Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

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Given enough time…

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Rob ( with Stephen, also GP): There is a question on the table as to whether intelligence [and agency] are reducible to forces of chance + necessity acting across time. To address that, evidence has to be heard, especially empirical evidence. that raises the problem that Lewontinian a priori materialism is distorting the ability of the evidence to be heard. [Rob, pardon a note: I find that assertions that to speak of design or intelligence -- in light of what has been put into touch above repeatedly by SB, GP, and others, including the undersigned -- begs the question, comes across as a turnabout and distraction from that far more material point.] As Stephen has summarised, we have an empirically observed distinction between entities routinely capable of producing say ASCII text strings in contextually responsive English and exceedign 143 characters, and those that we have no observation that they can do that. We also have good reason to note that such digital, multistate text strings are highly contingent, not merely determined by natural law. That leaves undirected, stochastic contingency -- chance -- as one alternative causal force triggering the strings. But, per needle in the haystack reasons, such is not a reasonable source. Now, as conscious, intelligent entities, and observing other similar entities, we assign the term design to the observed or experienced purposeful act that routinely produces such strings. So, Rob, we have a sign of intelligence -- FSCI, and a term for the acts of such: design. We also observe a similar contextually functional complex digital string in the heart of the cell, i.e DNA. We see it works in an algorithmic context to produce e.g proteins. We infer to a similar process of design, and note that we have no reason to infer that no designers were present at the time of origination of DNA, i.e of life on earth. But, we see we only may infer to design, not to the nature of the designer(s) beyond the obvious: intelligent and even expert. Where is there any question-begging metaphysical commitment in that process? [Notice, I have not adverted to agents, just designers and intelligence, viewed by family resemblance to our own known intelligence.] We make a further step: the observed cosmos is fine-tuned for the existence of such cell-based life. that suggests a designer capable of designing and implementing the physical cosmos. And it raises the issue that such a possible designer might also be the designer of life on earth. but, noticve how the chain has gone, not from presumption of an extracosmioc designer, but to in effect asking whether such is a reasonable candidate for the designer of life as well. Now, per argument, do you have observations that show that chance + necessity is -- within the search resources of our planet or the observed cosmos -- probabilistically plausibly capable of generating digital strings that must function algorithmically or linguistically, of 1,000+ bit capacity? Plainly not. We have observed intelligences, observed signs of intelligence,a nd cases that go from this blog's posts to DNA and onward to the fine tuned cosmos we live in. Do you see why on inference to best explanation in light of OBSERVED evidence, we will accept the design explanation in preference to the chance + necessity one? And given that our observed cosmos seems to have had a beginning, and one that shows signs of intelligence, do you not see why we are inclined to see that intelligence and design are not necessarily embodied bodies based on C, H, O, N, S, P, etc atoms? Indeed, Rob, do you not see that physical cause-effect processes and associated forces of necessity and/or stochastic undirected contingency are simply not congruent to the rational logic of ground and consequent reasoning? GEM of TKIkairosfocus
February 27, 2009
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gpuccio: "I am sure that StephenB would agree on that (Steve, can you confirm?). I hope that you can agree too." Yes, without the slightest hesitation. It is not essential to ID that we assume or agree to the proposition that agency cannot be reduced to law/chance. So, we have the common ground that everyone has hoped for. I happily grant the point, and I hope that I have not said anything that would lead anyone to believe otherwise. Further, if Gpuccio wants to follow through with that approach as only he can, I salute him. However, I now ask everyone to attend to my point as well: None of this should be necessary. The philsophical principles of right reason (not metaphysics) are still in force, and I don't think we should forget about them. If agency could be reduced to law/chance, then it would no longer be agency. Agency, by definition, means the capacity to redirect law and chance in innovative ways. To reduce agency to law/chance is, in effect, is to strip it of its defined capacity to be what it is, an alternative causal force. It's like saying, "let's consider an agency that really is not an agency at all. The last time I checked, a thing cannot be and not be at the same time under the same formal circumstances. Indeed, one of the reasons we coined the term "agency" in the first place was to distinquish it from law and chance. So, if someone wants to know how we can be sure that agency cannot be reduced to law and chance, there is only one logical answer: When we use the word "agency," we mean something different than law and chance."StephenB
February 27, 2009
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gpuccio:
I am sure that StephenB would agree on that (Steve, can you confirm?). I hope that you can agree too.
I agree wholeheartedly.R0b
February 26, 2009
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R0b: "The conversation centers an assumption inherent in his (and Dembski’s) version of ID, namely that intelligence/design/agency is irreducible to law and chance." I really don't think there is all that difference between what Atom, kairosfocus, StephenB, Dembski or I think. We may have slight differences of attitude, sometimes maybe even of substance, but I am sure that we agree on most important things. We certainly agree on the fact that conscious intelligent agents have to be treated as a special set of beings and of causal principles. If you ask me for my personal philosophical opinion, I will answer that I do believe that "intelligence/design/agency is irreducible to law and chance". But in my last post I have tried to show that such a philosophical assumption, while IMO true, is not necessary for ID theory, and that ID theory can be completely expressed in purely empirical terms, if we accept the simple fact, on which you seem to agree, that we "don't know" if intelligence/design/agency is reducible or not to law and chance, and on the further proposition that, unless and until there is a satisfying theory capable to reasonably show how such a reduction can be made, we have the cognitive duty to scientifically study the properties of agents independently of any philosophical preconception. I am sure that StephenB would agree on that (Steve, can you confirm?). I hope that you can agree too. Such an agreement would be a very good start to seriously consider ID theory for what it is. Are you willing to do that?gpuccio
February 26, 2009
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----Rob: "According to him,(StephenB) ID attaches metaphysical significance to terms like intelligence, design, etc. His philosophy co-opts the English language to such an extent that he can claim, with a straight face, that academia teaches that nothing is man-made." Rob, you are making me laugh. Rob, Atom, and Gpuccio vs. StephenB. What's wrong with that picture? There is a coalition for the ages. In any case, you ought to be prepared to provide every ounce of context if you are going to summarize my position on any previous discussion. The point that I made, which is perfectly logical, is this: If matter is all there is, then matter explains all that is "created." That means, that, in the final analysis, human agents are simply obeying the laws of matter. That point should be clear enough. On to substance; If you think that intelligent agents can be included in the (C+N) formulation, meaning that they have no more to say about their operation than any other formulation of molecules, then just say so. If you believe that the written paragraphs are nothing more than matter obeying physical laws and that the writer had no choice in the matter since he too, as matter, must obey the laws of matter, and therefore cannot act as a difference- making causal agent or redirect matter’s activity, then say so, and we can disengage. JT acknowledged as much and I expressed gratitude for his clarity, even though I obviously don’t agree with his position. My position is that an intelligent agent can act as a causal agent insofar as he/she can cause physical laws to do something differently than they would have done if the agent had not intervened. Further, I submit that the agent can choose to intervene or not intervene. Please be forthcoming on this matter, since we have all invested a lot of time in our discussions with you. -----“But wait, you put “natural causes” in quotes, so maybe you’re referring to “natural causes” as I use the term. I will call for an immediate moratorium on the use of italics. If all “non-supernatural” causes are “natural causes,” including humans, how do YOU differentiate between those natural causes that can generate paragraphs and those that cannot. ----“Does the emphasized YOU indicate that I should answer in terms of my own definitions, not yours?” Since you have been gracious enough to give me a choice, I will choose the ID definition. Thanks! -----“Amen. If you want to have a scientific discussion, then you need to leave your metaphysical definitions at the door.” In keeping with that point, I was hoping that you would provide an example of how Dembski uses metaphysical concepts in a scientific context. I submit that he has not. My position, to return temporarily to the scientific mode, is falsifiable.StephenB
February 26, 2009
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gpuccio and Atom, I have little to dispute in your comments. Understand that in this conversation, I'm challenging StephenB's version of ID, not yours. According to him, ID attaches metaphysical significance to terms like intelligence, design, etc. His philosophy co-opts the English language to such an extent that he can claim, with a straight face, that academia teaches that nothing is man-made. And he is so insistent on his own usage of terms that even when I explicitly refer to other people's definitions, he still acts like I'm talking about his own. The conversation centers an assumption inherent in his (and Dembski's) version of ID, namely that intelligence/design/agency is irreducible to law and chance. Even after pressed by myself, JayM, JT, and others before us, neither StephenB nor kairosfocus has come up with anything resembling a scientific case for this claim. Of course, we didn't expect them to, but I was curious whether they would deny that ID is premised on this claim, or admit that the premise is not scientifically supported. As far as I can recall, they've done neither.R0b
February 26, 2009
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StephenB:
To highlight the counterpoise between supernatural and natural. Once again you answer a question with a question.
I wasn't attempting to answer your last question. As I said, I haven't gotten to it yet. I was simply pointing out that you put "natural causes" in quotes and asking why. We still haven't gotten past your first two questions. Let's recap. You asked:
Either you think that [A] the paragraph happened solely by law and chance, [B] it did not happen solely by law and chance. Which position do you take?
And I answered this, which required some disambiguation of the word "law". Then you asked:
So, do you believe that these human agents who write the paragraphs are “natural causes?”
Here's my thinking on reading this question: If "natural causes" = "not C+N", then this question is redundant with the question above. Furthermore, if agency, by your definition, is not C+N, then the question is tautological. So now I'm confused. Should I be using your definitions or mine? But wait, you put "natural causes" in quotes, so maybe you're referring to "natural causes" as I use the term. (I'm not sharp enough to realize that you're highlighting the counterpoise between this term and "non-supernatural", which occurs two paragraphs later.) Just to be safe, I'll point out that the answer to the question depends on the definition of "natural", and I'll try cover all the bases. If "natural"="non-C+D", then I've already answered it. So I'll also give the answers that follow from two other definitions, namely "not man-made" and "testable", explicitly stating my usage for each answer. Now, which part of my answers did you not understand?
I didn’t ask for three definitions. I asked: If all “non-supernatural” causes are “natural causes,” including humans, how do YOU differentiate between those natural causes that can generate paragraphs and those that cannot.
Does the emphasized YOU indicate that I should answer in terms of my own definitions, not yours?
(For all concerned: I hope this makes it clear that we should not be discussing CSI, mathematical patterns or anything else that presupposes a common usage of basic terms.)
Amen. If you want to have a scientific discussion, then you need to leave your metaphysical definitions at the door.
It depends on the context. It also depends on whether ID proponents are responding to arguments and double meanings such as those you are presenting.
If anything I've said is not understandable from the context, then please point it out and I'll correct it. I'm trying to be as clear as I can, given that we speak different languages.R0b
February 26, 2009
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Rob [and onlookers]: I also need to respond on select specific points: 1] Rob, 84: to you even 10 - 20 billion years and the entire universe at our disposal is too sharp and discrete a jump for life to occurs without the magic of intelligence. I do not necessarily mean to ridicule by using the term magic. But intelligence as your conceiving it is a black box that all we know about it is that it does marvelous miraculous things by some unknown and actually indescribable process. Now, onlookers: WE INSTANTIATE INTELLIGENT AGENTS, and conscious intelligent agency is the means by which we access the world of experience, observation, and yea even discussion and debate. So, whether or no there is mystery -- and I amt he last to deny that -- there is also strong empirical warrant for intelligence, design and agency. As well, for the signs of intelligence we leave behind when we act. So, since we do not have any good reason to infer that th we exhaust existing or possible intelligences, we can use the signs of intelligence to infer to the action of intelligence even where we were not present. Once we do that, the computer in the heart of the cell strongly implies that the cell, i.e life, is a product of design. This is not metaphysically decisive, as the designers of observed life could well be within the cosmos. i tis only when the design of life is set in the context of the further evident design of the cosmos we live in to facilitate life, that we see that one credible candidate for designer of cosmos and life is God. And, for those who are3 apt to try to use science to lead away from god to object to those who would use well-established scientific principles and facts to show that the evolutionary materialist scheme is not as well warranted as its proponents imagine is well within one's worldview rights. 2] its indescribable because its asserted to operate outside of law. And we cannot describe things without laws. Sorry, we and routinely do can describe actions of chance, necessity and design. Cf the case of a falling die that tumbles to rest. Then repeat enough times and see that in one case we see a fair die and in another a loaded one. Have we not thus described what goes beyond law, in light of empirical data? 3] to you even 10 - 20 billion years and the entire universe at our disposal is too sharp and discrete a jump for life to occurs without the magic of intelligence . . . the Cambrian Explosion was 70 million years - is that what they say? More like 5 - 10 MY. And, observers, note: nowhere is there a serious addressing of the needle- in - haystack implications of islands of function in vast config spaces, to be scanned by chance before we can get to the beach of an island of function. Hill-climbing based on variations and differential reproductive success, are premised on getting to at least minimal function first -- the "beach." 4] He’s [the human inventor] using his brain as an alternate to the external world and can simulate alternate scenarios of physical reality in his brain. Of course, do you know that he is ONLY using his brain? On what grounds apart from Lewontinian presumption of materialism? especially, given the radical divergence between what mind does and what matter is like: neuronal impulses are in mVolts; "Socrates is a Man" is a proposition, a claim to truth. A completely different order of issue. 5] But my point would be, how could “Intelligence” be a magical black box operating outside of laws that makes physical improbabilities vanish? Let's see: the post no 84 is a contextually relevant composition in ASCII text, of much more than 143 characters. the ASCII config space for just 143 characters -- about 18 words -- is 10^301, or ten times the SQUARE of the number of quantum states of the atoms of the observed universe across its reasonable lifespan: the universe acting as random string generator could not sample as much as 1 in 10^150 of the config space across its lifespan, so the odds of getting there by chance alone are minimal. Similarly, by the very nature of text, the matter is contingent: you DECIDED to produce that text and no other. (And the determinism that in effect says this message was writ in the initial conditions of the cosmos, ends up undercutting all reason.) And yet, you, an intelligent agent -- I assume you are not lucky noise mimicking a signal -- composed it in a matter of minutes. So, it is an empirical fact of observation to be accounted for by any credible explanation, that intelligences exist hat can do that. How, we may not fully know -- though you describe the process of human invention so you do know some of how -- but the point is not to know how first, but to simply know and acknowledge that. 6] If God somehow has to step in and materialize major forms instantaneously, without causal precursors, thats not at all how our intelligence functions. So if that’s how God works then it seems unjustified to label it intelligence in an attempt to equate it to what man does. If God manifests creative purpose and so directs contingent entities and processes that they lead towards his goals, then he is intelligent. The same holds for other candidate intelligences: humans, nymphs, sprites, devils, angels, gods, Kzinti, or future R Daneel Olivaaw complete with positronic brain. 7] I am definitely not imagining oracles operating actively like that to monitor a process and broadcast hints. It seems that “Intelligence” as conceived in I.D is the ultimate oracle, invoked whenever we don’t know how something works. Onlookers, such broadcasting oracles are as close as Mr Dawkins' favorite "Weasel" program that the held was an example of how evolution proceeds. He succeeded only in showing that intelligently directed, purposeful evolution is in principle possible. Which is not in doubt. Similarly, I spoke also of winds or currents imagined to waft rafts of search resources [i.e. our observed cosmos] towards islands of function in the config spaces. i pointed out that a cosmos with such winds, currents or oracles is an obviously designed cosmos. As for the assertion that intelligence is pulled in when we don't know how something works, it has already been answered, and so Rob needs to reckon with the fact that he is himself an example of intelligence, however he may imagine that the world so came to be. We are reasoning from he fact of intelligence to the signs thereof to the presence of such in cases, not by inferring to what we do not know. 8] its not just sufficient to have a planet. As I said previously there are thousands of known requirements for life, so it would not be surprising if life were extremely rare in the universe. This was in response to my pointing out that we are in a neighbourhood where we are in a galactic habitable zone and now know that planets are fairly common in star systems in that neighbourhood. So, if there is a written in program for life on circumstellar habitable zone planets in such GHZ's, life should be quite common in our neighbourhood, including on next door r mars [apart form life wafted there form earth]. So, on the principle that if there is a program that moves such situations towards life and onward intelligent life, it should be so common that our neighbourhood shooed be abundant with signs of life. It is not. And the silence raises serious questions on the idea that life is written into the physics of the cosmos. This is also the same message that OOL research tells us, and it is the same message that statistical thermodynamics tells us: we do not see laws of spontaneous algorithmically functional organisation -- not mere order -- and complexification, but of conservation and breakdown. 9] But the only way to accurately characterize any phenomenon is through a series of laws - that is what a program is. What is in DNA is laws. Contingent states of affairs can also be characterized as laws. Your own post refutes this, as you describe invention not as law but intelligent action, including that of program development. Programs are not laws, they are highly contingent and intelligently directed purposeful contingency at that. Second, when we do experiments, we routinely have to distinguish the natural regularity from he noise caused by accidental contingencies, i.e we have to apply the theory of experimental error. So, we see intelligence, natural regularity and undirected stochastic contingency all playing a part in a reasonable accurate exploration and description of a situation. 10] It [a robot as an exemplar cybernetic system] operates on the basis of the program instructions that define it. Those instructions are laws . You say that the robot has to be “competently managed ” the implication being that there has to be the continual ongoing involvement of human intelligence for that robot to function. Now, of course, the context for competent management was the design, development and commissioning process, especially where the servo loops have to be tuned. Robots, too, usually need to be maintained. Programs, again, are precisely not laws, but intelligently designed instructions and associated data structures and interfaces such that a programed entity operates successfully in a given environment. And in the heart of the cell is just such a programmed entity. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
February 26, 2009
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Atom, Stephen and GPuccio: Very well said. It seems we are here bringing the issues into sharp focus: we are thinking empirically, and tasking things from what we see and how different things are best explained in that light, and then taking them how far they can go. I find it instructive that when we do that, the rhetorical -- and I am using that word advisedly -- counter is to assert that metaphysics is being smuggled in. Why? Well, in effect because the assumed default "scientific" position of those who object to the design school of thought is, by and large: materialism. So, we invite such to the worldview level table of comparative difficulties, to address this on factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power. And, lo, they now impose a criterion of in effect demonstration on their [question-begging]terms, for what is an empirical investigation that -- per the nature of science itself -- is only reasonably warranted per best current explanation. Worse, when we point that out, and show the empirical ladder from . . .
[a] agents exist per observation and experience, to [b] such agents often leave characteristic signs of intelligence (not at all reasonably attributable to chance and/or necessity in cases where we can observe the origin process, i.e the empirical base . . . ) , to [c] FSCI is one of these, to [d] FSCI is exemplified by contextually responsive ASCII English text of 143 or more characters, to [e] Similarly, source or object code of more than 1,000 bits is clearly also FSCI, to [f] DNA is a functional, digital data string well in excess of 1,000 functional bits, so [g] DNA is credibly -- per inference to best current explanation -- designed . . . [h] they assert that we must show that designers are not the products of chance + necessity.
But in fact, we have here shown that on warrant by inference to best explanation, we have a case of design that is not reasonably attributable to humans. No metaphysical implications are then pulled out of the hat; indeed, from the beginning of the Design Theory in modern times, Thaxton et al have led the way in highlighting this. Nor has this changed since 1984. Where there IS a design inference that points to an extra-cosmic agent, that is on cosmological design, which is not even usually a subject for point by point discussion on ID. That is the fine-tuning of the cosmos that facilitates life is seen as pointing to an intent to create a suitable habitat for cell-based, Carbon chemistry anchored life. And on that, some pretty serious cosmological thinkers fully agree with the design view. Even Sir Fred Hoyle spoke of how the parameters of physics seem to have been "monkeyed with." Why, then is there the insistent, now routine inference or accusation that biological ID is about unwarranted injection of metaphysics [etc] into the sciences? Simple: "metaphysical" is here plainly a rhetorical stand-in for "religious" in the sense of "Judaeo-Christian theistic," often with onward hints or outright accusations of imposition of theocratic anti-science tyranny. But in fact there is plainly another side to the story, especially, since ID thinkers have -- for over two decades -- been at pains to underscore that the biological ID inference is NOT metaphysically decisive. So, any inference to unwarranted metaphysical assumption plainly falls of its own weight. But that has not prevented the loaded accusation from being a now "standard" rhetorical resort used by objectors to ID. That is, sadly, we are now plainly in one of those prudential cases where an examination of the motives and agenda of a party to a dispute are now legitimate, not a distracting fallacy. So, let us start here, and please pardon some words that will have to be painfully frank, if serious error and worse wrong are to be corrected: 1 --> First, what is going on is a plain case of selective hyperskepticism; i.e. inconsistent standards of warrant are used to reject what one does not wish to accept; while the objected to standards are routinely accepted for other similar and important cases. 2 --> To wit, it is routine to reason empirically in science, and to infer on best current explanation; with the obvious implication that further evidence can change the verdict. (Onlookers, cf the above . .. ) 3 --> On those terms, we are plainly dealing with a well-warranted inference to see that in the case of DNA and associated entities and processes in the cell, we have stumbled on a COMPUTER in the living cell. 4 --> And on "like causes like" [as Newton and other founding scientists taught us, so that we can infer from observation and experiment to general causes and patterns] we see that a computer implicates a designer. 5 --> This very simple and empirically well-anchored chain of thought is objected to in the end in service to Lewontinian a priori imposition of evolutionary materialism on science:
We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. ,b>It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. [NY review of Books, 1997; now embedded in US National Academy of Sciences edicts etc.]
6 --> So, the case -- sadly -- is in too many instances rather plain. (Of course,t eh degree of responsibility for leaders in this attack like Ms Barbara Forrest is very different from that of those who unwisely have trusted the claims of such, and the talking points that stem from their work.) Now, we cannot force such rhetoricians as Ms Forrest to be coherent or open-minded or charitable or even reasonable, but we can expose the fact of such unjustified and uncharitable false accusations, fallacies, inconsistencies and self-referential incoherence for all to see. And, we can highlight that science is here being subverted from what it should be: an empirically anchored, unfettered (but intellectually and ethically responsible) search for the truth about the world in which we -- conscious, intelligent, and at least sometimes rational agents -- live. Worst of all, such subversion is then too often projected to the public as a "consensus of THE EXPERTS" that is true or tantamount to truth for all practical purposes. So, finally, we need to re-read Plato's parable of the cave . . . GEM of TKIkairosfocus
February 26, 2009
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R0b: "Absolutely! So is the concept that “agents are not instances of law and chance”. Unless, of course, “law and chance” are defined mathematically or operationally. Has the ID community done so, or is it content with premising its arguments on a metaphysic?" Your answers are very to the point, so I will try to be brief and clear in my counter argument. You still ignore that agents have one important feature (consciousness and all its properties, including intelligence and purpose) which is never observed in non conscious agents. Unless and until someone can demonstrate that such properties can be expressed by objects working merely by deterministic laws, known or not, it is perfectly correct to consider them a special set of observables, and to study their behaviour and properties as separate form that of non conscious objects. That is not metaphysics, but simple empiricism. To do that, I have no need to show that "agents are not instances of law and chance". The problem if they are of if they are not can very well remain unsolved, for the moment. The only thing I need to do is prove what is under the eyes of all, that agents have properties and abilities which are not shared by other classes of things for which the law and chance paradigm can be tested. I can eprfectly agree with Atom when he says: "I am not arguing that human intelligence is not ultimately reducible to a (designed) arrangement of matter operating on the laws of physics alone; I have a hunch that it isn’t the case, but for the sake of the current argument, I’m pointing out that this is irrelevant for drawing distinctions between Agents and blind forces (the “non-agent” part of nature.) We can draw the distinction functionally, regardless of the underlying metaphysical basis." Indeed, I have more than a "hunch" that "it isn't the case", but again we do not need a metaphysical consensus about that for our discussions. Our discussions can stay perfectly empirical. You too seem to agree with Atom. You say: "I agree completely. But I don’t see any evidence that these terms are being defined functionally by the ID community. When I see ID leaders like Dembski contrasting ID to materialism and speaking of the irreducibility of design, it sure seems that the terms are being used metaphysically." Isn't being conscious or not a functional definition? Isn't displaying recognizable purposes a functional definition? Isn't being able to generate ever new FSCI a functional definition? What is metaphysical in all that? I am very careful never to use any metaphysical assumption in my ID reasoning. You say: "By the same token, human-made computers can do things that nothing else has been shown capable of doing. And yet we know for a fact that the execution of computer programs reduces to natural law (regardless of who or what designed the computer and wrote the program)." You know all too well that a fundamental point of ID is that computers can do that exactly because they are designed, and they already have a lot of FSCI in them. While the execution of computer programs can certainly be explained in terms of necessity (and maybe, even too often, chance), the process of designing a new computer program requires a conscious intelligent agents (except for cases where a computer program has been instructed in passively generating or modifying other programs, but you are well aware that in that case the program is justv using the information given it form its programmer). In no case a computer program has been shown able to consciously build another program for a purpose. Indeed, in no case a computer program has been shown to be conscious, as I believe you agree. And in no case a computer program can creatively use language (creating new specifications, new meanings, and so on). You say: "As I’ve mentioned before, the laws of physics are at least Turing equivalent. To show that human-like intelligence cannot be implemented with the laws of physics, you would have to at least show that such intelligence exceeds the capabilities of a Turing machine. Nobody has done so. And that would only be one step toward ruling out the entire category of “law+chance”, whatever that entails, as a basis for intelligence." I have to show nothing. Consciousness, purpose, all subjectibe experience, and easy generation of new FSCI all exceed the capabilities of a Turing machine, according to both our empirical experience and our theoretical reasoning. To believe the contrary is to believe in strong AI. But you say: "As for Strong AI, I see it as a philosophical position, not a scientific theory. It probably depends on how you define it." Well, strong AI is certainly bad philosophy, but it is also a scientific theory: the assumption that the complexity of the software can generate consciousness and all its properties is certainly a scientific theory, although IMO a completely false one. And indeed, strong AI is constantly trying to build models of how software could do that, without ever showing a software which can do it. You could object that strong AI is not scientific because it cannot really be falsified. That could have some truth in it, but I am not completely sure of it, and moreover I am not a strict Popperian, and I can allow even theories which cannot be falsified, provided that we agree that, until they are verified, we have no reason to give them our attention. So, to sum up: the hard problem of consciousness remains one of the biggest problem in scientific knowledge, maybe the biggest. Our definition of agents relies critically on it. Unless and until that problem is scientifically solved by a satisfying scinetific theory, it is necessary to consider conscious agents as an empirical category, without superimposing any philosophical concept to them. ID, for its purposes of design detection, only needs to define agents empirically. There is no need to go beyond that.gpuccio
February 25, 2009
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----Rob: "But I don’t see any evidence that these terms are being defined functionally by the ID community. When I see ID leaders like Dembski contrasting ID to materialism and speaking of the irreducibility of design, it sure seems that the terms are being used metaphysically." Have you ever heard of Dembski using those metaphysical terms while discussing CSI or the explanatory filter? What you may hear about is Dembski discussing ID science in a metaphysical context, in which case meatphysical terms are appropriate. He is, after all, a philosopher as much as a scientist. Are you taking the context into account? Is this what you mean when you suggest that ID proponents are using terms "inconsistently?"StephenB
February 25, 2009
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----I wrote: If all “non-supernatural” causes are “natural causes,” including humans, how do you differentiate between those natural causes that can generate paragraphs and those that cannot. ----Rob: "Why did you put “natural causes” in quotes if you intended your own usage?" To highlight the counterpoise between supernatural and natural. Once again you answer a question with a question. The question still stands. I didn't ask for three definitions. I asked: If all “non-supernatural” causes are “natural causes,” including humans, how do YOU differentiate between those natural causes that can generate paragraphs and those that cannot. (For all concerned: I hope this makes it clear that we should not be discussing CSI, mathematical patterns or anything else that presupposes a common usage of basic terms.) ----"(Are you under the impression that ID proponents use the term consistently? If so, would you like a boatload of counterexamples?)" It depends on the context. It also depends on whether ID proponents are responding to arguments and double meanings such as those you are presenting. On the other hand, if you have an example of someone discussing the explanatory filter who uses any other formulation other than law, chance, agency, I would like to be informed about that. Can you point to any such case?StephenB
February 25, 2009
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Meanings have been superceded by terms. Argument for argument's sake.Upright BiPed
February 25, 2009
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I am not arguing that human intelligence is not ultimately reducible to a (designed) arrangement of matter operating on the laws of physics alone; I have a hunch that it isn’t the case, but for the sake of the current argument, I’m pointing out that this is irrelevant for drawing distinctions between Agents and blind forces (the “non-agent” part of nature.) We can draw the distinction functionally, regardless of the underlying metaphysical basis. And once we make that distinction, the science of ID becomes incredibly relevant and in need of further exploration/development.
I agree completely. But I don't see any evidence that these terms are being defined functionally by the ID community. When I see ID leaders like Dembski contrasting ID to materialism and speaking of the irreducibility of design, it sure seems that the terms are being used metaphysically.R0b
February 25, 2009
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P.S. StephenB:
So, do you believe that these human agents who write the paragraphs are “natural causes?” Did these paragraphs generated by humans happen by necessity, by chance, or by choice? If all “non-supernatural” causes are “natural causes,” including humans, how do you differentiate between those natural causes that can generate paragraphs and those that cannot.
Why did you put "natural causes" in quotes if you intended your own usage? I can think of at least relevant definitions of the term natural: (1) Law+chance (2) Not human-made (independent of whether humans reduce to law+chance (3) Testable I interpret Barry's FAQ to indicate (2), but you say that the ID definition is (1). No problem. I answered your question according to all three usages, and explicitly indicated the usage for each answer. I did this to untangle the terminology, not to tangle it. Since ID proponents don't use the term consistently, and since you put it in quotes, how else was I supposed to answer? (Are you under the impression that ID proponents use the term consistently? If so, would you like a boatload of counterexamples?)R0b
February 25, 2009
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R0b wrote:
By the same token, human-made computers can do things that nothing else has been shown capable of doing. And yet we know for a fact that the execution of computer programs reduces to natural law (regardless of who or what designed the computer and wrote the program).
I am not arguing that human intelligence is not ultimately reducible to a (designed) arrangement of matter operating on the laws of physics alone; I have a hunch that it isn't the case, but for the sake of the current argument, I'm pointing out that this is irrelevant for drawing distinctions between Agents and blind forces (the "non-agent" part of nature.) We can draw the distinction functionally, regardless of the underlying metaphysical basis. And once we make that distinction, the science of ID becomes incredibly relevant and in need of further exploration/development. AtomAtom
February 25, 2009
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StephenB, in Case#2, I said "known laws of nature" because I didn't want to say simply "known laws", which might have been interpreted to include man-made laws. Perhaps I should have said "descriptive laws, as opposed to prescriptive laws". I thought that "known laws of nature" would be understood to mean known laws of physics, chemistry, etc. Of course I shifted meanings between Case#1 and the paragraph that preceded it, as I was contrasting two different usages of the term. My whole point was that the term is equivocal, and I explicitly said that the answer to your question depended on the usage.
(Almost as if meanings are being shifted to serve one purpose and then another).
I'm sorry that you didn't understand my single usage of the term in Case#2, but I sincerely thought that it would be obvious. What do you think my purposes were?R0b
February 25, 2009
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Atom, perhaps I'm misunderstanding you, and maybe I'm misunderstanding StephenB and gpuccio as well, but I still don't think that StephenB was talking about distinguishing something from the entire category of law+chance. It's pretty trivial to look at a human and say, "That is not the entire category of law+chance," or look at an artifact and say, "That was not caused by the entire category of law and chance." Maybe StephenB can clarify for us. I apologize if I've misinterpreted anyone. Atom:
For example, an Agent can construct an intel-based computer in one week whereas blind forces (for the time begin, anything “not agent”) have not been shown capable of doing so.
By the same token, human-made computers can do things that nothing else has been shown capable of doing. And yet we know for a fact that the execution of computer programs reduces to natural law (regardless of who or what designed the computer and wrote the program). Human intelligent is undisputably striking and unique within the observed universe. But I don't know that its uniqueness constitutes a scientific case that it's irreducible to the stuff that makes up the rest of the universe. As you brought up, the speed with which human intelligence works might provide a basis for such a case. Nobody has shown that humans can compute things that the laws of physics cannot, but we could conceivably show that humans can compute things faster than the laws of physics can in principle. That would make for an interesting argument, but as far as I know, nobody has been able to put a limit on what physically-based non-linear systems are capable of. We're not even sure that they're limited to Turing equivalence.R0b
February 25, 2009
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Upright BiPed:
Please state what you are arguing in a short distict sentence.
No problem: ID assumes that design is irreducible to chance+necessity, but they have never made a scientific case for this.R0b
February 25, 2009
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Rob, Gpuccio, Atom, Kairosfocus: I am fussing over terms because I want everyone concerned to understand that, in my judgment, all these long discussions about quantifying CSI are totally futile until everyone concerned will concede basic facts about ID definitions and stop misunderstanding (or abusing) the language of "natural causes." Put another way, it seems unfitting to discuss analytic geometry with anyone who disputes the proposition 2+2=4. When you are at that point, all the advanced discussions are shaped by the initial minsunderstanding. As Aristotle pointed out, a little error in the beginning becomes a large error in the end. Our task at the moment, it would seem, is to address the little error in the beginning, which seems like an attempt to reframe ID's clear definition of "natural" (law+chance only) and therefore create a linguistic barrier which no amount of logic or scientific reasoning can overcome. Pay close attention to these two paragraphs by Rob, (not to pick on him, they could just as easily have been written by JayM or JT:) The subject is about detecting the cause of the written paragraph. Notice especially how definitively the word "natural" is being used Case #1 and how equivocally it is being used in Case #2: (Almost as if meanings are being shifted to serve one purpose and then another). Case #1 ----"But when we speak of “naturalism”, we’re obviously not referring to a view that denies the existence of humans. My sense is that scientists use the term “methodological naturalism” loosely to mean “assume that the correct hypothesis, whatever it is, is in principle testable”. (This might be more aptly named “methodological empiricism”.) Under this sense of “natural”, the paragraph was certainly generated by a cause that’s natural, simply by virtue of the fact that we can in principle test the hypothesis that a human wrote it." Case #2 (answering this question by me: Either you think that [A] the paragraph happened solely by law and chance, [B] it did not happen solely by law and chance. Which position do you take? ----"I’ll say first that my position on this is irrelevant to any of the my points, but I’ll answer as best as I can. ----"(1) If law=determinism and chance=non-determinism, then I have no logical choice but to choose [A]. -----"(2) If, on the other hand, “law” includes only known laws of nature, then my position, with no scientific justification whatsoever, is [B]." -----"(3) If “law” includes all law-like behavior that is yet to be discovered, then it seems that (1) applies, so the answer is [A]." Now I realize that science must allow for the remote possibility of a possible fourth cause, (something other and law/chance/agency,) but I don't think that is the hang up here. This seems to me a clear cut case of refusing to allow ID to define itself and its operating definition of "natural causes." Am I being unfair or otherwise diagnosing the problem improperly?StephenB
February 25, 2009
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ROb, You've been at this same line of reasoning so long. Please do a charitible favor for the good of all who have ever held a thought in their heads. Please state what you are arguing in a short distict sentence.Upright BiPed
February 25, 2009
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StephenB:
I was hoping that you would clarify that point. Either you think that [A] the paragraph happened solely by law and chance, [B] it did not happen solely by law and chance. Which position do you take?
I'll say first that my position on this is irrelevant to any of the my points, but I'll answer as best as I can. (1) If law=determinism and chance=non-determinism, then I have no logical choice but to choose [A]. (2) If, on the other hand, "law" includes only known laws of nature, then my position, with no scientific justification whatsoever, is [B]. (3) If "law" includes all law-like behavior that is yet to be discovered, then it seems that (1) applies, so the answer is [A].
So, do you believe that these human agents who write the paragraphs are “natural causes?”
It depends entirely on what you mean by "natural". If, as Barry says, ID uses the term in the same way that archeologists use it, then human agents are, by definition, not natural causes. But when we speak of "naturalism", we're obviously not referring to a view that denies the existence of humans. My sense is that scientists use the term "methodological naturalism" loosely to mean "assume that the correct hypothesis, whatever it is, is in principle testable". (This might be more aptly named "methodological empiricism".) Under this sense of "natural", the paragraph was certainly generated by a cause that's natural, simply by virtue of the fact that we can in principle test the hypothesis that a human wrote it. I'll answer your last two questions as I get time.R0b
February 25, 2009
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R0b, With due respect (since I haven't followed the discussion), I'll submit to you that StephenB's distinction between the "agent" and "law and chance" sets was functional (in the sense that members of the "agent" set can do things not expected of all members of the "law and chance" set, even if "agent" is a subset.) Furthermore, if Agents can do things that we don't expect part (or likely most) of Nature to do, then it is possible, at least in principle, to see if there is anything that distinguishes the set "agent" from "law + chance" (even if this second set is merely the complement of the first, rather than a disjoint set, and our label "law + chance" only refers to those parts of nature that are "not agent.") Once you can draw a distinction between the powers of Agents from the powers of subsets of Nature (which could in principle include an early earth free of life), then we need to develop a science to figure out how we can sort items into their proper sets ("Agent" vs. "Law + Chance"/"Not Agent".) This is ID at its core. We distinguish between intelligent Agents and blind forces, because Agents can demonstrably do certain things that blind forces (at least the ones we're familiar with) have not been able to demonstrably do. For example, an Agent can construct an intel-based computer in one week whereas blind forces (for the time begin, anything "not agent") have not been shown capable of doing so. ID investigates why this is the case and why we don't see FSCI (or complex machines) created in nature all the time, when we're cognizant of the cause. Anyway, the point is that we can draw a useful distinction between "Agent" and "Law+Chance" based on a functional definition even if the first set is a subset of the second. AtomAtom
February 25, 2009
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Atom:
So it is absolutely correct and helpful to mark a distinction between “pine tree” (subset) and just “tree” (the larger set), or between “intelligent object” and “object” (with “intelligent objects” being a subset of “objects”.)
To get some context, StephenB's statement was: "That would be the same as conceding the reality of a design inference and the possibility of distinguishing the agent from law and chance." Of course "the agent" is distinct from "law and chance" in the sense that they don't refer to equivalent sets, regardless of whether agency is a proper subset of or disjoint with law+chance. But I don't think that StephenB was referring to such a trivial distinction.R0b
February 25, 2009
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R0b wrote:
Does it make sense to talk about “distinguishing my pine tree from trees”?
Yes it does. "Pine tree" is more specific than "tree", and pine trees have things (like pine cones and needle-like leaves) that other members of the set "trees" may not have. So it is absolutely correct and helpful to mark a distinction between "pine tree" (subset) and just "tree" (the larger set), or between "intelligent object" and "object" (with "intelligent objects" being a subset of "objects".) It amazes me that you'd waste gpuccio's time with such a trivial objection. AtomAtom
February 25, 2009
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gpuccio:
I certainly don’t.
So you think it makes sense to talk about distinguishing X from Y when X is an instance of Y? Does it make sense to talk about "distinguishing my pine tree from trees"?
I think you are missing the important point: conscious intelligent agents are observable entities, not at all rare, and their behaviour can be well observed.
Nope, I haven't missed that point at all. I've never disputed the existence of intelligent agents.
On the contrary, the concept which you refer to, that “agents are themselves instances of law and chance”, is a specific philosophy,
Absolutely! So is the concept that "agents are not instances of law and chance". Unless, of course, "law and chance" are defined mathematically or operationally. Has the ID community done so, or is it content with premising its arguments on a metaphysic?
That’s why to speak of agents is perfectly legitimate, because it is based on universally shared facts, while criticizing the concept of agents in name of a minority philosophy and of a bizarre and controversial (and I am being very kind) scientific theory is a rather peculiar cognitive attitude.
Who criticized the concept of agents? I speak of agents all the time. As for Strong AI, I see it as a philosophical position, not a scientific theory. It probably depends on how you define it. As I've mentioned before, the laws of physics are at least Turing equivalent. To show that human-like intelligence cannot be implemented with the laws of physics, you would have to at least show that such intelligence exceeds the capabilities of a Turing machine. Nobody has done so. And that would only be one step toward ruling out the entire category of "law+chance", whatever that entails, as a basis for intelligence.R0b
February 25, 2009
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KF [82]: (I've pared down my comments because I was just repeating myself from previous posts.)
The Cambrian fossil life revolution answers: major body plan innovation comes first, then variations within the pattern. Top-down, not bottom up, on the generally accepted model of natural history...
In short, we see sharp discrete jumps — and even 10 - 20 bn years on the gamut of the observed cosmos not just one planet would make no practical difference — that go far beyond the reasonable reach of random mutations as mechanisms to originate bio-information. However, we do know that inventors often produce sharp discrete jumps in functional information of the required orders of magnitude.
So your observation about "sharp discrete jumps" in the Cambrian explosion would appear to be irrelevant because to you even 10 - 20 billion years and the entire universe at our disposal is too sharp and discrete a jump for life to occurs without the magic of intelligence. I do not necessarilly mean to riducule by using the term magic. But intelligence as your conceiving it is a black box that all we know about it is that it does marvelous miraculous things by some unknown and actually indescribable process. We know its indescribable because its asserted to operate outside of law. And we cannot describe things without laws. (Furthermore, the Cambrian Explosion was 70 million years - is that what they say?) I would say a human inventor works by long hours of observation and then simulating multiple scenarios in his mind. He'll think about one configuration and say, "That won't work" He'll think about another and say, "That won't work" and so on. He's using his brain as an alternate to the external world and can simulate alternate scenarios of physical reality in his brain. Eventually though he'll have to start building prototypes. The first prototype won't work. So he'll have to figure out why not, ususally starting with a visual inspection. He may then take a part out to see what effect that has on the system. The part won't be chosen at random obviously but the potential problem areas will be narrowed down by eliminating those components which through experience have proven to be reliable. So the human creation process is a laborious process of trial and error. That part of the labor is simulated in a mind does not make it a nonphysical process. Furthermore the brain is always an error prone tool. It is just such an inescapable and frustrating reality in programming for example that no matter how carefully you've planned and thought out some augmentation to some process, after you've made all the changes, there will ALWAYS be compiler errors - ALWAYS. And then after you've elimated compiler errors there will ALWAYS be runtime errors that have to be hunted down and eliminated. And then weeks later some situation will come up that you did not forsee and then you will have to go back and make changes again. Its a never ending process of errors being discovered and eliminated. I could almost see the phyiscal universe as a big brain, running through multiple scenarios and then sticking with what works. But my point would be, how could "Intelligence" be a magical black box operating outside of laws that makes physical improbabilites vanish? This is exactly how its is being treated in I.D. Intelligence as we know it is actually a physical process (IMHO). If God somehow has to step in and materialize major forms instantaneously, without causal precursors, thats not at all how our intelligence functions. So if that's how God works then it seems unjustified to label it intelligence in an attempt to equate it to what man does. Furthermore it takes society operating over millinea to create the complex artifacts we enjoy. Human creativity is a long contigent process involving numerous human elements operating completely independently with contingent causal precursors at every step of the way.
Perhaps, your intent is that there are ordering laws that waft drifting rafts on the config sea towards islands and archipelagos of function, or else that there are oracles that somehow broadcast warmer/colder signals even before function emerges by landing on the beach of an island. [I am perfectly willing to accept that hill-climbing mechanisms will allow one to go to optimum performance once one is on an island. but eh issue is to get tot he islands and archipelagos.]
I am definitely not imagining oracles operating actively like that to monitor a process and broadcast hints. It seems that "Intelligence" as conceived in I.D is the ultimate oracle, invoked whenever we don't know how something works. I can imagine reality itself as the oracle though, but operating in a passive sense.
And, given that we now see that planets are fairly common in our galactic neighbourhood — which is a galactic habitable zone per Gonzalez et al — then we should expect that we would find sings of such intelligent life in that neighbourhood. For, it is a characteristic of natural law that it acts reliably once conditions are right.
But its not just sufficient to have a planet. As I said previously there are thousands of known requirements for life, so it would not be surprising if life were extremely rare in the universe.
[JT:]It would not require "Intelligence” or Agency operating outside of law to discern whether or not a mutation got you closer to an eye. All it would require is some internalized template of what an eye was.
In short, you are speaking of built-in oracles that broadcast warmer-colder signals to as yet non-functional variations in DNA molecules.
NO, I am NOT speaking of built-in oracles. If you wrote a program that could discern an eye, (which you could ) that would NOT be an oracle. An oracle is something that operates outside of law. A set of program instructions would be laws not an oracle.
[I do not believe the concept of Agency as something distinct from Law and chance is a coherent idea . . . I think that we operate via complex physical and chemical processes. However unsettling the determinism of such a scenario is to you or anyone and however threatening it is too someone’s sacrosanct concept of “Free-Will is irrelevant.
First, just how is the observed distinction between chance, natural regularity and design “incoherent,” given that it is a routine observation — as routine as the text in long enough ASCII strings constituting contextually responsive English communications vs a simple repeating pattern or a typical at- random string?
You talk about natural regularity and your intention is some reductioniist notion of what law can accomplish or what natural laws must be in your mind. (E.g. wind, erosion, etc.) But the only way to accurately characterize any phenomenon is through a series of laws - that is what a program is. What is in DNA is laws. Contingent states of affairs can also be characterized as laws.
–> Considering the brain-body system as a cybernetic machine or a “meat robot” [cf here Derek Smith ], we can see that there are cause-effect chains around the loops, including in brain-processing. Such loops are based on the internal state of the modules in the system, and the forward path, feedback path and comparator sensor, comparison and actuating signals they exchange with one another. That is how cybernetic or control loops work. b –> But also, such loops are highly sensitive to architecture, processing laws [transfer functions], interfaces, and to degree of tuning — even in adaptive or learning systems. The intelligence resides not in the mere physical processing or transfer of signals, but in the competently managed structured integration of the loop and especially in how it is made to be robust against drift, noise and perturbations. (That is what we pay — handsomely — Instrumentation and Control engineers to do. And the level of responsibility they must undertake for serious designs is crushing. never mind what happens when we look at somewhat analogous managerial “control loops,” where people are “components” . . . )
I wouldn't say that a Robot functions by means of the laws of electricity for example, or "the mere physical processing or transfer of signals". It operates on the basis of the program instructions that define it. Those instructions are laws. You say that the robot has to be "competently managed " the implication being that there has to be the continual ongoing involvement of human intelligence for that robot to function. Rhetorically it seems that's what you would like the implication to be. You apparently want the implication to be that the Robot functions via the magic of human intelligence, not on the basis of its program. The same suggestive rhetoric is employed in the following:
d –> in fact the Derek Smith model gives us a way forward. The two-tier controller. In such a system, level 1 is the loop controller, but level 2 is a supervisory and creative entity that does the real designer level work: creative imagination, projections, planning of paths, judgements. It then feeds into the cybernetics,and interacts with it towards goals, dynamically.
(So I'll end it somewhat abruptly here).JT
February 25, 2009
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R0b (#78, to StephenB): "Your talk of “distinguishing the agent from law and chance” only makes sense if agents are not themselves instances of law and chance. Do you agree?" I certainly don't. I think you are missing the important point: conscious intelligent agents are observable entities, not at all rare, and their behaviour can be well observed. The design process and designed objects can all be observed. These are facts. Why do you think there are words of common use like "design", "intelligence", "consciousness" and similar in all human languages? Like many other univeral words, they have been created to describe what we routinely experience, both subjectively and objectively. On the contrary, the concept which you refer to, that "agents are themselves instances of law and chance", is a specific philosophy, certainly not universal or self-evident, which has only recently generated a scientific theory, strong AI. One can accept those positions or not. I certainly don't, and so many others, both here and in the whole world. That's why to speak of agents is perfectly legitimate, because it is based on universally shared facts, while criticizing the concept of agents in name of a minority philosophy and of a bizarre and controversial (and I am being very kind) scientific theory is a rather peculiar cognitive attitude.gpuccio
February 25, 2009
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JT: First, I appreciate, like SB, that you have taken time to lay out your thoughts. Now, too, I have but little concern that you -- or the undersigned, for that matter -- will be able to undermine the truth, as the truth is independent of our ideas and arguments. It is as it is: that which says of what is, that it is; and of what is not, that it is not. [Cf. Ari, Metaphysics 1011b] I do however think that something has gone far amiss with origins science in our day, on multiple grounds. Things that are damaging our civilisation. And, that is what I have set out to respond to, as we may harm ourselves in ways that will cost our children especially, a lot. So, you will understand why I in turn will take up some points from your remarks, for my own comments. (Take the below as a bit of a markup on points of interest.) My thoughts are premised on the unexpected discovery starting in 1953, that in the heart of cell-based life is a nanotech-based computer, using DNA and its interface molecules as a core information store that is used as the data-base for algorithmically implemented life processes tied especially to expression and application of proteins. That means that evolutionary biology has opened itself to empirical test based on the findings of information theory and computer science, with statistical thermodynamics lurking in the background of both, as the components in view are molecular scale: 1] JT, 75: Darwinists are also quick to point out that they ALSO do not subscribe to chance or randomness alone as an explanation. THEREFORE, the challenge is not to make people understand the randomness does not accomplish anything. RATHER, it is to show how various mechanisms proposed by evo theorists largely EQUATE to randomness, IF INDEED THIS IS THE CASE. Darwinists [e.g. Monod] make much of how the blend of chance and necessity is capable of the magic that either alone cannot. In particular, they think that a combination of random variation and natural selection [with some additional odds and ends] is capable to accounting for body-plan level biodiversity up to and including man, with mind and morals. Now, let us look at the two halves. First,t he one that is usually stressed as non-random, NS, On that, let us note from that ever so humble and reliably pro-Darwinist source, Wiki:
Natural selection is the process by which favorable heritable traits become more common in successive generations of a population of reproducing organisms, and unfavorable heritable traits become less common, due to differential reproduction of genotypes. Natural selection acts on the phenotype, or the observable characteristics of an organism, such thatindividuals with favorable phenotypes are more likely to survive and reproduce than those with less favorable phenotypes. The phenotype's genetic basis, the genotype associated with the favorable phenotype, will increase in frequency over the following generations. Over time, this process may result in adaptations that specialize organisms for particular ecological niches and may eventually result in the emergence of new species.
Observe the highlights: "more likely" and "frequency," i.e. NS boils down to being a proposed, non-foresighted probabilistic culler of already expressed -- i.e. functional -- variations. hence, "differential reproduction" claimed to account for not only speciation but across time origins of novel body plans. At best this accounts for the survival of the fittest, not their arrival. So, to get to the arrival of the novelties, we have to get engines of genotype variation that are expressed in phenotypes across populations. And, at each stage of phenotype expression, that has to be immediately functional and advantageous, thus selectable across time on a population basis. This leads to the core challenge, which starts with the required arrival of the first reproducing population of all: observed required DNA information to sustain life forms and to innovate body plans is of initial order 600 k bits - 1 Mbits for OOL, and on body plans, 10's - 100's of Mbits. So, whether you get to metabolism first or R/DNA world models, you are over two orders of magnitude of bits beyond the 1,000 bit threshold where the entire probabilistic resources of the observed cosmos across its lifespan are inadequate to scan 1 in 10^150th part of the config space. And, on body plan origination, it is far worse than that. So, on empirical evidence, there is no good reason to infer that our observed cosmos is capable of scanning the config space to get us to the islands of bio-functional configurations, per blind variations in genotypes or molecules. And, in the pre-biotic world, the thermodynamics strongly favour moving away from complexity towards low- potential energy, simple molecules. Now also, observed biofunction relates to molecules implicating hundreds of molecules that are of the order of 100's - 10,000's of atoms big; and if earlier biofunction did not, there is no good thermodynamic reason to expect that the trend thereafter would be towards higher complexity, but he opposite.After all, in observed life we see that the chemical reactions are carefully programmed, sequenced and controlled, with tightly managed energy feed-ins, all using molecules produced by earlier phases of the same process. That does not sound like a self-starting process. But, we know that intelligences routinely create systems that do that sort of thing. So, on inference to best explanation, core biofunctions and body plans are intelligently programmed. On mechanisms to do that, I have no need to speculate at the moment. 2] The added ingredient to make it all seemingly work for evolution is natural laws (and also the environment). So its mutations plus natural laws. (Not saying you don’t realize this, but for the sake of clarity…) Now, of course, natural laws have a characteristic signature: once the initial conditions are set up, the dynamics will reliably play out, and will in general produce outcomes of low contingency, i.e there will be a reliable pattern. Now, apart from NS [already addressed -- and note Behe's edge of observed evolution . . .], what is the pattern observed? The Cambrian fossil life revolution answers: major body plan innovation comes first, then variations within the pattern. Top-down, not bottom up, on the generally accepted model of natural history. but, that immediately poses a challenge [as Darwin recognised, and hoped that the missing links would be found to resolve; 150 years later, they have not and with 100's of thousands of fossil species as classified and millions of fossils in museums after intense global search, the statistical odds of such emerging are now very low]:
The Cambrian explosion represents a remarkable jump in the specified complexity or "complex specified information" (CSI) of the biological world . . . One way to estimate the amount of new CSI that appeared with the Cambrian animals is to count the number of new cell types that emerged with them (Valentine 1995:91-93) . . . the more complex animals that appeared in the Cambrian (e.g., arthropods) would have required fifty or more cell types . . . New cell types require many new and specialized proteins. New proteins, in turn, require new genetic information. Thus an increase in the number of cell types implies (at a minimum) a considerable increase in the amount of specified genetic information. Molecular biologists have recently estimated that a minimally complex single-celled organism would require between 318 and 562 kilobase pairs of DNA to produce the proteins necessary to maintain life (Koonin 2000). More complex single cells might require upward of a million base pairs. Yet to build the proteins necessary to sustain a complex arthropod such as a trilobite would require orders of magnitude more coding instructions. The genome size of a modern arthropod, the fruitfly Drosophila melanogaster, is approximately 180 million base pairs (Gerhart & Kirschner 1997:121, Adams et al. 2000). [Meyer, 2004]
In short, we see sharp discrete jumps -- and even 10 - 20 bn years on the gamut of the observed cosmos not just one planet would make no practical difference -- that go far beyond the reasonable reach of random mutations as mechanisms to originate bio-information. However, we do know that inventors often produce sharp discrete jumps in functional information of the required orders of magnitude. Perhaps, your intent is that there are ordering laws that waft drifting rafts on the config sea towards islands and archipelagos of function, or else that there are oracles that somehow broadcast warmer/colder signals even before function emerges by landing on the beach of an island. [I am perfectly willing to accept that hill-climbing mechanisms will allow one to go to optimum performance once one is on an island. but eh issue is to get tot he islands and archipelagos.] Such laws, of course, have never been observed, but that is not all. For, if such were observed they would immediately imply that our cosmos was set up to create life and to diversify it into a multitude of body-plans. Thus, we would face a massive increment in cosmological fine-tuning, which points straight to a powerful a nd intelligent designer beyond the cosmos. but equally, we have no direct observation of such laws -- which should by now have manifested in OOL experiments on plausible pre-biotic scenarios. [Miller-Urey type experiments -- apart from being predicated on questionable atmospheric conditions -- in the end show that we get not to incremental complexity, but would most likely produce tars, random arrangements of organic molecules.] And, given that we now see that planets are fairly common in our galactic neighbourhood -- which is a galactic habitable zone per Gonzalez et al -- then we should expect that we would find sings of such intelligent life in that neighbourhood. For, it is a characteristic of natural law that it acts reliably once conditions are right. the failure to observe signs of independent intelligent life in our near-space neighbourhood [starting with the solar system], is not a hopeful sign for such suggested laws. 3] what if the natural laws were, “If the next mutation gets me closer to an eye, then accept else reject”. Obviously such natural laws could accomplish quite a lot. And please let us all understand: Regardless of what Plato said or believed, it would not require an “Intelligence” or Agency operating outside of law to discern whether or not a mutation got you closer to an eye. All it would require is some internalized template of what an eye was. In short, you are speaking of built-in oracles that broadcast warmer-colder signals to as yet non-functional variations in DNA molecules. This requires front-loaded information [e.g. Platonic Forms . . .], and would imply design; precisely as Marks and Dembski are now investigating and have forthcoming publications on. [Have you seen the preprintes at their site?] 4] I do not believe the concept of Agency as something distinct from Law and chance is a coherent idea . . . I think that we operate via complex physical and chemical processes. However unsettling the determinism of such a scenario is to you or anyone and however threatening it is too someone’s sacrosanct concept of “Free-Will is irrelevant. First, just how is the observed distinction between chance, natural regularity and design "incoherent," given that it is a routine observation -- as routine as the text in long enough ASCII strings constituting contextually responsive English communications vs a simple repeating pattern or a typical at- random string? Or, the falling of a die, its tumbling to a value, and whether or no that die is fair or loaded [Notice, I am not using AGENT just now. In short, you are projecting a conclusion back into a logically prior observation. (In short, agency is a conclusion in this context, not a term of observation.) I am not committing the circular argument you think I am.] Now, from the other direction: we observe and experience ourselves as deciding, reasoning and acting by our own responsible volition; and in fact community life and our entire civilisation are premised on that understanding. The abandonment of the concept of agency therefore is one we should take only with extreme care, and on very good warrant. But therein lieth the rub, as. e.g. Reppert points out -- and NB I give the source on the principle of not plagiarising, not as an fallacious appeal to blind adherence to authority [I have to say that in light of certain remarks by Rob . . . ]: . . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions. a --> Considering the brain-body system as a cybernetic machine or a "meat robot" [cf here Derek Smith], we can see that there are cause-effect chains around the loops, including in brain-processing. Such loops are based on the internal state of the modules in the system, and the forward path, feedback path and comparator sensor, comparison and actuating signals they exchange with one another. That is how cybernetic or control loops work. b --> But also, such loops are highly sensitive to architecture, processing laws [transfer functions], interfaces, and to degree of tuning -- even in adaptive or learning systems. The intelligence resides not in the mere physical processing or transfer of signals, but in the competently managed structured integration of the loop and especially in how it is made to be robust against drift, noise and perturbations. (That is what we pay -- handsomely -- Instrumentation and Control engineers to do. And the level of responsibility they must undertake for serious designs is crushing. never mind what happens when we look at somewhat analogous managerial "control loops," where people are "components" . . . ) c --> Thus, Reppert's point: rationality lieth not in signal- system module interactions, but in the inferential process tied to cognitive content. A process that is radically different from mere cause-effect processing of signals and the symbols that they encode. d --> in fact the Derek Smith model gives us a way forward. The two-tier controller. In such a system, level 1 is the loop controller, but level 2 is a supervisory and creative entity that does the real designer level work: creative imagination, projections, planning of paths, judgements. It then feeds into the cybernetics,and interacts with it towards goals, dynamically. In short, wee see that modelling in terms of a mind-brain interface makes a lot of sense of the data and our internal experience of being conscious, deciding, reasoning, morally constrained creatures. There is a cybernetic subsystem, but it is not autonomous, it interacts with a higher order system that has the capacities that are not to be found in the nature and interaction of material components and associated signals. e --> That is, we are not locked up to a materialist a priori, with the absurdities it implicates, Absurdities that Reppert (duly multiplied by Plantinga et al,)points towards: whatever triggers brain states and such like will drive the process, so if this is completely internal to matter, rationality is at an end. My simple summary os why is:
. . [evolutionary] materialism [a worldview that often likes to wear the mantle of "science"] . . . argues that the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature. Therefore, all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of chance. But human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this picture. Thus, what we subjectively experience as "thoughts" and "conclusions" can only be understood materialistically as unintended by-products of the natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains. (These forces are viewed as ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance ["nature"] and psycho-social conditioning ["nurture"], within the framework of human culture [i.e. socio-cultural conditioning and resulting/associated relativism].) Therefore, if materialism is true, the "thoughts" we have and the "conclusions" we reach, without residue, are produced and controlled by forces that are irrelevant to purpose, truth, or validity. Of course, the conclusions of such arguments may still happen to be true, by lucky coincidence — but we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” them. And, if our materialist friends then say: “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must note that to demonstrate that such tests provide empirical support to their theories requires the use of the very process of reasoning which they have discredited! Thus, evolutionary materialism reduces reason itself to the status of illusion . . . . In the end, materialism is based on self-defeating logic . . .
f --> In short, the real issue is not whether agency is a coherent view of humanity, but whether evolutionary materialism is. And the clear answer is NO. 5] I think everyone understands you’re never ever going to get some describable pattern characterizing a string of 1000 coin flips. Everyone understands you won’t get a 1000 heads, or any other kind of discernable pattern (much less Romeo and Juliet). You could conceivably get it, but the chances of doing so are absurdly small and can be ruled out (So needless to say, WE AGREE on that point.) . . . . What seems intuitive to me is that the universe is as large as it is and contains as much energy as it does, so that its probabilistic resources COULD be exploited . . . . from that vantage point, it seems clear how randomness MUST HAVE played a large role in our creation The FIRST problem is not the coin flips to get to 1,000; but the equivalent of getting to 600,000; for OOL. Then onwards, dozens of times over 10 - 100 millions, for body-plan level evolution as proposed. Such are well beyond the probabilistic resources of the observed cosmos. A cosmos whose physics is BTW, exceedingly fine-tuned for the existence of a world in which C-based cellular life is possible. On many, many dimensions. [As you will note from above, fine tuning is a sign of serious engineering work.] ___________ JT, now that you have articulated your view in some details, I think it is clear that you are being pulled by your own reasoning towards a design oriented view of the cosmos and of life in it. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
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In any case, I don’t think I have ever heard of a belief system composed of such an amalgamation. Would it be fair to classify you as a Christian materialist? No, I'm working with a marketing team on names. You do indeed have a lot of tweaking to do, especially on the matter of free will. That isn't where the problem lies. I was thinking about Hell for example. Angels to me could in fact be humans from the future, or at least from a timeless dimension. I'm thinking people that are dead now are really dead - they don't have a spirit living in heaven somewhere. Nothing happens until the resurrection. And then people are essentially resurrected as sons of God - immortal beings (or end up in the other place.) Just a cursory overview, because you enquired.JT
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