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Computational Intelligence and Darwinism

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This UD post got me to thinking. I do that from time to time.

On the subject of computational intelligence I have some minor credentials, including a Silver Medal at the first Computer Olympiad in London, sponsored by David Levy of chess fame. You can access the final results of my research and efforts in computational artificial intelligence (AI) here:

If you have a computer with sufficient memory and disk space you can explore the only perfect-play endgame algorithm ever invented for the game of checkers (known as draughts in the UK).

It was my exploration into computational AI that initially caused me to have doubts about the creative powers of the Darwinian mechanism, which I now consider to be a transparent absurdity as an explanation for almost anything of any significance, and certainly not as an explanation for human intelligence.

Here’s why.

Computer programs that play games like checkers and chess involve two primary algorithms, a brute-force tree search and a leaf-node static evaluator. The tree search says, “If I move here, and the opponent moves there, and I move thus…” Unfortunately, the exponential explosion of possibilities means that the search must eventually be terminated. At that point a static positional evaluator must be invoked. This requires designing heuristics that can evaluate the position with no further search.

The problem is that these heuristics are difficult to devise and encode, and they are often wrong, because of tactical considerations that lurk beyond the horizon of the search and the fact that the heuristics can have unanticipated side-effects.

A human player might say, “Hmmm, if I move here, this will create a positional weakness from which the opponent cannot possibly recover.” There is no way to encode such knowledge, which comes from human experience and positional recognition.

The other problem is that computer programs like mine do not play against the opponent; they play against themselves. The tree search assumes that the opponent sees everything it does, which in a human-versus-human game is not the case. In one game my program played against a grandmaster human, the human was in deep trouble, and he told me so. The computer was considering the move the human feared, which would lead to a very difficult, razor-thin draw. But the program searched so far ahead that it found the draw, assumed the human would see it as well, and played a move that gave the program a few more meaningless points, letting the human off the hook.

All attempts at computational language interpretation have been dismal failures for similar reasons. Even the best spell- and grammar-checkers are astronomically stupid:

Eye halve a spelling chequer
It came with my pea sea
It plainly marques four my revue
Miss steaks eye kin knot sea.

Eye strike a key and type a word
And weight four it two say
Weather eye am wrong oar write
It shows me strait a weigh.

As soon as a mist ache is maid
It nose bee fore two long
And eye can put the error rite
Its rare lea ever wrong.

Eye have run this poem threw it
I am shore your pleased two no
Its letter perfect awl the weigh
My chequer tolled me sew.

The point is: With all our human intelligence, technology, and inventiveness, how can anyone who is still in contact with reality believe that random accidents engineered our brains and minds?

Comments
tgp, As I have said dozens of times on this forum, I do not happen to be materialist. I was trying to explain the materialist viewpoint, but I do not happen to agree with it (but of course not for the reasons you have tried to argue). Materialists do not deny abstraction. They deny non-physical ontological status, which is something entirely different. There is no contradiction between materialism and abstraction, because materialists do not deny that we can think, and thinking always entails abstraction. Materialists believe that our thinking proceeds as according to physical causes operating on physical entities. Computers can learn to recognize faces. A "face" is an abstraction, but can be reduced to physical features (eyes, nose, mouth, eyebrows... or skin, teeth, hair... or molecules, atoms... you can reduce these things to any level of abstraction you wish). Computers are also abstractions, and they too can be reduced to physical features (chips, transistors, wires... or atoms, electrons, etc). So we have one abstraction (a computer) learning to recognize another abstraction (faces), and everything is reducible to physical entities. Of course you will point out that the human who created the computer system cannot be reduced to physical entities and cause, because you believe there is something else in a human being that is not in a computer - an immaterial, causal mind (and an immortal soul perhaps). That is the difference between you and a materialist. You both understand abstractions just fine, but you believe that in order to have conscious thought at all we require something that transcends physical cause and entities. Materialists believe that there is no special mind-stuff or sould that inhabits our bodies; they believe that our thinking operates mechanically. The reason I am not a materialist has nothing to do with mental abilities or with abstractions, but rather with our subjective experience of conscious awareness. My position is called neutral monism, which holds that there is only one sort of substance (rather than making an ontological distinction between mind and matter), but that this substance cannot be understood as we intuitively think of matter. Modern physics (especially quantum physics) has already clearly revealed that matter is a very bizarre thing; I believe that there must be something about what we call matter that has aspects of consciousness associated with it. None of this has anything to do with science, of course - it is all nothing but philosophical speculation - but neutral monism seems like the most reasonable position to me.aiguy
August 15, 2010
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!!!!!! aiguy, thanks for stating my point so clearly even as you disagree with me... "This is complete nonense. This is a bizarre caricature of materialism, so naive that a freshman philosophy student would dismiss it instantly. Materialists make inferences to – and believe in – all sorts of things that are inaccessible to our unaided senses, quite obviously." The problem is not that I am caricaturing materialism, I am merely pointing out the logical ABSURDITY of it. Look at what you JUST WROTE. "Materialists make inferences to - and believe in - all sorts of things that are inaccessible to our unaided senses" EXACTLY. I am merely pointing out the egregious intellectual hypocrisy of someone who, on the one hand says, as a metaphysical doctrine, that nothing exists beyond the material world, and on the other hand avails himself of abstracta whenever it suits him. It's intellectual degeneracy, is what it is. It is self-destructive and will, if left to its own ends, destroy western civilization. We'll see how that turns out. That you can read, and apparently understand, the words I am writing, yet not have the first clue about what I am saying is so depressing, on a number of levels. It's a reflection of how far gone rational thought is from our world.tgpeeler
August 15, 2010
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Aiguy, I tried to tell you. :) No hall pass.Upright BiPed
August 15, 2010
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more on aiguy, can't help it, too much error to ignore... "This is patently ridiculous. Of course materialists do not deny the existence of the “abstract world”! Rather, materialists believe that all abstractions are reducible to physical entities and causes! Everything is an abstraction, of course! A chair is an abstraction; a brain is an abstraction; an atom is an abstraction, an electron is an abstraction… These are all abstractions (as opposed to noumenon). Materialists just happen to believe that all of these abstractions fundamentally derive from the same sort of stuff (which is why materialism is monistic) and that stuff is physical." I quote: "Materialism is the naturalistic metaphysics that regards nature as consisting of matter in motion. Whatever is apparently not matter in motion is to be regarded as "mere appearances" of what is matter in motion. All explanation, therefore, in philosophy as well as in science, is to be phrased in terms of the laws now known or yet to be discovered concerning the relationships among the different kinds of matter and the laws of their motion with respect to each other. Philosophic Inquiry, page 338." “Materialists deny that the world includes both mental and material substances. Every substance is a material substance. Minds are fashioned somehow from the same elementary components from which rocks, trees, and stars are made.” Philosophy of Mind, page 51. So you have just demonstrated the first art of the materialist. The open denial of what you believe. You say, OF COURSE the abstract world exists (your ontology says not), but it's NOT REALLY abstract!!! Wow, look Ma, no hands!!! So explain to me, just give me one example, of how sub-atomic particles in energy fields relate to, oh, I dunno, mathematics or the rules of logic. I'll wait.tgpeeler
August 15, 2010
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aiguy,
But ultimately the abstraction of “chair” always refers to some physical object. Now you see what I mean when I say that abstractions reduce to physical things.
Can you show me the physical abstraction of dignity? of freedom? of love? of the square root of two? of zero? can you please show me the physical abstraction of logic and reason? of laws of nature?Clive Hayden
August 15, 2010
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aiguy @ 118 "Wow, you are wrong already. Materialists claim that there is nothing except physical entities and causes in the world. However, they do not claim that all human knowledge is derived from sensory experience." Wow, you've already made my point. They do claim that nothing exists except physical entities and causes (I thought we were past that, I had moved to another, less fundamental claim) and in the same breath you announce that somehow they claim to know things apart from sensory experience, right after acknowledging that they claim there is nothing beyond sensory experience. How do you not understand this internal contradiction? May I ask that you actually consider what I am saying and address the argument. Sigh... Maybe this will help. IF I am going to be an intellectually honest materialist (there is no such creature) THEN I would have to admit that I could know nothing other than sense experience. I say this for two reasons. First, my ontology demands it. That is, IF there is nothing beyond the material that exists which may be sensed, THEN how could I possibly sense something, be aware of something, that is not physical (doesn't exist)? Second, since the physicalists in philosophy of mind disavow the existence of immaterial mind (nature is causally closed, you see), then I'd have no way to grasp the abstract even if there were abstract things to grasp. In other words, if ALL there is to me is sense experience, THEN I have no way to grasp the existence of abstractions even if they existed. Which, of course, my ontology as a materialist denies. Jaegwon Kim gets this: "“So all roads branching out of physicalism may in the end seem to converge at the same point, the irreality of the mental. This should come as no surprise: we should remember that physicalism, as an overarching metaphysical doctrine about all of reality, exacts a steep price.” Mind in a Physical World, page 119." Of course, he believes it anyway. So sad.tgpeeler
August 15, 2010
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Hi Vivid,
AIGUY: Materialists just happen to believe that all of these abstractions fundamentally derive from the same sort of stuff (which is why materialism is monistic) and that stuff is physical. VIVID: Got it, abstractions are physical stuff.
No, in the view of materialists abstractions are reducible to physical stuff. So a materialist would say that "economics" is an abstraction that ultimately reduces to physical acts of physical human beings. Here's a simpler example: A chair is an abstraction. I could show you lots of different pictures of things and you would identify some as chairs and some as not-chairs. It's not easy though, and there would be lots of instances where you might disagree with other people about what is a chair and what is something else. The abstract idea of a chair usually involves four legs, for example, but there are things that most people would call chairs that have no legs at all (like a beach chair with just the seat and the back). Some chairs have no backs, some have arm rests, etc. (It's hard to teach a computer what a chair is for this reason!) But ultimately the abstraction of "chair" always refers to some physical object. Now you see what I mean when I say that abstractions reduce to physical things. Materialists believe that all abstractions reduce to physical things, in particular the abstraction of "mind". For a materialist, a "mind" is just another way of talking about what brains do.aiguy
August 15, 2010
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"Materialists just happen to believe that all of these abstractions fundamentally derive from the same sort of stuff (which is why materialism is monistic) and that stuff is physical." Got it, abstractions are physical stuff. Vividvividbleau
August 15, 2010
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I, for one, will be moving on to more productive pastures.Zach Bailey
August 15, 2010
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Onlookers will judge for themselves whether points have been answered perhaps. (At least those who have the stamina to keep reading this thread!)Zach Bailey
August 15, 2010
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Aiguy @ 118 Your reply to Tom Peeler was laced with all the arrogance befitting a failed argument. It is the failed argument itself (not you), coming from a willfully closed mind (you), which forces the arrogance into play. It is referred to as assuming a position you cannot defend. Here is how it works. Tom gave you a straightforward challenge. If you intend on successfully refuting it, then there here are four possibilities that flow forward. 1) You can attack his argument from the front and simply defeat it in easily accessible logic and rationale. 2) You can return with a counter argument which does not make a frontal attack, but instead hopes to distract him from his position. 3) You can abandon the argument without changing your position, or 4) Well, here you must make a decision. If you cannot attack on the front, and if you cannot distract him, and if you intend to remain in the argument, then you must by necessity simply assume your conclusions. Which is what you’ve done, you’ve assumed territory you cannot defend. As far as Tom’s argument, I am almost certain he was not asking you to simply assume your conclusions, but to defend them instead. I am just as certain that he did not ask you to point to the conclusions of others and simply assume them as well. Perhaps you’d be better off carrying on a conversation with persons less qualified to judge your comments. Your expectations of being given a hall pass are misplaced. You see, that is how debate works. As far as your response to Peeler’s challenge, I think these words are appropriate, although they’ve already been used on this thread: “Instead of debating and making arguments, you … point to other people who you wish could refute my arguments…and …you have failed to produce a single argument of your own or refute a single point I’ve made.”Upright BiPed
August 15, 2010
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avo,
Asking me for a definition of intelligence is merely an invitation to long and irrelevant debate.
No, asking ID what it means when it says that an "intelligent designer" created life is the central question here. I'm certainly not the only one who has pointed out this out.
Perhaps, as you pointed out above, if the designer is an omnipotent being it cannot learn, although the ability to learn seems like an important part of a good definition.
Most scientists consider learning as a critical part of what they mean by "intelligence". If the cause of life was not capable of learning, then, ID would be wrong and the cause would not be intelligent. Omipotence (I think you meant "omniscience", really) would only be one reason the cause of life couldn't learn; maybe the Designer knew only how to produce various biological structures, knew nothing else at all, and was incapble of learning anything else - an extreme savant, as psychologists would say. Computers that can play chess may be very good at playing chess, but many of these programs are not capable of learning, and they usually can't do anything else at all. We don't usually consider these programs to be intelligent; they are just very good at playing chess. Perhaps whatever created life was like that - not generally intelligent, but only good at generating the biological systems we see. (Here is where you say that something intelligent must have designed the chess program. And then I say in that case, who designed the Designer? And you say maybe the Designer exists uncaused. And then I say if you can posit some generally intelligent being who exists uncaused, I can certainly posit something that is not generally intelligent that exists uncaused.)
What sort of IQ would it take to design the first cell? Gee, I don’t really know. And maybe it’s a good question for those interested in pursuing it. But whatever it is, some entity or entities had it. However, in the case of biological life forms, it looks strongly as though the designer would be fairly different from us.
No, the designer would not be farily different from us. Rather, the designer of the first life form would be radically different from us, because it would not even have been a living thing! That is why we have absolutely no idea about any attribute at all that this thing might exhibit. We have no idea about any attribute at all. If you disagree, please tell me one single attribute that ID claims the Designer of First Life exhibits. And please, please do not say "The attribute that ID claims the Designer of First Life exhibits is... the ability to create First Life"!
Thus, the intelligence and directed will are pretty much all we have.
If you are going to claim that you know something about the cause of life, and you'd like people to be able to decide if you are right are not, then you need to say what it is you think you know about it. For example if I claimed something was "blue", you would know some things that were supposed to true about it. You could say, for example, that if you were to shine white light on this thing (whatever it was), the light it would reflect back should be primarily in the blue part of the spectrum. If it turned out that this thing did not reflect blue light, then you would know I was wrong in my claim. If I claimed something was "massive", you would know that I was saying it would be accelerated in the presence of another mass, and that it would have momentum if it was moving, and so on. If it turned out that this thing did not accelerate in the presence of another mass, or that it had no momentum, then you would know I was wrong in my claim. Likewise if I claimed something was massless, or electrically charged, or radioactive, then you would know how to go about seeing if I was right or wrong. You (or some scientist) would know just how to go about seeing if the attributes associated with each of these labels were exhibited by this thing or not. What if I claimed something could do math problems, or do a crossword puzzle, or answer questions about something they'd read? Sure - if I claimed this, you would know what I meant and you could think of a way to determine if my claim was correct or not. Likewise if I claimed something could play chess, or build a spider web, or find buried peanuts - these are all descriptions that are meaningful in a way that would enable you to ascertain if I was right or not. Do you get the idea here? Now let's try it with your claim. Say I claimed something has "intelligence" and "directed will". Now you would like to determine if I am right or not. What exactly do you do in order to see if I'm right? Obviously you have no answer to this question, because the terms "intelligence" and "directed will" are very different from all the other terms we've been talking about. All those other terms tell us something about the thing we're making claims about. In contrast, saying something has "intelligence" and "directed will" tells us nothing at all that we can use to determine if it is true or not. If you disagree, Just answer the question: How would you go about seeing if I was right or wrong when I said something had intelligence and directed will.
AIGUY: You have precisely nothing until you tell me, at long last, what your operational definition of “intelligence” is. AVO: I can see that you are intelligent, and apparently can design computer programs, and yet I don’t know your precise IQ and STILL haven’t got my very own operational definition of intelligence!
Here I will try to explain to you why you have a hard time understanding this. When you say that I appear to be intelligent, you certainly feel as though you have made a concrete claim about me. But the only reason you think that is because you have not merely inferred that I am an "intelligent agent". The truth is you have inferred that I am a human being! Admimt it - that is what you think. You have not simply concluded that I am some unknown type of entity who exhibits "intelligence and directed will" of course! You know all sorts of things about me!. You know some things about me with virtual certainty, like that I have a brain and muscles and sense organs, that I breathe and eat and drink, etc. You know other things with a high degree of probability - that I can do arithmetic, do a crossword puzzle, answer questions about something I've read, solve a maze, recognize a melody, draw a stick figure... and so on, ad infinitum. You know all of these things about me not because you have determined I am an "intelligent agent". NO! Rather, you know these things about me because you know that I am a human being. If I told you that something was intelligent but was not itself a life form, then all of these assumptions would be groundless! You would not know if a single one of these attributes was true or not! This really is the central confusion in your thinking, so please make sure you understand what I am saying here.
AIGUY: Uh, you have precisely zero attributes. None. You haven’t said one single thing about this hypothetical designer that we can use to decide if it exists or not. AVO: First of all, we do not have zero. We have intelligence and what I called directed will and CJ calls foresight.
As I have just tried very hard to explain, this is precisely where you are confused. None of these things mean anything concrete - they only have concrete meaning when they (implicitly) refer to human beings (or perhaps other animals) - not when they refer to entities that are completely unknown to us.
This also means, if not personal consciousness of our type, awareness.
OK - this really IS a concrete claim. We all know what conscious awareness is, so when you make the claim that the Designer of Life was conscious, I do know just what you are talking about specifically. Unfortunately, I have absolutely no way of decided whether or not this claim of yours is true. Think about it - we couldn't even decide if Terri Shiavo had conscious awareness, and she was surrounded by instruments and doctors studying her in detail! So how are we going to decide if some unknown entity who existed prior to first life had conscious awareness? Do you think bees or termites are conscious when they create their complex artifacts? Your guess is as good as anyone's, since we have no way to determine this.
I don’t necessarily think God is the designer, but certainly is the only source of anything. I can and do doubt absolutely everything, but never the existence of God. It’s a point of logic, not faith.
I'm pretty good at logic, actually, but I don't know what you mean by the word "God".
AIGUY: Sorry, but you didn’t answer the question. I asked the following: If you believe there is a difference between “guided” and “unguided” forces in nature, please tell me what it is you think is guiding the “guided” forces. (hint: You have no idea; I think its best to just come out and say it). AVO: What I was referring to is the difference between natural processes, versus what can happen when we purposely guide nature’s materials to create things that do not occur without that interference.
Sorry, but you didn’t answer the question. I asked the following: If you believe there is a difference between “guided” and “unguided” forces in nature, please tell me what it is you think is guiding the “guided” forces. So far, your answer is "we" (i.e. human beings). Is that what you mean? If not, please tell me what it is that is capable of guiding forces. (hint: You mean consciousness, don't you?)
How come when the PEAR project or Rupert Sheldrake do it, that is scientific?
Because they (Jahn and Sheldrake) use the scientific method. All of their definitions are fully operationalized. They clearly state their hypotheses, draw meaningful predictions from their hypotheses, design controlled experiments to test their predictions, and publish their data. That is why. Jahn found statistically significant results to support his hypothesis that humans can affect external physical events by consciously thinking about them. However, the effect was vanishingly small, so the only way he could achieve statistical significance was to run gigantic numbers of trials. This amplifies the possibility that his results were confounded and didn't really support his hypothesis. While most of the scientific dismissed his results for this reason, I believe it remains an open question.
Oh, those engaging in scientific endeavors are constantly speculating about things they haven’t seen and cannot (yet) test.
Yes of course we all speculate. I'm not talking about speculations. I'm talking about scientific results. Most scientists make the distinctions clear, but some don't.
Well it seems to me that there is a barrier in your thinking. You are somewhat open to “other” possibilities, but see no bridge to get there. My point was that we may have perfectly valid clues as to the existence of a designer(s) despite not having much of a testable nature to work with, as of yet.
You are speculating, then.
You say that Stuart Kauffman is doing science when he points up the faults of evolution theory, but many ID theorists do that, too.
Yes, that is all that ID theorists do scientifically. Let's agree arguendo that ID theorists are as scientific as Kauffman when they analyze evolutionary theory. They are then doing perfectly good science... but it has nothing to do with "intelligent designers". Instead, it has to do with "evolutionary theory".
And why would the discussion of intelligent beings be unscientific? I’m just asking.
It is neither scientific nor unscientific to discuss intelligent beings. It is unscientific to offer "intelligence" as a cause, because we have no way of telling if it is true or not. There is no scientific result in any field that offers "intelligence" per se as a cause of anything.
AIGUY: Biological complexity was either caused by blind forces or there is an infinite number of universes. I’ve proven blind forces can’t do it, so there must be an infinite number of universes! AVO: Multiple universes is the same as blind forces. It just increases the time and particles to help overcome probabilistic hurdles.
I didn't say "multiple universes". I said an "infinite number of universes". If there are an infinite number of universes, then an infinite number of universes with exhibit life forms which are astronimically improbable, and an infinite number of universes will exhibit no life at all, and so on.
So far, the only alternative to undirected natural forces and directed intentional ones is an unconscious force of some kind, but I think CJ is doing well with that
We don't know what the answer is. You can say an unspecified non-living but conscious being, or you can say an unspecified non-living and unconscious force, but neither of these alternatives are testable, and we observe neither of these things in our experience.aiguy
August 15, 2010
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Avo: Well said. Again, we have an elaboratable definition of "intelligence" that has been sitting in the UD glossary for nearly two years, and which we can easily enough develop details on by following the reference in Wiki (and, all the links you could want are there in the glossary item):
“capacities to reason, to plan, to solve problems, to think abstractly, to comprehend ideas, to use language, and to learn.”
So, ever so much of the verbiage above was distractively irrelevant. And, BTW, IQ is a metric of differential intelligence, not of intelligence per se. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
August 15, 2010
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aiguy,
I love this one. What you are saying is that your testable definition of “intelligence” is that it can create just the sorts of things we observe! The way scientists measure intelligence is with standardized IQ tests, and obviously that isn’t going to work in the context of ID, right
Asking me for a definition of intelligence is merely an invitation to long and irrelevant debate. Perhaps, as you pointed out above, if the designer is an omnipotent being it cannot learn, although the ability to learn seems like an important part of a good definition. What sort of IQ would it take to design the first cell? Gee, I don't really know. And maybe it's a good question for those interested in pursuing it. But whatever it is, some entity or entities had it.
However, in the case of biological life forms, it looks strongly as though the designer would be fairly different from us. Thus, the intelligence and directed will are pretty much all we have. You have precisely nothing until you tell me, at long last, what your operational definition of “intelligence” is.
I can see that you are intelligent, and apparently can design computer programs, and yet I don't know your precise IQ and STILL haven't got my very own operational definition of intelligence!
Uh, you have precisely zero attributes. None. You haven’t said one single thing about this hypothetical designer that we can use to decide if it exists or not.
First of all, we do not have zero. We have intelligence and what I called directed will and CJ calls foresight. This also means, if not personal consciousness of our type, awareness. It's current or former existence is a whole nother ball of wax. I don't necessarily think God is the designer, but certainly is the only source of anything. I can and do doubt absolutely everything, but never the existence of God. It's a point of logic, not faith.
Sorry, but you didn’t answer the question. I asked the following: If you believe there is a difference between “guided” and “unguided” forces in nature, please tell me what it is you think is guiding the “guided” forces. (hint: You have no idea; I think its best to just come out and say it).
What I was referring to is the difference between natural processes, versus what can happen when we purposely guide nature's materials to create things that do not occur without that interference.
The only thing I object to is when folks decide to claim that their speculation is not philosophical or theological, but it is instead scientific.
How come when the PEAR project or Rupert Sheldrake do it, that is scientific?
I only care that science is grounded in our shared experience, and that inferences that can’t be grounded in our shared experiences (like the speculation that a conscious being created life) not be palmed off as “science”.
Oh, those engaging in scientific endeavors are constantly speculating about things they haven't seen and cannot (yet) test.
Obviously science discovers all manner of things we can’t observe directly – everybody knows that. What we typically observe directly are our instruments, or statistical summaries of observations. This has nothing to do with the limitations of our unaided senses, avocation. Good grief.
Well it seems to me that there is a barrier in your thinking. You are somewhat open to "other" possibilities, but see no bridge to get there. My point was that we may have perfectly valid clues as to the existence of a designer(s) despite not having much of a testable nature to work with, as of yet. You say that Stuart Kauffman is doing science when he points up the faults of evolution theory, but many ID theorists do that, too.
It has nothing to do with the hypothesis that a conscious being created life. I’m not sure why this is hard to understand. It has nothing to do with “intelligent design”.
And why would the discussion of intelligent beings be unscientific? I'm just asking.
DGUY: What do you mean? AIGUY: Biological complexity was either caused by blind forces or there is an infinite number of universes. I’ve proven blind forces can’t do it, so there must be an infinite number of universes!
Multiple universes is the same as blind forces. It just increases the time and particles to help overcome probabilistic hurdles. So far, the only alternative to undirected natural forces and directed intentional ones is an unconscious force of some kind, but I think CJ is doing well with that.avocationist
August 15, 2010
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AIGuy: "I have no idea why you would say this presents a problem for materialism." TGPeeler: "IF the only way we have to know of things is via sense experience, and materialists of all stripes claim this, they have to, they DENY the existence of the abstract world, THEN the only things I could possibly know are things that I could “sense.” That means things that I can see, hear, smell, taste, and touch. Do you understand this? . So IF it is true that the only way I can know something is by sense experience THEN how is it that I am aware of abstract things??????? Which are, BY DEFINITION, beyond being sensed????? . But I do know of abstract things like mathematics, laws, information, justice, love, etc… etc… etc… . Therefore, THEREFORE, there MUST be something more to me than the physical." AIGuy: "Wow, you are wrong already. Materialists claim that there is nothing except physical entities and causes in the world. However, they do not claim that all human knowledge is derived from sensory experience. Research reveals that we are born with a good deal of knowledge which can not derive from sense experience, and materialists believe this knowledge is encoded in genetic and epigenetic information. ..." Wow! The only way to explain AIGuy's persistent and willful self-contradiction is one of these three: 1) he is utterly incapable of understanding what he's talking about ... and what he himself said. 2) he lacks some prior knowledge or understanding ... such that he is unable to understand what he himself said. 3) he declines to correctly understand what logically follows from materialism ... and from what he himself has said. Option #1 amounts to "AIGuy is stupid" (I'm sure that's not it). Option #2 amounts to "AIGuy is ignorant" (in this context, I'm sure that's not it -- how can one really be ignorant about one's own assertions?). Option #1 amounts to "AIGuy is intellectually dishonest."Ilion
August 14, 2010
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tgpeeler,
IF the only way we have to know of things is via sense experience, and materialists of all stripes claim this, they have to, ...
Wow, you are wrong already. Materialists claim that there is nothing except physical entities and causes in the world. However, they do not claim that all human knowledge is derived from sensory experience. Research reveals that we are born with a good deal of knowledge which can not derive from sense experience, and materialists believe this knowledge is encoded in genetic and epigenetic information. Noam Chomsky - a fully committed materialist if there ever was one! - famously argued that humans are born with innate linguistic knowledge.
...they DENY the existence of the abstract world,
This is patently ridiculous. Of course materialists do not deny the existence of the "abstract world"! Rather, materialists believe that all abstractions are reducible to physical entities and causes! Everything is an abstraction, of course! A chair is an abstraction; a brain is an abstraction; an atom is an abstraction, an electron is an abstraction... These are all abstractions (as opposed to noumenon). Materialists just happen to believe that all of these abstractions fundamentally derive from the same sort of stuff (which is why materialism is monistic) and that stuff is physical.
THEN the only things I could possibly know are things that I could “sense.” That means things that I can see, hear, smell, taste, and touch. Do you understand this?
This is complete nonense. This is a bizarre caricature of materialism, so naive that a freshman philosophy student would dismiss it instantly. Materialists make inferences to - and believe in - all sorts of things that are inaccessible to our unaided senses, quite obviously.
So IF it is true that the only way I can know something is by sense experience THEN how is it that I am aware of abstract things??????? Which are, BY DEFINITION, beyond being sensed?????
It is not at all clear that you are aware of abstract things, tgpeeler. Judging by your argument, it would appear there is much about abstraction you have yet to learn.
But I do know of abstract things like mathematics, laws, information, justice, love, etc… etc… etc… Therefore, THEREFORE, there MUST be something more to me than the physical.
Sigh. Materialists understand all of these things in terms of the material of course. Do yourself a favor and read a book - just one single book - on beginning philosophy. You would learn that the difference between materialists and non-materialists has nothing to do with abstraction. Rather, the difference has to do with something called ontology.
How about this time, you actually disagree with what I said rather than float a straw man and argue against that.
You are so confused that it is difficult to even explain to you why you are wrong. My best advice to you is to begin by reading about metaphysical ontology, and then read about how materialists interpret levels of abstraction and inference to unseen entities. Trust me: Everybody knows that we can't see, hear, smell, taste, or touch a neutrino, but the physicists who describe their existence are still and yet materialists of the highest order.
Or you can say, tgpeeler, you insufferably arrogant so and so, haven’t you read and studied the many dozens of great thinkers and their arguments and counter-arguments? I will say, yes, I’ve read enough to know that many of them are merely spouting nonsense. My argument makes sense. Kindly deal with it and leave the ad hominems at home. In philosophy, there are no authorities, only arguments. Or haven’t you heard???
I am content at this point to leave this discussion to the review of the fair reader, and will submit to their judgement as to whether I have dismissed your views prematurely.
AIGUY: Because machines can represent things; they assume physical states which map to the world at various levels of abstraction. TGP: Oh really? And why is it that “machines can represent things”??? Do you think it might possibly have anything to do with a human agent who programmed the machine to represent things with electronic 1s and 0s??? Maybe? But all that is beside the point. The point I was making anyway.
Perhaps you might enjoy thinking about this: You suggest that machines can only represent things because they have been designed by "human agents". And I presume that you also believe that human agents are the products of design - am I correct? And so you (presumably, again) believe that we can only represent things mentally because we have been designed by the Intelligent Designer. Is this what you think?
AIGUY: Because machines can represent things; they assume physical states which map to the world at various levels of abstraction. TGP: “They” assume… a machine assumes? I MUST BE misunderstanding you because this borders on incoherent. You may gain some insight into what machines can “understand” by reading John Searle’s Chinese room thought experiment.
Yes, you are misunderstanding what I wrote, and I must say this is the most comical error that I have seen on an ID forum in a very long time. I wrote that machines assume physical states which map to the world. The word "assume" in that sentence means (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/assume ):
assume (verb): 5. to take on; be invested or endowed with: The situation assumed a threatening character
So when I said machines assume physical states I meant they take on various states. In other words, the physical states of machines change in ways which map to (by which I mean systematically correlate with) various features of the external world. You, however, mistakenly thought the word sense I intended was this:
assume (verb): 1. to take for granted or without proof; suppose; postulate; posit: to assume that everyone wants peace
Thank you for that one, tgp, really. Very, very funny. I will get a lot of mileage out this.
I will reply again if you actually deal with my argument instead of ignoring it. I look forward to seeing your rebuttal.
Let's just say I did not rebut your argument, so you really don't have to rely again, OK?aiguy
August 14, 2010
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more aiguy @ 103 "Because machines can represent things; they assume physical states which map to the world at various levels of abstraction." Oh really? And why is it that "machines can represent things"??? Do you think it might possibly have anything to do with a human agent who programmed the machine to represent things with electronic 1s and 0s??? Maybe? But all that is beside the point. The point I was making anyway. "They" assume... a machine assumes? I MUST BE misunderstanding you because this borders on incoherent. You may gain some insight into what machines can "understand" by reading John Searle's Chinese room thought experiment. I will reply again if you actually deal with my argument instead of ignoring it. I look forward to seeing your rebuttal.tgpeeler
August 14, 2010
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aiguy @ 103 "I have no idea why you would say this presents a problem for materialism." I guess that must be because you did not read my post. IF the only way we have to know of things is via sense experience, and materialists of all stripes claim this, they have to, they DENY the existence of the abstract world, THEN the only things I could possibly know are things that I could "sense." That means things that I can see, hear, smell, taste, and touch. Do you understand this? So IF it is true that the only way I can know something is by sense experience THEN how is it that I am aware of abstract things??????? Which are, BY DEFINITION, beyond being sensed????? But I do know of abstract things like mathematics, laws, information, justice, love, etc... etc... etc... Therefore, THEREFORE, there MUST be something more to me than the physical. How about this time, you actually disagree with what I said rather than float a straw man and argue against that. Let me help. You can say there are other ways to sense the physical world and they are: (you fill in the blanks). Or you can say of course our five senses can be used to detect, understand, and manipulate the abstract world. We do it by: (you fill in the blank). This is how you defeat an argument. You actually attack what the other person said. Or you can say, tgpeeler, you insufferably arrogant so and so, haven't you read and studied the many dozens of great thinkers and their arguments and counter-arguments? I will say, yes, I've read enough to know that many of them are merely spouting nonsense. My argument makes sense. Kindly deal with it and leave the ad hominems at home. In philosophy, there are no authorities, only arguments. Or haven't you heard???tgpeeler
August 14, 2010
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UB: Thanks.kairosfocus
August 14, 2010
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PS: And as for the fulminations against foresight and purpose in creating directed contingency, you used it to create the posts protesting the concept and trying to come up with exceptions. As to PC's, where do they come from again? [Have you ever seen a design spec? A Blueprint? A Complex ckt drawing, much less one for a Motherboard? And even spaghetti code has purpose. And BTW, what were you doing when you hit he submit button? (This is beginning to remind me of my old cultic group deprograming days . . . there is a cultic mindset and it utterly twists obvious reality to try to force-fit it into the program. Only, it doesn't really work. But, for those caught up, it is very hard to see that until something breaks in their personal life. And then it is usually too late to stop massive pain. For major institutions and cultures there is a groupthink problem, and I am seeing symptoms of that all over the place in the Darwinist tactics these days. Something big is going to have to crash to break the mindset. And it is going to be painful.)]kairosfocus
August 14, 2010
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AIG: For Teleological Law, read -- it's written into the physics. think about what programming life into the basic physics of the cosmos implies. (Cosmological finetuning is already part way to that, BTW, and it is a serious issue in Cosmology. Watch the video int he already linked.) Gkairosfocus
August 14, 2010
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KF @ 110 Entirely correct.Upright BiPed
August 14, 2010
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CJYman,
When did I say that “foresight” is what enables humans to think? I have defined foresight as “envisioning a future target that does not exist and then engineering matter and energy in the present to accomplish that goal.” This is not a process that “enables” us to think … this is a description of the very process of thinking itself. Maybe that is why you’ve been misunderstanding and misrepresenting my arguments.
If you believe that foresight is "the very process of thinking itself", then you exclude most of human mental ability from your definition of "thought". For example, our ability to infer (make deductions, inductions, and abductions) does not entail envisioning future goals, but it's hard to believe you wouldn't consider these sorts of inferences as thought.
A computer can also produce FSCI without accompanying conscious foresight. However, conscious foresight is in the causal chain. This is why I keep asking you to provide an example of FSCI that did not require foresight in the causal chain.
Sorry but you still haven't been clear. 1) You say that foresight comes in two varieties, conscious and unconscious. Is that right? 2) You say that when computers use foresight it is of the unconscious variety, and when humans use it, it can be either conscious or unconscious. Correct? 3) You say that there can be no unconscious foresight unless it has been arranged (e.g. programmed) by conscious foresight. Is that what you mean?
So at least we agree that we do have foresight and use it in the generation of FSCI … ie, when we design complex circuitry or in your case more likely complex software. Now, there is one more question that needs to be answered … can you provide any examples of FSCI being generated without foresight in its causal chain?
Sorry, but you haven't qualified which sort of "foresight" you are talking about. If you don't want me to "mispresent" your arguments, I'm afraid you'll need to take a bit more care in defining and using your terminology.
AIG: The problem with this is the you are reifying foresight. There is no science to that. CJY: I’m not sure what you are saying here.
I meant that you are describing "foresight" as though it is a thing-in-itself rather than a property of something else. For example if you said "Her beauty got her the job", people would understand that you meant she got the job because she was beautiful, not because beauty is something that exists independently of her physical body and could causally act in the world.
1. Then how can you acknowledge that you possess foresight as I have defined it, when you don’t know what it is?
I do not "possess" foresight because foresight is not something one can "possess". Rather, I have conscious experiences of future goals (of course). Your definition of foresight goes beyond this, however, and includes the physically causal acts of realizing those goals. Since I believe these two things (conscious experience and physical behavior) may be causally independent, then I cannot say I have "foresight" as you define it.
2. Furthermore, if you’ve agreed that in order for the engineer to produce complex circuitry he must first be able to envision a future target that does not yet exist
Again we need to be more clear on terminology if you don't want me to misunderstand you. Above I've tried to clarify what you mean by "foresight" and as best I can determine you think it comes in these two varieties - conscious and unconscious. Now, when you say "envision" do you believe that we can "envision" things both consciously and unconsciously? And can you offer a way we can tell if a computer, say, is "envisioning" something or not? Until I understand this better, I can't answer your question without the danger of being nonresponsive to your point.
3. What do you mean by “I don’t know what this process ‘doesn’t do’.” Tell me, based on the same idea that you are attempting to get across here, just so I understand what you are stating and the relevance of the question, what does the Big Bang not do?
The Big Bang does not cause blue-shifted spectra, and it does not cause uniform background radiation in the ultra-violet range, and it does not cause a china teapot to orbit Venus... I could name as many things as you wish. Now, what does "foresight" not do?
Do you regularly experience foresight?
In hopes of improving our communication, I will repeat this once again: 1) I experience conscious awareness of future goals 2) I cause the realization of FSCI that match those goals 3) I do not know if the conscious awareness I experience is necessary to realize those goals or not, and nobody else knows this either. It is a subject of philosophical debate that is just beginning to become informed by scientific research. 4) If your definition of foresight entails that the conscious awareness of future goals (what you call "envisioning"?) is causal, then I can't say if I experience that or not. 5) If there can be "unconscious envisioning", then I do not experience that, no (because I only "experience" things I am conscious of!!!)
Is there anyone that will deny the existence of foresight?
It depends, as I've just explained. You need to be more careful with your terms. I don't really know what you mean by "envisioning" (i.e. Is it necessarily something that we consciously experience? Can we experience something unconsciously?) Until you are more clear about the relationships among these concepts (foresight, consciousness, envisioning, causality, and FSCI) we will continue to talk past each other.
AIGUY: This is a very old mistake. You name something that humans make, then ask what we would think if we found this extra-terrestrially. You say it we would infer “intelligent agency”. But that is wrong – we would instead infer “a life form similar to human beings”. CJY: … which was able to utilize its foresight. That ommission is also another mistake. This is the whole idea behind SETI. Oh, BTW, now that we are here, do you see SETI as a scientific research program?
SETI seeks extra-terrestrial life forms, not "foresight". They hire astrobiologists to look for planets that can support "life as we know it" (what they say). They do not assume that foresight exists independently of life as we know it.
So then you disagree that you first envision a future target that does not yet exist before you engineer FSCI such as a software program?
I do not always end up engineering what I first envision; typically the engineering process is the result of a certain amount of trial and error. But beyond that I will tell you once again: Just because human beings picture things in the "mind's eye" as they construct plans does not mean that this is a necessary aspect of planning. Computers generate complex plans without (presumably) being conscious of their goals. A materialist might say the following: My brain, as a result of its structure and physical interactions with the environment mediated by my senses, causes my fingers to move on the keyboard in such a way as to produce a program. During this process, I have conscious experiences too, which is my own perception of these physical, deterministic processes occuring in my brain. These conscious experiences are not the cause of my programming, however; rather they are an independent function that serves to narrate and explain what my brain is doing. Now, if what you are referring to "envisioning" is the conscious experience of the future goal, then no, if this materialist is correct it would not be necessary to envision the future goal. It would only require that the unconscious brain processes are functioning properly. You may think this viewpoint is incorrect, but I hope you will agree that this remains a philosophical issue without scientific resolution.
Except that, and its already been pointed out to you, we have no experience of FSCI being generated absent foresight in the causal chain but we do experience the generation of FSCI by utilizing the process that I’ve already described and defined as foresight.
You are assuming that envisioning is causal, which is an unsubstantiated claim. Ouija board uses experience external intelligent agency producing FSCI in the words being spelled out. But their experience is mistaken; it is really themselves generating unconscious plans to produce the FSCI. Various experiments reveal that people experience that they have conscious control over certain functions, while in truth they have no control over them at all. So your belief that we can infer causality here is unsupported; you have shown nothing but correlation between conscious envisioning and planning, and there is very good reason to doubt the causality is how you believe it to be.
So, your unconscious unspecified generator of life (an instance of FSCI) is nothing more than unspecified, speculative imagination and ID Theory’s intelligent designer of life is based on something that does exist and does generate FSCI.
This is mistaken for all the reasons I've given, but you'll need to complete the clarifications I've asked for before we can ever agree on this. (The clarifications are at the beginning of this post, where I ask you to summarize the relations among foresight, envisioning, consciousness, causality, and FSCI.
AIG: OK, from a materialist viewpoint, when a human designs a watch, it is something that happens in strict accord with natural law. Physics determines how the environment interacts with the structures and chemistry of the brain, and out comes a watch. It’s just law + chance, nothing more. Our experience of consciousness has nothing to do with it – it is purely epiphenomenal. CJY: You have demonstrated nothing of the sort. You’ve merely assumed consciousness to be epiphenomenal.
Are you kidding? How many times must I tell you? Sorry, but I will have to resort to a more aggressive font to catch your attention here. I am not taking a position on the mind/body problem. I do not assume that consciousness is causal, nor that it is epiphenomenal. I do not know the answer and nobody else does either. The mind/body problem has not been resolved by science. That is my point: Since ID requires particular solutions to the mind/body problem, and these solutions can't be demonstrated empirically, then ID is not based on our experience.
It’s quite obviously so much more than just law+ chance that is required since there are many layers of structure of organization (specifically organized quantum effects ala Penrose and Hameroff, the structure of the brain, the structure of cells, the sequencing of DNA) that aren’t defined by only law + chance and law+chance on its own absent this process of foresight in the causal chain has not been shown to be able to produce any of those structures or FSCI or foresight itself. To say that it is nothing but law+chance is quite obviously incorrect. Here is a link (https://uncommondescent.com.....ent-337588) to an in depth discussion I’ve already had with someone on this exact subject. Please go through that discussion as I’d rather not have to repeat the whole thing over again.
If you are going to argue that the mind/body problem has been solved empirically - by Penrose/Hameroff or anybody else - then we can quit right here. If you wish to claim that science now has some way to demonstrated that our mental abilities transcend physical cause (and that we know everything there is to know about "physical cause" in the first place!) then we have nothing left to discuss. This is precisely what I mean when I say ID rests on metaphysical assumptions about the mind/body problem. You have denied this, but apparently what you mean is that your dualistic solution has already been demonstrated by science!
Then I stated that IF, and it’s a bit IF, consciousness is shown to be epi-phenomenal, then Meyers is wrong.
Come on, then - let's see if we can actually agree here with some clarity. HERE IS OUR BEST SHOT AT CLARIFYING THE ISSUE: 1) As I have said (in bold, above), we have no empirical solution to the mind/body problem, and so it remains in philosophical debate, just as it has been for thousands of years. So we do not know, scientifically, if consciousness is epiphenomenal or not. 2) You have just said that Meyer is right if and only if epiphenomenalism is false. 3) Since we cannot determine the truth of epiphenomenalism by reference to experience, then our experience cannot tell us if Meyer is right or wrong. 4) Therefore Meyer's conclusion does not rest on our uniform and repeated experience.
aiguy: Huh? How do you imagine we can guage the complexity of consciousness? What possible metric might you be thinking of? This is getting pretty far out there… CJY: When we understand how consciousness operates we should be able to measure the complexity of its operation … unless it is not “material/physical” and not amenable to measurement. Is that what you are suggesting?
I'm pointing out that we most certainly do not understand how conciousness "operates"!!!! Much less does anyone have the faintest idea how we might go about measuring the "complexity" of consciousness!
I did not deny that machines, in principle, can not become conscious. I denied that AI could produce a conscious being without consciousness already in the causal chain.
We do not know what sorts of things can be conscious, or why.
Until someone provides a good explanation of the operation of consciousness, I don’t see how anyone can suggest that consciousness is epi-phenomenal.
The reason it can be suggested is exactly the one you provide: Because nobody has a good explanation of consciousness (or whether it can be said to "operate" at all). One argument for epiphenomenalism is the apparent causal closure of the physical world of course. But I do NOT want to debate this!!! All I want is for you to agree that these questions have not yet been resolved empirically!!!
The main reason that I am not presently in the epi-phenomenal camp is because IMO the only real testable and falsiifiable solution which actually provides a potential mechanism for consciousness is the theory provided by Penrose and Hameroff and it appears that their theory does not place consciousness as merely epi-phenomenal.
First I think we have different interpretations of P/H's theory. But I do not want to debate that either. If you wish to claim that Penrose/Hameroff has solved the mind/body problem and demonstrated that consciousness is causal, and that this is the science upon which Meyer can be shown to be correct, then we can stop now. In that case, you'll need to let Meyer know that his claims rest on the truth of this new theory by Penrose and Hameroff!
I’m not sure about that, however Dembski has stated that the intelligent designer could be a “teleological law” which would be more akin to my non-conscious definition of intelligence.
Dembski has admitted that his view requires "an extended ontology" in his words. But yes, he also alludes to "teleogical law" (which is a bit confusing since he denies lawlike causes can account for CSI!). It's all very confused. So, CJYman, I will ask you to please try and be as clear as you can and tell me what you think the relations are: foresight, envisioning, consciousness, causality, FSCI. Which concepts entil which other concepts? And I'm very disappointed you didn't answer my explicit questions about the computer, because they were designed to clarify these very issues. I've reposted them with the specific questions in bold:
AIGUY: You called natural Darwinian evolution an “artificially intelligent” system, and I’ve asked you to clarify that statement three times now to no avail. Can you please tell me the difference between what you consider an artificially intelligent system and other types of intelligent systems? Since presumably you believe we humans are the artifacts of a Designer, do you believe that we are also artificially intelligent? Let’s say we have a machine that is programmed to design various complex devices. Although it is impossible for anyone (including the programmers) to predict what designs the machine will invent, the machine operates strictly according to deterministic laws (including perhaps a deterministic pseudo-random generator). Would you say this machine has “foresight”? Perhaps you will say that the computer does not have foresight, but that the human programmer did. If this is your response, you must tell us how you have decided this is the case. What is it about the computer that makes you think it lacks foresight, while the human has it? Or, perhaps you will say that the computer does have foresight. But do you really think it “envisions” future goals? What does it mean to “envision” a future goal when the computer presumably has no conscious experience of a “mind’s eye”? While you ponder these questions, keep in mind that according to ID theory, one mustn’t ever ask the question “Who designed the designer?”. ID dictates that we can infer that something is intelligent without regard to the origin of the entity in question. For example, we can say that human beings are intelligent even though ID holds that human beings themselves were designed by some other intelligent designer.
aiguy
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UB: Sometimes it helps to use a concrete or plausible example or two to cut through the tangled multiply tangential verbiage, strawman caricatures and rhetorical plays. I suggest we go back to four comparative cases:
1] SB's 1963 Corvette Stingray moulded in sand on a beach, compared to a fossilised animal in sandstone. 2] Old Man of the Mountain vs Geo Washington at Mt Rushmore (cf my discussion that starts with this case here as Fig I.1, see also Fig I.3 on a dolphin wire mesh with facets vs Nefertiti with a 3-D face mask.) 3] The comparison of the "wiring diagram" -- I am copying Wicken's term) for a petroleum refinery with the similar flow network for the metabolic reactions in the cell. [Cf. the onward full bore metabolic reactions chart.] 4] The comparison of the digital code for say this web page [hit "Character Encoding" or the like, in the View menu] with the DNA for an organism.
1 --> Ask yourself, why is it that we so confidently identify the directed contingency in the 'vette sand sculpture, and in Mt Rushmore. (Ask yourself whether it would be credible to try to explain these as the products of waves, erosion etc, i.e chance and necessity in their environment.) 2 --> There is but one honest answer: we confidently identify the directed contingency -- which we are familiar with as designers ourselves -- because we see here functionally specific, complex information in 3-D form and we have no good reason to believe that the sort of natural forces [as opposed to artificial ones] that account for even a Man of the Mountain, or sand dunes and ripples, will give rise to the relevant specific and complex organisation and implied information to match the portraits of car and man. 3 --> To identify the presence of FSCI, observe how a 3-d wire mesh can be made to model the item, and how tightly it has to be specified to get the sculptures right. In addition, observe how such configurations will come from vast configuration spaces that would empirically lock out chance variations from such particularity. 4 --> Next, we turn to the chemical flow networks. FSCI rapidly emerges from the specifics of the functional organisation of the petroleum plant. 5 --> Similarly, once we see the functional specificity and complexity of the text strings for this page, we have little difficulty identifying he FSCI. 6 --> Now, whatever our ultimate natures, we know ourselves to be designers, and to have intelligence. We know on direct observation that FSCI is routinely produced by such creatures like ourselves, directly or indirectly; and well within the scope of resources of he cosmos -- utterly unlike what a troop of monkeys would do in the similar situations. 7 --> BTW, the difference between a chimp at a keyboard and a man, shows that the matter is not explained on being embodied, but on possessing verbal intelligence. So the repeated deflections to our intelligence being embodied are a strawman distraction. 8 --> We know that intelligence exists and what it does, regardless of its potential nature or natures. (And I happen to suspect that intelligence may be able to come in different ontological flavours.) 9 --> So, we have a duty to allow the evidence of reliable signs of intelligence speak, as facts that will constrain our speculations on its possible natures. 10 --> And -- uncontested though obscured and derided amidst the smoke of burning strawmen soaked in appeals to prejudice and to ad hominems -- we can see that FSCI and especially dFSCI is an empirically reliable sign of directed contingency, on cases were we independently know the causal story. 11 --> We also have good search space reasons to infer that on the gamut of the observed cosmos, try converting the universe into monkeys, keyboards with computers on tables, and bananas etc -- and the universe would reach heat death long before they could produce something comparable to this single post. [And the DNA for a simplest organism is much more complex than that.] 12 --> Now, the fossil mould and DNA are "natural" features tracing to the unobserved remote past, which exhibit FSCI. So, are they counter examples? 13 --> Far from it. They allow us to use the principle of inference from observed reliable pattern to explain the past (as the already linked page discusses in brief). 14 --> The principle that some would divert our attention from, to suggest that we are smuggling in assumptions about the ultimate nature of reality into our start-points. But the truth of the above is obvious: we are starting from empirical experience and are reasoning on facts and reasonable inferences form reliable patterns of causation and their signs. 15 --> The fossil mould first. The matrix took its shape passively from a bio-form. maybe a shell, maybe a trilobite, or whatever. The FSCI traces to the DNA in the bioform from whenever and the resulting embryological development. 16 --> So, we are back to DNA, which is digitally coded, functionally specific algorithmic complex information playing a part in both metabolism and cell-level replication, thence embryological development. Codes, algorithms, implementing machines -- where do these come form on our observation? 17 --> Would a tornado at Round Rock, TX be likely enough to be credible to plausibly explain the assembly and load up a functioning Dell? 18 --> Would a universe of Round Rocks and tornadoes make any material difference to the result? [On the implications of FSCI, not at all. No more than a universe full of monkeys etc would be plausible to explain the posts in this thread.] 19 --> And, remember, that for first life, we are needing to explain the origin of an algorithmic, coded digital information system based body plan that allows self-replication a la von Neumann. (Speculations on hypothesised replicator molecules is in a morass of empirical difficulties.) 20 --> For novel body plans, the islands of embryologically feasible function have to be reached per 10's of millions of bases worth of DNA, before we can credibly talk about hill-climbing off variation and selection for superior function. 21 --> You have to have function before you can talk about improvement. 22 --> So, we have fgood reason to infer that life as an information system based on dFSCI, is designed. 23 --> Now we cannot properly impose a rejection of this on claiming that one has to independently show the existence of an intelligent designer at that time. 24 --> This is a turnabout tactic, based on implicit assumption that on a priori materialism, despite want of evidence, only chance and necessity can be allowed as explanations. (But we know that chance necessity and design are observed causal factors nor can we reasonably assume that we or entities like us exhaust the set of possible designers. So, let us allow the evidence to point for itself.) 25 --> On considering the further factor [discussed in the same page with video and onward link on details] that the cosmos itself exhibits fine-tuned complex cosmological organisation that sets up a context in which C-chemistry cell based life is possible, then it points to intelligent design of our cosmos. 26 --> In light of the credible conclusion tha tour cosmos is contingent, this also raises the question of its orgin in a necessary being, one that is not credibly explained on an eternal wider material cosmos, or heat death would have already rendered a cosmos like outrs moot. 27 --> So we have no good reason to a priori rule out or dismiss the possibility of an immaterial [remember, heat death . . . ], powerful intelligent designer [recall, fine tuned complex organisation of a UNIVERSE and its underlying physics] of the cosmos. 28 --> That may not be palatable to those committed to or under the control of a priori materialist ideology[which often likes to wear a lab coat] but it puts right back on the table exactly the sort of possibilities that such would like to dismiss and deride without consideration. __________________ GEM of TKIkairosfocus
August 14, 2010
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aiguy: "It is clear, however, that Meyer’s version of ID rests squarely on dualism/interactionism, as does Dembski’s version of ID (and Dembski has said so quite explicitly, although he denies his version of interactionism is Cartesian)." I'm not sure about that, however Dembski has stated that the intelligent designer could be a "teleological law" which would be more akin to my non-conscious definition of intelligence.CJYman
August 14, 2010
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Aiguy at 98, You may not be aware of this, but many people here are already well-acquainted with your argument. It isn’t particularly new, and has been argued on these pages and elsewhere long before Meyer wrote his book (given his background, I am almost certain he was aware of it himself). Despite the twist du jour, the argument is the same as it has always been; to escape the design inference one must deny that the self exist. The problem is that none of you cats can ever develop a rationale for doing so, and you virtually always deposit the idea right where it hurts – like a bandage for the self-inflicted wound of ignoring the self-evident – and then you act like you didn’t mean it in virtually every other thing you do in life. One smells a rat. Of course you’ve sought to immunize yourself here by claiming you are disinterested in any such arguments, only to then assume them fully within your comments. In any case, I am appropriately leery of any empirical quest that begins by demanding that I must ignore homeplate for the practice of empiricism itself. This is not a strength. It is not a sign of post modern wisdom or a cleansing of the intellectual pallet. It’s just the same old philosophical sales pitch it’s always been, and in your case its part of a rabbit trick for the reasons I’ve already noted. And what it is that I am to give my self up for? What? What is it? Because some people believe some weird things? Because some people kill each other and fart on the elevator? Because even really smart people follow errors in their perception? Sorry, but these peculiarities are hardly up to the task of causing me think I am not here. To concede what you demand, the conscious self is not just my own personal imagination, but is imagination itself, certainly in no need of me along its causal plane. But then again, imagination doesn’t really exist either; that’s just an interesting state of chemical affairs which I/we named after I/we thought of it. My self would have to exist in order for me to compare my self to the world around me and make up names for what I observe. Nope, I cannot exist, only it can - in all its emergent glory - as the unconscious output of an elaborate chain of inanimate chemical accidents. I remember commenting here once about the utter arrogance of such a position. And by the way, you also seem to be enamored with the idea that this conundrum has been festering for eons, and you imply this fact must indicate something truly substaintial. I would suggest what you are seeing is nothing more than an effect which can be observed when bad ideas are useful, and therefore don’t go away. And of course no idea could be, or has been, as useful as this one. Its usefulness is obvious. If the self exist, then so does language and information – and the game is up.Upright BiPed
August 14, 2010
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aiguy: "Gee whiz. I have had to repeat my arguments dozens and dozens of times to everybody here, and I have been misconstrued, misrepresented, misquoted, and had words put in my mouth by all concerned – over and over again. Yet I have not once accused anyone of willfully and purposefully twisting my arguments! Forum arguments are difficult for a number of reasons, and these are difficult questions. I assure you I have not twisted anyone arguments purposefully, and will continue to believe that when people mistake everything I say it is because I haven’t been sufficiently clear and they haven’t been sufficiently attentive, and not because they are choosing to purposefully lie about what I’m saying." Sometimes it can just get a little frustrating, as I'm sure you've also experienced, trying to explain a concept or idea or position over and over again, yet having someone consistently not "get it right." I do apologize for any accusations and I hope we can eventually understand what each other is saying.CJYman
August 14, 2010
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aiguy: "Good grief, CJY! First you accuse me of purposefully misconstruing your argument, and then you repeat exactly what I had summarized your position to be! That is all I said – that you denied ID theory necessarily posited a conscious mind!" I apologize if I misunderstood what you said, but it appeared that you were saying that I agreed with you that Meyers was wrong in inferring a conscious mind when I did no such thing. I want to make it clear, and I did already make it clear, that I believe the inference to be well supported since FSCI has not been seen to be generated absent a conscious mind in its causal chain. Here's the example I referred to again ... Imagine a scientist working the way that you want this done. He would always be saying “I don’t know” regardless of the fact that effect “y” is always present when “x” is first present and effect “y” is never present absent “x" [in its causal chain]. Would he be a good scientist if he ignored his own work and just said “I don’t know,” or should he publish his findings of the apparent relationship between “x” and “y” based on his uniform and repeat experience? Then I stated that IF, and it's a bit IF, consciousness is shown to be epi-phenomenal, then Meyers is wrong. CJYman: "Furthermore, if consciousness is indeed the most complex phenomenon in existence" aiguy: "Huh? How do you imagine we can guage the complexity of consciousness? What possible metric might you be thinking of? This is getting pretty far out there…" When we understand how consciousness operates we should be able to measure the complexity of its operation ... unless it is not "material/physical" and not amenable to measurement. Is that what you are suggesting? aiguy: "… and if the Conservation of Information Law that Dembski has been working on is correct [that FSCI can not be increased only transferred and transformed] then this provides evidence that AI will not produce consciousness without conscious foresight already in that AI’s causal chain." aiguy: "I’ve heard a whole lot of philosophical arguments for and against AI in my time, but this numbers among the most strange and far-fetched. Unless you wish to claim that these ideas of yours can be emprically substantiated, I will pass on debating these notions." I did not deny that machines, in principle, can not become conscious. I denied that AI could produce a conscious being without consciousness already in the causal chain. I'm just dealing with some IFs here that will have to be decided during future research, just as you are when you are dealing with the possible epi-phenominalism of consciousness. Until someone provides a good explanation of the operation of consciousness, I don't see how anyone can suggest that consciousness is epi-phenomenal. The main reason that I am not presently in the epi-phenomenal camp is because IMO the only real testable and falsiifiable solution which actually provides a potential mechanism for consciousness is the theory provided by Penrose and Hameroff and it appears that their theory does not place consciousness as merely epi-phenomenal.CJYman
August 14, 2010
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aiguy: "You say that “foresight” is what enables humans to think; others say it is “neuronal activity”. You say consciousness is required; this is by no means evident." When did I say that "foresight" is what enables humans to think? I have defined foresight as "envisioning a future target that does not exist and then engineering matter and energy in the present to accomplish that goal." This is not a process that "enables" us to think ... this is a description of the very process of thinking itself. Maybe that is why you've been misunderstanding and misrepresenting my arguments. CJYman: "you have to ignoring what we do experience daily, as summed up in the three questions re: your experience of foresight, the engineer’s utilization of foresight, and the generation of FSCI absent foresight in the causal chain that I keep asking you and you have not yet sufficiently answered or answered at all." aiguy: "I really don’t mean to skip your questions. I think I’ve answered these: Yes I experience conscious awareness of my intentions and goals. Everything we see creating FSCI is a human being or other animal, but when humans or other animals produce FSCI it is not always accompanied by conscious awareness of the planning involved." Of course, and we've already been over this a few times. A computer can also produce FSCI without accompanying conscious foresight. However, conscious foresight is in the causal chain. This is why I keep asking you to provide an example of FSCI that did not require foresight in the causal chain. So at least we agree that we do have foresight and use it in the generation of FSCI ... ie, when we design complex circuitry or in your case more likely complex software. Now, there is one more question that needs to be answered ... can you provide any examples of FSCI being generated without foresight in its causal chain? aiguy: "The problem with this is the you are reifying foresight. There is no science to that." I'm not sure what you are saying here. aiguy: "I’ve said this in many different ways, but you don’t acknowledge it. You don’t know what foresight is, or what it does, or what it doesn’t do, or what conditions are required for it to operate, or what it has to do with consciousness." 1. Then how can you acknowledge that you possess foresight as I have defined it, when you don't know what it is? 2. Furthermore, if you've agreed that in order for the engineer to produce complex circuitry he must first be able to envision a future target that does not yet exist and then manipulate matter and energy in the future in order to accomplish that goal, then how can you say that you don't know what this process does? 3. What do you mean by "I don't know what this process 'doesn't do'." Tell me, based on the same idea that you are attempting to get across here, just so I understand what you are stating and the relevance of the question, what does the Big Bang not do? 4. The conditions for its operation have nothing to do with its existence or the ID inference. I've already explained this and you have not shown otherwise. aiguy: "For you, “foresight” means the same thing as res cogitans. There is nothing scientific about it – nothing that we can test." Yes science does deal with testing, and it also deals with uniform and repeat experience. Do you regularly experience foresight? Is there anyone that will deny the existence of foresight? Secondly, we can test for the previous existence of foresight by calculating for FSCI. This is so, because of our repeat and uniform experience of foresight and our repeat and uniform experience of using foresight (the process that I have already defined) to generate FSCI, and our lack of any experience of FSCI being generated absent foresight in the causal chain. Thus, call it what you will, ID Theory is based on repeat and uniform observation, mathematics to provide a no-go theorem, testing to see if FSCI will be generated absent foresight in the causal chain, and potential falisifiability. ID Theory does what it sets out to accomplish and it is just as scientific as any other historical scientific discipline which relies on inference. CJYman: "1. Re: “anthropomorphic mistake,” that is nothing more than a cop-out that would not work if we found FSCI such as a manuscript on the other side of the universe." aiguy: "This is a very old mistake. You name something that humans make, then ask what we would think if we found this extra-terrestrially. You say it we would infer “intelligent agency”. But that is wrong – we would instead infer “a life form similar to human beings”." ... which was able to utilize its foresight. That ommission is also another mistake. This is the whole idea behind SETI. Oh, BTW, now that we are here, do you see SETI as a scientific research program? aiguy: "You’re half right – there is no science to support Meyer’s claim that the cause of life was conscious. So we both agree he’s completely wrong about that." I just provided evidence that supports Meyers claim based on an inference no less effective as that used to support the Big Bang ... and actually more so since we experience foresight, yet we've never experience anything remotely like the big bang ... and all you say in return is "no!" and "we completely agree." That makes no sense whatsoever. aiguy: "You’re wrong, however, about experiencing foresight as the cause of FSCI. We do not." So then you disagree that you first envision a future target that does not yet exist before you engineer FSCI such as a software program? CJYman: "For you to come up with imaginary causal factors that you can’t define and we never experience has nothing to do with science." aiguy: "Yes, quite so. True for everyone. No imaginary conscious things, no imaginary unconscious things, no imaginary connection between what human beings experience in their minds and what caused first life. Imagination is fine, but it’s not science." Except that, and its already been pointed out to you, we have no experience of FSCI being generated absent foresight in the causal chain but we do experience the generation of FSCI by utilizing the process that I've already described and defined as foresight. So, your unconscious unspecified generator of life (an instance of FSCI) is nothing more than unspecified, speculative imagination and ID Theory's intelligent designer of life is based on something that does exist and does generate FSCI. CJYman: "2. As to foresight not being well defined … how is “your ability to envision a future goal and then organize matter and energy in the present to accomplish that goal in the future” not a good definition?" aiguy: "If what you are saying is scientific, then it is not predicated on dualism, right? In other words, IF I adopted a materialist viewpoint your definition would be just as meaningful, right?" Possibly, so long as materialism, however you are defining it is able to account for the existence of foresight. It appears that we both agree that foresight exists so whatever it is founded upon must be able to account for it. aiguy: "OK, from a materialist viewpoint, when a human designs a watch, it is something that happens in strict accord with natural law. Physics determines how the environment interacts with the structures and chemistry of the brain, and out comes a watch. It’s just law + chance, nothing more. Our experience of consciousness has nothing to do with it – it is purely epiphenomenal." You have demonstrated nothing of the sort. You've merely assumed consciousness to be epiphenomenal. It's quite obviously so much more than just law+ chance that is required since there are many layers of structure of organization (specifically organized quantum effects ala Penrose and Hameroff, the structure of the brain, the structure of cells, the sequencing of DNA) that aren't defined by only law + chance and law+chance on its own absent this process of foresight in the causal chain has not been shown to be able to produce any of those structures or FSCI or foresight itself. To say that it is nothing but law+chance is quite obviously incorrect. Here is a link (https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/polanyi-and-ontogenetic-emergence/#comment-337588) to an in depth discussion I've already had with someone on this exact subject. Please go through that discussion as I'd rather not have to repeat the whole thing over again. aiguy: "So IF that were true, then ID Theory would say: First life was created by something that operated according strictly according to law + chance, just like everything else." It really depends on how you are defining "materialism." Can foresight even exist under materialist presuppositions? CJYman: " Can you answer the question: “do you experience foresight as I have defined it?” If you can answer in the affirmative, how is the definition not good enough?" aiguy: "Because our conscious experience may be epiphenomenal (i.e. not causal)." But whether or not your consciousness is epiphenomenal, you still seem to have agreed that you experience foresight as I have defined it. If someone can provide evidence that consciousness is epiphenomenal then Id will merely have to change slightly as I've already explained. However, as I've said, I believe that the best theory of consciousness is that of Penrose and Hameroff which seem to place consciousness as non-epiphenomenal. I apologize, but I'm going to leave out the rest of your post since it seems to deal with the distinction between consciouness being epiphenomenal or not and I have already provided a useful definition for either scenario as the topic pertains to ID Theory. Basically either way, IMO it really doesn't affect ID much at all. Here again is the link (http://telicthoughts.com/what-is-an-intelligent-cause/#comment-244642) to my thoughts on that subject. I would like to come back, though, and discuss whether or not consciousness is epiphenomenal and what the latest evidence shows. However, if consciousness is indeed shown to be epiphenomenal this will only have an impact on one interpretation of ID Theory.CJYman
August 14, 2010
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CJYman,
You’ve missed two important and simple points … IN OUR EXPERIENCE: 1. We envision future goals (FSCI) that do not yet exist and then engineer matter and energy to accomplish that goal (FSCI). 2. There is no known example of FSCI being generated absent the process in number 1 in operation in the causal chain. It’s really that simple. There is no need to discuss mind/body duality or how foresight operates. Those are interesting questions yet make no difference to the ID inference so long as foresight exists and is used to generate FSCI. ie: will the engineer be able to create complex circuitry if he could not engage in the process described in point number 1 above.
Let's say we have a machine that is programmed to design various complex devices. Although it is impossible for anyone (including the programmers) to predict what designs the machine will invent, the machine operates strictly according to deterministic laws (including perhaps a deterministic pseudo-random generator). Would you say this machine has "foresight"? Perhaps you will say that the computer does not have foresight, but that the human programmer did. If this is your response, you must tell us how you have decided this is the case. What is it about the computer that makes you think it lacks foresight, while the human has it? Or, perhaps you will say that the computer does have foresight. But do you really think it "envisions" future goals? What does it mean to "envision" a future goal when the computer presumably has no conscious experience of a "mind's eye"? While you ponder these questions, keep in mind that according to ID theory, one mustn't ever ask the question "Who designed the designer?". ID dictates that we can infer that something is intelligent without regard to the origin of the entity in question. For example, we can say that human beings are intelligent even though ID holds that human beings themselves were designed by some other intelligent designer.
AIG: CJYman, for example, believes that Meyer is wrong when he claims to have supported the idea that the Designer of ID would necessarily have a conscious mind. Do you believe CJYman is also misrepresenting ID? CJY: I’m sorry, but to me this provides a staggering amount of evidence that either you do not thoroughly read through my responses or you purposefully twist what others are stating, which it seems you’ve been accused of here on this thread already. So hold on aiguy, not so fast … I only provided a link to a definition of intelligence that doesn’t require consciousness.
It was not my intent to misrepresent you; I had interpreted the fact that you denied the importance of any particular commitments about mentality except for "foresight", and had indicated that "foresight" may well occur without consciousness, as allowing for the possibility of unconscious design. That is why I said you agreed the Designer would not necessarily have a conscious mind. Gee whiz. I have had to repeat my arguments dozens and dozens of times to everybody here, and I have been misconstrued, misrepresented, misquoted, and had words put in my mouth by all concerned - over and over again. Yet I have not once accused anyone of willfully and purposefully twisting my arguments! Forum arguments are difficult for a number of reasons, and these are difficult questions. I assure you I have not twisted anyone arguments purposefully, and will continue to believe that when people mistake everything I say it is because I haven't been sufficiently clear and they haven't been sufficiently attentive, and not because they are choosing to purposefully lie about what I'm saying.
I’ve merely shown that there can be two different versions of ID Theory based on two very similar ideas of targets. The only difference is that one would include conscious awareness of the target in the definition and one would not.
Good grief, CJY! First you accuse me of purposefully misconstruing your argument, and then you repeat exactly what I had summarized your position to be! That is all I said - that you denied ID theory necessarily posited a conscious mind!
BTW, I think that the best hypothesis for the operation of consciousness is that provided by Penrose and Hameroff and it appears that according to their model, consciousness is not merely epi-phenomenal.
Maybe, maybe not. No science there yet, but interesting speculation. I'm not talking about that, however - I'm talking about the fact that ID's claims do not rest on experience the way Meyer claims.
Here is the link [http://telicthoughts.com/what-is-an-intelligent-cause/#comment-244642] to my comment re: a non-conscious definition of intelligence. So IF, and again that is a BIG IF, consciousness is indeed epi-phenomenal, the intelligent designer would have to be an artificially intelligent system (in line with the definition I’ve given in the link).
You called natural Darwinian evolution an "artificially intelligent" system, and I've asked you to clarify that statement three times now to no avail. Can you please tell me the difference between what you consider an artificially intelligent system and other types of intelligent systems? Since presumably you believe we humans are the artifacts of a Designer, do you believe that we are also artificially intelligent?
Furthermore, if consciousness is indeed the most complex phenomenon in existence
Huh? How do you imagine we can guage the complexity of consciousness? What possible metric might you be thinking of? This is getting pretty far out there...
... and if the Conservation of Information Law that Dembski has been working on is correct [that FSCI can not be increased only transferred and transformed] then this provides evidence that AI will not produce consciousness without conscious foresight already in that AI’s causal chain.
I've heard a whole lot of philosophical arguments for and against AI in my time, but this numbers among the most strange and far-fetched. Unless you wish to claim that these ideas of yours can be emprically substantiated, I will pass on debating these notions.
So now you are stating that you’ve never envisioned a future target that does not exist and then engineer matter and energy in the present to accomplish that goal in the future? I’m seriously confused here … is that what you are stating?
If I were you I would definitely accuse you of willfully misrepresenting me and failing to read my posts. But I am not you, so I won't. I will tell you that I have repeatedly stated that I have of course experienced exactly that. I have gone on to explain in some detail why many cognitive scientists believe there is good empirical evidence to suggest that conscious foresight is not causal in this process. I am not taking a stand on the causal or ontological status of consciousness one way or another. It is clear, however, that Meyer's version of ID rests squarely on dualism/interactionism, as does Dembski's version of ID (and Dembski has said so quite explicitly, although he denies his version of interactionism is Cartesian).aiguy
August 14, 2010
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