Jason Rosenhouse writes:
We certainly do not know a priori that piles of bricks do not form images of imaginary unicorns, and it is not logically impossible that they do.
I decided I could not resist adding Example 8,265 from the some post:
I do not know how the chemical reactions and electrical firings inside my head lead to mental images, but there is copious evidence that they do and zero evidence that anything non-physical is involved
Wow. How does Rosenhouse deal with all of the evidence contrary to his position? Easy peasy. Fiat. Just declare that it does not exist.
Turns out the hard problem of consciousness is not so hard after all. All David Chalmers needed to do was call up Jason Rosenhouse and the conversation would have gone something like this
Dave: Hey, Jason, I have all of these observations that I cannot fit into monist categories. The observations are so puzzling that I have coined a term, the “hard problem of consciousness.”
Jason: Do tell.
David: Yep. I have all of this evidence. How do I deal with it Jason?
Jason: Easy. The evidence does not exist.
David: I’m pretty sure it does.
Jason: Nope. You are wrong. It does not exist.
David. Well, OK then. I’m glad we talked. That’s a load off my mind.
In all seriousness, this is a persistent problem that materialists don’t seem to be able to understand, far less overcome. They genuinely seem to believe that evidence that does not persuade them is “non-evidence” instead of “unpersuasive-to-me-evidence.” See here where I discussed this in depth. Especially amusing is the smug certitude with which Rosenhouse and his ilk dismiss all evidence contrary to their position as if it does not exist. It must be nice to live in a bubble of incurious certitude where one’s beliefs are never challenged because anything that could possibly challenge them does not, by fiat, exist. Nice, but boring.