Cosmological ID — Who Designed the Designer?

_{Gil Dodgen

August 14, 2007

Intelligent Design}

Share: Facebook; Twitter; LinkedIn; Flipboard; Print; Email

Some insights can totally change one’s perspective. One of those insights for me was learning that time had a beginning at the origin of the universe. (Oops, “beginning” implies a point on the time line, so let’s change that to “a point of appearing.”) If time came into existence, then the cause of the universe could not have had a cause, or a history, or a beginning, or a designer, because all of these require that the cause of the universe be located on the time line of the universe, which did not exist prior to the creation of the universe. (Oops, can’t use “prior to” because that implies time.)

Thus, the question of who designed the designer is meaningless when it comes to the origin of the universe. The designer must be “it is that it is,” or if “it” is personal, “I am that I am.”

I realize that this twists one’s brain into a Mobius strip, but it does make sense if you think about it.

Comments

I think we need to exercise great caution when responding to "Who designed the designer?" style arguments, for two reasons. First, some versions of this argument are much better than others. (More on this below.) Second, some theistic responses to the "who designed the designer?" argument are philosophically inadequate. This deficiency exposes our faith to ridicule from unbelievers. I'd like to begin by addressing the second point, which I shall illustrate by citing an extract from Gil Dodgen's post: "If time came into existence, then the cause of the universe could not have had a cause, or a history, or a beginning, or a designer, because all of these require that the cause of the universe be located on the time line of the universe, which did not exist prior to the creation of the universe. (Oops, canÃ¢â‚¬â„¢t use "prior to" because that implies time.)" This argument overlooks the distinction between temporal priority and ontological priority. Logically speaking, beginnings and histories have to be located on time lines; causes and designers do not. A cause is ontologically prior to its effect, but it may or may not be temporally prior to its effect. (The same is true for an intelligent cause - i.e. a designer.) In fact, causes (whether intelligent or not) are often simultaneous with their effects. Think of a flame heating a saucepan of water, or an inventor having an idea. God is ontologically prior to the universe, without being temporally prior to it. Mr. Dodgen's argument also proves too much, if taken at face value. If a cause has to be located on a time line, then there can be no timeless cause of the universe - which means that God's existence is impossible. I'm quite sure that Mr. Dodgen would not want to argue that. Interestingly, back in the 13th century, St. Thomas Aquinas was quite happy to assume for argument's sake (when disputing with his philosophical opponents) that the universe had existed from all eternity in his famous "Third Way". However, he did not draw the conclusion that the universe must be uncaused. Instead, he took the argument a step further - "every necessary thing has its necessity caused by another, or not" - and then proceeded to rule out an infinite regress. In the subsequent question (Summa Theologica I, q.3), he then argued that this uncaused cause could not be a material one. Incidentally, the comment by mentok, that "Since reality is beginningless therefore time is also beginningless because time is simply a continuum of reality" strikes me as very odd. I have always thought of time as a measure of motion (following Aristotle). If motion has a beginning, then so has time. Aristotle would have denied the antecedent, of course; but for anyone who accepts the Big Bang, the notion that motion (and hence time) seems a plausible - perhaps probable - conclusion. I would also like to ask some contributors to this post why they are so attracted to the Kalam cosmological argument, when there is a much better cosmological argument available for God's existence: the argument from contingency, as refined by Robert Koons. Indeed, Koons has published two versions online. Here are the relevant addresses: http://www.arn.org/docs/koons/cosmo.pdf http://www.leaderu.com/offices/koons/menus/lecture.html The reason why I prefer the argument from contingency is that as Leibniz realized, in making this argument, you don't have to commit yourself to philosophically contentious notions like the impossibility of an actual infinite. Also, while the kalam argument seems clearer and simpler, it is very difficult to argue on a priori grounds that a being with no beginning has to be non-physical, let alone intelligent. The oft-cited argument that if the beginningless cause that produced the universe were purely physical, it would automatically give rise to its effect (the universe), which would then imply (contrary to fact) that the universe had no beginning, mistakenly equates "physical" with deterministic. And the newly popular "abductive" argument - that a personal agent with freedom of will who decided to create the universe is the best explanation of our universe popping into existence - is vulnerable to the atheistic riposte: "Well, it may be the best explanation we can think up, but there may be some other explanation that human beings, because of their cognitive limitations, are simply incapable of conceiving. The universe may, as J. S. Haldane suggested, be queerer than we can imagine." Koons' argument from contingency, on the other hand, is much more robust. It can easily be argued that a physical cause of any sort - even a set of basic physical laws, such as the "final theory of everything" proposed by some physicists - would still be contingent, and hence in need of explanation. If we combine this argument from contingency with the Cosmic Argument from Design (based not only on fine-tuning but also on the unexpected beauty of the laws of nature), then the notion that the cosmos might be the work of an intelligent agent makes sense. We can use a Thomistic argument from analogy here, which Koons defends in his paper, "A New Look at the Cosmological Argument", where he also distinguishes it from Paley's argument for a designer. The Cosmic Argument from Design is, I would suggest, more robust than arguments based on the complexity of some part of the cosmos (e.g. our biosphere), for the simple reason that the only possible alternatives are to take the fine-tuning as a brute fact (which is absurd, as the laws of nature are still metaphysically contingent) or to try to remove the contingency by positing a multiverse where everything possible happens. Robin Cook argues for the failure of the Multiverse hypothesis, and also develops the point I alluded to above about the beauty of the laws of nature, in his article, "Design and the Many-Worlds Hypothesis" at http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/muv2.htm Some contributors have belittled the "Who designed the designer?" argument. I think this kind of mockery is dangerously naive. I for one take this argument very seriously, for it can be formulated rigorously, using premises that look quite plausible: (1) Inductive argument: everything which is irreducibly complex has a cause. This generalization looks solid: we have never empirically observed any exceptions to it. (2) Inductive argument: intelligent designers are more complex than the objects they design. Again, we have never observed any exceptions to this rule. (3) ID Postulate 1: all irreducibly complex objects and/or systems within the the cosmos which pre-date the emergence of intelligent life within the cosmos (i.e. objects such as the DNA molecule; systems such as the blood-clotting cascade), have an intelligent designer outside the cosmos. (This postulate rests on the inductive observation that all of the irreducibly complex objects and/or systems which we have observed coming into existence, have an intelligent cause.) (4) From (2), this designer is more complex than the cosmos. (5) All complex entities are either reducibly or irreducibly complex. (Law of Excluded Middle.) (6) ID Postulate 2: An irreducibly complex entity must have a cause which is not reducibly complex. (Sounds intuitively plausible; again, no exceptions have been observed.) (7) Since the designer of the cosmos designed some irreducibly complex systems, it must also be irreducibly complex. (It cannot be simple, by (4); and neither can it be reducibly complex, by (6); so it must be irreducibly complex.) (8) By (1), the designer of the cosmos has a cause. However, (9) Anything which has a cause is not God. Thus (10) God did not design the cosmos. What's wrong with the argument? One could question the inductive generalizations, (1) and (2). Problem is, two can play at that game. For the ID postulate (3) rests upon an inductive postulate as well: every irreducibly complex object or system that we have observed coming into existence, has a designer. If (1) and (2) could be false, then an atheist might argue that (3) could be wrong too. Another approach might be to argue that "more complex" is a meaningless phrase, as complexity is difficult to quantify. Yet it seems overwhelmingly obvious that a DNA molecule is more complex than a benzene molecule. My own suggestion is that we need to question the seemingly innocuous fifth premise, that all complexity is either reducible or irreducible. Both kinds of complexity assume the existence of parts that can be separated. If the system fails to function properly when even one part is removed then it is irreducible; if its functioning survives the removal of one or more parts then it is reducible. But what about an entity whose parts are incapable of being separated from one another? By "incapable" I mean "metaphysically incapable", not just physically incapable. In other words, how do we describe a complex Being whose dissolution is impossible? Neither the term "reducibly complex" nor "irreducibly complex" seems to do such a Being justice; we might call it "indestructibly complex." Traditionally, the Scholastic philosophers held that God is altogther simple. To this day, the view has its able defenders, such as Dr. Alexander Pruss (see http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/On3ProblemsOfDivineSimplicity.html ) and Dr. William Vallicella (see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/ ). They may be right; however, the notion that something (or rather Someone) utterly simple could account for the various sights, smells, sounds, tastes and feelings that we experience, in all their glorious diversity, seems profoundly counter-intuitive, to say the least. I would be very reluctant to pursue this line of argument with an intelligent, well-read atheist who was familiar with the philosophical problems attending the doctrine of divine simplicity. It seems easier to defend the notion of a God who is personal, complex and yet metaphysically indestructible, because God's "parts" are perfectly integrated. If an atheist asks you "Who designed the designer?" then the correct response is not: "Something outside time"; but: "A metaphysically necessary Being, which cannot be broken into separate parts. Such a Being would need no designer."vjtorley_{August 15, 2007
August
08
Aug
15
15
2007
09:45 AM
9
09
45
AM
PDT}

Somehow IÃ¢â‚¬â„¢m uncomfortable with William Lane CraigÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s argument that there can be no past eternity. HeÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s right, of course, there is no traversing an infinity of events. But then neither can I imagine a dynamic world of events emerging from a static world where nothing happens. It is my opinion that as the theologians cast aside the Hebrew God of history in favor of a Platonic realm of pure being they set the stage for Deism and Darwinism. It is also my opinion that Einstein will not have the last word. Newton conceived a stable world as a backdrop for Agency, Einstein went for determinism and relegated God to the laws of physics. If agency is elemental (as in Angus MenugeÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s Agents Under Fire: Materialism and the Rationality of Science) then time is fundamental. So if and when materialism collapses the next step, let me suggest, is to weave agency back into our physics and philosophy and religion.Rude_{August 15, 2007
August
08
Aug
15
15
2007
07:46 AM
7
07
46
AM
PDT}

The logical underpinning of this discussion is nothing less than the Kalam argument: 1) That which begins-to-exist must have a cause. 2) The universe began-to-exist. 3) Therefore, the universe has a cause. The discussion here revolves around the 1st premise. For the 1st premise to be false, either: 1) Things that come into being don't need a cause (a form of creation ex nihilo) 2) Things don't begin to exist. For the 2nd option, I don't mean that the universe did not have a beginning. Instead I refer to the 'B' theory of time alluded to by Mentok above. For this theory of time, the beginning of the universe is akin to the beginning of a meter stick. It just 'is'; it doesn't reference a coming into being. I don't think this option is truly open to those who are proponents of evolution. Evolution (things change with respect to time as described by reliable laws of physics; Darwinism is a special case of this) requires temporal becoming. So we are back to the first option. There is a creation-ex-nihilo; but of what type? Is it of the Christian type (lacking only an Aristotelian material cause) or is it of an Atheist character (there is no cause whatsoever). We can go to experiment to check. There is a form of creation-ex-nihilo in the universe today that is directly relevant to the question. The source of dark energy within the cosmos is a positive energy density within space itself. This energy density appears constant (i.e. is like Einstein's cosmological constant; it does not depend on space or time). If the energy density is constant, but space expands, then new energy is constantly being created. This is, in fact, the mechanism that is appealed to by the inflationary theory. A 'false' vacuum of higher energy density decays to a 'true' vacuum with lesser energy density. The excess energy is then available to transform to matter and radiation is a decay to a different vacuum state is available. See Andrei Linde's presenation at http://energy.nobelprize.org/lectures.html) for a fuller explanation). This process demonstrates a creation-ex-nihilo that lacks only a material cause. The issue is not left to metaphysics; our own experience of creation-ex-nihilo processes should lead one to believe that the 1st Kalam premise is more plausible than its contradictory and therefore the argument's conclusion is true.sinclairjd_{August 15, 2007
August
08
Aug
15
15
2007
05:56 AM
5
05
56
AM
PDT}

PS: BTW on "time stops at the speed of light." This seems to be a popular level summary on Einstein's definition of simultaneity as observer-relative, i.e we judge events "simultaneous" by coincidence of the signals from them, ultimately light. [It is worth noting that Relativity is not relativism; the speed of light is the same constant in-vacuo value in all inertial, non-accelerating, frames of reference, and the laws of physics take their same simplest form in such a frame. Those are STR's core postulates from Einstein, and they are objective and testable.]kairosfocus_{August 15, 2007
August
08
Aug
15
15
2007
01:43 AM
1
01
43
AM
PDT}

H'mm: Interesting issues on origins and ultimates. We are here treading in deep phil waters [too deep and turbulent for Mr Dawkins, it seems], namely the issue of sufficiency of reason for things. We want to know why this, why that, and we see no good reason to not press the issue back to origins, of the cosmos, and indeed of reality [a very different thing in principle!]. That brings up the point that an observed cosmos full of contingent beings, and which itself credibly had a beginning, is plainly on the evidence contingent. So, it had a cause. But, there is another way that something can be: there is the implication that the cluster of contingent beings have a root in a NECESSARY being; i.e one that is not caused but is necessary. Such a being is in effect eternal and indestructible. On this, the centuries long debate now boils down to: [1] some extension to the material cosmos [the quasi-infinite universe as a whole idea], or [2] an intelligent creator who is a necessary being. Both are inherently metaphysical proposals, and both are not demonstrable beyond logical objection. But, that is a feature of most human reasoning on serious matters that we see. A good point to debate the issue further is to first ask concerning the fine-tuned cosmos we observe, is this the reasonable result of a random event in a quasi-infinite universe as a whole, or is it more credibly the mark of intent and agency? Why? A good close-off is to suggest a re-look at the old Cosmological Argument as not a purported proof but an inference to best explanation (the best we can do on these matters and most other matters of serious import); setting the underlying context for all of this. (You may want to look at my always linked, Sections D and E, and also at the 102 level discussion of the relevant cluster of arguments here.) GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{August 15, 2007
August
08
Aug
15
15
2007
01:39 AM
1
01
39
AM
PDT}

Oops, I meant BenK.dgw_{August 14, 2007
August
08
Aug
14
14
2007
11:59 PM
11
11
59
PM
PDT}

It seems to me that the appeal to the uncaused cause makes ontological sense if the uncaused cause is separate from creation (time, space, matter energy). Barry, I like the puddle analogy. This resting place is more satisfying than the unfinished regress of panspermia where the extraplanetary source of life itself requires causal explanation. By the way (slightly OT), here is a recent finding on panspermia that estimates the improbability of life originating on earth (compared to a cometary origin). http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/08/070814093819.htmdgw_{August 14, 2007
August
08
Aug
14
14
2007
11:58 PM
11
11
58
PM
PDT}

The complaint against ID and I guess God in general when it comes to "who designed the designer?" is refutable in another way as well. The complaint that ID requires to show what designed the designer is contradicted by the fact that humans can design and build things, yet according to evolutionists humans are not intelligently designed. If we can design things then don't we need to have been designed if we follow their logic? It's perfectly allowable in their logical scheme that a natural non intelligent cause created all life and the natural world but it is illogical to them that a cosmic designer would not need to have been designed. The consciousness mind and intellect of humans in their logical scheme is not a product of design, but if we postulate a consciousness mind and intellect infinitely larger older and more powerful then ourselves as a realistic probablity then we need to explain the intelligent cause of that? As far as the origin of the universe and time vis-a-vis a designer, the definitions of "universe" and "time" are all important. If by universe we mean "all matter/energy in existence" then we can contrast time relative to the creation of matter/energy. If all matter/energy came into existence at a certain point i.e the big bang or some other cause, then time can be measured from that point onward. But is that really the beginning of all time? Is time only relative to matter/energy? What is time? There are 2 basic definitions of time. 1. A nonspatial continuum in which events occur in apparently irreversible succession from the past through the present to the future. 2. An interval separating two points on this continuum Does matter/energy need to exist in order for the above two realities to exist? If matter/energy came into existence into a universe where previously there was no matter/energy then that doesn't mean that time had to begin at that point. Only time relative to matter/energy came into existence then. If another substance existed prior to matter/energy then time also existed relative to that substance. Ultimately reality and time is beginningless because something cannot come from nothing. Since something exists therefore something has always existed because nothing by definition does not exist. Without accepting that reality is beginningless then we face an illogical paradox. If we postulate that ultimately there had to be a beginning of reality then we have to explain where that beginning occured. If reality had a beginning then where did reality come into existence? If nothing exists and then something pops into existence the paradox of "where can something come into existence if nothing exists" cannot be logically answered. The only logically acceptable paradigm is that reality, defined as something which exists, has always existed. If at any point nothing at all existed then nothing would ever exist because there needs to be somewhere in order for something to exist. If there is somewhere then there must be something which defines it as real. Also if nothing existed at one point then there would be no causal impetus for something to come into existence. So logically something has always existed and there had to have been an original substance of reality without cause. The original substance of reality has logically existed without cause and without any beginning. Since reality is beginningless therefore time is also beginningless because time is simply a continuum of reality or a measurement between any number of points withing that continuum. The concept that time stops at the speed of light is illogical because time does not move and so therefore cannot stop. Time is a conceptual framework and has no ability to move because there is nothing to move. If we measure points within time relative to each other while simultaneously moving at the speed of light time will not be affected because there is nothing to affect. You cannot slow time because time is not moving, it is static. Everything moves in relation to time, but time cannot move because it is not a real ontic entity, it is a concept, not a substance which exists and can move.mentok_{August 14, 2007
August
08
Aug
14
14
2007
11:23 PM
11
11
23
PM
PDT}

This is one of those things that differentiates between ideas of a cosmological designer, and studying biological designers. Design behind biology does not require that Mobius strip-type reasoning (which is more a matter of philosophy than science), but is something that can be studied. I think that cosmological and biological design concepts should be kept separate because we're talking about two completely different kinds of problems.EJ Klone_{August 14, 2007
August
08
Aug
14
14
2007
09:44 PM
9
09
44
PM
PDT}

Gil, I had one of those insight's that totally changed my perspective, when I learned that time comes to a complete stop at the speed of light. I never could put my mind around that idea until I realized that it totally agrees with what theologians have been saying along. In a paraphrase of Gerald Shroeder, Relativity has changed a timeless existence from a Theological claim to a physical reality that we know to be true.bornagain77_{August 14, 2007
August
08
Aug
14
14
2007
07:18 PM
7
07
18
PM
PDT}

I don't believe the concept of cause and effect dictates every cause requires a cause. It only requires that every cause has an effect and every effect has a cause. Where does one get the idea that every cause necessarily belongs to an antecedent cause? The concept of infinite causes being mandatory is illogical and also just plain silly. Thankssaxe17_{August 14, 2007
August
08
Aug
14
14
2007
07:05 PM
7
07
05
PM
PDT}

One of my philosophy students put this thought brilliantly: "It's like following ripples back to the center of a pool and being surprised that a stone is not a ripple" i.e. Each ripple is being pushed by the ripple behind it, but the thing that started this whole process is radically different from a ripple - i.e. a stone falling into the pool. Likewise with the idea of a 'first cause' or an 'unmoved mover' or a 'cosmic designer'. The problem of infinite regress in the case of cause and effect can only be solved by something that can be a cause but does not require a cause. This 'first cause' would have to be something radically different from the universe of classical physics in which everything has a cause. Now this 'first cause' doesn't have to be a 'cosmic designer'; I suppose we could invoke some sort of quantum wierdness. But the 'who designed the designer' objection (to cosmological ID, not biological) simply misses the point. A first cause, by definition, is not caused by something else.BenK_{August 14, 2007
August
08
Aug
14
14
2007
06:51 PM
6
06
51
PM
PDT}

Prev 1 2

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Leave a Reply