Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Nihilism at TSZ

Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

Over at The Skeptical Zone Learned Hand (who goes by “Colin” there) has been psychoanalyzing me.  I’m a wall builder don’t you know:

I think one major motivator of the “you’re a liar!” style of debate they’ve adopted is community identification. I’ve been thinking of this as building a wall. The point of the conversation is largely, not entirely, to show that “we think like this:” and “they think like that:”, or more pointedly, “look how stupid and ugly they are.” It makes it very easy to avoid questioning beliefs, because we cling particularly to those notions that separate us from them. It identifies and strengthens the community of us by redefining it in opposition to the ugliness and stupidity of them. And once that wall is built, it’s extremely hard to dismantle. Why on earth would you stop and seriously consider something a stupid and dishonest person says? And what would it say about you if you agreed with them? The wall exists to separate.

LH has been drinking deeply from the postmodern Kool-Aid, and it has led him to say some staggeringly stupid things.  Remember, this is the guy who says he does not believe that the law of identity (A=A) is infallibly true.  I pointed out to him that such a claim is absurd, self-defeating and incoherent and only an idiot or a liar would assert it.  Instead of withdrawing his idiotic claim, he doubles down and asserts that the only reason I refuse to countenance it is because I want to build a wall to insulate myself from the those who don’t think like me so that I can “cling” to the notion that A always and without exception in all possible universes equals A.

It beggars belief.  I will not bother to defend the self-evident truth of the law of identity.  Why?  Robert L. Kocher tells us why:

It is a fact of life that you cannot win an argument with someone who is not sane. Sane bystanders may come to agree with your presentation, but you have no way of convincing someone who is not sane of anything. . . suppose that I say that the red pen I happen to have in my hand at this moment is a red pen. Further suppose that someone else says it is not a red pen, but is instead a flower pot, or a suitcase or a TV set. As a practical matter, I am unable to refute the assertion that what I am holding in my hand is not a flower pot. That does not mean that I’m incorrect when I say that it is a red pen. Nor does it mean that I am intellectually weaker than the other person who is arguing that it is not a red pen. Nor does it mean that his assertion that it is not a red pen is correct.

It means that I have no stronger argument than the red pen being in my hand. There is no stronger argument possible than the simple fact of the red pen being in my hand. No stronger refutation of the other person’s arguments is possible. At some point there must be agreement on what constitutes basic reality.

Similarly to Kocher’s red pen, I have no greater argument that A=A than the self-evident fact that A=A.

No, the purpose of this post is not to refute Learned Hand, because to any reasonable observer Learned Hand’s insanity is self-refuting.  Instead, I want to consider why anyone would say such an idiotic thing.  He must know he is making a fool of himself, right?  No actually; exactly the opposite is true.  Kocher again:

It has become common for people who routinely engage in chronic psychotic levels of denial to consider themselves as being mental powerhouses, and to be considered by others as being mental powerhouses, because no one can break through their irrationality. This is often supported by a self-referencing congratulatory inner voice which says, “(guffaw) He REALLY didn’t have an answer for that one!” And they are correct. He didn’t have an answer.

Far from acknowledging the manifest folly of his statements, LH revels in it.  Only wall building rubes like Barry believe that A=A is infallibly, necessarily true; hyper-sophisticated intellectuals like myself are not so narrow minded.

So why do people like LH make such staggeringly stupid, borderline psychotic claims?  Well, LH feels free to psychoanalyze me, and I will now return the favor.  LH rejects the concept of absolute and infallible truth, because absolute and infallible truth acts as a check on his autonomous will.  If A always equals A, then maybe, just maybe, it is also always evil to kill little boys and girls, chop them into pieces and sell the pieces.  I assure you that it is no coincidence that LH rejects both assertions.  Because the rejection of any potential limit on LH’s autonomous will drives the nihilistic antinomianism at the core of his worldview.

Comments
LH@ 270 "Odd how the people shrieking about how easy it is to exclude error don’t seem to be able to identify how it’s actually done. Which is, of course, consistent with their surety being an artifact of preferred belief rather than actual logical reasoning." LH, I "wikipediaed" the term solipicism. I had heard the term here and there and the arguments you make seem come from someone who fits that belief. It might not be correct, but I think you are a solipcist. You are basically saying you can't be sure of knowing anything, and give yourself permission to question everything. Perhaps you can live this way. I can't. I have to live my life being "sure" of various things. Your response to me is incoherent. How can you even criticize my "preferred belief" with your "preferred belief"? Silly isn't it? How can you even identify "actual logical reasoning"? How would you know what it is? This will be my last post in this thread. I doubt I can change your mind. Its obvious you have built your house on this property and don't intend to move. But I would like you to consider that you are more than just particles in motion. Your ability to cogently reason (if you choose to) is not an accident, but the gift of your creator. Your retort to your creator "but you didn't give me the ability to be sure I was correct" will not excuse you.juwilker
September 18, 2015
September
09
Sep
18
18
2015
08:12 PM
8
08
12
PM
PDT
HeKS, I understand the demands of work! I'm only going to be home for a few days over the next month--if I comment it'll be from Boston or Detroit or SLC or Baltimore or Houston or Germany or who knows where else. (Consulting pays my bills.) Thanks for the discussion so far, if we don't get a chance to continue. If we do, I'm very curious to see how you think the provisional nature of the laws of reason in the eyes of many (not all, I think) religious people affects their ability to reason. If that's included with your post, I'd appreciate it. I also hope you'll bear in mind something that, in my experience, gets left out of many Christians' explanations of Christianity to outsiders: it's a different faith to different people. Which is not to say they're all right, at least from any particular believer's perspective, but merely that if you gathered fifty Christians together and asked each to explain what it means for God to be omnipotent, you'd get a dozen answers at least. I like that, I think it shows that people's faith makes them think. But it makes any single explanation along the lines of "this is what Christians think" is likely to be underinclusive.Learned Hand
September 18, 2015
September
09
Sep
18
18
2015
08:08 PM
8
08
08
PM
PDT
Hi LH, Thanks for the response. I'm also very busy with work right now so I have very little time to participate here at the moment. I also happen to be working on a post for the site about the use of arguments related to God possessing an attribute of omni-something, because I believe Christian claims about what this means are routinely misconstrued, leading to very faulty arguments against God's existence. That said, I'll respond to you as soon as I have some time. HeKSHeKS
September 17, 2015
September
09
Sep
17
17
2015
09:51 PM
9
09
51
PM
PDT
HeKS,
LH, you don’t seem to understand what HeKS is getting at. He qualified the statement with “where he can understand.” Every single time I understand the predicate is included in the subject, I will understand it is an analytic proposition. And every time I understand it is not, I will understand it is a synthetic proposition. HeKs statement is a tautology. Any time I understand the nature of a proposition, it is impossible for me to be mistaken about the nature of a proposition.
Exactly.
Then at best you’ve got yourself a tautology, as BA says; things that we define as true are true, things that we define as being infallible are infallible, when and where no other metric is possible. Great, but so what? The paraphrase above admits that in the real world, error is going to happen. Think about that test, asking people whether A=A is an analytic proposition: people will answer the question wrong. Your answer, as interpreted above, is that they’re just No True Scotsmen when they do, because they didn’t understand the proposition. They thought they did, though. The individual people who err won’t know that they’ve erred (or else they wouldn’t have), and how can any test-taker know infallibly they aren’t among this group of people who misunderstood? And if they can’t know in advance whether they’ve erred, then how can anyone taking the test know infallibly that they’ve correctly assigned any given proposition to the “I can know this infallibly” bucket or the “I could be in error” bucket? People make mistakes? Is he sure? Is LH therefore absolutely certain that error exists? I’ve answered this question a bunch of times. I take the position only that no one has illustrated—or, with the exception of SB, even tried to illustrate—how it could be possible for a human being to know something infallibly. BA has worked himself backwards to analytic propositions (abandoning, for the moment, Jupiter and moral propositions), a limitation I think is probably fair. Is it possible that error doesn’t exist? I suppose it’s possible, but you’d have to put up an argument for the proposition—and while insults are thick on the ground here, actual arguments are hard to come by. For example, the statement “all bachelors are unmarried” is an analytic proposition, but it is not a definition. The meaning of the word “bachelor” is not exhausted by the term “unmarried” (it only applies to men), nor is the set of persons who can be described as “unmarried” identical to the set of persons who can rightly be described as “bachelors” (women can also be unmarried). I confess the distinction escapes me. I think you’ve shown that “unmarried” is an incomplete definition of “bachelor,” but all that shows is that the two terms are not exactly identical. I think “all bachelors are unmarried” is true by definition; the fact that “all unmarried people are bachelors” is not relevant. In other words, I don’t think exact equivalence is necessary. I don’t think this is an important point, I’m just quibbling, but I’d appreciate understanding where you’re coming from here. Let’s allow for a moment that these rules of logic are merely foundational axioms for thought, but ones that do not necessarily apply to the extra-mental world. That is, they are vitally necessary in order for us to be able to think about and conceptualize things, but the external world does not necessarily need to conform to them. Ok, so now let’s ask a question: Is it possible for a square-circle to actually exist in the extra-mental world? There seem to be three possible answers: A) No B) Yes C) Maybe – The question is unanswerable because any differentiation between the other answers relies on the validity of the LOI, LNC and LEM applying to the extra-mental world. Barry’s answer on my behalf isn’t bad. I wrote this before I read it: My answer would be D) We can’t know, infallibly, but our inability to find or even conceive of a square-circle is a very good basis for proceeding as if it is not possible. (Your C is very close to that, but I would want to emphasize that our fallibility doesn’t mean we have to go hunting for square-circles or to suspect one will show up any day now. Our belief that we will survive the night fallible, but we still set our alarm clocks.) What, then, would happen to a person mentally if they came across a square-circle in the world? It seems to follow necessarily that they would be unable to mentally process it as it actually existed. I’m not sure this is true at all. I think there are lots of things that we find impossible to mentally process. Try to picture both aspects of a Necker cube simultaneously, or infinity. (The cube might not be a good example, I don’t know if you’d consider it to be “in the world” since it’s representational. It’s an amusingly mind-melting exercise, though. And it supports your thought #3 a bit, since our brains seem to force us to see just one half at once.) If all evidence that could possibly be marshalled in favor of one view over another contradictory view is not only open to question but could in fact be something utterly different than it seems, possibly actually supporting that contradictory view, and without any possibility of us knowing or ever finding out, or if the views that conflict in our minds could be identical when applied to the extra-mental world, then on what grounds can we argue that holding a rational worldview is commendable or virtuous rather than just some different kind of delusion? Consistency, I think. As I said above, we aren’t infallibly sure that we’ll wake up in the morning, but we set our alarms anyway. If circle-squares are possible and perceptible, we’ve never found one and can’t conceive one; we should proceed as if they’re impossible until and unless someone proves us wrong. If circle-squares turn out to be impossible, we’re in good shape. If they’re possible but imperceptible, we’ll never know it, so we’re still in good shape. I don’t think we have to be infallible in any meaningful way to value rationality. After all, we already know that people make mistakes about facts and logic all the time—yet we carry on. If all were formless chaos and uncertainty meant that 2+2=4 was only true half the time, it would undermine logic. But when no one can find any example of it ever not being 4, or conceive of such an example, we have just cause to take it as an axiom and proceed. But that doesn’t make us infallible! It just means we don’t need to be hostage to the concept of fallibility, when it comes to such basic concepts. The reason we’re having this conversation at all is that BA and SB take the concept of fallibility far beyond such trivial notions, to moral propositions that can’t be tested in the way that 2+2 can. And if they can’t show how they know anything non-trivial infallibly, why should we agree that their moral beliefs are infallible? Eigenstate and LH want to deny the possibility of certainty over knowledge of any sort about the extra-mental world, but they don’t seem to be in any rush to abandon science or rationality as being wholly useless. Correct. The fact that we could be wrong does not mean that we are wrong, obviously. We can test the consistency of propositions to see whether they hold up, and if the tests aren’t infallible, that’s OK. We know from experience that we can proceed on certain axioms reliably, and that if our understanding of them is wrong, it’s wrong in such a way that isn’t impeding us. Instead, what it seems to mean is that either the ability to know some things about the external world for a certainty is actually increased, or else rationality and science is utterly destroyed and pointless. There doesn’t seem to be any middle ground. I understand what you’re asserting, but not why. Why do we have to be infallible to reason? We apply rationality every day, and it works extremely well. The fact that it works justifies our continued reliance on it. It does not prove that our understanding of its principles is infallible, since that understanding could be flawed in ways that don't affect us or can't, in turn, be accurately perceived. Unless and until such flaws do affect us, we're entitled to go on with our lives. Here's a question for you: what about religious people? If I believe that God is omnipotent and above even the laws of time, space, and reason, then I have to assume these fundamental laws don't apply universally--God could suspend them on a whim. Am I therefore not allowed to reason? If I assume that God suspended the LOI during the act of creating a universe separate from Himself, or the LOI or LNC by being three-in-one, how does that keep me from using reason and logic everywhere else in my life--even being a scientist? Thanks for offering a serious and interesting argument. I’m enjoying it, and I hope I’m being clear. I travel a lot for work, and when I come back to a conversation like this after a day or two there’s a lot to wade through. I chopped up several of your comments in the above response; please let me know if I missed something you’d like a response to.Learned Hand
September 17, 2015
September
09
Sep
17
17
2015
07:44 PM
7
07
44
PM
PDT
Beating back madness is hard work, and I admit that I need a break from time to time. It can’t be that hard; you refuse to offer even a cursory explanation of why the people you revile and insult are wrong. Be honest, BA—typing “liar!” isn’t that much work. You can make a macro for it if it wearies you. Mount Everest is a mountain in Asia. I am a man in Colorado. A man in Colorado cannot also be a mountain in Asia. Therefore, I am infallibly certain that I am not Mount Everest. Seems like an awfully trivial exercise in reasoning there. Which side of the line do you put it LH? The fallible side. Because logically, “I’m certain!” is not an argument that supports the proposition that an infallibly certain answer is possible. It’s a lazy and sophomoric substitution of the feeling of certainty for a reasoned argument for why error is impossible. Whether you’re certain is an entirely separate question from whether error is logically possible. After all, people make mistakes on trivial questions all the time. And even if they didn't, it still doesn't resolve the question. How do we establish, rigorously and logically, that a proposition about the real world is known infallibly? "It's easy" isn't even on the same wavelength as an answer. For example, there are people who assert that all life and existence is an illusion—that you are not a man, you are not in Colorado, neither men nor Colorado exist, etc. I find the philosophy pointless, but it exists. How do you know, infallibly, that they’re wrong? After two weeks of resistance, we finally dragged LH kicking and screaming into admitting the infallibility of the law of identity. You’re preening, not thinking, and thus still misunderstand the conversation that’s been going on above your head for weeks. My position has not changed, and my point has not been that the law of identity isn’t infallible. It’s that we cannot infallibly perceive propositions. My failure to add “except in purely tautological ways” seems to have confused you, and I’ll own that failure to communicate. On the other hand, I’ve directly explained this to you several times. I know that reading and responding to an argument is hard. Can you bring yourself to try?Learned Hand
September 17, 2015
September
09
Sep
17
17
2015
07:35 PM
7
07
35
PM
PDT
Barry, I think perhaps I'm not being clear, because while I agree that LH says those things, none of them address my point. Eigenstate and LH want to deny the possibility of certainty over knowledge of any sort about the extra-mental world, but they don't seem to be in any rush to abandon science or rationality as being wholly useless. They therefore seem to take the position that the first principles of right reasoning (LOI, LNC, LEM) are only necessary axioms with respect to our ability to think about anything, but that the extra-mental world is not beholden to these principles, by which they seem to mean that they are not necessarily a complete description of what might be possible in the extra-mental world. And yet, they don't seem to be throwing up their hands and declaring science useless and rationality itself utterly baseless. They seem to think that the mere claimed possibility of what we might call extra-logical entities or states of affairs is sufficient to eliminate the possibility of any absolute certainty with respect to any kind of knowledge of the external world but also somehow think that rationality isn't burned to the ground. What I'm saying is that even if they're right and such extra-logical entities do or can exist in the extra-mental world, that doesn't necessarily mean that absolute certainty about aspects of the extra-mental world is impossible. Instead, what it seems to mean is that either the ability to know some things about the external world for a certainty is actually increased, or else rationality and science is utterly destroyed and pointless. There doesn't seem to be any middle ground. Again, to be clear, what I'm saying here is based on allowing that there is or might be extra-logical entities in the external world, just as they claim. I am not relying on any argument that such things couldn't possibly exist in the extra-mental world. And what I'm arguing is that this possibility doesn't actually help their (middle-ground) cause. Aleta, I find it best to admit when I'm incompetent in a subject, and when it comes to math, I'm largely incompetent. In fact, if you do a google search of this site with my name and the word "math" I think you'll probably find me saying that a few times. That said, as I was just saying to Barry, I'm not arguing that things we can't visualize or that don't conform to the basic rules of logic couldn't possibly exist in the extra-mental world. I'm talking about the possible scenarios that are implied if they do. Also, I'm not clear on how the existence of a "perfectly logical mathematical object" serves as a basis for arguing that things could exist in the extra-mental world that are logically inconsistent. As I said in my earlier post, what I was arguing was "not the same as saying that whatever cannot be directly perceived [or visualized] by humans is therefore in contradiction of the LOI, LNC and LEM". HeKSHeKS
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
06:19 PM
6
06
19
PM
PDT
Positing a square circle can easily be shown logically, within the structure of geoemtry, to lead to a contradiction, and thus be impossible: proof by contradiction is a standard proof technique. The fact that we can't imagine one with a mental image is a consequence of one being geometrically impossible. However, not being able to imagine something is not a sufficient reason to think a mathematical object is impossible: 4-dimensional hypercubes are perfectly logical mathematical objects and we can't imagine one of those either.Aleta
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
05:31 PM
5
05
31
PM
PDT
Barry and HeKS, Feser on the difference between grasping a concept and having a mental image:
Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once. And so forth. In general, to grasp a concept is simply not the same thing as having a mental image.
Box
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
04:57 PM
4
04
57
PM
PDT
HeKS LH has a standard response to that objection as well. The fact that you cannot imagine what a square circle would look like is a failure of your imagination that by no means precludes the concept. His favorite aphorism is "the universe is not only stranger than we imagine; it is stranger than we can imagine." And he also likes to work in "the map is not the territory" a lot. And you can be certain that he is utterly flummoxed when he stops using pronouns, as in "HeKS does not seem to understand that there are a lot of other people out there who are not HeKS."Barry Arrington
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
04:30 PM
4
04
30
PM
PDT
Mung, That's exactly my point. As I said:
But if you try to think about a square-circle (beyond the words themselves) what do you get? Nada. It’s impossible to picture or conceptualize or think about meaningfully in any way, because it contravenes first principles of logic and right reasoning.
Do you have any thoughts on the implications I stated regarding our mental perceptions of the external world once we realize this?HeKS
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
04:07 PM
4
04
07
PM
PDT
HekS: Is it possible for a square-circle to actually exist in the extra-mental world? You can say the word square and you can follow it with the word circle. You can even hyphenate the two when writing the words. But there is no concept of a square circle.Mung
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
03:56 PM
3
03
56
PM
PDT
Hi Barry
LH’s standard response would be to choose a fourth option: D. I can’t imagine or even conceptualize a square circle in the extra-mental world, but my inability to imagine or conceptualize merely means I am fallible and cannot imagine ever possible extra-mental event; it follows that while I cannot even begin to explain how an extra-mental square circle is possible, I cannot rule it out.
But that's not really a fourth option. That's just the third option, which is essentially equivalent to maybe, and so it entails the implications I assigned to that. What are your thoughts on those?HeKS
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
03:51 PM
3
03
51
PM
PDT
HeKS @ 291: LH's standard response would be to choose a fourth option: D. I can't imagine or even conceptualize a square circle in the extra-mental world, but my inability to imagine or conceptualize merely means I am fallible and cannot imagine ever possible extra-mental event; it follows that while I cannot even begin to explain how an extra-mental square circle is possible, I cannot rule it out.Barry Arrington
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
02:37 PM
2
02
37
PM
PDT
Barry,
Yes, they do. Our work is far from done. But in 288 I was just celebrating a victory — no matter how small — of reason over madness. God knows such victories are rare enough; we should stop to celebrate them when they do occur.
Fair enough. You know, assuming that I understand their viewpoint and have stated it accurately, I find it seems to have some interesting implications. Let's allow for a moment that these rules of logic are merely foundational axioms for thought, but ones that do not necessarily apply to the extra-mental world. That is, they are vitally necessary in order for us to be able to think about and conceptualize things, but the external world does not necessarily need to conform to them. Ok, so now let's ask a question: Is it possible for a square-circle to actually exist in the extra-mental world? There seem to be three possible answers: A) No B) Yes C) Maybe - The question is unanswerable because any differentiation between the other answers relies on the validity of the LOI, LNC and LEM applying to the extra-mental world. If we choose A and say that a square-circle cannot exist in the extra-mental world then we are saying that the LOI, LNC and LEM apply necessarily to the extra-mental world. Presumably, people like eigenstate and LH will not choose this one. If, instead, we choose B and say that a square-circle can exist in the extra-mental world, then we are saying that the extra-mental world is not constrained by the LOI, LNC and LEM. This, again, would be a claim to certainty, so again, eigenstate and LH would presumably pass on this choice. This stuff is all very obvious so far. What's interesting is when we consider the hypotheticals of option C. So, suppose our answer is that maybe a square-circle could exist in the extra-mental world. What would be the mental implications of this possibility? Well, even according to eigenstate, the LOI, LNC and LEM are necessary axioms for us to actually think about anything. But if you try to think about a square-circle (beyond the words themselves) what do you get? Nada. It's impossible to picture or conceptualize or think about meaningfully in any way, because it contravenes first principles of logic and right reasoning. What, then, would happen to a person mentally if they came across a square-circle in the world? It seems to follow necessarily that they would be unable to mentally process it as it actually existed. This seems to open the door to three possible scenarios: 1) The square-circle would appear distorted in some way that was utterly incomprehensible to the person, recognized only as being indiscernible. 2) The square-circle would be utterly imperceptible to the person, as though it weren't even there. 3) The person's mind would forcefully warp the square-circle into something other than it actually was so that it could be mentally perceived and processed by the person. If either scenario 1 or 2 were true, it would be conducive to the possibility of gaining certain knowledge of at least some things in the extra-mental world, since it would mean that everything that is perceivable and discernible to the human mind is actually in harmony with the LOI, LNC and LEM, as anything that is not would either be completely imperceptible or utterly indiscernible to the human mind (note that this is not the same as saying that whatever cannot be directly perceived by humans is therefore in contradiction of the LOI, LNC and LEM) On the flip side, if scenario 3 were true, we would be utterly unable to identify anything (whether some entity or some state of affairs) that did not conform to the LOI, LNC or LEM, even if it were staring us right in the face. This would completely undermine our ability to analyze evidence, weigh competing theories, assess the outcomes of experiments, or draw any kind of reliable rational conclusions about anything based on either observable evidence or the application of logic, because it would be entirely possible that any given piece of evidence is something completely different than we think is, with no hope of ever being able to find out. Science would thereby be destroyed, as would be any basis for favoring a rational and coherent worldview over an irrational and incoherent one. If all evidence that could possibly be marshalled in favor of one view over another contradictory view is not only open to question but could in fact be something utterly different than it seems, possibly actually supporting that contradictory view, and without any possibility of us knowing or ever finding out, or if the views that conflict in our minds could be identical when applied to the extra-mental world, then on what grounds can we argue that holding a rational worldview is commendable or virtuous rather than just some different kind of delusion? HeKSHeKS
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
11:33 AM
11
11
33
AM
PDT
HeKS
But don’t eigenstate and LH hold that A=A does not actually apply necessarily to the external world . . .
Yes, they do. Our work is far from done. But in 288 I was just celebrating a victory -- no matter how small -- of reason over madness. God knows such victories are rare enough; we should stop to celebrate them when they do occur.Barry Arrington
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
09:47 AM
9
09
47
AM
PDT
Barry, But don't eigenstate and LH hold that A=A does not actually apply necessarily to the external world and that it is simply a useful axiom for thinking about things and therefore not an actual basis for any infallible knowledge? And don't they further hold that A=A is only infallibly "true" as a definition, which is not subject to being either true or false as a definition? Furthermore, it seemed to me that either eigenstate or LH (I can't remember which) confused an analytic proposition as being identical with a definition (which holds a certain irony) rather than being a proposition that is true by definition. Obviously there's a strong connection between the two, but "definition" and "analytic proposition" don't mean exactly the same thing. For example, the statement "all bachelors are unmarried" is an analytic proposition, but it is not a definition. The meaning of the word "bachelor" is not exhausted by the term "unmarried" (it only applies to men), nor is the set of persons who can be described as "unmarried" identical to the set of persons who can rightly be described as "bachelors" (women can also be unmarried). HeKSHeKS
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
09:32 AM
9
09
32
AM
PDT
HeKS, Allow me to catch you up a bit. After two weeks of resistance, we finally dragged LH kicking and screaming into admitting the infallibility of the law of identity. In the end it was not our arguments that did the trick. It was because even elmininative materialist eigenstate -- despite the fact that he believes his own experiences of subjective self-awareness and subject-object duality are illusions -- is not stupid enough to deny the infallibility of the proposition A=A. So LH is now with us on the possibility of infallible knowledge. Now if we could just get him to stop believing he may be Mount Everest . . .Barry Arrington
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
09:10 AM
9
09
10
AM
PDT
@Barry #226
LH, you don’t seem to understand what HeKS is getting at. He qualified the statement with “where he can understand.” Every single time I understand the predicate is included in the subject, I will understand it is an analytic proposition. And every time I understand it is not, I will understand it is a synthetic proposition. HeKs statement is a tautology. Any time I understand the nature of a proposition, it is impossible for me to be mistaken about the nature of a proposition.
Exactly. Also, I found this comment from LH rather interesting:
Can he? If we wrote down a thousand propositions and asked him to assess each one, as either an analytic and synthetic proposition, he’d get each one right? If we gave him that test every day for ten years, he’d never make a mistake? This is an astonishing proposition to me. People make mistakes.
People make mistakes? Is he sure? Is LH therefore absolutely certain that error exists? HeKSHeKS
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
09:02 AM
9
09
02
AM
PDT
@Popperian #118
This series of OPs started with trying to point out that what we end up with are moral problems to solve. Unless one can infallibly identify an infallible source, then infallibly interpret it, how does Barry, or anyone else, have any other recourse other than to conjecture solutions to moral problems, then criticize them? No one has explained how this is possible, in practice.
If you look back through my comments in this thread you will see that I haven't been discussing any ability to infallibly know objective moral truths one way or the other. I entered this discussion because I saw people arguing against the validity of the Law of Identity and other basic rules of logic and right thinking, and making the obviously self-defeating claim that we might use argument and reason to undermine and disprove these, and that we ought to operate under an ongoing doubt about the truth of these most basic principles of rational thought.
In the same sense, how do you infallibly know anything is indeed an A instead of a B or something else we haven’t identified yet?
You seem to be confusing ideas here. A=A is about telling us that A is itself, and that A has distinct identity. It is not about telling us whether some particular X is some A or some B, where A and B are distinct identities and X has some definition that corresponds to the identity of one or the other. What A=A does do is point to the fact that A!=~A, that A is not equal to something that is not itself, that A can't be both itself and not itself at the same time and in the same sense, which would contravene the Law of Identity. Thus we have the Law of Non-Contradiction. So, if some particular X has a definition that corresponds to identity B, and if identity B is not contained within identity A (i.e. if B is not just a different name for A), then we know that X!=A, because X=B, and B=~A. More generally, we are led to see that the world is divided up into things that are either A or ~A. No particular X could fall into both categories at the same time, since that would entail being both A and not-A at the same time, in contravention of the Law of Non-Contradiction and, in turn, the Law of Identity. Further, no X could fail to be either A or ~A, such that it is neither, as the Law of Identity sets A off as distinct from everything that is not itself, leaving no crack between A and ~A for any X to fall through. And, thus, we have the Law of the Excluded Middle. So, you asked:
how do you infallibly know anything is indeed an A instead of a B or something else we haven’t identified yet?
But in this, you're missing the point. The laws of Identity, Non-Contradiction and the Excluded Middle are what make it even sensible to consider that A and B could be distinct things, and that some X could possibly be one and not the other.
Unless you do, A=A isn’t actually going to help you solve problems, in practice.
Except in the sense that it is the whole basis for the possibility of solving problems in the first place.
And you’re asking why I’m having such “difficulty getting it”?
Yes, absolutely, and I'm still asking. As soon as you start talking about how these first principles of right reasoning could potentially be undermined through argument and rational criticism then it becomes apparent that you are not getting it. It is a self-defeating endeavor, as the degree to which you might hypothetically succeed is precisely the degree to which you undermine your own success, since you cannot possibly argue against the validity of the LOI, LNC and LEM without using the LOI, LNC and LEM, and so any success in undermining them would cripple your own argument against them. Realizing this, it is simply silly to suggest that we should operate under an ongoing doubt about the validity of these first principles, where "ongoing" means after we've recognized the obviously self-defeating nature of the doubt.
IOW, if criticism really does rest on A=A, but you cannot infallibly identify anything as an A
You are mixing up two ideas here, as I pointed out above. A=A is not about identifying some X as an A, such that the term "A" is being used in two very different ways. A=A is about understanding that something is itself as opposed to something else that is not itself. A=A, X=X, G=G, and so on.
then, by your own foundational “standard” there can be no criticism, knowledge, etc.
Of course there can. It is made possible by and derived from the application of these first principles of logic and right reasoning. They are what make criticism even possible. Criticism and knowledge is impossible if two logically contradictory propositions can both be equally true at the same time or if it is impossible, in principle, to distinguish between outcomes.
That’s what I mean by holding knowledge and reason hostage.
You mean that reason is held hostage by insisting on the validity of the very first principles that make reason possible in the first place? You mean that reason, criticism and knowledge can be set free to really blossom by allowing that logically contradictory propositions could be equally true at the same time and that all possible outcomes could be identical?
What is the alternative? If you’re familiar with epistemology, I’m a Popperian in that we start out with a problem, or for which we conjecture solutions to that problem, then criticize those solution and discard errors we find. That’s my “view” on the growth of knowledge.
I'm happy for you. But I'd be even happier for you if you realized that this process presupposes the validity of the first principles of logic and becomes completely unhinged and useless if those principles are invalid.
This includes giving up the quest for justificationism.
I hope you understand that there is a difference between justifying and proving your beliefs as true (or even as cohering with other beliefs you hold) and ensuring that your beliefs are simply rational (i.e. in accord with the basic principles of logic and right reasoning).
To summarize, with each infallible authority described in each OP, one has had to use reason and criticism to determine when defer to the supposedly infallible authority. Reason always comes first. Regardless if that authoritative sources is God, our senses, or even A=A.
Reason always comes first ... even before A=A? Huh?! A=A, being the first basic principle of right reason is now an "authority" which must be made subject to reason and criticism? Huh?! Your summary is utterly incoherent. It is word salad. It is a flock of bleachers feeding their baby oranges speaker chairs.
A=A is an extremely hard to vary explanation, just as 2+2=4.
Huh? A=A is extremely hard to vary? And the understatement award goes to.... If you vary it, rationality comes to an end.
I know of no good expansions that suggest otherwise, Bad explanations would be along the lines that just some things are liable to be something other than what it is, while others are not
There's an easier way to word that "bad explanation". It goes like this: "Sometimes the Law of Non-Contradiction is broken". Can you figure out when that is the case? No? Then you can't figure out when it is not the case. Congratulations. Rationality has been destroyed ... again.
or that some capricious being decides to occasionally break this rule for fun, etc.
Except for the fact that theists maintain that God cannot do what it is logically impossible to do, and hence the reason they point out that certain atheist arguments against God are misguided, as they misconstrue use of the term "omnipotent" to mean "can do anything, including what is logically impossible", which is simply not the case.HeKS
September 16, 2015
September
09
Sep
16
16
2015
08:57 AM
8
08
57
AM
PDT
So humans can be infallible about “the most trivial exercises.”
Mount Everest is a mountain in Asia. I am a man in Colorado. A man in Colorado cannot also be a mountain in Asia. Therefore, I am infallibly certain that I am not Mount Everest. Seems like an awfully trivial exercise in reasoning there. Which side of the line do you put it LH?Barry Arrington
September 15, 2015
September
09
Sep
15
15
2015
08:58 PM
8
08
58
PM
PDT
an alternative method of exercising power to constrain criticism
No, a method for giving us a temporary (one day) respite from his insanity. Beating back madness is hard work, and I admit that I need a break from time to time.Barry Arrington
September 15, 2015
September
09
Sep
15
15
2015
08:52 PM
8
08
52
PM
PDT
So, LH, where is the line between a “trivial exercise” in reasoning and a non-trivial exercise in reasoning? Are you, Learned Hand, the infallible source of all judgments about what is trivial and what is non-trivial? No. In fact, once we pull back from the trivial world of definitions measured by their own definitions, we have to look at the practical, human question of analyzing such propositions. And there's the problem of whether humans can infallibly identify a proposition as an analytic proposition, such that no omission or entailment can be incompletely or incorrectly understood. Is such discrimination infallible? I don't think so; I think if we gave 1,000 people a test on this question 1,000 times, we would not reliably get 1,000,000 perfect answers. The possibility of error creeps in as soon as the proposition expands beyond the trivial. Are you now of the opinion that the infallible assessment of a proposition is possible only for analytic propositions? Or is your earlier ranting about Jupiter an indication that you feel it's applicable more broadly? It's hard to tell, you hide your ideas so aggressively.Learned Hand
September 15, 2015
September
09
Sep
15
15
2015
08:51 PM
8
08
51
PM
PDT
Pardon me--you put him in moderation for it, an alternative method of exercising power to constrain criticism.Learned Hand
September 15, 2015
September
09
Sep
15
15
2015
08:47 PM
8
08
47
PM
PDT
LH:
As I said, odd how the people shrieking about how easy it is to exclude error don’t seem to be able to identify how it’s actually done.
Barry:
Well, it just seem logical to me that you, having done it, can tell us how you did it.
LH:
Only be defining it to be true and not admitting any test of the proposition other than the definition itself: “Defining A as equal to A is defining A as equal to A; the proposition is not fallible if the only metric is its own definition. The reasoning process behind creating the definition, and understanding its implications, is fallible.” Which isolates human infallibility to the most trivial exercises. If we define it to be true, and our definition is the only metric, it’s true.
OK. So humans can be infallible about “the most trivial exercises.” The most trivial exercises in what? Looking up, the most logical answer seems to be a trivial exercise in reasoning about definitions and the implications thereof. So, LH, where is the line between a “trivial exercise” in reasoning and a non-trivial exercise in reasoning? Are you, Learned Hand, the infallible source of all judgments about what is trivial and what is non-trivial?Barry Arrington
September 15, 2015
September
09
Sep
15
15
2015
08:47 PM
8
08
47
PM
PDT
"You banned him for it" eigenstate has not been banned. That is a lie. Why do you feel like you can just come into this site and tell lies?Barry Arrington
September 15, 2015
September
09
Sep
15
15
2015
08:35 PM
8
08
35
PM
PDT
Well, it just seem logical to me that you, having done it, can tell us how you did it. Only be defining it to be true and not admitting any test of the proposition other than the definition itself: “Defining A as equal to A is defining A as equal to A; the proposition is not fallible if the only metric is its own definition. The reasoning process behind creating the definition, and understanding its implications, is fallible.” Which isolates human infallibility to the most trivial exercises. If we define it to be true, and our definition is the only metric, it’s true. But what about external truths? What about the moral truths that underlie this line of discussion? How can they be known infallibly? BA has nothing to say.Learned Hand
September 15, 2015
September
09
Sep
15
15
2015
08:33 PM
8
08
33
PM
PDT
I mean it couldn’t have been easy after spending literally weeks denying the possibility that a proposition could be infallible; something must have changed your mind. Tell us what changed your mind. Again, how is asking what changed your mind a “gotcha”? Eigenstate explained why you're wrong to be counting coup. You banned him for it, which is certainly easier than talking about ideas. Do you have any? I said many times that a proposition cannot be known infallibly, not that propositions in and of themselves cannot be infallibly true. You still don't understand my position, which may be one reason you're focused on gotchas rather than ideas. This idea that "A=A" is infallibly true only because it's defined as such is a new introduction to the conversation. You didn't take this approach when you were screeching about Jupiter and using it as an excuse to ban critics; you didn't take this approach when self-evident truths included moral propositions. Indeed, this entire line of inquiry stemmed originally from your assertion that objective, external self-evident truths can be known infallibly--not merely that we define them as such. But having introduced this idea, as the last refuge for your increasingly incredible idea that you have infallible faculties capable of perceiving objective external truths without error, you now are going back to prior statements and scrutinizing them in light of the latter change. My position hasn't changed, BA. I think yours has. But it's hard to tell, with all the work you do hiding your light under a bushel. BA, if your ideas work, why can't you talk about them? Why can't you discuss them without attacking the messenger?Learned Hand
September 15, 2015
September
09
Sep
15
15
2015
08:29 PM
8
08
29
PM
PDT
LH:
just an attempted gotcha
Nonsense. You arrived at a conclusion. How is it a "gotcha" to ask you how you arrived at it? I mean it couldn't have been easy after spending literally weeks denying the possibility that a proposition could be infallible; something must have changed your mind. Tell us what changed your mind. Again, how is asking what changed your mind a "gotcha"? Barry Arrington
September 15, 2015
September
09
Sep
15
15
2015
07:48 PM
7
07
48
PM
PDT
LH:
As I said, odd how the people shrieking about how easy it is to exclude error don’t seem to be able to identify how it’s actually done.
Well, it just seem logical to me that you, having done it, can tell us how you did it.Barry Arrington
September 15, 2015
September
09
Sep
15
15
2015
07:46 PM
7
07
46
PM
PDT
Another comment with no thought, no argument, no advancement of a conversation--just an attempted gotcha. As I said, odd how the people shrieking about how easy it is to exclude error don’t seem to be able to identify how it’s actually done.Learned Hand
September 15, 2015
September
09
Sep
15
15
2015
07:43 PM
7
07
43
PM
PDT
1 2 3 11

Leave a Reply