Multiverse Mavens Hoisted on Own Petard

_{Barry Arrington

March 6, 2010

Intelligent Design}

Share: Facebook; Twitter; LinkedIn; Flipboard; Print; Email

Several factors are combining to increase belief (of the “faith” variety, not the “demonstrated fact” variety) in the multiverse among materialists. Two of these factors are relevant to ID at the biological and cosmological levels. At the biological level materialists are beginning to understand that the probability that life arose by random material processes is so low (estimated in this article written by materialists to be 10 raised to -1018) that infinite universes are required for it to have occurred, the implication being that we just happen to live in the ever-so-lucky universe where it all came together.

At the cosmological level, the probability that the fine tuning of the universe necessary for the existence of life arose by sheer coincidence is so low that again the multiverse is invoked to provide infinite “probabilistic resources” to do the job (see here).

Of course, there is another possible explanation for both the emergence of life and the fine tuning of the universe. These phenomena may be the results of acts of a super powerful being whom we might call God.

Obviously, the whole reason materialists have invoked the multiverse in the first place is to avoid resorting to agency to explain the emergence of life and cosmological fine tuning. But isn’t it obvious that given the very premises invoked by materialists in the multiverse scenarios that we can just as easily conclude that God exists.

Here is how the logic runs: The materialists says, “Yes, the probability that life emerged through random material processes is vanishingly small, but in an infinite multiverse everything that is not logically impossible is in fact instantiated, and we just happen to live in the lucky universe where life was instantiated. Similarly, we happen to live in the Goldilocks universe (which, again, is one of infinite universes) where the physical constants are just right for the existence of life.”

But the theist can play this game too. “The existence of God is not logically impossible. In an infinite number of universes everything that is not logically impossible is in fact instantiated, and we just happen to live in one of those universes in which God is instantiated.”

I do not believe in the multiverse. The entire concept is a desperation “Hail Mary” pass in which logical positivists and their materialist fellow travelers are attempting to save a philosophical construct on the brink of destruction. The point is that materialists’ own multiverse premise leads to the conclusion that God exists more readily than the opposite conclusion. Ironically, far from excluding the existence of God, if the multiverse exists, God must also exist.

Comments

Oops. char -> chairpelagius_{March 12, 2010
March
03
Mar
12
12
2010
10:56 PM
10
10
56
PM
PDT}

tgpeeler, Have fun skiing. And watch out for the infinite char lift. :-)pelagius_{March 12, 2010
March
03
Mar
12
12
2010
10:55 PM
10
10
55
PM
PDT}

P and SV - going skiing for a week. No puter. Some things to think about. thanks.tgpeeler_{March 12, 2010
March
03
Mar
12
12
2010
10:34 PM
10
10
34
PM
PDT}

Tgpeeler, If we assign the second law the modal status you recommend, it would straightforwardly contradict both classical mechanics and quantum theory. According to the Poincare Recurrence Theorem, any closed Hamiltonian system must eventually return arbitrarily close to its initial conditions. This means that if we start with a drop of dye localized at the center of a glass of water and wait long enough, it MUST eventually return to this state. Of course, in the relative short term it will diffuse, as the second law predicts. But in the long term it must eventually violate the second law. Of course, it's not really a violation once you understand that the law is statistical. Say it is a law that a coin I flip has a 50% chance of landing heads. If I flip the coin long enough I am very likely to eventually get a string of, say, 100000 heads. Taken by itself, this string might seem like a violation of my law, but understood as a part of a much longer sequence, it isn't. As for your rejection of actual infinites: I don't deny it is a coherent position, but I still don't see any compelling reason to hold it. You've just asserted that it's impossible. It's true that I (or a Turing machine) can't generate an infinite output in finite time, but in the multiverse scenario we're not talking about the infinity being generated in finite time. It's just there. I still fail to see why you think this is conceptually impossible (I presume you mean conceptual impossibility rather than logical impossibility. An actual infinity is clearly logically possible - it doesn't entail a contradiction.)Sotto Voce_{March 12, 2010
March
03
Mar
12
12
2010
12:19 PM
12
12
19
PM
PDT}

tgpeeler:
I’ve found that when making assumptions upon which I build a system of conclusions that it works better if the assumptions are true. Just a thought.
Indeed, which is why I asked this question earlier:
The problem is with your assumption in step 1. How do you know that there cannot be an infinite number of physical things?
tgpeeler:
It’s logically possible that heat can move from a cooler object to a warmer object or that a drop of dye in a glass of water will remain a drop and not diffuse throughout the water in the glass but it’s not physically possible that these things will ever occur because of the statistical LAW they would be violating.
The fact that the SLoT is a statistical law means that it is physically possible, just very, very unlikely.
So, for example, I would agree that the set of integers, or positive integers, or negative integers, is infinite. But that is a conceptual infinite. As soon as you start to write them down, i.e. make them concrete, then you are dealing with a finite set, even if it is one that goes on indefinitely.
And earlier you wrote:
But I do know that there are not an infinite number of [universes]. Because if you start showing them to me I can count them.
At any point in time, the set of integers that you have already written down is finite. That is because you are writing them down one at a time. Nevertheless, the set of all integers remains infinite. You will never finish writing them down. Likewise, suppose that there are an infinite number of universes, and I begin showing them to you at a constant rate. At any point in time, the number of universes you have counted is finite, because you are seeing them one at a time. Nevertheless, the number of universes remains infinite. You will never finish counting. The logic is the same in both cases. The idea of an infinitude of universes is just as coherent as the idea of an infinitude of integers. Do you see your mistake?pelagius_{March 12, 2010
March
03
Mar
12
12
2010
09:19 AM
9
09
19
AM
PDT}

Mark @ 76 "I am afraid not." What would you consider evidence for theism?tgpeeler_{March 12, 2010
March
03
Mar
12
12
2010
09:01 AM
9
09
01
AM
PDT}

Clive @ 74 Exactly. :-)tgpeeler_{March 12, 2010
March
03
Mar
12
12
2010
08:22 AM
8
08
22
AM
PDT}

Sotto @ 72. "The second law is a statistical law." Of course it is but there's a reason it is called a LAW. Is there any 'law' in nature that is more certain that this one? Eddington thought not. It's the physical equivalent to the law of non-contradiction in logic. If your argument breaks it, it's wrong. If your theory 'breaks' the 2nd law of thermodynamics it's wrong. See perpetual motion machines. It's logically possible that heat can move from a cooler object to a warmer object or that a drop of dye in a glass of water will remain a drop and not diffuse throughout the water in the glass but it's not physically possible that these things will ever occur because of the statistical LAW they would be violating. "Of course this is all academic. We currently have excellent evidence that the age of the universe is finite. Just an interesting sidebar to the discussion." Yes, 'we' do. Well, not me but everyone who knows seems to say so. I would add that, once again, the empirical world offers up evidence that validates a logical truth. There is an argument from pure reason that says the age of universe is finite and lo and behold the evidence confirms it. Reason is the ultimate ruler when it comes to truth. "Do you think a spatially infinite universe is logically impossible?" Yes, I do. But let me explain before you declare me beyond hope. By definition it is impossible to have a finite infinite or an infinite finite. So how can the universe be finite (in terms of matter/energy and age) yet be infinite in terms of space? That said, I think the universe could expand indefinitely, but that is not the same as it being infinite. Or so I say. The infinite, as I understand its technical sense and as I use the term, is always abstract. So, for example, I would agree that the set of integers, or positive integers, or negative integers, is infinite. But that is a conceptual infinite. As soon as you start to write them down, i.e. make them concrete, then you are dealing with a finite set, even if it is one that goes on indefinitely. It's just impossible to have an infinite number of finite things. Just like it's impossible to have a square circle. Even God can't make a square circle. It violates reason (law of identity) and therefore cannot possibly be true.tgpeeler_{March 12, 2010
March
03
Mar
12
12
2010
08:21 AM
8
08
21
AM
PDT}

p @ 71 "No, the first law tells us that energy (including mass) is conserved, which means that it will never run out. Don’t confuse energy with entropy." I'm not. Conserved means neither created nor destroyed (yet here we are) which means no more of it is being "made" which means finite. The energy changes from 'available' or a state of lower entropy, to 'unavailable' or a state of more entropy. Maximum entropy being a state of no 'available' energy. I hope this helps. p.s. I've found that when making assumptions upon which I build a system of conclusions that it works better if the assumptions are true. Just a thought.tgpeeler_{March 12, 2010
March
03
Mar
12
12
2010
07:43 AM
7
07
43
AM
PDT}

Sotto @ 36 "An infinite set doesn’t have to include everything." I agree. I don't recall ever claiming that one did. Did I?tgpeeler_{March 12, 2010
March
03
Mar
12
12
2010
07:26 AM
7
07
26
AM
PDT}

#75 I would expect an infinite Mind to make the universe in the most elegant fashion, if there is one that stands out from all the others. Would you consider that to constitute evidence for theism? I am afraid not. It supposes that the infinite mind is fond of elegance and therefore, to quote Sober, "builds the observational outcome into the theory it is supposed to test". Or to use Collins' terminology, I lack "independent motivations for believing the hypothesis apart from the confirming data". Suppose the universe, or some aspect of the universe, turns out not be elegant but actually extremely chaotic and ugly. Would that now be evidence for an infinite mind that is fond of the chaotic and ugly?Mark Frank_{March 12, 2010
March
03
Mar
12
12
2010
02:47 AM
2
02
47
AM
PDT}

Mark Frank (#63) and Mr. Nakashima (#64) Thank you for your posts, both of which raise excellent points. I would agree that the fine-tuning hypothesis needs to make more specific predictions in order to be judged scientifically useful, and also in order to rebut the philosophical charge of being too ad hoc. Interestingly, the first person to use fine-tuning to make a scientific prediction was the atheist, Fred Hoyle. To quote Wikipedia:
An early paper of Hoyle's made an interesting use of the anthropic principle. In trying to work out the routes of stellar nucleosynthesis, he observed that one particular nuclear reaction, the triple-alpha process, which generates carbon, would require the carbon nucleus to have a very specific energy for it to work. The large amount of carbon in the universe, which makes it possible for carbon-based life-forms (e.g. humans) to exist, demonstrated that this nuclear reaction must work. Based on this notion, he made a prediction of the energy levels in the carbon nucleus that was later borne out by experiment. However, those energy levels, while needed in order to produce carbon in large quantities, were statistically very unlikely. Hoyle later wrote:
Would you not say to yourself, "Some super-calculating intellect must have designed the properties of the carbon atom, otherwise the chance of my finding such an atom through the blind forces of nature would be utterly minuscule." Of course you would... A common sense interpretation of the facts suggests that a superintellect has monkeyed with physics, as well as with chemistry and biology, and that there are no blind forces worth speaking about in nature. The numbers one calculates from the facts seem to me so overwhelming as to put this conclusion almost beyond question.

Regarding future predictions from fine-tuning, I think it may be necessary to invoke a principle of maximal elegance. That's why I'm interested in Garrett Lisi's E8 theory. As one Web article puts it: "In Lisi's model, the base is a four-dimensional surface—our spacetime—and the fiber is the E8 Lie group, a complicated 248 dimensional shape, which some mathematicians consider to be the most beautiful shape in mathematics." (See http://theoryoforder.com/blog/2010/1/15/garrett-lisi-and-e8-supersymmetry/ .) I would expect an infinite Mind to make the universe in the most elegant fashion, if there is one that stands out from all the others. Would you consider that to constitute evidence for theism?vjtorley_{March 12, 2010
March
03
Mar
12
12
2010
01:07 AM
1
01
07
AM
PDT}

tgpeeler,
So tell me that the second law of thermodynamics somehow doesn’t eventually lead to a maximum state of entropy.
Some folks claim that the oscillating model of the universe relieves this difficulty, as if entropy were renewed at each oscillation, similar to how a player in a video game has full strength after each death, and this model is about as realistic as that video game too ;)Clive Hayden_{March 11, 2010
March
03
Mar
11
11
2010
09:45 PM
9
09
45
PM
PDT}

An actual infinite does not reside with space, as we understand it, but resides with transcendent information. Space, as we know it, is shown by general relativity to be inextricably linked with time, and thus space is being "created" or expanded, as we go into the future. Space has a finite past and thus a definite point of origination in the past, as does time, as well space has a definite point of origination into the future with the passing of time: Both time and space are also linked, fundamentally, to the second law of thermodynamics as is noted by Penrose. Will God, as revealed in Christ, fundamentally change this arrangement, sometime in the future when He returns?, So that time and space, as we understand them, are radically changed so as to not incorporate the second law at such a fundamental level? I would think so, at first glance, since the second law is so closely tied to death and decay, but as to degree of the change I have not the foggiest.bornagain77_{March 11, 2010
March
03
Mar
11
11
2010
07:27 PM
7
07
27
PM
PDT}

Tgpeeler, The second law is a statistical law. For any finite system in a maximum entropy state, there is some non-zero probability that it will fluctuate into a lower entropy state. Of course, this is a very low probability event, but in an infinitely old universe it will occur an infinite number of times. So the observation of non-maximal entropy is not incompatible with an infinite past. Boltzmann, the man who first formulated statistical mechanics, proposed that the universe was infinitely old, had been in a maximum entropy state in the past and has since fluctuated into its current low entropy state. Of course this is all academic. We currently have excellent evidence that the age of the universe is finite. Just an interesting sidebar to the discussion. On the more substantive point, current cosmology strongly suggests that the universe is spatially infinite (although things are still far from conclusive). Do you think a spatially infinite universe is logically impossible?Sotto Voce_{March 11, 2010
March
03
Mar
11
11
2010
06:24 PM
6
06
24
PM
PDT}

tgpeeler:
Being infinitely old would require maximum entropy whether [Hoyle's] theory required it or not.
Only if you also assume that the universe is closed. In Hoyle's theory, it was not -- matter was being continuously created.
There is a burn rate for the energy in the universe and unless things have radically changed in the last few weeks there is a finite amount of energy in the universe (see first law of thermodynamics). This means it will eventually run out.
No, the first law tells us that energy (including mass) is conserved, which means that it will never run out. Don't confuse energy with entropy.pelagius_{March 11, 2010
March
03
Mar
11
11
2010
05:28 PM
5
05
28
PM
PDT}

P @ 68 "Not true. That fact by itself is not enough to establish the finite age of the universe. The Steady State Theory of Fred Hoyle (who is beloved of IDers and creationists everywhere for his fallacious “tornado in a junkyard” argument) posited an infinitely old universe, but it did not require that the universe be in a state of maximum entropy." The steady state theory of Fred Hoyle is nonsense and has been recognized as such for years. He was also an advocate of panspermia. hee hee. Yeah, aliens did it. Being infinitely old would require maximum entropy whether his theory required it or not. There is a burn rate for the energy in the universe and unless things have radically changed in the last few weeks there is a finite amount of energy in the universe (see first law of thermodynamics). This means it will eventually run out. This means the universe can't possibly be infinitely old. The argument goes like this: If the universe were infinitely old it would have reached a state of maximum entropy by now (see second law of thermodynamics). But it hasn't reached a state of maximum entropy. Therefore, it isn't infinitely old. This isn't difficult. It's called modus tollens and it's a valid form of deduction. That means if the premise is true the conclusion is true. So tell me that the second law of thermodynamics somehow doesn't eventually lead to a maximum state of entropy. As for the rest, this really isn't the place to split definitional hairs about what infinite means so I give up on that. And this too, actually. :-)tgpeeler_{March 11, 2010
March
03
Mar
11
11
2010
04:57 PM
4
04
57
PM
PDT}

Mr Nakashima (#65) Thank you for your post, and thank you also for letting me know that you have only been reading one of Collins' papers. I would strongly suggest that you have a look at Collins' 2009 paper, The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe . It is exhaustive: I think it's fair to say there's not a single objection to the argument in the literature that Collins doesn't address somewhere in his latest paper. You raise a good point about the fine-tuning argument for G, at 1 part in 10^60, when you write:
Perhaps you should have bolded the phrase Holding these other parameters constant. Is this estimate a clue to fine tuning or to the idea that these are not independent parameters?
But Collins has anticipated this objection too. Here's what he writes on page 215, in Section 2.3.2 of his essay:
[Footnote] 10. This latter fine-tuning of the strength of gravity is typically expressed as the claim that the density of matter at the Planck time (the time at which we have any confidence in the theory of Big Bang dynamics) must have been tuned to one part in 10^60 of the so-called critical density (e.g. Davies 1982, p. 89). Since the critical density is inversely proportional to the strength of gravity (Davies 1982, p. 88, eqn. 4.15), the fine-tuning of the matter density can easily be shown to be equivalent to the aforementioned claim about the tuning of the strength of gravity. Of course, if one cites this fine-tuning of gravity, one cannot then treat the fine-tuning of the force of the Big Bang or matter density of the Big Bang as an independent fine-tuning. (See Section 5.1.1 for how to combine cases of fine-tuning.) (Emphases mine - VJT.)
Now, I only cited gravity in my preceding discussion in #51. I didn't talk about the force of the Big Bang or matter density of the Big Bang, so I think I've been fair here. What Collins is saying is that we need to avoid double-counting our cases of fine-tuning. In section 5.1.1, on pages 252-253, Collins develops his point at further length:
Some have faulted the fine-tuning arguments for only varying one constant at a time, while keeping the values of the rest fixed. For example, Victor Stenger claims that, "One of the many major flaws with most studies of the anthropic coincidences is that the investigators vary a single parameter while assuming all the others remain fixed!" (2007, p. 148). This issue can be easily addressed for a case in which the life-permitting range of one constant, C_1, does not significantly depend on the value that another constant, C_2, takes within its comparison range, R_2. In that case, the joint probability of both C_1 and C_2 falling into their life-permitting ranges is simply the product of the two probabilities....[Supporting mathematical calculations follow - VJT.] Thus, we can treat the two probabilities as effectively independent. When will two constants be independent in this way? Those will be cases in which the factors responsible for C_1’s being life-permitting are effectively independent of the factors responsible for C_2’s being life-permitting. For example, consider the case of the fine-tuning of the cosmological constant (C_1) and the fine-tuning of the strength of gravity (C_2) relative to the strength of materials – that is, the first case of the fine-tuning of gravity discussed in Section 2.3.2. The life-permitting range of gravity as it relates to the strength of materials does not depend on the value of the cosmological constant.... This means that the joint probability of both gravity and the cosmological constant’s falling into their life-permitting ranges is the product of these two probabilities: W_r/W_R for gravity times W_r/W_R for the cosmological constant. This same analysis will hold for any set of fine-tuned constants in which the life-permitting range for each constant is independent of the values the other constants take in their respective EI ranges: e.g., the set consisting of the fine-tuning of the strong nuclear force needed for stable nuclei and the previously discussed example of the fine-tuning of gravity. (Emphases mine - VJT.)
Regarding the possibility of G having a negative value, I think Collins deals adequately with this in the following quote from page 212 in section 2.2:
In classical physics, the amount of force is given by Newton’s law, F = G.m_1.m_2/r^2, where F is the force of attraction between two masses, m_1 and m_2, separated by a distance r, and G is the gravitational constant (which is simply a number with a value of 6.672 × 10^?11 N.m2/kg^2). Now consider what would happen if there were no universal, long-range attractive force between material objects, but all the other fundamental laws remained (as much as possible) the same. If no such force existed, then there would be no stars, since the force of gravity is what holds the matter in stars together against the outward forces caused by the high internal temperatures inside the stars. This means that there would be no long-term energy sources to sustain the evolution (or even existence) of highly complex life. Moreover, there probably would be no planets, since there would be nothing to bring material particles together, and even if there were planets (say because planet-sized objects always existed in the universe and were held together by cohesion), any beings of significant size could not move around without floating off the planet with no way of returning. This means that embodied moral agents could not evolve, since the development of the brain of such beings would require significant mobility. For all these reasons, a universal attractive force such as gravity is required for embodied moral agents. (Emphases mine - VJT.)
The same points apply if gravity were negative. I hope that answers your questions.vjtorley_{March 11, 2010
March
03
Mar
11
11
2010
01:49 PM
1
01
49
PM
PDT}

tgpeeler:
What you fail to grasp is that BY DEFINITION there cannot be a concrete number of infinite things.
That sentence doesn't make sense. Are you trying to say that there cannot be an infinite number of concrete things?
You say that it is logically coherent for an infinite number of universes to exist. That’s absurd on the face of it. Let me try to make it even simpler. If it’s physical, it’s countable. If it’s countable, it’s not infinite.
You evidently aren't familiar with the concept "countably infinite". Try googling it.
By the way, the reason we empirically KNOW the universe is finite, that it began, that it is not infinitely old or eternal, is because it still has not reached a maximum state of entropy. If the universe was “infinitely old” (a logical impossibility) all of the stars would have burned out by now. But they haven’t. Therefore, the universe isn’t eternal. It had a beginning.
Not true. That fact by itself is not enough to establish the finite age of the universe. The Steady State Theory of Fred Hoyle (who is beloved of IDers and creationists everywhere for his fallacious "tornado in a junkyard" argument) posited an infinitely old universe, but it did not require that the universe be in a state of maximum entropy.
But I do know that there are not an infinite number of [universes]. Because if you start showing them to me I can count them.
If I start showing them to you then you can start to count them. But that's not the issue. The issue is whether you will ever finish. How do you know that you will? Your argument boils down to this: 1. There cannot be an infinite number of physical things. 2. A universe is a physical thing. 3. Therefore, there cannot be an infinite number of universes. The problem is with your assumption in step 1. How do you know that there cannot be an infinite number of physical things?pelagius_{March 11, 2010
March
03
Mar
11
11
2010
12:44 PM
12
12
44
PM
PDT}

#66 But I do know that there are not an infinite number of them. Because if you start showing them to me I can count them. Which means, of course, there is not an infinite number of them. You might want to Google "countable infinity". You will find out about the difference between countable and uncountable infinities.Mark Frank_{March 11, 2010
March
03
Mar
11
11
2010
12:31 PM
12
12
31
PM
PDT}

re Pelagius @ 60 "You seem to be confused over the terms ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’. The concept ‘four’ is abstract, but that doesn’t mean that a set of four concrete things is logically impossible. Similarly, the concept ‘infinity’ is abstract, but that doesn’t mean that an infinite number of universes is logically incoherent." This is rich. I know that it is possible to have a concrete number of 4, 5, 6, or whatever number of things, even though the numbers themselves are abstract. What you fail to grasp is that BY DEFINITION there cannot be a concrete number of infinite things. You say that it is logically coherent for an infinite number of universes to exist. That's absurd on the face of it. Let me try to make it even simpler. If it's physical, it's countable. If it's countable, it's not infinite. Because part of the definition of infinite means being uncountable. This is the logical absurdity that at one point in your last post it looked like you might understand. By the way, the reason we empirically KNOW the universe is finite, that it began, that it is not infinitely old or eternal, is because it still has not reached a maximum state of entropy. If the universe was "infinitely old" (a logical impossibility) all of the stars would have burned out by now. But they haven't. Therefore, the universe isn't eternal. It had a beginning. I cannot say for certain whether there is more than one universe and neither can anyone else. It is certainly logically possible that there are more. But I do know that there are not an infinite number of them. Because if you start showing them to me I can count them. Which means, of course, there is not an infinite number of them.tgpeeler_{March 11, 2010
March
03
Mar
11
11
2010
11:31 AM
11
11
31
AM
PDT}

Dr Torley, You should be aware that my discussion of Collins' positions and arguments is drawn completely from the single paper you referred me to earlier in this thread - How to Rigorously Define Fine-Tuning. Again, the point is not the actual size of the range Collins can establish for G, it is that his procedure for choosing the range is not rigorous. Could G be negative, and gravity actually be repulsion? Having brought up the possibility, Collins doesn't show that he has a good procedure for rejecting it. Holding these other parameters constant, if the strength of gravity were smaller or larger by an estimated one part in 10^60 of its current value, the universe would have either exploded too quickly for galaxies and stars to form, or collapsed back on itself too quickly for life to evolve. Perhaps you should have bolded the phrase Holding these other parameters constant. Is this estimate a clue to fine tuning or to the idea that these are not independent parameters? Yes, Leslie. Why should his fly shooting analogy be relevant? Going back to the start of the discussion on probability, we know by experience that fine tuning the gun angle to hit a particular fly is difficult. Frequentism. We don't have that warrant of experience for creating universes.Nakashima_{March 11, 2010
March
03
Mar
11
11
2010
03:49 AM
3
03
49
AM
PDT}

Dr Torley, Please allow me to continue to use an honorific you have obviously earned. As Leslie points out, it is still a remarkable fact that within this large but finite region, a lifeless universe would have resulted from fairly minor changes in the forces etc. with which we are familiar. Wouldn’t you agree? If it were true, I might! I think the Olbermann paper on the resonances that generate C or O in stars is the best start in that direction. But as Collins points out, that ratio of C:O production can't be considered a free parameter of the system. This is like arguing that the flicker rate of the sun is fine tuned to 0. If the sun flickered on and off, it would have a dramatic effect on life on earth. If the sun were on for 6 months, then off for 6 months, could life have arisen naturally? We can calculate a range of solar flicker values, from 0 to the length of time it takes a photon to cross the sun. Blah, blah, blah. It doesn't matter because solar flicker rate is not a free parameter. We don't know the free parameters of the universe. The Standard Model has 19. They are things like the mass of the electron and the CKM 23-mixing angle. What is the possible range of the CKM 23-mixing angle (actual value = 2.4 degrees)? 0 to 360? What is smallest increment? Is there a Planck angle? Why would I be concerned with the interval 2.3 to 2.5 degrees rather than 0-360? Collins can't analyze the universe at this level, and is inconsistent with his answers to these questions. This is a large source of frustration to me in reading his work.Nakashima_{March 11, 2010
March
03
Mar
11
11
2010
03:22 AM
3
03
22
AM
PDT}

vjtorley I have spent much of the last day thinking about Collins essay and I have to admit I underestimated him. It is thought provoking; in particular the example of inferring the truth of QED from the very accurate measurement of g. This made me think hard about the nature of this inference. Clearly it is a powerful reason for accepting QED but I cannot accept his attempt to phrase the inference in terms of comparative likelihood. The point being there is no alternative hypothesis to compare it to. I found it more helpful to think of it in terms of Bayesian priors. But after a while I realised that, while this is fascinating, it is not my main problem with the fine tuning argument. After all, if some genius came up with a naturalistic unified theory of everything, based on independent evidence, which predicted that the fundamental constants the universe would have the values we observe, then I would take that as very strong evidence for that theory (especially if the genius did not know the values of those constants beforehand). The key here is the “independent evidence”. I know that you and Collins believe there is independent evidence for a “universe designer”. I don’t. Therefore I find the explanation “ there must be a designer that wanted it this way” to be hopelessly ad hoc. The outcome is built into the hypothesis. It is the same fundamental problem with all design hypotheses. Unless the hypothesis is sufficiently specific about the designer so that it is possible to have evidence for that designer other than the data you are trying to explain then it is just gremlins in the attic writ large. Every so often the debate at UD rises above the trivial and you are usually involved - thanks.Mark Frank_{March 10, 2010
March
03
Mar
10
10
2010
11:03 PM
11
11
03
PM
PDT}

Mr. Nakashima (#56) In your post, you ask why Collins does not address the possibility that the gravitational constant G that G could have a negative value:
Again, in other spots Collins toys briefly with the idea that the parameter G actually could have a negative value. But then this is abandoned. Why? I'm not worried that allowing negative values for G will increase the eventual appearance of fine tuning. I'm worried that Collins' method for arriving at a range is completely arbitrary.
Three points in reply. First, as I read it, Collins' fine-tuning argument for G relates only to the magnitude of G, rather than its sign. This is apparent from the following extract from his essay, "God, Design and Fine-Tuning" at http://academic.udayton.edu/WilliamRichards/Intro%20essays/Collins,%20Fine-tuning.htm :
Suppose, for instance, that the "theoretically possible" range, R, of values for the strength of gravity is zero to the strength of the strong nuclear force between those protons - that is, 0 to 10^40.G_0, where G_0 represents the current value for the strength of gravity. As we saw above, the life-permitting range r for the strength of gravity is at most 0 to 10^9.G_0. Now, of itself (specifically, apart from the knowledge that we exist), the atheistic single-universe hypothesis gives us no reason to think that the strength of gravity would fall into the life-permitting region instead of any other part of the theoretically possible region. Thus, assuming the strength of the forces constitute a real physical magnitude, the principle of indifference would state that equal ranges of this force should be given equal probabilities, and hence the probability of the strength of gravity falling into the life-permitting region would be at most r/R = 10^9/10^40 = 1/10^31. (Bold type mine - VJT.)
Second, even if one were to allow negative values for G into the epistemic range, this range would still be bounded below by the Planck scale, which is often assumed to be the cutoff for the applicability of the strong, weak, and electromagnetic forces, and which is commonly proposed as a cutoff point for gravity as well. Thus including possible negative values of G would at most double the epistemic range. Third, the foregoing considerations do nothing to weaken the force of Collins' strongest fine-tuning argument for G - that it is fine-tuned to a value of 1 in 10^60 on either side. The following extract is taken from section 2.3.2 of his essay, "The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe" (page 215):
There is, however, a fine-tuning of gravity relative to other parameters. One of these is the fine-tuning of gravity relative to the density of mass-energy in the early universe and other factors determining the expansion rate of the Big Bang – such as the value of the Hubble constant and the value of the cosmological constant. Holding these other parameters constant, if the strength of gravity were smaller or larger by an estimated one part in 10^60 of its current value, the universe would have either exploded too quickly for galaxies and stars to form, or collapsed back on itself too quickly for life to evolve.
Notice too that if G is too small, stars cannot form. Presumably this would also be the case if G were negative. I conclude that Collins' fine-tuning argument for G is substantially sound. The incredible degree of fine-tuning observed (1 in 10^60) should surprise anyone who reflects on the fact. By the way, I'd be very interested to hear about whether CA theory makes any predictions for the values of physical constants, and for the degree of fine-tuning we should expect to observe. Also, what does CA theory say about the range of values for these constants? I've just had another thought about Leslie's "fly-on-the-wall" argument. It seems to me that the skeptic, in arguing that we should not be unduly surprised if the bullet hits a fly in the sparsely populated illuminated region of the wall, is implicitly assuming a "God's-eye" view of the wall: if there are lots of flies elsewhere, then it's quite likely that the bullet will hit a fly. The same applies when the skeptic argues that a potentially infinite variety of other forms of life, which we cannot conceive of, may exist in universes with parameters completely different from our own. What strikes me as ironical here is that the skeptic does not believe in the existence of any entity possessing this "God's-eye" view of reality, but he/she is invoking this "God's-eye" view of reality, which (on his/her account) no being can possibly have, in order to argue against God. I have to say I find that odd.vjtorley_{March 10, 2010
March
03
Mar
10
10
2010
06:25 PM
6
06
25
PM
PDT}

Mr. Nakashima (#56) Thank you for your post. By the way, "vjtorley" is fine with me. I'd like to begin with physicist John Leslie's "fly-on-the-wall" analogy, which Robin Collins cites in his paper. Here's the relevant passage from Leslie:
If a tiny group of flies is surrounded by a largish fly-free wall area then whether a bullet hits a fly in the group will be very sensitive to the direction in which the firer's rifle points, even if other very different areas of the wall are thick with flies. So it is sufficient to consider a local area of possible universes, e.g., those produced by slight changes in gravity's strength... It certainly needn't be claimed that Life and Intelligence could exist only if certain force strengths, particle masses, etc. fell within certain narrow ranges... All that need be claimed is that a lifeless universe would have resulted from fairly minor changes in the forces etc. with which we are familiar. (1989, pp. 138–9)
Your comment:
Yes, part of the problem with establishing this range is know whether the sub-range that permits life is a single continuous region. At different points it seems that Collins allows as to how it is possible that it might not be true, that it actually might be necessary to take the sum of several non-contiguous sub-regions, but then basically abandons this caution. He seems really over the top in agreeing with Leslie's fly-on-the-wall analogy that the local region is all that needs to be taken into account, even if the wall is thick with flies elsewhere. How does that make sense to someone trying to calculate the total area of the sub-regions??
I would agree with you that if it makes sense to speak of a physical constant as being able to take any value between infinity and minus infinity, then we have no idea whether the total length of the life-permitting regions is finite or infinite. All we can talk about is our own relatively narrow band, in which our concepts of physics meaningfully apply. This is the epistemically illuminated region. As Leslie points out, it is still a remarkable fact that within this large but finite region, a lifeless universe would have resulted from fairly minor changes in the forces etc. with which we are familiar. Wouldn't you agree?vjtorley_{March 10, 2010
March
03
Mar
10
10
2010
04:54 PM
4
04
54
PM
PDT}

tgpeeler:
The CONCEPT of infinity is abstract.
So is the CONCEPT of 'four'.
There can be no actual infinite number of anything. As soon as you reify your “infinite” number of integers with an actual number then it’s no longer infinite.
Why would you reify infinity with a finite number? They're not the same. You might as well reify six with four.
So the CONCEPT of an infinite number of integers remains coherent but placing an actual value on what that is, is not.
By "an actual value" you appear to mean "a finite value". If so, then of course it is incoherent to place a finite value on infinity. Infinity is not finite.
To speak of an actual infinite number of universes is logically incoherent. I hope this helps.
It helps me to understand the mistake you are making.
Infinity is abstract, not concrete. That permeates the definition of what infinity means. So to say that we have an infinite number of universes is to say that we have an infinite set of concrete things. Not possible. By definition.
You seem to be confused over the terms 'abstract' and 'concrete'. The concept 'four' is abstract, but that doesn't mean that a set of four concrete things is logically impossible. Similarly, the concept 'infinity' is abstract, but that doesn't mean that an infinite number of universes is logically incoherent.
...mathemeticians ...say that some infinite sets are larger than other infinite sets (has to do with one to one correspondence). In a conversation with a mathematics professor (the poor guy was trying to get me to understand this) I said to him that if one infinite set could be larger that another infinite set it had to be infinitely larger. He said, this is true.
Yes. For example, the set of even integers is just as large as the set of all integers, because they can be brought into a one-to-one correspondence with each other. The set of real numbers, on the other hand, is larger than the set of integers. You cannot bring the integers into a one-to-one correspondence with the real numbers. If you try, there will always be an infinite number of reals left over.pelagius_{March 10, 2010
March
03
Mar
10
10
2010
04:28 PM
4
04
28
PM
PDT}

oops, Pelagius Sotto @ 36 "The curious thing about an infinite set is that adding one more member does not actually change the size of the set. Transfinite arithmetic is weird." Indeed it is. One only has to check into Hilbert's hotel to understand that. Infinity is abstract, not concrete. That permeates the definition of what infinity means. So to say that we have an infinite number of universes is to say that we have an infinite set of concrete things. Not possible. By definition. Which makes the discussion of an infinite multiverse a fool's errand. I've been on plenty of those, mind you, and will be on many more, no doubt, but not this one. Another thing about the infinite (a very fascinating subject which I know very little about) is that some mathemeticians (I forget the guy's name now who started this - Cantor maybe?) say that some infinite sets are larger than other infinite sets (has to do with one to one correspondence). In a conversation with a mathematics professor (the poor guy was trying to get me to understand this) I said to him that if one infinite set could be larger that another infinite set it had to be infinitely larger. He said, this is true. He couldn't explain it beyond saying it and neither can I. Mind bending stuff, no error. Just like God.tgpeeler_{March 10, 2010
March
03
Mar
10
10
2010
03:04 PM
3
03
04
PM
PDT}

Pelagias @ 32 "Mathematicians claim that the set of integers is infinite. This strikes me as incoherent. How can there be an actual infinite number of integers? I can always add one more to the count of how ever many there are. Ergo, no infinite number of integers." Yes, I do, but apparently you do not. I'll try again. The CONCEPT of infinity is abstract. There can be no actual infinite number of anything. As soon as you reify your "infinite" number of integers with an actual number then it's no longer infinite. So the CONCEPT of an infinite number of integers remains coherent but placing an actual value on what that is, is not. To speak of an actual infinite number of universes is logically incoherent. I hope this helps.tgpeeler_{March 10, 2010
March
03
Mar
10
10
2010
02:26 PM
2
02
26
PM
PDT}

Dr Torley, Physicists being convinced by 13 experiments does not sound to me like epistmeic probability. It sounds completely frequentist. Similarly with plants and continental drift. We have lots of experience (aka frequently repeated trials) with plant ranges, and when they are interrupted by rivers, lakes, mountains, etc. An argument that two ranges of plants were once connected is based on experience at many other scales of time and space.Nakashima_{March 10, 2010
March
03
Mar
10
10
2010
12:40 AM
12
12
40
AM
PDT}

1 2 3 Next

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Leave a Reply