Disappointed with Shermer

_{Mark

April 6, 2009

Intelligent Design}

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From EXPELLED Dr Caroline Crocker.

“Recently I attended a lecture by Michael Shermer at the UCSD Biological Science Symposium (4/2/09). His title was, “Why Darwin Matters,” but his topic was mostly religion. He started by defining science as “looking for natural explanations for natural phenomena” and said that his purpose was to “debunk the junk and expose sloppy thinking.”

We were all subjected to an evening of slapstick comedy, cheap laughs, and the demolition of straw men.

His characterization of ID was that the theory says, 1) If something looks designed, 2) We can’t think how it was designed naturally, 3) Therefore we assert that it was designed supernaturally. (God of the gaps.) Okay everyone, laugh away at the stupid ID theorists.

I was astonished at how a convinced Darwinist, who complains about mixing science and religion, spent most of his time at the Biological Science Symposium talking about religion.”

Get the full text here.

Comments

Diffaxial, Oh I see, you brought in an illustration to show us that all illustrations are wrong, or at least, cannot be known. This is tantamount to saying that the unknown cannot be known. But surely, we cannot know that the unknown cannot be known, for if we say that, we are saying that we at least know that it cannot be known, and surely, this is a contradiction. "We do not know enough about the unknown to know that it is unknowable."~G.K. Chesterton.Clive Hayden_{April 14, 2009
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Diffaxial: vjtorley just played a symphony at 498 and 501, the concert is over.StephenB_{April 14, 2009
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Clive:
Your oscillating universe model just pushes the question of causation back a bit further, it doesn’t answer it. And secondly, there is only enough energy in our universe to postulate about 100 oscillations of the universe, not infinite. And thirdly, there are reasons apart from entropy to reject an infinitely old oscillating universe, namely, that an infinite cannot be traversed, thus we could never come to be in the here and now.
This remark (and the Lewis quote) rather dazzlingly misses the point of my "oscillating law" illustration. I'm not advocating the oscillating law as an alternative - in fact, I invented it as I wrote that post this morning for the purposes of illustration. What it illustrates is the emptiness of Stephen's assertions about what is "necessary" of impersonal versus personal timeless causes, etc. His assertions have no more basis in either logic or necessity than does my oscillating law. Nor can he, or you, describe an observation that will enable us to decide between oscillating law, unchanging impersonal law, or the actions of an agent. Declaimations that he, or you, have proven that personal agency is responsible are just that -declaimations. The pedantic, arrogant tone that has recently crept in doesn't help.Diffaxial_{April 14, 2009
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vjtorley [498], thanks for pointing me to Koons. I missed that before. And thanks for the restatement both of Koons and of StephenB. I'll take a close look at both the paper and your summary of StephenB and get back to you. (You may or may not recall that way back in 98 I wrote that "the cosmological argument is a pretty good one as such things go" but that I, who believe in God, do not find it logically compelling.)David Kellogg_{April 14, 2009
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vjtorley @498: Incredible! ----"This is just intended as a springboard to get the discussion going. Feel free to refine the notation and/or arguments as you wish." That is like Jerry Lee Lewis saying to Chuck Berry after his performance, "follow that killer."StephenB_{April 14, 2009
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I forgot to translate these three premises of StephenB's argument into plain English: 9. M(^x)(^y)((-Px & -Qx & Cxy) -> -Qy) (Necessarily, if an impersonal individual with no temporal beginning causes an effect, that effect also has no temporal beginning.) It follows that: 10. M(^x)((-Px & -Qx & Cxa) -> -Qa) by Universal Instantiation. (Necessarily, if an impersonal individual with no temporal beginning causes the universe, the universe also has no temporal beginning.) It follows that: 11. M((-Pb & -Qb & Cba) -> -Qa) by Universal Instantiation. (Necessarily, if the cause of the universe is impersonal and has no temporal beginning, the universe also has no temporal beginning.) The rest of the argument is easy to follow.vjtorley_{April 14, 2009
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----David: "StephenB, I read your lecture, but the meaning was overwhelmed by the smugness. I don’t need your “lectures,” thanks, as you’ve shown no superiority of reasoning of philosophical knowledge." Yes, do you get the point? No one likes to be lectured. So, when someone issues a challenge, don't lecture, step up.StephenB_{April 14, 2009
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I agree with 493, and disagree with Stephen's characterization of how this discussion has gone. But what else is new?hazel_{April 14, 2009
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David Kellogg Wow, this discussion is still going? I see you've raised the bar with your post (#476), where you called for an analytically rigorous presentation of the cosmological argument. I would certainly agree with your comment that Frege's logic represents a great advance over Aristotle in its clarity. Some time ago I pointed out to readers that there IS an analytically rigorous, up-to-date presentation of the cosmological argument at this Website: http://www.arn.org/docs/koons/cosmo.pdf ("A New Look at the Cosmological Argument" by Dr. Robert Koons. In American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (April, 1997): 171-192.) I quote from a paragraph by the author:
I will follow closely the classical argument from contingency, with its origins in Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda 6 and developed by the falsafa movement of Arabic philosophy (al-Farabi and Ibn Sina). My argument closely resembles Maimonides' fourth proof and Aquinas' Second and Third Ways. The argument is rigorously empirical in character: I nowhere make claims to a priori knowledge (other than of the rules of classical logic). There is no claim of great originality to the argument presented here. What is original is the use of three logical resources that were not available to the classical authors: (1) mereology (the calculus of individuals - essentially a variant of Cantorian set theory adapted to aggregates of concrete things), (2) modern modal logic , and (3) nonmonotonic logic (the theory of defeasible reasoning). I lay out a successful defeasible argument for the existence of a necessary First Cause and discuss briefly its relevance to natural theology.
Is this paper rigorous enough for you, David? It does at least attempt to demonstrate the existence of a necessary Being which is not essentially located in space in time, and is not essentially a body. However, Koons' subsequent argument for a personal God is an analogical one, which he does not attempt to formalize, but which can easily be formalized, using some basic logical notation. Let & denote: and. Let - denote: not. Let = denote: is identical to. Let -> denote: if-then. Let ^x denote: for all x. Let $x denote: there exists x. Let a denote the name of our spatio-temporal universe (which can be considered as an individual). Let Cxy denote: x is a cause of y. Let Oxy denote: x is wholly distinct from y. (x and y have no parts in common.) Let Tx denote: x has specified teleological properties. (Koons, who was writing in 1997, hedges his bets here as to what exactly these properties are - ID proponents could say CSI if they like.) Let Ix denote: x is intelligent. Assumptions: 1. (^x)(Tx -> ($y)(Cyx & Iy & Oyx)). (Every individual with specified teleological properties has an intelligent cause which is distinct from it.) 2. Ta. (Our spatio-temporal universe has specified teleological properties.) Thus 3. ($y)(Cya & Iy & Oya) (There exists a cause of our spatio-temporal universe which is intelligent and distinct from it.) Premise 1. is of course critical; Koons thinks it is highly plausible, given firstly, that he has already established: 4. ($y)(Cya & Oya) (our universe had a cause which is wholly distinct from it), and given secondly, that we already know: 2. Ta (our universe has specified teleological properties - think of fine tuning); and finally, given the following premise which Koons thinks is true by definition of "intelligent": 5. (^x)(^y)(^z)((Tx & (Hy & Cyx & ((Hz & -(z=y)) -> -Czx))) -> Iy) (if an object has specified teleological properties and only one human maker, then that human maker must be intelligent). Thus at this point, Koons' argument is a suasive one. It is not strictly demonstrative. ------------------------------------ To assess StephenB's argument in #408, we need to add some more notation: Let Px denote: x is a personal agent. Let Qx denote: x is temporally limited in duration (has a beginning). Let individual b denote: the cause of the cosmos. (Here assumed to be some sort of individual.) Let L denote: possibly. Let M denote: necessarily. All sides in this debate agree that 6. ($y)(Cya & Oya & -Qy) (our universe had a timeless cause which is wholly distinct from it). Thus 7. Cba & Oba & -Qb by Existential Instantiation. For argument's sake, let us assume: 8. -Pb. (The cause of the universe is impersonal.) Stephen B contends that this premise is self-evidently true: 9. M(^x)(^y)((-Px & -Qx & Cxy) -> -Qy) (The underlying premise being assumed here is that an impersonal cause is sufficient for its effect; hence it can never exist without it.) It follows that: 10. M(^x)((-Px & -Qx & Cxa) -> -Qa) by Universal Instantiation. It follows that: 11. M((-Pb & -Qb & Cba) -> -Qa) by Universal Instantiation. But we know 12. Qa (The universe had a beginning.) Thus by Modus Tollens: 13. -(-Pb & -Qb & Cba), or: 14. Pb v Qb v -Cba (The cause of the universe is either personal, or located in time, or not the cause of the universe.) But we know 15. Cba, from 7. (The cause of the universe is indeed its cause.) We also know -Qb from 7. (The cause of the universe is not located in time.) Thus we conclude that Pb (the cause of the universe is personal). Note: Throughout this argument, I had to treat the cause of the cosmos (which we called b above) as if it were a single individual. This is just intended as a springboard to get the discussion going. Feel free to refine the notation and/or arguments as you wish.vjtorley_{April 14, 2009
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----"David: "StephenB, [462] seems just plain silly to me, and not worth answering. Pick your logic: if you’re going to argue by analogy, your arguments cannot be ironclad." Inasmuch as you have not yet stepped up to the challenge of analyzing it, you would have no way of knowing would you?StephenB_{April 14, 2009
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----David: "So I repeat: which premises? I’ve objected to some, but StephenB won’t talk about those because they’re not in 408." The only substantive objection I remember was your proclivity to challenge the statement that the universe is "contingent." I had defined contingent several times prior to that as meaning, "need not exist," and "dependent on something else." Since then, I pointed out to you that the big bang proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the universe is contingent. I could have also proved it philosophically, but I gathered that if evidence for the big bang didn't warm you up to the proposition that something cannot come from nothing, appealing to arguments about the relationship of ontological elements would really leave you cold. Meanwhile, there is another argument on the table at, let's see, oh yes, 462.StephenB_{April 14, 2009
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Perhapa I was a bit harsh, and [462] does not reason by analogy. In which case, congratulations! StephenB has proven the existence of a personal God by means of a thermometer.David Kellogg_{April 14, 2009
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correction [493]: "you've shown no superiority of reasoning or philosophical knowledge."David Kellogg_{April 14, 2009
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StephenB, I read your lecture, but the meaning was overwhelmed by the smugness. I don't need your "lectures," thanks, as you've shown no superiority of reasoning of philosophical knowledge. Further, I wasn't being evasive: I objected to [402] fairly quickly, but you had decided by that time to abandon those terms. You're the one acting like a moving target.David Kellogg_{April 14, 2009
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StephenB, [462] seems just plain silly to me, and not worth answering. Pick your logic: if you're going to argue by analogy, your arguments cannot be ironclad.David Kellogg_{April 14, 2009
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----David: "I was not denouncing the form of the syllogism. I mentioned that the form is limited, as it leads to no new knowledge, but that is noncontroversial." Did you hear my recent lecture about those who are asked to solve a problem and immediately launch into a discussion on the theory of problem solving. If you want a replay of it, you will find it at 480.StephenB_{April 14, 2009
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David, I know you would like to assume that theologians are not logicians, but that is simply not the case. Nor is it the case that theologians are not professional philosophers, such as Richard Swinburn and Kieth Ward and William Lane Craig etc. There is coherence, if you can believe it :D. You're the one that has the issue with StephenB's argument, so you tell me which premise it is that is giving you difficulty. And no, logicians today do not find arguments about God to be nonsensical.Clive Hayden_{April 14, 2009
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----David Kellogg: "Clive, which premises? StephenB has offered several versions of these arguments. I laid out objections to some of his premises in [418], but Stephen then refused to to discuss any versions of his argument but one [408]. Moreover, he’s never put the arguments in syllogistic form (the closest he came was 402). Finally, it’s not the case that “syllogisms are valid and sound.” Some syllogisms may be valid but not sound, some may be sound but not valid, and some may be neither. Well, this is interesting. About fifty posts ago, I abandoned all hope that I could reach anyone with classically framed premises and arguments, however valid and meaningful they might be, so I dropped all the terms and completely reformulated the approach @462 so there could be no question about what was being argued or the terms that were being used. Meanwhile, Clive asks you about your response to this new formulation @462, and you promptly hearken back to the pre462 conditions. To paraphrase the warden in "Cool Hand Luke," what we have here is a failure to communicate." Or, maybe its just an old fashioned evasion? Nah.StephenB_{April 14, 2009
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I was not denouncing the form of the syllogism. I mentioned that the form is limited, as it leads to no new knowledge, but that is noncontroversial.David Kellogg_{April 14, 2009
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Clive, I disagree: I'm pretty sure most logicians today find arguments about God to be logically nonsensical. Theologians don't, obviously, but that's one reason theologians are not logicians. :-) You and StephenB obviously disagree with me, sharing as you do a very high opinion of StephenB's arguments. So I repeat: which premises? I've objected to some, but StephenB won't talk about those because they're not in 408.David Kellogg_{April 14, 2009
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David, "Finally, it’s not the case that “syllogisms are valid and sound.” Some syllogisms may be valid but not sound, some may be sound but not valid, and some may be neither." And some are, of course, both valid and sound. The "form" of a syllogism is valid and sound itself. You were denouncing the form itself, not the particular aspects of validity or soundness within it. Let's be clear in what we're saying from comment to comment, please.Clive Hayden_{April 14, 2009
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David, It's these things, these rabbit trails, like "the state of logic in philosophy" that seem to be evasive maneuvers quite honestly. This argument that is being propounded by StephenB is embraced by current logicians. Now, can we get back to the actual argument please?Clive Hayden_{April 14, 2009
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Clive, I only brought up formal logic because you and StephenB seem agreed that his arguments are more or less perfect and would be accepted by contemporary logicians. I mentioned the state of logic in philosophy only to note that this conclusion is (cough cough) optimistic.David Kellogg_{April 14, 2009
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Clive, which premises? StephenB has offered several versions of these arguments. I laid out objections to some of his premises in [418], but Stephen then refused to to discuss any versions of his argument but one [408]. Moreover, he's never put the arguments in syllogistic form (the closest he came was 402). Finally, it's not the case that "syllogisms are valid and sound." Some syllogisms may be valid but not sound, some may be sound but not valid, and some may be neither.David Kellogg_{April 14, 2009
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David, Please show me the faulty premises, and don't skirt the issue by raising differing opinions of logic. Analytic philosophy is not an answer to any of his premises being wrong. Syllogisms are valid and sound. This style of argumentation is called Bulverism by C.S. Lewis, where you do not take up what a man has said, rather you try to explain on other grounds how he got to be so silly. But the argument is just where it was, unanswered.Clive Hayden_{April 14, 2009
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Diffaxial, Consider this bit of sober wisdom from C. S. Lewis, "The laws of physics, I understand, decree that when one billiards ball (A) sets another billiards ball (B) in motion, the momentum lost by A exactly equals the momentum gained by B. This is a Law. That is, this is the pattern to which the movement of the two billiards balls must conform. Provided, of course, that something sets ball A in motion. And here comes the snag. The Law won't set it in motion. It is usually a man with a cue who does that. But a man with a cue would send us back to free-will, so let us assume that it was lying on a table in a liner and that what set it in motion was a lurch of the ship. In that case it was not the law which produced the movement; it was a wave. And that wave, though it certainly moved according to the laws of physics, was not moved by them. it was shoved by other waves, and by winds, and so forth. And however far you traced the story back you would never find the laws of Nature causing anything. The dazzlingly obvious conclusion now arose in my mind: in the whole history of the universe, the laws of Nature have never produced a single event. They are the pattern to which every event must conform, provided only that it can be induced to happen. But how do you get it to do that? How do you get a move on? The laws of Nature can give you no help there. All events obey them, . . . The laws are the pattern to which events conform: the source of events must be sought elsewhere. This may be put in the form that the laws of Nature explain everything except the source of events. But this is rather a formidable exception. The laws, in one sense, cover the whole of reality except — well, except that continuous cataract of real events which makes up the actual universe. They explain everything except what we should ordinarily call ‘everything’. The only thing they omit is — the whole universe. . . . The smallest event, then, if we face the fact that it occurs (instead of concentrating on the pattern into which, if it can be persuaded to occur, it must fit), leads us back to a mystery which lies outside natural science." ~The Laws of Nature, from his collection of essays called God in the Dock. Your oscillating universe model just pushes the question of causation back a bit further, it doesn't answer it. And secondly, there is only enough energy in our universe to postulate about 100 oscillations of the universe, not infinite. And thirdly, there are reasons apart from entropy to reject an infinitely old oscillating universe, namely, that an infinite cannot be traversed, thus we could never come to be in the here and now.Clive Hayden_{April 14, 2009
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On the matter of soundness and validity. Validity is just another word for internal consistency, and I gather everyone, having been brought in kicking and screaming, has finally come on board and confessed that the argument is valid, which it is. Now, on the question of soundness, if the premise is not sound or unreasonable, you should be able to zero in on the problem and expose it. In essence, you are attacking the argument from a distance, saying “you can’t do this,” “you broke this or that law,” or “no fair doing that,” without actually specifying where, in your judgment, things break down. So far, all I have heard is sour grapes. Now, I must tell you that I tested all of you not that long ago concerning your knowledge about the foundations for logic. I asked you as a group to identify that which we must believe and assume in order to safely conclude that logic can work for us. After waiting long enough to satisfy myself that you couldn’t answer the question, I was about to end the suspense for you, but Nakashima, bless his heart, chimed in, “Is it the law of non-contradiction? Of course, he was right. So, you all flunked that test. It is too late to tell me now that you knew it all along. Indeed, I have asked several of you on more that on occasion if you believe that a thing can be true and false at the same time. Your answers have not been consoling. So, I have good reason to believe that some of you either [a] cannot reason in the abstract or [b] have abandoned reason altogether, or [c] are so heavily invested in secularism, you can’t bring yourself to follow arguments and evidential elements wherever they lead. I choose [c]. In truth, most of you have flunked the many quiet tests that I have administered all along. I asked you plainly, “can a thing that always was begin in time?” It took days to finally get a sulky answer from Hazel, and the remainder of you strenuously avoided the question. So, I am not interested in your high and mighty lectures on the laws of logic. I am in interested in knowing if you can apply the principles that you claim to know. At this point, I have serious doubts about that. There is one sure mark of an amateur: give him a problem to solve and he will launch into a lecture on the theory of problem solving. Now, I am going to present to you another test. What are my premises? Identity them and provide a critique. What are the steps in the argument and why does each step work or not work? Why does the conclusion follow or not follow from the premises? Suffice it to say, David, Diffaxial, Hazel, a textbook lecture on the finer parts of logic will not do nor will cheap shots about my so-called “nonsense.” There has been plenty of nonsense on this thread and it has not been coming from me. If, as I suspect, some of you no longer believe in the foundations of logic, then you really ought to bow out. If you don’t believe that rational discourse is grounded in anything, then you shouldn’t be discoursing.StephenB_{April 14, 2009
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Clarification: Gottlob Frege was of course German, but the analytic philosophy in which the analysis of formal logic has developed is mostly (though not exclusively) Anglo-American.David Kellogg_{April 14, 2009
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Clive Hayden, thanks for your comments. I believe this is an absolutely critical discussion that all reasonable people must confront, and I think you have considered the matter carefully and with due discipline. I appreciate the fact that you have taken the trouble to think this thing out. In a way, we are saying the same thing, which is very, very interesting to me.StephenB_{April 14, 2009
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I asked what observations can disconfirm my postulated oscillating law. Clive responds "entropy." But time is one of the terms inherent to the definition of entropy (decrease of order over time, etc.). Hence it cannot possibly have application prior to the advent of time.
Why postulate that? And secondly, what StephenB is postulating is a timeless law, not a series of events as you just described.
I postulate it to demonstrate that, because unconstrained in principle by observation, we can define/invent "laws" and "agents" alike, as we please, and draw logical consequences from them 'till the cows come home. When all is said and done we know nothing more than when we started. I asked, “What observation distinguishes the consequences of my law from the actions of a personal agent." Clive responds,
The fact that the origin being impersonal would necessitate that the mere relationship between the impersonal force and the origin of the universe would be sufficient to bring about the Big Bang.
This is simply bald assertion, and doesn't flow from "necessity." I have baldly asserted a force that contradicts the necessity of conclusion. As I said, my postulated force oscillates - and that oscillation had no beginning. Moreover, my force (by definition) does not give rise to the big bang while in one of its two postulated states. Only upon assuming the opposite value does the bang issue forth. Moreover, I also pull from my hat the fact that my force may remain in a state of "nothing" for periods beyond time before (inevitably, impersonally) assuming the state "something." Hence it stands in relationship to the universe without giving rise to that universe - until it does, in fact, give rise to it. Exactly in the same sense that your preferred personal agent does not issue forth a universe, until it does. And it postulates series of events only in the same sense that your postulate of an agent does likewise. Of course this is all nonsense. But no more so than Stephen's assertions.Diffaxial_{April 14, 2009
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