Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Optimus, replying to KN on ID as ideology, summarises the case for design in the natural world

Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

The following reply by Optimus to KN in the TSZ thread, is far too good not to headline as an excellent summary of the case for design as a scientifically legitimate view, not mere  “Creationism in a cheap tuxedo”  ideology motivated and driven by anti-materialism and/or a right-wing, theocratic, culture war mentality commonly ascribed to “Creationism” by its objectors:

______________

>> KN

It’s central to the ideological glue that holds together “the ID movement” that the following are all conflated:Darwin’s theories; neo-Darwinism; modern evolutionary theory; Epicurean materialistic metaphysics; Enlightenment-inspired secularism. (Maybe I’m missing one or two pieces of the puzzle.) In my judgment, a mind incapable of making the requisite distinctions hardly deserves to be taken seriously.

I think your analysis of the driving force behind ID is way off base. That’s not to say that persons who advocate ID (including myself) aren’t sometimes guilty of sloppy use of language, nor am I making the claim that the modern synthetic theory of evolution is synonymous with materialism or secularism. Having made that acknowledgement, though, it is demonstrably true that (1) metaphysical presuppostions absolutely undergird much of the modern synthetic theory. This is especially true with regard to methodological naturalism (of course, MN is distinct from ontological naturalism, but if, as some claim, science describes the whole of reality, then reality becomes coextensive with that which is natural). Methodological naturalism is not the end product of some experiment or series of experiments. On the contrary it is a ground rule that excludes a priori any explanation that might be classed as “non-natural”. Some would argue that it is necessary for practical reasons, after all we don’t want people atributing seasonal thunderstorms to Thor, do we? However, science could get along just as well as at present (even better in my view) if the ground rule is simply that any proposed causal explanation must be rigorously defined and that it shall not be accepted except in light of compelling evidence. Problem solved! Though some fear “supernatural explanation” (which is highly definitional) overwhelming the sciences, such concerns are frequently oversold. Interestingly, the much maligned Michael Behe makes very much the same point in his 1996 Darwin’s Black Box:

If my graduate student came into my office and said that the angel of death killed her bacterial culture, I would be disinclined to believe her…. Science has learned over the past half millenium that the universe operates with great regularity the great majority of the time, and that simple laws and predictable behavior explain most physical phenomena.
Darwin’s Black Box pg. 241

If Behe’s expression is representative of the ID community (which I would venture it is), then why the death-grip on methodological naturalism? I suggest that its power lies in its exclusionary function. It rules out ID right from the start, before even any discussions about the emprical data are to be had. MN means that ID is persona non grata, thus some sort of evolutionary explanation must win by default. (2) In Darwin’s own arguments in favor of his theory he rely heavily on metaphysical assumptions about what God would or wouldn’t do. Effectively he uses special creation by a deity as his null hypothesis, casting his theory as the explanatory alternative. Thus the adversarial relationship between Darwin (whose ideas are foundational to the MST) and theism is baked right into The Origin. To this very day, “bad design” arguments in favor of evolution still employ theological reasoning. (3) The modern synthetic theory is often used in the public debate as a prop for materialism (which I believe you acknowledged in another comment). How many times have we heard the famed Richard Dawkins quote to the effect that ‘Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist’? Very frequently evolutionary theory is impressed into service to show the superfluousness of theism or to explain away religion as an erstwhile useful phenomenon produced by natural selection (or something to that effect). Hardly can it be ignored that the most enthusiastic boosters of evolutionary theory tend to fall on the atheist/materialist/reductionist side of the spectrum (e.g. Eugenie Scott, Michael Shermer, P.Z. Meyers, Jerry Coyne, Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Peter Atkins, Daniel Dennett, Will Provine). My point simply stated is that it is not at all wrong-headed to draw a connection between the modern synthetic theory and the aforementioned class of metaphysical views. Can it be said that the modern synthetic theory (am I allowed just to write Neo-Darwinism for short?) doesn’t mandate nontheistic metaphysics? Sure. But it’s just as true that they often accompany each other.

In chalking up ID to a massive attack of confused cognition, you overlook the substantive reasons why many (including a number of PhD scientists) consider ID to be a cogent explanation of many features of our universe (especially the bioshpere):

-Functionally-specified complex information [FSCI] present in cells in prodigdious quantities
-Sophisticated mechanical systems at both the micro and macro level in organisms (many of which exhibit IC)
-Fine-tuning of fundamental constants
-Patterns of stasis followed by abrupt appearance (geologically speaking) in the fossil record

In my opinion the presence of FSCI/O and complex biological machinery are very powerful indicators of intelligent agency, judging from our uniform and repeated experience. Also note that none of the above reasons employ theological presuppositions. They flow naturally, inexorably from the data. And, yes, we are all familiar with the objection that organisms are distinct from artificial objects, the implication being that our knowledge from the domain of man-made objects doesn’t carry over to biology. I think this is fallacious. Everyone acknowledges that matter inhabiting this universe is made up of atoms, which in turn are composed of still other particles. This is true of all matter, not just “natural” things, not just “artificial” things – everything. If such is the case, then must not the same laws apply to all matter with equal force? From whence comes the false dichotomy that between “natural” and “artificial”? If design can be discerned in one case, why not in the other?

To this point we have not even addressed the shortcomings of the modern synthetic theory (excepting only its metaphysical moorings). They are manifold, however – evidential shortcomings (e.g. lack of empirical support), unjustified extrapolations, question-begging assumptions, ad hoc rationalizations, tolerance of “just so” stories, narratives imposed on data instead of gleaned from data, conflict with empirical data from generations of human experience with breeding, etc. If at the end of the day you truly believe that all ID has going for it is a culture war mentality, then may I politely suggest that you haven’t been paying attention.>>

______________

Well worth reflecting on, and Optimus deserves to be headlined. END

Comments
NL: Are you unable to see that I have made a very careful distinction between an empirically grounded inference on empirically reliable observable sign, and onward debates that may happen in other circles on such plainly scientific findings? Are you unaware that a priori ideological materialists have set out to redefine science on their metaphysical assumptions, and are busily censoring and expelling those who do not go along with such tactics? Have you forgotten that they love to dress up in the holy lab coat and pretend that the science that they have biased into begging ontological questions by that imposition, somehow proves their worldview? If you are concerned about begging metaphysical questions, that is where you really need to be expending ammunition. It is clearly well grounded that FSCO/I is a good and reliable sign of design as cause. So, let us stand on that inductive evidence and let us then challenge the materialist ideologues that they are suppressing the evidence and where it points, then pretending that "there is no evidence." And, if that then opens up worldview level questions that materialists are uncomfortable with, tough luck. They have been using "science" in making worldview claims for years. Only, this time they have been caught out with a Victorian era positivist ideology in a C21 information age with 60 years of evidence of CODE, digital code in copious quantities, in the heart of life. Remember, this is what Crick wrote to his son March 19, 1953:
"Now we believe that the DNA is a code. That is, the order of bases (the letters) makes one gene different from another gene (just as one page of print is different from another)" . . .
What is the observed, empirically warranted cause of large amounts of digital code and associated execution machines and systems? Just fill in the blanks: ______________ Let them answer to that evidence. I assure you, no amount of parsing of terms in light of oh so delicate sensibilities -- remember, we are here dealing with people who do not hesitate to imply that we are Nazis by making utterly ungrounded invidious comparisons [I had to deal with that over the past few days . . . ], and who resort to outing tactics and smears on the web to damage personal reputations and economic prospects, as well as in some cases outright making threats against families -- that does not challenge that a priori materialism and does not publicly expose it to the point where it is undeniable, is going to make a dime's worth of difference. That is why they get so hot under the collar and falsely cry "quote mining" when the following key admission by Lewontin in the NYRB is cited:
It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes [[--> another major begging of the question . . . ] to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute [[--> i.e. here we see the fallacious, indoctrinated, ideological, closed mind . . . ], for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door . . . [NYRB, Billions and Billions of demons, Jan 1997. For a refutation of the "quote mining" false accusation, cf. the above linked.]
KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
10:55 AM
10
10
55
AM
PDT
kairosfocus 249: Do you not see that you are erecting a strawman caricature and twisting the empirically evident fact into a pretended unjustified ontological discussion on the nature of mind and its ultimate roots? As explained in post #250, this is not a strawman argument, but observation that the ID refusal to provide scientifically legitimate hypothesis about the nature of the "intelligent cause", and offering instead the ontological mind-matter debate is as unwise strategy as if Spartans had picked to battle Persians in the widest planes they could find. Namely, the natural science can't just say, OK, we agree, the "intelligent cause" is the best explanation for biological artifacts, the end of the story. The science has a built in Promethean drive to go further, to find out what is that cause, how does it work, how can it be corroborated more directly,... Natural science is just not going to walk along with ID to the edge of abyss with only philosophical and religious tar pits ahead, without knowing where the next solid foothold is. That's what the scientifically legitimate hypothesis would do -- serve as the provisional falsifiable foothold. Whatever the fate of that initial hypothesis turns out to be, the ID has entered the scientific tent, and its basic finding, the "intelligent cause" has become a part of legitimate science. That's the time to sit down, light up a pipe and philosophize all night long. But offering the philosophy for scientific hypothesis is not going to do it.nightlight
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
10:46 AM
10
10
46
AM
PDT
That’s precisely what I am saying and then taking the next step, asking: why would you drag debate into the philosophical swamps of mind-matter debate which has been going on for thousands of years and which cannot be won?
No, that is not what you have been saying. Your argument has been that in the scientific context alone, ID injects "mind" into its methodology. Whether or not science should interact with philosophy, which I think is a good idea, is a totally different discussion and unrelated to your claim.StephenB
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
10:43 AM
10
10
43
AM
PDT
nightlight, OK, thank you for that citation. We now have something to work with. What then, can we make of Dembski's quote. “Thus mind or intelligence or what philosophers call “agent causation” now stands as the only cause known to be capable of creating an information-rich system, including the coding of DNA, functional proteins and the cell as a whole." Again, context is critical. Recall the three known causes under consideration, namely, law, chance, or agency. This triad appears in both the scientific and philosophical realms. In philosophical discussions about causation, discussions about the origin of life often breaks down into an either/or dichotomy, that is, either mind arose from matter or matter arose from mind. In this context, mind, as a philosophical construct, is synonymous with agency, as a scientific construct insofar as it is understood as the counterpoise to matter (a designing mind vs mindless matter). I don't agree with those who stump for a "Non Overlapping Magisteria" or the idea that various disciplines cannot interact in a meaningful way. Indeed, each discipline can illuminate the other. In this case, Dembski is not saying that we can extract the existence of a mind from functionally specified complex information, which is the false charge you are trying to defend. He is saying that, as a second order question, that same intelligence that is inferred by the process of design detection is often characterized as a mind by philosophers. This, then, cannot qualify as an example of an ID proponent injecting mind into design detection methodology. Sorry, but you are barking up the wrong tree.StephenB
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
10:15 AM
10
10
15
AM
PDT
@248 kairosfocus: As to the ontological nature of such intelligent causes, that is a different level of discussion. Indeed, the observation of the reliability of that sign of FSCO/I in terms of the organisation of the cosmos we observe is evidence that then points to a cause sufficient to explain such an observed cosmos* - and even a speculative multiverse - that has regions suitable for C-chemistry, cell based life, given evident fine tuning for that. That does raise issues that lead on to a discussion of cause in a mind beyond matter, a mind that is an ontologically necessary being. However, that onward discussion is most emphatically not a scientific discussion but a broad philosophical one. That's precisely what I am saying and then taking the next step, asking: why would you drag debate into the philosophical swamps of mind-matter debate which has been going on for thousands of years and which cannot be won? Why would one expand the battlefield, when ID already has a perfectly legitimate, narrow but scientifically solid argument (design detection in biological artifacts), which is winnable, provided the battle is limited to the scientific terrain. But once Meyer, Dembski and others extend the battlefield onto the wider philosophical tar pits, being already perceived as suspicious outsiders, ID is sure to lose the whole battle. The strategy is like Spartans picking to battle Persians on the widest open planes they could find in ancient Greece. The approach which will win, due to wiser selection of the battlefield terrain, is that of James Shapiro, which attributes the inferred intelligence to biochemical networks, which is a valid scientific hypothesis about the nature of the immediate intelligent cause. I suspect, when ultimately cornered by the shear volume of clear facts from molecular biology, provided ID sticks to its current strategy, neo-Darwninians will semantically rejigger (again) the meanings of "random mutation" and "natural selection" and embrace it, re-branding it as more detailed variant of what they have always been saying. But if ID were to change its strategy and get there first (by producing a scientifically legitimate hypothesis about the nature of the 'intelligent cause'), it could already occupy that position, leaving neo-Darwinian no option but to agree with ID. What is more likely to happen it seems, is that after neo-Darwinians shift gears sooner and get there first, ID will concede on biological artifacts and evolution, and shift the remaining battle to problems of origin of life and fine tuning of physical laws, while still refusing to produce a scientifically legitimate hypothesis about the intelligent cause. Of course, they will lose eventually those battles as well, to something like Planckian networks I discussed in this thread.nightlight
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
10:10 AM
10
10
10
AM
PDT
NL: This attempted "gotcha" is silly:
“Thus mind or intelligence or what philosophers call “agent causation” now stands as the only cause known to be capable of creating an information-rich system, including the coding of DNA, functional proteins and the cell as a whole. “ + lot more elaborations of the same kind pp. 137-138. Clearly, he equivocates between terms “intelligence” and “mind”, just as Meyer does. Other sites linked from UD also have hundreds of hits of the same kind.
Do you not see that Meyer is using "mind" in the obvious sense of an OBSERVED conscious choosing intelligence capable of causing FSCO/I, without any particular reference to the ontological nature of such a "mind" or "intelligence" or "agent"? Do you not see that you are erecting a strawman caricature and twisting the empirically evident fact into a pretended unjustified ontological discussion on the nature of mind and its ultimate roots? Do you not see that this is actually leading to a begging of the question on allowing the reliable evidence and warranted inference of observed causal patterns of intelligent designers acting to create FSCO/I, to point to the origin of FSCO/I in the world of life? And onwards, do you not see that you are similarly begging the question on the broader issue of asking what best explains the observed finely tuned cosmos, by trying to shut out reliable induction on cause of functionally specific complex organisation? Please, think again. KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
09:31 AM
9
09
31
AM
PDT
NL: Sorry, all that is used in the design inference proper is that we empirically observe intelligent causes and use that to ground that intelligence is the only known and observed adequate cause of FSCO/I. Where mind and agency appear int6hat context, they should be taken as synonymous to intelligent action or cause. That is, the evidence is that FSCO/I is a good sign of intelligent cause by choice contingency. And such is patently an empirical reality as familiar as the decisions we make in composing and posting comments in this thread, which themselves reflect FSCO/I as a reliable sign of the known cause of that observable pattern. As to the ontological nature of such intelligent causes, that is a different level of discussion. Indeed, the observation of the reliability of that sign of FSCO/I in terms of the organisation of the cosmos we observe is evidence that then points to a cause sufficient to explain such an observed cosmos* -- and even a speculative multiverse -- that has regions suitable for C-chemistry, cell based life, given evident fine tuning for that. That does raise issues that lead on to a discussion of cause in a mind beyond matter, a mind that is an ontologically necessary being. However, that onward discussion is most emphatically not a scientific discussion but a broad philosophical one. But, the inference that matter, energy, time, space, blind necessity and chance are capable of sufficiently causing the world of life and the wider world and that we may not infer beyond that circle is equally in that wider context. That many of those who argue the latter wear lab coats does not change that any one whit. KF *PS: Onlookers, see why I so often have to use even clumsy expressions to make sure they don't lead into all sorts of side tracks? (How many times would I have had to explain at length that I mean "observed cosmos" if I did not use this term repeatedly, hundreds and hundreds of times? How many times have objectors tried to twist something so in principle simple as FSCO/I -- functionally specific complex information and/or associated organisation -- into pretzels because they do not want to face what it is and is saying? Do you remember the weeks of silly talking points over the term, "arbitrary," which UB used in a perfectly acceptable sense? And so forth? At any moment, some pretty hostile objectors are waiting in the wings, hoping to pounce and latch on to any perceived gap in the case made by design supporters; and to run off elsewhere announcing triumphantly that they have a gotcha. Why, they do so all the time, even when they repeatedly have to make up strawmen laced with ad hominems, invidious associations, twisted about false accusations and the like. And BTW, when corrected, they do not retract or apologise they go on to the next attempt and if one does not look carefully, after a time they will recirculate the old and so laboriously rebutted talking points. Of course, that is why it is helpful to look through the weak argument correctives, as they summarise the main cycle of long since cogently answered accusations and objections. Except for the latest one, your'e a Nazi. Which, OM et al, is an outright lie. Indeed -- surprise [not) -- it is an exercise in big lie propaganda tactics; which were championed by guess who and who . . .)kairosfocus
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
09:22 AM
9
09
22
AM
PDT
@244 StephenB Discovery.org site is mostly quotes from Meyer (similar to what was already discussed so I won't recycle them). For others, such as Dembski, here is quote from his book "Mere Creation:..." "Thus mind or intelligence or what philosophers call "agent causation" now stands as the only cause known to be capable of creating an information-rich system, including the coding of DNA, functional proteins and the cell as a whole. " + lot more elaborations of the same kind pp. 137-138. Clearly, he equivocates between terms "intelligence" and "mind", just as Meyer does. Other sites linked from UD also have hundreds of hits of the same kind. Hence, this particular leap from scientifically legitimate attribute of the cause, intelligence, to additional attributes (of the cause) which have no counterpart in natural science, such as "mind" or "conscious" permeates the ID writings.nightlight
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
09:18 AM
9
09
18
AM
PDT
I am not the one deciding officially whether ID is a legitimate natural science or not. Those who do point precisely at these kinds of leaps (common in ID literature & talks) as indicators of the ulterior motives behind ID, which gives them excuse to reject the whole proposal and make propaganda points out of it.
I understand the strategy very well, and only remind you that the argument for ID can be made on purely material grounds without ambiguity. The issue is not what excuses will be used to discount ID, the issue is that ID will be discounted regardless of the words used, solely because it's consistent with theism. - - - - - - - - by the way....our AI friends have spent thousands of words on this blog arguing that "intelligence" cannot be used (and indeed is not used) as a causal explanation anywhere in science. You see? It doesn't matter what the words are. All one can do is not violate material findings or logical contraint. To babysit the ideologue is a losing proposition.Upright BiPed
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
09:00 AM
9
09
00
AM
PDT
kairosfocus #238: Summing up: FSCO/I is an empirically reliable sign of design as cause. I have no quarrel with that part. The problem is the leap that comes after that which assigns additional properties to that cause, such as mind or consciousness or mental. My point is that these extra attribute don't have a counterpart in natural science (check the so called "hard problem of consciousness"), hence the combinations such as "intelligent mind" or "conscious intelligence" or "intelligent mental agency" ... etc, don't have any counterparts in natural science either. Hence, while the attribute "intelligent" of that cause was inferred properly and is a perfectly solid science (no less so than archeology), the remaining attributes (mind, consciousness, mental) are wishful leaps outside the natural science. It is this needless weakening of otherwise valid inference of "intelligence" which I have problem with.nightlight
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
08:35 AM
8
08
35
AM
PDT
nightlight
Search of discovery.org finds 839 articles combining terms (conscious OR mind) AND agency (or 937 if you include ‘OR mental’ in the parens). This thread itself also illustrates the prevalence of the same position.
Please do not ask me to search out evidence for your claim. Just provide the appropriate quotes in the appropriate context to show that ID proponents inject "mind" into their design detection methodology.StephenB
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
08:28 AM
8
08
28
AM
PDT
F/N: AmHD, summarising the term mind and its link to intelligence, in response to yet another mountain out of a molehill objection: mind (mnd) n. 1. The human consciousness that originates in the brain and is manifested especially in thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination. 2. The collective conscious and unconscious processes in a sentient organism that direct and influence mental and physical behavior. 3. The principle of intelligence; the spirit of consciousness regarded as an aspect of reality. 4. The faculty of thinking, reasoning, and applying knowledge: Follow your mind, not your heart. 5. A person of great mental ability: the great minds of the century. 6. a. Individual consciousness, memory, or recollection: I'll bear the problem in mind. b. A person or group that embodies certain mental qualities: the medical mind; the public mind. c. The thought processes characteristic of a person or group; psychological makeup: the criminal mind. 7. Opinion or sentiment: He changed his mind when he heard all the facts. 8. Desire or inclination: She had a mind to spend her vacation in the desert. 9. Focus of thought; attention: I can't keep my mind on work. 10. A healthy mental state; sanity: losing one's mind. v. mind·ed, mind·ing, minds v.tr. 1. To bring (an object or idea) to mind; remember. 2. a. To become aware of; notice. b. Upper Southern U.S. To have in mind as a goal or purpose; intend. 3. To heed in order to obey: The children minded their babysitter. 4. To attend to: Mind closely what I tell you. 5. To be careful about: Mind the icy sidewalk! 6. a. To care about; be concerned about. b. To object to; dislike: doesn't mind doing the chores. 7. To take care or charge of; look after. v.intr. 1. To take notice; give heed. 2. To behave obediently. 3. To be concerned or troubled; care: "Not minding about bad food has become a national obsession" (Times Literary Supplement). 4. To be cautious or careful. [Middle English minde, from Old English gemynd; see men-1 in Indo-European roots.] minder n. Synonyms: mind, intellect, intelligence, brain, wit1, reason These nouns denote the capacity of thinking, reasoning, and acquiring and applying knowledge. Mind refers broadly to the capacities for thought, perception, memory, and decision: "No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear" (Edmund Burke). Intellect stresses knowing, thinking, and understanding: "Opinion is ultimately determined by the feelings, and not by the intellect" (Herbert Spencer). Intelligence implies solving problems, learning from experience, and reasoning abstractly: "The world of the future will be an ever more demanding struggle against the limitations of our intelligence" (Norbert Wiener). Brain suggests strength of intellect: We racked our brains to find a solution. Wit stresses quickness of intelligence or facility of comprehension: "There is no such whetstone, to sharpen a good wit and encourage a will to learning, as is praise" (Roger Ascham). Reason, the capacity for logical, rational, and analytic thought, embraces comprehending, evaluating, and drawing conclusions: "Since I have had the full use of my reason, nobody has ever heard me laugh" (Earl of Chesterfield). See Also Synonyms at tend2. The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.kairosfocus
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
08:28 AM
8
08
28
AM
PDT
nightlight
Those who do point precisely at these kinds of leaps (common in ID literature & talks) as indicators of the ulterior motives behind ID, which gives them excuse to reject the whole proposal and make propaganda points out of it.
Other than you, who else is pointing to these alleged "leaps" from intelligence to "mind" in the context of ID methodology?StephenB
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
08:18 AM
8
08
18
AM
PDT
NL: Further to all of the above, you have now been repeatedly corrected that intelligent designers are facts of observation. So also, without reference to any ontological theory of mind, we can see that FSCO/I is an inductively reliable sign of design as cause, where we can directly confirm, on billions of cases without any significant exception, despite a lot of claims and attempts to the contrary. Such grounds the inference that FSCO/I is a reliable sign of intelligent design as most credible causal explanation in cases where we do not have the opportunity to directly observe the cause. Kindly explain where in that there is any imposition of "mind" or more precisely any injection of a theory of "mind" beyond that what many people would call "minded" creatures would be typical examples of intelligent ones -- taking us and beavers as cases of "minded" creatures, however such CONSCIOUS INTELLIGENCE CAPABLE OF CHOOSING AND SHAPING CONTINGENCIES TO REFLECT SOME SORT OF INTENT comes to be. I take it, your own experience of posting in the thread should suffice to show the point, by self reference. At this point your objections are therefore coming across as a bit contrived. As for the ones who have made any number of irresponsible and provably false accusations and assertions concerning design theory and what it is about, I simply say, we should go to the merits instead of relying on demonstrably biased, often plainly wrong and sometimes outright dishonest advocates. KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
08:17 AM
8
08
17
AM
PDT
@236 StephenB Search of discovery.org finds 839 articles combining terms (conscious OR mind) AND agency (or 937 if you include 'OR mental' in the parens). This thread itself also illustrates the prevalence of the same position.nightlight
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
08:16 AM
8
08
16
AM
PDT
nightlight,
The tragedy of it is that with plenty of scientifically perfectly valid nouns to use and that fit the ID finding, such as “process”, “computation”… to apply his correctly inferred attribute “intelligent” to, why would one pick something that is a scientifically meaningless noun and squander it all.
You're using semantics to try and deny the obvious. That an intelligent Designer made DNA (and the universe). Other anti IDists on this blog have made the point that if DNA implies an intelligent "process" or "computation", then evolution fits the bill. But it's not going to fly. We all know that DNA has a ton of CSI/FSCI/dFSC/IC, and we also know it's a code (just like a human made code, except so much more complicated that it's really nothing like it). And since humans have minds, then the Designer of DNA had a mind too. Some might say that minds are natural things, made up of processes and computations. And that we can study minds scientifically to understand how those processes and computations work. And that just because we may understand how a mind works, doesn't mean it ceases being a mind. But those people are all atheist-materialist-darwinists, which means they're just a bunch of quarks and gluons bouncing around randomly. So we don't pay them any attention.lastyearon
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
08:10 AM
8
08
10
AM
PDT
NL: Implication: P IMPLIES Q means that P being true is sufficient for Q to be true and Q being true is necessary for P to be true. This is an objective state or claim. That is, on whatever reasonable grounds, one cannot have P true and Q false or Q false and P true. It has no underlying claim that P is true. As modelling theory shows, false antecedents routinely imply true consequences. But a true antecedent will only and can only properly imply true consequents, Q. Inference: the ACT of drawing out a conclusion, on some species of warrant or another. The pivotal issue, is grounds and the degree of warrant provided. The grounds for the design inference, I have already linked on. Where, this is an exercise in abductive, inductive reasoning. That is the logic runs P => Q, but the empirical evidence is for Q being true. Strictly, to reason Q, so P is to affirm the consequent, if we use deductive logic. That is why scientific reasoning is inescapably provisional, and critically pivots on having a broad and exceptionless base of observations, that in every case q1, q2, . . . qn . . . we see p1, p2 . . . pn . . . So, as Newton observed, we provisionally infer there is a general pattern. As this becomes strong enough, we infer that the pattern is reliable and is summarised as a law of nature, subject to some future possible counter example that shows limitations. Much as happened with Newtonian dynamics. In the case of design theory, the base of observations is billions of cases deep, all around us, and indeed posts in this thread add to the base. Summing up: FSCO/I is an empirically reliable sign of design as cause. In addition, we have a needle in the haystack analysis as to why that is plausible. KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
08:09 AM
8
08
09
AM
PDT
@Upright BiPed #234 You need to spit the hook out. I am not the one deciding officially whether ID is a legitimate natural science or not. Those who do point precisely at these kinds of leaps (common in ID literature & talks) as indicators of the ulterior motives behind ID, which gives them excuse to reject the whole proposal and make propaganda points out of it. Whatever his motives may be, it is as unwise to wear them on his sleave as it would be for a chess player to point his finger at what his last move is meant for. If you care to win, you just don't do that.nightlight
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
08:02 AM
8
08
02
AM
PDT
nightlight,
He is using the same inductive reasoning of equal strength in both cases. The only difference is that the first one is a personal form of induction “(royal) we infer B from A” while second one is impersonal form of induction “A implies B”.
I disagree for the reasons stated earlier. In any event, you have provided your interpretation of Meyer's words and I have provided mine. Since you ignore all counter arguments and correctives, there is no reason to go over that territory yet a third and fourth time. Meanwhile, you have made the general claim (and the false claim) that ID proponents do, by definition, inject "mind" into their methodology for design detection. Putting aside your dubious interpretation of Meyer's words, can you point to any other writers, either among the ID luminaries or writers on this blog that exemplify this trait that is supposed to be so prominent among ID thinkers.StephenB
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
08:00 AM
8
08
00
AM
PDT
F/N: NL, kindly cf. here. KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
07:55 AM
7
07
55
AM
PDT
Nightlight, ID isn't "unscientific" because of the words that Stephen Meyer wrote in a book intended for the popular audience, its "unscientific" for the singular reason that rational interpretation of empirical evidence is consistent with theism. You need to spit the hook out.Upright BiPed
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
07:36 AM
7
07
36
AM
PDT
@229 Upright BiPed: So your summary of ID arguments is flawed to the extent that ID is already firmly on the table without reference to "mind-stuff" or "consciousness", and your assertion that ID cannot support its claims materially is just simply false. Not only are they materially supported, they remain unrefuted by those same means. As explained in post #232 above, I agree that link identified by ID design detection methods is perfectly solid and as good a science as any (such as archeology). It is what is attached to that link ("intelligent mind" or "mental agency") that is vacuous as a hypothesis within the present natural science. The present natural science can't tell you the difference between "intelligent mind" and "intelligent tooth fairy" since neither "mind" nor "tooth fairy" have a counterpart in present natural science. His inductive inference of "intelligent" as the attribute of the generator of biological artifacts is dismissible because it is applied to a scientifically vacuous noun, not because the inductive inference of the noun's attribute "intelligent" is invalid. The tragedy of it is that with plenty of scientifically perfectly valid nouns to use and that fit the ID finding, such as "process", "computation"... to apply his correctly inferred attribute "intelligent" to, why would one pick something that is a scientifically meaningless noun and squander it all. In the "fly & soup" analogy at the end of the post #232, you were explaining to me how delicious the soup is and how good the chef who prepared it is, while I am wondering what possessed Meyer (and others within ID making the same leap) to drop that big fat fly into that delicious soup.nightlight
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
07:07 AM
7
07
07
AM
PDT
StephenB #228 This is quite a stretch. As I pointed out, there are, indeed, parallels, so the structure makes sense, but those parallels are not perfectly similar, which is why he uses two different words (infer vs. imply). I disagree. He is using the same inductive reasoning of equal strength in both cases. The only difference is that the first one is a personal form of induction "(royal) we infer B from A" while second one is impersonal form of induction "A implies B". Impersonal form is used to add more weight to the inductive connection (making it sound as logical implication used in math and physics, such as "eq. A implies eq. B"), since the personal form can be seen as subjective. Normal gradation of inductive strengths from weakest to strongest would be: 1) "a fool infers B from A", 2) "I infer B from A" 3) "expert X infers B from A" 4) "(royal) we infer B from A" 5) "A implies B" or "B is inferred from A" (or "inferable"). Since passive voice of the alternative variants in #5 sound discordant, he used the first variant of impersonal induction. Hence it is obvious that via the impersonal form of induction used in his second sentence he deliberately sought to make induction "DNA => action of intelligent mind (mental agency)" appear stronger than the first induction "human artifacts => human actions". If you or others here know him, you are welcome to ask him what he meant there. Note though, that neither interpretation helps him. Namely, if he wanted a weaker induction strength he could have said "DNA suggests intelligent mind" or even weaker "DNA hints at intelligent mind". Both of these forms are less unscientific than the impersonal forms only because they say less, not because the scientifically vacuous clause "intelligent mind" (or "mental agency") has become less vacuous or more scientific or. There is no more "mind" (or "consciousness") in natural science than there is a tooth fairy. For example, if you substitute 'mind' with 'tooth fairy' (since natural science can say nothing about either), it becomes obvious that using "DNA suggests intelligent tooth fairy" or "DNA hints at intelligent tooth fairy" doesn't help him it all -- it's less scientifically flawed merely because it says even less, not because it is more scientific. Hence, neither interpretation of what he meant, stronger or weaker induction, helps him bring ID closer to becoming a legitimate natural science, since what is hanging on that inductive link is equivalent to 'intelligent tooth fairy' as far as natural science can tell. The unfortunate part is that the link itself is perfectly good, but what is attached to that link is what allows Darwinian opponents to dismiss it all. If he and others were to say, "implies intelligent process" or "implies intelligent algorithms" which are perfectly valid concepts in natural science (e.g. in the sense of AI or a computational process), the opponents wouldn't have that kind of cheap excuse. "Intelligent mind" or "mental agency" or "consciousness"... are simply not valid hypotheses (as causes or as anything at all) in natural science. That's why I cringe any time I hear it -- it is like watching someone gratuitously dropping a big fat fly into a delicious bowl of soup prepared by a master chef. Why?nightlight
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
06:12 AM
6
06
12
AM
PDT
NL: I interleave comments as indicated, re your 211 - 12: ____________ >> I think two of us have for whatever reason hit a semantic wall and there was no progress over several exchanges. Hence I chose to leave the last word with you, if only to avoid boring the rest of the guys here with what was increasingly turning into a semantic nitpick tiff.>> 1 --> "Semantics" is about meaning. Meaning is very important to understand. In this case, it is pivotal and ought not to be dismissed as in effect a mere difference of views leading to a "tiff." >>For example, on “redness” I was talking about qualia of red (“hard problem of consciousness”), while you were talking about physiology of color perception.>> 2 --> Nope. I spoke to the fact that there is a reasonable meaning to the claim that an object is objectively red. That is, there is no reason to impose an ugly gulch between the internal world of subjective phenomena, and the external one of things in themselves. Knowledge per warranted, credibly true belief, provides such a bridge in analysis, and in everyday experience as well as science. The redness of the cup next to me is as objective as the reddishness of the berries I just had from it in search of flavinoids etc. 3 --> To remind, yes, there is a physiological response that is traceable and that can be studied using protocols that exploit the fact that volunteer experimenters will often try to be precise and accurate, so their reporting of internal states and perceptions can be used in reasonable scientific investigations. But that does not mean that the results of such are simply subjective, the investigations provide reasonable warrant regarding evident and objective states of affairs in the external world, redness being one of them. 4 --> In particular, redness of objects is associated strongly with properties of such that reflect, preferentially transmit or emit light in the band, roughly 600+ - 700+ nm. So, there is reason to accept that redness is an objective reality, never mind the fuzzy borders that seem inevitable in ever so many things. 5 --> The qualia of being appeared to redly is important, but does not change that fact. You may wish to note my 101 level discussion of a model framework, here, which discusses brains and minds in a cybernetic context, using the suggestion of a two-tier controller: one in the loop, one in a supervisory role for the loop. >> Hence there was nothing to concede or stand corrected and change in what I was saying.>> 6 --> You have side-slipped the point I have again outlined, that redness is not reducible to a perception. >>Similarly, on self-evident schema>> 7 --> Something is self evident when it is not only seen to be true, but is seen to be necessarily true on pain of patent and prompt absurdity if one attempts to deny. 8 --> the matter you are again raising is NOT of this class. >> of any natural science S: (M) – Model space (formalism & algorithms) (E) – Empirical procedures & facts of the “real” world (O) – Operational rules mapping between (M) and (E) The (M) component is a generator of meaningful statements in S. The “statements” can be numbers, words, symbols, pictures,… The generator must follow the rules of logic (e.g. it shouldn’t produce mutually contradictory statements).>> 9 --> I pointed out above, e.g. at 112, why the scheme fails, fails as in effect a definition, which you erroneously perceive to be "self-evident." 10 --> Not all of science is reducible to mathematical and/or algorithmic models [and an algorithm is a finite, step by step procedure that effects an outcome, you have used the term idiosyncratically], there is a process of doing science that in many stages and aspects will not involve especially the sort of model as you have highlighted. >>Output obtained within (M) by one practitioner of S should be reproducible within (M) by any other practitioner of S, i.e. the procedures of (M) are algorithmic (one could conceive a computer checking the output or generating it i.e. the operation in (M) should be in principle programmable and executable on a computer).>> 11 --> Trivially not so, e.g in astronomy, volcanology and other observational sciences, we often deal with unique events that cannot be reproduced, so that we rely on the accuracy and reliability of record. Which brings the methods of history into science. Experiments, in genral terms are often reproducible, but observations and circumstances of real world as a going concern events are not. 12 --> To underscore, we are not in a position to reproduce experimentally the formation of the cosmos, the galaxies, the solar system, the planets within it, the actual origin of life, the actual origin of body plans, the actual origin of humans, actual origin of geological and geographic features, etc etc. All of these can be and are studied scientifically, and so your attempt at definition trivially fails. 13 --> It so happens that design theory is essentially about just such circumstances, and therefore uses the appropriate investigatory logic, abductive reasoning. 14 --> That is [and kindly cf. CR at 224],
a: we observe and desire to investigate causally traces of the remote, unobservable past of origins. b: We cannot directly observe that past or its events, which we cannot replicate. c: However, we can in the present investigate forces and factors that give rise to closely similar phenomena as we see in the traces from the past. d: For material instance, we may consider functionally specific, complex organisation and associated information, FSCO/I. e: We can then see patterns of cause that are inductively strong, and empirically reliable, e.g. that FSCO/I is routinely and only observed to be caused by intelligent design. f: We may analyse, e.g on infinite monkeys and/or needle in haystack searches, and see why it is that blind forces of chance and necessity acting on the gamut of the solar system and/or the observed cosmos across reasonable timelines, cannot sufficiently sample the space of possibilities, to be plausible as alternative explanations. g: We are then epistemically entitled to draw the scientific conclusion that FSCO/I is an empirically reliable sign of design as credible cause, of course subject to correction or clarification in light of further observations, as is standard for scientific work. h: So, even though it is controversial in a day where some have attempted to redefine science as applied evolutionary materialism, it is a well-warranted empirically grounded conclusion that where we see FSCO/I the most credible, empirically reliable explanation of its cause is design.
. . . Of course, such is in principle subject to empirical refutation by counter-example, but it is plain that such is not in reasonable prospect, for reasons connected to analyses quite similar to those that give us high confidence in our estimation of the reliability of key conclusions of thermodynamics. 15 --> You are also confusing experimental investigations with computer simulations. Computers are effecting a model world indeed, but one that is not equal to reality. >>Component (E) is analogously, a procedural system and technology for extracting the data relevant to S from the “real” world. Component (O) are the procedures (algorithms) which map between statements produced by (M) and empirical facts produced by (E), allowing for falsification of statements by (M). In most cases the mappings by (O) are implicit, accomplished by simply using the same name for the corresponding elements of (M) and (E). There is nothing of substance that can be argued about this basic schema which consists mostly of definitions and labels (perhaps priority of various requirements may be reordered), since it is self-evident and the only issues one may have are a matter of taste.>> 16 --> Some of the more obvious gaps have been pointed out above, and have again been outlined just now. >> I happen to like it since is very useful analytical tool for troubleshooting and disentangling otherwise perplexing semantic tangles such as those often encountered in interpretations of Quantum Theory (that’s the literature where I picked this scheme from).>> 17 --> In very limited and highly mathematical contexts, it will have some utility. But this reminds me of an error in my reasoning on basic mechanics that I picked up some years ago. I had unconsciously substituted location for displacement, and found that it gave the same effective results for many things. But location is not at all the same, and for some things it will not be equivalent at all. >>You objected to “algorithmic” attribute of (M), a term which you define more narrowly than I do (my semantics classify as algorithmic any procedure which can be programmed into a computer or an android robot or any other computer controlled devices if it requires actions in the real world).>> 18 --> This error has already been corrected. I have given the standard meaning of algorithm, and have pointed out areas of investigation in which algorithms, and computers or robots etc cannot even in principle be programmed to do an investigation. Creative abductive inferences dependent on judgement and intuition or highly instructive analogies is a major example which has often played a pivotal role in sciences. Similarly, investigations such as the colour one, will rely on interactions between subjects, trust, trustworthiness, judgement etc. >>Hence, there wasn’t anything to correct or retract about any of that either. If you wish to have the last word, that’s fine with me, I will leave it at what was said above. >> 19 --> I invite you to reassess your thinking in light of the points of concern I have again pointed out. _____________ I trust the above will be helpful. KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2013
April
04
Apr
4
04
2013
02:47 AM
2
02
47
AM
PDT
BA77,
"Sorry CR, I didn’t know you were setting up for Behe’s (and BI’s) work."
Lol, no worries mate, your comments were both timely and appropriate, and I couldn't have done better. :DChance Ratcliff
April 3, 2013
April
04
Apr
3
03
2013
08:59 PM
8
08
59
PM
PDT
Just a quick comment on the reply to Chance at 182,
nighlite: So what you are saying is that his (E) space has “E-mind” element and his (M) space has some element M-mind...
There are two “E” empiricals: the physical conditions imposed by the translation of recorded information inside the genome, and those imposed by recorded information everywhere but the genome. And the “M” that ties them together is a coherent physical model of semiosis. And if the infinite examples of semiosis outside the genome are each a universal result of an organized agent, then the semiosis observed inside the genome implies a similar class of origin, particularly since the physical conditions are identical in both instances. The implication stems directly from the principle of uniformity in matter, as well as the parsimony of a single class of origin for a manifestly single material phenomenon. But the observation doesn't stop there. The information recorded within the genome is recorded by the use of iterative code structures, each being independent of the lowest potential energy state of the medium. So along with the already demonstrated implication of an organized agent, there is an even more narrow subset, where the only other examples of iterative ("energy degenerate") code structures are those established by choice contingency. In other words, there are two independent and universal indicators of agency involvement, demonstrated by physics. So your summary of ID arguments is flawed to the extent that ID is already firmly on the table without reference to “mind-stuff” or “consciousness”, and your assertion that ID cannot support its claims materially is just simply false. Not only are they materially supported, they remain unrefuted by those same means.Upright BiPed
April 3, 2013
April
04
Apr
3
03
2013
08:03 PM
8
08
03
PM
PDT
nightlight
On page 93, he first gives example in which we “infer” “intelligent agents” when seeing human artifacts, then follows up saying in the next sentence: “Similarly, the specifically arranged nucleotide sequences,[...] imply the past action of an intelligent mind, even if such mental agency cannot be directly observed.”
Yes, he is making the perfect distinction between infer (science) and imply (philosophy) that I made earlier.
Both sentences are deliberately structured to exactly parallel each other in form and phrasing in order to amplify the equivalence of the two conclusions.
This is quite a stretch. As I pointed out, there are, indeed, parallels, so the structure makes sense, but those parallels are not perfectly similar, which is why he uses two different words (infer vs. imply). The two ideas cannot be totally separated nor can they be perfectly unified; they simply intersect. That's the point and Meyer makes it very well. Why you would choose to misread him is a mystery. He is certainly not a sloppy writer or a sloppy thinker. On the contrary, you seem to be going out of your way to invent problems that aren't there. ID does not, for example, conflate evolutionary explanations or intrude unscientific concepts in its methodology. One wonders how you manage to come up with these novel interpretations. On the latter point, you have made a generalized accusation to the effect that ID posits "mind" as a scientific explanation for design, indicating several times that this is a widespread problem among ID thinkers. Just to provide a few examples, I cite the following:
For example, scientific postulates can make no use of concepts such as ‘mind’ or ‘consciousness’ or ‘god’ or ‘feeling’ or ‘redness’ since no one knows how to formalize any of these...,
and again
The ID proponents unfortunately don’t seem to realize this “little” requirement. Hence, they need to get rid of “mind” and “consciousness” talk
and again
So my earlier point about ID is that it is to become part of legitimate natural science it would be better served by algorithmically effective elements, such as computer-like intelligent agency like Plnackian networks, rather than by algorithmically undefined concepts such as ‘mind’ or ‘deity’.
and again
Namely, the point of that scheme was to explain how the ID proponents often violate the key necessary conditions for a natural science. Violating the necessary conditions, such as algorithmic effectiveness of postulates, suffices to disqualify a proposal from clams on becoming a science (see post #117 on why that is so). Since they have tripped already on the necessary conditions, there is no need to analyze further as to whether their proposal is sufficient.
and again
As in the case of analogous injection of ‘consciousness’ into (M), these are parasitic elements belonging to some other agenda foreign to the discipline,
and again
The ID proponents unfortunately don’t seem to realize this “little” requirement. Hence, they need to get rid of “mind” and “consciousness” talk,,,
This is a troubling pattern.StephenB
April 3, 2013
April
04
Apr
3
03
2013
07:49 PM
7
07
49
PM
PDT
Sorry CR, I didn't know you were setting up for Behe's (and BI's) work. I should have smelled it coming. I like the Chesterson 'just right' reflection you brought up.,,, As is exactly how it should be. Science done right should ruffle feathers and continually lead towards that 'narrow path' that many may find uncomfortable to what they would prefer to go.bornagain77
April 3, 2013
April
04
Apr
3
03
2013
07:02 PM
7
07
02
PM
PDT
nightlght @219
"Dembski is surely playing it safe there."
I believe the reason for this is essentially to rule out chance in principle, by setting a threshold which exceeds all Planck-time events for all subatomic particles for the entire age of the universe.Chance Ratcliff
April 3, 2013
April
04
Apr
3
03
2013
05:38 PM
5
05
38
PM
PDT
BA77 @220, thanks for bringing up Behe, although you stole some of my thunder. ;) I was intending to mention Behe in reference to The Edge of Evolution, and also The First Rule of Adaptive Evolution. The work he's done, as presented in EoE, as well as the work of the Biologic Institute, has sought to explore the causal limits of neo-Darwinism. This is necessary work, although I notice that ID is criticized by some for focusing too much on the insufficiency of Darwinian-compatible processes, and by nightlight of being too generous (See #191). It reminds me of something that G.K. Chesterton said about Christianity:
Christianity was accused, at one and the same time, of being too optimistic about the universe and of being too pessimistic about the world. The coincidence made me suddenly stand still. Chesterton, G. K. (Gilbert Keith) (1994-05-01). Orthodoxy (Kindle Locations 1024-1025). Public Domain Books. Kindle Edition.
He recounted his experience of noticing that in many ways, Christianity was accused of being contradictory things at the same time, giving him pause to realize that it was possible to consider Christianity of being, to paraphrase, just right. Perhaps ID, by focusing both too much and too little on the limits of neo-Darwinism, is doing it just right. :)Chance Ratcliff
April 3, 2013
April
04
Apr
3
03
2013
05:36 PM
5
05
36
PM
PDT
1 2 3 4 10

Leave a Reply