Quotes of the Day: Atheists Are VERY Religious

_{Barry Arrington

September 1, 2016

Intelligent Design}

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This exchange between Phinehas and HeKS brings it out as succinctly as anything I’ve ever seen:

Phinehas says:

The thing that fascinates me is how atheists are shown to have prodigious faith in something eternal with god-like creative powers [i.e., the multiverse]. It’s almost like they have no issues whatsoever believing in a god, just so long as it doesn’t bear that particular label.

HeKS replies:

I tend to think that it’s because they don’t want that eternal thing with god-like creative powers to also be personal and have the ability to ground and impose moral values and duties on humans.

As the multiverse has demonstrated, atheists have no problem at all with faith in something that is unseen, intangible, outside of the physical universe, eternal, capable of bringing about unlikely effects we can’t fully understand, and that cannot be falsified through any conceivable scientific experiment.

The only thing they insist on stopping short of is something that is intelligent and that can ground moral values and duties … and probably they stop short of the former only because of the latter, as suggested by the willingness of some to accept the idea that we’re living in an intelligently designed simulation created by other contingent physical beings based largely on the same scientific evidence theists point to as suggestive of God’s existence, which they had denied suggested design until the simulation hypothesis came along. Neil deGrasse Tyson is one such example.

Comments

daveS #93
I think my understanding of possible worlds is similar to others’. How do you know that God would not always choose to create one of these pens? So regardless of the rest of the details of any particular possible world, this pen has to exist in it?
A pen that God chooses to create in every possible world would be contingent in every possible world. That it would eventually be brought into being in every possible world does not make it necessary. A "possible world" should be viewed as a possible description of reality not only in all places but also at all times. Could a pen have existed at the point in time when space was limited to a singularity? Or in the ultra-intense furnace of the Big Bang? What about "prior" to the Big Bang, when there was no space or time? An object that is described by characteristics that cannot have been present at all points in all possible worlds cannot be a serious candidate for a necessary being. Furthermore, an object or person that comes into being at some point in time cannot be a necessary being, since things were able to get along quite well prior to its coming into being. Take care, HeKSHeKS_{September 6, 2016
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KF, I think my understanding of possible worlds is similar to others'. How do you know that God would not always choose to create one of these pens? So regardless of the rest of the details of any particular possible world, this pen has to exist in it? If that's the case, then we can't point to a possible world without an instance of this pen. Likewise for any particular material object, as long as it's not impossible. I, like you, can try to imagine a possible world where this pen is absent, but that doesn't mean such exists. It might turn out that such a world is actually impossible.daveS_{September 6, 2016
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DS, you are misunderstanding what a possible world is. If something is made of components that are assembled to create the object, automatically there is a possible state of affairs in which the parts are not so assembled. Which starts with, atoms. Any material entity composed of component parts is automatically composite and contingent, thus caused; it can begin, it can cease -- not least by being dissolved or disintegrating or disassembled. No material entity in itself can be a necessary being. You will note that examples of actual or serious candidate NBs are always non-material. Thus for instance the signal failure of the flying spaghetti monster or the like parody to actually be a serious argument; however in a day when understanding of basic philosophy is generally speaking quite weak, such parodies and sleight of words such as mislabelling a quantum foam "nothing" as though something were non-being, will seem persuasive to many. KFkairosfocus_{September 5, 2016
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KF,
DS, possible worlds automatically — by definition — include all configurations of parts that can be scattered, clumped and assembled, not just the assembled ones. KF
What I'm saying is that none of this proves that there exists a possible world without a pen identical to the one on my desk (which resembles this, by the way).daveS_{September 5, 2016
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DS, possible worlds automatically -- by definition -- include all configurations of parts that can be scattered, clumped and assembled, not just the assembled ones. KFkairosfocus_{September 5, 2016
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KF, I don't want to get too far off track, but re: #87, how can you prove this pen is not a necessary being? Perhaps for some reason unknown to us, it exists in every possible world. Again, notice the word "prove" there. I don't actually think it's likely any particular pen is a necessary being, but I don't think I can prove otherwise.daveS_{September 5, 2016
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PS: Contingency demo: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTlrULWk2bE (Yup, our fav reel again.) --> more: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_zz40QUkvwkairosfocus_{September 5, 2016
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DS, composition from parts, esp. material parts instantly entails a config space for parts. From this we can get to various possible configurations of parts. Thus, composition of a particular arrangement or cluster of such is contingent. KFkairosfocus_{September 5, 2016
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Oops, sloppy editing. Please remove the redundant "from the beginning" from the first sentence of #85.daveS_{September 5, 2016
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KF,
DS, instantly as the pen is a composition made up of components that can be taken apart or put together to form the relevant entity, esp material ones — starting with atoms — it is contingent.
I'm prepared to stipulate from the beginning that the pen is contingent from the start (and almost said that in my post #83), although I don't see what the fact that it is composed of parts has to do with that. So yes, let's say the pen is contingent. The ultimate question I have is, how do we know that there is a cause for the pen's existence? Post #81 purports to be a proof of this assertion, I believe, and I'm trying to understand how it works, starting by dealing with the "principle y" part.daveS_{September 5, 2016
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DS, instantly as the pen is a composition made up of components that can be taken apart or put together to form the relevant entity, esp material ones -- starting with atoms -- it is contingent. This is already showing how the principle of sufficient difference from non-being reduces to pointing to a cause here. KFkairosfocus_{September 5, 2016
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Autodidaktos, Suppose we walk through this argument with x equal to a pen which is lying on a table. Let's assume I'm seeing the pen for the first time and don't know the history of how it came to rest on the table. Now if someone asked me to identify the principle y which distinguishes the pen from non-being, I wouldn't be sure how to proceed. For one thing, which sense of the word "principle" are we using here? Anyway, perhaps I would place the pen on a balance and note that its mass is about 20 grams. "Nonbeing" has no mass, presumably, so it seems to me that I have distinguished the pen from nonbeing. Does that sound right to you so far?daveS_{September 5, 2016
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AD, a further phase of the argument, it looks like. KFkairosfocus_{September 5, 2016
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daveS and KF, we might build upon the argument thus: (1) For all x, there is some principle y which distinguishes it from non-being. (2) For any x, y is either identical to x or it is not. (3) If y is identical to x, then x is necessarily distinct from non-being, i.e., it necessarily exists. (4) If x is contingent, then y is not identical to x. [From (3) via modus tollens) (5) If x is contingent, and x exists by virtue of some principle y such that y is not identical to x, then y is related to x as a cause of x. Yes, the argument shows that no contingent entity can exist without a cause of its existence.Autodidaktos_{September 4, 2016
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KF, Thanks for the clarification. I think I understand most of the argument. Now, is this argument claimed to prove that, for example, that a pen cannot suddenly materialize (without cause or reason) on my desk, thereby violating the principle of sufficient reason? Obviously we have any number of reasons to doubt that this could happen, but does this argument prove that it is impossible?daveS_{September 4, 2016
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DS, that a y exists is general: if there is a thing x that is, there is some principle y that sufficiently distinguishes it from non-being. The specifics obviously will vary case by particular case. As was shown in answer to your earlier comment. KFkairosfocus_{September 4, 2016
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KF,
DS, x and y are variables that take specific values for particular individual cases across the domain of reality. X and Y would best be viewed as instances chosen for argument.
Yes, certainly. I'm still not clear on exactly what y is for any of the three examples I suggested. Is there just one "principle ‘y’ that differentiates beings from non-being", or are there different ys for different xs?daveS_{September 4, 2016
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DS, x and y are variables that take specific values for particular individual cases across the domain of reality. X and Y would best be viewed as instances chosen for argument. KF PS: For cases 1) The cup of coffee on my desk a --> contingent, particular material entity, distinct from non being. Tied to a long chain of circumstances all the way back to the root of reality. 2) The planet Jupiter b --> contingent, particular material entity, distinct from non being. Tied to a long chain of circumstances all the way back to the root of reality. 3) Euler’s identity e^i*pi + 1 = 0 c --> particular abstract meaningful entity [a quantitative proposition that joins five very important numbers], distinct from non being. On the meanings in the symbols and relationships, necessarily true for any world Wn. That is, part of framework reality. d --> This raises interesting onward issues on how abstracta of this order of propositions that are necessarily true and tied to the logic of structure and quantity [= Mathematics] are existent and distinct from non-being. Arguably the best answer is they are eternally contemplated by the mind at the root of reality. e --> You know I start from {} --> 0, {0} --> 1 etc, which entails that the domain of structure, quantity and logic is a framework, foundational reality for any possible world Wn to exist. f --> I have particularly emphasised the sixth pivotal number, 2. g --> Where, two-ness is bound up in there being A and ~A [i.e. distinction], thus the triple-form first principles of right reason. h --> In the first two cases, we can partially identify y with various recognisable contingent enabling factors that cause these things to exist. i --> In the third, the logic of structure and quantity is a necessary being at root of reality once some world Wn exists. j --> As these are propositions with force that constrains what may be so both abstractly and concretely, they seem to point to eternal mind as an essential component of the root of reality. As, propositions seem to be inherently mental abstract realities. k --> The logic then constrains everything else, including concrete contingent material realities such as the presumably long since downed cup of coffee.kairosfocus_{September 4, 2016
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Autodidaktos and KF, Is y the same for all x? I would like to consider some specific examples for x: 1) The cup of coffee on my desk 2) The planet Jupiter 3) Euler's identity e^i*pi + 1 = 0 What would y be in each case?daveS_{September 4, 2016
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Autodidaktos, Thanks for the reference. I'll have a look.daveS_{September 4, 2016
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KF, thank you for further refining the argument. :)Autodidaktos_{September 4, 2016
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PS: Let's see:
1. [Primary] Premise: For every being ‘x’ there is some principle ‘y’ that differentiates it from non-being. 2. If false, then: 3': It is not the case that for every being ‘x’. there is some principle ‘y' that differentiates it from non-being. 4. If the [primary] premise is false, then there is some being ‘x’ that is indistinguishable from non-being. 5. But, a being cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same manner. ___________________ 6. Therefore, there must be some principle ‘y’ that differentiates beings from non-being. 7. Now, the principle that differentiates being from non-being must needs be a [sufficient principle of distinction, y, which in some cases y1 is causal, in others y2 necessity of being connected to the framework for existence of a possible world.
Where, 7a: [Principle of causality/contingency of being:] for y2, or any object X2 such that it is contingent, there is at least one object Y2 such that X2 exists by virtue of Y2 and X2 and Y2 are not identical. 7b: Y2 is thus a cause of X2. 7c: [Principle of necessity of being:] In the case of a necessary being X1, any possible world Wn will be such that X1 is present in the framework for Wn to exist, it is thus a necessary condition of a world existing.]
__________________ 8. But, any principle that differentiates being from non-being must be that which accounts for the existence of a being, i.e., the principle of distinction. [Where also, 9: Where, once we see some X which may be an instance of cases x1 or x2, we may freely inquire as to why it is so, expecting and desiring an intelligible reason. (Weak form, inquiry based principle of sufficient reason: wiPSR. An invitation to investigation as opposed to a declaration of intelligibility. The wiPSR is self-evidently sound as on observing a given X, we may simply proceed.)]
Thus, we have a framework in which we may profitably discuss both cause and the roots of cause and of a world. I have already put on the table:
as a start point, being. Candidates can be possible or impossible, the latter such that core characteristics stand in mutual contradiction so no such entity may exist in any possible world. Think square circles. Possible beings would exist in at least one possible world. Of such, contingent beings depend on on/off enabling causal factors that if off in a possible world would block the beginning or continuation of existence. Think, a fire i/l/o the fire tetrahedron used to fight such. Then conceive of beings with no such dependence on external enabling factors, i.e. there is no possible world in which they do not exist. For example try to see how a world could be without two-ness in it thus also the abstract contrast A vs ~A (which is foundational to rationality). That is necessary beings are root-level elements of the framework for a world to exist and no possible world can be without such. This addresses the “far fetched[ness]” of the concept, necessary being. Now contrast non-being, a genuine nothing. Such hath not causal capability and were there ever utter nothing, such would forever obtain — so much for the rhetorical trick of pulling a world out of a non-existent hat. Further to this the immediate consequence is, as a world manifestly is, SOMETHING ALWAYS WAS AT WORLD-ROOT LEVEL, a necessary being, root-cause of existence. The issue is, what is the best candidate. Especially in a world with morally governed, evidently responsibly and rationally substantially free beings — or else rational discussion evaporates . . . . Where this is going, is that we need to assess serious candidate necessary being roots of reality. In a world that includes credibly responsibly free and rational, morally and logically governed beings, that poses the question of adequacy. We need at root-level an IS capable of grounding OUGHT. After centuries of debate, one serious candidate exists: the inherently good creator God, a necessary, maximally great being worthy of loyalty and the responsible reasonable service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature. If you doubt this, simply suggest and justify a case for another: _______ on comparative difficulties. Where, parodies like flying spaghetti monsters need not apply (starting with, composite constructed entities would be contingent). In short, it is plain that informed ethical theism is a responsible, rational worldview, not something to be skewered and dismissed with one liners about comparing evidence for the reality of God to fictional characters.
Your insightful comment in this context is:
Classical theism is the thesis that there is a necessarily existent ultimate reality which is simple (i.e., without any composition), immaterial (not spatially extended, immutable, timeless, omnipotent, and because it is immaterial, is analogous to a mind, and freely maintains all of contingent reality in existence. This view is shared by Jews, Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and many Greeks of late antiquity, following the classical arguments for God’s existence laid out by Aristotle and Plotinus. This thesis is obviously different from belief in Zeus or Marduk or Quetzalcoatl, insofar as the latter are themselves contingent beings. Nevertheless, those who do not believe in the gods of paganism are not atheists with respect to them, no more than Republicans or Democrats are anarchists with respect to Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump respectively.
We are looking at a framework that challenges the dominance of evolutionary materialistic scientism and its fellow travellers, a major contribution to the chaos of our world -- including the ongoing worst holocaust in history, credibly 800+ millions and counting at 50 millions more per year. The errors behind the chaos of our present en-darkened age are manifest. St Paul put them thusly:
Eph 4:17 Now this I say and testify in the Lord, that you must no longer walk as the Gentiles do, in the futility of their minds. 18 They are darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in them, due to their hardness of heart. 19 They have become callous and have given themselves up to sensuality, greedy to practice every kind of impurity. 20 But that is not the way you learned Christ!— 21 assuming that you have heard about him and were taught in him, as the truth is in Jesus, 22 to put off your old self,[f] which belongs to your former manner of life and is corrupt through deceitful desires, 23 and to be renewed in the spirit of your minds, 24 and to put on the new self, created after the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness. [ESV]
We are called to renewal of mind; duly enlightened by the candle of the Lord within, conscience illuminated by the Spirit of God. This implies a call to address worldviews and socio-cultural agenda/ civilisation trend issues with clarity and truth-seeking guided by sound conscience. This, let us do. And in due course, as we refine and agree on the argument and how to express it, DV we will headline it, for it is a worthy and even game changing contribution. For one, I intend to use it in my own discussion of worldviews issues from here on, as a point of reference. PPS: It seems your referred book is here in the Internet Archive: https://archive.org/stream/Garrigou-LagrangeEnglish/God_%20His%20Existence%20and%20His%20Nature%20(vol.%201)%20-%20Garrigou-Lagrange,%20Reginald,%20O.P__djvu.txtkairosfocus_{September 4, 2016
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AD, an important and obviously powerful argument, one that we need to refine the skeleton of to bring it to a clear and robust focus in a nutshell. KFkairosfocus_{September 4, 2016
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RVB8, Sadly predictable. Dismissive deflection, driven by scientism and selective hyperskepticism. The issue for instance is not whether drugs influence our mental behaviour (which no one has disputed), but what Darwin actually said about the issue of the ability of a jumped up monkey mind to form credible knowledge, especially as such addresses the abstract domain of logical framing of thought. (I will simply note the typical deflective tactic of trying to project to that despised IDiot on a blog somewhere on the Internet, an issue put on the table by Darwin which requires serious thought; where even Darwin tried to exert a double-standard in favour of "scientific" thought by trying to confine his argument to the issue of the reality of God as designer. That is, the selective hyperskepticism and scientism are there right from the founding era of Darwinism. Fail, both now and from the early days of Darwinism.) Let us refocus on the clip Origines highlighted at 60 above, building on BA77's earlier clip from Nancy Pearcey:
Another source of conviction in the existence of God, connected with the reason, and not with the feelings, impresses me as having much more weight. This follows from the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist. This conclusion was strong in my mind about the time, as far as I can remember, when I wrote the ‘Origin of Species;’ and it is since that time that it has very gradually, with many fluctuations, become weaker. But then arises the doubt;– can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions? May not these be the result of the connection between cause and effect which strikes us as a necessary one, but probably depends merely on inherited experience? Nor must we overlook the probability of the constant inculcation in a belief in God on the minds of children producing so strong and perhaps an inherited effect on their brains not fully developed, that it would be as difficult for them to throw off their belief in God, as for the monkey to throw off its instinctive fear and hatred of a snake. I cannot pretend to throw the least light on such abstruse problems. The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic.
See the deflection and double-standard of reasoning? First, if there i a mistrust of abstract thought, Science is founded on abstract thought. Especially Origins Science, where we try to understand the remote, unobserved, unrepeatable past. Where, we are well advised to appreciate that we are forming frames of explanation that are just as abstractly tied to the unobserved as we do when we speculate about the invisible God. Scientism fails yet again as a reasonable demarcation line between reliable and unreliable knowledge, as science must rely on abstract logical inferences drawn from the context of observations to construct explanations and to argue that observed evidence supports the explanations. Yes, we do try to exert empirical controls, observing traces of the past in the present which we then try to infer the best, empirically grounded explanation of. But that is equally a case of inference to best unobserved explanation as the sort of reasoning about God from traces in the order of the world that Darwin is projecting doubts upon. Worse, he and too many since, play fast and loose with Newton's vera causa principle, that when we seek to explain the remote past or distant reaches or the like, we should confine explanatory constructs based on what we can and do observe as having capability to cause the like effects as the traces we are seeing. As a capital example, functionally specific complex and often fine tuned organisation and associated information has just one actually observed, "true cause." On trillions of cases in point, intelligently directed configuration. For, it has NEVER been observed that a stew of chemicals in a pond or comet etc can and does begin to self-assemble towards a living cell. Nor, that blind incremental vaiations and differential reproductive success leading to descent with modification can and does lead to novel body plan features. Finch beak variations do not provide an adequate empirical base to explain the arrival of finches, birds, vertebrates etc. And the injection of so called methodological naturalism as a censoring constraint to lock out the only thing that is actually observed to create the required complex, functionally specific organisation, intelligently directed configuration, is an obvious case of ideological censorship. Where, it is readily seen that such comments are backed up by the challenge of blind chance and mechanical necessity as search mechanisms for large configuration spaces beyond 500 - 1,000 bits; 10^500 - 10^301 possibilities, on the gamut of the sol system [~10^57 atoms] or the observed cosmos [~10^80 atoms] with chemical action rates of up to 10^- 12 - 10^-15 s. What this boils down to is that only a very small, astronomically small, fraction of possibilities can be explored by blind search. Where also, it is easy to show that a search is in effect a subset of a space of say n possibilities, so if one relies on the good luck of hitting a golden search, that implies a search for a good search challenge in the power set . . . of order 2^n possibilities That is, exponentially harder. In short, the challenge of finding deeply isolated islands of function in vast configuration spaces through blind search is real, not an empty speculation made up by design thinkers. The design inference on empirically tested reliable signs such as FSCO/I and fine tuning, is a cogent and well grounded inference. This already puts Darwin and his successors down today very much on the back foot under the bowling of the equivalent of Holding, Garner, Croft and Daniel in the glory days of the Windies four-superpace attack. But this is by m=no means all. The pivotal point is that in this clip, Darwin is appealing to the undermining of our ability to carry out abstract thought (multiplied by appeals to prejudice against childhood and alleged ill-founded indoctrination . . . he is not complaining against teaching children the times tables) in order to dismiss design inferences and God in particular as serious candidate designer. But the sauce for the goose is very much the sauce for the gander too. Darwin's speculations about the remote and unobserved past of origins rely on the same abstract logic of inference to best explanation as inferences to design and discussions of designers manifest in the evidence as a whole. So, he has fallen into selective hyperskepticism, using logic with a swivel so that he may direct it against targets he wishes to undermine, but making sure not to look at the issue that when one points with his finger, three fingers are pointing back to one. In short, a capital example of self-referential incoherence rhetorically shielded through selective hyperskepticism dressed up in a lab coat. And, no, Darwin was not drunk when he penned these words, the problem is persistent down to today. That is why for instance, Reppert argued as I already clipped, it is why famed evolutionist J B S Haldane argued:
It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” ["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209.]
And, it is why Nancy Pearcey says in the context where she drew attention to Darwin's selectively hyperskeptical blunder:
A major way to test a philosophy or worldview is to ask: Is it logically consistent? Internal contradictions are fatal to any worldview because contradictory statements are necessarily false. "This circle is square" is contradictory, so it has to be false. An especially damaging form of contradiction is self-referential absurdity -- which means a theory sets up a definition of truth that it itself fails to meet. Therefore it refutes itself . . . . An example of self-referential absurdity is a theory called evolutionary epistemology, a naturalistic approach that applies evolution to the process of knowing. The theory proposes that the human mind is a product of natural selection. The implication is that the ideas in our minds were selected for their survival value, not for their truth-value. But what if we apply that theory to itself? Then it, too, was selected for survival, not truth -- which discredits its own claim to truth. Evolutionary epistemology commits suicide. Astonishingly, many prominent thinkers have embraced the theory without detecting the logical contradiction. Philosopher John Gray writes, "If Darwin's theory of natural selection is true,... the human mind serves evolutionary success, not truth." What is the contradiction in that statement? Gray has essentially said, if Darwin's theory is true, then it "serves evolutionary success, not truth." In other words, if Darwin's theory is true, then it is not true. Self-referential absurdity is akin to the well-known liar's paradox: "This statement is a lie." If the statement is true, then (as it says) it is not true, but a lie. Another example comes from Francis Crick. In The Astonishing Hypothesis, he writes, "Our highly developed brains, after all, were not evolved under the pressure of discovering scientific truths but only to enable us to be clever enough to survive." But that means Crick's own theory is not a "scientific truth." Applied to itself, the theory commits suicide. Of course, the sheer pressure to survive is likely to produce some correct ideas. A zebra that thinks lions are friendly will not live long. But false ideas may be useful for survival. Evolutionists admit as much: Eric Baum says, "Sometimes you are more likely to survive and propagate if you believe a falsehood than if you believe the truth." Steven Pinker writes, "Our brains were shaped for fitness, not for truth. Sometimes the truth is adaptive, but sometimes it is not." The upshot is that survival is no guarantee of truth. If survival is the only standard, we can never know which ideas are true and which are adaptive but false. To make the dilemma even more puzzling, evolutionists tell us that natural selection has produced all sorts of false concepts in the human mind. Many evolutionary materialists maintain that free will is an illusion, consciousness is an illusion, even our sense of self is an illusion -- and that all these false ideas were selected for their survival value. So how can we know whether the theory of evolution itself is one of those false ideas? The theory undercuts itself. A few thinkers, to their credit, recognize the problem . . .
She adds, regarding Darwin:
People are sometimes under the impression that Darwin himself recognized the problem. They typically cite Darwin's famous "horrid doubt" passage where he questions whether the human mind can be trustworthy if it is a product of evolution: "With me, the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy." But, of course, Darwin's theory itself was a "conviction of man's mind." So why should it be "at all trustworthy"? Surprisingly, however, Darwin never confronted this internal contradiction in this theory. Why not? Because he expressed his "horrid doubt" selectively -- only when considering the case for a Creator. From time to time, Darwin admitted that he still found the idea of God persuasive. He once confessed his "inward conviction ... that the Universe is not the result of chance." It was in the next sentence that he expressed his "horrid doubt." So the "conviction" he mistrusted was his lingering conviction that the universe is not the result of chance . . .
In short the problem of selective hyperskepticism and deflection of the inherent self referential incoherence of evolutionary materialistic scientism buttressed by methodological naturalism is real. It needs to be faced, not deflected by trying to denigrate the man and then distracted from by talking about drunks in court. In short, your reply fails; fails in a most revealing way. KFkairosfocus_{September 4, 2016
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Following daveS'recommendation, I emend the argument I wrote: 3: It is not the case that for every being 'x'. there is some principle 'y'that differentiates it from non-being. Though this uses the negation of the universal quantifier.Autodidaktos_{September 3, 2016
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daveS @ 57, I'm afraid the proof I've supplied is but a paraphrase of the proof for the Scholastic PSR given by French philosopher and Dominican friar Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., in his work 'God: His Existence and His Nature, A Thomistic Response to Certain Agnostic Antinomies'. Also, #8 should have read 'the principle of sufficient reason' instead of 'the principle of causality', thank you for pointing that out, kairosfocus. I would define the principle of causality this way: For any object X such that it is contingent, there is at least one object Y such that X exists by virtue of Y and X and Y are not identical. Y is thus a cause of X.Autodidaktos_{September 3, 2016
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"..a poster child level example of selective hyperskepticism in the teeth of direct evidence of self referential incoherence of darwinism once origin of mind is on the table." Wow! Perhaps a 'poster child' for the kind of almost indicipherable twaddle I loath, which seems to be the main stay of 'Kairos & Co'. Do you mean, 'the other people are wrong because they can't explain the origins of self awareness?' We can! The mind is a product of eating the right food, and surviving. It is nourished by human contact, and blossoms with human contact. The mind shrivels if denied human contact, and when the physical body expires, the human mind ceases to be. The connection between the human mind and its physical home, the brain, is demonstrable when you introduce foreign chemicals, which interfere with the natural, evolved function of the human brain; to keep the human away from harm and alive. These chemicals include alcohol! "I'm sorry your Honour, I was not myself, I was drunk!" Hmmm, not an uncommon, but certainly a bad defense. Basically the defendent is saying, 'while drunk I was not Robert van Bakel your Honour, I was Maurice Dublay Ontondra, and have no idea what became of Robert, I am guiltless, as my MIND, did not know it was my MIND engaged in this crime! My MIND was elsewhere at the time of drunkeness! Heh:)rvb8_{September 3, 2016
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KF,
DS, it rather looks like statement 8 gives the relevant definition in context. KF
Thanks, however I wouldn't mind seeing a standalone formulation of the principle if Autodidaktos is willing to oblige.daveS_{September 3, 2016
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Origines & BA7, a poster child level example of selective hyperskepticism in the teeth of direct evidence of the self referential incoherence of darwinism once the origin of mind is on the table. And from Darwin himself, so it is hard to suggest this was not known about. It would be interesting to see how the objectors in-thread and in the penumbra of attack sites deal with Darwin himself as an example of the self referential incoherence of evolutionary materialism and its fellow travellers. My bet, studious ignoring and/or deflecting. KFkairosfocus_{September 3, 2016
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F/N 3: Greenleaf in Testimony of the Evangelists -- buried without response above also:
1] THE ANCIENT DOCUMENTS RULE: Every document, apparently ancient, coming from the proper repository or custody, and bearing on its face no evident marks of forgery, the law presumes to be genuine, and devolves on the opposing party the burden of proving it to be otherwise. [p.16.] 2] Conversance: In matters of public and general interest, all persons must be presumed to be conversant, on the principle that individuals are presumed to be conversant with their own affairs. [p. 17.] 3] On Inquiries and Reports: If [a report] were “the result of inquiries, made under competent public authority, concerning matters in which the public are concerned” it would . . . be legally admissible . . . To entitle such results, however, to our full confidence, it is not necessary that they be obtained under a legal commission; it is sufficient if the inquiry is gravely undertaken and pursued, by a person of competent intelligence, sagacity and integrity. The request of a person in authority, or a desire to serve the public, are, to all moral intents, as sufficient a motive as a legal commission. [p. 25.] 4] Probability of Truthfulness: In trials of fact, by oral testimony, the proper inquiry is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but whether there is a sufficient probability that it is true. [p. 28.] 5] Criteria of Proof: A proposition of fact is proved, when its truth is established by competent and satisfactory evidence. By competent evidence is meant such as the nature of the thing to be proved requires; and by satisfactory evidence is meant that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind, beyond any reasonable doubt. [pp. 28 – 9.] 6] Credibility of Witnesses: In the absence of circumstances which generate suspicion, every witness is to be presumed credible, until the contrary is shown; the burden of impeaching his credibility lying on the objector. [p. 29] 7] Credit due to testimony: The credit due to the testimony of witnesses depends upon, firstly, their honesty; secondly, their ability; thirdly, their number and the consistency of their testimony; fourthly, the conformity of their testimony with experience; and fifthly, the coincidence of their testimony with collateral circumstances. [p.31.] 8] Ability of a Witness to speak truth: the ability of a witness to speak the truth depends on the opportunities which he has had for observing the facts, the accuracy of his powers of discerning, and the faithfulness of his memory in retaining the facts, once observed and known . . . It is always to be presumed that men are honest, and of sound mind, and of the average and ordinary degree of intelligence . . . Whenever an objection is raised in opposition to ordinary presumptions of law, or to the ordiary experience of mankind, the burden of proof is devolved on the objector. [pp. 33 – 4.] 9] Internal coherence and external corroboration: Every event which actually transpires has its appropriate relation and place in the vast complication of circumstances, of which the affairs of men consist; it owes its origin to the events which have preceded it, it is intimately connected with all others which occur at the same time and place, and often with those of remote regions, and in its turn gives birth to numberless others which succeed. In all this almost inconceivable contexture, and seeming discord, there is perfect harmony; and while the fact, which really happened, tallies exactly with every other contemporaneous incident, related to it in the remotest degree, it is not possible for the wit of man to invent a story, which, if closely compared with the actual occurrences of the same time and place, may not be shown to be false. [p. 39.] 10] Marks of false vs true testimony: a false witness will not willingly detail any circumstances in which his testimony will be open to contradiction, nor multiply them where there is a danger of his being detected by a comparison of them with other accounts, equally circumstantial . . . Therefore, it is, that variety and minuteness of detail are usually regarded as certain test[s] of sincerity, if the story, in the circumstances related, is of a nature capable of easy refutation, if it were false . . . . [False witnesses] are often copious and even profuse in their statements, as far as these may have been previously fabricated, and in relation to the principal matter; but beyond this, all will be reserved and meagre, from fear of detection . . . in the testimony of the true witness there is a visible and striking naturalness of manner, and an unaffected readiness and copiousness in the detail of circumstances, as well in one part of the narrative as another, and evidently without the least regard to the facility or difficulty of verification or detection . . . the increased number of witnesses to circumstances, and the increased number of circumstances themselves, all tend to increase the probability of detection if the witnesses are false . . . Thus the force of circumstantial evidence is found to depend on the number of particulars involved in the narrative; the difficulty of fabricating them all, if false, and the great facility of detection; the nature of the circumstances to be compared, and from which the dates and other facts to are be collected; the intricacy of the comparison; the number of intermediate steps in the process of deduction; and the circuity of the investigation. The more largely the narrative partake[s] of these characteristics, the further it will be found removed from all suspicion of contrivance or design, and the more profoundly the mind will rest in the conviction of its truth. [pp. 39 – 40.] 11] Procedure: let the witnesses be compared with themselves, with each other, and with surrounding facts and circumstances.[p. 42.] Here, we supplement: J W Montgomery observes of the NT accounts — and following the McCloskey and Schoenberg framework for detecting perjury — that the modern approach to assessing quality of such testimony focusses on identifying internal and external defects in the testimony and the witness: (a) Internal defects in the witness himself refer to any personal characteristics or past history tending to show that the “witness is inherently untrustworthy, unreliable, or undependable.” (b) But perhaps the apostolic witnesses suffered from external defects, that is, “motives to falsify”? (c) Turning now to the testimony itself, we must ask if the New Testament writings are internally inconsistent or self-contradictory. (d) Finally, what about external defects in the testimony itself, i.e., inconsistencies between the New Testament accounts and what we know to be the case from archaeology or extra-biblical historical records? –> In each case, the answer is in favour of the quality of the NT, as can be observed here. 12] The degree of coherence expected of true witnesses: substantial truth, under circumstantial variety. There is enough of discrepancy to show that there could have been no previous concert among them, and at the same time such substantial agreement as to show that they all were independent narrators of the same great transaction, as the events actually occurred. [p.34. All cites from The Testimony of the Evangelists (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Classics, 1995).]
All of this is of course relevant to evidence and to responsiveness to evidence under the moral government of truth and right. KFkairosfocus_{September 3, 2016
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