The atheist declares there is no transcendent objective standard by which to measure ethical choices. Thus, ethics ultimately boils down to subjective preference. For the atheist, our subjective preference for the ethical rule against theft, for example, is impelled by evolution. Theft is, on balance, maladaptive. Therefore, our genes cause us not to prefer it.
To the extent this is true, out ethical choices are akin to our aesthetic judgments. The evolutionary materialist says that our aesthetic judgments are also impelled by evolution. We judge certain things to be beautiful or sublime not because they are beautiful or sublime in any objective sense, but because our aesthetic preferences have been formed by evolutionary adaptations in exactly the same way our ethical preferences have been formed by evolutionary adaptations.
Fair enough. It seems to me, however, that if this is true the so-called “problem of evil” as an argument against the existence of God would evaporate instantly.
Consider the following argument:
1. Evolutionary adaptations have caused me to prefer chocolate ice cream.
2. An omni-benevolent, all powerful God would share my preference for chocolate ice cream.
3. From the evidence available to me, I have concluded no deity exists who prefers chocolate ice cream.
4. Therefore, God does not exist.
The argument is perfectly valid (i.e, the conclusion follows if the premises are true). But only an idiot would think the argument is sound (i.e., the premises are true).
Now consider a similar argument:
1. Evolutionary adaptions have caused me to prefer that theft never occur.
2. An omni-benevolent, all powerful God would share and indeed enforce my preference that theft not occur.
3. From the evidence available to me, I have concluded no deity exists who shares my preference that theft not occur.
4. Therefore, God does not exist.
Again, the argument is perfectly valid but obviously unsound. The argument hangs on the assumption that my subjective preferences resulting from evolutionary adaptations should somehow be binding on God and if no deity acts in a way that is consonant with my subjective preferences, that is powerful evidence that no deity exists.
Left unanswered is the following question: Why should the evolutionary adaptation that caused me not to prefer theft be any more binding on God than the evolutionary adaptation that caused me to prefer chocolate ice cream?
The argument against the existence of God based on the “problem of evil” works only if “evil” means more than “that which evolutionary adaptations have caused me not to prefer.” Indeed, the argument works only if there is an objective ethical standard by which to judge God. But such a standard can exist only if God exists. Therefore, the argument swallows its own tail.