I Call on Materialists Everywhere to Stop Equivocating

_{Barry Arrington

April 15, 2015

Intelligent Design}

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Again, I extend my hearty thanks to Seversky for breaking the dike here. Now other materialists are following his brave lead and admitting the obvious (but nevertheless frequently resisted) implications of materialism:

Graham2

There doesn’t seem to be anything remarkable in what Sev has said. Its little more than what us heathens have been repeating.

Indeed Graham2. Why don’t you tell RDFish, who is still resisting with all his might?

Mark Frank:

As a materialist and subjectivist I agree with Seversky:

A ) Personal preferences can be reduced to the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of each person’s brain.

B) There is no such thing as objective good and evil.

C) Statements about good and evil are expressions of personal preferences.

Thank you Mark.

Now for the next step: Having admitted the obvious implications of materialism, stop speaking like theists when it comes to good and evil. The point of all of my recent posts has been to get materialists to admit that they don’t get to use words like “morally wrong,” “evil,” “bad,” “immoral,” or “wicked,” in any sense other than “that which I personally do not prefer, which personal preference can be reduced to the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of my brain.”

If on materialist premises terms like “morally wrong,” “evil,” “bad,” “immoral,” or “wicked” are exactly synonymous with “that which I do not prefer,’ what is the sense of using those terms at all? Indeed, using those terms creates confusion and obscures what the materialist is actually saying, because to the vast majority of English speakers those terms are almost always understood to mean “that which transgresses an inter-subjectively binding moral norm.” But when materialists use those words that is precisely NOT what they mean for the simple reason that they reject the existence of any such code.

Why do materialist use those terms in one sense with the full understanding the almost everyone understands them in a completely different sense? In other words, why does it seem like materialists are addicted to equivocation? There are three reasons:

1. Materialists have a PR problem

As Alex Rosenberg notes in chapter 5 of his The Atheist’s Guide to Reality:

But we should also worry about the public relations nightmare for scientism [i.e., materialism’s intellectual handmaiden] produced by the answer theists try to foist on scientism. The militant exponents of the higher superstitions say that scientism has no room for morality and can’t even condemn the wrongdoing of a monster like Hitler.

Rosenberg is, of course, correct about this as Richard Dawkins famously demonstrated when he said, “What’s to prevent us from saying Hitler wasn’t right? I mean, that is a genuinely difficult question.”

Materialists believe they are right about ontology, and they want to convince other people they are right. But that is very difficult when people find out the nihilistic implications of materialism. To deal with this PR problem materialists cheat and continue to use morality words as if those words have meaning. Materialists have a simple PR interest in obscuring their meaning from others.

2. No one cares what you prefer.

No one cares about your idiosyncratic preferences (or mine). Yet we find ourselves trying to influence others all the time. The problem for materialists is that in such debates it would be absurd to say “Do X because that is what I personally prefer.” Debaters always appeal to what they hope will be (or at least perceived to be) inter-subjectively binding norms.

Consider the following two statements:
(a) “Discrimination against homosexuals is desperately wicked!”
(b) “Discrimination against homosexuals is something which I personally do not prefer, which personal preference can be reduced to the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of my brain.”

On materialist premises statement (a) is exactly equivalent to statement (b). Obviously, statement (b) is far less compelling in a debate.

3. Russell’s Problem

Finally, not only do materialists have an interest in obscuring their meaning from others, but also they have an interest in obscuring their meaning from themselves. Bertrand Russell pointed this out many years ago: “I cannot see how to refute the arguments for the subjectivity of ethical values, but I find myself incapable of believing that all that is wrong with wanton cruelty is that I don’t like it.” Russell on Ethics 165/Papers 11: 310–11. For most people materialism requires self deception.

Russell hated the ineluctable conclusions of his own premises. But if his premises were true, then it really is the case that all that is wrong with wanton cruelty is that he does not like it. Going further, this means that in Russell’s moral system “wrong” and “I don’t like it” are equivalent terms. It follows that Russell does not get to condemn what he calls “wanton cruelty” using terms like “morally wrong,” “evil,” “bad,” “immoral,” or “wicked” in any sense other than “that which I do not prefer.”

On a more contemporary note, Richard Dawkins engages in self-deception all the time. He does not really believe condemning Hitler is difficult. Indeed, if one reads Dawkins, he is constantly going on about moral issues as if the word “moral” means something other than his own personal preferences.

Here WJM’s dictum comes into play: “No sane person lives as if materialism is true.” The truth underlying WJM’s dictum creates extreme dissonance problems for materialists. They say one thing is true (and perhaps they even believe it); yet all sane materialists act as if what they say is false. Consider, for example, Mark Frank’s statements above: “Statements about good and evil are expressions of personal preferences.” “Personal preferences can be reduced to the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of each person’s brain.” Mark Frank seems like a descent fellow. I am all but sure that he is not a psychopath. And this means that he does not live his life as if what he just said is true. Like the rest of us, he goes about making moral judgments as if those judgments are something other than expressions of his idiosyncratic preferences. Indeed, on these very pages he has recently expressed moral outrage at the tone of my posts, and he clearly meant something other than merely, “I do not personally prefer the tone of Barry’s posts.”

So what is a non-psychopath materialist to do when embracing the nihilism at the bottom of materialist premises is all but impossible for most people? The answer, of course, is that they do exactly what we seem them do on these pages all of the time: To deal with their dissonance, they obscure the conclusions impelled by their premises even from themselves. They follow WJM’s dictum slavishly and speak in moral terms as if those terms mean something other than “that which I prefer.”

In conclusion, I say to materialists: We know that you equivocate on moral terms all the time. We even know why you equivocate on moral terms. Nevertheless, such equivocation is not licit. If you are going to have your materialist roast, you must accept the nihilistic sauce that inevitably comes with it.

Stop using words like “evil,” “wicked,” and “immoral” as if those words are expressions of anything other than your personal preferences. To do otherwise is an act of deception.

Comments

I'm late to the game. But better late than never. Now, as for the supposed inevitable conclusion that Barry has reached, let's start out with one significant problem, which I'll illustrate with an analogy. I need to get places quickly, efficiently and on a non-regular schedule. As such, I use a car to travel from place to place. When cars operate, they are self-propelled. Mine happens to use an internal combustion engine. Others, like Tesla's Model S, use batteries and electric motors. Other options include hydrogen fuel cells, or even light weigh vehicles with petals. Regardless, I can point to any of these things as an explanation as to how a vehicle is self-propelled. However, if one goes to a salvage yard and points to a car without an engine, they can make the argument that the absence of that engine leads to the inevitable conclusion that one cannot drive it anywhere in it's current state. That is, they can point to where the engine used to be, which is itself based on a number of explanatory ideas about how the world works, and note it's absence. So, the argument implicitly refers to explanations about how cars propel themselves. Now, let's take Barry's argument.
1. On materialism there can be no such thing as “good” and “evil.”
If by "good" or "evil" Barry has merely defined them as merely being justified by an authoritative source, all he's done is implicitly defined "good" and "evil" as being "grounded" in an inexplicable ultimate authoritative source, then claim to have made an argument that "materialism" must lead to their absence. However, it's no more clear how a "non-material source" is any more or less authoritative than a "material" source. In fact, I'd suggest that the very idea that knowledge comes from authoritative sources, including knowledge about moral problems, is a specific epistemological view you hold, and a rather poor one at that. So, his argument is parochial, because it is narrow in scope. IOW, Barry has no good explanation as to how non-material entities justify moral values. As such it's unclear how he can point to any missing explanation in materialism that necessities the absence of objective moral values either. If the lack of an actual explanation is not a problem for non-materialism, then it's unclear why it's a problem for materialism either. A designer that "just was", complete with the knowledge of what is objectively morally good or bad, already present, doesn't serve an explanatory purpose. This is because one could just as efficiently state that human beings "just appeared", complete with the knowledge of what is objectively morally good or bad, already present. All theism does is say the knowledge existed in one place (a designer) and was copied to another place (in human beings). However, this doesn't address the origin of that knowledge. As such, neither actually solve the problem. Nor am I advocating the latter, either. (see below) I'm pointing out a problem with Barry's argument. As I've said elsewhere, theism is a particular case of justificationism, which is a specific epistemological view on knowledge. In the case Barry's question, the knowledge in question is knowledge of how to solve moral problems. So, this entire "problem" is parochial because it's unnecessarily narrow in scope. The entire issue is a problem for juistificationists, which they are projecting on others. So, Barry should clarify his argument to explicitly state justificationist materialists, or something to that effect. What I want from ideas are their content, not their providence. You might need some ultimate justification, but that's your problem, not mine. Note the contrast here. Barry and company is referring to objective morality for the sake of defining moral rules. However, I'm referring to moral knowledge in context of solving moral problems. To quote Poppper, "All life is problem solving." Even in the moral sphere. To clarify, let me illustrate what I mean by "parochial " using details of Barry's original challenge as an example: Barry claimed that all arguments rest on premises. That is to say, all arguments are amplitude and move from more general to more specific and that we must "attack" his argument as if that were the only approach. However, that is merely one form of argument, known as modus ponens. Another form of argument is modus tollens, which is deductive, and moves from more general to more specific. That only modus ponens is the only kind of argument is merely assumed to be the case, without any kind of argument. Not to mention that modus ponens arguments only have three options to actually provide proof.
01. An infinite regression, which appears because of the necessity to go ever further back, but is not practically feasible and does not, therefore, provide a certain foundation. 02. A logical circle in the deduction, which is caused by the fact that one, in the need to found, falls back on statements which had already appeared before as requiring a foundation, and which circle does not lead to any certain foundation either. 03. A break of searching at a certain point, which indeed appears principally feasible, but would mean a random suspension of the principle of sufficient reason.
Instead, one can discard the search for justificationism and adopt a stance of critical preference, which is deductive in nature. Again, this is none of the above. IOW, not only is the criteria Barry setup for his challenge is itself parochial, because it is unnecessarily narrow in scope, but it does not withstand rational criticism. It's unclear how Barry, or anyone else, can get more out of an argument than they put in. At best, we hear that we need to justify our beliefs or there could be no knowledge. But that's what it means to be a justificationist. That's just towing the party line. That's their problem, which they project on others.
2. There is only my personal preferences competing with everyone else’s personal preferences.
I would suggest that moral knowledge genuinely grows via conjecture and criticism and that knowledge is independent of anyone's belief. IOW, we're not merely limited to personal preferences, but we arrive at moral conclusions by rational persuasion, criticism and argument, which detects errors in our ideas about what we want. Imagine the following hypothetical scenario. Suppose a group of voters of a small civilization firmly believed that stealing was a great virtue, one from which many benefits were derived, and decided to repeal all laws prohibiting it. What would happen? Everyone would start stealing. Soon, the best thieves would be the wealthiest. However, most people could not retain their own property, including most thieves. Companies and individuals who produced goods and services would be unable to continue producing anything worth by anyone stealing. Their economy would collapse, food would become scarce, etc. Since their initial conviction that stealing was beneficial was strong, this may lead them to think there simply wasn't enough stealing going on. So, the voters would actually enact laws to promote it. However, no matter how convinced they were initially, those setbacks would be problems in their lives they would want solve. A few voters would begin to suspect that stealing wasn't such a good solution after all and direct their attention to the problem yet again. Since some explanation would be behind their belief that stealing was beneficial, they would try to explain why it wasn't actually working, in practice. Eventually, they would settle on a different explanation that seemed better. And, gradually, they would persuade others of it, and so on, until the majority of voters opposed stealing. This is not to say it is not we who choose, but our choices are not merely preferences. We can rationally criticize our moral ideas. Knowledge is objective in that it independent of what we believe. This includes moral knowledge about how we think we can obtain what we want. And it's independent of knowing subjects.
"Let me repeat one of my standard arguments for the (more or less) independent existence of [knowledge]. I consider two thought experiments: Experiment (1). All our machines and tools are destroyed, and all our subjective learning, including our subjective knowledge of machines and tools, and how to use them. But libraries and our capacity to learn from them survive. Clearly, after much suffering, our world may get going again. Experiment (2). As before, machines and tools are destroyed, and our subjective learning, including our subjective knowledge of machines and tools, and how to use them. But this time, all libraries are destroyed also, so that our capacity to learn from books becomes useless." Karl Popper, Knowledge: Subjective Versus Objective, page 59
Choosing to search for truth, rater than falsehoods is a moral choice. So is the choice to continually attempt to criticize all ideas. Furthermore, Popper indicates the problems with utopian schemes, in that even with the best intentions, they end up with totalitarian results. Instead, he suggests that we should try to reduce suffering via criticism and piecemeal social engineering. This is in contrast to trying to justify any particular rule or law as an ultimate solution outside the context of a moral problem to be solved. Again, note that I'm approaching morality from a different perspective: moral problems to solve, which no one here as actually addressed. This is yet anther way Barry's argument is unnecessarily narrow in scope and by which his conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises, unless he assume them implicitly as part of his argument, which shields them from criticism.
3. Finally, I say on materialist premises all of those personal preferences can be reduced to the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of each person’s brain.
Here, Barry assumes all explanations must be reductionist in nature. But this simply isn't the case. For example, when we make progress in scientific explanations, they are occasionally dissimilar in the way they explain their predictions, even in domains where the predictions are similar or identical. Einstein's explanation of planetary motion not only corrects Newton's, but is radically different - sweeping away the very core elements (the reductionist elements) in Newton's explanation, such as a gravitational force and the uniformity of the passing of time, by which Newton defined motion. Each subsequent theory made progress in producing more accurate predictions, despite the fact that the underlying means by which the previous theory explained it was never true. This is possible because sweeping away the elements by which an theory makes an explanation is not the same as sweeping away the entire explanation. Newton's force of gravity was replaced with Einstein's warping of space time. Both revealed some truth about reality, yet they could be progressively replaced. How does that reconcile with reductionism? IOW, not all explanations are reductionist in nature. This is yet another way Barry's argument is parochial, because it is narrow in scope. As such, it's unclear how his conclusions are inevitable.Popperian_{April 18, 2015
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@RDFish Hi. I wrote: We may rely on our “moral perception” as you put it, but it doesn’t follow from that [that] such moral sense can make anything right or wrong. to which you responded, 'You’ll need to provide your definitions of “right” and “wrong” in order for that sentence to make sense.' I don't think "right" and "ought" are definable, but I can tell that they don't mean "whatever provides me with this or that emotion of approbation or disapprobation" [respectively], because it seems obvious to me that I may be mistaken when I have one of those emotions. The obviousness of that proposition is what has led many philosophers from egoism (where you still reside) to cultural relativism. The thing is, the same problem arises for cultural relativism, which led one of its champions, Ruth Benedict, to hold both that whatever was considered normal by some culture or other is for that reason good, and to claim that racism is detestable wherever it occurs. The moral (no pun intended) here is that Moore's open question argument is right. The thing is, though, that nothing follows about God or design or any such blath from it. C.S. Lewis farted around with that stuff for years and ended up holding not two (like Benedict) but THREE contradictory views on the matter. WWALTO_{April 18, 2015
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Zachriel @ 89: Never mind 77’s redirection of the arguing from the OP’s argument—are those indeed the sources 87 would like to refer to? How am I to know? If “it’s the first link, dummy” is an acceptable answer, why could 87 not specify the link in the first place… …bah. No point in going on about this. (“Look everybody! The Sun really is shining! Can’t you tell by looking at that bedazzling light in the sky?!” Thanks for providing something concrete, though. I see reference to Old Norse and Old High German, which I suppose is 77’s evidence that theists have “hijacked the term ‘good’ from Norse and Germanic pagans and have refined it with a meaning that is different in essence”…?ebenezer_{April 17, 2015
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ebenezer: I’m supposed to redefine “sources” as “whatever one can find proof for via Google”? The first link has been reliable. http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=good Here's the sources the author used. http://www.etymonline.com/sources.phpZachriel_{April 17, 2015
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Roy @ 87: I’m supposed to redefine “sources” as “whatever one can find proof for via Google”? The burden of proof lies on me to show that an opponent’s claim is not backed up? OK—I accept your admission of having no sources. To:
If you have any integrity at all, you’ll either retract your post and apologise, or cease using the word “good” except w.r.t. North European pagans.
I repeat:
That is a lot to ask with absolutely no evidence whatsoever given that “North European pagans” had anything to do with the original definition of “good”. Integrity is going to very much prevent a retraction of the post to which you’re replying—and I wouldn’t accept that mike1962 is the one who needs to apologize before he’s issued such stern condemnation of someone else on the basis of entirely unsubstantiated pleas to “Norse and Germanic pagans”.
(I do appreciate the attempt at using LMGTFY to Bolster The Case. Relevant here from Dr. Jay Richards, however: “A sneer is not an argument.”)ebenezer_{April 17, 2015
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ebenezer @ 82: try this.Roy_{April 17, 2015
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RDFish @ 85:
I think this sums it up – we simply disagree. If the elf told me to cheat on my science test and blackmail my teacher, I would think his advice was immoral whether or not he was an elf. My position is that I am not obligated to listen to elves or angels or gods or demons or anyone else; I get to decide for myself what is right and wrong.
To be fair, I said only that it could be a source of “objective morality” (given some requirements which materialism cannot agree to), and probably I shouldn’t even give it that much credit, since it’s not exactly on the same level as a God who created you…
We disagree here too: My position is that whether our brains operate according to neural impulses or res cogitans, it makes no difference whatsoever regarding what is right and wrong action. The two things are not connected, any more than whether or not our intestines play a critical role in our decision making (they do).
But once again, it doesn’t matter whether our brains are involved with this! Intestines and brains and anything else to which a materialist could apply for a standard—all are material.
As for how humans in general came to exist, nobody knows.
As I said last time, though: we don’t have to know the correct account for there to be one.
You’ve skipped from a theory of origin to a theory of morality without connecting them. What difference does it make how life began? If life began via some organic chemistry reaction, would that make anyone think rape was ok?
If it did, to what standard could you logically appeal in order to determine that it was wrong? And it’s not me who’s saying both that it did and that there’s such a standard…
No. What I perceive as right or wrong does not depend in the least on the latest research findings regarding abiogenesis.
In the materialist view, if it does not boil down to matter in the end, what is it?

RDF: And if there was a god who created us, why does the fact that he created us give him moral authority over us? I don’t think it does. EB: Because He gets to set the rules!
No, he doesn’t. We disagree about this. By what objective standard can we decide who is right (hint: there is none). See what I mean? How do you establish that “whoever is the creator gets to set the moral rules” is itself a moral rule? That’s just your personal opinion.
Not quite, any more than Mr. Arrington’s example of “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal” is just his personal opinion…

Saying “I don’t think it does”, in a scenario where He did exist and had indeed given us rules, would neither eliminate Him nor help that He had given us rules.
I don’t understand this.
It once again means simply: Whether or not you or I believe something has nothing to do with whether it’s true. If there were no God, I could “think” that there were all day long, and there still would not be. If there is, you can not “think” that there is likewise, and there still would be.
Maybe there is no god (which I believe), or maybe there is one and he gave us rules. In the latter case, there is no objective moral imperative that everybody must follow His rules – just his say so. If he told me to stone adulterers to death (which apparently some people believe he did) I would be sure that his rules were immoral, and I would tell him I wasn’t following his rules.
That would be supremely ironic, since if there was and He gave you your sense of morality, you’d be using His standard to judge Him wrong.
I’ve refuted Barry’s dumb “argument” many times over. Materialism isn’t a moral theory. He just doesn’t get it.
I don’t see where he said that it was. I likewise don’t see where anyone showed that materialism can have any right or wrong—and that would have to be shown in order to refute his argument.ebenezer_{April 16, 2015
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Hi Ebenezer,
RDF: Let’s say I told you that I like to imagine a small elf who lives in my ear and answers questions regarding right and wrong. Would that, in your view, make my morality objective? If not, then what do you think does constitute an objective morality? EB: If an actual small elf lived in your ear and answered questions regarding right and wrong, sure (for these purposes)!
I think this sums it up - we simply disagree. If the elf told me to cheat on my science test and blackmail my teacher, I would think his advice was immoral whether or not he was an elf. My position is that I am not obligated to listen to elves or angels or gods or demons or anyone else; I get to decide for myself what is right and wrong.
if there’s something beyond a matter of which we can be “made” (of which “we” can consist), then we have a chance at a logical moral authority which can tell us what is right and what is wrong.
We disagree here too: My position is that whether our brains operate according to neural impulses or res cogitans, it makes no difference whatsoever regarding what is right and wrong action. The two things are not connected, any more than whether or not our intestines play a critical role in our decision making (they do).
Because, as I said last time, we surely agree that there is a means by which we came into existence, right?
Well, I'm pretty sure I was born :-) As for how humans in general came to exist, nobody knows.
That means that there is a correct answer to be had here,...
Huh? You've skipped from a theory of origin to a theory of morality without connecting them. What difference does it make how life began? If life began via some organic chemistry reaction, would that make anyone think rape was ok? No. What I perceive as right or wrong does not depend in the least on the latest research findings regarding abiogenesis.
RDF: And if there was a god who created us, why does the fact that he created us give him moral authority over us? I don’t think it does. EB: Because He gets to set the rules!
No, he doesn't. We disagree about this. By what objective standard can we decide who is right (hint: there is none). See what I mean? How do you establish that "whoever is the creator gets to set the moral rules" is itself a moral rule? That's just your personal opinion.
Saying “I don’t think it does”, in a scenario where He did exist and had indeed given us rules, would neither eliminate Him nor help that He had given us rules.
I don't understand this. Maybe there is no god (which I believe), or maybe there is one and he gave us rules. In the latter case, there is no objective moral imperative that everybody must follow His rules - just his say so. If he told me to stone adulterers to death (which apparently some people believe he did) I would be sure that his rules were immoral, and I would tell him I wasn't following his rules.
Again: None of this is bringing us any closer to a refutation of the OP’s argument nor to a logical materialist basis for morality.
I've refuted Barry's dumb "argument" many times over. Materialism isn't a moral theory. He just doesn't get it. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{April 16, 2015
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Re #81, Yeah, I know. Also "Lord", "Easter", and probably others I've forgotten. I don't object to borrowing words, only to false accusations. RoyRoy_{April 16, 2015
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RDFish @ 80:
Let’s say I told you that I like to imagine a small elf who lives in my ear and answers questions regarding right and wrong. Would that, in your view, make my morality objective? If not, then what do you think does constitute an objective morality?
If an actual small elf lived in your ear and answered questions regarding right and wrong, sure (for these purposes)! (Although, unless we could exempt the elf from the process of entirely unguided natural processes acting on matter by which we’re supposed to have come into being, not really…)
This is really just a fallacy of division. Matter can’t play chess, but people can play chess. That doesn’t argue against materialism. Water molecules aren’t wet, but water is wet, and so on. In the same way, matter can’t have a moral sense, but people can have a moral sense, and this is the case whether or not people are made of something else besides matter.
But as we’ve been over before, the mere possession of a “moral sense” doesn’t obligate us to follow it—the more so since we (we are to believe) know that the process by which we came into being was entirely unaware of its own existence and was simply acting through Chance and Necessity. “[Whether] or not people are made of something else besides matter” is a more important point than I think you necessarily realize: if there’s something beyond a matter of which we can be “made” (of which “we” can consist), then we have a chance at a logical moral authority which can tell us what is right and what is wrong.

If it were only a case of “let’s all devise our own fictitious accounts of gods and their rules so we can have something nice to think of as behind morality”, sure. That’s not the case
Why not?
Because, as I said last time, we surely agree that there is a means by which we came into existence, right? That we exist and that therefore (since we’re surely not eternal beings…) we came into existence in the first place? That means that there is a correct answer to be had here, and we’re not limited to devising fictitious accounts. To say that we are is to say that nothing at all is correct, to strongly suggest that we don’t in fact exist, and to raise the question: Why are we arguing?

RDF: At most one of them can be true, but all of them can be (and likely are) false. EB: the same can be said for almost any theory of origins or morality
Of course.
—with the provision that we acknowledge that there is a right one.
When it comes to facts that we can confirm inter-subjectively (i.e. scientifically), then yes. When it comes to morality, how could we ever know that there is one single correct moral code? What could possibly determine this? And if we can’t know this (we can’t), what difference does it make whether or not there is?
“What difference does it make?” is very much different from “OK—it doesn’t exist”. On the ceiling of a building along Germany’s Bahnhofstrasse, there may very well be a water stain. It makes absolutely no difference to me if there is or if there is not; does that prove that it doesn’t exist? (Forgive the trivial example—the point stands!)

RDF: You think God has moral authority. Even if I believed in the same god you did, why should I give him moral authority over me? Maybe he’s wrong. … EB: By definition, He couldn’t be wrong—He would have created you.
And if there was a god who created us, why does the fact that he created us give him moral authority over us? I don’t think it does.
Because He gets to set the rules! Those would, incidentally, be our standard of morality. Saying “I don’t think it does”, in a scenario where He did exist and had indeed given us rules, would neither eliminate Him nor help that He had given us rules. I trust that in very basic instances involving non-moral actions which one would prefer or not prefer to be taken by one’s pet, you would allow that one has authority over that pet to decide what it should or should not do? (You wouldn’t, surely, tell the owner that the pet must be allowed to form its own opinion about these things?) Like (in some perilously much-less-trivial way) that, but with moral actions. Again: None of this is bringing us any closer to a refutation of the OP’s argument nor to a logical materialist basis for morality.ebenezer_{April 16, 2015
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Roy @ 77:
Ignorant theists like mike1962 have hijacked the term “good” from Norse and Germanic pagans
…Citation Needed™
and have refined it with a meaning that is different in essence, and then incorrectly complained that it has been hijacked from them. That is not only dishonest and fraudulent, it is hypocritical.
May we hear the “original” meaning as given by your Norse and Germanic pagan sources? By the way, it’s hard to imagine complaints about the meaning of “good” or of “evil” as anything other than attempts to distract from the OP’s argument, unless, to the argument “Jell-O has no solid basis for a vehicle!” the response “You’ve hijacked the term ‘vehicle’ from North American automobile manufacturers and refined it with a meaning that is different in essence” is a valid refutation.

Make up your own terms. Don’t highjack the terms of others.
You make up your own terms.
…why? The materialist is the one who takes the theist’s “good”, by which the theist can mean “that which is moral”, and refines it to mean “my perception of what is good, given the circumstances and my background… or that society’s idea of what is good, given the power their rulers possess over their members… or anything else at all which somebody else wishes to believe to be good, so long as it does not pose any problems to my own personal self at the moment.”
If you have any integrity at all, you’ll either retract your post and apologise, or cease using the word “good” except w.r.t. North European pagans.
That is a lot to ask with absolutely no evidence whatsoever given that “North European pagans” had anything to do with the original definition of “good”. Integrity is going to very much prevent a retraction of the post to which you’re replying—and I wouldn’t accept that mike1962 is the one who needs to apologize before he’s issued such stern condemnation of someone else on the basis of entirely unsubstantiated pleas to “Norse and Germanic pagans”.
But you’re a typically arrogant and ignorant theist, so I doubt it’ll happen.
No wait. What is “integrity” when we’ve ruled out the theist’s definition? Let’s hope that it doesn’t happen, then…ebenezer_{April 16, 2015
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#77 Roy,
Ignorant theists like mike1962 have hijacked the term “good” from Norse and Germanic pagans and have refined it with a meaning that is different in essence, and then incorrectly complained that it has been hijacked from them. That is not only dishonest and fraudulent, it is hypocritical.
They likewise hijacked the word god, changing its gender from neuter to masculine and using it to translate Church Latin Deus (which, truth to tell, had been hijacked as well).Don Pedro_{April 16, 2015
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Hi Ebenezer,
The whole of what I can consider moral or immoral, along with why I consider anything moral or immoral, is only actually correct if my theory is correct. Subjective belief actually has nothing to do with it; as I suggested last time, to say that “it is only my subjective belief in a particular theory” which gives weight to my take on morality is to say “my subjective belief is ill-founded because that theory is wrong”.
I don't follow. Let's say I told you that I like to imagine a small elf who lives in my ear and answers questions regarding right and wrong. Would that, in your view, make my morality objective? If not, then what do you think does constitute an objective morality?
I only want to say that none of it gets weight (or “authority”, or “say”, or “any ability to determine what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ for me”) from anything which is not, in the end, matter. (This is assuming my previous super-simplified definition of “materialism”, which would mean that nothing other than matter exists.)
This is really just a fallacy of division. Matter can't play chess, but people can play chess. That doesn't argue against materialism. Water molecules aren't wet, but water is wet, and so on. In the same way, matter can't have a moral sense, but people can have a moral sense, and this is the case whether or not people are made of something else besides matter.
If it were only a case of “let’s all devise our own fictitious accounts of gods and their rules so we can have something nice to think of as behind morality”, sure. That’s not the case
Why not?
RDF: At most one of them can be true, but all of them can be (and likely are) false. EB: the same can be said for almost any theory of origins or morality
Of course.
—with the provision that we acknowledge that there is a right one.
When it comes to facts that we can confirm inter-subjectively (i.e. scientifically), then yes. When it comes to morality, how could we ever know that there is one single correct moral code? What could possibly determine this? And if we can't know this (we can't), what difference does it make whether or not there is?
RDF: You think God has moral authority. Even if I believed in the same god you did, why should I give him moral authority over me? Maybe he’s wrong. ... EB: By definition, He couldn’t be wrong—He would have created you.
And if there was a god who created us, why does the fact that he created us give him moral authority over us? I don't think it does. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{April 16, 2015
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Hi ENich,
RDF: “Your philosophy also has problems, and your philosophy is also not objectively grounded. What is not fine is that you think that your own particular definitions for “right” and “wrong” are somehow the only ones that should be allowed – that is stupid.” EN: You do know this plays right back at you, correct?
Obviously. Each of us acts, when we act morally, according to our subjective perception of what is right. Most of the time we all agree (rape, murder, theft, and so on) and sometimes we disagree (abortion, gay marriage, drug laws, etc). This is true even for people who profess to follow the same moral code, the same religion, etc. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{April 16, 2015
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Hi WALTO,
RDFish, in a recent post you assert that all moral theories are based on “subjective choice,” and use that term about 50 more times therein. What is a “subjective choice”? Is “subjective” there an expletive or is it supposed to add something? (I mean, what’s an “objective choice”?) And what do you mean by “based on” there? I’m thinking here that you’re actually referring to some kind of causal connection rather than an inferential one, but I really don’t know. Of course, we make choices of our axioms, but the choices don’t make the axioms true (if they are).
Essentially we're using "subjective" to mean "based upon internal considerations" (beliefs, desires, emotions, and perceptions) and "objective" to mean "based upon external considerations (things in the outside world). My point is that nothing in the outside world can be morally compelling unless one makes a choice, based on subjective factors, to consider it so.
RDF: ““Right” is what we perceive (not choose, perceive) to be moral. Each of us must rely on our own moral perception.” WALTO:I don’t mean by “right” that which I perceive to be moral and I doubt very many people do.
StephenB asked me what I meant, so I told him. You think otherwise. Many people agree with you, and many people agree with me.
We may rely on our “moral perception” as you put it, but it doesn’t follow from that such moral sense can make anything right or wrong.
You'll need to provide your definitions of "right" and "wrong" in order for that sentence to make sense. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{April 16, 2015
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Materialist atheists have highjacked the terms “good” and “evil” from theists and have refined them with a meaning that is different in essence. That is dishonest. That is fraud.
Ignorant theists like mike1962 have hijacked the term "good" from Norse and Germanic pagans and have refined it with a meaning that is different in essence, and then incorrectly complained that it has been hijacked from them. That is not only dishonest and fraudulent, it is hypocritical.
Make up your own terms. Don’t highjack the terms of others.
You make up your own terms. If you have any integrity at all, you'll either retract your post and apologise to all the materialists and atheists here, or cease using the word "good" except w.r.t. North European pagans. But you're a typically arrogant and ignorant theist, so I doubt it'll happen. RoyRoy_{April 16, 2015
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RDFish @ 69: The problem with most of this is that I’m not relying on subjective belief. May I have a “subjective belief” in a particular theory? Absolutely! Will that make it actually correct? Absolutely not. The whole of what I can consider moral or immoral, along with why I consider anything moral or immoral, is only actually correct if my theory is correct. Subjective belief actually has nothing to do with it; as I suggested last time, to say that “it is only my subjective belief in a particular theory” which gives weight to my take on morality is to say “my subjective belief is ill-founded because that theory is wrong”.
None of this has anything to do with electricity or chemistry or neurons.
I only want to say that none of it gets weight (or “authority”, or “say”, or “any ability to determine what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ for me”) from anything which is not, in the end, matter. (This is assuming my previous super-simplified definition of “materialism”, which would mean that nothing other than matter exists.)
Barry’s idea that materialism is the foundation of atheistic moral theory is just stupid. It isn’t the case – it is just his ignorant cartoonish view that anyone who doesn’t believe in god is basing their beliefs on “electro-chemistry”.
Maybe I missed something but I think he rather was arguing about materialism itself (as opposed to atheism, which perhaps logically follows from materialism but which I didn’t see brought up in the OP). “Electro-chemistry” completely aside, no one here has brought up anything of more moral authority than “electro-chemistry” to which a materialistic worldview can point for the purposes of determining good or evil, or right or wrong; since we therefore can’t, in a materialistic worldview, take anything to be the question settler as regards morality, his argument says that materialism has no “good” or “evil”, or “right” or “wrong”.
You think that belief in a God provides a “logical arbiter” of morality, but it doesn’t. There have been thousands of different theistic religions throughout history, each with different ideas about what these gods want people to do.
Again: If it were only a case of “let’s all devise our own fictitious accounts of gods and their rules so we can have something nice to think of as behind morality”, sure. That’s not the case: even that every different religion considers itself correct in its account of how we all came to be doesn’t make it so, obviously—as you say:
At most one of them can be true,
On
but all of them can be (and likely are) false.
, the same can be said for almost any theory of origins or morality—with the provision that we acknowledge that there is a right one. (Note that we don’t even necessarily have to say that we know the right one, or that it’s been proposed yet; we simply must acknowledge that there is a right one at all.) This does not mean that all of them are false, any more than that all known atheistic or materialistic explanations of origins could be false means that all of them are (it doesn’t).
In any case, if you want to choose one of these religions and follow its moral code that’s fine, but don’t pretend that it is an objective anchor – it isn’t.
If what the religion gives as an account of morality (and origins, etc.) is true, then it actually does give an objective anchor. If I must sound like a broken record, I must (sorry)… again I refer to the uncle example from 52.
You are just doing what everyone else does – following their own personal preferences – but you are then claiming that somehow your own personal religious beliefs are the only ones that are objectively true.
I would indeed claim that they are; more relevant to this discussion, I have been claiming here that any belief is, i.e., that there is a correct account out there. If it were true that “everyone” simply had their “own personal” beliefs and that that in itself invalidated all belief, there’d be no sense in arguing—nothing, whether currently believed by anyone or not, would be correct (and we would not exist, so I suppose we’d find it more difficult to argue anyway).
You didn’t look around at different religions, and then chose one of them and decided to follow it. You almost certainly adhere to the religion of your parents, and if you were born to parents of a different religion you’d follow that one. Rarely one is converted to another religion, but even so, we have no way of objectively determining which one might be true. So it simply isn’t the case that religious beliefs can provide an objective grounding for morality.
They can. They also can be wrong, but if as in your hypothetical example I had followed a different one as a result of being born to parents of a different one, that would not make that one right, any more than my present belief in this one makes it right (it definitely doesn’t). The (separate) argument of how we determine “which one” is “true” is of course not tied to the central idea of ID, but interestingly enough follows similar lines of reasoning.
You think God has moral authority. Even if I believed in the same god you did, why should I give him moral authority over me? Maybe he’s wrong. If he threatens to punish me, then he’s just being a bully – it doesn’t make him right. I’d rather go with what I perceive as right.
By definition, He couldn’t be wrong—He would have created you. That would have included giving you your sense of morality, which is what you would need to determine whether or not He was “wrong”—and what you would use to decide that He’d be a “bully” to punish you for not doing as He says. Early on in the Christian (e.g.) account of origins, the first man decides to “go with what [he] [perceived] as right”, and he does indeed get punished. That doesn’t make God a bully—He set the rules, and we understand at our own level that it’s OK to punish those who break our rules. Was God under obligation to the man, having created him? Until God gave him life and a conscience and a moral sense, he was no more aware of “morality” than is a lump of clay—to borrow the NT (New Testament) metaphor, is a lump of clay owed anything by the potter who makes it into a pot? If the account is true, then God created that man’s sense of morality—what was to tell the man that anything was “wrong”? I must also note here that however interesting this discussion is (it is interesting, IMO), it’s not relevant to or able to refute the OP’s argument. Even if my view were wrong, the materialistic case for morality would (purely by benefit of my own view’s wrongness) be no closer to validity.ebenezer_{April 16, 2015
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RDFish #70
There have been thousands of different theistic religions throughout history, each with different moral commands, and therefore even if there was one that was “right”, almost all of them must be wrong.
Metaphysics is necessarily unique because the Supreme Being is One, whatever term the different people use to name it. As a consequence, the fundamentals of ethics are universal because are based on metaphysics. In short, all that inside us is in dissonance with the ultimate Unity is evil, while whatever helps to know and reach such Unity is good. For more see: https://uncommondescent.com/religion/how-do-you-derive-moral-principles-from-theism/niwrad_{April 16, 2015
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"Your philosophy also has problems, and your philosophy is also not objectively grounded. What is not fine is that you think that your own particular definitions for “right” and “wrong” are somehow the only ones that should be allowed – that is stupid." You do know this plays right back at you, correct? If you do agree that you are subject to this , it regresses infinitely. Nobody can get a grounded anything. So what's your point? Why should I believe you? Should I believe you? If not, why do you bother? If so, tell me on what grounds do I believe you since : "“Right” is what we perceive (not choose, perceive) to be moral. Each of us must rely on our own moral perception. It would be nice if we could derive ought from is, but we can’t." Am I daft? Missing something?ENich_{April 16, 2015
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Consider the following two statements: (a) “Discrimination against homosexuals is desperately wicked!” (b) “Discrimination against homosexuals is something which I personally do not prefer, which personal preference can be reduced to the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of my brain.” On materialist premises statement (a) is exactly equivalent to statement (b). Obviously, statement (b) is far less compelling in a debate.
Anyone who thinks statement (a) is in any way compelling is never going to change anyone's opinion on anything. RoyRoy_{April 16, 2015
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Mark
SB – I think you are a bit confused about Kant. But I won’t pursue it because, as I said, what matters is not the person but the moral code.
OK, we don't have to pursue it.
There is nothing subjective about the categorical imperative.
So, you want to pursue it after all. OK. There is, indeed, a universal component (not objective) in his formulation, but it is subjectively based. Like the Golden Rule, the Categorical Imperative is based on the preferences of the subject, that is, "what would I want done or not done 'to me' or "what maxims would I want to be universalized." It isn't defined. The subject can fill in the blanks for himself. Man is his own law. He is autonomous. He binds himself to the law that he gives himself. This is Kant's Categorical Imperative.
[On Bentham] My claim was that utilitarianism is objective – this is different from whether it is based on feeling or based on reason. We are into definitions here again, but I have always interpreted an objective predicate as one that is true or false independent of the speaker’s rsponse to the object; while a subjective predicate as one which is determined by speaker’s response to the object.
As I have stated in the past, I don't think things like subjective personal tastes can be compared to attempts to subjectivize truths. After giving it a lot of thought, I have come to the conclusion that there is no such thing as objective funniness or tastiness, but I do think there is such a thing as objective truth. So, I don't think we can make analogies along those lines. However, with respect to utilitarianism, I would summarize its subjective nature in the following way: It cannot break free of egoism (subjective) and find its way to altruism. It conflates self interest (subjective) with benevolence and usefulness (subjective) with what is morally right (objective).StephenB_{April 16, 2015
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RDFish, in a recent post you assert that all moral theories are based on "subjective choice," and use that term about 50 more times therein. What is a "subjective choice"? Is "subjective" there an expletive or is it supposed to add something? (I mean, what's an "objective choice"?) And what do you mean by "based on" there? I'm thinking here that you're actually referring to some kind of causal connection rather than an inferential one, but I really don't know. Of course, we make choices of our axioms, but the choices don't make the axioms true (if they are). Thanks. EDIT: I see that in a later post you write: "“Right” is what we perceive (not choose, perceive) to be moral. Each of us must rely on our own moral perception." I don't mean by "right" that which I perceive to be moral and I doubt very many people do. We may rely on our "moral perception" as you put it, but it doesn't follow from that such moral sense can make anything right or wrong. Sure, it's the case that we take to be right that which seems to us to be right, just as we take to be green that which seems to us to be green, but one must be careful not to mix up what something is with how we come to know it. (ratio essendi with ratio cognoscendi) WWALTO_{April 16, 2015
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Hi StephenB,
And even if this was not the case, philosophers make errors all the time, especially atheist philosophers.
Theist philosopher make errors all the time. There have been thousands of different theistic religions throughout history, each with different moral commands, and therefore even if there was one that was "right", almost all of them must be wrong.
So name dropping does not help you make your case.
Hahahahaha - name dropping? Barry accused me of NOT providing names, so I did in response! Hahahahaha, just can win with you clowns. Barry asked for names of philosophers who have written objectivist ethics compatible with materialism. Kant, Bentham, and Rand all did exactly that. The fact that they didn't talk about materialism in their moral theories just makes my point: materialism is not what "ineluctably leads to" a particular moral theory! It's true that Hume's was a materialist and a sentimentalist, but Rand - a ferocious atheist/materialist - wrote an objectivist ethics (called "objectivism").
You are on your own: Show me how you get to [a] electro-chemical processes of each person’s brain to [b] Objective morality, good, and evil. Did I forget to say, “define your terms?”
For the zillionth time, the operation of brains have nothing to do with moral theory in general. Moral theories can be based on happiness, utility, moral perceptions, a categorial imperative, and so on. How the brain might work is simply irrelevant.
RDF: Subjectivism does not necessarily rely on personal choice SB: Are we supposed to take your word for that, or were you planning on making your case.
The key point here is "choice". As I've explained to you endlessly, I am not personally capable of choosing to change my moral perceptions, any more than I am capable of choosing to change my color perception. I think the same is true for most people (aside from psychopaths).
You are simply wrong.
Nope, I'm quite right.
Modern materialism (physicalism)...
Many people (including me) distinguish materialism from physicalism - they are different ideas with different names. Materialism is a holdover from pre-19th century physics and doesn't make sense any more (because no educated person believes that observable phenomena arise from "matter in motion", the way Laplace did). Physicalism has its own problems, which are quite irrelevant to the discussion at hand.
...includes matter/energy/space and any combination or manifestation of the interactions. It rules out spirit or non-matter by definition.
Let's just agree that "materialism" rules out "spirit", and define "spirit" as "conscious beings without physical bodies". That should do it. A belief in spirits or gods does not help provide an objective grounding for ethics. You just make up your own ethics and then attribute it to some spirit - how does that help? Even if the spirit existed, why should I do what it says I should do?
Electro chemical interactions in the brain are what modern materialism reduces to on matters of ethics.
This is ridiculous. Besides, not all materialists are reductionists. All this is really a bucket of red herrings.
It is ridiculous to think that there should be more than one definition for right and wrong. Just for fun, what is your definition? I know that you will not answer, but what the hell, it doesn’t hurt to ask.
Here is your ploy: I tell you all about utiliarianism or the categorical imperative or Randian objectivism, and you start arguing that these philosophies have problems, or they aren't actually objectively grounded, and so on. That's fine - I agree! Your philosophy also has problems, and your philosophy is also not objectively grounded. What is not fine is that you think that your own particular definitions for "right" and "wrong" are somehow the only ones that should be allowed - that is stupid. Instead, just accept that other people have different definitions for these words, and if you'd like to debate moral theory you must understand what other people mean and then debate the relative merits of their ideas vs. yours. For you to simply declare that their definitions are improper while yours is correct is just arrogance and stupidity.
Just for fun, what is your definition?
"Right" is what we perceive (not choose, perceive) to be moral. Each of us must rely on our own moral perception. It would be nice if we could derive ought from is, but we can't. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{April 16, 2015
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Hi Ebenezer, Materialism is a view about what sorts of things fundamentally exist. Moral theory is concerned with how people ought to act. Most theists base their moral theory on their subjective beliefs about what sorts of gods exist and on their subjective beliefs about what these gods want them to do. Materialists base their moral theory on how people perceive right and wrong, on their intuitions and sentiments, or on rules that can be consistently applied to all agents fairly, or on maximizing some certain thing like happiness or prosperity. None of this has anything to do with electricity or chemistry or neurons. Barry's idea that materialism is the foundation of atheistic moral theory is just stupid. It isn't the case - it is just his ignorant cartoonish view that anyone who doesn't believe in god is basing their beliefs on "electro-chemistry". You think that belief in a God provides a "logical arbiter" of morality, but it doesn't. There have been thousands of different theistic religions throughout history, each with different ideas about what these gods want people to do. At most one of them can be true, but all of them can be (and likely are) false. In any case, if you want to choose one of these religions and follow its moral code that's fine, but don't pretend that it is an objective anchor - it isn't. You are just doing what everyone else does - following their own personal preferences - but you are then claiming that somehow your own personal religious beliefs are the only ones that are objectively true. You didn't look around at different religions, and then chose one of them and decided to follow it. You almost certainly adhere to the religion of your parents, and if you were born to parents of a different religion you'd follow that one. Rarely one is converted to another religion, but even so, we have no way of objectively determining which one might be true. So it simply isn't the case that religious beliefs can provide an objective grounding for morality. You think God has moral authority. Even if I believed in the same god you did, why should I give him moral authority over me? Maybe he's wrong. If he threatens to punish me, then he's just being a bully - it doesn't make him right. I'd rather go with what I perceive as right. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{April 16, 2015
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Follow-up from 67: technically that would be the conclusions, rather than the argument… however:
Barry Arrington’s position is a straw man, plain and simple.
My quote from the last post does state the position. So hopefully we’re OK anyway. :)ebenezer_{April 16, 2015
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bFast @ 56:
The secondary question is, if no moral foundation, then what? In the start of this thread, however, Barry Arrington declared that materialists, therefore, only had “feelings” to guide them. I beg to differ with him on that. Barry Arrington’s position is a straw man, plain and simple. While well-though materialists recognize a total lack of moral code, they do have and use tools which determine a code of socially acceptable conduct. The resultant code has a lot of similarities to the moral code used by the theist.
I wanted to be sure I was arguing about the right thing, so here is the quote from the last post which Mr. Arrington seems to call “the argument”:
Materialist premises lead ineluctably to the following conclusions. There is no such thing as “good.” There is no such thing as “evil.” There is only my personal preferences competing with everyone else’s personal preferences, and all of those personal preferences can be reduced to the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of each person’s brain.
Unless I’m missing something (perhaps I am), the question is whether a materialist idea of morality can ultimately be based on anything other than personal preference. (I know I’ve brought up “feelings” in this thread, but I don’t see that the OP did, so strictly speaking the argument seems not to have to do with feelings.) I don’t disagree that such standards as a non-theist could devise might have many similarities with theistic moral codes. However, they don’t define “good”, and they can’t say what’s “evil”. Obviously, even accepting matter as all that is, one could make use of much other than feelings to decide what needs to be decided—as has been pointed out before (maybe by you? I think so), one could employ the results of scientific research in making a decision for exercise when one may not feel like exercising. But whether any “code of socially acceptable conduct” comes down to feelings or logic or reasoning or science or really anything at all, the individual makes his own personal choice of which standards to keep and which to ignore. I think that that places them safely in the category of “preference”.ebenezer_{April 16, 2015
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Fundamentally this is not a question of whether or not morals "exist", it is a question of who has the moral (!) right to invoke moral principles on the PR battlefield. The materialist has nothing better to base his moral code on than the fickle consensus of human society, or the best analyses going of "human nature", which itself is held to be the end result of millions of years of change. True, this is not "Morals are whatever I feel like", but you have to admit that as far as universal applicability goes it's no match for the notion that there is a Supreme Being who has established an immutable moral code for all time. Each to their own, of course, but then comes the question: How should you feel when you do something "immoral"? A materialist who reasons that moral standards are simply human constructs, which may or may not be outdated, would likely find it much easier to salve his conscience than someone who believes that the smallest transgression of the Supreme Being's universal moral code is an eternal debt that must be repaid. Given that, it's understandable that when a materialist lectures a believer on moral principles it may come across as somewhat hypocritical. "How dare you call me out on my immutable moral principles when you only hold to yours when you can see a practical benefit!" On the other hand, if it is true that all human beings have a conscience, then any one human being has the right to challenge another on issues of conscience. Now we come to an interesting point. A deist can have one more reason to recognize our collective conscience than a materialist: If he believes our conscience is God-given and we are created in God's image, then it follows that there should be some limit to the variation in that conscience between individuals. However, if materialism is true then the present state of our collective conscience is just one tiny station on the railway line from apes to who-knows. Such a deist, therefore, cannot claim the right to automatically shut down a materialist calling him or anyone else out on moral principles. He does, however, have the right to ask him on what grounds he demands those moral principles be adhered to, and where those moral principles came from in the first place. Dawkins, Russell, Rosenberg and the others candidly admit they have no easy answer. Any on their side who act otherwise are indeed being disingenuous.englishmaninistanbul_{April 16, 2015
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RDFish
SA: For the materialist, in whatever way it happens, it’s an entirely material process. RDFish: Nobody here bothers to say what that means, which is a big part of the problem. If you mean “matter in motion”, no educated person has believed that for a hundred years. This is actually important, though nobody here seems to understand why.
As my previous comment ... interesting how you: 1. claim to understand materialism better than materialists do. 2. Attack non-materialists for using understandings, defintions, entailments of materialism taken from materialists themselves. 3. Never attack materialists directly even though "Nobody bothers to say what materialism means". And "nobody" seems to understand it - except you (a non-materialist).
Our defintions of “good”/”evil” have nothing to do with our brains work.
When you use the phrase "nothing to do with" it's very easily refuted. You tend to do that a lot. "We know nothing ... etc." It tells me you're willing to use imprecise exaggerations at the same time you demand absolute precision on definitions and knowledge. Selective-skepticism.
Dualist metaphysics is no more helpful in grounding morality than materialism.
Here you shift the topic to attack dualism. Your position is very weak. If you have something to say, then say it. Instead, you're playing peek-a-boo with little scraps of knowledge to create ambiguity. Again, if you have a position to take, make that known. Attacking dualism is a distraction.
A materialist might say that “good” means “the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people”. That is a perfectly coherent definition of “good” that has nothing to do with materialism, dualism, etc.
I'm very sure you don't understand. But instead of attacking something, just explain why that definition is coherent from a materialist perspective. Why is the term "good" necessary from the perspective of physics? What is an "evil" physical process? Why is it? Why is happiness a goal? Where did the goal come from? What is unhappiness? Where does it come from? Why should the smallest number of people have unhappiness? Where, in physics, can we find the answer to that?Silver Asiatic_{April 16, 2015
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RDFish
I reject materialism because it is poorly defined ...
We debate with dozens of people here who confidently call themselves materialists and assert that the concept is well-defined enough for them to embrace it. Your position is in opposition to all of them. You've offered hundreds (a thousand?) posts attacking ID and/or theism. You pour ridicule and scorn on these opponents. I have never seen you attacking materialism - a concept you reject. That says something. Even now, when I asked for your arguments against materialism, all you could say that it is 'poorly defined". You take the same approach to other matters. Basically, we don't know anything and we can't define anything. Since nothing is known, no conclusions can be reached and any conclusions that have been reached are therefore false. The universe, origin of life, consciousness, biological origins, materialism, God - all are assessed in the same way. "Nobody knows anything about it". It's selective hyper-skeptic agnosticism. It's a very easy position to argue from. All matters of life and thought contain some mystery, some unknown aspects. Therefore "we don't know anything about it".Silver Asiatic_{April 16, 2015
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#61 SB SB - I think you are a bit confused about Kant. But I won't pursue it because, as I said, what matters is not the person but the moral code. There is nothing subjective about the categorical imperative.
Bentham’s moral philosophy was based on pain and pleasure, which is based on feeling, not right and wrong, which is based on reason.
My claim was that utilitarianism is objective – this is different from whether it is based on feeling or based on reason. We are into definitions here again, but I have always interpreted an objective predicate as one that is true or false independent of the speaker’s rsponse to the object; while a subjective predicate as one which is determined by speaker’s response to the object. For example, it is subjective whether something is funny because the defining characteristic is that it amuses the speaker – it is not an attribute of the object that the speaker finds funny. Similarly beautiful, perplexing, inspiring and so on. Objective predicates include round, small etc but also happy – because the object (which happens to be a person) is happy independent of the speaker’s reaction to that happiness. So according to that definition of objective – utilitarianism is an objective moral code. If you want to define “subjective” differently that is fine – but then we need to rethink the whole debate about subjective moral philosophy.
A right act is one that is consistent with, or proper to, our human nature. A wrong act is one that is inconsistent with our nature
I thought your definition of “right” and “wrong” might be something on those lines. The problem is that you are incorporating your views on right and wrong into the definition so of course your views on morality become true by definition. It raises an interesting question. We deeply disagree about the nature of morality. But if we have different definitions of right and wrong then this would appear to be just a difference about semantics. Yet I think we both know that our disagreement is more than semantics. For there to be a substantial disagreement between us there must be something about the meaning of the words that we agree on – consciously or subconsciously – or we have no common language to conduct the debate. Here is my attempt to describe how people use words like (morally) good and evil in correct English usage. It is a bit long because, as Wittgenstein said, to describe a word’s meaning you have to describe how it is used as a part of a “form of life”. So I have to describe the form of life. Just possibly it provides a core element of moral language that we can agree on. I can’t see any elements that are not easily observed to be true. * People have many different “drivers” – that is fundamental needs/motives that drive what they do. It really doesn’t matter for this debate how they got there or whether they are material or immaterial, evolved, cultural or God given. * Some of those drivers are non-selfish in that they do not bring obvious benefits to the individual – e.g. compassion, a desire to see rewards given in proportion to the effort/risk expended, etc * Many of those non-selfish drivers are widely shared among humans although their relative strength varies and not everyone shares them. Other non-selfish drivers are confined to specific groups or even people. * The promptings of these non-selfish drivers is what we call conscience. * The different drivers (both selfish and non-selfish) compete within a single person (so we may find ourselves conflicted between hunger and a desire to relieve suffering) * The various drivers result in attitudes and actions relating to specific situation. One of these is condemnation. Condemnation is expressing one’s desire to for something to stop because of unselfish drivers and calling on others to join in for similar reasons. (There is an equivalent positive action but I don’t know of a word which accurately captures it – something like condoning). We used words like “evil” and “wrong” to condemn. We use words like “good” and “right” to condone. In a nutshell that is what I think moral language means. Note that it is not any kind of statement about what is right or wrong - it simply seeks to define the common element between us when we say something is right or wrong Mark Frank_{April 16, 2015
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