Does ID Rest on Metaphysical Claims About Dualism?

_{Barry Arrington

December 15, 2015

Intelligent Design}

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RDFish seems to think so. I summarize his argument as follows:

The ID explanatory filter works as follows:

(a) The explanatory filter first asks whether the phenomenon is contingent. If it is not, then it is probably best explained as the result of a natural regularity.

(b) If the phenomenon is contingent, the filter asks whether it is complex and specified. If it is neither complex nor specified, then chance is the most viable explanation. While there may be false negatives, there can be no reliable design inference.

Therefore, under the explanatory filter design is inferred only after law and chance have been eliminated.

If physicalist monism is true, everything must be reducible to the operation of law and chance.

Therefore, if physicalist monism is true, the residual after the elimination of law and chance is always an empty set.

It follows that the ID explanatory filter sneaks in a base assumption of dualism.

Dualism is a metaphysical proposition that cannot be tested empirically. It follows that ID is based on metaphysical premises that cannot be tested empirically. And because one of its key assumptions cannot be tested empirically, ID cannot be considered a valid scientific hypothesis.

RDFish’s claim is wrong, and I will refute it with a simple thought experiment.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that physicalist monism is true.

Let us suppose that all life on earth dies out.

A million years from now an alien is exploring this barren planet and he finds Mount Rushmore and decides to apply the explanatory filter to it.

The alien concludes that the carving is highly contingent. It cannot be attributed to any law-like natural regularity.

The alien concludes the carving is specified. It is an image of four members of the former inhabitants of this barren planet.

The alien concludes that the carving is highly complex/improbable, i.e., one would not expect the images to be carved by chance processes (e.g., erosion caused by wind and rain).

Therefore, the alien concludes, correctly, that the best explanation for the carving is an intelligent agent carved it.

The alien’s design inference would be correct even if physicalist monism is true, because the plain fact of the matter is that Mount Rushmore was caused by an intelligent agent, i.e., an agent with the capacity to arrange matter for a purpose.

Not so fast, RDFish will probably argue. If physicalist monism is true, then the intelligent agents who carved Mount Rushmore where themselves the result of law/chance and acting according to law/chance. Therefore, the conclusion that Mount Rushmore was not ultimately the result of law/chance would be false.

But RDFish would be wrong. Design exists as a category of causation. To suggest otherwise is absurd and self-defeating. Not only does design exist, designers leave objective markers of design. Therefore, if RDFish is going to stick to his guns and say that design cannot be detected, he is stuck with this syllogism:

If monist physicalism is true, it is impossible objectively to infer design.
But it is possible objectively to infer design.
Therefore, monist physicalism is false.

How can physicalist monism be reconciled with the obvious existence of design as a category of causation? The following reasoning would apply:

Design, meaning the capacity to arrange matter for a purpose, exists as a category of causation.
The capacity to arrange matter for a purpose can be reduced to any force that is able to arrange matter in the present such that it will have an effect in the future.
There are at least two candidates for causal forces that have the capacity to arrange matter for a purpose. (a) intelligent agents who have immaterial mental capacity; (b) an impersonal non-conscious yet-to-be-discovered natural telic force.
The monist rejects the existence of intelligent agents with immaterial mental capacities, because the existence of such agents obviously entails dualism.
Instead, the monist can resort to the natural telic force.
If such a natural telic force exists, the existence of design as a category of causation is no obstacle to accepting the truth of monist physicalism.

This get us to:

If monist physicalism is true and a natural telic force exists, it is nevertheless possible objectively to infer design.
Therefore, design may be inferred under monist physicalism using the explanatory filter.
Therefore, ID does not depend on dualist metaphysical assumptions.

In summary, ID does not depend on dualism. As Dembski has observed, ID is compatible with a natural telic force.

The problem the monist has, of course, is that in order to account for the obvious existence of design, he can no longer say everything in the universe is reducible to law/chance. He has to say everything in the universe is reducible to law/chance/not-yet-discovered natural telic force. ID is OK with allowing such a natural telic force as a candidate for the source of design (and therefore does not depend on dualism). Obviously, however, based on observations of known intelligent agents, ID is also perfectly comfortable with dualism.

Comments

RDFish:
The root of our disagreement centers on the meaning and implications of the word “specified” in this sentence. Why won’t you tell me what you mean by “specified” in this sentence?
Meyer, who you have claimed to have read, goes over that. It is the same as Crick meant when he said: "Information means here the precise determination of sequence, either of bases in the nucleic acid or on amino acid residues in the protein." And then there is No Free lunch pages 148-49
Biological specification always refers to function. An organism is a functional system comprising many functional subsystems. In virtue of their function, these systems embody patterns that are objectively given and can be identified independently of the systems that embody them. Hence these systems are specified in the same sense required by the complexity-specification criterion (see sections 1.3 and 2.5). The specification of organisms can be crashed out in any number of ways. Arno Wouters cashes it out globally in terms of the viability of whole organisms. Michael Behe cashes it out in terms of minimal function of biochemical systems. Darwinist Richard Dawkins cashes out biological specification in terms of the reproduction of genes. Thus, in The Blind Watchmaker Dawkins writes, “Complicated things have some quality, specifiable in advance, that is highly unlikely to have been acquired by random chance alone. In the case of living things, the quality is specified in advance is…the ability to propagate genes in reproduction.” The central problem of biology is therefore not simply the origin of information but the origin of complex specified information. Paul Davies emphasized this point in his recent book The Fifth Miracle where he summarizes the current state of origin-of-life research: “Living organisms are mysterious not for their complexity per se, but for their tightly specified complexity.” The problem of specified complexity has dogged origin-of-life research now for decades. Leslie Orgel recognized the problem in the early 1970s: “Living organisms are distinguished by their specified complexity. Crystals such as granite fail to qualify as living because they lack complexity; mixtures of random polymers fail to qualify because they lack specificity.” Where, then, does complex specified information or CSI come from, and where is it incapable of coming from? According to Manfred Eigen, CSI comes from algorithms and natural laws. As he puts it, “Our task is to find an algorithm, a natural law that leads to the origin of [complex specified] information.” The only question for Eigen is which algorithms and natural laws explain the origin of CSI. The logically prior question of whether algorithms and natural laws are even in principle capable of explaining the origin of CSI is one he ignores. And yet it is this very question that undermines the entire project of naturalistic origins-of-life research. Algorithms and natural laws are in principle incapable of explaining the origin of CSI. To be sure, algorithms and natural laws can explain the flow of CSI. Indeed, algorithms and natural laws are ideally suited for transmitting already existing CSI. As we shall see next, what they cannot do is explain its origin.
All of this is easily found unless you are willfully ignorant. Cheers, Virgil CainVirgil Cain_{December 16, 2015
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1) ID’s core arguments – including the explanatory filter – cast “intelligence” as dichotomous with “law+chance”, which is a dualist assumption.
And yet those core arguments flow from Newton's four rules of scientific reasoning. Also archaeology, forensic science and SETI, to name three, use those same core arguments.
2) The definition of “intelligent agency” as “able to arrange matter for a purpose” is non-scientific because there is no scientific method to distinguish matter arranged for a purpose.
AGAIN, archaeology, forensic science and SETI rely on our ability to do just that. We have objective criteria that allows us to do exactly that.
ID’s core arguments depend on “law/chance” being incapable of producing CSI, leaving only “intelligence”.
And if anyone ever demonstrates necessity and chance producing CSI ID would fall. History is riddled with science going out on limbs, ie scientists making leaps based on the current understanding. Why RDFish thinks that is fatal to ID is beyond me. So what we have here is a RDFish who is willfully ignorant and scientifically illiterate. Cheers, Virgil CainVirgil Cain_{December 16, 2015
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Hi Upright BiPed,
For leucine to be the first in this sequence, it must be specified among the alternatives.
The root of our disagreement centers on the meaning and implications of the word "specified" in this sentence. Why won't you tell me what you mean by "specified" in this sentence? If you tell me what you mean by that word in that sentence, we can move forward in debate. If you won't tell me what you mean, then it's pointless to continue. [edited to add: TOO LATE :-) You can hide behind Barry, but that won't remove the fact that you are afraid to even engage the questions.] Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{December 16, 2015
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Comment removed. (I'm not going to give you cover from the beating that BA is already giving you)Upright BiPed_{December 16, 2015
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Hi Barry Arrington,
Every single word after the colon is irrelevant. You have admitted that ID allows for a natural telic force to explain the goal-directedness found in nature. Game over. ID does not depend on dualism.
If you insist that ID claims only to support the notion of "natural telic force" as the cause of living things, then we indeed agree. That means there is nothing about consciousness, intent, beliefs, desires, reason, or any other aspect of human mentality that can be scientifically inferred. Is that what you are saying? If so, then your theory of "Intelligent Design" is misnamed and misrepresented in books by Dembski and Meyer. If not, then whatever else you're saying entails assumptions of dualism and cannot be scientifically supported. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{December 16, 2015
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Dear readers, Notice that RDFish has gone into full-on INSANE DENIAL mode. When RDFish admitted five days ago that ID allows for an impersonal telic force as the designer, it completely undermined his later effort to argue that ID absolutely depends on a dualist assumption. His first argument cannot be reconciled with his second argument. Apparently, RDFish was counting on us not noticing his prior argument. But we did. And when we pointed it out to him there was nowhere for him to run. But did he concede? Of course not. He is a zealot and zealots never concede. They go down in flames. And that is what RDFish is doing now. It is an ugly thing to watch, but we won't stop him if he insists. Barry Arrington_{December 16, 2015
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RDFish @ 93:
Here is what I've shown:
Every single word after the colon is irrelevant. You have admitted that ID allows for a natural telic force to explain the goal-directedness found in nature. Game over. ID does not depend on dualism.Barry Arrington_{December 16, 2015
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Hi Upright Biped,
There is no length to which RD will not go in order to avoid empirical evidence.
There is no length to which UB will not go in order to avoid debate. You spend all this time reading and writing here, but you refuse to engage the debate. You just huff and puff and complain and insult, but you won't actually quote what I say and respond to it, and you won't try and make any arguments to counter what I say. The most reasonable conclusion would be that you know you're wrong and are afraid to engage the debate because you will lose. You won't tell me what you mean by "specify", and so you make me guess. When I guess you say I'm wrong, but won't say what you mean instead. You'll do ANYTHING to avoid debate. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{December 16, 2015
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For a protein to be made up of a sequence of objects such as leucine, bound to glycine, bound to alanine, etc, requires leucine to be specified among its alternatives.
You mean “associated with”?
There is no length to which RD will not go in order to avoid empirical evidence.Upright BiPed_{December 16, 2015
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Hi Barry Arrington, Here is what I've shown: 1) ID's core arguments - including the explanatory filter - cast "intelligence" as dichotomous with "law+chance", which is a dualist assumption. Since dualism cannot be scientifically established, ID's arguments fail as scientific justifications for ID. 2) The definition of "intelligent agency" as "able to arrange matter for a purpose" is non-scientific because there is no scientific method to distinguish matter arranged for a purpose. The explanatory filter, which Barry suggested was the method ID uses to identify matter arranged for a purpose, depends upon a dualist assumption. You are now attempting two counter-arguments: i) Dembski allows for "impersonal telic force" as the designer, which (according to Barry) means that ID does not assume dualism. If ID was called "Natural Teleology Theory", drop its dualist arguments, and agreed with Nagel, I would not disagree with it. But that isn't the case. ContraNagel, Dembski calls it "Intelligent Design Theory", and fails to characterize what sort of "Designer" is being proposed for the purpose of implying that living things were designed by a conscious mind. ID bases it all on arguments and "explanatory filters" that assume dualism, things Nagel never does. These are my objections, to which you have no response. ii) I agree with Thomas Nagel, so I must agree with ID But Nagel disagrees with Dembski and ID on the same grounds I do. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{December 16, 2015
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Fish @ 89. Stop it. You've lost this round. Now all you are doing is embarrassing yourself.Barry Arrington_{December 16, 2015
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Hi mike1962,
I suppose it depends on how you define it. (I know, I know.)
Ah, truer words have ne'er been spoken.
But I don’t think it does violence to the notion that people typically have, such as goal seeking, foresight, etc.
Just look at those two words. "Goal seeking" can be clearly defined - cybernetics uses the term perfectly operationally. "Foresight", however, doesn't really make sense unless you assume conscious foresight.
Would “telic force” be appropriate in your view?
It's not that it's not appropriate, it's just that there isn't much meaning to saying that, and certainly no scientific meaning. The correct answer, for the time being, is "we do not know". I can't figure out why people hate that answer so much. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{December 16, 2015
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RDFish: Some quantum force like this, biasing changes as you say, would not be “intelligence” I suppose it depends on how you define it. (I know, I know.) But I don't think it does violence to the notion that people typically have, such as goal seeking, foresight, etc. I admit I could be missing something here. Would "telic force" be appropriate in your view? Some sub-quantum force with an impetus toward manipulating the quantum level toward the effect of macro-level objects having foresight and goals?mike1962_{December 16, 2015
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Hi Barry Arrington,
ID allows for impersonal telic force, but also allows for . . . a conscious mind. That is exactly the point of the OP. Thank you for conceding defeat.
Well, when all else fails, simply declare victory! The part of ID that requires dualism is not the part that infers an impersonal telic force; it is the part that infers a "conscious rational agent" (as Stephen Meyer says) or an "intelligent agency" as most people here say, that requires dualism. ID's core arguments regarding law/chance being incapable of producing CSI require dualism. Why do you think Nagel and Dembski disagree? Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{December 16, 2015
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Hi mike1962,
Not logically necessary...Point is, CSI generators need not be “supernatural.” Dualism not logically necessary.
The dualism I refer to is "mind/body" dualism (as I've pointed out above), not a dualism between "natural" and "supernatural". ID's core arguments depend on "law/chance" being incapable of producing CSI, leaving only "intelligence". That is an argument that depends upon dualism. Some quantum force like this, biasing changes as you say, would not be "intelligence" and it wouldn't be "supernatural"; it would be just a new form of "law/chance". I've been trying to explain that here for a long time. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{December 16, 2015
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Yes, Mapou, case closed.Barry Arrington_{December 16, 2015
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Case closed?Mapou_{December 16, 2015
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RDFish:
ID allows for impersonal telic force, but also allows for . . . a conscious mind.
That is exactly the point of the OP. Thank you for conceding defeat.Barry Arrington_{December 16, 2015
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RDFish As I’ve explained many times now, the argument that “law+chance” cannot produce CSI, which underlies a great deal of what is written in Dembski’s books and other books about ID, assumes dualism. Thus the explanatory filter, that you say is what detects “purpose”, assumes dualism. Thus, ID assumes dualism. Not logically necessary. Within the universe there could be a CSI-seeking impersonal force that is unified at the sub-quantum level, that drives the course of the macro scale by biasing the seemingly-from-our-perspective "random" quantum events ever-so-slowly in certain directions. Over eons of time macro changes happen that lead to CSI. You may ask how this CSI-seeking force got its nature, but that applies to all primary forces. Point is, CSI generators need not be "supernatural." Strict dualism not logically necessary. (Although I think a good case can be made for a "relative dualism", but that's another subject.)mike1962_{December 16, 2015
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Hi Barry Arrington,
Notice how RDFish is in full bad faith frenetic spin mode, like a logger trying to stay on a log in the water.
Do these sort of weird tactics work for you in law? I'm actually being incredibly patient with you, Barry - not frenetic at all.
RDFish last week: Dembski says ID allows for an impersonal telic force.
Yes - it allows for. But it allows for conscious minds too, and the language ID uses clearly implies the latter. Nagel would never agree to it, which is precisely why Nagel and Dembski publically disagree! Dembski knows that Nagel does not believe in ID, for exactly this reason!
RDFish this week (getting progressively more red in the face): ID does not allow for an impersonal telic force.
You've made two errors in this sentence. First, I am not red in the face - that is just your weird way of taunting people. Second, you are mistaken (you would say "lying") about me saying that of course. I have never said ID does not allow for an impersonal telic force, since I was the one who brought Dembski's words to your attention in the first place!
RDFish last week quotes Demski arguing that Nagel’s impersonal natural telic force is a candidate for ID’s designer. RDFish this week: But I agree with Nagel, not ID.
Yes, this is exactly right.
That won’t do Fish, because as you yourself pointed out only five days ago, ID says Nagel may be right on the very point about which you agree with him.
Nagel and I disagree with Dembski because Dembski tries to draw broader conclusions than Nagel - conclusions that go beyond the evidence. ID allows for impersonal telic force, but also allows for and alludes to a conscious mind. That is why Nagel disagrees with Dembski, and Dembski disagrees with Nagel, and I agree with Nagel but not Dembski. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{December 16, 2015
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This is getting fun. RDFish now does not need separate comments to contradict himself. He can do it within the space of a single comment, as he does in 78:
RDFish reaffirms his prior comment: “as Debmski himself says, the Designer may be a conscious agent, or it may be an ‘impersonal telic process . . .’”

RDFish: The major point is that Nagel and I do not use language intended to suggest that science has evidence that a conscious being was involved. ID (including Dembski) does.
Except when, as you yourself admitted like three seconds ago, he doesn’t. Keep going Fish. Making the other side look feckless, foolish and dishonest is very helpful to us here at UD. And you are giving us plenty of grist for that mill today. On the other hand you can do the honest thing and admit you are wrong. But no one is going to be holding their breath waiting for you to be honest are they?Barry Arrington_{December 16, 2015
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Hi Upright BiPed,
I asked you about objects becoming specified so that they may be organized into living things.
I have asked you to clarify what you mean by "becoming specified", and you haven't answered.
For a protein to be made up of a sequence of objects such as leucine, bound to glycine, bound to alanine, etc, requires leucine to be specified among its alternatives.
You mean "associated with"?
How does a material system such as the cell specify something in a universe where no object specifies any other object?
I don't know. How? This is not sarcasm, I mean this perfectly literally. In my view, the origin of the genetic code is mysterious, and we have no explanation. What I'm always trying to explain to you is that you have no explanation either. If you'd like to disagree, then please present your explanation for how these things become associated the way they are inside the cell. If you'd like to claim this is a scientific explanation, instead of some religious belief or story you're making up, then you'll need to use terms that can be grounded in empirical observations. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{December 16, 2015
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Dear readers, Notice how RDFish is in full bad faith frenetic spin mode, like a logger trying to stay on a log in the water. RDFish last week: Dembski says ID allows for an impersonal telic force. RDFish this week (getting progressively more red in the face): ID does not allow for an impersonal telic force. RDFish last week quotes Demski arguing that Nagel’s impersonal natural telic force is a candidate for ID’s designer. RDFish this week: But I agree with Nagel, not ID. That won’t do Fish, because as you yourself pointed out only five days ago, ID says Nagel may be right on the very point about which you agree with him.Barry Arrington_{December 16, 2015
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Mike1962:
RDFish: Again, as I’ve been explaining here, humans are similar to each other in so many observable respects that we infer similar conscious experiences as well. The actions of humans are similar. But you don’t know which ones of those humans “acting similar” have consciousness. You only have a data point of one: yourself. Does that warrant a generalization?
That's a good argument. IOW, if a robot was designed to be able to create new objects with specified information, all the explanatory filter could tell you about the objects is that they were created by an intelligent agent but not necessarily a conscious one. One could stop there because it's enough to arrive at the ID conclusion. However, we all know that we cannot stop there because we are children of a greater deity. We know that ultimately we must explain the agent. We must pursue knowledge wherever it takes us. And it does take us to a duality whether we like it or not. Which is fine by me. We must not be afraid of knowledge.Mapou_{December 16, 2015
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Hi Barry Arrington,
Only five days ago you admitted that “as Debmski himself says, the Designer may be a conscious agent, or it may be an ‘impersonal telic process . . .’”
Yes, he has written this.
Now that that statement is inconvenient for your argument you act as if you never said it. You have lost this round Fish.
No, both of my arguments against ID are completely intact.
As you admitted last week, ID allows for an impersonal telic force, just exactly the kind of force you and Nagel posit, as the designer.
First, neither Nagel nor I are really saying that a "force" has been empirically identified or characterized. But that's a minor point. The major point is that Nagel and I do not use language intended to suggest that science has evidence that a conscious being was involved. ID (including Dembski) does.
Therefore, you are plainly wrong when you say ID is necessarily committed to dualism.
As I've explained many times now, the argument that "law+chance" cannot produce CSI, which underlies a great deal of what is written in Dembski's books and other books about ID, assumes dualism. Thus the explanatory filter, that you say is what detects "purpose", assumes dualism. Thus, ID assumes dualism. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{December 16, 2015
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RDFish: ID lacks a definition for “intelligence” that can be empirically supported in the context of ID There is no empirical, objective definition of consciousness, that can be scientifically supported in any context. What do we do?mike1962_{December 16, 2015
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Hi Barry Arrington,
RDFish: ID’s core arguments require dualism to be true in order to be coherent. Barry: Nonsense. Thomas Nagel posits a natural telic force that is operative in a monist universe.
Yes, but Nagel's ideas are different from what ID claims. So I agree with Nagel, but not with ID.
RDFish: I tend to agree with Nagel. Barry: Then you’ve given away the store.
No, I agree with Nagel, not ID. My arguments against ID do not apply to Nagel's views.
The ID designer in a monist universe could be this impersonal, non-conscious, non-dualist (by definition) natural telic force.
Nagel doesn't say it "could be" this natural telic force, implying that it could be something else. ID is crafted to allow for the appearance of a scientific warrant to the belief that a conscious mind was involved in the origin of life. Nagel doesn't believe this any more than I do.
RDFish: ID’s core arguments require dualism to be true in order to be coherent. SB: Fish, you have been soundly beaten in this round. Move along.
On the contrary, both of my arguments are substantiated: 1) ID's core argument (the claim that law/chance cannot produce CSI) entails dualism and is thus non-scientific 2) ID lacks a definition for "intelligence" that can be empirically supported in the context of ID Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{December 16, 2015
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RDFish: Intelligent Design Theory does not argue for “natural telic forces”, it argues for “intelligent agents”, which is why the word “intelligent” is in the name of the theory.
Fish you are utterly shameless. Only five days ago you admitted that “as Debmski himself says, the Designer may be a conscious agent, or it may be an ‘impersonal telic process . . .’” See comment 126 to this post. Now that that statement is inconvenient for your argument you act as if you never said it. You have lost this round Fish. As you admitted last week, ID allows for an impersonal telic force, just exactly the kind of force you and Nagel posit, as the designer. Therefore, you are plainly wrong when you say ID is necessarily committed to dualism.Barry Arrington_{December 16, 2015
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If you’d like to debate, then answer the clarifying questions I ask, and ask your own which I will answer.
Great. You can begin by answering the question I asked at the top of our exchange. I asked you about objects becoming specified so that they may be organized into living things. This is not a topic that is foreign to you, so there is no need to pretend you do not understand it. For a protein to be made up of a sequence of objects such as leucine, bound to glycine, bound to alanine, etc, requires leucine to be specified among its alternatives. How does a material system such as the cell specify something in a universe where no object specifies any other object? Please note: this is a physical system in a physcial universe operating under physical law. Whatever one can (only) speculate happens inside an immaterial alien is of absolutely no consequence to this question.Upright BiPed_{December 16, 2015
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RDFish: Again, as I’ve been explaining here, humans are similar to each other in so many observable respects that we infer similar conscious experiences as well. The actions of humans are similar. But you don't know which ones of those humans "acting similar" have consciousness. You only have a data point of one: yourself. Does that warrant a generalization? Scientists can only correlate brain states and actions including self-reported experiences. You can assume that consciousness exists based on actions and self-reporting and correlate brain states with those, but that doesn't prove consciousness, that assumes it. Strengthening our inference is the fact that neurological correlates of consciousness If you don't know the test subjects are conscious in the first place, how can you assign a correlation between some unseen, alleged consciousness and neurons? Consciousness is the thing you need to prove exists in the first place before you can make a correlation. have been discovered in all humans, and of course the fact that we each can verbally confirm our inner conscious awareness. Verbal confirmations are external actions. There's no consciousness to be seen there, just mouths moving and words uttered into the air. How do you know there is a consciousness "in there" associated with the movements? Just because they act similar to you (a data point of one)? What compels the inference of consciousness? science is able to study human consciousness by using the neurological and self-reporting evidence. Scientists have never studied consciousness. Scientists can only study actions and brain states. Why do those actions and brain states require consciousness?mike1962_{December 16, 2015
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