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Darwinism: Why its failed predictions don’t matter

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From Wayne Rossiter, author of Shadow of Oz: Theistic Evolution and the Absent God: at his book blog:

It’s an odd pattern. It was this problem that came to mind as I recently revisited Living with Darwin: Evolution, Design and the Future of Faith, by Philip Kitcher. Kitcher is a philosopher at Columbia University, and he specializes on biology. His book was published by Oxford University Press, and was the recipient of the 2008 Lannan Notable Book Award. We should take his views seriously.

His book begins with a forceful assertion: “From the perspective of almost the entire community of natural scientists world-wide, this continued resistance to Darwin is absurd. Biologists confidently proclaim that Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is as well established as any of the major theories in contemporary science.”

This is not really a prediction. But, it is a statement that was wrong even before it was penned. More.

People who are committed to intellectual integrity in their own work often miss this central point: Once a bully pulpit like Darwinism has been established the occupant does not need to be correct, accurate or even useful. He can be a drag on the system. He can lead the march into degenerate science. He can, incidentally, fix you good if you try to offer an alternative view however grounded.

Bullies are not dislodged by being shown to be wrong, only by being successful opposed. Efforts so far have been commendable but quite honestly, more is needed.

See also: Biologist Wayne Rossiter on Joshua Swamidass’ claim that entropy = information

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Comments
PaV, I don't know why you persist in this error that the number of unordered hands is ~4x10^21. It has been demonstrated to you many times that this is not the case. With your latest comment. Before anyone writes something down, and presuming a uniformly random probability of writing down a hand, then sure the probability of writing down a specific hand in order then drawing that same hand in order is 1/ (4 x 10^21). The probability writing down any hand then getting it is 1 in 4 x 10^21)^2. Another way of seeing this is that the probability of matching the hand (in order) once you have written it down 1 in 4 x 10^21 (the hand you just wrote down is on of 4x10^21 possible hands, after all).wd400
June 3, 2017
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Origenes, You are illustrating Kitcher's point. The probability of a particular event depends on how tightly it is specified It is easy to start from almost any observation and then assign it a minuscule probability. We shouldn't be easily impressed by such calculations. When someone somewhere sees the face of jesus burnt in their toast, most sane people shrug their shoulders and make nothing of it. That's partly because lots of people burn their toast every day (there have been many trials) and partly because lots of burn patterns look a bit like a face, especially to our face-spotting brains (it's not that tightly specified).wd400
June 3, 2017
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So we have: (1) The probability of getting a particular 13-card hand is 1/S (2) The probability that a 13-card hand matches an independent specification is 1/S. Now the question is: If these probabilities are the same, then why is it that (1) is guaranteed*, while (2) (almost) never happens? "Improbable events happen all the time", only goes for type (1) events and never for type (2) events? If so why do they have the same probability of occurring? - - - * thanks to Kitcher's after the fact specificationOrigenes
June 3, 2017
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jdk:
1 in 4 x 10^21
You've stated that the probability of a hand being dealt is this very probability. I submit that the probability of receiving the exact hand of cards you wrote down in anticipation of the hand you would shortly receive is also 1 in 4 x 10^21. So, in the ONE event that comprises the 'dealing of hand' and the 'writing down of the sequence of the hand you will receive,' being one that involves TWO independent events, I would suppose the probability of that event is (1 in 4 x 10^21)^2. Or, put another way, the probability you give, is it for the dealing of the hand, or the writing down of the exact hand?PaV
June 3, 2017
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Phinehas,
DS: Is there no contradiction in this? Every time I press the button to start the program [that generates a random string with the length of Hamlet], what almost surely will never happen is almost surely guaranteed to happen. Or, why is the above not an accurate depiction wrt probability theory?
It involves equivocation. "what almost surely will never happen" corresponds to a particular 13-card permutation. "what is almost surely guaranteed to happen" is that some 13-card permutation will be drawn.daveS
June 3, 2017
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Phinehas,
DS: If this is taken literally, one experiment of dealing 13 random cards leading to a particular hand of 13 cards would still have a 1/1 probability. Did you mean theoretically performed?
Yes, and I mean over a large number of trials. I'm basically just trying to describe the frequentist conception of probability.daveS
June 3, 2017
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Phinehas,
LOL! This is just an appeal to authority couched in different language. I may not be as sharp on the math as others, but I can spot a rhetorical ploy a mile away. And as I’ve been saying, the issue with Kitcher and many others on this thread is not their mathematics, but their rhetorical sleights-of-hand.
Nonsense. I have a very elementary understanding of probability and associated philosophical issues, which I understand are significant. I'm not in charge of "accepted probability theory", so I am sincere when I say if you have some suggestions which might bring probability theory more in alignment with reality, by your lights, have at it.daveS
June 3, 2017
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DS:
I know you didn’t ask me, but if you think there is some problem with accepted probability theory, you are certainly free to suggest some modifications to improve it.
LOL! This is just an appeal to authority couched in different language. I may not be as sharp on the math as others, but I can spot a rhetorical ploy a mile away. And as I've been saying, the issue with Kitcher and many others on this thread is not their mathematics, but their rhetorical sleights-of-hand.Phinehas
June 3, 2017
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DS:
An event has low probability if and only if it occurs a small number of times compared to the total number of times the experiment is performed.
If this is taken literally, one experiment of dealing 13 random cards leading to a particular hand of 13 cards would still have a 1/1 probability. Did you mean theoretically performed?Phinehas
June 3, 2017
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DS: Is there no contradiction in this? Every time I press the button to start the program [that generates a random string with the length of Hamlet], what almost surely will never happen is almost surely guaranteed to happen. Or, why is the above not an accurate depiction wrt probability theory?Phinehas
June 3, 2017
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Phinehas,
This is really the crux of my objection, so I do wish you’d at least attempt to address it rather than simply appealing to the authority of accepted probability theory. I get the accepted probability theory, but am questioning whether it makes sense when compared to reality.
I guess I'm guilty of the same thing. I know you didn't ask me, but if you think there is some problem with accepted probability theory, you are certainly free to suggest some modifications to improve it. Maybe they will catch on. I don't see a pressing need to do so, but I'm not a probabilist or statistician.daveS
June 3, 2017
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Phinehas,
Suppose I have a computer program that will spit out a random string the length of Hamlet. We know that the odds of it spitting out a specified configuration (such as Hamlet) are so small that we can say it almost surely will never happen.* Does it really make sense that every time I press the button to start the program, what almost surely will never happen is now almost surely guaranteed to happen? In a theoretical system where the above is the case, might we not suppose it is the theoretical system that is flawed rather than reality?
I think you're reading more into the concept of "low probability" than is justified. An event has low probability if and only if it occurs a small number of times compared to the total number of times the experiment is performed. This doesn't mean that events which actually do occur generally have reasonably large probability. Many of these 13-card permutations we have been talking about might actually occur just one or even zero times in the complete history of our universe. This is despite the fact that people around the world play bridge all the time, where the permutations are generated constantly. There really is no contradiction in saying that one can generate very low probability events at will.daveS
June 3, 2017
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When flipping a coin the probability you will get one of the possibilities (heads or tails) is exactly 1 (not nearly 1).
In reality, it is only nearly 1, since you might have a heart attack, or the coin might land on its edge, or...
When you flip the coin, you now have an actual event. That particular event was heads, and the probability of it having happened was 1/2.
In reality, there is no probability of something having happened. If it has happened then, in reality, the probability is 1.0. It is certain that it has happened, so talk of probability is rather meaningless at that point. Again, the issue here isn't in the mathematics, but in the sleight-of-mind, ambiguity of language, imagination, etc. What actually happened, apart from imagination, was that a fair coin was flipped to see which of the two potential outcomes would be instantiated. One of the two potential outcomes was then observed.
End of case. I will once again give up. This is fundamental and basic accepted probability theory.
But if basic accepted probability theory brings you to this:
Suppose I have a computer program that will spit out a random string the length of Hamlet. We know that the odds of it spitting out a specified configuration (such as Hamlet) are so small that we can say it almost surely will never happen.* Does it really make sense that every time I press the button to start the program, what almost surely will never happen is almost surely guaranteed to happen?
Might we not suppose it is the theoretical system that is flawed rather than reality? This is really the crux of my objection, so I do wish you'd at least attempt to address it rather than simply appealing to the authority of accepted probability theory. I get the accepted probability theory, but am questioning whether it makes sense when compared to reality.Phinehas
June 3, 2017
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When you haven’t specified anything, the probability when flipping a coin is nearly 1.0 that you will get one of the possible specifications (heads or tails). The real specification for the flip when no specification is given is heads or tails.
When flipping a coin the probability you will get one of the possibilities (heads or tails) is exactly 1 (not nearly 1). The probability of each is 1/2. It make no difference whether someone specifies what is going to happen, or not. When you flip the coin, you now have an actual event. That particular event was heads, and the probability of it having happened was 1/2. End of case. I will once again give up. This is fundamental and basic accepted probability theory.jdk
June 3, 2017
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jdk: To see why the above has to be the case, it helps to look at something other than a single coin. Suppose I have a computer program that will spit out a random string the length of Hamlet. We know that the odds of it spitting out a specified configuration (such as Hamlet) are so small that we can say it almost surely will never happen.* Does it really make sense that every time I press the button to start the program, what almost surely will never happen is now almost surely guaranteed to happen? In a theoretical system where the above is the case, might we not suppose it is the theoretical system that is flawed rather than reality? * See: Infinite Monkey Theorem on WikipediaPhinehas
June 3, 2017
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jdk:
I flip a coin and it comes up heads. Am I justified in saying that the probability of that having happened is 1/2, even if no one “called heads” before the flip?
The probability of what having happened. When you haven't specified anything, the probability when flipping a coin is nearly 1.0 that you will get one of the possible specifications (heads or tails). The real specification for the flip when no specification is given is heads or tails. What actually happened is that you got one of either heads or tails exactly as specified. The probability of this is 1/1 and not 1/2.
Would I be justified in saying the probability of this particular flip is 1/2.
But at the time of the flip, it wasn't a particular flip. It was a random flip. We're only trying to pretend it was a particular flip after the fact. It wasn't. If you specify a specific outcome ahead of time, then it becomes a particular flip and not a random flip.Phinehas
June 3, 2017
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1 in 4 x 10^21jdk
June 3, 2017
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jdk: @ 279, among other statements you said this:
Even in bridge, where order doesn’t count, the number of hands is 635 billion, so when you are dealt a hand is likely that that hand has never been dealt before because the probability of that hand is so low.
So, we're basically in agreement as to how to look on Bridge hands. You also said this:
The probability of your getting the particular hand you get is 1/n, a very small number (2.5 x 10^-22).
Here's two different scenarios: First scenario: I'm at a table playing Bridge. You say that the odds of getting my hand are one 635 billion. Okay. But, if include the order in which they were dealt, it is 1 in 4 x 10^21. Okay, you're saying the odds of my getting the hand I got was 1 in 4 x 10^21. Second scenario: Before the dealer deals, I write down the suits, numbers/faces, and order of 13 cards. The dealer then deals me my cards. The order, numbers/faces, and suits of the cards I receive match exactly what I wrote down. What is probability of the second scenario happening? This is what you said @ 124:
Now, a winning set of numbers, a specification, is chosen by the lottery administrators. The probability of your having the winning ticket is 1 out of 10 billion also. But this is a different probability even though it has the same numerical value.
Aren't the probabilities of "independent" events supposed to be multiplied together? Now, if the probability of getting a lottery ticket, or of getting a Bridge hand is 1.0, then, to me, everything works out.PaV
June 3, 2017
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re 292: You write,
I still think this is only true in some sort of technical, imaginary sense that doesn’t really line up with reality.
It is true in a technical, mathematical sense. You write,
The above rests on an ambiguity of language where we can use the words “particular hand” for a hand that is not really particular. If it is not pre-specified as the exact cards to match ahead of time, then it is not in reality a “particular hand."
I flip a coin and it comes up heads. Am I justified in saying that the probability of that having happened is 1/2, even if no one "called heads" before the flip? Would I be justified in saying the probability of this particular flip is 1/2. How do you answer these questions?jdk
June 3, 2017
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The probability of a bridge hand is NOT 1 in 4 x 10^21. I am really baffled that you don't get that. And yes, you can say what I said about every bridge hand that is ever dealt to anyone: they all have an equal, very small, probability of 1 in 635 billion.jdk
June 3, 2017
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jdk: @127:
But if someone looks at their hand and thinks to himself, “I am virtually certain no one in the universe has ever had this particular hand, even if this game has been played billions of times, because this particular hand, like all hands, has a extremely small probability of happening”, they would be making an accurate statement. Notice that this second statement has nothing to do with specifications. It is just a true statement reflecting the fact that the probability of any hand is 1/S.
I didn't see this before. It was addressed to someone else. jdk, I ask you, if you know that the probability of ANY Bridge hand is 1 in 4 x 10^21, then couldn't that statement have been made of any hand? That is, "looking" at the hand is not necessary. This observation seems to me to indicate that the probability of any Bridge hand is 1 in 52!/(39!)(13!). Why? Because, if I had the time---my Bridge partners might become impatient!---I could sort my cards any way I wanted; and so I could then go through 13! of such combinations. It would always be the same hand I was dealt. It was for this reason, I suspect, that Kircher had to specify "if order is important." But notice that the probability of the initially dealt hand was, in fact, 1 in 4 x 10^21. All the combinations come from the person holding the hand mixing them up. That is, a seecondary event.PaV
June 3, 2017
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Eric A @ 287:
jdk: Therefore, an event of very low probability occurred. Events of very low probability happen all the time.
Eric: Absolutely agree.
What jdk has left out is that there was an earlier discussion about the probability of a hand, and it was pointed out by me that although the probability of any hand is low, there are, as jdk has stated, just that many ways of dealing a hand. They cancel. The probability of dealing out a hand of cards is 1.0 It is NOT an improbable event. Rolling three dice is not an improbable event. What would be improbable is if the dice hit the table they were being rolled on and then jumped in the air and stayed there. That would be improbable. No, the improbabilities involved in the rolling of the dice occur in the minds of intelligent beings, and are "associated" with the rolling of the dice, and no more. This would be an improbable event: two people throw three dice on the same table and the end up with the same numbers. But a single roll has a probability of one. It's going to happen. In the case of cards, receiving a Bridge hand is completely probable. It, too, is going to happen, as I mentioned above. Here's an improbable event. I list 13 cards on a piece of paper, and then place the piece of paper with the list of cards facing down. Then I'm dealt a hand. I turn over the piece of paper, and find that I got the exact same hand. (Even if the order isn't the same, we're still dealing with an highly improbable event.) And, Eric, this has to do, of course, with a "specification" being involved in the two examples I've given. Maybe you would like to comment a little further.PaV
June 3, 2017
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PaV: I'm trying to understand, and explain, and I think your subtle point is just confused and wrong. You write,
However, since there are 13! hands that are combinations of one another, to select one of these makes the odds different. The odds are now 13! x 1 in 4 x 10^21, or 13! x 39!/52! = [13! x 39!]/52!.”
Since the one permutation (out of 4 x 10^21) can be rearranged into 13! other permutations, each one of which is the same combination, you have 13! fewer combinations than permutations. If in the middle of the problem you change your interest from permutations to combinations, then the probabilitiies have changed because you have changed what your studying. Nothing subtle there. You write,
This means that there are then (52!)/(39!)(13!) combinations, and 52!/39! permutations of a deck of cards chosen 13 at a time.
This is absolutely true, and has been mentioned a number of times, assuming you have understood parentheses in the formula (52!)/[(39!)(13!)] combinations, and 52!/39! permutations of a deck of cards chosen 13 at a time. But we all agree with that. All the manipulations of how it happens doesn't change the number of possibilities. And since the probabilities are just the reciprocals of the number of possibilities, we are thus agreed on the probabilities. And I read over your other two examples, and I'm convinced you are confused. If we deal hands and declare that order is important, we have a different situation than if we declare that order is not important. That is up to us. And, how can I say it more clearlyL in bridge order is not important so bridge is not what Kircher's example is about.
All you have to say, contra Kircher, is that the odds of receiving a Bridge hand is 1 in 4 x 10^21. Why? Because we’re not dealing with entire sample space at once, and the possibility of a combination occurring in normal act of dealing is zero.
This paragraph makes no sense. You don't ever deal with the sample space at one, you select one element out of the sample space. And I have no idea what "the possibility of a combination occurring in normal act of dealing is zero" means.jdk
June 3, 2017
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jdk:
The probability of your getting the particular hand you get is 1/n, a very small number (2.5 x 10^-22). Therefore, an event of very low probability occurred. Events of very low probability happen all the time.
I still think this is only true in some sort of technical, imaginary sense that doesn't really line up with reality. The above rests on an ambiguity of language where we can use the words "particular hand" for a hand that is not really particular. If it is not pre-specified as the exact cards to match ahead of time, then it is not in reality a "particular hand." The pre-specification in reality is "13 random cards dealt from a 52 card deck." It is only a sleight-of-hand (or mind, or language) that would allow us to suppose that the cards dealt are a "particular hand" rather than "13 random cards dealt from a 52 card deck." I believe that it is only the pre-specification in reality that determines how improbable an event actually is. The sleight-of-mind comes with getting the specification confused and supposing that it is a "particular hand" (which is actually unspecified while purporting to be highly specified) when in fact "13 cards dealt from a deck of 52" is the real specification. This is reinforced by the intuition that highly improbable occurrences ought to be surprising. It ought to be surprising to be dealt a "particular hand" but it ought not be surprising at all to be dealt "13 random cards from a 52 card deck." The lack of surprise should clue us in to the reality that nothing truly improbable has happened. Again, it seems like the idea that events of very low probability happen all the time is a violation of common sense on the face of it. When I sit down to deal out a hand, is it true in reality that the unimaginably improbable is not only probable, but a near certainty? Surely, that cannot be right, can it? Surely, there is a better way to look at the issue that doesn't blatantly harm logic and common sense.Phinehas
June 3, 2017
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jdk: @278: I think everyone misses the subtle point I'm stressing (overstressing?). Imagine the young girl, who, for the next twenty centuries, shuffles a deck, places them face down on a table, selects 13 cards at random forming a pile, which she then shuffles so that the order of the original selection is lost. She now flips them over, lays them out left to right, and writes the sequence of cards. The probability of each selection of 13 cards is 1/52 x 1/51 x . . .1/40 = 1 in 4 x 10^21. But, over the centuries, as she writes down all these various hands, she notices that some of them are similar. In fact, they have the same cards, but simply in a different left-to-right order. She finds that that whatever hand she picks, she find 13! less one more of them. So, she says to herself, "If I'm not interested in the order of the cards, but just that these groups of 13 cards contains the same 13 cards, then my odds of coming up with such a grouping of cards is 13! higher than if I 'select' ANY one of these orderings of the 13 cards." She then goes on to find out: "There are 4 x 10^21 hands in total that are different when I select 13 cards out of the deck. The likelihood of EACH ONE of these hands is therefore 1 in 4 x 10^21. However, since there are 13! hands that are combinations of one another, to select one of these makes the odds different. The odds are now 13! x 1 in 4 x 10^21, or 13! x 39!/52! = [13! x 39!]/52!." This means that there are then (52!)/(39!)(13!) combinations, and 52!/39! permutations of a deck of cards chosen 13 at a time. So, all the numbers work out. It's simply a matter of understanding what is happening. It seems to me, please correct me if you see otherwise, that since the cards, after being selected in a particular order, are then shuffled, the order of the original selection is lost, and no longer has anything to do with what happens later. After shuffling the cards, the cards are then placed from left-to-right. This is a NEW order, independent of the original selection. And this ordering of the shuffled pile will completely be equivalent to the sample space of all hands formed by selecting 13 cards from a shuffled deck of 52 cards. Whether she didn’t shuffle the pile, or shuffled them, the same sample space will eventually turn up. IOW, ordering is what separates permutations from combinations, not what constitutes the actual probability of any event of ‘dealing’ a hand of 13 cards. ********************************** Another example: I have a bag full of 52 balls that are not numbered. I pull out 13 balls. What are the odds of this event? 1.0 Now I have a bag full of 52 balls numbered from 1 to 52. I pull out 13 balls. What is the probability of doing this? 1 in 4 x 10^21 since each individual ball can be distinguished. Now, I look at the balls, I see what their numbers are. I confirm to you that, indeed, all of the numbers come from the set of numbers 1 to 52, and none of them are duplicated. Do you need more information than that to tell me the probability of the selection? I say, “no.” You don’t need to know the ‘order’ of how they were selected. All you need to know for computing its probability is that the balls were numbered, and nothing funny happened. ******************************** Finally: You shuffle a deck of cards, and you deal out all the cards into four hands. What is the probability of those hands? For each of them, courtesy of wd400, the probability, as it should be is 1 in 4 x 10^21. But you say, “No, wait a second, that’s if order is important, because that’s the only way of getting us away from combinations which can affect the probabilities.” To which I respond: Do you really want to tell me that there is a chance that any two of those four hands dealt are ‘combinations’ of one another? Of course they’re not. So the whole idea of ‘combinations’ is moot. All you have to say, contra Kircher, is that the odds of receiving a Bridge hand is 1 in 4 x 10^21. Why? Because we’re not dealing with entire sample space at once, and the possibility of a combination occurring in normal act of dealing is zero. This is why people are free to sort their individual hands once they've been dealt. The order in which the cards were dealt affects nothing.PaV
June 3, 2017
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Origenes, incidentally, there is an important nuance to address when we actually get down to making the specification, particularly in cases of otherwise non-functional strings, like card deals, coin tosses and the like. I'm not sure if I've already posted an OP on this before. I'll check my notes and, if needed, may do a quick post on this point sometime in the next week.Eric Anderson
June 3, 2017
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Origenes @276: There is nothing special about Kitcher's example. His is just another case of failing to understand that the design inference is not based on improbability alone. This is the whole point of a specification. I actually have the last sentence you quoted highlighted in my copy of his book. Rather than going into the issue in detail again (there have been previous posts on this), I'll just reproduce here my note in the margin: "This is a failed argument, but requires some careful analysis to understand Kitcher's mistake. The issue is not whether improbable things can happen. They do. All the time. The issue is this: in the context of comparing possible explanations for a complex and specified event, which explanation is most rational: blind chance or intelligence."Eric Anderson
June 3, 2017
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re 287: Great! :-)jdk
June 3, 2017
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jdk @279:
I have no interest in Kircher: either what use he makes of probability in his book or the way he phrased this situation. I am interested in the probability theory.
Fair enough.
Therefore, an event of very low probability occurred. Events of very low probability happen all the time.
Absolutely agree. I'm not sure I have a lot to add, as we are in agreement here. ----- Now there is much more that could be added if we want to discuss how this observation might or might not apply to the design inference . . .Eric Anderson
June 3, 2017
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But I am not "using this as a means against the design inference." I mentioned putting symbols on the cards just to make them more random than suits and numbers.jdk
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