Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

“Unpredictable” Does Not Equal “Contingent”

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In a previous post JT believes he has crushed the entire ID project by pointing out that: “A process determined entire[ly] by law can have EXTREMELY complex behavior and extremely difficult to predict behavior.”

 

No one disputes JT’s point, but it is beside the point as far as ID is concerned.  JT is making a common error – he is confusing “unpredictable” with “contingent.”  They are very different things.

 

When a bomb explodes the pieces of the bombshell are scattered willy nilly, and it is impossible to predict where any piece will land.  Nevertheless, where each and every piece lands is utterly determined by law.  In other words, where each piece lands is a function of nothing but the various physical forces acting upon it, which could, in principle, be modeled by a mathematical formula.  This is an example of the complex unpredictable behavior resulting from law to which JT alludes.

 

Contrast the complex unpredictable – but nevertheless determined – behavior of the bombshell with the contingent behavior of an intelligent agent.  This sentence that I am writing is an example of contingent behavior.  My choice of typing out a certain combination of letters and spaces and not another cannot be accounted for on the basis of any known law.  The only way to account for the sentence is as the contingent act of an intelligent agent.  I had a choice, and I wrote that sentence instead of another.

 

Now JT might counter that I only believe I had a choice in writing that sentence, that my consciousness is an illusion, and that my actions were governed by law as surely as the flight of the pieces of bombshell.  Well that’s the question isn’t it.  JT – and other materialists – do not know that my consciousness (and theirs) is an illusion.  They merely assert it, and until they can provide evidence (and by “evidence” I do not mean the recitation of their metaphysical tropes), that the seemingly self evident fact that I am conscious is not after all a fact, I will go on believing it.  What is more (and this is very amusing) so will they.  In other words, materialists struggle to prove that which they do not really believe.  Every one of them knows he is a conscious agent, and why they attempt to prove that which they know for a certain fact not to be the case is a mystery. 

 

Later JT wrote:  “And for the record, I generally put ‘mind’ in quotes when referring to the ID concept of it and don’t use the term much at all, because of the potential for confusion.”

 

One wonders what JT meant by “I,” in that sentence, because if, as he says, the mind does not exist, the concept of “I” has no meaning, so it seems to me that it would make more sense for him to put irony quotes around “I” and not “mind.”  This, of course, is just another example of how the materialist is forced to affirm the non-materialist case in the very act of attempting to refute it. 

Comments
What has satisfying got to do with anything? The truth is often disappointing.
Dave, I think Barry meant that the promissory materialism in this case, being blatant, is not very satisfying intellectually (rather than "not very satisfying" emotionally, which you seem to have read). There appears to be plenty of evidence for the integrity of the mind (cf. The Spiritual Brain), which influences the brain and therefore cannot be reduced to a material substrate. Granted, this raises scientific and philosophical problems...but not as striking as those which arise from trying to maintain a rigid materialist perspective.Lutepisc
December 17, 2008
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This may spark things up: The Day I Died - A Closer Look At Near Death Experiences 4/6 http://www.godtube.com/view_video.php?viewkey=9baed5185c8ddfddddb4 Miracle Of The Mind/Brain in Recovering from Hemispherectomy http://www.godtube.com/view_video.php?viewkey=ca2a589bd122500a3172bornagain77
December 17, 2008
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Barry, I won't agree that there is more than a brain required for self-consciousness. Occam's Razor seems to be cutting in my favor as you're the one who is adding something unnecessary (IMO) to what's needed to explain self-awareness. What has satisfying got to do with anything? The truth is often disappointing.DaveScot
December 17, 2008
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Barry - I have to side with DaveScot on this one, and "not very satisfying to say the least", doesn't mean it is not the way things are. I learned that when I didn't get that damn pony for Christmas when I was 10.JackInhofe
December 17, 2008
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DaveScot, I appeal to Occam’s Razor. Set aside philosophical gobbledy gook like Cartesian demons and Boltzmann brains and stipulate with me that my subjective experience really is my subjective experience and not an illusion. If the materialist gives me that, they give away the entire store. I perceive there is an “I” that perceives. I experience qualia, which defy explanation by any reductionist account of the mind. The most parsimonious explanation of these two phenomena is that I have subjective experience, which leads inexorably to the conclusion that the mind, while it is certainly affected by brain function, is not reducible to it. Your response can be boiled down to: A thoroughly materialist account of consciousness, which probably must take into account quantum mechanics, is too complicated for us to express now, and will probably always be too complicated for us to express. This is the typical “promissory materialism” that we have seen so often with a twist. Here the twist is that in the very act of making the promissory note, the maker of the note admits that he may never be able to pay it. Not very satisfying to say the least.Barry Arrington
December 17, 2008
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Barry As a materialist most of the time I feel qualified to point out that what materialists generally think is an illusion is consciousness that is independent of a brain. I suspect few if any would agree that consciousness itself is an illusion. The previous poster, now banned, made a legitimate point. In the article you say: My choice of typing out a certain combination of letters and spaces and not another cannot be accounted for on the basis of any known law. I'll agree with the caveat that the lack of accounting may be because the interaction of law and matter becomes so complex as to defy an accounting with our limited ability to analyze it. Consult the articles that Granville Sewell has written here where he describes how the Schrodenger Equation of Quantum Mechanics becomes intractible when more than a couple of elementary particles are involved. There are trillions of trillions of elementary particles in a human brain. The statement I quoted from you is essentially a denial of material determinism. The question of whether, as Einstein put it, God plays at dice with the universe is not a settled question. Einstein went to his grave believing God does not play dice with the universe. Free will may be an illusion and not all materialists will agree on whether it is or it isn't. The most well informed materialiists IMO will tell you it's an unsettled question. For another commenter here who asked how QM relates to all this is how - quantum uncertainty - effects without causes - absolute unpredictability. Personally I think quantum uncertainty is just as likely an artifact of incomplete understanding of the quantum universe, a view which is often referred to as "the missing variable" hypothesis. As to you believing you could have chosen to write something other than what you did? How do you know that when in fact you did not write something different? In hindsight you think you had a choice but is that hindsight an illusion? Presumably you used some chain of reason and logic in your choice of words and the reason and logic itself has a chain of causation traceable to your education, experience, instant frame of mind, and perhaps genetic predispositions (instincts) as well. If I look outside I might say it's partly cloudy or partly sunny. Is it really my choice or are the words dictated by a state machine whose instant state and operation are too complex to analyze?DaveScot
December 17, 2008
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Clive Hayden: Thank you for the wonderful Chesterton quote. I really enjoyed it.gpuccio
December 16, 2008
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I want to take this argument back to experimental observation. 1. I believe with all my being that I have the ability to make independent decisions. i.e. that my choices am not just the sum of all the stimuli around me. 2. But that is only my subjective experience. How can I be sure that others have that opinion? 3. Well, if JT and others are busy coming to this sight trying to convince me of their opinions, it appears that they also believe that I can make independent decision. They are presenting arguments in words that want to convince me to do what --- to make a decision to agree with them. So my experience is that they believe I have an independent will. 4. As an inverse to this, I believe that anyone who truly did not think I was capable of independent decisions would not bother arguing. It would be pointless. In other words, I find that by the mere exercise of arguing with me that free will is just and illusion, and that the mind is just bodily function, the net effect is to ring up more field observation, that convinces me that I do indeed have an ability to make independent decisions.JDH
December 16, 2008
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Following up: Re JT in 66, trying to answer the "lucky noise makes an apparent message -- 'Welcome to Wales' . . . " challenge in 57 (with onward link to the main discussion here):
Let me restate that: You are sitting in a railway carriage and seeing stones you believe to have been randomly arranged, spelling out a valid and comprehensible proof for some math theorem Would you believe the apparent message? Why or why not? Yes, I would believe it because even though it was randomly generated, the proof was comprehensible and self-evidently valid.
This is ever so revealing! 1 --> "Let me restate . . ." is -- coming out the starting gate -- an open admission of resort to trying to knock over a distractive strawman. (This is a sure sign that the argument in the main is a serious challenge to the evo mat view that seeks to explain mind on chance plus necessity. [Of course, if you follow up the link you will see that in the end the evo mat view disintegrates into self-referential absurdity, which is precisely what happens with JT's rebuttal . . .]) 2 --> JT then resorts to an attempted counter- example where a rockfall -- which is of course a paradigm for chance + necessity in action -- piling up in the shape of a series of alphanumerical glyphs that lo and behold just happens to state in mathematical language a proof that per his judgement is valid. 3 --> You will note the key difference between [a] rocks falling into arbitrary shapes (and in principle such rocks can take up any shape under the laws of physics prevailing . . . just that the odds of the suggested case happening are very long indeed, tantamount to zero, but we are talking Gedankenexperiment here . . .) that are then [b] read by an onlooker as a valid mathematical proof. 4 --> This underscores the key difference between physical events and forces, and mental actions carried out by the sort of conscious, intelligent creature that we are. 5 --> For, the rocks -- remember Ari's point that "nothing is what rocks dream of" -- don't care what shape they take up, nor do the forces of chance plus necessity. they make no distinction between rocks falling into one pattern or another. Similarly, noise in the Internet and your PC could in principle produce a pattern of bits that physically causes the dots of light, dark and colour on your screen that seem to be a comment post, just by chance.) 6 --> But, the onlooking eye -- backed up by the intelligent mind -- sees SYMBOLS, and interprets MEANINGS, then makes LOGICAL judgements. In short, acts of mind are radically different from acts of chance plus necessity, and take up a radically different scope of significance. 7 --> And, when evo mat speculations on origins try to deduce the latter from the former; on long observation, they invariably founder on the crucial gap, and the implicit self reference involved. 8 --> As the linked appendix sums up:
. . . [evolutionary] materialism [a worldview that often likes to wear the mantle of "science"] . . . argues that the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature. Therefore, all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of chance. But human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this picture. Thus, what we subjectively experience as "thoughts" and "conclusions" can only be understood materialistically as unintended by-products of the natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains. (These forces are viewed as ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance ["nature"] and psycho-social conditioning ["nurture"], within the framework of human culture [i.e. socio-cultural conditioning and resulting/associated relativism].) Therefore, if materialism is true, the "thoughts" we have and the "conclusions" we reach, without residue, are produced and controlled by forces that are irrelevant to purpose, truth, or validity. Of course, the conclusions of such arguments may still happen to be true, by lucky coincidence — but we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” them. And, if our materialist friends then say: “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must note that to demonstrate that such tests provide empirical support to their theories requires the use of the very process of reasoning which they have discredited! Thus, evolutionary materialism reduces reason itself to the status of illusion. But, immediately, that includes “Materialism.” For instance, Marxists commonly deride opponents for their “bourgeois class conditioning” — but what of the effect of their own class origins? Freudians frequently dismiss qualms about their loosening of moral restraints by alluding to the impact of strict potty training on their “up-tight” critics — but doesn’t this cut both ways? And, should we not simply ask a Behaviourist whether s/he is simply another operantly conditioned rat trapped in the cosmic maze? In the end, materialism is based on self-defeating logic . . .
JT, that is the case you and your fallow evo mat advocates need to cogently and clearly address squarely on the merits. The ball is back in your court. G'day GEM of TKI PS: GP, great comments as usual. PPS: CranDaddy, may I quietly note that "cause" may relate to logical necessity as opposed to sufficiency. [AS GP points out, ability to influence is not the same as sufficiently being able to determine. A full causal account is both necessary and sufficient. I daresay that materialists have not produced such a necessary and sufficient account of the mind, its origins and its degree of credibility that we need to operate as thinkers. They may think; they may even think they have accounted for the mind; but their explanations to date here at UD have invariably ended in self-referential absurdity..)kairosfocus
December 16, 2008
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In response to JT and crandaddy: JT Thank you for your response. You write: "[I] was wondering whether Aquinas, Augustine or Aristototle actually knew about the function of the brain at all. If they did their conviction regarding souls, intellect and so forth might be more compelling." In answer to your question, Aristotle (the world's first biologist) didn't know much about the role of the brain, but Avicenna certainly did, as the foremost physician of his day, and Aquinas would have been familiar with his work. There is a book you can google on the Internet called "Thomas Aquinas and Human Nature" by Robert Pasnau. (You can order it at http://www.amazon.com/Thomas-Aquinas-Human-Nature-Philosophical/dp/0521001897) In chapter 9, Pasnau discusses Aquinas' insistence that corporeal images (phantasms) derived from the senses are essential for the intellectual act of understanding to take place. Aquinas seems to be well aware that imagination and memory are dependent on the brain. I'll quote from page 285: "Aquinas knows little about the varieties of brain damage and mental dis-function (sic), and their correlations to mental activity. Still, he offers two fairly specific examples: 'We see that when the power for imagination has its action impeded by damage to the organ [i.e. the brain - V.T.] (as happens to the phrenetic) and likewise when the power for memory has its action impeded (as happens to the lethargic) the person is impeded from actually cognizing through intellect even the things he has already acquired knowledge about ([Summa Theologica I, question] 84.7c).' "Here Aquinas is making rather definite and psychological claims: he associates damage in two different parts of the brain with two specific kinds of mental disorders." (See http://books.google.com/books?id=oTmKh2S56cAC&pg=PA279&lpg=PA279&dq=Aquinas+phantasm+organ&source=web&ots=7vfPYbfv06&sig=rECJ9AycFsc6XHNOIr8RgNOXd98&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPA285,M1 .) In other words, Aquinas was certainly not guilty of armchair theorizing. Next, you quote from an article by Dr. Nancey Murphy, entitled "Neuroscience and Thomas Aquinas": "Recent science has shown the fruitfulness of taking the brain to be the seat of all those mental faculties medieval thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas, had attributed to the soul. Therefore, we consider here a variety of results from neuroscience which make it appear that the various human capacities once attributed to the soul are better understood as capacities of the human brain." Murphy is setting up a straw man here: she ascribes to Aquinas the demonstrably erroneous belief that human capacities are capacities purely of the soul. As the foregoing quote from Aquinas shows, this is nonsense. Aquinas was well aware of the important role of the body in growth, sensation, imagination and memory. (Aristotle was aware of most of these things too, although he mistakenly ascribed some capacities to the heart wheich we would ascribe to the brain.) Murphy is guilty is an elementary mis-reading of Aquinas. To ascribe these capacities to the soul (as Aristotle and Aquinas sometimes do) is NOT to deny them to the body; all it means is that an animal has to be alive to exercise these capacities. The ONLY human capacities which, according to Aquinas, are in no way bodily capacities are the rational faculties of intellect and will - precisely the areas where Murphy is vaguest about the underlying neuroscience. She writes: "These higher mental faculties Aquinas attributed to the rational soul are further from being understood. However, all of them involve language. Even if we do not understand how these mental faculties depend on brain functioning, we know that they do because of the close association of linguistic abilities with specific brain areas, especially Wernicke's area and Broca's area." This is what the late neurologist John C. Eccles would have called "promissory materialism": we don't understand the intellect yet, but we will. As for the neurological findings regarding the role of the brain in language, all this shows is that language presupposes memory for words and the ability to associate words and images - in other words, damage to the brain can impair imagaination and memory, without which we cannot exercise our reason. But as I have already shown, Aquinas was well aware of that. crandaddy Thank you for your reply. You write: "The ontological schism (that Searle, himself, recognizes) between being a brain state and being a conscious experience seems to wreak havoc on the prospect of achieving an identity. Yet if we are to avoid dualism (of the property variety, at least) this is precisely what we require." As I read him, the schism which Searle recognizes is between the third-person properties of brain states (and other material entities), and the irreducibly first-person properties of mentl states. Nevertheless, what Searle wants to say is that there are some material entities (e.g. brains) which can have both first-person and third-person properties. Searle finds this fact mysterious; however, he seems to treat it as a brute fact. His position on the mind-body question seems close to Russell's neutral monism, in this regard, or possibly property dualism. However, property dualism is a different kind of thing from substance dualism. I have to say I find Searle7s position on consciousness to be a tenable one. If I were attacking materialism, I wouldn't focus on the mystery of consciousness, but rather on the impossibility of a bodily organ doing the kinds of things which a normal human being does with his/her intellect every day: self-reflexive activity (thinking of thinking); storage of a potentially infinite number of concepts; and forming concepts of abstract and immaterial entities. (Those who think computers can do these things had better read Searle.)vjtorley
December 16, 2008
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vjtorley, Thank you for the lengthy reply. That does clarify things. I, too, have a great deal of respect for Searle's work. He seems to be generally on the right track (which I can't say for all of his colleagues in philosophy of mind), but he also seems to want to reap all the benefits of dualism on the one hand while adamantly denying it on the other. As to the quote you provide,
“Grant me that consciousness, with all its subjectivity, is caused by processes in the brain, and grant me that conscious states are themsleves higher-level features of the brain. Once you have granted these two propositions, there is no metaphysical mind-body problem left” (p. 52).
I'll happily grant that consciousness is caused by the brain. Indeed, in this modern age of neuroscience, we can hardly deny it. The second point, however, is worlds removed from being quite as obvious. The ontological schism (that Searle, himself, recognizes) between being a brain state and being a conscious experience seems to wreak havoc on the prospect of achieving an identity. Yet if we are to avoid dualism (of the property variety, at least) this is precisely what we require.crandaddy
December 16, 2008
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Yes, the mind is magical, but so is the brain. Everything is magical, and a scientific description of the parts doesn’t persuade us that the magic is gone or that it never existed in the first place. Something out of nothing is magical, and that is exactly what modern cosmology would have us believe. This is no different than the rabbit from the hat. The fact that the cosmos exists at all is magical. "It might be stated this way. There are certain sequences or developments (cases of one thing following another), which are, in the true sense of the word, reasonable. They are, in the true sense of the word, necessary. Such are mathematical and merely logical sequences. We in fairyland (who are the most reasonable of all creatures) admit that reason and that necessity. For instance, if the Ugly Sisters are older than Cinderella, it is (in an iron and awful sense) NECESSARY that Cinderella is younger than the Ugly Sisters. There is no getting out of it. Haeckel may talk as much fatalism about that fact as he pleases: it really must be. If Jack is the son of a miller, a miller is the father of Jack. Cold reason decrees it from her awful throne: and we in fairyland submit. If the three brothers all ride horses, there are six animals and eighteen legs involved: that is true rationalism, and fairyland is full of it. But as I put my head over the hedge of the elves and began to take notice of the natural world, I observed an extraordinary thing. I observed that learned men in spectacles were talking of the actual things that happened–dawn and death and so on–as if THEY were rational and inevitable. They talked as if the fact that trees bear fruit were just as NECESSARY as the fact that two and one trees make three. But it is not. There is an enormous difference by the test of fairyland; which is the test of the imagination. You cannot IMAGINE two and one not making three. But you can easily imagine trees not growing fruit; you can imagine them growing golden candlesticks or tigers hanging on by the tail. These men in spectacles spoke much of a man named Newton, who was hit by an apple, and who discovered a law. But they could not be got to see the distinction between a true law, a law of reason, and the mere fact of apples falling. If the apple hit Newton’s nose, Newton’s nose hit the apple. That is a true necessity: because we cannot conceive the one occurring without the other. But we can quite well conceive the apple not falling on his nose; we can fancy it flying ardently through the air to hit some other nose, of which it had a more definite dislike. We have always in our fairy tales kept this sharp distinction between the science of mental relations, in which there really are laws, and the science of physical facts, in which there are no laws, but only weird repetitions. We believe in bodily miracles, but not in mental impossibilities. We believe that a Bean-stalk climbed up to Heaven; but that does not at all confuse our convictions on the philosophical question of how many beans make five. Here is the peculiar perfection of tone and truth in the nursery tales. The man of science says, “Cut the stalk, and the apple will fall”; but he says it calmly, as if the one idea really led up to the other….the scientific men do muddle their heads, until they imagine a necessary mental connection between an apple leaving the tree and an apple reaching the ground. They do really talk as if they had found not only a set of marvellous facts, but a truth connecting those facts. They do talk as if the connection of two strange things physically connected them philosophically. They feel that because one incomprehensible thing constantly follows another incomprehensible thing the two together somehow make up a comprehensible thing. Two black riddles make a white answer. A law implies that we know the nature of the generalisation and enactment; not merely that we have noticed some of the effects. If there is a law that pick-pockets shall go to prison, it implies that there is an imaginable mental connection between the idea of prison and the idea of picking pockets. And we know what the idea is. We can say why we take liberty from a man who takes liberties. But we cannot say why an egg can turn into a chicken any more than we can say why a bear could turn into a fairy prince. As IDEAS, the egg and the chicken are further off from each other than the bear and the prince; for no egg in itself suggests a chicken, whereas some princes do suggest bears. Granted, then, that certain transformations do happen, it is essential that we should regard them in the philosophic manner of fairy tales, not in the unphilosophic manner of science and the “Laws of Nature.” When we are asked why eggs turn to birds or fruits fall in autumn, we must answer exactly as the fairy godmother would answer if Cinderella asked her why mice turned to horses or her clothes fell from her at twelve o’clock. We must answer that it is MAGIC. It is not a “law,” for we do not understand its general formula. It is not a necessity, for though we can count on it happening practically, we have no right to say that it must always happen. It is no argument for unalterable law (as Huxley fancied) that we count on the ordinary course of things. We do not count on it; we bet on it. We risk the remote possibility of a miracle as we do that of a poisoned pancake or a world destroying comet. We leave it out of account, not because it is a miracle, and therefore an impossibility, but because it is a miracle, and therefore an exception. All the terms used in the science books, “law,” “necessity,” “order,” “tendency,” and so on, are really unintellectual, because they assume an inner synthesis, which we do not possess. The only words that ever satisfied me as describing Nature are the terms used in the fairy books, “charm,” “spell,” “enchantment.” They express the arbitrariness of the fact and its mystery. I deny altogether that this is fantastic or even mystical. We may have some mysticism later on; but this fairy-tale language about things is simply rational and agnostic. It is the only way I can express in words my clear and definite perception that one thing is quite distinct from another; that there is no logical connection between flying and laying eggs. It is the man who talks about “a law” that he has never seen who is the mystic. Nay, the ordinary scientific man is strictly a sentimentalist. He is a sentimentalist in this essential sense, that he is soaked and swept away by mere associations. He has so often seen birds fly and lay eggs that he feels as if there must be some dreamy, tender connection between the two ideas, whereas there is none. This elementary wonder, however, is not a mere fancy derived from the fairy tales; on the contrary, all the fire of the fairy tales is derived from this. Just as we all like love tales because there is an instinct of sex, we all like astonishing tales because they touch the nerve of the ancient instinct of astonishment…These tales say that apples were golden only to refresh the forgotten moment when we found that they were green. They make rivers run with wine only to make us remember, for one wild moment, that they run with water… All that we call common sense and rationality and practicality and positivism only means that for certain dead levels of our life we forget that we have forgotten. All that we call spirit and art and ecstasy only means that for one awful instant we remember that we forget. I have remarked that the materialist, like the madman, is in prison; in the prison of one thought. These people seemed to think it singularly inspiring to keep on saying that the prison was very large. The size of this scientific universe gave one no novelty, no relief. The cosmos went on for ever, but not in its wildest constellation could there be anything really interesting; anything, for instance, such as forgiveness or free will. The grandeur or infinity of the secret of its cosmos added nothing to it. It was like telling a prisoner in Reading gaol that he would be glad to hear that the gaol now covered half the county. The warder would have nothing to show the man except more and more long corridors of stone lit by ghastly lights and empty of all that is human. So these expanders of the universe had nothing to show us except more and more infinite corridors of space lit by ghastly suns and empty of all that is divine. In fairyland there had been a real law; a law that could be broken, for the definition of a law is something that can be broken. But the machinery of this cosmic prison was something that could not be broken; for we ourselves were only a part of its machinery. We were either unable to do things or we were destined to do them. The idea of the mystical condition quite disappeared; one can neither have the firmness of keeping laws nor the fun of breaking them. The largeness of this universe had nothing of that freshness and airy outbreak which we have praised in the universe of the poet. This modern universe is literally an empire; that is, it was vast, but it is not free. One went into larger and larger windowless rooms, rooms big with Babylonian perspective; but one never found the smallest window or a whisper of outer air." G.K. Chesterton, "Orthodoxy" http://www.cse.dmu.ac.uk/~mward/gkc/books/ortho14.txtClive Hayden
December 16, 2008
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JT (#74): I apologize for entering the discussion only now (I have been very busy), and I admit that I have not read the whole thread. But the subject is very interesting, so I will try to catch up on your last post. You say: "I consider ‘necessity’ and ‘mechanism’ to be synonymous." You can obviously do as you like, but there is a simple reason why we use two different words. Necessity refers to a specific kind of causation (completely deterministic). Mechanism, and especially "causal mechanism" are broader terms. But, if you prefer, we can speak of "causal process", without implying that the process is completely deterministic. You cannot hide behind words. You can believe that only necessity exists, but that's your personal philosophy. I don't agree. I believe, like many, that non completely deterministic processes exist in reality: the actions of conscious agents are an example, and so are quantum probabilistic events. Please note that those "non completely deterministic" events, in my view, can obviously be cause of other events. In that sense, you can have a "causal mechanism" (for instance design) which acts as a deterministic cause (of the designed object), but is not in itself completely deterministic. You say: "You can’t impose some stringent and yet simultaneously vague restrictions on what natural laws can be like, in my judgement." I really have to object to your use of the concept of "law". A scientific law is made by humans, and is not in nature. Beware, I am not denying that there is some reality in nature which justifies our laws, I am just affirming that scientific laws, as we know them, are part of human scientific theories. That's why we can really impose restrictions in scientific laws: they are the product of human reasoning, and therefore they have the same restrictions of human reasoning. I don't wnat in any way to give a final answer to what those restrictions are, but I think that as a preliminary assumption we could well agree that human scientific laws seem to be always based on some form of logico-mathematical formulation. You say: "But when I use the term law (or equivalently mechanism or necessity) I am also thinking of it as being equivalent to a scientific theory, one that characterizes in a systematic and thorough way (but also as compactly as possible) how some natural phenomenon has been reliably observed to function," I agree on that. That's exactly my point. Therefore, laws are logico-mathemathical structures. They are essentially deductive, and are an expression of necessity. And they are man made. "I also have in mind the contention of Gregory Chaitin, one of the fathers of Algorithmic Information Theory who repeatedly asserted that every valid scientific theory equates to a program. (i.e. a computer program)." That's only a way of stating the obvious: that any algorithmic process is a process of necessity, and therefore can be expressed as a program. That is true for scientific laws, because they are logico-mathematical structures. But it's not true of scientific knowledge in general. Scientific knowledge is much more than scientific laws. And the word "theory" is just too vague to be useful. There is a lot in science which cannot be expressed as a computer program. "As far as systematic description, nothing we know of exceeds the expressive power of a computer program." That's complete nonsense! There are a lot of things which we can very well describe, and which are beyond the power of a computer program. Consciousness is the best example. Meaning too. Free will. Perception. Pleasure. Pain. Purpose. Intuition. Human language. Beauty. Harmony. And so on. According to Penrose, even some non algorithmic parts of mathemathics. You say: "So obviously everything is governed by laws - the movement of the planets, human behavior, you name it." It's not obvious at all. What about consciousness and free will? They are certainly "influenced" by laws, but who says that they are "governed" by them? The usual view has always been the contrary. Again, you are entitled to your own dogmas, but you cannot make us share them by raw force. You say: "If you say, “its just not possible to derive a accurate reliable description of how such and such phenomena functions, or equivalently, that laws do not govern its behavior, what you’re saying is that its behavior is random." Absolutely not. Intelligence and will are not random, and are not "governed" by laws (although certainly "influenced" by them. Randomnes is another thing, and not an easy one to define. I will give you ny take on randomness. I think we have two different kinds of randomness: 1) Randomness in deterministic events. Even if a set of events can be completely deterministic, still it can express randomness at a higher level of organization. Let's make a simple example: the tossing of a fair coin. We have no doubt that how a coin falls depends on the laws of mechanics, which are deterministic. So, the tossing of a fair coin is in a sense a deterministic, necessary event. But the causal variables are so many, and so difficult to control, that we can never know in advance if H ot T will be the result of any single toss. And we know that, in the long run, the probability of each event is 0.5. So, in games, which after all are the origin of our theories of probability, randomness is a level supreimposed to necessary events. I think all maxcroscopic randomness can be interpreted that way. 2) True randomness: I mean the randomness at the quantum level, which is expressed in the collapse of the wave function. As far as we know, that randomness seems to be intrinsic to reality itself, and not superimposed to necessary events. Anyway, no kind of randomness explains free will, exactly as no kind of necessity explains consciousness. Unless one accepts the irrational theory of strong AI, most serious theories of consiousness do use quntum randomness, but only as an interface where consciousness can interact with matter without violating known laws of necessity (see for instance John Eccles and his school). That's very interesting, because that's exactly the concept at the base of CSI: consciousness and intelligence can impart a higher level of order to events which are "flexible" enough because of their random nature.gpuccio
December 16, 2008
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CJYMan [63,64]: JT: So by identifying a “highly improbable function” it mean “highly improbable to occur by pure randomness.” It does not rule out necessity or mechanism as a cause.” CJYMan: I agree that it doesn’t rule out mechanism. I have no problem with intelligence being “mechanistic” in that there is cause and effect involved. As to necessity, it can only play a part in the sense that an evolutionary algorithm will necessarily unfold CSI. I consider 'necessity' and 'mechanism' to be synonymous. Law is usually understood as mathematical description of regularities, or emergent effects of the physical properties of material. You can't impose some stringent and yet simultaneously vague restrictions on what natural laws can be like, in my judgement. The informal observation, "In our everyday experience we general attribute the cause of some event to one of three alternatives, "chance, law-like regularity, or intelligent agency." - that's not something to build an entire world view on. Sure, an average schmo, with what he happens to remember from high-school physics, laws are pretty thread-bare and simplistic concepts. And in his mind, "intelligent agency is OBVIOUSLY something entirely different from law. But when I use the term law (or equivalently mechanism or necessity) I am also thinking of it as being equivalent to a scientific theory, one that characterizes in a systematic and thorough way (but also as compactly as possible) how some natural phenomenon has been reliably observed to function, i.e. a theory that has been used to successfully predict subsequent behavior of some phenomenon as well. I also have in mind the contention of Gregory Chaitin, one of the fathers of Algorithmic Information Theory who repeatedly asserted that every valid scientific theory equates to a program. (i.e. a computer program). As far as systematic description, nothing we know of exceeds the expressive power of a computer program. So whether its a set of laws, a computer program, a scientific theory, or a mechanism, these are all referring to a systematic and reliable description of how some aspect of nature has been observed to operate. So obviously everything is governed by laws - the movement of the planets, human behavior, you name it. If you say, "its just not possible to derive a accurate reliable description of how such and such phenomena functions, or equivalently, that laws do not govern its behavior, what you're saying is that its behavior is random. Then, once chance is ruled out by detecting highly improbable specificity, we may arrive at CSI. But, that is not where the reasoning stops. We also observe that intelligence routinely produces CSI through use of foresight, as I have explained earlier. In fact, that is basically how we label something as intelligent. There is an argument from ignorance going on here, where you look at attributes of some known causes of CSI, and say "I'm justified in assuming any cause of CSI will have these attributes." As I've alluded to before and will again here briefly, here is a different take on the general subject of design inferences (though not spefically utilizing design as a concept): If f(x) causes y then f(x) equates to y. If some process f acted on x and the result was y then f(x) equates to y, in terms of probability as well. So to explain anything, it is necessary to point out some process f(x) that preceded it that equates to it. And the analogy I used previously is, a computer image: before it is on your screen it is stored in memory. The image is in a different form in memory but actually equates to what is on the screen. Now considering biological origins, if f is natural laws and x is some mutations and the output is y, f(x) still equates to y, and thus you're still requiring something equating to y (f(x)) come into existence by chance to account for y. (So the bind that darwinists are in for example should be apparent.) If there is no free will, then extremely complex interactions do govern the actions of intelligence. However, this would occur in a chaotic way which is in principle still unpredictable as per chaos theory Not following you. Do the laws governing a chess program interact in a chaotic way? If a set of laws (i.e. a theory, mechanism, etc.), perhaps a large complex set of laws, has been observed to reliably characterize or govern an observed phenomenon, must that set of laws operate chaotically? We also have sufficient reason to believe that CSI just won’t result from only law and chance. What reason is that? So, baring infinite regress, either the foundation of our universe is an eternal set of active information or intelligence That eternal set of active information would be law.JT
December 16, 2008
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to vjtorley was wondering whether aquinas, augustine or aristototle actually new about the function of the brain at all. If they did their conviction regarding souls, intellect and so forth might be more compelling. Will make an effort to read that paper on aquinas and arisotle you discussed, but was curious as to the nature of aquinas' conclusions - was it experimental knowledge he obtained, was it armchair philosophizing, how you would you characterize it. Also, would you consider doing arithmetic a function of the soul? I googled 'aquinas brain': from Neuroscience and Thomas Aquinas:
Recent science has shown the fruitfulness of taking the brain to be the seat of all those mental faculties medieval thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas, had attributed to the soul. Therefore, we consider here a variety of results from neuroscience which make it appear that the various human capacities once attributed to the soul are better understood as capacities of the human brain.
I don't present this with a lot of glee, because it seems that there's a lot of playing God and Orwellian scenarios on the horizon with what they're doing in brain research these days.JT
December 16, 2008
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Norman Doering, There are permanent limits discovered by established science: knowing what happened before time began, verifying the existance of universes outside our own; going back in time, and going faster than the speed of light. Other impossibilites are being suggested by experimentation and other research: the origin of first life, the origin of all life including humans, the origin of the anthropic principle None of the researchers you linked to has accomplished the creation of life from scratch. Most are just tweeking the parts. The rest is hyperbole to get press, and therefore grants.Peter
December 16, 2008
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JT: "What I meant was that if Intelligent Agency is distinct from law, which it is for most in ID, it is meaningless to invoke Intelligent Agency as a cause. If you cannot potentially identify a pattern characterizing how an entity functions in at least some known set of circumstances, then that entity’s behavior is completely random." Or true free will is involved, however I don't think that free will is necessary for what we are discussing. However, I won't rule it out as a possibility. JT: "Contrarily, to be able to identify such a pattern is equivalent to identifying laws that govern how that entity operates in those circumstances. If you cannot characterize the behavior of some entity via some set of laws (potentially a large and complex set of laws) then the behavior of that entity is random. So an intelligent agent not determined by laws is meaningless and equivalent to randomness amd invoking it as a cause for something explains NOTHING." I've already stated that I have no problem with law being involved, however that's not the complete story. You do bring up a descent point, assuming free will does not exist. If there is no free will, then extremely complex interactions do govern the actions of intelligence. However, this would occur in a chaotic way which is in principle still unpredictable as per chaos theory. So as it relates to predictability, invoking "law" doesn't help. Further, invoking "law" still doesn't help us understand highly improbable, contingent, specified patterns since you need the same type of non-lawful pattern being acted on by law to produce those patterns. Invoking *only* law and chance thus also becomes meaningless. So, we are at a place where we can observe CSI coming from intelligent agents. We also have sufficient reason to believe that CSI just won't result from only law and chance. So, baring infinite regress, either the foundation of our universe is an eternal set of active information or intelligence. As I have explained eariler, because of the existence of consciousness and because of the implications of Conservation of Information, it seems quite obvious to myself that intelligence is a better explanation than an eternal set of laws that "just happen to be describable in terms of active information" -- enough active information, mind you, to produce foresight without foresight. Oh really ?!?!?CJYman
December 16, 2008
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JT: "I don’t know how the weather works exactly - I know its very complex. And I know its highly sensitive to condition external itself, so that it is influenced by ocean currents and other distinct attributes of the planet. I would suspect that the visible contours of the land masses of this planet, the continents that is, have a very specific impact on the weather of this planet. So that for example, say the Island of Cuba disappeared - that would dramatically effect weather systems in the Gulf of Mexico. So, what I’m thinking is that the land mass contours of earth, are in effect a DNA for a major subset of the functionality of the weather systems of this planet. In other words this contour of the earth’s land masses encodes functionality external to itself. With enough knowledge, you could talk about what slight changes to the coastline of Maine would do to the Earth’s weather. And at this point we probably know as much about DNA as we do about the effect of land mass contours on the weather." Ah, yes, you are discussing a chaotic system here. The huge difference between a chaotic weather system which is the result of random elements and DNA is that one is specified and the other is not. Any collection of "weather elements" will produce some type of weather, so a calculation will never produce CSI. Of course you also suggest, later on in your comment, that you understand the difference between a highly improbable functional system and a random and chaotic system. Furthermore, the organization inherent in DNA is not defined by any laws of the physical properties of the nucleotides used, which places it in the same non-lawful category of organization as an essay. However, no matter how complex and chaotic a weather system is, it is the result of laws of attraction and repulsion between air molecules, etc. JT: "Rereading the above however, I am thinking about the “highly improbable function” aspect of it, so maybe you would object to my analogy above on that basis. So here’s my response, as I read the design inference (not the book - the theory) nowhere is there a formal method to detect “intelligent design”. The only formal method there is rules out pure randomness as a cause for something. So by identifying a “highly improbable function” it mean “highly improbable to occur by pure randomness.” It does not rule out necessity or mechanism as a cause." I agree that it doesn't rule out mechanism. I have no problem with intelligence being "mechanistic" in that there is cause and effect involved. As to necessity, it can only play a part in the sense that an evolutionary algorithm will necessarily unfold CSI. However, there is no necessary law, as emergent effect of the physical properties of units involved which will produce an EA. Again, the specified organization involved is not defined as a necessary by-product of any material. This is how law absent foresight can be ruled out. Law is usually understood as mathematical description of regularities, or emergent effects of the physical properties of material. Through empirical investigation, we can discover if the pattern in question is the result of the aforementioned definition of law. The pattern of nucleotides in DNA can't be a result of the physical properties of the nucleotides or they would merely form a periodic chain, without the ability to carry information to the RNA which is then converted to function. Read Hubert Yockey on the subject for some key insight into the code of life. Of course "law" can simply mean that a mechanism and causal chain is involved, such that the statement "intelligence is always caused by previous intelligence" can be seen as a "law of intelligence." Then, once chance is ruled out by detecting highly improbable specificity, we may arrive at CSI. But, that is not where the reasoning stops. We also observe that intelligence routinely produces CSI through use of foresight, as I have explained earlier. In fact, that is basically how we label something as intelligent. Does it produce improbable, specified results at better than chance performance? If so, then there is most likely some type of foresight (modelling of future conditions to reach a goal) either artificially or consciously.CJYman
December 16, 2008
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crandaddy In response to my earlier claim (49, (i)) that "the term 'mind' does not refer to a thing of any kind, let alone a thing interacting with the brain," you write: "Would it not, at least, refer to the substantial form of an individual person (on the Thomistic account)? If not, how am I mistaken?" Good question. What you are assuming here is that the terms "mind" and "soul" are synonymous. The article by John O'Callaghan at http://www2.nd.edu/Departments//Maritain/ti00/ocallagh.htm , which I cited in my last post makes a strong case that for Aquinas, as for Aristotle, the term "mind" refers not to the essence or substance of the soul, but to a specific power of the soul: namely, the intellect. Augustine seems to have equated "mind" with the highest part of the soul, and in particular with will, memory and intellect. O'Callaghan demonstrates that in his later works, Aquinas came to reject this view in favor of Aristotle's position. Why? The problem with Augustine's view (and also with Descartes' later view) is that it implies that each of us leads a double life: the life of an animal animated by its animal soul, and a distinct mental life, animated by its mental soul, thereby separating or "setting off" rational life from animal life. O'Callaghan argues that Aquinas, following Aristotle, views human life as a unity: "On the contrary, for Aquinas we live but one life, the life of a rational animal. Aquinas argues that the principle of rational life just is identically the principle of animal life in the human being. Thus the life of the mind or intellect just is identically the life of the animal. He takes this position explicitly in order to preserve the integrity and unity of human life." On this point, materialists are correct. Where they err is in equating the exercise of rationality with the act of a bodily organ. In short: the soul (as substantial form of the body) can be called a thing of sorts - or more precisely, the substantial form of a thing. The mind or intellect, as a mere power of the soul, cannot be called a thing. Even for the soul, it would be misleading to speak of it as interacting with the brain. Rather, what we should say is that because we are animals, there are some things (such as seeing) which we do with our brains and sensory organs; and there are other things (such as reasoning) which we do without any bodily organ. In the former case, the action of ascribed to the relevant parts of a living (and hence ensouled) body; in the latter case, the action [reasoning] cannot be ascribed to the body at all. Nevertheless, reasoning is still an act of the person as a rational individual, so it must be ascribed to that person's substantial form or soul. In response to your query, then, a bodily act [such as seeing] is the act of a living body or some physical part thereof; whereas an act of the whole person is an act [such as reasoning] which cannot be ascribed to any part(s) of the body. Finally, you write: "The reason I'm inclined to substance dualism is that no form of material substance (coherently conceived) is identical to the essentially subjective person." I'd be a little careful of this argument if I were you. It sounds like Thomas Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?" (see http://www.clarku.edu/students/philosophyclub/docs/nagel.pdf ). John Searle is a philosopher for whom I have the greatest respect, and he has some things to say about this argument in his book, "Mind, Language and Society" (Basic Books, paperback, 1999; ISBN 0-465-04521-9; available at http://www.amazon.com/Mind-Language-Society-Philosophy-World/dp/0465045219 ). Unlike materialists, Searle acknowledges the existence of "inner, qualitative, subjective mental states" (p. 50) which cannot be reduced to "third-person phenomena, phenomena that are neither inner, qualitative nor subjective" (p. 50). However, unlike dualists, Searle denies the Cartesian claim that material things cannot have a first-person properties. He writes: "Grant me that consciousness, with all its subjectivity, is caused by processes in the brain, and grant me that conscious states are themsleves higher-level features of the brain. Once you have granted these two propositions, there is no metaphysical mind-body problem left" (p. 52). Searle admits that there is a huge mystery about how brain processes COULD cause consciousness, and an even bigger mystery about how they DO IN FACT do so. Nevertheless, the fact THAT they do so seems unarguable to Searle. In other words, the implicit claim of substance dualists that material substances cannot possess subjective first-person properties is questionable. There might well be laws of nature, to the effect that, when suitably configured, they just do. By contrast, the Aristotelian claim that intellectual acts cannot be bodily acts does not construe these acts as acts of a separate substance interacting with a body; rather, they are acts by the same substance (a person who is thinking), but simply acting as a whole, without employing a bodily organ. This is a more defensible claim, as it avoids the problem of spooky souls pushing around bodies, which bedevilled Descartes' philosophy of mind. I hope these comments answer your questions. Finally, I would like to say that it seems safer to build an argument for the reality of human freedom and agency on the bedrock of the essential immaterial nature of understanding, rather than on the philosophical quicksands of the ineluctibility of first-person consciousness. That's my own opinion; however, if someone wishes to argue otherwise, then I am open to suggestion.vjtorley
December 16, 2008
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What if an intelligent agent says "Welcome to Wales". How likely is it for an intelligent agent to lie? If he's a government agent pretty likely.JT
December 16, 2008
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JT, your answer is incomprehensible.Upright BiPed
December 16, 2008
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KF [57]: Is this what you were talking about: You are sitting in a railway carriage and seeing stones you believe to have been randomly arranged, spelling out: "WELCOME TO WALES." Would you believe the apparent message? Why or why not? Let me restate that: You are sitting in a railway carriage and seeing stones you believe to have been randomly arranged, spelling out a valid and comprehensible proof for some math theorem Would you believe the apparent message? Why or why not? Yes, I would believe it because even though it was randomly generated, the proof was comprehensible and self-evidently valid.JT
December 16, 2008
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vjtorley wrote:
You make a valid point when you criticize the “radio tuner” model of the mind-brain relationship. However, all this shows is that Cartesian dualism is false.
Which is a significant problem for the many people here at UD and elsewhere who are Cartesian dualists, whether they know it or not. That would include those who 1) think that they will go to heaven when they die, leaving their bodies behind but retaining their intellects, personalities, memories and emotions; 2) think that dear, departed Grandma is looking down on them and maybe even communicating with them from time to time; 3) think that NDEs and OBEs are true accounts of what happens when the soul leaves the body; 4) believe in ghosts; etc. Those people will not be happy when you tell them that no, Grandma is really just dead after all.
(ix) acts of the human intellect are acts of the WHOLE person, which cannot be ascribed to a bodily organ such as the brain, so there is no way in which they could be determined by some set of physical laws governing interactions between bodies, as determinists contend.
Evidence for this?
Incidentally, one of the many philosophical grounds for rejecting the view that intellectual acts could possibly be bodily acts is that intellectual acts are capable of being self-reflexive. You can kick a ball; but you cannot kick “kicking.” Nor can you see “seeing”; vision, like kicking, is a bodily act. However, you can easily think about the act of thinking about something...
Why would you think that physically instantiated thoughts cannot be about other thoughts?ribczynski
December 16, 2008
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CJYMan wrote [9]: This has nothing to do with magical minds floating around. This has to do with intelligence (as the ability to model the future and then organize law and chance to arrive at a future specified goal at better than chance, which does exist as per our experience) being fundamentally either alongside matter and law or preceding matter and law as we presently understand it. The “material” properties of this intelligence is inconsequential for the purposes of this debate JT:But anyway, I think you’ve already admitted that computers can potentially be intelligent in the same sense as a human as far we know, and that’s good enough for me. That was a stupid comment on my part. A desktop computer could never be intelligent like a human being. Obviously it could never be conscious. A computer would have to be rendered with a near identical physical-chemical makeup of a human being to be conscious like a human being. Material properties seem definitely consequential at least in that regard.JT
December 16, 2008
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As a mechanistic determinist I have come to believe that consciousness is a product of language. What our brains do... or one of the unique thing that human brains do is to process memes. The spontaneous emergence of Nicaraguan Sign Language is a fine example of how our brains are constantly sorting and looking for memes. Language is a gigantic meme that is growing independently in the nether. What we experience is words. ID subscribers push the notion that the overall picture implies a "greater consciousness." Any consciousness must have words. What fantastic language meme did the Intelligent Designer absorb? Feral people never get words, and because of this lack of names for things and experiences, they never become consciousness of our verbal universe. Helen Keller lived in darkness until she got words, and began naming her experiences. If there is no voice, no constant stream of words in your mind, then you are unconscious.Michael Haanel
December 16, 2008
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Okay JT, the same challenge has come up in the earlier thread. Why don't you start from the falling pile of rocks by chance plus necessity only spells out "Welcome to Wales" example here; as per Upright's challenge. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
December 16, 2008
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TCS
It is also interesting to note that these effects are virtually undetectable after a short period of time.
So, let me get this straight, the human brain was designed to have chunks removed with little to no ill effect? Is that what you are saying? This is a new one on me. One would have thought if that was the case then a more useful "design" would be to ensure the spine does not degenerate, or a better knee, those things would help everybody wherease a design feature of the brain that allowed chunks to go missing would only affect a tiny percentage of all people who ever lived.
You are also citing design principles of chips that are vastly inferior to the design principles of the brain. If you can’t see that, then I can’t help you.
I'm not asking for your help. You used a "brain vs chip" analogy. In years past CPU's only had 1 core and your analogy would have worked. Cutting that single core in half would have resulted in a unusuable CPU. However, as I keep noting, modern CPU's are more like the brain in that they have two (or more) hemispheres and so can afford to "lose" one and still be able to function. I don't believe I've cited any "design principles" and neither have you. We're simply talking about analogies. And yes, no doubt CPU design is "vastly ingerior" to the design of the brain but, er, CPUs have only been around for a few decades whereas the brain has been around for substantially longer. Give it a few tens of thousands of years and we'll see what happens! I don't understand why you have such an issue with my counter analogy. You seem to be saying that unless I go out and perform a CPU into two operation I can't speak about it? Have you performed many brain operations then? I doubt it. And, regarding the "mind as 2 way radio issue" do you have an opinion on how the corpus callosotomy prodecure affects the "transmitter" as it obviously has effects on the "radio"?MikeKratch
December 16, 2008
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Barry Arrington [OP]:
One wonders what JT meant by “I,” in that sentence, because if, as he says, the mind does not exist, the concept of “I” has no meaning, so it seems to me that it would make more sense for him to put irony quotes around “I” and not “mind.” This, of course, is just another example of how the materialist is forced to affirm the non-materialist case in the very act of attempting to refute it.
noted scholar [31]:
It’s possibly JT was using the word “I” simply in a functional sense. It’s a common piece of rhetoric.
The reason I didn't address BarryA's point previously is I didn't understand it. The arguments in ID are often highly esoteric. Why should I be prohibited from using a particular pronoun because I believe the mind is essentially a physical thing? Why no prohibit me from using "We" as well, The plural "I". When I use a pronoun it is for the purpose of alluding or referring to an object in an abbreviated way. "Him" "Her" "This" "That". Maybe you should demand I use "it" when referring to people because I think on some level they really are just complex mechanisms. Maybe you should demand that French or other European dualists not use pronouns reflecting gender when referring to inanimate objects: "De boat - she no go." That's an affront to the dignity of humanity. How is a beer inherently feminine - answer me that Mexico. Maybe I only mock what I do not understand.JT
December 15, 2008
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vjtorley,
(i) the term “mind” does not refer to a thing of any kind, let alone a thing interacting with the brain
Would it not, at least, refer to the substantial form of an individual person (on the Thomistic account)? If not, how am I mistaken? The reason I'm inclined to substance dualism is that no form of material substance (coherently conceived) is identical to the essentially subjective person. Also, I'm not quite sure what you mean by "bodily act" as opposed to an act of the "whole person." Could you explain further? (Forgive me if I've not read through all of your work. References thereto will be quite sufficient. Thanks!)crandaddy
December 15, 2008
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Excuse me if someone has already covered this.....and I am sure they have....but, the code is conventional. Transcription/translation is a bridge that cannot be crossed without volition. Chance and Law both are dead - even if they are yet to be buried.Upright BiPed
December 15, 2008
December
12
Dec
15
15
2008
10:53 PM
10
10
53
PM
PDT
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