All that follows is from johnnyb’s comment to New Books On Consciousness Underscore Naturalism’s Fatal Problem posted by the UD News Desk yesterday.
This plays very nicely into Plantinga’s “Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism”.
The evolutionary argument against naturalism basically states, “if evolution is true and theism is false, we cannot know that evolution is true. The only way to be able to know if evolution is true is for theism (or some other non-naturalistic alternative) to also be true.” The reason for this is the precise theorem that Hoffman states – in evolutionary competition, fitness beats truth. Therefore, if the orientation of our minds is from evolution, then we have no reason to trust it, which would include its thoughts about evolution. The only reason to trust the mind is if the mind were oriented by something that did have truth (and not a substitute like fitness) as a goal.
Interestingly, Darwin got halfway to Plantinga’s EAAN, but stopped short, probably because he didn’t like what it implied.
But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?
Here he is talking about religious convictions, but his reasoning here does not limit the claim to only those types of convictions. Like most naturalistic philosophies, it doesn’t bother to apply its own reasoning to itself. It pretends theism is true long enough to make the naturalistic claim, but the naturalistic claim pretends to show us why theism isn’t true. However, logically followed, the naturalistic claim really just tells us that the naturalistic claim itself is non-sensical.