Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

On Moral Progress In A Materialist World

Categories
Intelligent Design
Share
Facebook
Twitter/X
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

A commenter in my last post gave a very nice summary of the current state of thinking about moral progress among matrialists.  Obviously, by definition, materialists cannot point to a transcendent moral code by which to measure moral progress.  Indeed, it is difficult for them to account for moral progress at all because if materialism is correct, the “is” in a society defines the “ought.”  The commenter took a stab at it nevertheless and came up with this: 

In terms of progress: I would say that progress is measured by the increase or decrease of the sphere of human recognition. We today recognize the humanity of African-Americans — a recognition that was denied to their ancestors. It is the contrast between the present and the past, not between the present and an imagined future, that indicates whether or not progress has occurred.  Although such recognition still has some ways to go, as measures go, it’s not a bad one.

In response I would like to pose two questions:

1.  On what basis do you say that the recognition of the humanity of African-Americans is “progress” unless you have held up the previous nonrecognition and the present recognition to a code and deterermined the former was bad (i.e., did not meet the code) and the latter is good (i.e., does meet the code)?  In other words, when you say we have “progressed” it is just another way of saying that the previous state of affairs was bad and the present state of affairs is good.  But how can you know this unless there is a code that transcends time and place by which both states of affairs can be measured.  Certainly to say that things were previously one way and now they are another is not the same as saying there has been progress.  Change is not the same as progress. 

 2.  Increasingly in our society pornography is viewed as an affirmatively good thing.  Perhaps that is even the majority view today, so let us assume for the sake of argument that the majority of people in America think pornography is a good thing.  Does the fact that the majority of people believe pornography is a good thing in fact make the exploitation and objectification of women for the sexual gratification of men good?  Would you say that there has been moral progress because now our society recognizes that the exploitation and objectification of women for the sexual gratification of men is good wheras before we believed that was bad?

Comments
BarryA, I just checked. This whole time I haven't been wearing pants. :-) For a syllogism to be well-formed, the terms must be agreed on. I don't think the syllogism works for materialists (and perhaps for others too) because the premises are loaded with words on which the disputants will disagree. If the premises were that obvious, we could all go home.getawitness
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
08:42 AM
8
08
42
AM
PDT
alan, I knew I shouldn't have stated my position outright. I'm not going to get into a defense or extended exposition of my beliefs. I don't see how that will be productive or lead to anything other than a set of people badgering me to give up what they perceive as my inconsistencies one way or the other. No thank you.getawitness
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
08:37 AM
8
08
37
AM
PDT
getawitness give me a break. Is it really (I hope that word didn't through you off; it means "truly" or "the way things actually are") true that all you can do is quibble, nitpick and pettifog in response to Brute's syllogism? Truth is, you got caught with your pants down. You averred that the syllogism is terrible, but when called to back up your claim you could not even begin to deliver the goods. Pathetic.BarryA
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
08:31 AM
8
08
31
AM
PDT
Two question for gitawitness: Was Jesus a product of evolution? and What do you base your acceptance of evolution on and is that Darwinian Evolution? (or evolution meaning some modification of kinds, but still within that "Kind" i.e. its still a horse, a dog, a considerably deformed fruit fly, but still a fruit fly etc. - thanksalan
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
08:25 AM
8
08
25
AM
PDT
Clumsy Brute, I love your name, by the way. "That is why I reject the materialist position that morals are merely a by-product of nature." I'd say it's a materialist position, not the> materialist position. The existentialist, as I mentioned above, is one alternate version. (But then, I'm not a materialist.) "Oh really? Which premise do you disagree with?" I can't even get to the premises because the terms are so woolly: not just the one-size-fits-all euphemism ("certain things") but also "really," "wrong" and "objective." I'm guessing that "really" will be a point of great contention in any argument you might have on the issue.getawitness
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
08:19 AM
8
08
19
AM
PDT
getawitness: "Hume’s view is that the 'ought' cannot in any sense be derived from the 'is.'" Exactly. I agree, at least for the materialist. A materialist can never argue from the "is" (morals are an accidental by-product of nature), to the "ought" (therefore certain things are wrong). That is why I reject the materialist position that morals are merely a by-product of nature. Because it is evident that certain things are really wrong. So what exactly is your objection to Barry A's claim? getawitness: "As for your “rational” verification of Moral Law, it would be nice if it were that simple. But that’s a terribly formed syllogism." Oh really? Which premise do you disagree with?Clumsy Brute
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
07:56 AM
7
07
56
AM
PDT
"But I hope it acts as an existence proof, at the very least." That is the traditionally suggested pathway, but that never really convinced me. Very un-Darwinian, this altruism and faithfulness to spouses is. And why should you, personally, obey any of it? The honest atheist must admit that there is no basis for obeying this vestige of evolution. Have fun, but don't get caught!vrf
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
07:35 AM
7
07
35
AM
PDT
Sorry, but has this Blog given up posting any articles actually related to ID? Seems to be turning into a Christian theology Blog...tdean
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
07:32 AM
7
07
32
AM
PDT
I think I see what BarryA means. It's true that, for Hume, any morality has to derive (ultimately) or be concocted from our sense impressions. But the is/ought distinction Hume makes means that no morality, no ought, follows rationally from any condition or set of such conditions. Since people are announcing their positions on this thread, I'll declare myself a Christian and an evolutionist. Some people will find that contradictory.getawitness
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
07:28 AM
7
07
28
AM
PDT
The difference is that the theist can say that this code is built-in, wired in the design. Written on our hearts, if you will. But the atheist has no intellectual basis for the code’s existence, and certainly no basis for obeying it.
Not so. Firstly, the existence of a moral code could be the result of social evolution - it has evolved (mimetically) so that societies that use the code do better than those that don't. Anarchist states don't tend to last very long. This then shows us one reason for why a materialist may want to obey a moral code - they want to live in a "good" society, and are aware that morals are set by society as a way of letting everyone live together. Obviously this is only a sketch of the arguments one could use, and there may be other, better, arguments. But I hope it acts as an existence proof, at the very least. It doesn't necessarily follow that any one society's moral code is perfect for functioning of the society - as always reality tends to get in the way.Bob O'H
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
07:18 AM
7
07
18
AM
PDT
From Hume: "Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them; that the immutable measures of right and wrong impose an obligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself: All these systems concur in the opinion, that morality, like truth, is discern'd merely by ideas, and by their juxta-position and comparison. In order, therefore, to judge of these systems, we need only consider, whether it be possible, from reason alone, to distinguish betwixt moral good and evil, or whether there must concur some other principles to enable us to make that distinction, If morality had naturally no influence on human passions and actions, `twere in vain to take such pains to inculcate it; and nothing wou'd be more fruitless than that multitude of rules and precepts, with which all moralists abound. Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and practical; and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division, `tis supposed to influence our passions and actions, and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding. And this is confirm'd by common experience, which informs us, that men are often govern'd by their duties, and are deter'd from some actions by the opinion of injustice, and impell'd to others by that of obligation. Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality. therefore, are not conclusions of our reason." And later: "I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, `tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason." A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, "Of Morals"getawitness
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
07:15 AM
7
07
15
AM
PDT
What can we say regarding these issues in the context of developing Intelligent Design as an objective empirical science? As BarryA notes in 1, empirical observation finds almost universal use of right/wrong, good/bad, progress, ought to etc. among human beings. This in turn reflects the existence of a near universal moral code. There appears no basis for a requirement for such a code by the four forces of nature. Similarly, the universality of this observation appears beyond chance occurence. Consequently, should I not infer that this evidence for a moral factor in human beings, can be attributed to Intelligent Design? This could be used to infer at least a similar degree of moral character in the Intelligent Designer. Beyond that I would refer to revealed religions for characteristics of the Designer. Per BarryA's 2, there is still the observation of the use of good/bad, oppression etc regarding pornography which indicates the existence of a moral code separate from biological processes and reactions. While the widespread availability of pornography may be influencing the majority's perceptions, this is not universal. It further indicates a moral code underlying training or nurture. Without a designed moral basis, materialistic evolution can only say what is. Beyond that any moral construct is a tool for increased "fitness" of one individual or group over another. e.g., the "sacred duty" of Stalin, Mao or the Communist party to destroy places of worship and incarcerate believers. Thus Richard Dawkins' appeal to "Delusion", religion as evil, and other moral terms and constructs is based on the foundations of morality in society. These infer ID, and are evidence against the very materialism that he advocates. Per Carl Sachs' effort to "see how far we can go in keeping what’s of value in the Judeo- Christian-Enlightenment legacy within a conception of humans as animals." Does ID provide basis for considering humans as animals? Rather I would see very substantial differences in communication and in moral awareness that argue for very distinct differences between humans and animals, and thus for ID rather than materialistic naturalism.DLH
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
07:12 AM
7
07
12
AM
PDT
Hume's view is that the "ought" cannot in any sense be derived from the "is." A twentieth-century derivative of this view is expressed by (among other views) existentialism, which views morality as something profoundly chosen. The existentialist chooses morality because the material universe provides no guidance on that score. It's true that there are debates within materialism about this. With respect to evolution, this sort of informs the debates between Dawkins and Richard Lewontin (Lewontin being on the side of choice). As for your "rational" verification of Moral Law, it would be nice if it were that simple. But that's a terribly formed syllogism.getawitness
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
07:08 AM
7
07
08
AM
PDT
Carl Sachs is a Darwinist but not a materialist. He’s a philosopher—biologists, in my experience, tend to be materialists par excellence, whereas physicists (at least those who have thought about the matter) tend to be mathematical realists (Platonists). That is, the physicist may be an atheist just as much as atheism’s high priests in biology (Darwin must be upheld at all costs or atheism is in deep trouble!), but the physicist does recognize an abstract realm of eternal verities that could be no other way. This abstract Platonic realm is independent of the particles and forces that the physicist studies, but his primary tool—mathematics—lies square in that abstract realm. The very fact that the physicist studies other possible worlds means that he believes mathematics to be necessary and the laws of physics to be contingent. This comes through in the popular writings of physicists like Paul Davies and Roger Penrose. It’s the Peircean realm of logic, esthetics, ethics—it’s the Natural Law of the theologian—it’s where the fundamental categories that underlie language reside. The verities of this realm are discovered, not invented. We may find here Plato’s God—and Spinoza’s and Einstein’s—but certainly not Abraham’s God. This is a realm of being—of eternal truths that lie outside of time and space. Abraham’s God is an Agent, a Creator, and a King. He is the Hebrew God of History. He is not God until he enters time. Thus I see three realms—an abstract realm of timeless truths, a temporal realm of consciousness and agency, and a contingent, material world instantiated via both of the above. It’s there in the spirit and soul and body of Scripture if you do the study. Any worthwhile theodicy must temper God as transcendent Agent with limitations from the realm of timeless truths. Granting agency and freedom, for example, entails the risk of failure as decreed in the realm of timeless truths. Even God cannot make it otherwise. The Deists were reductionists who tried to reduce God to the realm of eternal being which, if they were right, would make us all agnostics. The atheist charges on further through faith. Now depending on where you are philosophically you will find much of this foolish. If you’re a straight Dawkinsian Darwinist you see only the particles, if you’re a Platonic atheist you see further, and if you’re an old fashioned Judeo-Christian you’ll be ridiculed.Rude
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
07:06 AM
7
07
06
AM
PDT
getawitness: 'If materialism is correct, the “is” in a society defines the “ought.' "This is precisely wrong. The is/ought distinction was first raised seriously by David Hume, who seems to have been an atheist." You are mistaken. Hume's view affirms Barry A's claim. Hume believed that a moral "wrong" was merely something that repulses us. In other words, the "ought" (one shouldn't murder) was merely an illusion for the "is" (I don't like murder). He reduced morals to cultural preference, which is exactly what Barry A is saying. If materialism is true, then moral values are simply a matter of cultural and personal preference. If a materialist is to be consistent, he can only say, "I don't like x." He cannot say, "X is wrong." mike1962: "what objectively verifiable “transcendent moral code” can non-materialists point to?" The Moral Law may not be empirically verifiable, but it is rationally verifiable: 1) Certain things are really wrong only if there is an objective Moral Law. 2) Certain things are really wrong. 3) Therefore, there is an objective Moral Law.Clumsy Brute
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
06:56 AM
6
06
56
AM
PDT
"what objectively verifiable 'transcendent moral code' can non-materialists point to?" The code would be the same for everyone, atheists, theists, whatever. That little feeing you get when faced with a moral choice. This is right. That is wrong. I should help him, though it hurts me. I shouldn't cheat. I shouldn't lie. I shouldn't steal. I should stay faithful to my wife. The difference is that the theist can say that this code is built-in, wired in the design. Written on our hearts, if you will. But the atheist has no intellectual basis for the code's existence, and certainly no basis for obeying it. There either is a God--a giver of the code--or the code is a by-product of evolution, one we can cast off now that we are smart enough to have a choice in the matter. God exists, or right and wrong do not exist. Very few atheists are honest enough to admit that, though. Singer is one of the few.vrf
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
06:32 AM
6
06
32
AM
PDT
ellazim, It is very possible that all of what Zoroaster taught was in fact correct. I have not had the opportunity to study the subject in detail, but it would not be surprising if God revealed truth to multiple sources. You say, "To speak of an eternal code is divisive and it would be more constructive to emphasise those points upon which most of us can agree." You do, I hope, recognize that the above statement is divisive. If most of us agree on a point, that agreement divides most of us from those who do not agree with that point. No matter how you cut it, any morality with any content at all will inevitably be "divisive" to some people. Your criterion above seems to be majority rule ("most of us"), and the whole point of BarryA's post is that majority rule has changed, and he is asking the question of whether that change is good. Should Martin Luther King Jr. and others have protested the majority view of segregation? Should William Wilberforce and others have protested the majority view of slavery? If so, then your rule above fails. You give another rule: "On the basis that I respect all human beings as equal to myself. I can only do what in my heart I know is right. I believe we should treat others as we wish to be treated." I agree with that rule. But of course part of that rule is derived from the Declaration of Independence, and part of it comes from the recorded words of Jesus. Similar sentiments have occurred in other religions, and again it would not be surprising if God revealed truth to other people than Jesus. Certainly traditional Christianity would posit that God revealed truth to Moses and the prophets, but also to the Magi, who may have been Zoroastrian. One point that has been made repeatedly is that at least some Darwinists interpret the moral implications of Darwinist theory as beng that the Golden Rule is not how we got here and should not be how we live our lives. Nietzsche is one example. Are you willing to be "divisive" and argue that Nietzsche got it all wrong? If so, would it matter if you lived in a society where Nietzsche was in the majority (there apparently was one once, you know)? Is the Golden Rule transcendant? If so, we have the basis for a transcendent moral code. You say, ". . . if the materialists are right then all religious moral standards were created by men and are therefore relative by your criterium." But that begs the question of whether the materialists are right. Perhaps they are not. Finally, you say, responding to BarryA's comments on pornography, "Accepting your “fact” strictly for the sake of the argument I would say there is a difference between adults voluntarily participating in sexual activity and being coerced and manipulated. I will always support prosecuting those who exploit any other person for their own gain. I’m just like you, I don’t want the government or the academics or the media to tell me what is right or how to behave and I am not about to dictate other’s activities." This is somewhat incoherent. Can one engage in sexual activity voluntarily after manipulation? Is it too much manipulation to show someone skin, or to omit pertinent details on the assumption that the other person already knows them, when in fact she/he doesn't? What about the fact that oxytocin is released during female orgasm, and has the effect of bonding to the person one is physically close to at the time? Can the "Fatal Attraction" scenario be anticipated? if so, should it be avoided? Most importantly, you do not "want the government or the academics or the media to tell me what is right or how to behave", but you "upport prosecuting those who exploit any other person for their own gain." Isn't that having the government tell others how to behave? Isn't enforcing the Golden Rule in fact enforcing morality? If so, do you not at least sometimes want the government to tell you what is right and how to behave? And do you not want the academics or the media to pile on in those instances?Paul Giem
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
06:29 AM
6
06
29
AM
PDT
barrya: "materialists cannot point to a transcendent moral code by which to measure moral progress" Not trying to be a crank but, what objectively verifiable "transcendent moral code" can non-materialists point to?mike1962
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
04:52 AM
4
04
52
AM
PDT
BarryA, "If materialism is correct, the “is” in a society defines the “ought.” This is precisely wrong. The is/ought distinction was first raised seriously by David Hume, who seems to have been an atheist. It's true that atheist "philosopher" Ayn Rand claimed to have "solved" the problem (or rather dismissed it) with her own vesion of materialism, but Rand was an idiot.getawitness
November 13, 2007
November
11
Nov
13
13
2007
03:33 AM
3
03
33
AM
PDT
Peter Singer sees nothing wrong with, and little reason to bar, sex with animals so long as the animal doesn't really mind. Your thoughts, Carl Sachs? May as well start with the fun aspects of Singer.nullasalus
November 12, 2007
November
11
Nov
12
12
2007
11:13 PM
11
11
13
PM
PDT
Jason, I've read Singer's Rethinking Life and Death, Practical Ethics, and most of Writings on an Ethical Life. If you want to talk about Singer, I'm ready to go!Carl Sachs
November 12, 2007
November
11
Nov
12
12
2007
10:51 PM
10
10
51
PM
PDT
I've given one answer to (1) in the previous topic, but feel free to post responses here. For what it's worth, I'm not a materialist. A materialist is committed to saying that there is single correct metaphysics -- one in which everything is "matter," whatever that is -- and that anything that exists, can be understood in terms of matter. In other words, materialists have the problem of how to explain things that aren't particles (e.g. minds, values, numbers) in terms of things that are particles. I think that there are such huge problems with this approach that it's not even worth defending. But that's in part because I'm deeply skeptical of their being any single correct metaphysics -- whether monistic or dualistic, material or spiritual. My aim here is therefore not to defend any particular metaphysical views, but to see how far we can go in keeping what's of value in the Judeo-Christian-Enlightenment legacy within a conception of humans as animals. Maybe we can't go as far as I'd like to -- maybe we'll see that such a conception requires us to give up on too much that's valuable to us -- or maybe we'll see -- and this is my suspicion -- that what must be given up in order to accommodate this conception isn't worth having. To that extent my explorations here are a continuation of my earlier work on Nietzsche. Nietzsche thought that once we see humans as animals and nothing more, then much of the Judeo-Christian-Enlightenment legacy was 'unnatural' and should be rejected. I think that Nietzsche was right about humans as animals, and wrong about the harmfulness of the ideals of the Enlightenment. So what I've been doing since then is trying to see if there's a way to have my cake and eat it, too, or if I'm just squaring the circle. I suspect that most patrons will argue that I'm squaring the circle, and that there's no way to defend the ideals of the Enlightenment, based as they are on the dignity of persons, together with a conception of humans as animals. No person could be only an animal, they might say. Well, maybe. But I suspect otherwise, and I look forward to continuing the discussion.Carl Sachs
November 12, 2007
November
11
Nov
12
12
2007
10:48 PM
10
10
48
PM
PDT
I would add an additional observation. It it materialist thinkers like Peter Singer that are seeking to disqualify vast numbers of human beings from being recognized. If anything the proliferation of materialist philosophy has been a regress even by this standard. The disabled, the elderly, the unborn, the "defective", the mentally disabled, and so on, are all in the sites of explicit materialists like Singer (who is a scary but very well thought out and careful thinking materialist, the problem is with his premises not with the conclusions her draws relative to the premises). Currently the trend among utilitarian "moral" philosophers like Singer is to drive towards pushing people out of the sphere of being a human being (under the guise of "personhood theory") rather than including them more. This shouldn't really be surprising though. Something about bad roots leading to bad fruit comes to mind here. But historically this direction isn't surprising. It was Christians who led the drive to end slavery (and even that took a long time and happened only in steps) and it was Christians who led much of the civil rights movements. Sadly there were Christians on the other side of the fence in all these things, just as there were Christians on both sides of the question of the divine right of kings vs rule by the people. But such is the nature of human beings. So even assuming the truth of the premise of the original comment, it would appear materialism is more trouble than it is worth in terms of human "recognition". But as Barry astutely notes, even the premise itself is problematic. No doubt someone will disagree with Singer's conclusions (good IMO) and say not all materialists agree with them. No doubt this is true. But I would wager that Peter Singer has thought about the implications of his materialism much more carefully and thoroughly than the person who disagrees with him that is also a materialist.Jason Rennie
November 12, 2007
November
11
Nov
12
12
2007
10:32 PM
10
10
32
PM
PDT
1 7 8 9

Leave a Reply