electric pulses).
Surely, you are aware of the fact that information is not reducible to purely material processes?Box_{January 14, 2014
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nightlight- I have never lost a game of chess to any computer. If you know of one that you think can beat me, please reference it and I will have a go.Joe_{January 14, 2014
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A side note: if you don't have Dembski's "End of Christianity", you can get it now for 99 cents for the new hardback at CBD. I guess it's a closeout. Which either means the publisher had too many copies printed or it was a commercial dud - hardback books usually don't get marked down so steeply.fmarotta_{January 14, 2014
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In this definition, real 37 teleology is not reducible to purely material processes.
Not quite sure what he is trying to say with this, but it sounds like a no true Scotsman fallacy. It is fact quite easy to come up with counterexamples to that statement. For example, a computer running a program that plays chess, is a real teleological process, pursuing objectives in an intelligent manner, yet everything it does is fully reducible (explicable) in terms of physical events in the computer (charge distribution and electric pulses). No intervention in its operation is needed while it is playing a game to help the "material process" choose more intelligent moves (in fact programs nowadays play a lot better and smarter than any human).nightlight_{January 14, 2014
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I applaud the effort to make the concept of intelligent design broad and accessible. (And lest anyone think otherwise after reading my comment, let me clarify up front that I am a huge fan of Bill Dembski's work and the tremendous contribution and leadership he has shown in promoting intelligent design.) However (and with the caveat that I'll have to wait and read Bill's book for more detail), on the basis of the passages cited I can't help but wonder how much is gained by the definitional exercise. Can someone tell me, for example, what is meant by "whatever form teleology in nature may take" if that teleology isn't ultimately referring back to something beyond the nature itself? Surely Bill is not proposing that nature itself, a la matter and energy, contains some kind of intelligence or produces design of its own accord. So there must be something else at play, something beyond the mere interaction of matter and energy, something else that we ultimately have to recur to to explain the observed designs. I can't tell whether this is just an attempt to acknowledge that organisms (e.g., Box's Shapiro example @1) can produce "design" or that, say, computers and robots and systems that themselves are not alive or conscious can produce "design." This was a point of much discussion recently with one of Sal's posts. Personally, I don't think such observations of "design in nature" are very meaningful, because we are still left to look back through the intervening artifact to the ultimate cause, which in every known case is an intelligent agent. I have never felt any particular need to bend to the definitional rhetorical whining of ID opponents who quibble endlessly about words like "intelligence" and "design." Will this teleological approach be any more successful? Do we think ID critics will suddenly have a light turn on and have an "aha" moment, or will they now just quibble endlessly about what is meant by "teleology"? I fear the question rather answers itself. But perhaps Bill has something more substantive in mind with the idea of "teleology in nature"? Bill, I realize you don't have time to follow UD posts much, but if by chance you do see this, I would be interested in your quick thoughts. Of course also interested in others' thoughts . . .Eric Anderson_{January 13, 2014
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Dembski: The definition of intelligent design just given, which explicitly cites real teleology and does not restrict itself to external design, (...)
Demski's definition of intelligent design seems to accomodate Shapiro's concept of 'natural genetic engineering' - cells, according to Shapiro, are intelligent in that they do their own natural genetic engineering, taking existing structures through horizontal DNA transfer or symbiogenesis, say, and reworking them in new contexts for new uses.Box_{January 13, 2014
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