On Moral Progress In A Materialist World

_{Barry Arrington

November 13, 2007

Intelligent Design}

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A commenter in my last post gave a very nice summary of the current state of thinking about moral progress among matrialists. Obviously, by definition, materialists cannot point to a transcendent moral code by which to measure moral progress. Indeed, it is difficult for them to account for moral progress at all because if materialism is correct, the “is” in a society defines the “ought.” The commenter took a stab at it nevertheless and came up with this:

In terms of progress: I would say that progress is measured by the increase or decrease of the sphere of human recognition. We today recognize the humanity of African-Americans — a recognition that was denied to their ancestors. It is the contrast between the present and the past, not between the present and an imagined future, that indicates whether or not progress has occurred. Although such recognition still has some ways to go, as measures go, it’s not a bad one.

In response I would like to pose two questions:

1. On what basis do you say that the recognition of the humanity of African-Americans is “progress” unless you have held up the previous nonrecognition and the present recognition to a code and deterermined the former was bad (i.e., did not meet the code) and the latter is good (i.e., does meet the code)? In other words, when you say we have “progressed” it is just another way of saying that the previous state of affairs was bad and the present state of affairs is good. But how can you know this unless there is a code that transcends time and place by which both states of affairs can be measured. Certainly to say that things were previously one way and now they are another is not the same as saying there has been progress. Change is not the same as progress.

2. Increasingly in our society pornography is viewed as an affirmatively good thing. Perhaps that is even the majority view today, so let us assume for the sake of argument that the majority of people in America think pornography is a good thing. Does the fact that the majority of people believe pornography is a good thing in fact make the exploitation and objectification of women for the sexual gratification of men good? Would you say that there has been moral progress because now our society recognizes that the exploitation and objectification of women for the sexual gratification of men is good wheras before we believed that was bad?

Comments

GAW and StephenB: I think we have found a reasonable basis for further discussion. GEM of TKI [MSc Physics, MBA]kairosfocus_{November 28, 2007
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GAW: By all means. Let's start over.StephenB_{November 27, 2007
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GAW Accepted. No hard feelings. Let us seek truth -- and Him who is Truth -- together. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{November 27, 2007
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I'd like to apologize to KF and StephenB for 265 above. It was intemperate, hasty, and poorly written. I was frustrated at being misunderstood, let my frustration get the better of me, and so misread things in turn. So, KF and StephenB, please accept my apology and retraction. If I could, I'd like my final word on this thread to be 261.getawitness_{November 27, 2007
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GAW: You last post amazes me. Beyond that, there is little else to say. I don't think that there is any way I can respond to it honestly without committing great offense. If you wanted any tips from me about the fine art of reasoning in the abstract, I am sure you would let me know. So, I will simply move along to another thread where I look forward to interacting with you in another context.StephenB_{November 27, 2007
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GAW, StephenB (and others): I see the thread continues. Also, that showing the (unfortunately highly relevant) context in which I made a remark for which I apologised for above has now become playing the victim card! Oh, well: GAW I have already long since apologised for making a statement that invited your inference that I was attacking you. I thought that would be clear enough, and that it would be further clear why I have shown how the underlying issue of almost habitual inference to ignorance, stupidity, insanity or wickedness is an unfortunately relevant factor and context in discussions of the above issues in the current climate as exemplified by Mr Rorty. In turn, it should be clear from the summary of and response to his views at 260, these issues are unfortunately a part of the overall context on relativism, anti- objectivist and anti- foundationalist thought and "tolerance" in today's intellectual climate. And, that relevance holds whether or not GAW follows all that Rorty holds or the many, many profs and pundits whom he speaks for. [GAW, please help us when we face the power games of those who do push the full politically correct agenda that Mr Rorty so bluntly summarised.] So, maybe we can move on; now that we have heard both sides of the story? Now, on further points (for variety as well as ease of reference, let's use roman numerals): i] to “properly” engage the issue on the merits is, in KF’s view, to engage him on his terms; since I cannot do that . . . Here we see the slide into subjectivism that relativism invites. I spoke to issues on the merits of fact and logic, here we see instead a clash of opinions and rhetorical tactics. My most basic point is that the relativist is in praxis forced to speak in terms of objective states of affairs, showing the clear self-referential incoherence of his rejection of objectivity. That is not a matter of getting GAW to cry "uncle," it is a matter of repeatedly observed fact in this very thread. QED. ii] Now I’m just like apartheid and the Nazis. (Both groups, of course, claimed their own “objective” morality.) Also, I’m in bed with the racist James Watson. Kindly, observe my point 5 in 264. I addressed the claim that GAW was appealing to a community standard that he believed we would all agree on. I cited the cases of other (notoriously wrong) "community standards," and asked on what basis then does one appeal to in (correctly!) dissenting from these. That is, the issue of dissent and reformation in light of the universality of humanity and the principles tied to the golden rule I discussed in 260, esp. points i - l, has been put back on the table. Instead of facing the implications and acknowledging then addressing the context, I now -- sadly -- see a plainly unwarranted inference to personal attack. Surely, we can do better than that. BTW, if memory serves, one of the Nazi defences offered at Nuremberg was that they were acting in accordance with the duly authorised Govt and associated community standards. It was overturned by making reference to the sort of Natural Law thought that Hooker as cited above, discusses; cf. also Rom 2:1 - 8, 14 - 15 & 13:8 - 10 on the roots and validity of such reasoning. As to Mr Watson, I pointed out that his argument was that on evo mat grounds, we have no reason to expect equality of intellectual ability across diverse isolated populations evolving. [Indeed, my wider argument [cf the Aug 20 Darwin thread] is that such a worldview undercuts the very mind much less morality and is therefore self-refuting.] So, it is unsurprising that without a Creation- in- the- image- of- God- anchored ethic [cf here Paul on Mars Hill to the Athenians, Ac 17:24 - 27 -- which I have publicly used to expose the false inference to racism from the Bible], Mr Watson opens the door again to racism. Many relativists rightly reject his racism, but again, on what basis? (BTW, if one knew what African schools were like in too many cases, one would understand some of the challenges faced by those who wish to help that continent move ahead. I am working with a Christian business family here in Montserrat, on a small school and community upliftment initiative in Kenya -- and was shocked to learn the on-the-ground facts in even this relatively well-off African country! Cf. here.) iii] that sentence sounds like a works gospel to me, where “seek the truth” refers to intellectual good deeds. As I understand it, people receive grace for no merit of their own. This gets into theology, so pardon me Patrick etc for going a bit off-topic, but it is necessary to now cite and comment briefly on Rom 2:6 - 8:
Rom 2:6 God "will give to each person according to what he has done." 7 To those who by persistence in doing good seek glory, honor and immortality, he will give eternal life. 8 But for those who are self-seeking and who reject the truth and follow evil, there will be wrath and anger.
Here, in context, Paul is addressing "the man without the Bible," and speaks to that inner pull to the light and the right that Locke also spoke to using the candle imagery from Prov 20:7. Those who - despite many a stumble, humbly keep on getting up and turning from wrong to right and false to true (i.e. are by whatever genuine light they have, penitent), God will receive with open arms. But those who turn from the light they have or should have and the right they know or should know, to habitually pursue darkness and evil, will face God's just judgement (however, with a Divine tear in the eye). [Cf here Jn 3:19 - 21.] That is not arrogant putting up of "works" as a basis for claimed self-justification, but rather humble, penitent persistence in the way of the truth and the good. It is the publican who dares not come too close but beats on his breast asking forgiveness and mercy, not the proudly self-justifying one who dares to boast of his good deeds before God. iv] I already seek truth; it’s just not objective truth Again, a quote:
Jn 3:19 This is the verdict: Light has come into the world, but men loved darkness instead of light because their deeds were evil. 20 Everyone who does evil hates the light, and will not come into the light for fear that his deeds will be exposed. 21 But whoever lives by the truth comes into the light, so that it may be seen plainly that what he has done has been done through God."
Let us all humbly strive to attain that standard. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{November 27, 2007
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Correction: my points were numbered incorrectly (7-9 should be 6-8). Also, Uncle.getawitness_{November 26, 2007
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StephenB, thanks for responding. I don't feel "ganged up on," though kairosfocus is a crowd all by himself. :-) I just don't think we're getting anywhere. See KF's last comment, to which I make the following short responses. The last, I promise! I'm not responding to the "substance," such as it is. I just had to respond because he wants suggests I'm somehow enabling Nazis. First, Richard Rorty does not speak for me. There are large differences among us. Again, I have not called KF stupid or anything of the sort. Something Dawkins said once doesn't give KF the right to play victim with everyone he disagrees. Further, I have not smeared anybody with Nazi associations (as noted below, I am so smeared by KF, but somehow that makes KF the victim -- go figure). To KF's points (not lettered this time but numbered; huh), 1] to "properly" engage the issue on the merits is, in KF's view, to engage him on his terms; since I cannot do that, it is impossible for me to engage KF in terms that he will view as on the merits. Indeed, I am convinced that no response will be accepted as "on the merits" other than "uncle." 2] IMHCO, KF has shown no such thing. 3] Perhaps it is, perhaps not. There are other accounts of both language and mathematics (e.g., Brian Rotman, George Lakoff). 4] I know, I know; I'm self-refuting. Alas. 5] Now I'm just like apartheid and the Nazis. (Both groups, of course, claimed their own "objective" morality.) Also, I'm in bed with the racist James Watson. 7] Whether there is a "real" self is an interesting question, though not entirely relevant. I lean against. 8] No. 9] "Fortunately, we live in a universe that will, in the end, reward those who seek the truth." I'm already a Christian, thanks, and I already seek truth; it's just not objective truth. Anyway, that sentence sounds like a works gospel to me, where "seek the truth" refers to intellectual good deeds. As I understand it, people receive grace for no merit of their own.getawitness_{November 26, 2007
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GAW (and Stephen B): It is probably wise to start with a cite from Mr Rorty [speaking for the liberal and radical wings of the professoriat], again courtesy that ever so humble and deeply flawed but often ever so helpful Wiki:
. . . we try to arrange things so that students who enter as bigoted, homophobic, religious fundamentalists [my NB: generally used as a offensive, usually contempt-filled smear-word] will leave college with views more like our own . . . The fundamentalist parents of our fundamentalist students think that the entire ‘American liberal establishment’ is engaged in a conspiracy. The parents have a point. Their point is that we liberal teachers no more feel in a symmetrical communication situation when we talk with bigots than do kindergarten teachers talking with their students . . . When we American college teachers encounter religious fundamentalists, we do not consider the possibility of reformulating our own practices of justification so as to give more weight to the authority of the Christian scriptures. Instead, we do our best to convince these students of the benefits of secularization. We assign first-person accounts of growing up homosexual to our homophobic students for the same reasons that German schoolteachers in the postwar period assigned The Diary of Anne Frank. . . You have to be educated in order to be . . . a participant in our conversation . . . So we are going to go right on trying to discredit you in the eyes of your children, trying to strip your fundamentalist religious community of dignity, trying to make your views seem silly rather than discussable. We are not so inclusivist as to tolerate intolerance such as yours . . . . [‘Universality and Truth,’ in Robert B. Brandom (ed.), Rorty and his Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 21-2.]
I trust that this is sufficient to show why I made the general aside that GAW has chosen to lead with for the second time now. The ignorant or stupid or insane or wicked jibe is real, and it is a serious underlying context whenever that smear- word or its cognates or context show up. That context, IMHCO, and as the above shows [complete with allusions to Nazism], includes the modern or ultra-modern revival of relativism and subjectivism, especially when the concept of objectivity on truth and on morals is at stake. Further to this, StephenB is dead right in 259, to raise the issue that a relativist [whether Rorty or GAW makes but little difference] has no grounds for complaint on diversity on morality, if s/he is consistent with his or her relativism -- especially if s/he explicitly rejects objectivity. And, that brings us right back to my underlying point: the fallacy of selective hyper-skepticism is plainly at work. Now, on new points raised: 1] GAW, 261: I’m not saying anything about your intelligence; I’m saying something about your writing . . . I was hoping this might encourage you to say something new. Not so fast. You have not to date properly engaged the issue on the merits. Whatever defects my writing may or may not have, none of your points above were substantial, but rather dismissive -- indeed, grimly echoing of a certain cite I just made. Further to that, I note that in my experience on these issues [and onlookers can note what happened with the brief summary of Royce's point as filtered through Trueblood supra], if I am summary, it is dismissed as mere assertions not an argument. If I expand it is dismissed as prolixity. Either way I cannot win stylistically. Given that choice, I have generally chosen to be sufficiently detailed to be responsible, with onward links to more where that may be helpful. 2] We’re obviously not going to reach agreement about the central point: your contention that I’m caught in objectivist epistemology despite my best efforts to the contrary "Agreement" is not at all a criterion of warrant. IMHCO, I have shown that it is objectively the case that even in trying to object to objective truth, you have managed to repeatedly instantiate objective truth-claims. 3] I’ll happily grant that our language does favor objectivist accounts It is trying to tell you something. So is the Mathematics underlying the operation of the PC you are using to post here. (Namely, the algebra of propositions.) 4] a lot of us find objectivist accounts of truth both inadequate and incoherent . . . That is your and their opinion. Is that opinion well-warranted or no? THAT is the real question. And, it points straight back to the issues of . . . objectivity. 5] I appealed to a community standard I hoped we could agree upon. And so why is that any more to be preferred or agreed upon than any other contrary standard at any given point in space and time, say that of the Boers of South Africa, pre- 1994 or the Nazis pre- 1945, etc? In short, making the issues of objective morality and truth implicit does not make them irrelevant. [Onlookers, observe Mr Watson's recent notorious remarks on the evident inequality of Africans based on alleged isolated evolution, in the context of this thread's issues, again.] 6] Sometimes I might strive for agreement; sometimes I might choose to quarrel (or fight — in fact, contra Lewis, humans sometimes fight when arguments fail). First, C S Lewis [and the many others who have said about the same thing] was very aware that quarrels often lead on to fights. The point is immaterial to the crucial difference between a quarrel and a fight: in quarrels, we generally assert and just as generally accept the binding nature of moral principles traceable to the concept of benevolent fairness and respect. [Hooker's summary already cited at 260 is apt.] And, relative to evolutionary materialist premises [which dominate the professoriat] is there a real I to think and choose in any way that is coherent,rather than driven by unconscious forces tracing to chance + necessity only, thus in the end self-referentially undermining both mind and morals? 7] I think [the civil rights movement of the 1960's] won — and I’m glad it did — by helping those outside the immediate conflict to recognize the shared humanity of those being oppressed. See my points? 8] Stephen B's telling summary: This deserves to be scooped out and highlighted:
. . . the differences [among various modernist and post-/ultra- modernist views] do matter insofar as they define which road was taken to escape the intellectual demands of right reason. A “subjective” morality that rebels against legitimate moral authority and seeks to de-legitimize it, differs somewhat from its derivative “relative ” morality that finds a convenient life ethic and is likely to change with the wind. A pragmatist world view that has settled on compromise answers differs well enough from a nihilistic world view that despairs over finding any answers at all. On the other hand, all these world views have something in common: Each rejects reason’s call to conform desire to truth, and chooses rather to conform truth to desire. Each fears somehow that the truth is less about setting them free and more about putting them in bondage. To that extent, they are all coming from the same place and going to the same place. Fortunately, we live in a universe that will, in the end, reward those who seek the truth, because the truth really does exist and it really is good.
Very well said, and deserving of being the bottom-line. I only add the reference to the astonishing intellectual ancestry of the last point: Rom 2:6 - 8. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{November 26, 2007
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GAW: One quick point that you may find consoling. You may feel "ganged up on" on this site, but let me assure you that I get it ten fold from my materialist (economically and metaphysically) culture. The difference is that my serious enemies (unlike you) have no sense of humor about our philosophical differences and are prepared to do anything that promises victory, including slander, intimidation, and, when all else fails, "hate crime" legislation. So, I don't really mind mixing up on the internet. It does bother me, though, if I offend someone UNECESSARILY. If my ideas offend, that’s fine; but if I offend, that’s no so good. Internet communication it a blessing, but it is not without its trade offs. First, it tends to degenerate into a conflict of egos, a kind of contest to be won rather than a means of attaining truth through dialogue. Also, there is something about anonymity that invites bloggers to be a little more abusive and a little less compassionate than they would be in a face to face encounter. Worse, as you rightly point out, they seldom concede anything, possibly because they fear that they will lose credibility with onlookers or because they simply can’t believe anyone could be wiser than they are. Anyway, most of us know that we will not conquer our “foes;” our objective is to convince the uncommitted middle that our views are better than the other alternatives presented. I agree with you about one thing, though: it is a beautiful thing when someone says, “you know, you’re right; I will give you that one.”StephenB_{November 25, 2007
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kairosfocus: Thanks again for elaborating so well on subtle points that make big differences. The good news is that they are all being recorded for posterity. Your posts reflect the efforts of one who strives mightily to find and follow the truth, probably at some cost. On pragmatism/subjectivism/relativism etc. It does not surprise me that so many post-modern commentators bristle when I place those words (and others) in a unified context. “Why do you keep conflating these things,” my critics often ask me? "Do you not know the differences?" My answer and the follow up question is always the same: Yes, I know the differences very well, but do you know where they all lead? Their undue concern over the first point suggests, to me, at least, that they are trying to avoid the moral implications of the second point. On the one hand, the differences do matter insofar as they define which road was taken to escape the intellectual demands of right reason. A “subjective” morality that rebels against legitimate moral authority and seeks to de-legitimize it, differs somewhat from its derivative “relative ” morality that finds a convenient life ethic and is likely to change with the wind. A pragmatist world view that has settled on compromise answers differs well enough from a nihilistic world view that despairs over finding any answers at all. On the other hand, all these world views have something in common: Each rejects reason’s call to conform desire to truth, and chooses rather to conform truth to desire. Each fears somehow that the truth is less about setting them free and more about putting them in bondage. To that extent, they are all coming from the same place and going to the same place. Fortunately, we live in a universe that will, in the end, reward those who seek the truth, because the truth really does exist and it really is good. It didn’t have to be that way, but since it is, we ought to take advantage of it.StephenB_{November 25, 2007
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kairosfocus, I've never said you're a "fundamentalist ignoramus" -- or even "words to that effect." The famous quote of Dawkins I find repugnant. I certainly don't think you're stupid (as you've said, you're a physicist -- having a Ph.D. in physics is a sign that you're pretty smart). Nor do I think you're ignorant, insane, or wicked. I'd have to say the same of many in my family, and of myself a few years ago. What was the point of my parody? It was to humorously note the obvious: that you are repetitive and (cough cough) prolix. I'm not saying anything about your intelligence; I'm saying something about your writing. I was observing what you would call a "commonly encountered" set of patterns in your own rhetoric. Everybody has rhetorical and argumentative habits. Yours are, I think, pretty identifiable: extraordinarily long posts containing the elements I noted. I was hoping this might encourage you to say something new. We're obviously not going to reach agreement about the central point: your contention that I'm caught in objectivist epistemology despite my best efforts to the contrary. I have made at least one (non-objective!) error: in using the word "cannot" without qualification. There was also something tautological about that sentence, which argued, in effect, that incommensurable accounts really are incommensurable. :-) I'll happily grant that our language does favor objectivist accounts. How much easier it is to say what I said than to say "I tend to view the impasse as an example of how incommensurable accounts are unlikely be reconciled at what appear to be fundamental levels." I need to maintain the "more or less" posture constantly (more or less), or else it will seem as though I'm making claims about absolute truth. I take it that for you all the following terms imply objective truth (including moral truth): warrant, argument, error, correction, wrong, right demonstrate, show, discover, meaning, good, bad, etc. etc. Well, if that's so, then I'm clearly wrong. But a lot of us find objectivist accounts of truth both inadequate and incoherent (again, I realize that for you this too, like everything I say, further wraps me in the cocoon of objectivty). StephenB [259], I wasn't and am not appealing to an objective standard of justice. I appealed to a community standard I hoped we could agree upon. As for moral standards working "pretty well," I think I reason the way we all reason, more or less: by looking at history, context, making the best decisions I can, etc. How are different standards accounted for? Well, it depends. There are lots of people with different values that I'm not doing anything about. Sometimes I might strive for agreement; sometimes I might choose to quarrel (or fight -- in fact, contra Lewis, humans sometimes fight when arguments fail). I admit that the idea of a univeral morality is appealing to me, and there are cases -- such as the abolition of slavery, the civil right movement, and the ongoing fight for economic justice and against capitalist exploitation -- where utopian impulses are powerful and guiding. I'm not opposed to using language such as "right" or "wrong" in those cases or in other cases I find morally reprehensible (such as for example the current occupation of Iraq). (Note to kairosfocus: this is not a concession, since I've never been opposed to using such language). The question is whether such moral action (or such moral language) entails universal moral laws in the sense implied by kairosfocus and others. And I don't think they do. For example, I don't think that the civil rights movement won by appealing to moral law. In fact, the supporters of segregation also appealed to what they perceived as universal moral law. I think it won -- and I'm glad it did -- by helping those outside the immediate conflict to recognize the shared humanity of those being oppressed. This was the brilliance of non-violence, a contextual tactic which Martin Luther King Jr. took from the non-Christian Gandhi. I think what happened was that lots of white folks who were indifferent to the condition of Americcan Blacks started to identify and empathize with their condition. The nonviolence of civil rights protestors, and the violent reaction of the oppressors, flashed in television screens across America and expanded how Americans in power thought of human rights. Of course all these movements are complex, but it's awfully reductive to think that the arguments won on logical grounds: those on the side of oppression think their moral reasoning is impeccable, even self-evident. What made Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin work? What made Lincoln call Stowe "the little woman who started this big war"? I don't think it was her appeal to universal moral law: John Brown tried that and failed. It was her empathetic and powerful representation of the humanity of oppressed slaves. This will be my last post on this thread, as I find it difficult and somewhat exhausting to keep up with you, kairosfocus, much less you and StephenB together. But let me save you some time by anticipating your inevitable followup:
Onlookers, GAW has, sadly but predictably, decided to leave the conversation without responding except dismissively. This is confirmation of the relativist's selective hyperskepticism and shows that my arguments are unassailable and have been correct all along.
Feel free to expand on that with points A-H and two followups.getawitness_{November 25, 2007
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Stephen B: Thanks for taking up the pragmatism angle in the position being taken by GAW. You have aptly shown the sorts of problems that led pragmatism into deep trouble about 100 years ago. I think it is unlikely that neo-pragmatic revivals, whether by the late Richard Rorty or any other party, are likely to escape the sorts of problems you have highlighted while hewing to the "it works" theory of sufficiently warranting a claim to be true. H'mm, it's worth clipping and commenting on a summary from Wiki on a key Rorty position, as it seems to speak fairly directly to a lot of what GAW is driving at [and before him Carl Sachs too . . .]:
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Rorty argues that the central problems of modern epistemology depend upon a picture of the mind as trying to faithfully represent (or "mirror") a mind-independent external reality. If we give up this metaphor, then the entire enterprise of foundationalist epistemology is misguided. A foundationalist believes that in order to avoid the regress inherent in claiming that all beliefs are justified by other beliefs, some beliefs must be self-justifying and form the foundations to all knowledge. There were two senses of "foundationalism" criticized in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. In the philosophical sense, Rorty criticized the attempt to justify knowledge claims by tracing them to a set of foundations; more broadly, he criticized the claim of philosophy to function foundationally within a culture . . . With no privileged insight into the structure of belief and no privileged realm of truths of meaning, we have, instead, knowledge as those beliefs that pay their way. The only worthwhile description of the actual process of enquiry, Rorty claimed, was a Kuhnian account of the standard phases of the progress of discipline, oscillating through normal and abnormal science, between routine problem solving and intellectual crises. The only role left for a philosopher is to act as an intellectual gadfly, attempting to induce a revolutionary break with previous practice, a role that Rorty was happy to take on himself.
I beg to differ, as follows: a] As long since noted, following Royce, there is a point of in fact universal agreement on an undeniable truth: error exists. [Cf. above for the implications of this, not least, that truth exists as that which faithfully mirrors that extra-mental reality that Rorty was plainly so suspicious of.] b] Thus, when we hold something to be worthy of accepting as true [sufficiently so to base serious decisions on it], we therefore need grounds for trusting it. c] The resulting demand for warrant [note my shift from "justification" in light of Gettier counter examples and Plantinga's work; also that I am speaking more broadly than proof in the sense of demonstration] ends in either an infinite regress or in a framework of beliefs that we hold to be plausible enough to trust without further warrant; on pain of futile infinite regress or else vicious circularity. (Of course in some cases, the very first beliefs are at that level; e.g. when you are crossing a road and see an out-of-control car careering towards you, you jump, you don't stop to question your perceptions.) d] Major beliefs on important issues at this basic level are of course the foundation of one's worldview, and can be assessed relative to evident correspondence with reality [factual adequacy], coherence, and simple but not simplistic elegance of explanation. Thus, de facto -- even if one is not inclined to accept it explicitly, we ALL have foundational beliefs in our worldviews: our Faith-Points. e] They can also be assessed relative to comparative difficulties of other live option worldviews. That is we are not locked up to circularity and closed-mindedness. Thus, in the end, Rorty's first objection fails. f] Similarly, since in a community we do in fact function based on worldviews, and tend to have dominant worldviews in given cultures, philosophical considerations are foundational (in the analytical sense) in communities that exhibit such cultures. Thus, for instance, the value of the present exercise here at UD, on the issue of moral progress in an evolutionary materialism driven, secular progressivism- dominated science and general culture. The second objection also fails. g] In contrast to paradigm-shift power games [cf here my remarks on the results of the Marxist version of that agenda above] and gadfly rhetorical tactics, we can therefore accept that we are finite, fallible and often in error, but certain things have passed reasonable tests of warrant and we are right to rely on them pending further evidence that allows us to refine or replace them with well-warranted improvements. h] This is not only so in the realm of facts and principles of science and the like, but also so on key moral principles too. (The existence of moral errors and evils also implies the parallel existence of moral truths and goods.) i] For crucial instance, the fact that we quarrel -- as opposed to simply fighting -- immediately warrants the claim that we acknowledge that we are bound by core moral principles, e.g. the classic one of bebevolent fairness that we term the Golden Rule. Here is Hooker [in his justly famous Ecclesiastical Polity], as cited by Locke on this, in Ch 2 Section 5 of his 2nd essay on civil government:
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant.
j] Thus, we have here a crucial, well-warranted, generally recognised basic principle for morality, policy and law. Moral reform of a community thus becmes possible based on seeing that even though it is tot he advantage of some, and so "works" for them, something fundamental is being disregarded and so injustice must be corrected. k] Likewise, generally following Kant's formulations of his categorical imperative, we can see that if a proposed policy would lead to chaos or destruction of the community, and/or [equivalently!] that it treats others as means to one's ends, not ends in themselves, that too is immoral and should be corrected or averted. l] Thus, progress becomes possible in the community, but the principles on which it rests are far more friendly to theism than they are to evolutionary materialism. m] Indeed, it is further reasonable to observe that evolutionary materialism, on credible analytical and empirical grounds both, undermines reason and morality so it is a danger to rather than a triumph of the modern world. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{November 25, 2007
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getawitness: You wonder if kairosfocus has ever conceded a point or apologized for an indiscretion: Why should he? To what standard of justice are you appealing? Are you implying that there is some objective standard of courtesy to which he should conform his behavior? Maybe his standard of courtesy is relative to his situation, while your standard of courtesy is relative to yours. By what right do you impose some comprehensive standard that may go against his personal preferences?. I have cautioned you in the past about imposing your stuffy morality down someone else’s throat.. Now, let’s get serious. You claim that certain moral values and truths work "pretty well." According to who? You? How do you know they are working well? Do you have a reliable measuring stick? How do you know if they are working barely well, moderately well, "pretty well," extremely well, or, for that matter---perfectly well? How are you making that calculation? Further, what happens if my measuring stick is different that yours? What if I think your truths work barely well, you think they work fairly well, and kairosfocus thinks they work perfectly well? How do we arbitrate those differences? What happens if we must pass a law that reflects one of our opinions and throws out the other two? By what criteria do we formulate the jurisprudential code that will adequately accommodate all parties, while doing violence to none? Do you know how civil rights were won in the United States? In the 1860’s, we still had slaves. But things were working “pretty well” for everyone else. Eventually, the chains of slavery were broken because our government decided that such abominable practices violated the “natural moral law.” In the early 1900’s, women were not allowed to vote, but things were working “pretty well” for men. Women finally won suffrage because, in the judgment of a small minority of movers and shakers, it was time to dispense with popular opinion and obey the rule of law written in the constitution, which was based on the “natural moral law. In the 1960’’s blacks were still being lynched and marginalized, even to the point where some could not earn a living. Martin Luther King decided he had had enough and made his famous “I have a dream” speech. In all of his public presentations, he kept alluding to the same point: It doesn’t matter if the majority is against us; we are not asking for favors; it didn’t even matter that thing’s were working “pretty well” for just about every one else. He didn’t say, “please give us a break;” this just doesn’t feel right.“ He didn’t say, “all this discrimination seems unfair to us.” He didn’t say, “why can’t we all get along.”. If he had taken that tack, blacks would still be drinking out of their own water fountains. He said this: Forget about your personal opinions, your subjective biases, and your narrow self interests. THIS ISN’T RIGHT! He gave it to us right on the chin. What we were doing as a country violated a universal standard of justice. It didn’t matter that 75% of the public disagreed. It didn’t matter what the intelligentsia believed. What mattered was this: We were violating a natural moral law that superseded the people, the elitists, even the power of the state---and it was going to have stop. They certainly would not have prevailed had they pointed out that natural rights are “true enough” or that they work “pretty well.”StephenB_{November 24, 2007
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GAW: I would have found your last post somewhat amusing -- if it were not so sad. Okay, let us first of all deal with the "race" and "dummy" cards. Kindly, let us look again, tracking back to the underlying context in 251: (a) I explicitly spoke [using an ironic self-reference in an aside] to a certain, commonly encountered, media-, professoriate- and pundit- shaped attitude to evangelicals that may well be a factor in how many will look at the exchange. (b) For instance, let us recall Dawkins' infamous: ignorant, stupid, insane or wicked remark, first made in I believe the NYT. (c ) In so doing, I modified the common term, "red-neck," to account for the fact that I am of Afro- Euro Indio-Caribbean descent. (d) This was in response to an earlier dismissive comment in 251, which (e) unfortunately reasonably comes under the Dawkins-style quadrilemma -- with particular reference to my descriptive term for a certain commonly encountered skeptical tactic, selective hyper-skepticism. (Observe the cited remarks by Simon Greenleaf -- I am simply putting up a descriptive term.) (f) If you doubt this, kindly think about the implications of your "menu" as laid out in 251 -- (h) IMHCO, fundamentalist ignoramus [or words to that effect] is the least worst option in interpretation. However, obviously, the remark I made in rebuttal opened the door to a red herring tracking out to a strawman, which on ignition has now clouded and distracted the discussion from substance. That is unfortunate, and for that I apologise. Now, on matters of some relevance to the substantial focus issue of moral progress in a materialist world, and the incidental matter of relativism: 1] “objective” is your term, not mine. I’m relatively confident about my claims holding up, more or less, under most circumstances. However, I make no claims to their objectivity. As have now -- as just above -- repeatedly highlighted, you are again making assertions concerning claimed states of affairs in the real world, regardless of reservations about the abstract possibility of error. Such claims are to potentially discoverable truths about reality [as opposed to imagined projections onto it]. In short, they are claims to objective truth, regardless of attempts to deny that in almost the same breath. Maybe, an excerpt from F. H. Bradley's gentle but stinging opening salvo to Kant, in his Appearance and Reality, 2nd Edn., will help clarify my point by putting in a side-light:
The man who is ready to prove that metaphysical knowledge is impossible has . . . himself . . . perhaps unknowingly, entered the arena [of metaphysics] . . . . To say that reality is such that our knowledge cannot reach it, is to claim to know reality. (Clarendon Press, 1930), p.1]
2] you put words into my mouth — again Not at all, I simply keep pointing out [by explicitly citing and highlighting your own words] that you are repeatedly making confident assertions about states of affairs in the external, real world. These are objective truth-claims. So, I have then repeatedly pointed out, that such claims inherently and inescapably undercut your declared relativism. Then, I have pointed to the implications of the implied point, that you are identifying cases of error on my part. Namely, if error exists, truth exists, and so the relativist project of collapsing truth, knowledge and morality into perceptions and tastes or preferences [whether individual, or group- based or culture- evolution- stage based etc] collapses. 3] I tend to view the impasse as an example of how incommensurable accounts cannot be reconciled at fundamental levels. See what I mean? (You have again here asserted a claim about discoverable reality, indeed beyond that, a universal negative absolute claim.) 4] Well, if a Master-philosopher said it in his introduction, then I give up. Why should it matter that he makes no argument but only asserts? (Of course, I first leave it as an exercise to see where objective truth claims are made in this excerpt and its immediate context. Even language itself is trying to tell you something!) On the substantial point, I highlighted that Locke circa 1690 anticipated the course, dynamics and fruitless result of subsequent discussion on the matter, thus anticipating and answering them, in fact decisively so. (Nor is it just assertions , save in the sense that he is making a chain of declarative mood sentences.) Yes, there has been much detailed, time-consuming and even in parts interesting or even insightful learned discourse -- but in the end only futile and in too many cases, absurd or even tragic [e.g. Nietzsche]. Locke in effect predicted that, and told in advance just why it would be futile -- echoing Solomon, Peter and Paul. In short: decisive. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{November 24, 2007
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kairosfocus, First, let me say that this [255] is beneath you:
I guess I am just a dumb, brown-necked fundy objectivist and philosophical broad foundationalist. (Your emphasis)
I've said nothing about your intelligence, and I don't know what "brown-necked" has to do with anything at all. You've said you've apologized on occasion; I haven't seen it, but I'm sure you can dig one up if necessary. How about offering one to me by implying that I've said anything remotely racial? Back to the actual issues. You write that I am
repeatedly making confident claims about objective, known states of affairs in the real world
I'll say again that "objective" is your term, not mine. I'm relatively confident about my claims holding up, more or less, under most circumstances. However, I make no claims to their objectivity. So when you write that I
repeatedly affirm that certain states of affairs are recognisably and objectively so,
you put words into my mouth -- again. This affirms that I have a point when I say that you have not heard me: hence your repeated conversion of my words into your sense of their implication. Indeed, you repeatedly convert what I have said into its opposite in order to "hear" me. This is not surprising nor, I think, particularly distressing. It just shows that we have been talking past each other. I don't doubt that in certain respects that may seem crucial to you, I also have not heard what you have been saying -- that is, I have not been able to understand what you have been saying in terms that seem coherent or reasonable to me. What is even stranger is that I was once a believer in philosophical objectivity, so I have the same view toward positions I once held and found to be the only coherent ones possible. In other words, I do not think belief in philosophical objectivity is dumb, even though it is not a view I can hold anymore. We even have different ways of understanding that impasse. I tend to view the impasse as an example of how incommensurable accounts cannot be reconciled at fundamental levels. You tend to view the impasse as confirming my (and by extension the "radical relativist's") irrationality and/or untrustworthiness. 256:
In short, the objections of modern relativism were already long since decisively answered even before they were even seriously raised, and by a Master- philosopher, in one of his best-known works, right there in the introduction.
Well, if a Master-philosopher said it in his introduction, then I give up. Why should it matter that he makes no argument but only asserts? No need to read alternative accounts by other Master philosophers (not only Nietzsche but also Wittgenstein (both early and late), C.S. Pierce, William James, John Dewey, J.L. Austin, Richard Rorty, George Lakoff), Master biologists (Ludwig Fleck, Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela, etc.), and others. Hundreds of years of thought are preemptively made null by a single assertion of John Locke.getawitness_{November 24, 2007
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PS: I think it is highly appropriate to here cite [and annotate in brackets] Locke's discussion in section 5 of his introduction to his essay on human understanding:
Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, since he hath given them (as St. Peter says [NB: i.e. 2 Pet 1:2 - 4]) pana pros zoen kaieusebeian, whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery, the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concernments [Prov 1: 1 - 7], that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties [cf Rom 1 - 2, Ac 17, etc, etc]. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grasp everything . . . It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant [Matt 24:42 - 51], who would not attend his business by candle light, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The Candle that is set up in us [Prov 20:27] shines bright enough for all our purposes . . . If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do muchwhat as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.
In short, the objections of modern relativism were already long since decisively answered even before they were even seriously raised, and by a Master- philosopher, in one of his best-known works, right there in the introduction.kairosfocus_{November 24, 2007
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GAW: H'mm, first of all I observe again that you are repeatedly making confident claims about objective, known states of affairs in the real world. In short, by your actions, you again imply that you accept the reality of objective, well-warranted -- thus, knowable -- truth. That is fatal for any theory of truth that rejects such as a core assumption/assertion. And, if what is really meant is that worldviews are so complex that no one worldview constructed by finite, fallible, too often ill-willed creatures such as ourselves will be able to capture all truth, welcome to the club "founded" by the Apostle Paul. [Cf here Ac 17, Rom 1 - 2, Eph 4:17 - 24 and 1 Cor 1 - 2.] Now on particular points: 1] Conceding points in debates . . . . First, FYI I have on many an occasion not only taken on board points made by others but where I have found it necessary, I have outright apologised. So, discussions of debates and implications on perceived/ projected attitudes are besides the point. (In general, FYI, I maintain the policy that I will only strongly affirm what is IMHCO a well-warranted point. If a point is less than well warranted, I will not affirm it, but may suggest it for discussion. Thus, for instance, in my own note and often in this blog's context, you will for instance note that I habitually speak of functionally specific, complex information, rather than generic complex specified information. That is not an accident -- the latter is far harder to discuss with benefit.) On the issue with Pixie, I happen to be a physicist, and I raised a rather basic and well-established statistical thermodynamics-anchored point that IMHCO, after much thought and discussion, including a long running public discussion in the blogosphere elsewhere,is a generally fatal one for evolutionary materialist scenarios for origin of life. It is no accident that one of my personal scientific heroes, the late, great Sir Fred Hoyle, raised the same point. All I did was to scale his point down physically to molecular scale. [I think he was trying to avoid having to explicitly discuss issues tied to so esoteric a field as statistical thermodynamics when he used the idea of a tornado in a junkyard forming a 747 by accident.] 2] I maintain that you have not heard what I have been saying. I suspect, rather, that this statement again underscores the underlying problem faced by the radical relativist. For, both bolded claims (whether accurately or not!) assert to be the case certain states of affairs in the real world. Thus, you directly imply the existence of objective truth, thus too of truth in the sense of that which says of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not. 3] things can be either “really wrong” or “truly evil” without the presence of an “objective” or “transcendent” “Moral Law” or “moral code.” If by the latter you mean that no-one here on earth has developed a known, generally accepted moral code that is comprehensive and detailed in all that it affirms and denies, then this is not exactly a novelty. Welcome, again, to the C1 conceptual world of Paul, cf Rom 2:6 - 8, 14 - 15, 13:8 - 10, Eph 4:17 - 24, etc. But if you mean -- and I suspect this is more to the point -- that there are no well-warranted moral principles and rules [which would be itself a claimed well-warranted moral principle . . .], then you are both affirming a claimed state of affairs in the cosmos, and are demonstrably wrong and against the general consensus of humanity on matters such as the principle of benevolent fairness commonly cited as the golden rule. To see the force of that, simply observe the general pattern of a human quarrel [as opposed to an animal fight]. And, once a single moral principle stands as well warranted, the rest of the points made in 150 follow. So your dismissals -- including those of Koukl BTW, fail. 4] you’re making my relativist case for me! I’m not arguing against the existence of evil. I’m arguing against the view of evil as absolute or transcendent. Oddly, I was just reading a recent short book on Anglo-Saxon Engla-lond circa 1000, in which the reduction of the poor to slavery due to desperation in famine times came up. The fact that peasants would only reduce themselves to slavery under such or similar circumstances is telling on the point that the lesser of evils is an evil. So is the context in which it is discussed: the slaveholders manumitting their slaves in their wills; i.e they are trying to unburden an uneasy conscience. That is, BOTH parties directly imply that slavery is an evil, but obviously a lesser one than starving to death. So, now, why is it we generally recognise (1) that evil is real, (2) that it can be identified in specific circumstances with high reliability, and (3) that it is to be avoided if reasonably possible? [3 of course broaches the issue of lesser evils and the one that avoiding the possibility of certain evils may eliminate the possibility of certain goods, e.g the existence of virtue, which is inescapably based on choice.] 5] I discussed . . . [184] in 251 and, while I was generally dismissive, I noted that my account of truth or rationality is not “the same as” the classical account, contra your assertion of the opposite. And indeed, you have offered nothing but an assertion on that score The core point still stands: you repeatedly affirm that certain states of affairs are recognisably and objectively so, which directly entails what I was pointing to. Indeed, I have therefore offered and continue to offer the DEMONSTRATION laid out in 184! 6] I do not assert that there are no methods for ajudicating claims, but only that such methods are not absolute. And, what did I imply by citing Josiah Royce's argument from the existence of error then developing its implications in outline? To wit:
A more profitable approach would be to follow Josiah Royce, and examine the claim, error exists. To try to deny this is to instantiate it, so it is undeniably true — i.e we see here a well-warranted case of truth. So for good reason, we see that at least one instance of truth exists, so truth exists. [And IMHCO, we may meet the Truth Himself, as I and millions of others have . . . . we are not locked up to despair!] Of course, we may be mistaken about particular truth claims, but that is not an excuse for resorting to relativistic rhetorical errors or games [however dressed up], but to being humble but persistent in the path of warrant so that we can be reasonably but open-mindedly confident in the truth claims we affirm.
In short, having dismissed Royce without consideration, you are saying the same thing he has said, and then fail to follow up the implications. (Unless of courswe you are so lacking in confidence in our ability to reason that you object tot he existence of well-warranted truth claims while confidently asserting certain states of affairs to be so, as I have repeatedly highlighted. That smacks of selective hyper-skepticism to me, but I guess I am just a dumb, brown-necked fundy objectivist and philosophical broad foundationalist.) All in all, this discussion underscores the force of the point in the original post. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{November 23, 2007
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kairosfocus, I did read your debate with Pixie on your blog. It was certainly civil on both your parts. Yet at the end, as far as I can tell, you had not conceded a single point. Instead, you told Pixie to post one last comment and followed up with several comments of your own claiming that everything of substance you said earlier stands. In other words, you were right all along (but of course!). What Pixie did was help you put in clearer terms what you knew already. Just out of curiosity, I'm wondering if you have ever conceded a substantive point to your opponents in a debate. Dr. Dembski has, though he is quite confident of views generally. For that he deserves respect. So have I (for example, I retracted a point about private schools a couple of weeks ago). I can't recall an instance from you: you seem to know everything already.getawitness_{November 23, 2007
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kairosfocus, If I delayed in replying earlier it is because replying is tiring when the replies will be predictable both in their length and their characteristic gestures. Also, I have a life. I maintain that you have not heard what I have been saying. But let's go to the posts of yours which you claim I have dimissed. Thank you for numbering them. 150. I do indeed dismiss that, because the first premise of the syllogism is not self-evident in either form. That is, things can be either "really wrong" or "truly evil" without the presence of an "objective" or "transcendent" "Moral Law" or "moral code." It's hard to do anything but dismiss it, since none of those who have used this syllogism have done more for this proposition than simply assert it as self-evident. This holds also for the essay by Koukl, which offers a facile version of a moral design inference. Koukl's essay would not work for the evolutionary materialist because it does not consider the possibility that moral laws might have evolved as beneficial adaptations. I'm not a materialist myself: his essay doesn't work for me becuase it assumes (wrongly) that moral laws given by God must be objective. 182. You write:
So, we need to look very closely at terms and contexts before answering such a question in light of our own cultural memories of new world plantation chattel slavery. For, under certain circumstances, certain forms of slavery may have been — and God forbid (I am a descendant of slaves and indentured servants!), may yet be — the lesser of evils. But, let us note: the lesser of evils is an evil, so the basic point still obtains: evil manifestly exists and can be recognised through concrete instances.
As far as I see, you're making my relativist case for me! I'm not arguing against the existence of evil. I'm arguing against the view of evil as absolute or transcendent. 184. I discussed this in 251 and, while I was generally dismissive, I noted that my account of truth or rationality is not "the same as" the classical account, contra your assertion of the opposite. And indeed, you have offered nothing but an assertion on that score: you have not demonstrated that I'm using the same account, only asserted the proposition. And you have miscontrued what I have said, as here:
For instance, observe in the above statement: when a relativist refuses to answer a question . . . Does this not plainly affirm to be so, a certain frequently encountered state of affairs in the cosmos that is accessible to reasonable tests of warrant, and that we may thus properly infer is so or is not so?
I do not assert that there are no methods for ajudicating claims, but only that such methods are not absolute. Again I think you have mistaken relativism for some form of subjectivism or "anything-goes" -- a common conflation but one I've tried to avoid. 238. I can't see that you're arguing with me there at all.getawitness_{November 23, 2007
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GAW: I would further take up the Moral Progress thread again in light of your remarks of Nov 22 instant, were there any actual substance in it. A run through your post, however, only comes up with facile dismissal rhetoric. Sigh. In particular, though, since I have been specifically dismissed by GAW, onlookers, kindly cf 150, 182, 184, 238, with GAW's remarks. IMHCO it is fair (but sad) comment to note that on the record of what he has just attempted, GAW has ried to ignore or dismiss what he evidently cannot address on the merits. It is probably worth excerpting the argument GAW so strongly objects to in 184, to show why:
Re [GAW at] 181: when a relativist refuses to answer a question on the terms of the objectivist, that refusal is not necessarily a refusal of rationality, but only a refusal of a certain account of rationality as the objectivist understands it — which is precisely the point at issue Not at all. So soon as the relativist affirms something to be or not to be, s/he directly entails that truth is that which says of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not. And, that falsity fails at this bar. For instance, observe in the above statement: when a relativist refuses to answer a question . . . Does this not plainly affirm to be so, a certain frequently encountered state of affairs in the cosmos that is accessible to reasonable tests of warrant, and that we may thus properly infer is so or is not so? That is, the very opening statement presumes that truth is, in the classical sense just described. In short, what is really happening here is, unfortunately a turnabout accusation rhetorical fallacy/tactic, in the guise of a position on truth. [If inadvertent, it is a mere error in reasoning; if willful, it is a tactic.] Putting it more bluntly: WHEN IT IS NOT CONVENIENT TO ANSWER, a relativist will in certain cases refuse to answer to a question on the objective state of affairs in the cosmos, projecting to the objectivist interlocutor, the accusation that s/he is imposing a particular “objectivist” account of truth or warrant or rationality. But, to make even that accusation, the relativist is inherently assuming precisely the same account of truth or warrant or rationality. In short we see here selective hyper-skepticism, which as an intellectual double-standard, is always self-referentially incoherent. A more profitable approach would be to follow Josiah Royce, and examine the claim, error exists. To try to deny this is to instantiate it, so it is undenaiably true — i.e we see here a well-warranted case of truth. So for good reason, we see that at least one instance of truth exists, so truth exists. [And IMHCO, we may meet the Truth Himself, as I and millions of others have . . . . we are not locked up to despair!] Of course, we may be mistaken about particular truth claims, but that is not an excuse for resorting to relativistic rhetorical errors or games [however dressed up], but to being humble but persistent in the path of warrant so that we can be reasonably but open-mindedly confident in the truth claims we affirm.
It will be immediately obvious that I have given an argument on the substance, which GAW replies to [after a considerable period] on dismissal rhetoric. Now, therefore, whose argument should we believe, why? GEM of TKI PS: The "always linked" is my summary of the basic overall case on the design inference as I see it, based on several years of investigation and analysis and dialogue. I invite a response on the merits, as that very page has always done. So, if GAW or any onlooker has a substantial point to make on it, s/he may post publicly or respond by email or enter into a dialogue in my own blog. You will see that in the page I acknowledge one such person's contribution, Pixie, who I first interacted with at UD and then went on to discuss in my own blog at length. The results are in Appendix 1, point 6.kairosfocus_{November 23, 2007
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Sorry to come back to the relativism issue, but I thought I'd give it one last go for Borne and kairosfocus. Borne [226]: 1. I only used the analogy of measure because you brought it up. Recall that you wrote:
The very possibility of moral debate is evidence of an external rule to which all must refer. Each side claiming to be closer than the other to that external rule they must necessarily assume exists. Otherwise no moral debate is even possible.
I mention that rules of measure are not absolute, and your response is to say that the comparison is "apples & oranges." But to clarify a point, neither physical nor moral) measures are subjective: they're relative. I've said over and over again that subjectivism and relativism are different positions, but that seems to be lost on people. You also write
All human invented units of measure - time, temperature, distance, weight etc. - are subjective and arbitrary. There is no absolute mile. No absolute meter. They are arbitrarily fixed units for practical use only and could be changed at whim. Not so with morals. You can’t make murder ‘right’ overnight on a personal whim. But that’s exactly what you could do if there were no moral Base Law.
Now that's comparing apples and oranges! Human units of measure are, in fact, not subjective but relative. As a practical matter, a great deal of consequence would result if people were to change them on a whim: bridges and houses would fall down, for one. I'm saying that relative measures are good enough to get lots of practical work done in the world, and that this holds for moral reasoning as well as practical reasoning. Further, I believe that moral reasoning never happens any other way: that is, moral reasoning is always conducted in relative terms, and it seems to work pretty well. Finally you write,
“Is it true?”, is the ultimate question here. But if there are no ultimate, absolute truths then there are no ‘true’ truths at all.
Not really: there are, I would say, "true enough" truths, that is, truths that seem pretty stable for most people. So when you write that "Relativism must itself be relative - thus it abolishes itself as having any real meaning," I think you're on to something in the first statement but not in the second. In fact, the relativism of relativism means that some things are less relative (more stable, more universal) than others. Societies maintain themselves (among other ways) by deciding and maintaining a sense a sense of what those more and less relative things are. You write, "Are u saying all ancient Greeks practiced [child rape]?" No, but I'm saying that ancient Greek society condoned child rape in the form of pederasty. My point was a simple response to your claim [172] that "There has never been a civilization, outside of demonic worship cultures, that has ever condoned child rape or murder for ex[ample]." I simply pointed out that yes, in fact, there has been such a civilization: ancient Greece. Condoning something (in law and practice) does not mean that everybody practices it. kairosfocus [184]:
what is really happening here is, unfortunately a turnabout accusation rhetorical fallacy/tactic, in the guise of a position on truth.
Of course you'd say that. I'm tempted to create a parody kairosfocus post along the lines of a Chinese menu. Choose an item from each of the following four lists: Chestnuts: comparative worldview difficulty, a priori assumptions, evo mat, warrants, objectivity, the obviousness of your arguments to all who are honest, etc. Accusations: of selective hyperskepticism, self-refutation, question-begging, rhetorical tactics, etc. Citations: of Royce, Platinga, Lewis, Aristotle, and of course and always "my always linked" tome, etc. Laments: "Sadly," where evolutionary materialism has taken us, the sad state of affairs today, the author's own need to repeat points he's made before, the moral bankruptcy of his opponents, the need to explain the debate to innocent onlookers, etc. Plate and serve. So in your response to me, you write:
Putting it more bluntly: WHEN IT IS NOT CONVENIENT TO ANSWER, a relativist will in certain cases refuse to answer to a question on the objective state of affairs in the cosmos, projecting to the objectivist interlocutor, the accusation that s/he is imposing a particular “objectivist” account of truth or warrant or rationality. But, to make even that accusation, the relativist is inherently assuming precisely the same account of truth or warrant or rationality. In short we see here selective hyper-skepticism, which as an intellectual double-standard, is always self-referentially incoherent.
Abundant presence of chestnuts? check. Accusations of rhetorical evasion? check. Citations to one of the expected sources? Check (not here, but later in the comment. Laments about the honesty (and in this case the fate) of your opponents? check. In fact, I don't think you've even begun to understand my point, because you haven't actually tried. You saw "relativist" and sprung into action: there's nothing I can say because you already know there's nothing I can contribute to the tight little house of your understanding. Let me make one thing clear, however: I am not "assuming precisely the same account [as you are] of truth or warrant or rationality." I am assuming a different account -- a relativist account -- which you seem to think must be the same account if words such as truth or warrant or rationality are to be used at all. I'm not sure how you will respond to this: say that I've evaded the point? Continue lamenting the sad state of relativist reasoning? Post a note to "onlookers" advising them of how to read the whole debate in your terms? Return to the well-trodden paths charted above? I'm breathless with anticipation.getawitness_{November 22, 2007
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StephenB, When I report something it does not mean I agree with it but use it to show why people believe something. I don't think you have the correct reading of natural selection. The problem with natural selection is not that the process is not effective but that it does not/never had anything to work with. In other words the reason natural selection has not produced much is not because it cannot but because there has not enough variation to work with to produce much change. Once variation is robust enough to produce real novelty in the genome then the natural selection process can work to spread it throughout the population. I just believe such variation has rarely if ever appeared. What Roughgarden is saying is that there has been enough variation to create novelty so that the natural selection process was able to work but also there is no reason to believe this variation could not be caused by God. Which by the way is what the theistic evolution position is. They often talk about how God created the variation at the molecular level while simultaneously criticizing the ID people for saying God probably did it on a more macro or sudden basis. It is interesting because ID does not require a macro or sudden change. I personally disagree that there is any evidence that there every was much variation for natural selection to work on unless it was introduced by an intelligence. After if it was introduced then natural selection could take over. I also personally believe that there is almost no evidence in evolutionary biology for any position only strong evidence against other people's positions. However, certain positions should have left forensic evidence and none has ever been found so I then lean toward the position that requires no forensic evidence.jerry_{November 18, 2007
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Jerry: I agree that Barr is far more reasonable than Miller. My point is that he is using the same rationale as Miller, namely Aquinas' notion of providence. As I argued, I think it is a misuse of Aquinas' words to suggest that God creates DNA molecules through contingency. It is on those grounds that I link him to Miller. Both quote Aquinas selectively to serve their purpose, so I think, on philosophical grounds, at least, their feet should be held to the fire. I grant you all your other points about their differences. I am making a very specific point in a very limited, though very important, context. Here is the deal breaker for me, though. Barr insists that Darwinism is compatible with Christianity, and yet he denies Chrisitanity’s testimony on the matter. According to the Bible (St. Paul, Psalms, etc) the design in nature is "evident." As a Darwinist, he must hold that design is an "illusion." A few other notes: I am not reading Roughgarden in the same way that you are. She holds that natural selection can guide the evolutionary process. Natural selection cannot guide anything, because it doesn’t know where it is going? I think Hunter has good ideas, but I don't accept his theme as the whole answer to Theistic evolution. I think other motives are at work. In any case, I don’t have much sympathy for “Christians” who persecute ID scientists on the grounds that a good God would not design such a world. If they don’t even go to the trouble to find out that 1) Their Bible teaches that there is design in nature and 2) that design was compromised by the fall, why should I give them the benefit of the doubt? Consider this: Theistic evolution did not always mean Theistic Darwinism. At one time it meant that God “planted the seed of evolution,” which is strictly a God-directed, non-Darwinian process. In other words, it WAS consistent with Christian theology. Through the years they slipped Darwin in (who needs seeds from the inside, when the environment will do it from the outside) and kept the term. Thus “directed” gradually morphed into “non-directed.” Now, “Christian” Darwinists can exploit the ambiguity by simply using the term.. On the one hand, they allow the general public to think Theistic evolution means God-directed, on the other hand, they do all they can to keep God out of the process; indeed, they will not even let his foot in the door. It doesn’t get any more duplicitous that that.StephenB_{November 18, 2007
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Bork, My problem with Miller is that he is not honest, makes a ton of money by supporting neo Darwinism and then throws himself into the debate so one sidedly with a position that will ensure he continutes to make the money. I do not mind anyone making money in fact I applaud it because it is what drives a lot of our world. It is the hypocrisy I can not take because his postion in the debate supports his ability to make the money. He has the number one selling textbook for high school biology and even if he makes just $1 per book, it is probably worth a couple hundred thousand a year. It would all disappear if he looked at both sides honestly.jerry_{November 18, 2007
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Jerry: I think you made a valid point with Barr. I have met many respectable christians who believe in God that don't like the title creationist or IDer. Those names have been marred- there is a negative connotation associated with them. Truth be known- every christian by definition is a creationist. Many scientists seem almost sympathetic to ID- but not under the name of ID. For example, I would consider Dr. Simon Conway Morris on par with ID with his work in convergent evolution- however, i think he considers himself a theistic evolutionist. I think Barr takes a phycist's point of view on things: things can be disproven. Physics has changed dramatically with many scientific revolutions- however, biology is still lacking their's. Biology has not had it's world turned upside down like physics- and it is just a bit hard to believe they got it right on the first try. As for Miller, I am still out to lunch. I don't know enough about him to make a valid judgement. Just because there is money to be made doesn't invalidate his point- it just opens the possibility.bork_{November 18, 2007
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StephenB, This may not relate to moral progress in a materialistic world but I have some comments on Miller and Barr. I am not sure Miller and Barr are in the same camp for the same reasons or may actually not be in the same camp. Miller should have a long time ago dismissed himself from the debate. He has tremendous financial interests in the debate so a person of good ethics should have excused himself as one who is not disinterested. Barr is apparently espousing the theistic evolutionist rationale that Hunter does such a good job of describing but as evident below is not 100% committed. The theistic evolutionist's God is more powerful than the tinkering God of ID to a lot of people and this has a lot of appeal with traditional religious thinkers. What is unusual about Barr and not Miller is that he does lay out the possibility that neo Darwinism may be wrong. He says in his First Things article "I personally am not at all sure that the neo-Darwinian framework is a sufficient one for biology. But if it turns out to be so, it would in no way invalidate what Pope Benedict has said: 'We are not some casual and meaningless product of evolution. Each of us is the result of a thought of God. Each of us is willed, each of us is loved, each of us is necessary.'" Separate but related - A recent review of Behe's EOE by a prominent evolutionary biologist is meant to support the theistic evolutionist view point. Joan Roughgarden, previously John Roughgarden, is a well respected biologist at Stanford and has recently written this review in a journal titled the Christian Century. See "www.christiancentury.org/article.lasso?id=3777" In it she says: "(Discovering that the emergence of higher organisms coincides with anomalous bursts of directed mutation would support the ID position without falsifying Darwinism, because Darwinism takes no position on what causes the variations on which natural selection acts.)" I wonder how many of the biology community would sign up for that. She also seems to think that Behe could modify what ID means and seems to be trying to steer him into the theistic evolution camp. Some of what Behe says in the EOE may be consistent with that assumption. As I said none of this is related very directly to moral progress in a materialistic world but is related to what Miller and Barr think. Whatever Miller contributes must be discounted since he is forever compromised by the financial aspects of this debate while Barr is apparently not. Can you imagine that Miller would allow Roughgarden's comment about the source of variation in his textbooks. Maybe someone should ask him that the next time he shows up for a debate or presentation.jerry_{November 18, 2007
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One quick note: Only "rules" that come from a "legitimate" authority would be superior to virtue ethics. In other words, God and the natural moral law would be examples of legitimate authorities. Obviously, no one is bound to "obey" authority that is not legitimate.StephenB_{November 18, 2007
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----Carl, "Stephen, I take it, from (241), that you refuse to accept my attempt to distinguish between objectivity and absoluteness. I don’t expect to convince you, but would you be willing to clarify your criticisms of this distinction? With all due respect, I was well aware of the distinction before you brought it up. Beyond that, I don't understand why you are asking the question. If you will clarify, I will answer. For the most part, subjectivists are relativists. If you want me to grant that there are exceptions, then, by all means, it is granted. As I recall (I don't know the reponse #) your idea of objective transcends the individual, but it stops at the community---that's not far enought to qualify for my interpetation of "objective." In my judgment, it should extend all the way to a "natural moral law" written on every human heart (The Ten Commandments) So, my reservations would be about that, not about a distinction that we both agree is real. In terms of "virtue ethics," I think it is great. It's about as good as a morality can be short acknowledging a universal morality that binds the conscience. It is certainly better than any de-ontological model alone. On the other hand, I think we need both an objective morality that transcends the community, and some semblance of virtue ethics to instill the right kinds of habits. To me, one without the other is incomplete.StephenB_{November 18, 2007
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kairosfocus, just a note to say I want to respond to your recent posts but have been very busy. I'll try to post something later tonight or tomorrow. You'll not be surprised to find that I find your posts unconvincing. Perhaps you'll not be surprised, either, to discover that I don't attribute that resistance the factors you adduce. :-)getawitness_{November 17, 2007
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