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Deep Blue Never Is (Blue, That Is)

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In the comment thread to my last post there was a lot of discussion about computers and their relation to intelligence.  This is my understanding about computers.  They are just very powerful calculators, but they do not “think” in any meaningful sense.  By this I mean that computer hardware is nothing but an electro-mechanical device for operating computer software.  Computer software in turn is nothing but a series of “if then” propositions.  These “if then” propositions may be massively complex, but software never rises above an utterly determined “if then” level.    This is a basic Turing Machine analysis. 

This does not necessarily mean that the output of computer software is predictable.  For example, the “then” in response to a particular”if” might be “access a random number generator and insert the number obtained in place of the variable in formula Y.”  “Unpredictable” is not a synonym for “contingent.”  Even if an element of randomness is introduced into the system, however, the way in which the computer will employ that random element is determined. 

Now the $64,000 question is this:  Is the human brain merely an organic computer that in principle operates the same way as my PC?”  In other words, does the Turing Machine also describe the human brain ?  If the brain is just an organic computer, even though human behavior may at some level be unpredictable, it is nevertheless determined, and free will does not exist.  If, on the other hand, it is not, if there is a “mind” that is separate from though connected to, the brain, then free will does exist. 

This issue has been debated endlessly, and I refer everyone to The Spiritual Brain for a much more in depth analysis of this subject.   For my purposes today, I propose to approach the subject via a very simple thought experiment. 

First a definition.  “Qualia” are the subjective responses a person has to objective experience.  Qualia are not the experiences themselves but the way we respond to the experiences.  The color “red” is the classical example.  When light of wavelength X comes into my eye, my brain tells me I am seeing the color red.  The quale (singular of “qualia”) is my subjective experience of the “redness” of red.  Maybe the “redness” of red for me is a kind of warmth.  Other qualia might be the tanginess of a sour taste, the sadness of depression, etc.

Now the experiment:  Consider a computer equiped with a light gathering device and a spectrograph.   When light of wavelength X enters the light gathering device, the spectrograph gives a reading that the light is red.  When this happens the computer is programmed to activate a printer that prints a piece of paper with the following statement on it “I am seeing red.”

I place the computer on my back porch just before sunset, and in a little while the printer is activated and prints a piece of paper that says “I am seeing red.”

 Now I go outside and watch the same sunset.  The reds in the sunset I associate with warmth, by which I mean my subjective reaction to the redness of the reds in the sunset is “warmth.”

1.  Did the computer “see” red?  Obviously yes.

2.  Did I “see” red.  Obviously yes.

3.  Did I have a subjective experiences of the redness of red, i.e., did I experience a qualia?  Obviously yes.

4.  Did the computer have a subjective experience of the redness of red, i.e., did it experience a qualia?  Obviously no.

Conclusion:  The computer registered “red” when red light was present.  My brain registered “red” when red light was present.  Therefore, the computer and my brain are alike in this respect.  However, and here’s the important thing, the computer’s experience of the sunset can be reduced to the functions of its light gathering device and hardware/software.  But my experience of the sunset cannot be reduced to the functions of my eye and brain.  Therefore, I conclude I have a mind which cannot be reduced to the electro-chemical reactions that occur in my brain.

Comments
Hi GP: Actually, it is even stronger, and has been since Cicero:
s it possible for any man to behold these things, and yet imagine that certain solid and individual bodies move by their natural force and gravitation, and that a world so beautifully adorned was made by their fortuitous concourse? He who believes this may as well believe that if a great quantity of the one-and-twenty letters, composed either of gold or any other matter, were thrown upon the ground, they would fall into such order as legibly to form the Annals of Ennius. I doubt whether fortune could make a single verse of them. How, therefore, can these people assert that the world was made by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, which have no color, no quality—which the Greeks call [poiotes], no sense? [Cicero, THE NATURE OF THE GODS BK II Ch XXXVII, C1 BC, as trans Yonge (Harper & Bros., 1877), pp. 289 - 90.]
Clearly, ever since C1 BC, it has been recognised that a sufficiently long and meaningful digital data string is utterly improbable on chance. but, such is well known as the product of an author -- in this case Ennius. So,the concept of CSI in the form functionally specified complex information was recognised as a signature of intelligent agents as long ago as C1 BC. Indeed, that is common sense. For instance, no-one who comes to this web page as a default assumes that the posts in it are lucky noise -- which is of course physically and logically possible. But it is so utterly improbable that reliably we infer to agency once something is functionally specified and complex enough that chance is utterly unlikely to "discover" it in the relevant configuration space. However, when the direct implication of such FSCI cuts across one's world view -- e.g on DNA and the complex organisation of the observed life-facilitating cosmos, suddenly many impose an unreasonably high standard of proof, often on the excuse that "extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof." Well, one could argue in response, that the idea that chance would do such an extraordinary thing would require an extraordinary degree of proof for that claim -- especially since in ALL directly known cases FSCI is the product of intelligent agents. But, it is better to point out that extraordinary claims are simply those we do not expect and are inclined to be incredulous over: that is, the perception of extraordinariness is a psychological fact, not an epistemic one. Instead of imposing unreasonably high standards of proof when our preferences are in contention, we should rather look at adequacy and being willing to be wrong -- as anything that is a claim about the empirical world can be. Then, we can look at what happens when worldview level commitments are not in contention -- e.g on the digital bit strings in this web page -- and soon it is plain that selective hyperskepticism is at work. This sort of unreasonableness -- by its very un-reason-able nature -- cannot be overturned directly by logical and evidential argument, but as more and more of the less committed, ordinary unprejudiced people see that this is what is going on, the tide of opinion will shift. For those who are genuinely confused and doubtful [as are many who come to this blog and are puzzled by why so many here who are educated and experienced do not buy into the evo mat metaphysical fairytale of origins [too often disguised as "science"], over time as the evidence comes across form many directions, it will eventually dawn that of course, the truth is obvious. Just as it always was, save to those blinded by modernist and post/ultra- modernist selective hyperskepicism. If you are blind, it is of no account how bright and plain the sun is -- you simply cannot see it. But, if we begin to even dimly see that science is inherently provisional, that it works by inference to best empirically anchored explanation, thence, that this is inescapably a philosophical (epistemological) issue -- indeed science used to be called natural philosophy -- then one will be open to see that Lakatos was right, namely, scientific research programmes have a belt of theories surrounding a worldviews core. And that core tends to be protected by the theories. Only when the theories become more and more plainly deficient in explanatroy power [and resort may be made to institutional power to suppress dissent], does the central thinking become exposed to challenge. So, as the power of the design inference is making itself felt once more in our civilisation, that is beginning to happen. THAT is why the evolutionary materialist opposition to the inference to design is so intense and ruthless: the course of a whole civilisation is in contention. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 12, 2008
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#95 aiguy: Please, be serious! Intelligence is an empirical experience and always has been. If you want to call it X-force, in your weird language, you are welcome. We all know what it is you are referring to as "X-force/intelligence", exactly because it is an empirical experience. Consciousness, free will and intelligence are all empirical experiences experienced by... guess who? Our own consciousness. You can cheat with words as long as you want, but you can't cancel that simple and universal fact. That's why words like "consciousness", "will" and "intelligence" have been created, and everyone agrees about their empirical meaning. #97 WinglesS: Intelligence is the only known empirical cause of CSI. In a recent thread I have asked someone to point to a single example of CSI which is not due to intelligence. He had cited Bénard cells, which obviously are not CSI. I have tried to explain what CSI is, you know, it's not that difficult, but obviously you can't explain to a darwinist the meaning of a concept which indeed falsifies what he believes in, and expect that he accepts it... Anyway, nobody has ever pointed to a single example of CSI (correctly defined) which is not the product of intelligence. Except, obviously, biological information, which is the issue we are discussing. That's an empirical truth. The fact that CSI "could" come into existence by chance, although very unlikely, is a logical truth, but it has no empirical relevance. The fact is, it has never come into existence by chance. And that's more than enough for a scientific, empirical theory like ID. And, after all, in the case of biological information, we are not dealing with a single, isolated case of CSI, which could "in theory" be the only example in the universe of CSI generated by chance. We are dealing, indeed, with billions of different examples and levels of CSI, independent one from another. Completely different functional proteins, different body plans, different regulatory networks, and so on. Therefore, even the theoretical, logical possibility of CSI being, once in the universe, generated randomly, is completely irrelevant. Again, intelligence is the only known cause of CSI. Period.gpuccio
January 12, 2008
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#97 WinglesS I don’t think intelligence can be defined as the source of all CSI but rather as a source of CSI. As I said it is possible, although very unlikely, for CSI to arise without intelligence. I don't agree; the relevance of CSI is just that to provide a useful and reliable reference to intelligence, either directly (intelligent agent) or indirectly (the product of an algorithm that was producedby an intelligent agent. This is possible because "very unlikely" does mean some event well below UPB.kairos
January 12, 2008
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AIG -- Newton addressed how and why things fell, not whether they fell. ID addresses, not why and how things are designed, merely how we can tell that they are.tribune7
January 12, 2008
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H'mm: It seems that the basic ID-related definitions issue is surfacing again. [AIG has asked me to come across and look at no 93.] I note first that definition is itself a process, not a statement. Further to this, precising statements of genera and differentia and/or of necessary and sufficient conditions are logically subsequent to basic concept formulation and exemplification. Namely, we have to have a firm enough concept based on examples and experiences, for definitions to be seen as reliably separating examples and non-examples. Such concepts imply another style of definition or at least recognition -- one that Aquinas was fond of pointing out: instantiation through and family resemblance across examples. Precising verbal or quantitative definitions help us t o mark borders, where this is possible. But we should note -- on a point of proportion -- that biology is a science where there is no generally accepted exception-less necessary and sufficient statement of what "life" is; the recent what is capable of undergoing darwinian macro-evolution is notoriously question-begging and tendentious for instance. And indeed there are some serious borderline cases. But, rightly, biology is a recognised science. Similarly, one can always challenge a definition -- just like one can always challenge any claim. Then we have a choice: infinite regress or resolution at first plausibles resting in part on self-evident truths and otherwise on comparative difficulties across worldviews options. in short we are here probing into the Lakatosian worldviews core of the relevant scientific research programmes. The proper method for such is comparative difficulties analysis across factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory elegance. In that context, I hold that we directly and as the first undeniable fact of all experience ourselves as intelligent agents, and that we observe one another as similarly intelligent agents. So -- as I discuss in the epistemology thread that spawned this one, now going into model identifying adaptive control systems and i/o front end processors as illustrations familiar enough from the world of technology -- we form the concept and look for family resemblance to identify other such agents. So, let us put all of this in proportion and keep out of that ever so tempting morass, selective hyper-skepticism. [And JT if you are hanging around, that is my descriptive term fro a concept neatly identified by Simon Greenleaf. Latterly others have begun to take it up in various versions. You still owe me a major apology for slander.] Okay, in my always linked section A I take a stab at adequate basic definition of several key concepts. here is my stab on intelligence:
First, let us identify what intelligence is. This is fairly easy: for, we are familiar with it from the characteristic behaviour exhibited by certain known intelligent agents -- ourselves. Specifically, as we know from experience and reflection, such agents take actions and devise and implement strategies that creatively address and solve problems they encounter; a functional pattern that does not depend at all on the identity of the particular agents. In short, intelligence is as intelligence does. So, if we see evident active, intentional, creative, innovative and adaptive [as opposed to merely fixed instinctual] problem-solving behaviour similar to that of known intelligent agents, we are justified in attaching the label: intelligence. [Note how this definition by functional description is not artificially confined to HUMAN intelligent agents: it would apply to computers, robots, the alleged alien residents of Area 51, Vulcans, Klingons or Kzinti, or demons or gods, or God.] But also, in so solving their problems, intelligent agents may leave behind empirically evident signs of their activity; and -- as say archaeologists and detectives know -- functionally specific, complex information [FSCI] that would otherwise be improbable, is one of these signs. This preliminary point immediately lays to rest the insistent assertion that inference to design is somehow necessarily "unscientific" -- as such is said to always and inevitably be about improperly injecting "the supernatural" into scientific discourse . . . For, given the significance of what routinely happens when we see an apparent message [we infer to message in the teeth of the possibility of lucky noise, as section A discusses, based on precisely FSCI], this is simply not so; even though certain particular cases may raise the subsequent question: what is the identity of the particular intelligence inferred to be the author of certain specific messages? (In turn, this may lead to broader, philosophical; that is, worldview level questions. Observe carefully: such questions go beyond the "belt" of science theories, proper, into the worldview issues that -- as Imre Lakatos reminded us -- are embedded in the inner core of scientific research programmes, and are addressed through philosophical rather than specifically scientific methods.) In short, those who would make such a rhetorical dismissal, would do well to ponder anew the cite at the head of this web page. For, the key insight of Cicero [C1 BC!] is that, in particular, a sense-making (thus, functional), sufficiently complex string of digital characters is a signature of a true message produced by an intelligent actor, not a likely product of a random process. He then [logically speaking] goes on to ask concerning the evident FSCI in nature, and challenges those who would explain it by reference to chance collocations of atoms. That is a good challenge, and it is one that should not be ducked by worldview-level begging of serious definitional questions or -- worse -- shabby rhetorical misrepresentations and manipulations. Therefore, let us now consider in a little more detail a situation where an apparent message is received. What does that mean? What does it imply about the origin of the message . . . or, is it just noise that "got lucky"? . . . [go to the always linked for more]
Now, is that helpful or not? Why/why not? GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 12, 2008
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#93 aiguy Newton’s gravity was so well characterized that people for the first time could see this: That which causes an apple to fall to Earth is the same thing as that which causes the planets to move in their orbits! That's right, but isn't that what does actually happen for intelligence? From Archeology to ET searching (and in lots of other fields for that matter) deductions and inferences for who could have produced some artifacts or signals are just done from a very high confidence to know what intelligence is. Are you sure that for Newton's theory there is a real qualitative difference and not just a quantitative one? Now, ID makes an analogous claim of identical causes: That which causes a human being’s intelligent behavior is the same thing as that which causes the CSI in biology. Unfortunately, if we have simply defined intelligence as the cause of all CSI, there is no way to evaluate whether or not this is true. So ID’s claim cannot be considered scientific. Everyone may legitimately put a so strict definition of what is scientific, but then the same person should coherently be resposible to state that lots of scientific fields are, with that definition, non scientific anymore.kairos
January 12, 2008
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aiguy says, Now, ID makes an analogous claim of identical causes: That which causes a human being’s intelligent behavior is the same thing as that which causes the CSI in biology. Unfortunately, if we have simply defined intelligence as the cause of all CSI, there is no way to evaluate whether or not this is true. So ID’s claim cannot be considered scientific. I don't think intelligence can be defined as the source of all CSI but rather as a source of CSI. As I said it is possible, although very unlikely, for CSI to arise without intelligence. And it does bring us back to the first point, when I said we can't evaluate whether a said case of CSI is caused by intelligence but we can conclude that it is very probable that it is. You've only named one alternative to ID but X-Force is pretty much the same as ID imo. ID doesn't have to be bogged down by metaphysical issues like libertarian free will, consciousness, and so on. Those issue come into the picture due to support of ID from the Christian community, and are inherited from Christian philosophy. Perhaps it would be good for you to list another laternative that isn't like ID or Darwinian Evolution at all. Perhaps your point that ID shouldn't be considered science is valid, but taking your point of view, I find myself doubting that Darwinian Evolution, (can we prove that a case of CSI is caused by Darwinian Evolution?) Abiogenesis, and the Oort cloud are scientific concepts, and that list might grow to include many other theories and concepts that others will argue vehemently are science. (dark energy perhaps) Perhaps someone might clear my thinking on this issue. On another note, sorry for taking up so much of your time, although I think your arguments have helped my thoughts on some issues I think it's confused me about what should be considered science, not because ID doesn't fit your criteria, but because so many other concepts that pass as science do not appear to do so.WinglesS
January 12, 2008
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John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV (1690): "[I]t is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent being, as that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in itself, able to produce nothing. For example: let us suppose the matter of the next pebble we meet with eternal, closely united, and the parts firmly at rest together; if there were no other being in the world, must it not eternally remain so, a dead inactive lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add motion to itself, being purely matter, or produce anything? Matter, then, by its own strength, cannot produce in itself so much as motion: the motion it has must also be from eternity, or else be produced, and added to matter by some other being more powerful than matter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in itself. But let us suppose motion eternal too: yet matter, INCOGITATIVE matter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk, could never produce thought: knowledge will still be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power of nothing or nonentity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by NOTHING, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when, before, there was no such thing as thought or an intelligent being existing? Divide matter into as many parts as you will, (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it,) vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please -- a globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, &c., whose diameters are but 100,000th part of a GRY, will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk, than those of an inch or foot diameter; and you may as rationally expect to produce sense, thought, and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain figure and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are the very minutest that do anywhere exist. They knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the greater do; and that is all they can do. So that, if we will suppose NOTHING first or eternal, matter can never begin to be: if we suppose bare matter without motion, eternal, motion can never begin to be: if we suppose only matter and motion first, or eternal, thought can never begin to be."j
January 12, 2008
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Daniel, Please list a dozen. Given the level of detail that ID provides ("CSI in biology is caused by intelligence, and intelligence is that which creates CSI") one could make up a dozen on the spot. But here is one I'm particularly fond of; perhaps you've heard of it. It is a theory called X-Force Theory. The claim of X-Force theory is "The complex form and function we see in biology is due to the X-Force". And what evidence do we have? Well, X-Force is what enables all complex form and function to arise. For example, when a human being builds a complex machine, that is X-Force at work. So, since the forms in biology are complex like the ones we see that humans build, that is evidence that X-Force is responsible. This theory is actually quite similar to ID, except that instead of positing that "intelligence" is what enables people to design complex machinery, X-Force theory posits that "X-Force" is responsible. One advantage of X-Force theory over ID theory is that X-Force isn't bogged down by metaphysical issues like libertarian free will, consciousness, and so on. It's just X-Force. Perhaps you will complain that I have not provided an independent, operationalized definition of X-Force? Yes, I can see how that might be problem. But since ID fails to provide an independent, operationalized definition of "intelligence", we can see that X-Force really is an alternative theory to ID. Neither of them say anything at all about what might be the cause of biological complexity that we can evaluate against empirical evidence.aiguy
January 12, 2008
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Q:
There are any number of alternatives to ID.
Interesting... Please list a dozen.Daniel King
January 12, 2008
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WinglesS, So you’re saying the concept of charge is science despite our inability to define charge from non-charge apart from its effects, as long as these effects are tied to a “rich network of concepts ultimately grounded in terms of observable effects”. If that’s what you’re saying, I think you’re being kind of vague, but from my limited understanding, I assume that you mean that there are formulae that decribe the behavior of electric fields while there are none for CSI. No, let's assume Dembski is right, just for the sake of argument, and CSI is a well-defined property. The problem, rather, is that while there are precise and empirically grounded characterizations of charge, and all of the fields and forces described in physics, there are no such characterizations of intelligence. And no, it doesn't have to be a forumla, it just has to be a sufficiently specific description so that we can evaluate whether or not the descriptions match our observations. Let's take an example which is a bit simpler than electricity - Newtonian gravity. Is gravity a vacuous explanation of falling objects? Q: What causes objects to fall? A: Gravity. Q: What is gravity? A: That which causes things to fall. If this is how Newton defined gravity, it would have been quite analogous to defining "intelligence" as "that which causes CSI". However, we would never have heard of Newton, because nobody would ever have paid any attention to such a silly circular explanation. Moliere famously lampooned just such explanations; Paraphrasing from memory here: Q: Oh learned doctor, why does Opium make one sleep? A: Because of course Opium contains a sleep-inducing agent! (laughter) So how is Newton's theory not just a circular definition like this? Because he defined gravity not merely as something that causes things to fall, but rather as a force that acts between any two objects and causes acceleration of both objects, and that this force varies with the inverse of the square of the distance between the two objects, and proportional to the mass of the object and to a constant, and this constant is given precisely, and the acceleration of each object will vary in proportion to the force and inversely proportional to their mass, and we can measure the acceleration, and we can measure the mass, and so on. And because gravity is characterized in such terms, rather than merely in terms of causing whatever we wish to explain, people could actually evaluate whether or not this thing was responsible for observed phenomena or not. Newton's gravity was so well characterized that people for the first time could see this: That which causes an apple to fall to Earth is the same thing as that which causes the planets to move in their orbits! Now, ID makes an analogous claim of identical causes: That which causes a human being's intelligent behavior is the same thing as that which causes the CSI in biology. Unfortunately, if we have simply defined intelligence as the cause of all CSI, there is no way to evaluate whether or not this is true. So ID's claim cannot be considered scientific. Enlighten me though, on any such laws for Darwinistic Evolution, the alernative of ID.No, Darwinistic Evolution is not the alternative to ID. There are any number of alternatives to ID. And I'm no no big fan of evolutionary biology, so I'll let somebody else respond to that.aiguy
January 12, 2008
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aiguy, I assume you take my point then, and see how the definition of electric charge is not vacuous; it is tied into a rich network of concepts that is ultimately grounded in terms of observable effects. In contrast, it is vacuous to define “intelligent causation” merely as the cause CSI, and then explain the presence of CSI by intelligent causation. So you're saying the concept of charge is science despite our inability to define charge from non-charge apart from its effects, as long as these effects are tied to a "rich network of concepts ultimately grounded in terms of observable effects". If that's what you're saying, I think you're being kind of vague, but from my limited understanding, I assume that you mean that there are formulae that decribe the behavior of electric fields while there are none for CSI. Hmm ID probably is a new science in that area, although they seem to have proposed a law of conservation of information, I think it's true that ID is lacking in formulation of such laws. There exists a law called Zipf's law for languages but I wonder if that's related to ID in any way as well. Enlighten me though, on any such laws for Darwinistic Evolution, the alernative of ID. (natural selection seems to me more of a result than a law btw) I've never heard of any evolutionary formula, but then I'm no Biologist.WinglesS
January 12, 2008
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Oops! I forgot the attribution in 90. It was for WinglesS in 88.Q
January 12, 2008
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I'd say that's a reasonably fair statement, from one direction of what I was indicating. But, it isn't really a contradiction to what aiguy suggested. By analogy, it's kind of like how E=mc2 shows that energy is just a different interpretation of matter, and m=E/c2 shows that mass is just a different interpretation of energy. I used the term "side effect" instead of "interpretation" in the earlier claim, and didn't mean them to be different claims. We can say that electric force is just a different interpretation of charge, electric field is just a different interpretation of charge, and electric field is just a different interpretation of electric force. For static charges, of course. Otherwise, magnetism rears its head and messes it all up!Q
January 12, 2008
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WinglesS, Correct my if I’m wrong, but I don’t think charge is a force. It’s a fundamental property that causes force which are described by the laws you mention. Quite right, my sloppiness - the force is the electro-motive force that acts on the charge. I assume you take my point then, and see how the definition of electric charge is not vacuous; it is tied into a rich network of concepts that is ultimately grounded in terms of observable effects. In contrast, it is vacuous to define "intelligent causation" merely as the cause CSI, and then explain the presence of CSI by intelligent causation.aiguy
January 11, 2008
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Q, Does that mean that Q: What are electric charges? A: Particles that cause an electric field. Q: What is an electric field? A: A side effect of electric charge. Is true? I didn't do very well for my physics, unfortunately, so I can't see things like that straight away.WinglesS
January 11, 2008
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WinglesS, in 85, mentions "Correct my if I’m wrong, but I don’t think charge is a force." in response to aiguy's claim of electric charges are forces. Well, scientifically, the simplification of both your claims are both right and wrong - fizzbin :-) . The concept of "charge" is interchangable with concepts of the "electric field". This is Gauss's Law. See http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/HBASE/electric/gaulaw.html#c2 The law says about charge and field :"The area integral of the electric field over any closed surface is equal to the net charge enclosed in the surface divided by the permittivity of space." In shorthand, this means that the perception of charge ends up being a side effect of the electric field. (Or just as accurately, electric field ends up being a side effect of the charge.) WinglesS, as you mentioned, force is proportional to the charge. Additionally, it is proportional to the strength of the electric field. (F = QE, if the charge is stationary) But, because of Gauss's law, we can fully eliminate Q from the equation and replace it with only the field. Or, we can eliminate the field, and replace it with charge. As a result, we can equally explain force as being a side-effect of the charge, or explain that charge is a side-effect of the force detected from the electric field. (But pursuing this too far would become a threadjack.)Q
January 11, 2008
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AIGuy, Too much stuff has passed by for me to want to answer it all. I just want to clear up a few things. First of all Searle's Chinese Room argument achieves dubious success as a materialist argument. So even though he may use it, feeling that there must be an attendant "experience" of knowing, he gets various people calling his argument both "dualistic" and "quasi-religious" for his troubles. If this were true, Searle doesn't alleviate the problem for materialists by stumbling onto the wrong side of the argument. Although it's all too common for me to see, I can not take bailing out of your stated POV as answering that question from that POV. (Also it is quite interesting that some find Searle's argument a negative argument at best.) Searle's Chinese Room problem is so ill-defined anyway. What are the rules to hand back Chinese symbols to the question "Summarize Kant's Critique of Pure Reason for me? Can you relate it to Proust's Memories of Things Past?" How many sheets of paper are they written on, who had time to write them up? I'll tell you the most reasonable way to answer that: "I haven't read it. Why do you ask?" Otherwise that is some significant intelligence that designed these "rules". Searle rejects it not because it's not "getting the job done," but because he doesn't see anything that resembles his subjective experience of actually knowing a language. However, this can be easily side-stepped by saying 1) we know the brain has side-effects of "feeling" 2) intelligent processes need not be accompanied by a subjective feeling of "knowing", and 3) perhaps only some processes produce this. We must then figure out whether or not the Chinese Room is this type of process or not. It can't fail But there is another point I'd like to make about my statement. I wasn't posing it as an insurmountable problem to materialists. Materialists aren't locked into Turing problems, necessarily. That "if" in that sentence plays a role. If the brain is too much like a computer, then Rice's theorem is a real problem for materialists. Increasing as a problem as the brain is thought to approach computer-like function. I would however, given the time and resources, argue that materialist rejections of Turing-like behavior runs counter to a more common methodology for no good reasons. For example, in Padian's criticism of ID, he says that the statement that "no transitional forms have been found" is deceptive. Why? Because that question is too hard. ID-ers are expecting too much, too much burden of proof. He says, instead they find "transitional forms" in related species. I think it's somewhat specious, because I think paleontologist would welcome a bona fide "transitional form" if they found one. It's not like they are looking for only transitional features, it's that they will settle for transitional features for the information they provide. Also, materialists or reductionists are always trumping Science as a collection of "best methods known". Well, we have rules of computation under the Turing model for information processing (assuming we do some of that) so referring to them to analyze human processing power gives us "facts" and implications, that I don't know that we would have unless we do that. Take this for example: if human brains closely match Turing machines, then we know something about brains. Non-Turing-like is not a positive identification and we cannot know something about brains from them simply being the negative. This is the typical form of the reductionist method. Materialists of all ages love the "How ELSE is it done?" argument. It's only fitting to answer them in kind. "Assuming the brain is not Turing-like, how ELSE is it done?! Oh, you don't know. Well Scientists X, Y, and Z have been publishing a lot of papers and collecting a lot of grant money, making headway mapping the brain to Turing instructions. What can you ADD?!! You HATE Science don't you?" And so on... In my view it is actually the presence of insight that reductionists do not want to get drawn in Turing models. They know--or sense--that our brain is only the type of machine that can understand how it processes only if it was coded that way. Which would make further development in understanding intelligence a matter of without it coincidentally arriving as the type of machine that can compute how a Turing Machine can tune itself to better understand its own processes. Again Rice's theorem suggests that a machine to determine whether a given TM is a certain type of algorithm or not faces it's own halting problems. Thus the brain can only examine itself if it is the type of algorithm that can examine that instance of algorithm. We can never know whether it can unless it can--and additionally assess whether or not it has. I can understand why they wouldn't want to step into this trap. But if the brain is a processing machine, it must be some kind of processing machine. Let's say Uuring codifies a VM standard for processing that is non-Turing. So, when similar or separate cognitive problems pop up with the Uuring definition, do we just say, we know that the brain is a procesing machine, but there is no reason why it has to be Turing-like or Uuring-like. Materialists would never let such lack of commitment to known processing models fly, were it reversed.jjcassidy
January 11, 2008
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aiguy, Q: What explains electromagnetic interaction? A: Electric charges. Q: What are electric charges? A: Forces which are fully and quantitatively described by the entire discipline of physics and electronics. Laws like Coulumbs Law or Ohm’s Law tell us all about the effects of these causes, and these laws can themselves be explained in terms of more fundamental physics. Correct my if I'm wrong, but I don't think charge is a force. It's a fundamental property that causes force which are described by the laws you mention. F is proportional to Q just as we can say your grade is proportional to the amount of hard work you put into studying, but I don't think the two are equal in the sense you mention.WinglesS
January 11, 2008
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aiguy, I don’t think evolutionary biology is vacuous in any important sense, but I agree that biology popularizers and even textbooks overstate the philosophical implications in order to bolster their own metaphysical beliefs. Between this and what else you've said, there's not much left for me to fight about. Hooray, that's a nice change of pace. I remember discussing this with you before - guess I wanted to make certain I truly had a grasp of your take on the situation. Kudos.nullasalus
January 11, 2008
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nullasalus, But the dirty secret is that ‘materialists’ are fairly divided on a score of issues. I don't think there's any secret about it; there are dozens of flavors of monism, and quite a few brands of dualism too, and this has been case throughout a very long history. This is the reason I say no scientific proposition can be dependent on the truth of any particular stance. But considering the divisions that exist between each of them, it just goes to show that ‘materialist’ is almost restricted to being a social label. I agree completely. Materialism is often mischaracterized as being entailed by atheism, for example, and mistakenly associated with determinism, moral relativism, epistemological relativism, and so on. Where were the cries of ‘abuse of science’ when Victor Stenger wrote ‘God: The Failed Hypothesis’, arguing that science disproves God? Why is the outrage reserved for Behe, who is on record as saying that even if he’s correct, he doesn’t think that supernatural intervention was needed in the course of evolution? Again I agree, and let me say I consistently and strenuously object to this sort of overstepping in either direction. I'll go on record saying I think Dawkins is simply ridiculous in this respect. I also object when textbooks say that evolutionary theory demonstrates that our cause was purposeless. Which experiment was it that they ran that demonstrated lack of purpose? If that’s true, then the assertion that life and the universe arose unguided and unplanned is also meaningless. No, I think that "planning" has a perfectly clear meaning. We can test to see if a system is capable of planning by observing it. If ID wishes to claim that biological structures were planned, then they should make it clear that's what the claim is, and not "intelligent" or "conscious" or "mental" or "has free will" or some other ambiguous or untestable thing. The entity who decides how to route your FedEx package plans. But is it conscious of its planning? Does it care if your package arrives? Is it aware of being busy, or bored? No way of telling, but I don't think so (I think it's a computer system). I personally don’t think agency can be scientifically detected or ruled out. I could argue ths specifics here more, but hey, may as well let it slide. Again, I think to the extent that "intelligent causation" is left undefined, the ID's proposition can't be evaluated at all, and to the extent that one does pin down what is meant, it either can't be tested (e.g. free will) or doesn't really mean what ID folks want it to mean (e.g. a planning mechanism that may well be completely physical, deterministic/algorithmic, unconscious, etc). If ID is vacuous, it’s just adding to some vacuity that’s been present, tolerated, and encouraged in many quarters for quite awhile. I’m not that interested in seeing ID condemned merely so the status quo can be maintained. Again I'll express some sympathy with this. I don't think evolutionary biology is vacuous in any important sense, but I agree that biology popularizers and even textbooks overstate the philosophical implications in order to bolster their own metaphysical beliefs. I also agree that the certainty expressed that evolution is a fundamentally complete theory is quite misplaced. And furthermore, I think that pursuing the design arguments is a perfectly valid philosophical endeavor. (My dirty secret: I think mind has something to do with it too) I am adamant, however, that the proposition "Intelligent causation is the best explanation for biological complexity" cannot possibly be evaluated by empirical means, and nobody should talk about "ID Theory" as if it was a scientific theory of anything.aiguy
January 11, 2008
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WinglesS, Hmm Q: What explains electromagnetic interaction? A: Electric charges. Q: What are electric charges? A: Particles that cause electromagnetic interaction. Hmm I think it works for electricity too actually… I think some things have fundamental properties that can’t be explained in other terms. Uh, no. Q: What explains electromagnetic interaction? A: Electric charges. Q: What are electric charges? A: Forces which are fully and quantitatively described by the entire discipline of physics and electronics. Laws like Coulumbs Law or Ohm's Law tell us all about the effects of these causes, and these laws can themselves be explained in terms of more fundamental physics. Hopefully you see the point here. An explanation that is described ONLY in terms of the phenomenon in question does not add anything to our knowledge. We must devise characterizations that allow us to test whether or not the effects are from what we believe it to be.aiguy
January 11, 2008
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Hmm Q: What explains electromagnetic interaction? A: Electric charges. Q: What are electric charges? A: Particles that cause electromagnetic interaction. Hmm I think it works for electricity too actually... I think some things have fundamental properties that can't be explained in other terms.WinglesS
January 11, 2008
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WingLesS, In other words you’re saying ID isn’t science because it can’t define what intelligence is. Yes, that's right. Hmm I don’t really think a perfect understanding of an intelligent cause is needed for a scientific theory. But I'm not asking for a "perfect" understanding; I'm asking for any usable scientific definition. "Intelligent Causation" is ID's sole explanatory principle; one would think there would be some attempt to pin down what this is supposed to mean. There is no other scientific discipline that attempts to explain any phenomenon by appeal to "intelligent causation" in the abstract. (Imagine if someone asked me how my AI system managed to play chess so well, and I responded "Because it is intelligent!". After laughing politely, they would say "Ok, seriously, how does it do that?"). I think it is valid to try and identify intelligence by its effects instead. Yes, of course. So, what effects shall we say distinguish intelligent causation? When I ask this question, the typical response is "Intelligent causation is distinguished by its ability to create CSI!". This is not a good candidate definition for intelligent causation in the context of ID, however, as you can see: Q: What explains the CSI we see in biology? A: Intelligence! Q: What is intelligence? A: The ability to create CSI!aiguy
January 11, 2008
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aiguy, Some philosophers do argue this; others have thought of a slew of arguments intended to defeat Searle’s theory (and the conclusion of the Chinese Room) entirely. It's probably a side-issue, but I'm bringing it up because you seem to keep slipping in 'Materialists think X' or 'Materialists don't think X' or 'Professor Y is a materialist'. Insofar as some people may think that, say, Dan Dennett embodies materialism, I would agree they're incorrect. But the dirty secret is that 'materialists' are fairly divided on a score of issues. The idea that 'you can't be conscious without a brain' is a term that would likely unite Chalmers, Dennett, Searle, and quite possibly Thomas Aquinas. Grouping them all as materialists can only be correct insofar as that may be how they describe themselves (Probably not Aquinas, probably not Chalmers). But considering the divisions that exist between each of them, it just goes to show that 'materialist' is almost restricted to being a social label. Do materialists think that an exhaustive, bare physical description of the brain would explain it utterly? Some do. Some don't. Some accuse the ones who do of being wrong. Some accuse the ones who don't of not really being materialists. It's tricky. But I am not here defending monist theories of mind, I am making a different argument entirely: 1) All of these questions remain squarely in the realm of philosophical debate, where they have been for millenia, unresolvable by appeal to empirical evidence One objection here: No, that's not where they've remained. Natural science, biology in particular, has been hefted up and swung around as a weapon for awhile now, and been presented as scientific proof of what truly are philosophical and (a)theological ideas. Where were the cries of 'abuse of science' when Victor Stenger wrote 'God: The Failed Hypothesis', arguing that science disproves God? Why is the outrage reserved for Behe, who is on record as saying that even if he's correct, he doesn't think that supernatural intervention was needed in the course of evolution? 2) Without reference to these issues, the bare claim of ID that “intelligent agency” is responsible for life is ambiguous to the point meaninglessness. If that's true, then the assertion that life and the universe arose unguided and unplanned is also meaningless. I personally don't think agency can be scientifically detected or ruled out. I could argue ths specifics here more, but hey, may as well let it slide. 3) Therefore, ID is either based on a metaphysical claim, or is vacuous. Again, I won't get into specific defenses available to ID proponents. I support it primarily as a philosophical endeavor, myself. Though I'd be more encouraged if I saw some consistent treatment on this subject - and honestly, I think a whole lot of the rage directed at ID is because it promotes looking at the data through a different lens, or with a different frame of mind than is the norm. There do exist people who believe that studying science and nature is either supposed to make you subscribe to their preferred philosophical views, or 'it isn't working as intended'. Or, put another way: If ID is vacuous, it's just adding to some vacuity that's been present, tolerated, and encouraged in many quarters for quite awhile. I'm not that interested in seeing ID condemned merely so the status quo can be maintained.nullasalus
January 11, 2008
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In other words you're saying ID isn't science because it can't define what intelligence is. Hmm I don't really think a perfect understanding of an intelligent cause is needed for a scientific theory. Many scientific theories understand phenomenon based on our observation of their effects rather than a perfect understanding of their cause. We theorize that there are only 2 types of charges, positive and negative based on our observation of the effects of charges, without knowing why there aren't 3 or 4 types of charges, nor what makes a charge different from a non-charge in the first place. The definition of a charge is based on its effects rather than a distinguishing between charged causes and uncharged causes. Thus I think it is not necssary to distingish what intelligence is as a cause. (different from natural cuasation) I think it is valid to try and identify intelligence by its effects instead.WinglesS
January 11, 2008
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WinglesS, No, "empirical" just means with reference to observable data (the reliably shared experience of our senses), not necessarily mathematical.aiguy
January 11, 2008
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WinglesS, I still don't see your point. The reason we cannot distinguish intelligent from non-intelligent causation is because we do not know what the difference is (except for our various philosophical speculations). So I don't think that it's a matter of determining the issue with 100% certainty or not; it is a matter of knowing what we are trying to determine.aiguy
January 11, 2008
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I don't think that there are any contradictions in what I said, aiguy, just because probability doesn't give you an definate answer, does that mean it isn't math? Then again, perhaps I'm being confused about what empirical means, in whish case I'll ask you to forgive me.WinglesS
January 11, 2008
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aiguy says: If you agree that we can’t empirically distinguish “intelligent causation” from “non-intelligent causation”, then why do you then turn around and suggest that the principles of information theory are capable of detecting “intelligent causation”? Looks like a pretty direct contradiction there. I said there is no way to determine for sure (100%) if an effect is due to intelligent causation, however we can conclude that and effect has a [b]high probabilty[/b] of being intelligently caused.WinglesS
January 11, 2008
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