Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Disappointed with Shermer

Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

From EXPELLED Dr Caroline Crocker.

“Recently I attended a lecture by Michael Shermer at the UCSD Biological Science Symposium (4/2/09). His title was, “Why Darwin Matters,” but his topic was mostly religion. He started by defining science as “looking for natural explanations for natural phenomena” and said that his purpose was to “debunk the junk and expose sloppy thinking.”

We were all subjected to an evening of slapstick comedy, cheap laughs, and the demolition of straw men.

His characterization of ID was that the theory says, 1) If something looks designed, 2) We can’t think how it was designed naturally, 3) Therefore we assert that it was designed supernaturally. (God of the gaps.) Okay everyone, laugh away at the stupid ID theorists.

I was astonished at how a convinced Darwinist, who complains about mixing science and religion, spent most of his time at the Biological Science Symposium talking about religion.”

Get the full text here.

Comments
Clive, two comments: First, I raised the soundness/validity issue some time ago, and StephenB has never taken it up. It seems to me that, even if his arguments are valid, the burden of soundness is on him, and leads back to the questions raised about the frame of observation and the limits of claims made about the origin of the universe from within the universe. In other words, there is no reason to think the premises either sound or unsound. Second, as to logic. StephenB seems to use a form of Aristotelian (syllogistic) reasoning, possibly influenced by Mortimer Adler (a fine popularizer of philosophy but not in the ranks of the great modern philosophers). I think almost all contemporary logical philosophers would dispute Stephen's arguments. One reason for this is that Aristotelian logic has been supplanted in analytic philosophy by Frege and the advances he made possible. (That's Anglo-American philosophy; a different sort of development happened in continential philosophy, though StephenB would no doubt be even less enamored of that!). As Frege showed, in Aristotelian logic, a great deal is obscured by the grammar of ordinary language. Some other stuff is made possible (see J.L. Austin) but not in the field of logic. In post-Aristotelian logic, arguments about God tend to be outside the realm of logic: where I would say they belong.David Kellogg
April 14, 2009
April
04
Apr
14
14
2009
08:51 AM
8
08
51
AM
PDT
hazel, "Stephen, you simply don’t understand that one can create logically valid arguments that are meaningless - that are just self-referential without telling us anything about the world." There is a difference between logically valid arguments and sound arguments. Logically valid but unsound arguments have a faulty premise or premises. Logically sound arguments have true premises and the conclusion logically follows. If you're interested in painting StephenB's arguments as logically valid but unsound--that is, from following from faulty premises--then show what those premises are that are faulty.Clive Hayden
April 14, 2009
April
04
Apr
14
14
2009
08:38 AM
8
08
38
AM
PDT
David Kellogg, "StephenB, do you really think most logicians would agree with you?" I know you didn't ask me David, but I think they definitely would agree with him. He's one of the most philosophically sophisticated commenters that contributes to this blog.Clive Hayden
April 14, 2009
April
04
Apr
14
14
2009
08:33 AM
8
08
33
AM
PDT
Diffaxial "Many impersonal, lawful physical phenomena oscillate. If you don’t like my law, what observation can disconfirm it?" Entropy. "why not postulate the law “Then nothing. Then something. Then nothing. Then something. (Repeat without end),”" Why postulate that? And secondly, what StephenB is postulating is a timeless law, not a series of events as you just described. "What observation distinguishes the consequences of my law from the actions of a personal agent?" The fact that the origin being impersonal would necessitate that the mere relationship between the impersonal force and the origin of the universe would be sufficient to bring about the Big Bang. This would mean that the impetus that caused the origin of the universe would've been around for as long as the impersonal relationship had existed. This would mean that there would be an inifitely old universe, for there couldn't be a time when the impersonal force's relationship that caused the origin, wasn't there. But instead, we have a particular time when the universe began. And if you'd like to give me your tautology that the universe created time, (tautology in the respect of being redundant), I'm well aware of this. But, the alternative is an infinitely old universe, which would be the logical conclusion of an impersonal force's responsibility for the universe's origin. And Stepehen's logical deck chairs are a place that I could hang out in and spend some time, because I happen to like logic.Clive Hayden
April 14, 2009
April
04
Apr
14
14
2009
08:30 AM
8
08
30
AM
PDT
Diffaxial, yes, but give StephenB a break: "moving logical deck chairs about" is the essence of deductive reasoning. Since its conclusions are always contained in its premises, even good deductive reasoning can never bring new knowledge.David Kellogg
April 14, 2009
April
04
Apr
14
14
2009
08:27 AM
8
08
27
AM
PDT
Nice last line.hazel
April 14, 2009
April
04
Apr
14
14
2009
08:25 AM
8
08
25
AM
PDT
Stephen:
If a thing always was, it cannot begin in time. Does it matter what that thing was? No. Whatever it is that always was cannot begin in time...Does this same rule apply to a physical law?
It's not a rule, it's a tautology. Rules are detected by exceptionless regularity (ceteris paribus), or emerge as necessities from theory. Tautologies emerge directly from the definitions of one's terms. Your "rule" is true for any "thing" you insert into the sentence because your terms are defined such that it must be true. The meaning content of your tautology is reducible to those definitions. Therefore you can save yourself the foregoing the pseudo-reasoning and simply say, "suppose there was an X that had no beginning in time."
Does this same rule apply to a physical law? Yes... Can an impersonal law [called the Tao] that always was begin in time? No.
Woops. Since these boil down to no more than, "suppose a physical law that cannot begin in time" "suppose an impersonal law [called the Tao] that cannot begin in time" you give no reason why I CAN insert an unchanging physical law into slot A of your rule, but not an unchanging principle of the Tao into the same slot.
A timeless law cannot exist without its effects.
While we're inventing BOTH inherently unobservable (because pre-bang), timeless, impersonal laws AND similar timeless personal agents, and inventing them out of thin air, why not postulate the law "Then nothing. Then something. Then nothing. Then something. (Repeat without end)," a law that had no beginning (because it always was, which proves it had no beginning). Many impersonal, lawful physical phenomena oscillate. If you don't like my law, what observation can disconfirm it? What observation distinguishes the consequences of my law from the actions of a personal agent?
Have we observed the big bang? Yes. Does that mean that the universe began in time? Yes.
The Big Bang describes not the universe beginning in time, but the origins of time itself (among other things) . Therefore your argument as formulated has no observational basis, as the big bang is the one event that cannot exemplify the beginning of something in time. You're just moving logical deck chairs about, Stephen.Diffaxial
April 14, 2009
April
04
Apr
14
14
2009
08:10 AM
8
08
10
AM
PDT
How, then, if the law always was, could the effect begin in time? Only if some personal agent chose to change the conditions, or if a personal agent created the conditions in the first place.
Place a radium atom in a completely isolated location. For a while nothing will happen, and then it will decay with no apparent external cause. Isn't this a case of a law that "always was" (or at least, was since close to the beginning of the universe) producing an effect that "begins in time"? Do you contend that spontaneous radioactive decay cannot be explained without postulating some personal agent who decides when the atom will decay?Sotto Voce
April 14, 2009
April
04
Apr
14
14
2009
08:03 AM
8
08
03
AM
PDT
Stephen, you simply don't understand that one can create logically valid arguments that are meaningless - that are just self-referential without telling us anything about the world.hazel
April 14, 2009
April
04
Apr
14
14
2009
06:26 AM
6
06
26
AM
PDT
StephenB, do you really think most logicians would agree with you?David Kellogg
April 14, 2009
April
04
Apr
14
14
2009
06:21 AM
6
06
21
AM
PDT
Hazel, you simply do not follow the argument. If you don't believe me, check it out with a logician.StephenB
April 14, 2009
April
04
Apr
14
14
2009
05:59 AM
5
05
59
AM
PDT
All sophistry, Stephen. You are assuming that if the uncaused cause is impersonal, it is like a natural law, and YOU DON”T KNOW THAT! You ascribe qualities to God that support your belief in God and qualities to other types of explanations that support your belief that they are deficient without any evidence that you are right. I’ve made my points numerous times, and seen numerous examples of what I consider your faulty mode of reasoning. The value of continued discussion is probably small at this point.hazel
April 14, 2009
April
04
Apr
14
14
2009
04:38 AM
4
04
38
AM
PDT
@462. That should read, "have we observed "evidence" for a big bang?StephenB
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
10:58 PM
10
10
58
PM
PDT
Mr. Nakashima: Yes, you are very perceptive. Sometimes, epistemology [how we know things] and metaphysics [how things are] do seem to overlap. I think that you are right. After all, If we have [A] Rational minds, [B] We live in a rational universe, and [C] there is a correspondence between the two, then we have added information about the real world to our information about logic. We are saying that our minds are in contact with the real world. Very good. Also, to say that the higher sciences illuminate lower sciences is to say something about the world. You are correct. I should not have said that ALL my statements applied solely to the laws of logic. Excellent! Most people approach the universe from some kind of metaphysical orientation. Here are five of the most prominent orientations in rather simplified form, although there are many more. [A] “Moderate dualism,” or “theistic dualism” suggests that ultimate reality consists of a spiritual realm and a material realm. In the spirit realm such things exist as God, angels, souls, minds, and other non material realities. In the material world, such things exist as time, space, matter, and energy. This is the world view held by Theists. God exists in the spiritual realm and created beings that are material [nature], spiritual [angels] and a composite of spirit and matter [humans.] This is the view that I hold. [B] “Monism” suggests that ultimate reality consists of one realm only. “Materialists, for example, are monists, meaning that they reject non-material entities and hold that nothing exists but matter. This is the typical metaphysical foundation for Darwinists and atheists. For them, God and angles don’t exist and humans are bodies without souls. This is the view held by most of the people I debate with on this blog. [C] In other times, monists took held the opposite view, [Radical Idealism] holding that matter is an illusion and that spirit is all there is. Monism need not necessarily mean materialism. [D] There is yet a third kind of monism called Pantheism. Unlike theistic dualism, which holds that God created the universe, monistic “Pantheism” teaches that God and the universe are indistinguishable, meaning that they are basically the same thing. As a general rule, pantheism lends itself to eastern religions while theistic dualism lends itself to eastern religions. [E] Deism characterizes the world view that God exists, but that, after creation, he decided not to intervene and left the world, its laws, and its inhabitants all alone. In this sense, it represents the other extreme to pantheism, with moderate dualism situated somewhere in the middle. For Deists, [and Muslims] God is “above” things [transcendent only] , for Christians, God is both above and in things [transcendent and immanent], and for pantheists, God is only “in” things [immanent].StephenB
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
10:12 PM
10
10
12
PM
PDT
Enough of this. The answer to the question is "no," just as hazel has finally answered, bless her heart. If a thing always was, it cannot begin in time. Does it matter what that thing was? No. Whatever it is that always was cannot begin in time. Does this same rule apply to a physical law? Yes. If the temperature –0 degrees centrigrade, [the law hat causes water to freeze] always was, then it cannot begin in time. Whatever always was cannot begin in time. Can there ever be a time that –0 degrees began to freeze water? No. Can there ever be a time that water began to freeze at –0 degrees centrigrade? No. If water began to freeze at –0 degrees centrigrade, then the law that caused it to happen would also have to begin in time. Therefore, neither the law nor its effect can begin in time. A timeless law cannot exist without its effect. How, then, if the law always was, could the effect begin in time? Only if some personal agent chose to change the conditions, or if a personal agent created the conditions in the first place. Can an impersonal law [called the Tao] that always was begin in time? No. Can its alleged effect, the universe begin in time? No. If the cause always was, then the effect always was. A timeless law cannot exist without its effects. Now finally we introduce our “observation,” without which we cannot complete our argument. Have we observed the big bang? Yes. Does that mean that the universe began in time? Yes. Could it have been generated by a impersonal Tao that always was. No. If the eternal Tao caused the universe, the universe, its cause, would have had to be eternal as well. The eternal cause must always be associated with its eternal effect. Thus, only a personal agent could have chosen to cause the universe to begin in time.StephenB
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
09:44 PM
9
09
44
PM
PDT
Mr StephenB, You write Truth exists Truth can be known Higher truths illuminate lower truths [physics>>chemistry>>>biology] Metaphysical truths are consistent with scientific truths [unity of truth] Something cannot come from nothing. We have rational minds, we live in a rational universe, and there is a correspondence between the two A proposition cannot be true and false at the same time [and under the same formal circumstances [law of non-contradiction] A thing cannot be and not be at the same time [related to but not identical to the above] The law of the excluded middle. The whole is greater than any of its parts. T3-6 seem to be about the universe, but now you are telling me your principles of right reason are not meant to explain the universe at all? I will continue reading this thread, and if the conversation loops back around to the subject of reality, I will try to rejoin.Nakashima
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
08:49 PM
8
08
49
PM
PDT
Arrggg. I am so sloppy. The last sentence above should be "I was stating to you exactly what you later agreed with: that logic without evidence - observations - and the ability to test our conclusions with further observations, is helpless in respect to giving us knowledge about the world." I commonly leave out the "not" part of sentences. My mind hears things I want to say but my fingers just don't get it.hazel
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
08:23 PM
8
08
23
PM
PDT
Oops - tags are wrong on the last portion of 458. Also, you write,
It wasn’t until I informed you about the importance of “observation” in some logical contexts that you abanonded your monotonic discourse on the limitations of “brute logic.”
You first mentioned that brute logic needed observations in 269: “Brute logic alone is helpless, but logic in conjunction with observable facts can tell us a great deal.” However, this was in response to my post at 264, where I had said,
But we have no way of actually testing whether those entities exist with the properties we assume they have. Logic without a valid referent - one which is accessible by something other than logic - can’t tell us anything other than what is internally embedded in the logical system itself. ... So, to summarize, brute logic, without any evidence that God is as we conceive him, cannot prove anything about God.
Clearly I brought up the need for observation, without using that exact word, before you said what you did about that need. I was not engaged in a “monotonic discourse on the limits of brute logic.” I was stating to you exactly what you later agreed with: that logic with evidence - observations - and the ability to test our conclusions with further observations, is helpless in respect to giving us knowledge about the world.hazel
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
07:21 PM
7
07
21
PM
PDT
I already answered that. The answer is no because the terms "always was" and "began in time" are contradictory terms - a point that you emphasized. The facts that the terms are logically contradictory doesn't tell us anything about whether these concepts correctly model metaphysical reality, which is unknowable. I'll also point out that you once agreed that brute force without observation is helpless, and now you say,
Sometimes, “brute logic” works just fine to answer a great many questions, other times it doesn’t. Everything depends on context and the quesions being asked.
Seems like you’ve changed your mind. Brute logic works to answer questions within logical systems: given a few axioms we can prove that the square root of 2 is irrational, or that if through a point in a plane there is only one line parallel to a given line then triangles have 180°. But if our statements are about the world, physical or metaphysical, then they need content based on observations of those worlds, and their results need to be tested against further observations. That the context and those are the kinds of questions brute logic can and cannot answer. The nature of the uncaused cause is not a purely logical question, and therefore brute logic cannot enlighten us about it. Also, you write,
It wasn’t until I informed you about the importance of “observation” in some logical contexts that you abanonded your monotonic discourse on the limitations of “brute logic.”
You first mentioned that brute logic needed observations in 269: “Brute logic alone is helpless, but logic in conjunction with observable facts can tell us a great deal.” However, this was in response to my post at 264, where I had said,
But we have no way of actually testing whether those entities exist with the properties we assume they have. Logic without a valid referent - one which is accessible by something other than logic - can’t tell us anything other than what is internally embedded in the logical system itself. ... So, to summarize, brute logic, without any evidence that God is as we conceive him, cannot prove anything about God. Clearly I brought up the need for observation, without using that exact word, before you said what you did about that need. I was not engaged in a “monotonic discourse on the limits of brute logic.” I was stating to you exactly what you later agreed with: that logic with evidence - observations - and the ability to test our conclusions with further observations, is helpless in respect to giving us knowledge about the world.
hazel
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
07:16 PM
7
07
16
PM
PDT
Hazel answered your question. He stated, "that which always was can begin in time" is tautologically false. Similarly, "that which always was cannot begin in time" is tautologically true. That has also been my answer. There is no other answer.Diffaxial
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
07:12 PM
7
07
12
PM
PDT
Hazel, I have no trouble answering your questions, and have never hesitated to do so. The easy answer to your question is that I have no observations in this case because none are needed. Sometimes, "brute logic" works just fine to answer a great many questions, other times it doesn't. Everything depends on context and the quesions being asked. What is so comical about this exchange is that I had to inform you about the very points that you are harping on. It wasn't until I informed you about the importance of "observation" in some logical contexts that you abanonded your monotonic discourse on the limitations of "brute logic." So, please stop with the lectures. Observation has absolutely nothing to do with the current question that I am posing. If you were a logician you would know that. Nor does it have anything to do with an uncaused cause or anything like that. I have abandoned those categories because I don't need them to make my point. Once again I ask the question: Can that which always was begin in time? If you cannot or will not answer it, I promise you that I can find someone else who can and will.StephenB
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
06:35 PM
6
06
35
PM
PDT
Stephen, I could as easily ask you to stop stalling and answer this question: do you have any observations which support your belief that in the metaphysical world which caused our universe “time”, whatever it may be, exists in the form your definitions claim it does? I don’t think it furthers the conversation, and certainly not the civility, to accuse us of stalling when you also are not addressing our questions. The question your statement asks is tautologically false: as you yourself say, it is a contradiction in terms. What we don’t know is whether those terms correctly model, or reference, anything in metaphysical reality. For all we know, the concept of time may in fact be meaningless in the metaphysical world which caused our universe, and the question of whether something had no beginning in time or did have a beginning in time may be no more an meaningful question than asking if God is green or not. And, to return to the question at hand - at least my question at hand: given the assumption that there is an uncaused cause someplace (although maybe not as the direct cause of our universe), what observations support your claim that this cause must be personal and not impersonal? (And I’ll point out that is it possible that this dichotomy is also a category error: how do we know that being personal or impersonal is a category that would apply to the uncaused cause - this may be no more relevant than wondering what color the uncaused cause is. Both time and personhood are attributes of this universe, but we have no observations to justify believing these concepts carry over to the uncaused cause. This also a point that I keep making and you keep not addressing.)hazel
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
05:00 PM
5
05
00
PM
PDT
Can a circle be square?hazel
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
04:34 PM
4
04
34
PM
PDT
Diffaxial, my question hasn't changed. Can that which always was begin in time?StephenB
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
04:29 PM
4
04
29
PM
PDT
(The above was posted by an accidental hit of return before the post was ready for prime time. A bit raggedy, but it will have to do.)Diffaxial
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
04:03 PM
4
04
03
PM
PDT
Your question is in response to hazel's comment that "you have no observational way to show that what you claim is true." Your reply: "Not at all. Everyone knows that that which always was cannot begin. It is a contradiction in terms, which is the point that makes the argument work" does not describe an observation. It describes a tautology. It no more requires observation than my assertion that to assert "all circles are round" requires observations of circles. Indeed, your comment that the proposition .must be true because the negation results in a contradiction in terms explicitly underscores the fact that your proposition is tautologically true, only, not observationally true. Therefore the answer to your question does not satisfy hazel's request for observations that support your argument.Diffaxial
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
03:56 PM
3
03
56
PM
PDT
Hazel, Diffaxial, I asked you both a very simple question to which there is a very simple answer. Can that which always was begin in time? Please stop stalling and answer the question. There are only three possible answers, Yes, no, or I don't know.StephenB
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
03:18 PM
3
03
18
PM
PDT
Do you deny the fact that that which always was cannot begin in time?
This is a tautology, not a "fact."Diffaxial
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
02:57 PM
2
02
57
PM
PDT
We aren't discussing whether there is uncaused cause - we are discussing whether that cause must necessarily be personal. You are making assertions about what an impersonal uncaused cause is capable of doing, and my claim is that you don't know, and can't know, whether those claims are true. What you are doing is just ascribing attributes to an impersonal uncaused cause based on your belief that a personal uncaused cause is necessary and therefore an impersonal uncaused cause must be deficient. But, as I said, you don't really know this, and can't. You are once again thinking you can obtain knowledge by brute logic.hazel
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
01:56 PM
1
01
56
PM
PDT
----Diffaxial: "That’s just talk. Reasoning of this kind is completely uninteresting to me, because it shows no promise of increasing our knowledge of the world." Do you deny the fact that that which always was cannot begin in time?StephenB
April 13, 2009
April
04
Apr
13
13
2009
01:48 PM
1
01
48
PM
PDT
1 8 9 10 11 12 25

Leave a Reply