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Now Materialists Are Trying to Turn Occam’s Razor On Its Head

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 Give me a break will ya.  In their feverish efforts to prop up the teetering materialist paradigm, to justify the unjustifiable, our materialist friends have now resorted to saying, essentially, black is white.  In a recent post a commenter turns Occam’s Razor on its head when he states:

 

It is a common misconception among ID supporters that scientists deliberately defy Occam’s Razor and pursue multiverse theories simply because they are uncomfortable with the idea of a designer.  This is false.

 

The commenter cites physicist Aurélien Barrau in support.  In this article Barrau states:

 

In any case, it is important to underline that the multiverse is not a hypothesis invented to answer a specific question.  It is simply a consequence of a theory usually built for another purpose. Interestingly, this consequence also solves many complexity and naturalness problems.  In most cases, it even seems that the existence of many worlds is closer to Ockham’s razor (the principle of simplicity) than the ad hoc assumptions that would have to be added to models to avoid the existence of other universes.

 

The sheer presumption, the overweening fatuity, of these statements (both the commenter’s and Barrau’s) beggars belief.  One must conclude that either they simply have no idea what Occam’s Razor means or they are deliberately trying to distort its meaning to support their conclusion.  I suspect the latter.

 

So, to set things straight, we will discuss first, what the Razor means, and secondly how it applies to the multiverse.

 

What Does Occam’s Razor Say?

 

William of Ockham (or, commonly, “Occam”) was a Franciscan friar and scholastic philosopher from the village of Ockham in Surrey, England who lived from the late 1200’s to the mid-1300’s.  Today, he is best remembered for Occam’s Razor.  Ockham’s formulation of the Razor, like all learned texts of the time, was expressed in Latin.  He stated:  entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.”  This is usually translated: “entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity.” 

 

What Does Occam’s Razor Mean?

 

Occam’s Razor is anothe way of statig the “principle of parsimony.”  Britannica Concise Encyclopedia states that Occam’s Razor is:

 

A rule in science and philosophy stating that entities should not be multiplied needlessly.  This rule is interpreted to mean that the simplest of two or more competing theories is preferable and that an explanation for unknown phenomena should first be attempted in terms of what is already known.  Also called law of parsimony.

 

Karl Popper argued that a preference for a simpler theory over a complex theory, other things being equal, is justified by his falsifiability criterion, because a simpler theory applies to more empirical cases and therefore is more “testable” and may be falsified more easily. 

 

If Multiverse Theory Violates the Razor, Does that Mean it is False?

 

We concede at the outset that should we conclude multiverse theory violates the Razor that would not, in itself, be the death knell for the theory.  Occam’s Razor is not a scientific theory itself.  It is a heuristic maxim.  Thus, a theory could violate the Razor and still be true.

 

Nevertheless, the Razor has stood the test of time, and remains useful.  A theory that violates the Razor has less standing than a theory that does not.  That is the very reason our commenter and Barrau have tried so hard to fit multiverse theory within the confines of the Razor, which, as we shall see, is like trying to fit Andre the Giant’s foot into a ballerina’s slipper.  No matter how you stretch it, it ain’t gonna fit.

 

Does Multiverse Theory Violate the Razor?

 

Of course it does.  Let’s go back to the original formulation of the Razor:  “entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity.” 

 

The multiverse theory posits that there are an infinite number of universes, and we just happen to live in one where the conditions for the existance of life are just right.  In other words, if there are an infinite number of universes, every condition that is not logically impossible will somewhere be instantiated. 

 

Thus, multiverse theory clearly violates the Razor. because it does not keep entities to an absolute minimum.  Indeed, by definition, the multiverse theory multiplies entities to an infinite degree!  This is why our commenter’s and Barrau’s statements are so staggering.  Far from meeting the conditions of the Razor, multiverse theory is the exact opposite of a theory that would meet the conditions of the Razor.  In other words, if multiverse theory, which posits the existence of infinite entities, does not violate the Razor, no theory does.

 

Comments
-----ribcyzanski writes, "Your argument would make sense only if your brain represented a particular ball by forming a little ball of the appropriate size in your brain tissue. Then it would be true that two of those balls could not occupy the same space at the same time. I’m pretty sure that our brains don’t contain lots of little physical balls, and little physical people, and little physical hot fudge sundaes. Nor would they need to in order to represent these concepts. Wouldn’t you agree?" Why on earth would you characterize what I said in that fashion? There are two things to think about: the objects being investigated and the investigator. Let’s take them in order. The objects of the investigation could be two chairs. Each of these chairs contains a particular, that is, all its sensible qualities, and a universal, one might say, its “chairness.” The universal exists, “in” the chair. It has a real immaterial existence. It is not just an idea. The chairs would have something in common even if no one ever saw them. It is more the collection of all its parts, it has a real essence. That is why taking away one of its parts will not change what it is as long as it still has the form of a chair. It will simply become a broken chair. No one could seriously think of saying that, as material objects, these two chairs can occupy the same space at the same time. On the other hand, they do have something in common, a oneness, a commonness that is more than an idea. What they share is a real, immaterial, universal. Obviously, this oneness, this universal, cannot be “in” the matter, but it most definitely is “in” the chair. Each chair is distinct from all other chairs, but each chair has something in common with all other chairs. The distinctness and the commonness are both real—not imaginary. When the investigator comes to experience this chair, two things happen. First, he experiences “this” chair, (leather, high neck, brown etc) as a particular, meaning that he has a sense experience. He cannot experience it as a universal, he cannot feel it, see it, or touch it, or even imagine it as a universal, because his brain is an organ for sensing, not an organ for knowing, it cannot conceive of what all chairs have in common. If you ask the investigator to imagine a chair, he cannot imagine “chairness,” he can only imagine some shape, size, texture of a chair. On the other hand, his mind can conceive of “chairness,” because, though it is dependent on the brain for its operation, it does, nevertheless, function as an organ of knowledge. It creates a mental IMAGE (obviously not a physical chair) that corresponds to the universal outside the mind. This image is a concept and REPRESENTS something outside the mind that is real. Materialists deny both the reality of the universal outside the mind and the reality of the image of a universal inside the mind. They don’t understand that knowing is both a sense experience and a mental experience, which is another name for epistemological realism. It is through this MODERATE duality that we know how a given object is different from all other objects in its class, and what it has in common with them. It is, therefore, possible to fall into two materialist extremes: One extreme is rationalism, whereby, the mental operation is acknowledged and the sense function is denied. The other extreme is radical empiricism, in which the sense operation is acknowledged and the mental operation denied. Materialism fails in many respects. First, it confuses the investigator with the investigation, treating them as if they were both of the same substance. Second, it denies both the reality of universals outside the mind and mental images that correspond to those universals. For the materialist, everything is particular and nothing is universal. Everything is in flux; nothing is constant. Naturally, this ties in very well to materialist Darwinism. Without universals, there is no morality, no objective truth, no “human nature,” no purpose, no design, no justice, no unity, no truth, no beauty, no goodness, nothing at all of any consequence. That is why it is important for everyone to understand that your world view of materialism is both destructive and false.StephenB
November 30, 2008
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ribczynski writes, "Stephen, you really ought to do a little research before issuing these categorical statements of yours." You really ought to read more carefully before writing. I have already done the research and have chosen my words carefully. You will notice that I expressly pointed out that there was no such thing as a “rule.” which forbade scientists from deviating from natural causes, meaning that there was no such thing as institutional enforcement of the principle that this is the only acceptable methodology. The quote you refer to was an exhortation for scientists to abandon the notion that God acts frivolously and to analyze nature in a systematic way. It was not a rule to be administered for all people, at all places, and at all times. Much less was it a call to disfranchise other scientists and persecute them for disagreeing with their point of view.. You materialist bias is showing, and it does not help your analysis.StephenB
November 30, 2008
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I wrote:
I’m surprised that this isn’t obvious to you, but the practice of methodological naturalism long preceded the coining of the term itself.
StephenB replied:
No, as a matter of fact, it did not. There was no such rule, and I invite you to provide one example in all of history to support your assertion.
Stephen, Is the 14th century early enough for you? In his book Science and the Study of God, p. 79, Alan Padgett quotes Jean Buridan:
Natural philosophers like Roger Bacon (ca. 1220-1292) and Jean Buridan (ca. 1292-1358) examined the secondary causes by which God upheld the common course of nature. Buridan wrote, for example, that "in natural philosophy we ought to accept actions and dependencies as if they always proceed in a natural way."
That's practically a textbook definition of methodological naturalism. Padgett adds:
We should note, however, that Buridan was devoutly Christian and that his natural philosopohy was framed within a Christian worldview. After the quotation just given, for example, Buridan goes on to state, "Nevertheless God is the cause of this world."
So Buridan is a perfect example of how one can embrace methodological naturalism without being a philosophical naturalist. Stephen, you really ought to do a little research before issuing these categorical statements of yours. They make you look sloppy and careless.ribczynski
November 30, 2008
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StephenB wrote:
Universals cannot be in matter. Matter particularizes because it takes up space. Take two balls that appear to be absolutely identical. (take two of anything) —they are two because one takes up this space and another takes up that space. If they took up the same space, they would be one. If fact, two balls CANNOT take up the same space, meaning they cannot be “one” in matter. No “one” can be in matter, no concept—no universal. The only way to counter the point is to suggest that two concrete entities can occupy the same space. Now explain to me why you think that they can.
Stephen, You're confusing the concept being represented with the representation itself. The concept may encompass more than one instance, or even an infinite number of instances, but the representation itself is just one representation. To repeat: It is just one particular representation that represents multiple members of a class, or even an infinite number. There is no reason why one representation cannot be realized in physical form. I can't write all of the odd integers on a finite piece of paper, but I can represent them there as "all integers not evenly divisible by 2". Your argument would make sense only if your brain represented a particular ball by forming a little ball of the appropriate size in your brain tissue. Then it would be true that two of those balls could not occupy the same space at the same time. I'm pretty sure that our brains don't contain lots of little physical balls, and little physical people, and little physical hot fudge sundaes. Nor would they need to in order to represent these concepts. Wouldn't you agree?ribczynski
November 30, 2008
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-----ribczynski: "I’m surprised that this isn’t obvious to you, but the practice of methodological naturalism long preceded the coining of the term itself." No, as a matter of fact, it did not. There was no such rule, and I invite you to provide one example in all of history to support your assertion. That science has come to be "primarily" about natural causes is obvious; that science cannot be "exclusively" about natural causes should be equally obvious. At no time in history has any scientist stated that science is exclusively about natural causes. How could they? Science is always changing. It should be obvious that since the scientist knows which problem he wants to solve, only he can choose the appropriate methods. One can hardly use methodological naturalism to acquire knowledge about the contemporary phenomenon of biological "information." That should be equally obvious.StephenB
November 30, 2008
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StephenB wrote:
Methodological naturalism was invented in the 1980’s for one purpose and one purpose only—-to combat the science of intelligent design. That is simply a fact that can be verified by consulting the literature on the philosophy of science. You cannot find one reference to the subject at any earlier time.
Stephen, I'm surprised that this isn't obvious to you, but the practice of methodological naturalism long preceded the coining of the term itself.
In theory, a superHUMAN identity could have designed the universe, but methodological naturalism will not permit that either.
Of course not. A superhuman entity who created the universe and exists outside of it is a supernatural being. Most people would call it God. Methodological naturalism doesn't permit the invocation of supernatural entities.
That is not a good argument...your point is hardly persuasive. I might as well suggest that you concede on the basis that vjtorley did NOT think Adler was wrong.
It was a suggestion, not an argument.ribczynski
November 30, 2008
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Barry Arrington: "In other words, if there are an infinite number of universes, every condition that is not logically impossible will somewhere be instantiated." Even this is not true. There are an infinite number of even numbers. Not one of them is odd. There are an infinite number of rational numbers. Not one of them is irrational. And so on. It is not enough to suppose an infinite number of entities. One must suppose that the prolific variation both exists and happens to cover all desired possibilities -- but (key requirement) for no directed reason at all. However, there is no inherent reason to suppose an undirected/random infinity would supply this. Even supposing infinite universes (for no directed reason), there could easily be an infinity of dead universes. So the multiverse faith system must assert, not merely infinite universes, but rather that there are sufficient universes of sufficient kind and variety such that we can disregard any indication of design (now or in the future) due to the perceived improbability of the state of the universe. In short, blank-check denial is required. As others have noted, this must be selectively applied only to questions of directed vs. undirected causes, since its general application would make anything possible and the ruling out of anything impossible. For the materialists that want to rule out reports of events that violate materialist expectations, that is a deal breaker, even though they have no basis for saying that in the infinity of universes, this universe couldn't have been one that would permit such an event. Nothing apparently exceptional is excludable, regardless of improbability. Multiverse is selective blank-check denial of design, not a framework that anyone seriously applies uniformly.ericB
November 30, 2008
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Patrick: what I mean is that specification, especially in biological systems, is an all-or-nothing judgement (it is either persent or absent in a single piece of information, however defined), and is context-dependent. I did not mean that specification is not objectively present, but that it is a meaning whose evaluation must be formalized by an observer. The observer does two important things: first of all he must define the piece of information for which we want to evaluate the presence of CSI. That is important, because we can evaluate CSI at different levels: a single protein, or a protein machine which involves different proteins (like a cascade), or a whole cell, and so on. Obviously, everything is easier if we remain at the single protein level, but it is intuitive that CSI complexity tends to increase, and not linearly, in complex systems. For instance, the complexity of a protein cascade, or of the flagellum, has to consider not only the sum of the search spaces of each individual protein, but also the search space of all possible interactions netween those proteins, which is influenced by extremely complex considerations of regulation, availability, cellular location, time patterns, and so on. After having defined the piece of information for which the calculation is being executed, the observer has to compute the search space (easy for single proteins, more difficult for complex systems). Then he has to define the function in the appropriate context. For instance, for an enzyme the function could be to catalyze a biochemical reaction which has meaning and usefulness in the cell which is being observed, with a minimum level of effectiveness. For the flagellum, the function could be that of providing effective and reliable motion in space. And so on. The observation of a specific function in the appropriate context is in itself a positive judgement of specification: we are observing a piece of information which has a discernible function in the appropriate context where that information if observed. Therefore it is functionally specified. That judgement, IMO, is very easy for most biological structures, because almost all biological structures we know are highly functional. But it is important that we define exactly the function and the context, for the next point. Now the observer has to compute the complexity. That is the most difficult part, because it requires at least an approximate judgement about the size of the target space, the functional space inside the search space. And that has to be done according to the definition of function and context we have given in the previous point. In other words, how bif is the target space of sequnces which can perform that function in that context with that minimum of effectiveness? At present we cannot usually have a detailed measure of that quantity, but as I have argued we can make reasonable assumptions, or at least assign reasonable limits. But I am sure that we will quickly understand more about that, especially through the growing experiences in protein engineering. Finally, the observer must be sure that no law of necessity can generate that piece of information, even with the contribution of randomness. That is easy, because it can be easily shown that there is no known law, or combination of laws, or special probability distribution, or else, which can generate the richness of functional information we observe in biological structures outside of design. I would like to add that, if we just ascertain that the information is specified and that its probability is lower than the UPB, we have qualitatively assessed the presence of CSI in it. But if we can in some way give a quantification, even approximate, of the target space, we can give a quantitative, or semi-quantitative, evaluation of the complexity of that instance of CSI. An interesting and creative application of similar principles was in the paper about Shannon entropy in protein families. Do you remember it?gpuccio
November 30, 2008
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StephenB Matter and energy are equivalent according to the formula e=mc^2. Both matter and energy also exhibit wave/particle duality. In the wave state two waves can occupy the same space at the same time but are still each distinct and upon measurement or observation separable. Matter and energy are exceedingly strange at the smallest (quantum) scales and there's no theory of nature yet that bridges the great divide between quantum and classical mechanics.DaveScot
November 30, 2008
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-----ribczynski writes, “Lots of assertions about what the brain and mind can and cannot do, but you provide absolutely no justification. Tell us why you think a material brain cannot represent" Universals cannot be in matter. Matter particularizes because it takes up space. Take two balls that appear to be absolutely identical. (take two of anything) ---they are two because one takes up this space and another takes up that space. If they took up the same space, they would be one. If fact, two balls CANNOT take up the same space, meaning they cannot be “one” in matter. No “one” can be in matter, no concept—no universal. The only way to counter the point is to suggest that two concrete entities can occupy the same space. Now explain to me why you think that they can. -----“Failing that, why not follow crow thrall’s lead? (He’s the one who linked to Adler’s argument.) After some debate, he conceded that Adler was wrong.” That is not a good argument. Perhaps CT thought, like many, that Adler was a radical dualist like Descartes. Many make that error. In any case, your point is hardly persuasive. I might as well suggest that you concede on the basis that vjtorley did NOT think Adler was wrong.StephenB
November 30, 2008
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-----“Not true. If it did, it would lead to absurdities like denying that the pyramids of Egypt were designed. Methodological naturalism precludes supernatural design, but it does not preclude design in general. Scientists aren’t idiots, Stephen.” Incorrect. Methodological naturalism was invented in the 1980’s for one purpose and one purpose only----to combat the science of intelligent design. That is simply a fact that can be verified by consulting the literature on the philosophy of science. You cannot find one reference to he subject at any earlier time. Also, it forbids any inference to design that COULD be INTERPRETRED as supernatural even, as it turns out, if the identity was not supernatural. In theory, a superHUMAN identity could have designed the universe, bue methodological naturalism will not permit that either. Once again, you resort to the meaningless natural/supernatural dichotomy. With regard to scientists being idiots, I will deal with that on a case by case basis.StephenB
November 30, 2008
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Hmmph. Seems I missed most of the conversation. Dembski addressed the fact that ID is not a supernaturalist theory in his book The Design Revolution, devoting a chapter to it. Here's another quote from Bill from this very site:
The conflation of ID with supernaturalism is inappropriate. What's at issue is the nature of nature. Is nature the sort of place where telic organizing principles can operate? That's all ID requires. It does not require supernatural designers who operate outside nature. Intelligence can be a PERFECTLY NATURAL aspect of the physical world.
So what it really comes down to is defining intelligence. We know it exists and operates, but we cannot currently describe how in detail. We also do not know what type of phenomena can generate intelligence (there can be multiple). It's sort of like how in the pre-Newton era we could see gravity operating but could do little to describe it. gpuccio,
I don’t agree that “there is no direct observation or measure of CSI”. The complexity part of CSI is measurable, even if it is often difficult to measure it exactly.
Discussed on Thanks for Professor Olofsson Although I'd say that the measurement part is easy. There's four possible states. The hard part is figuring out what information is linked to the functional system.
On the contrary, I agree that the specification part is not measurable, and is assigned by the observer. we could say it works this way: the observer (an intelligent conscious being) recognizes in input (cognition) the meaning inherent in the observed information (specification), which was imparted to it in output by the designer.
I would have to disagree, at least in regards to biological information and many other categories of design. For example, you are perfectly correct when it comes to much of art. But the specification for a signal could be the encoding or cipher. Mount Rushmore's Specification is that it bears the likeness of the presidents. And biological information is a direct abstraction of machine functionality, which is the Specification independent of any observer.Patrick
November 30, 2008
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Anyone who thinks Dembski is committed to supernatural explanations clearly never read anything he's written on the nature of nature. In Defense of Intelligent Design In a nutshell Dembski argues that intelligence or "mind" is a part of nature and we simply don't know the extent of it or what conspires to cause the emergence of it. We have only our own minds as proof that minds exist in nature. We see complex machines in nature with many interdependent components all arranged to serve a purpose yet wherever the origin of those machines can be determined unambiguously we find they are creations of mind. Some of us suppose that mind is an emergent property of matter ordered in just the right way. Suppose that it is. According to the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics the order in a closed system does not increase, it only decreases. Therefore, if that holds, then all the order in the entire universe, which as far as we know is a closed system, must have been present since its beginning. So if mind is an emergent property of order and the greatest order in the universe was present at the very beginning, what speaks against the case that mind has been a part of nature as long as nature itself has existed?DaveScot
November 30, 2008
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ribczynski: Regarding you assertion that concepts can be in matter: you seem to assume that having a concept of X is equivalent to being able to reliably distinguish between X's and non-X's. Not so. While the view you have put forward might seem plausible at first glance, it fails to account for some fairly straightforward cases. For instance, the concept of a closed three-sided figure is logically distinct from that of a closed figure having three angles; and yet the two concepts necessarily coincide: all trilaterals are also triangles. Which concept, if either, does a computer have? Questions of intensionality (as distinguished from intentionality) arise here. Professor David Oderberg discusses the triangle case, and the issue of whether animals can have concepts, in his paper, "Concepts, Dualism and the Human Intellect" in A. Antonietti, A. Corradini, and E.J. Lowe (eds) Psycho-Physical Dualism Today : An Interdisciplinary Approach (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books/Rowman and Littlefied, 2008): 211-33, at Web address http://www.rdg.ac.uk/AcaDepts/ld/Philos/dso/papers/Concepts,%20Dualism%20and%20Human%20Intellect.pdf . Although Professor Oderberg's remarks are chiefly directed at those who would argue that the difference between human and animal concepts is a purely quantitative one, his arguments should also give pause to those who would contend that the discriminatory capacities of computers show that they are capable of having concepts.vjtorley
November 30, 2008
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ID does not require the supernatural. Atheism requires faith. Attempts to deny reality -- that "design" exists and has observable characteristics -- is anti-science.tribune7
November 30, 2008
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ribczynski: First of all, I have always been able to answer your arguments, and I have done it. If you don't like, or don't understand, my answer, it's not my fault. Frankly, saying that "you hide behind what you claim are ambiguities in the terminology. That gives you an excuse for not having an answer." is really unfair. But at this point, that does not surprise me much. I hide behind nothing. I have defined my terminology, and asked that you do the same, when the meaning is ambiguous. I have stressed that it is useless to fught about words, when we are not sure what words mean. Just a note about our previous discussion about consciousness: it is perfectly true that I believe that a person in a coma or in a dreamless sleep still has some consciousness, although that consciousness is percieving something very different from what normal waking consciousness perceives. I have affirmed that belief, but I have not asked you to share it: I have only affirmed, and I do it again here, that you have no way to prove your opinion, that instead consciousness is completely absent there. Indeed, you did not even answer my observation that, at least in sleep with dream, we are sure that consciousness is there, while in a previous post you had affirmed quickly that consciousness is absent in sleep. As our discussion was about NDEs, which certainly are not a common state of consciousness, and ehich seem to show that consciousness continues to exist even when there is no way to objectively detect it from outside, including measurement of brain function, my reasoning was completely appropriate. Against that, you just appeal to how "the rest of the world" uses words in common language, while that has completely no relevance in a difficult cognitive discussion about a difficult cognitive point, and them accuse me of "hiding" behind ambiguities: that's really a very poor trick. But again, I am not surprised. But let's go to the "naturality" again. You say: "You’re doing the same thing now, pretending that there is some insurmountable ambiguity in the words “natural” and “supernatural” that makes it impossible to engage my argument. Yet we can easily define our terms precisely enough to make discussion possible" No, I am not saying that "there is some insurmountable ambiguity": I am saying that ambiguity remains until people clearly define their terms, and that terms like "natural" are often used withour being clearly defined, including by you. If the term is define clearly, I have no problem. You can call it "natural" ot "nice" or "cool", it's OK for me. It's not the term which counts, but its meaning. So, as I notice that in your last post, maybe because of my "hiding pressures", you have taken the time to give some understandable definitions, I can finally engage better your arguments. Let's do that. You say: "Let’s define two categories, A and B. Category A includes matter, energy, space, and anything else, discovered or (contra Patrick) undiscovered, that operates according to what Dembski calls chance and necessity. Category B is everything else — assuming there is anything else. Category B includes gods, souls, immaterial minds, demons, ghosts, angels, etc. — what most people refer to as the supernatural." So, if I understand well, category A includes everything which operates according to chance and necessity, while category B includes everything else which exists (if it exists) which is not in category A. So, the only discriminating criterion is the fact that the behaviour of objects in A must be fully understandable in terms of chance and necessity. You call A "natural" and B "supernatural". I have no problem tith that. That is a clear definition. You have to admit that it is not an intuitive one, and that I had no way to understand that you meant that with "natural" and "supernatural", neither in terms of common language, nor in terms of common philosophy. I have to mention that the assumption that nature is all that works according to law and necessity is a very strong apriori assumption, and a very specific and reductionist approach to the problem of nature. So it must be clear that in the following discussion I accept your definition only here and because I am talking to you and we have agreed on it in this context, but that I would never accept it in a general context. So, according to your definition, my point is very simple: there are a lot of things which are not in "A" in reality: some of them we know (practically all the events in consciousness); some we may discover (for instance, dark energy could well be found not to be in "A": I am not affirming that, but it is absolutely possible, as we have no idea what it is). Another important point: if entities in "B" exist, there is noe reason apriori to affirm that they cannot interact with entities in "A". In a sense, we cannot even be completely sure that there is any entity in "A", but I can accept that as a reasonable hypothesis for now. You say: "In terms of those definitions, Dembski’s view can be described thus: 1. Entities in category A cannot generate CSI. 2. At least some entities in category B can. 3. Therefore, all CSI in the universe ultimately comes from category B, whether it is present at the beginning of the universe or inserted thereafter." At last, that's a good summary of the conclusions of ID. "In normal English, Dembski’s ideas about CSI absolutely require the supernatural." Let's say "in your English". As I have said, I find no reason in general to link the concept of natural and supernatural to "completely describable according to chance and necessity". "It’s not just that there is a supernatural interpretation of his ideas. The ideas themselves demand the existence of the supernatural as a source for the CSI we see around us. Without the supernatural, his ideas don’t work." With the above definition of supernatural, that's certainly correct. But, as your defiintion of supernatural has no general value, that has no particular consequence in the general debate. If you are trying to link any connotative meaning to your definition of "supernatural", then you are failinf. In your definition, "supernatural" only means "completely describable in terms of chance and necessity. Substitute that in your description of ID thought, and you will see that it is perfectly reasonable and consistent. "Yet amazingly, you continue to deny this obvious implication. 'For instance, I do believe that the designer is God, but that conviction does not come from ID'." Why are you amazed? I believe the designer is God for other reasons (am I free to believe what I believe?) ID makes me scientifically sure that there must be a designer. What is the reason of your amazement? "I think that’s true of most ID supporters, who see ID as providing scientific support for ideas that they already hold for non-scientific reasons." I certainly see ID as providing support for ideas that I already hold for non-scientific reasons, just like an atheist certainly sees darwinian evolution as providing support for ideas he already holds for non-scientific reasons. Where is the problem? Anybody is free to see scientific results in the more general view of reality that he entertains. Still I can't see your point or the reason of your apparent indignation. "The issue is whether ID itself requires the supernatural. " It requires the supernatural as you have defined it. In other words, it requires entities which cannot be completely described in terms of chance and necessity, entities like consciousness and intelligence. I thought that was clear from the beginning. Have we discussed so long for that simple and obvious point? "Dembski’s formulation of ID as science requires the existence of the supernatural/category B as a source of CSI. This is not a religious or philosophical view — it’s the scientific view that must follow if you accept Dembski’s premises (I, of course, do not)." I perfectly agree with you, provided that you add "the supernatural as I have defined it here", or just stick to "category B". Again, I agree with what you say here. It's absolutely trivial, but true.gpuccio
November 30, 2008
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StephenB wrote:
Your mind abstracts the universals. Your brain cannot conceive of a universal; only your mind can do that... If I experience you personally, my brain or imagination experiences your particular instance of human nature. My mind, on the other hand, understands the universal common human nature that is present in everyone. That is why I can know why you are different that everyone else, but, at the same can know what you have in common with everyone else. The brain does the former, the mind does the latter.
Lots of assertions about what the brain and mind can and cannot do, but you provide absolutely no justification. Tell us why you think a material brain cannot represent universals. Failing that, why not follow crow thrall's lead? (He's the one who linked to Adler's argument.) After some debate, he conceded that Adler was wrong.ribczynski
November 30, 2008
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StephenB wrote:
Methodological naturalism is a rule that dictates that design inferences may not be made in the name of science.
Not true. If it did, it would lead to absurdities like denying that the pyramids of Egypt were designed. Methodological naturalism precludes supernatural design, but it does not preclude design in general. Scientists aren't idiots, Stephen.
What these men [Wells and Wise] say has nothing to do with the explanatory filter or the anthropic principle or any other ID paradigm.
Who said it did? I mentioned them to show that the following statement of yours is wrong:
Even if the scientist was a raving proselytizer, his religious zeal would have nothing at to do with the quality of his scientific approach.
That is simply not true, which is why I amended it to read: Even if the scientist were a raving proselytizer, his religious zeal wouldn't necessarily have anything to do with the quality of his scientific approach.ribczynski
November 30, 2008
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gpuccio wrote:
it seems that all that is left in your arguing is a monotonous recycling of ambiguities about natural and supernatural.
gpuccio, I've noticed that when you're unable to answer my arguments, you hide behind what you claim are ambiguities in the terminology. That gives you an excuse for not having an answer. You did it on the "Horrid Doubt File" thread by claiming that someone in a dreamless sleep or in a coma is conscious, and that in a living person, consciousness is "always there." Never mind that to the rest of the world, consciousness comes and goes, and "the patient is unconscious" does not mean "the patient is dead", as it would if you were correct. You're doing the same thing now, pretending that there is some insurmountable ambiguity in the words "natural" and "supernatural" that makes it impossible to engage my argument. Yet we can easily define our terms precisely enough to make discussion possible. Let's define two categories, A and B. Category A includes matter, energy, space, and anything else, discovered or (contra Patrick) undiscovered, that operates according to what Dembski calls chance and necessity. Category B is everything else -- assuming there is anything else. Category B includes gods, souls, immaterial minds, demons, ghosts, angels, etc. -- what most people refer to as the supernatural. In terms of those definitions, Dembski's view can be described thus: 1. Entities in category A cannot generate CSI. 2. At least some entities in category B can. 3. Therefore, all CSI in the universe ultimately comes from category B, whether it is present at the beginning of the universe or inserted thereafter. In normal English, Dembski's ideas about CSI absolutely require the supernatural. It's not just that there is a supernatural interpretation of his ideas. The ideas themselves demand the existence of the supernatural as a source for the CSI we see around us. Without the supernatural, his ideas don't work. Yet amazingly, you continue to deny this obvious implication.
For instance, I do believe that the designer is God, but that conviction does not come from ID.
I think that's true of most ID supporters, who see ID as providing scientific support for ideas that they already hold for non-scientific reasons. The issue is not whether you (or anyone else) conclude that God is the creator because of ID. The issue is whether ID itself requires the supernatural. As I've shown, the fine-tuning argument and Dembski's specified complexity arguments both require the existence of the supernatural (or category B, to use our terminology) as a source of CSI.
ID is scientific theory, and in itself it cannot be committed to any philosophical or religious view.
Dembski's formulation of ID as science requires the existence of the supernatural/category B as a source of CSI. This is not a religious or philosophical view -- it's the scientific view that must follow if you accept Dembski's premises (I, of course, do not).ribczynski
November 30, 2008
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-----ribczynski writes, -----" Think of the class of all circles. When we think of this class, we aren’t holding all members of this class in our minds simultaneously. Instead, we are thinking of the characteristic that unites them: the fact that for each circle, all of its points are equidistant from a given point, the center.” No, you still don’t get it. Your brain considers anything that has been sensitized, or imagined, such as various instances of this or that-----it is particularized. Your mind abstracts the universals. Your brain cannot conceive of a universal; only your mind can do that. You can only imagine or experience this red ball or this large ball, but it is your mind that comprehends the universal, the concept of ball. -----“Um, aren’t you a bit confused here, Stephen? You’re trying to show that only the mind can represent universals, but you cite a case where the mind cannot do so. That doesn’t exactly prove your point, does it?” I am afraid that you are the one who is confused. The imagination, which is sensitized can pick on only on particulars; the intellect.which is the organ of thought, abstracts universals. Knowing has a sense component and an intellectual component. If I experience you personally, my brain or imagination experiences your particular instance of human nature. My mind, on the other hand, understands the universal common human nature that is present in everyone. That is why I can know why you are different that everyone else, but, at the same can know what you have in common with everyone else. The brain does the former, the mind does the latter. Brain=particular; mind=universal. Brain=sense; mind=intellect.StephenB
November 30, 2008
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-----ribczynski writes: "There’s absolutely nothing in there about motives. Dembski is clearly, obviously saying that ID cannot succeed as a science unless methodological naturalism is relaxed." Well, of course. Methodological naturalism is a rule that dictates that design inferences may not be made in the name of science. How can ID succeed if the academy decides in advance that it may not use its own methodology? Dembski is simply stating the obvious but you are trying to read into it some sinister motive concerning the “supernatural.” -----“I realize that this embarrasses you, and that you wish Dembski hadn’t said it, but there it is.” Why would I mind Dembski saying the only thing that can be said? It is a fact that intelligent design cannot function with the rule of methodological naturalism? Are you sure you are thinking these things through? The rule was made up especially to stop intelligent design in its tracks. This is news to you? I think that you had better go back through the literature and read up on the birth of methodological naturalism. Pay close attention to the dates. -----"There are certainly cases where religious zeal is pernicious. Think Jonathan Wells or Kurt Wise." What these men say has nothing to do with the explanatory filter or the anthropic principle or any other ID paradigm. They are empirically anchored. I don’t want to be unkind here, but frankly, your objections are not even relevant.StephenB
November 30, 2008
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StephenB wrote:
Universals, that is concepts, names etc, cannot be in matter.
Sure they can. As I wrote in the other thread ( http://www.tinyurl.com/5qrbx2 ):
Think of the class of all circles. When we think of this class, we aren’t holding all members of this class in our minds simultaneously. Instead, we are thinking of the characteristic that unites them: the fact that for each circle, all of its points are equidistant from a given point, the center. Nothing about this characteristic defies material representation. Adler is simply wrong.
StephenB:
If I have two balls, each occupies a different space. That is what makes them two.
Your point being?
The “concept” of ball cannot be in matter.
Sure it can. A computer can be programmed to recognize balls as well as circles.
Indeed, you cannot imagine the concept of “ball”, you can only imagine this red ball or that white ball etc. Only your mind can pick up on universals.
Um, aren't you a bit confused here, Stephen? You're trying to show that only the mind can represent universals, but you cite a case where the mind cannot do so. That doesn't exactly prove your point, does it?ribczynski
November 29, 2008
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StephenB wrote:
I can sum up your error on #54 in one short sentence: In paragraph after paragraph, you confuse motives with methods.
Stephen, Did you even read those quotes? Not one of them deals with motives. Take Dembski's, for example:
So long as methodological naturalism sets the ground rules for how the game of science is to be played, intelligent design has no chance of success.
There's absolutely nothing in there about motives. Dembski is clearly, obviously saying that ID cannot succeed as a science unless methodological naturalism is relaxed. I realize that this embarrasses you, and that you wish Dembski hadn't said it, but there it is.
Even if the scientist was a raving proselytizer, his religious zeal would have nothing at to do with the quality of his scientific approach.
If you changed that to "wouldn't necessarily have anything to do with the quality of his scientific approach", then I would agree. There are certainly cases where religious zeal is pernicious. Think Jonathan Wells or Kurt Wise.ribczynski
November 29, 2008
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#58 should read, "not only do you fail to refute (Adler's argument) it, you do not even address it."StephenB
November 29, 2008
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ribczynski: I can sum up your error on #54 in one short sentence: In paragraph after paragraph, you confuse motives with methods. Even if the scientist was a raving proselytizer, his religious zeal would have nothing at to do with the quality of his scientific approach.StephenB
November 29, 2008
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ribczynski: In writing to vjtorley, you claim to have refuted Adler's argument. On the contrary, not only do you not refute them, you do not even address them. Universals, that is concepts, names etc, cannot be in matter. If I have two balls, each occupies a different space. That is what makes them two. The “concept” of ball cannot be in matter. Indeed, you cannot imagine the concept of “ball”, you can only imagine this red ball or that white ball etc. Only your mind can pick up on universals.StephenB
November 29, 2008
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ribczynski: it seems that all that is left in your arguing is a monotonous recycling of ambiguities about natural and supernatural. You seem not to understand very simple truths. For instance, I do believe that the designer is God, but that conviction does not come from ID. ID just infers scientifically a designer What is there so difficult in that, that you can't understand? Non design theories try to explain biological information in term of known physical laws and undirected processes. ID shows that it is not possible to do so. Obviously, those who, for their personal reasons, are committed not to believe in the existence of a god, either you call him natural or supernatural, are more at ease with darwinian explanations, and vice versa. But, as you know, that is not an absolute rule: there are theistic darwinists, and atheistic IDists. Human mind is very flexible, it seems. But all that does not change a comma of he main truth: ID is scientific theory, and in itself it cannot be committed to any philosophical or religious view. Obviously, individual supporters of ID can do that, and do that. But it never comes directly from ID theory. It comes from personal considerations about ID theory. So Dembski can believe one way, Johnson another way, DaveScot another way, and so on. But we happen to agree about the substance of ID theory.gpuccio
November 29, 2008
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Sal Gal: This is just to let you know that your points are not so distant from my perspective. About your post #50: I don't think I really share what you define as an "irrational idolatry of reason". Nor I think ID does. I have often argued that the only way science can be credible is if it does not posit itself as the only instrument of cognition. The same is valid for philosophy. I do believe that most cognition is intuitive and experience-based. But that does not mean that reason, science and philosophy, when used sincerely and humbly, cannot be a great help. Rational knowledge is important, but is not absolute truth. It is a useful map. I have used often the concept of "map of reality" in the last days. I do believe that. We use different maps every day. Some are good, some are bad. A map is useful as far as it help us in our journey, but a map is never the territory. As for cosmological ID, I have already said that it is IMO a good map with some limits. But biological ID is different (see next point). About your post #51: Thank you for your historical notes about the use of language in Dembski and the initial ID theory. I appreciate that. I am probably more acquainted with the more recent trend, both in Dembski and in UD. Anyway, I don't share the attraction for terms like "naturalism", as I have already said. Even "materialism" is too ambiguous for my taste (we should define before what we intend with "matter"). In general, I don't love "isms", and I am happy that ID is not called "designism", or something like that. But I must say that, when you say: "Dembski originally put a bound of 500 bits on the CSI a purely natural process could generate." it should be clear that the UPB, just from the beginning, was defined in terms of a comfortable limit to exclude that a random search could generate the observed CSI even if all he computational resources of the universe were destined to that task. In other words, here it isonly the total number of possible physical events which is in discussion, and not the concept of "natural". The context is clear enough: number of elementary particles by number of elementary time particles from the beginning of the universe. It is an approximate computation of the total number of physical bits (states) available in the physical universe according to our present understanding of it. I am really not interested in definitions of what is "natural" both in science and in theology. I am interested in understanding what is real. If a God exists and his real, and if His interactions with the world are real, I am not interested in labeling them as "natural" or "supernatural". I am just content in knowing they exist. Biological ID is not an idolatry of reason. It is a reasonable way to scientifically understand realities which have been not correctly investigated up to now. the "negative" part of ID does not consist in branding the "adversaries" as naturalists or materialists, but rather in falsifying a bundle of scientific theories which are bad scientific theories and yet are vastly successful. The "positive" part of ID consists in proposing a design-based scenario for future scientific investigations. In its true essence, ID is simple and humble, like all good scientific theories. About your post #52: I don't agree that "there is no direct observation or measure of CSI". The complexity part of CSI is measurable, even if it is often difficult to measure it exactly. It is the probability of a target set against the whole search space. Once the target set is defined (specification), the probability can be measured. The search space is usually very simple to compute. You are correct that you need to assume a probability distribution, but usually, as I have discussed recently, it is perfectly reasonable to assume a practically uniform probability distribution for most relevant biological issues (genome and protein sequences). That does not mean that the distribution is "chosen by the individual performing the CSI computation": it is chosen because it is the most reasonable assumption. But probability distributions are always assumed, and when possible empirically verified, in empirical sciences. There is no apriori way to assign with absolute certainty a probability distribution to observable events. That's empirical science, and ID is empirical science. On the contrary, I agree that the specification part is not measurable, and is assigned by the observer. we could say it works this way: the observer (an intelligent conscious being) recognizes in input (cognition) the meaning inherent in the observed information (specification), which was imparted to it in output by the designer. Once the information has been classified as being specified (an "all-or nothing process, a two bit categorization), then its complexity can be measured, and it expresses a measure of CSI. So a measure of CSI could be defined as : a measure of the complexity of the observed information, once it has been recognized as specified information. In that sense, a measure of CSI must always be referred to some unit of information, be it one gene, one protein, one system, and so on. Measures are always a product of intelligent measurers: they are not inherent in nature, or given by it.gpuccio
November 29, 2008
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vjtorley, You quote David Oderberg's argument that the mind must be immaterial because abstract concepts cannot be embodied. I criticize a similar argument by Mortimer Adler here: http://www.tinyurl.com/5qrbx2ribczynski
November 29, 2008
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Over and over, we hear from ID supporters that ID is not about the supernatural. It is amusing to juxtapose these denials with their constant protests against methodological naturalism. Their mixed message? "ID isn't about the supernatural, no sir, but it just happens to be really, really, really important to us for science not to rule out the supernatural." A couple of questions for the ID supporters on this thread: 1. As I asked Barry earlier in the thread, while we were discussing the fine-tuning argument: Besides God(s), who are the designers you have in mind who are capable of designing and implementing universes??? Nothing to do with the supernatural, no sir. 2. Read this quote from Bill Dembski:
So long as methodological naturalism sets the ground rules for how the game of science is to be played, intelligent design has no chance of success.
If ID has nothing to do with the supernatural, then why should methodological naturalism be an impediment, much less an insurmountable obstacle? 3. Patrick argues that when Dembski says something that implicates the supernatural, it's because he has "switched hats", replacing his scientist hat with his philosopher/theologian hat. If so, then why would Dembski invoke science so confidently in the following quote?
Unlike design arguments of the past, the claim that transcendent design pervades the universe is no longer a strictly philosophical or theological claim. It is also a fully scientific claim and follows directly from the complexity-specification criterion…Demonstrating transcendent design in the universe is a scientific inference, not a philosophical pipedream…
Transcendent design. Nothing supernatural here, no sir. 4. While we're quoting leaders of the ID movement, here's Phillip Johnson:
My colleagues and I speak of “theistic realism” — or sometimes, “mere creation” –as the defining concept of our movement. This means that we affirm that God is objectively real as Creator, and that the reality of God is tangibly recorded in evidence accessible to science, particularly in biology. We avoid the tangled arguments about how or whether to reconcile the Biblical account with the present state of scientific knowledge, because we think these issues can be much more constructively engaged when we have a scientific picture that is not distorted by naturalistic prejudice.
Hmmmm... 5. And Michael Behe:
Methodological naturalism proves at last nothing more than an artificial restriction on thought, and it will eventually pass. Despite would-be gatekeepers like Pennock, the argument for design is gaining strength with the advance of science and for a simple reason once described by the physicist Percy Bridgman: ‘The scientific method, as far as it is a method, is nothing more than doing one’s mind, no holds barred.’
I see. ID gains strength when scientists refuse to be constrained by methodological naturalism. Nothing supernatural here, no sir.ribczynski
November 29, 2008
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