Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Medical Practice, Biological Science, and the Power of a “Differential Diagnosis”

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Because science is a search for causes, its practitioners are ethically bound to keep an open mind about the nature of those causes. The whole point of investigating any given phenomenon is to find a reasonable answer to the question, “why is this happening?” or “why did it happen?” In that spirit, the researcher develops a rigorous methodology that will address a narrowly-focused problem and facilitate the process of finding the most plausible solution, regardless of whose interests might be served. This is just as true for the practice of medicine as it is for the study of life’s origins.

If, for example, a physician is about to decide on the appropriate therapy for his patient, he will, if he is competent, perform what is known as a differential diagnosis. The strategy is to identify at least two possible causes of a given medical problem, weigh the evidence for each against the other, and choose the one which best explains the data. In other words, the diagnosis determines the therapeutic response. When this process is reversed, that is, when available therapies or technologies determine the diagnosis, personal agendas override the scientific method. If any form of institutional bias prompts the physician to ignore a potential cause, the practice of medicine has been fatally compromised.

Consider the fashionable problem of carpal tunnel syndrome. Medical professionals understand that this condition is the result of dysfunction in the median nerve at the wrist. The appropriate question from a diagnostic standpoint is, therefore, “what is troubling this nerve?” According to conventional wisdom, the nerve is compressed as it passes under a ligament at the wrist, which would indicate a physical or structural problem. Not so fast. Dr. John Sarno, professor of rehabilitative medicine, insists that CTS is a mind/body (psychosomatic) problem caused by stress. Negative emotions in the unconscious mind produce the symptoms to distract the sufferer from one or more intolerable psychological conflicts. If CTS was truly a structural problem, Sarno reasonably asks, “Why is it that millions of men and women who pounded typewriters since the beginning of the twentieth century never developed it?” Or again, if the body is producing the symptoms, why have countless sufferers been cured of the malady by recognizing the mind as its source and acting on that information through a step-by-step process of self-analysis?

Most physicians, by virtue of their training as “body mechanics,” are not professionally equipped to perform a differential diagnosis for this kind of condition. They either do not understand or refuse to accept the reality: The mind can be, and often is, the source of a physical symptom. To press the point even further, disharmonious domestic relationships or competitive professional environments are often responsible for a cluster of symptoms known as “fibromyalgia.” Sadly, mind/body disorders are seldom treated properly because the medical establishment no longer takes mind/body medicine seriously, assuming that all problems are structural problems. As a result, they don’t ask the critical question: Structural pain or psychosomatic pain? In many cases, patients are doing physical therapy for a perceived mechanical problem when the time would be more profitably spent dealing with their emotional conflicts.

Just as millions must endure unnecessary physical suffering because scientists do not always apply a differential diagnosis in the medical arena, millions more must endure mental suffering because Darwinist ideologues, and their Christian Darwinist lapdogs, refuse to conduct a differential diagnosis in the biological realm. The problem is how to best explain the origin and variety of life on our planet? The question for the differential diagnosis is clear: Undirected Natural Processes or Directed Intelligent Design? While ID scientists consider the strength for both arguments and draw an inference to design, anti-ID partisans resort to methodological naturalism, an arbitrary rule of science that bans design arguments from the arena of competitive ideas. It is very easy to win a contest when you are the only competitor. Similarly, it is very easy to diagnose a cause when only one cause is eligible for consideration.

But this reluctance to keep an open mind about alternative possibilities strikes at the very foundation of the scientific enterprise. To investigate nature rightly is to sit humbly at her feet so that she can reveal her secrets—recognizing that she is the teacher and we are the students–delegating to her the task of scrutinizing our intellectual convictions so that they may be tested, sifted, or fine-tuned—-asking about the truth rather than indulging in the illusion that we have already attained it.

“Go to the pine if you want to learn about the pine, or to the bamboo if you want to learn about the bamboo. And in doing so, you must leave your subjective preoccupation with yourself. Otherwise you impose yourself on the object and do not learn.— Matsuo Basho

ID scientists engage Darwinists and TEs with a similar challenge: Go to the DNA molecule if you want to learn about the DNA molecule. Observe its behavior and ask yourself, “Why is this happening?” Test your atheistic doubts or your religious presumptions against the facts in evidence. Study those facts, submit to the data, and conduct a differential diagnosis. Build your theories on the evidence. Don’t try to squeeze, pound, jam, or hammer out the evidence into your rigid theoretical mold and cry out in futility, “fit, damn you, fit.”

Clearly, institutional bias can cloud judgment in any area or specialty. Like the structuralist physicians who ignore scientific evidence that points to the mind as a cause for physical symptoms, materialist Darwinists (and Christian Darwinists) ignore scientific evidence that points to the mind as a cause for biological design. In both cases, the analyst subordinates truth to convention, which is the hallmark of anti-intellectual partisanship.

Still, there is a difference. To ignore evidence is irresponsible, but to forbid its expression is evil. In the latter case, anti-ID zealots have, by virtue of their exclusionary rule, decided that nature should not be allowed to reveal all her secrets. Methodological naturalism, the surrogate enforcer of intellectual tyranny, declares that nature’s testimony, because of its possible religious implications, is inadmissible and may not be heard. As Basho might put it, devotees of evolutionary biology are imposing themselves and their subjective preoccuptations on the object. Insofar as they arrogantly and presumptuously assume the role of teacher and reduce nature to the role of student, they render themselves and everyone under their influence, uneducable.

The problem of institutional bias is an old one, but it has become manifest once again. According to the National Academy of Science, the Kansas Board of Education, and a number of other institutions, the job of science “is to provide plausible natural explanations for natural phenomena.” Even a Pennsylvania judge weighed in on the matter, issuing the mindless verdict that non-natural explanations are impermissible for science. For the secular minded, there will be no differential diagnosis because the differential component has been taken off the table.

At this point, nature objects to this reversal of roles and reasserts her rightful place as a teacher. The “stones cry out” by asking a few questions: What are we to make of the fact that these same rule makers who limit science to the study of “natural causes” have no problem with Big bang cosmology, which also has religious implications and also hints at a non-natural cause? Why is the differential diagnosis acceptable in the cosmological sphere and unacceptable in the biological sphere? If cosmological fine-tuning is acceptable as a scientific concept, why is biological fine-tuning not acceptable as a scientific concept?

Indeed, if one is to rule out a differential diagnosis on the grounds that science is limited to “natural causes,” he should at least be able to explain this exclusion in a rational way. How do we define nature and what is a natural cause? Darwinists (and the TEs that follow them) say, apparently without embarrassment, that a natural cause is one that occurs or can be found “in nature.” In that case, how do we distinguish bombs from earthquakes—or burglars from tornados–or the humanly-produced artifacts found in ancient Pompei from the unhuman volcano that buried them? If all these causes are of the same kind, then there is no way to discern one from the other. On the other hand, if we finally confess the difference between the intelligent causes and natural causes indicated, how can we call then “natural” as if they were all of the same kind? The intellectual dictators who crafted this cuckoo formula have no answers. How can they presume to enforce a standard that they can’t even define?

It is an interesting social phenomenon that Darwinists and most TEs suffer from what C.S. Lewis once called “the horror and neglect of the obvious.” In fact, biological design really is obvious, which explains why evolutionary biologists feel the need to remind themselves to forget it. This is a violation of the scientific method and the legitimate exercise of reason. One cannot search for a cause and, at the same time, disdain the object of the search. To sincerely ask about the “why” from a scientific perspective is to honestly weigh the alternative explanations to find the most plausible solution, regardless of whose interests might be served.

Comments
With that cleared up, unless you are genuinely interested in addressing the actual substance of my comments, then I do not think further discussion will be productive.
Does this mean that you will never disclose why you think that Darwinism "survives" the severe and ongoing scrutiny of critical rationalism even though there is no evidence to support it?StephenB
September 30, 2012
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There is no problem of induction. There is only a problem with people who wage war against reason.
This is a false dilemma, which has apparently lead you to the conclusion that I deny reason or I am "at ware" with rationality, which is also false. Critical Rationalism is an explanation for the growth of knowledge, in practice, which is itself the result of rational criticism. This includes detailed descriptions of what induction is and when it would be valid, etc. As such, not only did Popper point out no one has actually formulated a "principle of induction" that actually works in practice, but he also pointed out that it's not necessary to explain the growth of knowledge. Furthermore, Poppper separated Hume's logical problem of induction with Hume's psychological problem of induction. Specifically, he addresses the question: why do we have expectations of which we have great confidence? How does this actually work, in practice? When we rationally criticize these expectations, a clear "principle of induction" that actually provides guidance is not found there in any reliably, identifiable sense. To summarize, it ends up that induction is not only impossible in the case of certainty, but is unreliable regards to probability except in very specific, well defined applications. But this is does not represent an insurmountable problem reason and progress, in practice, as deduction does offer us certainty in modus tollens.
By dissolving justificationism itself, the critical rationalist regards knowledge and rationality, reason and science, as neither foundational nor infallible, but nevertheless does not think we must therefore all be relativists. Knowledge and truth still exist, just not in the way we thought.
With that cleared up, unless you are genuinely interested in addressing the actual substance of my comments, then I do not think further discussion will be productive.critical rationalist
September 30, 2012
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For Hume, it is to QUESTION causality’s ontological existence–it is to DENY our ability to be certain about it in an epistemological sense–it is to DENY our ability to apprehend it.
Again, you are attempting to conflate denying there are specific causes for phenomnia, in reality, and the inability to observe what those specific causes are, though our senses. Critical Rationalism is an explanatory theory of the growth of knowledge. Explanations solve problems.
To deny the certainly of causality as an apriori first principle of right reason is to deny the validity of inductive reasoning, which depends on that certainty. Hume questioned the validity of inductive reasoning BECAUSE he first questioned the certainty of causality.
The phrase "the certainty of causality", as you are using it here, is unnecessarily ambiguous.
I don’t know how I can possibly make things any more clear than that. This is the source of the mythical “problem of induction,” which, as I say, is not really a problem for the reasons indicated.
Make the phrase "the certainty of causality" less ambiguous. See the following informal notes for a reference the relevance of Hume in CR Furthermore, If, for the sake of argument, we assume that is what *Hume* meant, assuming CR is "a lot of nonsense" would be committing the genetic fallacy, as no one has formulated a "principle of induction" that actually works in practice.
SB: Very well, then, what is the problem with that argument? Clearly, you think that it fails. Why?
The argument…..
[a] This cooler contains 30 cans. [b] 25 cans selected at random were found to be Pabst Blue Ribbon (PBR). [c] Probably all the cans are PBR.
Before you could have calculated a probability, you would have had to *first* have a specific theory in mind, such as one person bought all of the beer and, in doing so, bought all of the same kind. This is not present in observations from [b] alone. In the absence of such a theory, no such probability calculus could be made. So, you merely thought you were using induction. This is the psychological problem of induction. There are two kinds of unknowability. The first kind of unknowability are scenarios where the outcome is completely random and all possible outcomes are known. An example of this is Russian Roulette. As long as you know all of the possible outcomes, we can use probability to make choices about it. For example, if for some horrible reason, one had to choose between different versions of Russian Roulette with specific yet variable number of chambers, bullets and trigger pulls, one could use game theory to determine which variation would be most favorable. This is a valid use of probability in that it yields approximately true conclusions most of the time. On the other hand, any piece of evidence is compatible with many theories. This includes an infinite number of theories that have yet to be proposed. You cannot assign probabilities to un-conceived theories, because those probabilities would be based on the details of which have been yet to be conceived. As such, the use of probability is invalid in the case of forming universal theories, rather than discerning between specific conclusions that following from such a theory, regardless of what our subjective experience might lead us to conclude. IOW, it does not withstand rational criticism. Furthermore, inductivism doesn’t tell us what we should observe or why those observations are relevant because all we have are observations at the outset. Until we devise a test, we do not know what observations to make. And without at least one theory, we have no way to devise a test that might result in observations that conflict with that particular theory.critical rationalist
September 30, 2012
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CR: You’re not actually addressing the substance of my comments. SB: I address them, follow up on them, and continue to clarify them as you pose objections.
Then what of the following?
CR: Specifically, you seem to be suggesting that evidence looks like ….
A is q, b is q, c is q, […] |= every x is q (or probably is q)
Therefore you think we can can, in a sense, “get a theory ” by induction or that a theory can be a conclusion. However, the evidence always [actually] looks like….
a is o or p or q or r … b is o or p or q or r … C is o or p or q or r … etc.
For induction to be a knowledge creating method we can actually use in practice, it has to offer a way to pick between o, p, q, r, etc. It needs to provide guidance for that step of the process first via observations. But it doesn’t. This is the step that is missing.
Had you addressed this, you would have revealed the guidance that induction supposedly provides for that step (and become quite famous for doing so). Kindly point out where you provided it.critical rationalist
September 30, 2012
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CR:
You’re not actually addressing the substance of my comments.
I address them, follow up on them, and continue to clarify them as you pose objections. I will follow up again:
While being unable to observe causes might entail denying causality, it does not *necessary* entail denying causality
For Hume, it is to QUESTION causality's ontological existence--it is to DENY our ability to be certain about it in an epistemological sense--it is to DENY our ability to apprehend it. To deny the certainly of causality as an apriori first principle of right reason is to deny the validity of inductive reasoning, which depends on that certainty. Hume questioned the validity of inductive reasoning BECAUSE he first questioned the certainty of causality. I don't know how I can possibly make things any more clear than that. This is the source of the mythical "problem of induction," which, as I say, is not really a problem for the reasons indicated. Meanwhile, my reciprocal question concerning the following inductive argument persists: [a] This cooler contains 30 cans. [b] 25 cans selected at random were found to be Pabst Blue Ribbon (PBR). [c] Probably all the cans are PBR. You write about the "problem of induction." Very well, then, what is the problem with that argument? Clearly, you think that it fails. Why? Also, I am still waiting for you to tell me how you employed critical rationalism to put Darwinism through a stringent intellectual test. All your other issues about "justification,""subjectivism" et al are derivative. They need to be addressed only if Hume was right, but they are irrelevant and nonsensical if Hume was wrong. That is why I don't want to invest time on the derivative question when the fundamental question is left hanging. That is why you need to probe this territory with me. You need to tell me if you agree with Hume's claim that we cannot be certain that effects are connected with causes.StephenB
September 29, 2012
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StephanB. You're not actually addressing the substance of my comments. And you seem to be bound and determined to misrepresent Hume. For example, is there something about the following you are having difficulty with?
CR: That’s not denying causality. You are conflating denying causality with an inability for us to actually observe those causes using our senses, which is supposedly how induction works.
While being unable to observe causes might entail denying causality, it does not *necessary* entail denying causality.
“When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infalliable consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impule of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects; Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection.” David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Section VII. Compare Favorably Popper’s note that the common-sense ideas of “events” and “causes” are mainly qualitative. Open Universe 10-11.
A universal theory can be found in error with a single statement. However, no number of singular statements can entail such a theory. Saying an argument is a "good, strong inductive argument" is only relevant to the extent that inductivism is actually valid form of reasoning. If merely meeting the definition is your criteria, then this is justificationism. While it may subjectively appear to you that we use induction every day, "What's wrong" is that no one has actually formulated a "principle of induction" that actually works, in practice. Note: I'm not denying that human knowledge has grown or claiming that bridges created by inductivists need to be rebuilt. I'm saying our best, current explanation for this knowledge is critical rationalism. Note: "Idea x isn't justified" is a bad criticism because it applies to all ideas.
critical rationalist
September 29, 2012
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Unless you have some other quote, it’s not clear that Hume actually was in error.
gasp. You're not using induction are you?Mung
September 29, 2012
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I have many such quotes.
Then you must post them all, else all you have is a weak inductive argument. ;)Mung
September 29, 2012
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CR:
Again, see the second half of the Russell’s Chicken example, which you completely ignored.
I didn’t ignore it. His argument doesn’t invalidate causality. It is an example of a weak inductive argument. Part of reason's task is to know a strong argument from a weak argument. A chicken cannot reasonably count on being fed forever. That is not the same thing as the laws of nature ceasing to exist. Russell is not a good philosopher. He is the same person who, after hearing about the argument for an uncaused cause, wanted to know what caused the uncaused cause. You are reading the wrong people.
For example, let’s say it actually was not a pro-ID website. Before you could have calculated an any sort of probability, you must have first had in mind an explanatory theory, such as websites that are about biological origins are either entirely (or mostly) pro-id or not.
I will make it easier with the classic example: This cooler contains 30 cans. 25 cans selected at random were found to be Pabst Blue Ribbon (PBR). Probably all the cans are PBR. This is a good, strong inductive argument.
Specifically, you seem to be suggesting that evidence looks like…….
Enough already. What is wrong with the argument?
Unless you have some other quote, it’s not clear that Hume actually was in error.
I have many such quotes. In discussing the action of billiard balls, Hume argues that “…there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection.” He is saying that we cannot be certain that causality exists. This is what is in back of the denial of induction. If we can’t be sure about the law of causation, then we can’t be sure that inductive reasoning is valid. This is the foundation for your philosophy. I have probably not observed more than a hundred pigs in my life. In each case, I witnessed an interesting phenomenon: the pig could not fly. On the strength of that modest sample size, and on the testimony of many other observers, I am going to go out on a limb and say that pigs cannot fly. Is that an airtight argument? No. It is logically possible, though highly unlikely, that a pig exists in this (or some other universe) that can fly. Is it a good and reasonable inductive argument? Absolutely. According to the hard evidence, it is probably true that no pig can fly. It is also probably true that the more pigs I find in this compromised condition, the greater is the probability that I am right. Am I going to be persuaded by irrational atheist partisans like David Hume or Bertrand Russell who claim, without embarrassment, that my argument is not reasonable because tomorrow the universe may become chaotic--or because there is no certain “connection” between the law of gravity and the pig’s limitations--or because I have not observed all the pigs--or because the pig, having grown accustomed to being fed, suddenly became someone’s meal and, as a result, lost confidence in his ability to draw conclusions from observational evidence? Not likely. Will I put up with men of that ilk (and their nonsense) so that I can help them find their way back to rationality? Yes, and I can always hope that when they make that return, they will reconsider the evidence for ID with their renewed minds. Meanwhile, I must call things by their right name. Our culture is being destroyed by materialist Darwinism, which survives only through the epistemology of irrational hyper-skepticism. This, by the way, is why I seldom discuss science with Darwinists. What is the point of analyzing evidence with those who cannot interpret it in a rational way?StephenB
September 29, 2012
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The above was a response to another thread. Please ignore.critical rationalist
September 29, 2012
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Furthermore IIRC, your argument specifically refers to the transfer of information in a material universe. This parochial as "materialism" is regularly abused to represent some sort of false dichotomy of "supernatural" or natural, which is simply outdated. Darwinism is just one such example, as knowledge is created and emerges from arrangements of matter.critical rationalist
September 29, 2012
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CR:Note that I’m not objecting to the use of non-naive induction, I’m suggesting that non-naive induction is impossible because we cannot derive theories from observations. SB: It is not a question of naïve or non-naïve arguments. There are strong inductive arguments and weak inductive arguments. [a] A website on the internet is currently featuring 20 articles [b] 18 of those articles were selected at random and found to be pro-ID [c] Probably all of the articles are pro-ID What is your rationale for saying that the conclusion of this strong inductive argument is not reasonable or that it cannot be based on observation?
Quibbling over terminology does not explain how inductive arguments are actually possible, in practice. Nor does substituting “true” for “probable” solve the problem of induction. Again, see the second half of the Russell's Chicken example, which you completely ignored. For example, let's say it actually was not a pro-ID website. Before you could have calculated an any sort of probability, you must have first had in mind an explanatory theory, such as websites that are about biological origins are either entirely (or mostly) pro-id or not. If past observations do not imply anything about future observations, they no more imply probability than truth. Your subjective experience might lead you to think otherwise, but that doesn't mean that's what actually happens in practice. Specifically, you seem to be suggesting that evidence looks like ….
A is q, b is q, c is q, […] |= every x is q (or probably is q)
Therefore you think we can can, in a sense, “get a theory ” by induction or that a theory can be a conclusion. However, the evidence always looks like…. a is o or p or q or r … b is o or p or q or r … C is o or p or q or r … etc. For induction to be a knowledge creating method we can actually use in practice, it has to offer a way to pick between o, p, q, r, etc. It needs to provide guidance for that step of the process first via observations. But it doesn't. This is the step that is missing.
SB: [Hume] even denied causality itself CR: Reference please? SB:
Hume: “When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other.”
That's not denying causality. You are conflating denying causality with an inability for us to actually observe those causes using our senses, which is supposedly how induction works. Again, I'm suggesting that no one has formulated a "principle of induction" that actually works, in practice - which we can actually use to explain the growth of human knowledge.
SB: Meanwhile, I think it would be more profitable to focus on the origins of your error than the errors themselves, since I don’t think you can appreciate the problems with the latter without understanding the significance of the former.
Unless you have some other quote, it's not clear that Hume actually was in error.
SB: All those nonsensical notions about “Critical Realism” or the so-called “problem of induction,” stem from Hume’s denial of rationality and his followers’ attempts to live with some kind of an irrational substitute.
How is justificationism rational? From the following essay.
3. Responses to the dilemma of the infinite regress versus dogmatism In the light of the dilemma of the infinite regress versus dogmatism, we can discern three attitudes towards positions: relativism, “true belief” and critical rationalism [Note 3] Relativists tend to be disappointed justificationists who realise that positive justification cannot be achieved. From this premise they proceed to the conclusion that all positions are pretty much the same and none can really claim to be better than any other. There is no such thing as the truth, no way to get nearer to the truth and there is no such thing as a rational position. True believers embrace justificationism. They insist that some positions are better than others though they accept that there is no logical way to establish a positive justification for an belief. They accept that we make our choice regardless of reason: "Here I stand!". Most forms of rationalism up to date have, at rock bottom, shared this attitude with the irrationalists and other dogmatists because they share the theory of justificationism. According to the critical rationalists, the exponents of critical preference, no position can be positively justified but it is quite likely that one (or more) will turn out to be better than others in the light of critical discussion and tests. This type of rationality holds all its positions and propositions open to criticism and a standard objection to this stance is that it is empty; just holding our positions open to criticism provides no guidance as to what position we should adopt in any particular situation. This criticism misses its mark for two reasons. First, critical rationalism is not a position. It is not directed at solving the kind of problems that are solved by fixing on a position. It is concerned with the way that such positions are adopted, criticised, defended and relinquished. Second, Bartley did provide guidance on adopting positions; we may adopt the position that to this moment has stood up to criticism most effectively. Of course this is no help for people who seek stronger reasons for belief, but that is a problem for them, and it does not undermine the logic of critical preference.
critical rationalist
September 29, 2012
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There is no problem of induction. There is only a problem with people who wage war against reason.
:)Mung
September 29, 2012
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CR:
Note that I’m not objecting to the use of non-naive induction, I’m suggesting that non-naive induction is impossible because we cannot derive theories from observations.
It is not a question of naïve or non-naïve arguments. There are strong inductive arguments and weak inductive arguments. Here is a strong inductive argument: [a] A website on the internet is currently featuring 20 articles [b] 18 of those articles were selected at random and found to be pro-ID [c] Probably all of the articles are pro-ID What is your rationale for saying that the conclusion of this strong inductive argument is not reasonable or that it cannot be based on observation?
For example, here’s an expanded version of Bertrand Russell’s story of the farmer and the chicken, which illustrates the above issue.
Russell’s example constitutes a weak inductive argument. It does not show that inductions are invalid. Like Hume, Russell was an atheist and sought to militate against reason. He, too, had his problems with causality. Atheists don’t like causality because it leads to a first cause. They abandon reason and evidence because they don’t like where it leads.
In other words, mere observations alone are inadequate to justify conclusions. This is the problem of induction.
No, the strength or weakness of an inductive argument is based on other factors. There is no problem of induction except for those who accept Hume’s premise that belief in causality is unwarranted.
In other words, mere observations alone are inadequate to justify conclusions. This is the problem of induction.
There is no problem of induction. There is only a problem with people who wage war against reason. (Speaking of which, I am still waiting for you to tell me how you scrutinized Darwinism and put it under a critical searchlight with Critical Rationalism). David Hume is the father of modern irrational skepticism and the first source of most of your misguided ideas. He denies causality, and, by extension, the validity of inductive reasoning. For him, the notion of cause and effect is just a mental habit of association. You asked for a quote, so here is one of many: “When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other.” According to Hume, we often assume that one thing causes another, but it may well be that one thing does not cause the other. We may use it on a daily basis, but we don’t know anything about what is really happening. This is your father, philosophically speaking, and the man most responsible for the way you think, so you should get to know him. All those nonsensical notions about “Critical Realism” or the so-called “problem of induction,” stem from Hume’s denial of rationality and his followers’ attempts to live with some kind of an irrational substitute. If you show any interest in learning about the reason for Hume’s error, I will be happy to share that information with you. Meanwhile, I think it would be more profitable to focus on the origins of your error than the errors themselves, since I don’t think you can appreciate the problems with the latter without understanding the significance of the former. We need to discuss the connection between Hume’s error and your current ideas, unless, of course, you agree with Hume’s denial of causality outright, in which case, we can get right at the root of your confusion.StephenB
September 29, 2012
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SB: This phony business about the “problem of induction” is a lot of nonsense.
"a lot of nonsense"? That's quite a sophisticated argument you have there.
SB: He even denied causality itself
Reference please?
SB: This was Karl Popper’s role model.
Genetic fallacy? Also…
“Einstein’s influence on my thinking has been immense. I might even say that what I have done is mainly to make explicit certain points which are implicit in the work of Einstein. ... The Einsteinian revolution has influenced my own views deeply: I feel I would never had arrived at them without him. - Karl Popper
“What impressed me most was Einstein’s own clear statement that he would regard his theory as untenable if it should fail in certain tests. ... Thus I arrived, by the end of 1919, at the conclusion that the scientific attitude was the critical attitude, which did not look for verifications but for crucial tests; tests which could refute the theory tested, though they could never establish it. - Karl Popper
A theory can thus be recognized as erroneous [unrichtig] if there is a logical error in its deductions, or as incorrect [unzutreffend] if a fact is not in agreement with its consequences. But the truth of a theory can never be proven. For one never knows that even in the future no experience will be encountered which contradicts its consequences; and still other systems of thought are always conceivable which are capable of joining together the same given facts. - Albert Einstein.
SB: People who use this tactic are just looking for ways to avoid the evidence.
No, I've already addressed this. Einstein addressed this in his above quote. "and still other systems of thought are always conceivable which are capable of joining together the same given facts."
SB: We use induction every day of our lives.
Which is essentially more justificationism. Again, I realize this is what your experience leads you to think. The question is, are we actually using induction? All you need to do is present a logical argument as to how induction is actually possible, which would refute CR. By all means, enlighten us. Note that I'm not objecting to the use of non-naive induction, I'm suggesting that non-naive induction is impossible because we cannot derive theories from observations. From a previous comment…
Nor have you directly responded to the idea that we derive theories from observations. Should I take this as acceptance or rejection? Your arguments seem to imply this is the case, but you can easily clear this up with an explicit response. For example, here’s an expanded version of Bertrand Russell’s story of the farmer and the chicken, which illustrates the above issue. A flock of anthropomorphic chickens has observed a farmer who fed them every day like clockwork since they were chicks. They extrapolate these observations to conclude the farmer will continue to feed them. One day the farmer starts feeding them even more corn that usual. This observation further reinforces their conclusion they will continue to be fed. However, not long after, the farmer puts them in cages and sends them off to slaughter. In other words, mere observations alone are inadequate to justify conclusions. This is the problem of induction.
… but then I move beyond naive induction with additional criticism
CR: However, if we’re not careful we’ll miss (or knowingly accept) a more fundamental misconception [of induction] illustrated in this story. Specifically, that it’s even possible extrapolate observations without first placing them in a explanatory framework. Before any of these anthropomorphic chickens could have induced a false prediction, they must first had in mind a false explanatory theory of the farmers behavior, such as thinking he had benevolent feelings towards chickens. However, had the chickens guessed a different explanation, such as the farmer was fattening them up for slaughter, they would have extrapolated observations of his actions differently. In other words, how we form predictions depends on our underlying explanation. According to the benevolent-farmer theory, observations of being fed even more corn suggested the chickens were more likely to continue being fed, while the fattening-up theory suggested this same observation was an omen of imminent slaughter. So, again, unless you can explain we can extrapolate observations without first putting them into an explanatory framework, then theories are not derived from observations.
SB: Critical rationalism is a refuge for those who would prefer not to be rational, presumably because they don’t want to go where evidence and rationality would take them.
is it? Again…
CR: …anyone’s preference cannot make something that is logically impossible is possible. Nor can anyone’s preference cause a theory to explain how the world works, actually solve problems or present an opportunity to be found in error, when it does not.
Is there something about this you do not understand?
SB: In any case, ID operates by abduction, not induction.
Can you summarize this adductive argument?
SB: The broader issue is to challenge CR’s claim that induction as a whole is not a legitimate form of scientific reasoning and also that an attack on induction is not, strictly speaking and in every sense, exactly the same thing as an attack on abduction.
Basic logic tells us that deductive reasoning is the only valid form. One singular statement can disprove a universal theory. However, no number of singular statements can entail such a theory. But, again, being open to rational criticism, feel free to present a "principle of induction" that actually works in practice.critical rationalist
September 28, 2012
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What were the alternative theories (to Darwinism) that you considered, and why were they rejected in favor of the Darwinian theory?
First, you still seem to be confused about Critical Rationalism. They were not rejected "in favor" of darwinism. They were discarded due to criticism, which leaves Darwinism our current, best conceived theory has withstood criticism. Even if no evidence inconsistent with Darwinism was found, some better yet to be conceived future theory could take its place if that theory better explain all of the same observations as Darwinism or explained all of the same the same observations just as well as Darwinism, while also explaining more phenomena. What conceived theories that are compatible with the same evidence have I criticized, in addition to Darwinism? Three of the most prominent are Creationism, Intelligent Design and Lamarckianism. First, they are more incomplete than Darwinism. Specifically, the fundamental flaw in each of them is the same fundamental flaw in pre-enlightenment, authoritative conceptions of human knowledge: its account of how the knowledge in adaptations could be created is either missing, supernatural or illogical. Supernatural accounts are explicitly inexplicable. The creator "just was", complete with the knowledge of how to build biological adaptations, already present. However, one could more economically state that organisms "just a appeared", complete with the knowledge of how to build their own biological adaptations, already present. Intelligent design has no account for how this knowledge was created, rather it pushes the problem into some unexplained realm under the guise that we cannot make any progress about the designer. A theory about biological complexity impossible because it assumes it was created by an intelligent an agent for with we can know nothing about. This is question begging. Of course, one make the same assumption about atoms or the movement of objects, then claim atomic theory or the movement of objects was impossible as well. Lamarckianism is a mixture of "use and disuse", which does not explain how the knowledge of how the knowledge used to build a longer Giraffe neck was created, and proposed the spontaneous generation of knowledge as the knowledge of how to build mice supposedly spontaneous generated out of rags and other rubbish in dark corners. However, in the case of Darwinism, we can make progress of "the designer". This is because have a good explanation for how non-explanatory knowledge is genuinely created through imperfect variation of biological replicators that are random to any specific problem to solve, along with discarding of errors in those variations by natural selection. Nor have we observed inconsistent evidence that the knowledge of how to build biological adaptations is explanatory in that it has significant reach. Rather it is non-explanation and has limited reach. Additional inconsistent evidence is outlined in #51critical rationalist
September 28, 2012
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Mung: True explanations cannot be false.
Correct, but there are an infinite number of explanations that are compatible with the same empirical evidence. For example, SB could have authored the comment I was replying to or some designer could have. One of those explanations could be true, despite the evidence being compatible with both explanations.
Mung: Despite the fact that true explanations cannot be false, the best explanation cannot be a true explanation but can at best be a good explanation (an explanation which may in fact be false).
We cannot prove that the best explanation is a true explanation due to the problem of induction. Nor can we actually construct a true explanation, in practice, as they are always incomplete. However, logically speaking, one singular statement can contradict a universal statement, but no number of singular statements can entail it. Finding errors in our theory is a good thing because that's how knowledge grows. In some cases, this means discarding the entire theory. In other cases, this means modifying the theory by conjecturing where the error is, conjecturing a non-ad-hoc solution and criticizing it. And there are cases such as Newton's law of motion, which we still use, despite it being replaced by GR, because the results it give are approximate enough to GR to solve a specific range of problems, such as launching space craft. IOW, finding observations inconsistent with our theories are how *all* problems start in the first place. That's because all observations are theory laden. So, this is the norm, not the exception. This is what I mean when I said theories are tested by observations, not derived from them. Observations were incomparable with some theory we previously held in the first place, about other observations etc.
Mung: Darwinism is not a true explanation, it’s just a good explanation (it may be false). The best we can hope for is a good explanation (which may be false), as true explanations are not possible.
All theories contain errors to some degree and are incomplete. So, Darwinism is not true in this sense. But, neither are any other theories either. So, we already know Darwinism contains errors. We know other mechanisms will be discovered. Etc. Finding errors in our theories is how we make progress.
Mung The best explanation cannot be a true explanation.
Problems are soluble. Problems are enviable. We will always just be scratching the surface of problems to solve, just as any room number in Hilbert's infinite hotel is always at the beginning of all room numbers.
Mung: Withstands significant criticism is the new criterion?
Deutsch's criteria is part of the criticism. In addition to being a good explanation, any explanation that entails a married bachelor does not withstand criticism. Any explanation that is not internally consistent does not withstand criticism, etc. Theories that conflict with the rest of our, current, best explanations indicates there one of them is in error, which creates a better problem to solve, Etc. Actually solving problems is part of the criteria. This is rational criticism. This is our current, best explanation for the growth of knowledge. Finding errors in our theories is an opportunity to make progress! So, we actively look for ways to find them. Knowing that a particular set of details of theory X is false is progress.critical rationalist
September 28, 2012
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KF, thanks for the comment. Yes, that is true in the sense that a past condition is "inferred" from a present clue (causes now in operation). My emphasis was on the distinction the Steve Meyer makes between [a] pure induction--establishing a universal law or principle from repeated observations of the same phenomena vs [b] inferring unseen facts, events, or causes from the past from clues or facts in the present. But I affirm your point, which is well taken. The broader issue is to challenge CR's claim that induction as a whole is not a legitimate form of scientific reasoning and also that an attack on induction is not, strictly speaking and in every sense, exactly the same thing as an attack on abduction.StephenB
September 28, 2012
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Steve, in the modern sense that induction refers to arguments that evidence supports but does not demonstrate the conclusion abduction is a form of induction. KFkairosfocus
September 28, 2012
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CR: "Evidence cannot positively support theories due to the problem of induction." This phony business about the "problem of induction" is a lot of nonsense. It stems from the philosophical ignorance of David Hume, who didn't understand how efficient causality works. He even denied causality itself. This was Karl Popper's role model. People who use this tactic are just looking for ways to avoid the evidence. We use induction every day of our lives. Critical rationalism is a refuge for those who would prefer not to be rational, presumably because they don't want to go where evidence and rationality would take them. In any case, ID operates by abduction, not induction. Historical science is different from laboratory science. So all your protests in that context are irrelevant. Meanwhile, as I pointed out, and as you just demonstrated, you cannot make a rational case for Darwinism, which you accept without question--a very strange position for someone who calls himself a "critical" rationalist.StephenB
September 28, 2012
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SB: No one in that camp has ever provided a shred of evidence to support that paradigm. [..] you cannot do it. No one can.
I see you still haven't actually put on your Critical Rationalism hat. Evidence cannot positively support theories due to the problem of induction. Rather, we look for inconsistent evidence, correct the theory when specific details of how it operates are found and we do so in a non-ad-hoc manner. So, you objections are based Darwinists not having done something that is impossible and could never be done - for any theory, not just Darwinism. Of course, being open to criticism, feel free to formulate a "principle of induction" that actually does work, in practice. Note: saying "everyone knows we use induction since...", or "we need induction to know anything" is just another form of justificationism, which doesn't actually address the criticism. "Idea X is not justified" is a bad criticism as it is applicable to all ideas.critical rationalist
September 28, 2012
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CR: "I accept that Darwinians is the best explanation because it has withstood significant criticism." That's really very funny. Darwinism has been stripped bare and exposed for the sham that it is. No one in that camp has ever provided a shred of evidence to support that paradigm. Indeed, we have asked its supporters thousands of times to make the case. They don't have enough courage or intellectual integrity to even try. You cannot do it. No one can.StephenB
September 27, 2012
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critical rationalist:
Is there something about “You are confusing good explanations with true explanations, as good explanations can be false.” that you do not understand?
yes. True explanations cannot be false. Good explanations can be false. Despite the fact that true explanations cannot be false, the best explanation cannot be a true explanation but can at best be a good explanation (an explanation which may in fact be false). Darwinism is not a true explanation, it's just a good explanation (it may be false). The best we can hope for is a good explanation (which may be false), as true explanations are not possible. The best explanation cannot be a true explanation. Am I at least in the ballpark?
I accept that Darwinians is the best explanation because it has withstood significant criticism.
Withstands significant criticism is the new criterion? Ptolemy comes to mind. What were the alternative theories (to Darwinism) that you considered, and why were they rejected in favor of the Darwinian theory? What was the incompatible evidence that you discovered in your analysis of the Darwinian theory? You are silent on that. Why?
Your continued responses suggest you simply cannot recognize your conception of human knowledge as an idea that would be subject to criticism.
This statement is false, but so what? There is no evidence that you are willing to modify your beliefs in the presence of countervailing evidence. In other words, there is no evidence that you actually practice what you preach.Mung
September 27, 2012
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What is the theory of critical rationalism and what evidence would be incompatible with that theory?
See above. Someone formulating a "principle of induction" that actually works, in practice, would be inconsistent with Critical Rationalism. For detailed arguments see Popper's The logic of Scientific Discoverycritical rationalist
September 27, 2012
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On the contrary. You accept that Darwinism is true, and we’re left wondering why? What was the incompatible evidence you discovered in your analysis of the theory?
Is there something about "You are confusing good explanations with true explanations, as good explanations can be false." that you do not understand? I accept that Darwinians is the best explanation because it has withstood significant criticism. This includes criticism in the light of the rest of our current, best explanations, including our universal theory of how knowledge is created. Darwinism explains an aspect of how the world works, actually solve problems and presents an opportunity to be found in error. Acting as if it is true because it a good explanation and actually solves problems does not mean that I think it has been proven to be true via observations. Your continued responses suggest you simply cannot recognize your conception of human knowledge as an idea that would be subject to criticism. Why don't you start with the Wikipedia entry here Then read the following essay here. Here's a pertinent quote...
3. Responses to the dilemma of the infinite regress versus dogmatism In the light of the dilemma of the infinite regress versus dogmatism, we can discern three attitudes towards positions: relativism, “true belief” and critical rationalism [Note 3] Relativists tend to be disappointed justificationists who realise that positive justification cannot be achieved. From this premise they proceed to the conclusion that all positions are pretty much the same and none can really claim to be better than any other. There is no such thing as the truth, no way to get nearer to the truth and there is no such thing as a rational position. True believers embrace justificationism. They insist that some positions are better than others though they accept that there is no logical way to establish a positive justification for an belief. They accept that we make our choice regardless of reason: "Here I stand!". Most forms of rationalism up to date have, at rock bottom, shared this attitude with the irrationalists and other dogmatists because they share the theory of justificationism. According to the critical rationalists, the exponents of critical preference, no position can be positively justified but it is quite likely that one (or more) will turn out to be better than others in the light of critical discussion and tests. This type of rationality holds all its positions and propositions open to criticism and a standard objection to this stance is that it is empty; just holding our positions open to criticism provides no guidance as to what position we should adopt in any particular situation. This criticism misses its mark for two reasons. First, critical rationalism is not a position. It is not directed at solving the kind of problems that are solved by fixing on a position. It is concerned with the way that such positions are adopted, criticised, defended and relinquished. Second, Bartley did provide guidance on adopting positions; we may adopt the position that to this moment has stood up to criticism most effectively. Of course this is no help for people who seek stronger reasons for belief, but that is a problem for them, and it does not undermine the logic of critical preference.
critical rationalist
September 27, 2012
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So, if you think criticism is looking for evidence that proves Darwinism is true, you are not a a critical rationales.
On the contrary. You accept that Darwinism is true, and we're left wondering why? What was the incompatible evidence you discovered in your analysis of the theory?Mung
September 27, 2012
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Becoming a critical rationalist entails not looking for positive support for theories but looking for incompatible evidence.
What is the theory of critical rationalism and what evidence would be incompatible with that theory?Mung
September 27, 2012
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Mung, If I become a critical rationalist without having examined all the criticisms of if along with the alternatives and the criticisms of them, would that just not be in the spirit of the entire enterprise?
Becoming a critical rationalist entails not looking for positive support for theories but looking for incompatible evidence. So, if you think criticism is looking for evidence that proves Darwinism is true, you are not a a critical rationales. Rather, we look for observations that would be inconsistent with our theories.
SB: That’s a good observation. I was sort of hinting at that when I asked CR to apply the same intense scrutiny to Darwinism. But, alas, he couldn’t find a single thing to criticize. Perhaps we should coin a new phrase: “selective critical rationalism.”
The Dream of Socrates chapter I referenced represents just such a criticism at length. As does the summary presented in comment #51 Let me guess, you omitted comment #51 as we'll because you're using the Socratic method?critical rationalist
September 27, 2012
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I'd wager that we're just an experiment. He's just trying to falsify some theories he has and we're only enforcing them.Mung
September 27, 2012
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Mung @49:
If I become a critical rationalist without having examined all the criticisms of if along with the alternatives and the criticisms of them, would that just not be in the spirit of the entire enterprise?
That's a good observation. I was sort of hinting at that when I asked CR to apply the same intense scrutiny to Darwinism. But, alas, he couldn't find a single thing to criticize. Perhaps we should coin a new phrase: "selective critical rationalism."StephenB
September 27, 2012
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