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Computational Intelligence and Darwinism

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This UD post got me to thinking. I do that from time to time.

On the subject of computational intelligence I have some minor credentials, including a Silver Medal at the first Computer Olympiad in London, sponsored by David Levy of chess fame. You can access the final results of my research and efforts in computational artificial intelligence (AI) here:

If you have a computer with sufficient memory and disk space you can explore the only perfect-play endgame algorithm ever invented for the game of checkers (known as draughts in the UK).

It was my exploration into computational AI that initially caused me to have doubts about the creative powers of the Darwinian mechanism, which I now consider to be a transparent absurdity as an explanation for almost anything of any significance, and certainly not as an explanation for human intelligence.

Here’s why.

Computer programs that play games like checkers and chess involve two primary algorithms, a brute-force tree search and a leaf-node static evaluator. The tree search says, “If I move here, and the opponent moves there, and I move thus…” Unfortunately, the exponential explosion of possibilities means that the search must eventually be terminated. At that point a static positional evaluator must be invoked. This requires designing heuristics that can evaluate the position with no further search.

The problem is that these heuristics are difficult to devise and encode, and they are often wrong, because of tactical considerations that lurk beyond the horizon of the search and the fact that the heuristics can have unanticipated side-effects.

A human player might say, “Hmmm, if I move here, this will create a positional weakness from which the opponent cannot possibly recover.” There is no way to encode such knowledge, which comes from human experience and positional recognition.

The other problem is that computer programs like mine do not play against the opponent; they play against themselves. The tree search assumes that the opponent sees everything it does, which in a human-versus-human game is not the case. In one game my program played against a grandmaster human, the human was in deep trouble, and he told me so. The computer was considering the move the human feared, which would lead to a very difficult, razor-thin draw. But the program searched so far ahead that it found the draw, assumed the human would see it as well, and played a move that gave the program a few more meaningless points, letting the human off the hook.

All attempts at computational language interpretation have been dismal failures for similar reasons. Even the best spell- and grammar-checkers are astronomically stupid:

Eye halve a spelling chequer
It came with my pea sea
It plainly marques four my revue
Miss steaks eye kin knot sea.

Eye strike a key and type a word
And weight four it two say
Weather eye am wrong oar write
It shows me strait a weigh.

As soon as a mist ache is maid
It nose bee fore two long
And eye can put the error rite
Its rare lea ever wrong.

Eye have run this poem threw it
I am shore your pleased two no
Its letter perfect awl the weigh
My chequer tolled me sew.

The point is: With all our human intelligence, technology, and inventiveness, how can anyone who is still in contact with reality believe that random accidents engineered our brains and minds?

Comments
@veilsofmaya (#38)
For example, we can use DNA and quantum mechanics to solve problems that would be normally untraceable. That is, we can enlist the laws of physics to perform factorizations in polynomial time which would normally take millions of years using existing computing algorithms.
I may be misunderstanding the above, it is important not to overlook any presupposed information that may be being used, regarding fitness functions and the use of operations to contruct functional proteins. Does this accurately reflect the problem presented to NS/RM, a non-goal driven search mechanism, to find what are very complex biological structures?cbburn1
August 7, 2010
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@veilsofmaya (#38) 'You seem to be suggest an intelligent designer could iterate over protein folding geometry space to select working proteins “in his head”, but could not design a natural process that does the same thing.' The evidence as presented in Douglas Axe's paper suggests very strongly that natural selection and random variation cannot achieve this. Do you disagree with the data he presents? Given the size of search space, the rarity and disparity of functional proteins, how does one account for the large number of enzyme complexes we see now? Does NS/RM have this power, or is some additional directing influence involved? 'That a hypothetical designer would chose to do X rather than Y seems rather arbitrary assumption, which doesn’t seem very scientific' Fair point, but you have to follow the evidence. Your view regarding quantum mechanics and natural law appeals me with its eloquence but Axe's findings are quite compelling.cbburn1
August 7, 2010
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For example, we can use DNA and quantum mechanics to solve problems that would be normally intractable. That is, we can enlist the laws of physics to perform factorizations in polynomial time which would normally take millions of years using existing computing algorithms. We also observe the cell performing sequence alignment and other tasks that appear to be NP-complete. I think this is consistent with something I've been arguing for a couple of weeks. Biological evolution is absolutely the fastest possible way to solve the problems of survival that living things face. One can always posit an omniscient and omnipotent creator/designer, but anything less would necessarily have to use biological evolution. Simulations of things like protein folding, no matter how powerful we make our computers and algorithms, will always be slower than the real thing, because a folding protein is, in effect, a quantum computer. Nothing in the physical world can be faster.
Petrushka
August 7, 2010
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They made the same bet as to whether the universe had a beginning, or had always been. They had been making that bet for a lot longer than 150 years. How'd that work out?Upright BiPed
August 7, 2010
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I’ll bet that within 20 years chance-and-necessity Darwinism will be laughed at as the most grandiose stupidity and fraud in the history of pseudoscience.
People have been making and losing that bet for 150 years. I believe we are within a few years of seeing the end of one famous bet.Petrushka
August 7, 2010
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@cbburn1 (#12)
The search must be directed by programming protein folds according to some desired goal.
cbburn1, You seem to be suggest an intelligent designer could iterate over protein folding geometry space to select working proteins "in his head", but could not design a natural process that does the same thing. Furthermore, a designer could have a goal of finding any functional proteins rather than looking for any proteins in particular. Again, this seems to be making rather specific assumptions about the designer that are not evident in the theory of ID. For example, we can use DNA and quantum mechanics to solve problems that would be normally untraceable. That is, we can enlist the laws of physics to perform factorizations in polynomial time which would normally take millions of years using existing computing algorithms. We also observe the cell performing sequence alignment and other tasks that appear to be NP-complete. Given that we as designers can do this in the lab, it would seem that one could use the same "inference" that ID uses with regards to design to assume some hypothetical designer who is much more intelligent and powerful than us could do the same thing while 'designing" the universe. Again, I find it odd that, on one hand, ID claims that we cannot know who the designer is, but ID proponents seem to make assumptions about the designer as if they know who the designer is, what he would or would not do, etc. That a hypothetical designer would chose to do X rather than Y seems rather arbitrary assumption, which doesn't seem very scientific.veilsofmaya
August 7, 2010
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avocationist,
I haven’t been here a while and spent a LONG time on some previous threads re your discussion of Meyer and I don’t know if it was ever resolved but it seems to me you misunderstood what Meyer says about our universal experience: 1) Meyer claims to explain the very first living cell from simpler non-living chemicals. 2) This means that the cause he infers cannot itself be a living thing. 3) Meyer claims that the cause he infers is known to our uniform and repeated experience. 4) But nothing in our uniform and repeated experience can create complex mechanisms except living things. 5) Therefore Meyer is wrong. On #3, Meyer is referring to our experience that human intelligence is the cause of our own complex creations...
Well, that is what we have experience of, yes. Human beings and other animals act with what we call "intelligence".
...but you seem to think that he means that we all experience a disembodied intelligence
He refers to both living things one hand, and hypothetical immaterial intelligent beings on the other hand, all together under the label "intelligent agency". But we only have experience of one of these two types of things, not the other.
No, he is referring to our intelligence only. So we can infer from the experience we DO have, the necessity of an intelligence to come up with IC and FCSI.
But obviously human beings didn't create the first living cell - nothing remotely like anything in our experience could have, because in our experience we only see complex FSCI-rich things acting intelligently.
I see that you have trouble with the idea of a disembodied entity but I don’t know why people use the word nonmaterial. What can that mean?
In this context I'm referring to intelligent beings which do not have complex, FSCI-rich physical bodies. Meyer says he's explaining how these complex FSCI-rich physical bodies first came to exist, so he can't possibly say that something else with an FSCI-rich physical body was responsible. That leaves something unknown to our experience, which is some sort of intelligent being that did not have an FSCI-rich physical body. * * * DATCG,
Do you think there are levels of intelligence? When you say; “operationalized” please expand. What is your definition? Are you saying we cannot measure such things in the future?
An operationalized definition is one that science can work with because it is described in terms of things independent researchers can observe and agree on. So the definition describes how to go about observing (detecting or measuring) the thing in question. The definition of "gravity" is operationalized (or "heat" or "mutation" or "gene" or any other scientific explanatory concept), but not the word "intelligence". Unless given a specific operationalized definition in a particular context (for example, you can define it as what is measured by a particular IQ test), the word "intelligence" isn't useful in science. Yes, I work in a field called "artificial intelligence", and for us the label is completely unimportant, since we simply research ways for computer systems to do things that humans do. So for AI we simply mean by "intelligent" nothing except "whatever folks would tend to call intelligent if a human being did it." We don't attempt to explain how our systems work by calling them "intelligent" - that would be funny, really. Can you imagine I build some computer system that designs electronic components, and somebody asks me how it works, and I say "Well, you see, my program works because it is intelligent!". Everybody would laugh, and then say "Seriously, AIGuy, how does your program work?" * * * DATCG,
My computer programs understand all sorts of things. Were your computer programs designed?
Were you designed? According to ID, you don't need to know the origin of something in order to determine if it is intelligent or not. http://cognorama.blogspot.comaiguy
August 7, 2010
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Avocationist: Let's start at the top of your attempted "proof" in no 33:
1) Meyer claims to explain the very first living cell from simpler non-living chemicals. 2) This means that the cause he infers cannot itself be a living thing . . .
1 --> Plainly, Meyer's context -- as in (as StephenB so often reminds us) we should always read reasonably, and for context -- is that the living cells in question are those relevant to the life we encounter on earth. 2 --> Of course, the origin of the first cells relevant to earth will not be the same cells, as something will not create itself out of nothing for no reason. 3 --> But, it is immediately a non-sequitur to infer that the source of said cell-based life relevant to earth "cannot itself be a living thing." 4 --> For, as is well known, one logical possibility is that life as we know it on earth is a technology of another form of life (which -- given the recent work of Venter et al -- could even be based on similar structures and systems). 5 --> You have therefore set up and knocked over a question-begging strawman. 6 -->Even more important -- and given that a strawman is actually also a distractive red herring -- you have distracted attention from the argument that Meyer and others have actually made. 7 --> You know or should know (and the Weak Argument correctives you seem to have neglected are there to help) that the real issue is that the cell exhibits digitally coded, functionally specific, complex algorithmic [and coded -- i.e. linguistic]information, or dFSCI as GPuccio abbreviates. 8 --> Now, dFSCI is a very familiar phenomenon in an information age, indeed it is the key element that makes the PC you are using to read this and make comments here work. 9 --> It is also a well known fact that such dFSCI, in every case where we directly observe the origin, is produced by intelligence. 10 --> Similarly, on the strength of the fact that we are ourselves intelligent and can contrast other creatures who do not produce dFSCI-based systems, we can conceptualise what intelligence is based on known examples and counter-examples, and follow and slightly expand Wiki's definiton of intelligence that apears in the UD glossary:
“. . . capacities to reason, to plan [[which entails (i) to purpose, (ii) to conceive or imagine a path to achieve it and (iii) to set out steps to fulfill the path], to solve problems, to think abstractly, to comprehend ideas, to use language [including codes and dFSCI], and to learn.” [[Wikipedia: article, “Intelligence.”]
11 --> Surely, if we were to encounter an entity more or less like that, we would deem it intelligent, especially if its capacity was flexible. (Contrast what would happen to a computer chess machine if you were to suddenly say, let's change rule a, b, c etc, by contrast with even a novice human player.) 12 --> Now, one of the challenges on origin of life is that whenever and wherever it happened, it happened in a deep past we cannot observe, nor do we have generally accepted records. That is the source of the sting in Job when YHWH speaks out of the storm in ch 38:
1 . . . the LORD answered Job out of the storm. He said: 2 "Who is this that darkens my counsel with words without knowledge? 3 Brace yourself like a man; I will question you, and you shall answer me. 4 "Where were you when I laid the earth's foundation? Tell me, if you understand . . .
13 --> Plainly, this is a very good and deep challenge to the project of origins science. 14 --> The best answer we can give is that once (i) we can establish an empirically reliable pattern in the present, (ii) we can observe traces of he past in the present, and (iii) we can see a credible set of initial circumstances that through those patterns would give rise to sufficiently similar traces, (iv) we may scientifically infer on best explanation, that the suggested circumstances and dynamics are a credible -- albeit inevitably provisional -- origins narrative. 15 --> Of course, one thing that we have no right to do, is to claim that such an inferential reconstruction is a fact beyond reasonable dispute or doubt. (Sadly, it is necessary to note this, as there is a tendency to over-claim the factual basis for evolutionary theories of origins.) 16 --> Coming back from epistemological underpinnings (and yes, science inescapably rests on philosophical foundations), we can note that there is a clear, empirically reliable pattern concerning dFSCI: it is a sign that -- per a massive base of observations and without a credible counterexample that can stand basic scrutiny -- reliably points to directed contingency as its origin. 17 --> That is, dFSCI, on empirical warrant, points to design its relevant causal factor. (Indeed, on the search space challenges, the other main source of contingency, chance, is not a credible source for dFSCI.) 18 --> So, we have good reason to see that he dFSCI in the cell is the product of intelligence, and not the credible product of chance circumstances, molecular noise and undirected chemical processes in Darwin's hypothetical pond or a modern equivalent. 19 --> To overturn that, all that would be required is to empirically demonstrate that dFSCI can, with reasonable likelihood, be produced by undirected chance and mechanical necessity in a reasonable natural circumstance. Or even, just in a credible computer or experimental setup. [Genetic Algorithms, to name a favourite rabbit trail, are in fact designed, and build in a lot of intelligently sourced active information that allows them to outperform blind chance plus necessity.] ___________ Now, onlookers, that we so routinely see specious objections to the above chain of reasoning, whether in the simple summary above or in the full treatment in Meyer's work or elsewhere, is telling us something about the actual balance of the case on the merits. GEM of TKI PS: Onlookers may find the beta test introductory survey here helpful. Note especially the remarks on origin of life and of body plan level biodiversity in light of the implications of embryological development.kairosfocus
August 7, 2010
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Aiguy, fyi, if you leave comments, I may not be able to respond until tomorrow. Have a good day.DATCG
August 7, 2010
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#33 Aiguy, "My computer programs understand all sorts of things." Were your computer programs designed?DATCG
August 7, 2010
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Aiguy, Do you think there are levels of intelligence? When you say; "operationalized" please expand. What is your definition? Are you saying we cannot measure such things in the future?DATCG
August 7, 2010
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AIGuy, I haven't been here a while and spent a LONG time on some previous threads re your discussion of Meyer and I don't know if it was ever resolved but it seems to me you misunderstood what Meyer says about our universal experience: 1) Meyer claims to explain the very first living cell from simpler non-living chemicals. 2) This means that the cause he infers cannot itself be a living thing. 3) Meyer claims that the cause he infers is known to our uniform and repeated experience. 4) But nothing in our uniform and repeated experience can create complex mechanisms except living things. 5) Therefore Meyer is wrong. On #3, Meyer is referring to our experience that human intelligence is the cause of our own complex creations, but you seem to think that he means that we all experience a disembodied intelligence or that he is referring to human beings as a whole. No, he is referring to our intelligence only. So we can infer from the experience we DO have, the necessity of an intelligence to come up with IC and FCSI. I see that you have trouble with the idea of a disembodied entity but I don't know why people use the word nonmaterial. What can that mean? I think it is an outdated idea from earlier eras. Either something exists or it doesn't. So many things that we never knew existed have been discovered such as ultraviolet or gamma rays - our physical senses only pick up so much of reality but we already know there is much more.avocationist
August 7, 2010
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Gil,
The hallmark of intelligence is understanding. Computer programs, no matter how sophisticated or impressive in what they can do in a limited domain (after having been intelligently designed by human engineers), do not understand.
My computer programs understand all sorts of things. How are we to decide which one of us is right? What test might we perform to resolve the matter? You haven't even attempted to address the issue, which is to provide an operationalized definition of "intelligence". There is a good reason you didn't try, though. It's because there is no such definition. Here's why: http://cognorama.blogspot.com/2010/08/what-is-intelligent-cause.html
Understanding means taking a learned concept and applying it in a different, novel situation.
I especially like this one in the context of ID. Evolution learns, adapts, and applies what it learns in different, novel situations. There is no evidence, however, that if a "designer" designed life, that it learned anything at all or adapted to any novel situation. So according to your definition of "intelligence", evolution is intelligent, but the Designer of life may not be.aiguy
August 6, 2010
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Petrushka @24:
But if you started not with Deep Blue, but a generalized learning program along the lines of Blondie24, I’m confident that a program that learns would stomp a human into the ground after a series of rule changes.
So much fun. 1. Deep Blue is not a generalized learning program. So what? Is Deep Blue a generalized CHESS learning program? 2. a generalized learning program along the lines of Blondie24 How does Blondie24 fare at CHESS against Deep Blue? How long will it take for a generalized CHESS learning program like Blondie24 to beat a program like Deep Blue? 3. I’m confident that a program that learns would stomp a human into the ground after a series of rule changes. Why are you so confident? Humans easily undertand rule changes. Do you disagree? On the other hand, computer programs have to be instructed that the rules have changed (by design), and they have to be told what the new rules are (by design), and they have to be DESIGNED to adapt to the new rules. Needless to say. I'm not convinced by your grandiose claims. But feel free to submit your code.Mung
August 6, 2010
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I’ll bet that within 20 years chance-and-necessity Darwinism will be laughed at as the most grandiose stupidity and fraud in the history of pseudoscience.GilDodgen
August 6, 2010
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The most sophisticated computer programs can do nothing of the sort. I once told Marion, “My program does not even know it’s playing checkers.”
Checkers is a trivial game. I don't disparage the effort required to "solve" it, but the point is it is just tic-tac-toe with a larger database. Programs that rely on a database will always be trivial from the perspective of AI or I. Folks at Stanford are building rather sophisticated silicon neurons. I'm not going to predict that this will lead to artificial intelligence anytime soon, but I will bet it will lead toward another level of commercial products. I'm betting that good language translation is less than 20 years away. Cars that will avoid accidents. Traffic lights that will optimise traffic rather than delay it. Good legal and medical advice.Petrushka
August 6, 2010
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The most sophisticated computer programs can do nothing of the sort. I once told Marion, “My program does not even know it’s playing checkers.”
AI discussions always lead to unexpected places. Does a cat know it is a cat? Is there any animal other than a human that knows or understands anything? Does anticipation count? A while back there was a story about a Turing test in which programs competed against humans in a blind test. It was a limited test. You were only allowed the query the unknown entity about a limited range of topic on which it was an expert. A woman was judged by most to be a computer program because she knew too much about Shakespeare, her area of expertise.Petrushka
August 6, 2010
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The hallmark of intelligence is understanding. Computer programs, no matter how sophisticated or impressive in what they can do in a limited domain (after having been intelligently designed by human engineers), do not understand. Understanding means taking a learned concept and applying it in a different, novel situation. There is nothing in computational "intelligence" that comes anywhere close to this. I had the honor of knowing Marion Tinsley for a few brief years before he died. He was without doubt the greatest checkerist of all time. I could tell you many amazing stories about him. He was a prodigy who entered Ohio State University at the age of 14, a university math professor, a born-again evangelical Christian, and one of the nicest people you could ever know. I'll tell you one story: I was playing a mail-play game against the world mail-play checkers champion, Richard Fortman. I would let my program run overnight, send off the move, and wait for a reply. At one point Richard told me that my program had played into a published loss, and he gave me the supposed refuting winning move. My program expected this move, and had a response that showed a drawing score. So, I called up Marion. He was watching a Nova science TV program but said he would rather talk to me. I told him the story and asked for his opinion. He said, "Run up the game." I asked, "Would you like to get your board?" He replied, "That won't be necessary." So, I rattled off the moves from the opening in rapid-fire checkers notation, some 30 of them, told him which move my program made, and which move Fortman said was a published winning refutation. I did not tell Marion which move my program said was a drawing move. Marion thought for no more than a few seconds, and gave me the drawing move the program had found after searching more than a billion positions overnight. But I digress and return to my original thesis: Intelligence is fundamentally characterized by understanding, whereby what has been learned can be applied in novel situations. The most sophisticated computer programs can do nothing of the sort. I once told Marion, "My program does not even know it's playing checkers." He laughed.GilDodgen
August 6, 2010
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Right, Petrushka. Anyway cbburn1, you seem to think that learning and adapting are critical in separating "real" intelligence from the "fake" intelligence (the kind that Gil thinks computers are limited to). Now here's are two questions for you ID folks: 1) What evidence do we have that the Designer of ID is capable of learning? 2) Since Darwinian evolution is capable of learning and adapting, does that mean that Darwinian evolution ought to be called "intelligent"?aiguy
August 6, 2010
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The test I’m referring to is the ability to conceptualise and adapt to a new situation, the rules the testee would know about (or at least made available through an interface). For example, say in one rule change all pieces can only move one step at a time as pawns. Would Deep Blue then be able to participate (without considerable reprogramming)?
I'm sure Deep Blue relies on a database of opening moves and such. So do human players, at least good ones do. But if you started not with Deep Blue, but a generalized learning program along the lines of Blondie24, I'm confident that a program that learns would stomp a human into the ground after a series of rule changes.Petrushka
August 6, 2010
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@aiguy I think you've misunderstood my point. The test I'm referring to is the ability to conceptualise and adapt to a new situation, the rules the testee would know about (or at least made available through an interface). For example, say in one rule change all pieces can only move one step at a time as pawns. Would Deep Blue then be able to participate (without considerable reprogramming)? Probably not, then the test fails. I suspect even a novice player could cope with this.cbburn1
August 6, 2010
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Peepul,
What you or I believe to be credible is useless as an argument. Only evidence counts.
I find that incredible. :)Clive Hayden
August 6, 2010
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More interesting games are Backgammon and poker, which are not completely deterministic, and for which neural networks and evolutionary algorithms prevail.
Yup. I was playing in a poker game once and one of my cards evolved into a fifth Ace. Imagine how disconcerting it was when the other players refused to accept my explanation!Mung
August 6, 2010
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I should have mentioned that the criterion for failure would be the inability of Deep Blue to participate at all in the ‘redefined’ game of chess
I see. So in order to tell if something is intelligent or not, you get them to play a game of chess and start changing the rules on them, and see if they can learn the new rules. Is that your final answer?aiguy
August 6, 2010
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cbburn1,
Set up a Turing Test to provide logically sufficient conditions for the attribution of intelligence, but with changing context. So if Deep Blue is the subject, in the context of standard chess rules it will pass.
Really? If I was playing a chess game against an unknown opponent, I don't think I could tell if my opponent was a human or a computer. Could you?
Then change the rules progressively, ie remove pieces, change the way they move, redefine what constitutes a win. Probably sooner rather than later Deep Blue will fail, as it has no ‘mental’ state representative of the human ability to think strategically and adapt.
In a Turing test, the point is for the computer system to fool the human interviewer into thinking the responses are coming from a human. If I was interviewing an unknown candidate the candidate began to lose this complicated chess game where the rules kept changing, I might think I was playing a human being who wasn't very good at chess and couldn't keep the ever-changing rules straight. As far as thinking strategically and adapting, computers excel at that sort of thing of course. That's why computers are in charge of designing and planning complex shipping routes for FedEx packages in the face of ever-changing priorities and circumstances, for example. Also, I'm not sure why you're talking about "mental" states or representations, as these are not factors in evaluating a Turing Test. What we're looking for here are things we can observe, right? We can't observe mental states.aiguy
August 6, 2010
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I should have mentioned that the criterion for failure would be the inability of Deep Blue to participate at all in the 'redefined' game of chess.cbburn1
August 6, 2010
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@ aiguy (#12) Set up a Turing Test to provide logically sufficient conditions for the attribution of intelligence, but with changing context. So if Deep Blue is the subject, in the context of standard chess rules it will pass. Then change the rules progressively, ie remove pieces, change the way they move, redefine what constitutes a win. Probably sooner rather than later Deep Blue will fail, as it has no 'mental' state representative of the human ability to think strategically and adapt.cbburn1
August 6, 2010
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Wagenweg,
I disagree in that Deep Blue doesn’t comtemplate chess, is not at awe with it, and doens’t find pleasure in playing it,
I see. For you, then, in order for something to be said to "think", it must be capable of "awe" and also find "pleasure" in various pursuits. Interesting criteria. Are there any other ones you'd like to add? Also, can you provide some way for us to measure the "awe" and "pleasure" that may or may not be occuring in various systems at a given time?
...just as the plane does not intellectually absorb or experience the wonder of flying flapping wings or not.
Are you saying that in order to fly something must "intellectually absorb or experience the wonder" of flying? Really? Also, are you quite sure that birds "intellectually absorb or experience the wonder" of flying? How can you tell?
The analogy of the airplane lacks something. What would Mr, McDermott say to the analogy of an airplane and an eagle both of which do not flap their wings? (although an eagle can that is not how they fly primarily)
Dr. McDermott would of course say that all of these things fly. His point was that function is distinct from implementation.
The plane flys because some human at the helm causes it to.
Most planes are like this, but a few experimental aircraft can navigate completely autonomously - including landings and takeoffs.
An eagle flys for example as a search for food.
Among other things... Sorry, but what exactly is your point?
I would like to see a program designed that could first identify hunger (not the measurable calculation of lack of food in a test tube) then take flight in search for food, capture it, and then consume it.
That's all quite doable with current technology except perhaps the part about "identifying hunger" rather than measuring it. Can you tell us how to objectively determine if this autonomous craft is actually "identifying hunger" rather than merely "measuring a lack of food"? Do you have some sort of instrument that will distinguish these things?
Call deep Blue intelligent if you want but their is a vast differnece between living and non living intelligence which I think is the main point that is being made here.
And here is my point: You can go on and on about what you think the differences are between various agents. What you cannot do is come up with some actual set of criteria that you will stick with that can distinguish "true" intelligence in general. In other words, there is no criteria - no specific set of observable attributes or abilities - that you can define which will allow us to divide things in the world into "real intelligent agents" and "not real intelligent agents".aiguy
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aiguy @ 13, “Saying Deep Blue doesn’t think about chess is like saying airplanes don’t fly because they don’t flap their wings”. I disagree in that Deep Blue doesn't comtemplate chess, is not at awe with it, and doens't find pleasure in playing it, just as the plane does not intellectually absorb or experience the wonder of flying flapping wings or not. The analogy of the airplane lacks something. What would Mr, McDermott say to the analogy of an airplane and an eagle both of which do not flap their wings? (although an eagle can that is not how they fly primarily) The plane flys because some human at the helm causes it to. An eagle flys for example as a search for food. I would like to see a program designed that could first identify hunger (not the measurable calculation of lack of food in a test tube) then take flight in search for food, capture it, and then consume it. Call deep Blue intelligent if you want but their is a vast differnece between living and non living intelligence which I think is the main point that is being made here.wagenweg
August 6, 2010
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P.S. As my friend Drew McDermott famously noted, "Saying Deep Blue doesn't think about chess is like saying airplanes don't fly because they don't flap their wings".aiguy
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