Quotes of the Day: Atheists Are VERY Religious

_{Barry Arrington

September 1, 2016

Intelligent Design}

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This exchange between Phinehas and HeKS brings it out as succinctly as anything I’ve ever seen:

Phinehas says:

The thing that fascinates me is how atheists are shown to have prodigious faith in something eternal with god-like creative powers [i.e., the multiverse]. It’s almost like they have no issues whatsoever believing in a god, just so long as it doesn’t bear that particular label.

HeKS replies:

I tend to think that it’s because they don’t want that eternal thing with god-like creative powers to also be personal and have the ability to ground and impose moral values and duties on humans.

As the multiverse has demonstrated, atheists have no problem at all with faith in something that is unseen, intangible, outside of the physical universe, eternal, capable of bringing about unlikely effects we can’t fully understand, and that cannot be falsified through any conceivable scientific experiment.

The only thing they insist on stopping short of is something that is intelligent and that can ground moral values and duties … and probably they stop short of the former only because of the latter, as suggested by the willingness of some to accept the idea that we’re living in an intelligently designed simulation created by other contingent physical beings based largely on the same scientific evidence theists point to as suggestive of God’s existence, which they had denied suggested design until the simulation hypothesis came along. Neil deGrasse Tyson is one such example.

Comments

F/N 2, Greenleaf having been studiously ignored and conveniently buried above, let me again clip, from his foundational treatise on evidence (which very much gives a legal point of reference):
Evidence, in legal acceptation, includes all the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved . . . None but mathematical truth is susceptible of that high degree of evidence, called demonstration, which excludes all possibility of error [--> Greenleaf wrote almost 100 years before Godel], and which, therefore, may reasonably be required in support of every mathematical deduction. [--> that is, his focus is on the logic of good support for in principle uncertain conclusions, i.e. in the modern sense, inductive logic and reasoning in real world, momentous contexts with potentially serious consequences.] Matters of fact are proved by moral evidence alone; by which is meant, not only that kind of evidence which is employed on subjects connected with moral conduct, but all the evidence which is not obtained either from intuition, or from demonstration. In the ordinary affairs of life, we do not require demonstrative evidence, because it is not consistent with the nature of the subject, and to insist upon it would be unreasonable and absurd. [--> the issue of warrant to moral certainty, beyond reasonable doubt; and the contrasted absurdity of selective hyperskepticism.] The most that can be affirmed of such things, is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them. [--> moral certainty standard, and this is for the proverbial man in the Clapham bus stop, not some clever determined advocate or skeptic motivated not to see or assent to what is warranted.] The true question, therefore, in trials of fact, is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but, whether there is sufficient probability of its truth; that is, whether the facts are shown by competent and satisfactory evidence. Things established by competent and satisfactory evidence are said to be proved. [--> pistis enters; we might as well learn the underlying classical Greek word that addresses the three levers of persuasion, pathos- ethos- logos and its extension to address worldview level warranted faith-commitment and confident trust on good grounding, through the impact of the Judaeo-Christian tradition in C1 as was energised by the 500 key witnesses.] By competent evidence, is meant that which the very-nature of the thing to be proved requires, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular case, such as the production of a writing, where its contents are the subject of inquiry. By satisfactory evidence, which is sometimes called sufficient evidence, is intended that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind [--> in British usage, the man in the Clapham bus stop], beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances which will amount to this degree of proof can never be previously defined; the only legal [--> and responsible] test of which they are susceptible, is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man; and so to convince him, that he would venture to act upon that conviction, in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own interest. [= definition of moral certainty as a balanced unprejudiced judgement beyond reasonable, responsible doubt. Obviously, i/l/o wider concerns, while scientific facts as actually observed may meet this standard, scientific explanatory frameworks such as hypotheses, models, laws and theories cannot as they are necessarily provisional and in many cases have had to be materially modified, substantially re-interpreted to the point of implied modification, or outright replaced; so a modicum of prudent caution is warranted in such contexts -- explanatory frameworks are empirically reliable so far on various tests, not utterly certain. ] [A Treatise on Evidence, Vol I, 11th edn. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1888) ch 1., sections 1 and 2. Shorter paragraphs added. (NB: Greenleaf was a founder of the modern Harvard Law School and is regarded as a founding father of the modern Anglophone school of thought on evidence, in large part on the strength of this classic work.)]
It is quite clear that the real issue is the standard of warrant to be acknowledged in the face of the self-referential incoherence of selective hyperskepticism. Where also while scientific facts of observation may be morally certain, no scientific theory can rise to that standard given the problem of affirming the consequent and the pessimistic induction on theory succession across time. Theories at their best are empirically reliable in a tested range and are held i/l/o confidence in there being a generally orderly and at least partially intelligible world. The testimony of eyewitnesses is evidence, period. Record that is fair on the face and from reasonable chain of custody is evidence. Reasoned argument to build up a cumulative worldviews case on good facts and careful comparative difficulties is evidence. It is decisive evidence against a claim that it implies self referential incoherence. Especially in the form grand delusion that undermines responsible rational freedom, logical inference and knowledge. This last is patently a major problem for evolutionary materialistic scientism and fellow travellers, in many ways. I cite an example from Reppert:
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
It is noteworthy how we keep on seeing the dodging of the comparative difficulties challenge and successive resort to various forms of selective hyperskepticism on the part of atheism supporters. KFkairosfocus_{September 3, 2016
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F/N 1: The Dictionary test -- ev·i·dence (?v??-d?ns) n. 1. a. A thing or set of things helpful in forming a conclusion or judgment: The broken window was evidence that a burglary had taken place. Scientists weighed the evidence for and against the hypothesis. b. Something indicative; an indication or set of indications: saw no evidence of grief on the mourner's face. 2. Law a. The means by which an allegation may be proven, such as oral testimony, documents, or physical objects. b. The set of legal rules determining what testimony, documents, and objects may be admitted as proof in a trial. tr.v. ev·i·denced, ev·i·denc·ing, ev·i·denc·es To indicate clearly; exemplify or prove: Her curiosity is evidenced by the number of books she owns. Idiom: in evidence 1. Plainly visible; to be seen: It was early, and few pedestrians were in evidence on the city streets. 2. Law As legal evidence: submitted the photograph in evidence. [Middle English, from Old French, from Late Latin ?videntia, from Latin ?vid?ns, ?vident-, obvious; see evident.] American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition. Copyright © 2011 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved. KFkairosfocus_{September 3, 2016
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Scuzzaman, "I certainly would not want such a confused person representing me in a law court". What is the point of this statement. I have not suggested that I would want to represent you. Based on a few lines I have written in a blog you are asserting that I am incompetent at my job. It's a non sequitur aimed at denigrating me.Pindi_{September 3, 2016
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Wjm @44 It depends on your definition of evidence. If you adopt the legal standard then no, it's not all evidence. Something is only admitted as evidence if it meets the rules. For example, and with some exceptions, hearsay is not admitted as evidence.Pindi_{September 3, 2016
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Bornagain77 @ 46, Thank you for quoting Nancey Pearcey on Darwin's selective use of his “horrid doubt” — only when considering the case for a Creator. Below the original text by Darwin. Mr. Barry Arrington, if you happen to read this post, I recommend it for a post titled "Gobsmackingly Stupid Things Materialists Say, Entry 7,688".
Another source of conviction in the existence of God, connected with the reason, and not with the feelings, impresses me as having much more weight. This follows from the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist. This conclusion was strong in my mind about the time, as far as I can remember, when I wrote the 'Origin of Species;' and it is since that time that it has very gradually, with many fluctuations, become weaker. But then arises the doubt;-- can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions? May not these be the result of the connection between cause and effect which strikes us as a necessary one, but probably depends merely on inherited experience? Nor must we overlook the probability of the constant inculcation in a belief in God on the minds of children producing so strong and perhaps an inherited effect on their brains not fully developed, that it would be as difficult for them to throw off their belief in God, as for the monkey to throw off its instinctive fear and hatred of a snake. I cannot pretend to throw the least light on such abstruse problems. The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic. [Charles Darwin]
Origenes_{September 3, 2016
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AD, I suggest that necessary being -- cf above -- should be accounted for; not everything is caused. It seems there is a sufficient principle of distinction, y, which in some cases y1 is causal, in others y2 necessity of being connected to the framework for existence of a possible world. KFkairosfocus_{September 3, 2016
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DS, it rather looks like statement 8 gives the relevant definition in context. KFkairosfocus_{September 3, 2016
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Autodidaktos,
1. Premise: For every being ‘x’ there is some principle ‘y’ that differentiates it from non-being. 2. If false, then: 3. For every being ‘x’ there is not some principle ‘y’ that differentiates it from non-being. 4. If the premise is false, then there is some being ‘x’ that is indistinguishable from non-being. 5. But, a being cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same manner. 6. Therefore, there must be some principle ‘y’ that differentiates beings from non-being. 7. Now, the principle that differentiates being from non-being must needs be a principle that causes the existence of beings 8. But, any principle that differentiates being from non-being must be that which accounts for the existence of a being, i.e., the principle of causality.
Is this your own proof? May I ask what your definition of "principle of causality" is? One nitpick: I think #3 should be rephrased with an existential quantifier, to make it consistent with #4.daveS_{September 3, 2016
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And now that we have proven the principle of causality, the existence of God necessarily follows, as is demonstrated here: http://www.magiscenter.com/pdf/Contemporary_Thomistic_Metaphysical_Proof_of_God.pdf Or here: http://rocketphilosophy.blogspot.in/2013/12/al-farabi-and-avicennas-cosmological.htmlAutodidaktos_{September 3, 2016
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@35 "Who did I misrepresent scuzzaman?" Me. I did not denigrate you.ScuzzaMan_{September 3, 2016
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Autodidaktos
Nevertheless, those who do not believe in the gods of paganism are not atheists with respect to them, no more than Republicans or Democratsare anarchists with respect to Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump respectively.
Exactly. Atheism is an ISM, which is a positive assertion or doctrine. The "A" is a negation (negation is a positive assertion), but not a negation of "theism", per se, but a negation of Greek "theos", which is "god". It is "negation of god" ISM, or, more simply, "No-God(s)-ISM". As such, you cannot be an atheist with respect to any particular god. You can only be an atheist if you positively deny the existence of any and all gods. That's what the word actually means. The claim that atheism is merely a "lack of belief" is rhetorical strategy intended to displace any burden of proof when challenged. There is no such thing as an ISM that is devoid of content. Unfortunately, many atheists themselves have been taken in by the strategy and actually think they can claim to be atheists, deride theists and theism as stupid, and then claim they only lack belief when challenged and so don't need to positively support their position or their derision.HeKS_{September 3, 2016
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Seversky
As WJM points out, there is evidence for God in much the same way as there is evidence for the Dark Lord Sauron or Darth Vader or the Starship Enterprise.
In effect your declaration is that evidence of God is equivalent to that for modern Fantasy fiction. Such snide dismissiveness is utterly revealing of failure to actually do an actual assessment of the evidence we have. As a start, I again point out that the simple fact of my presence here is as a result of a miracle of guidance in answer to prayer. Sauron, Darth Vader and Mr Spock are not able to deliver on such. Likewise, millions have direct experience of the life-transforming action of God in their lives through the gospel. Sufficiently so that if we are all in error or delusional, that would bring the rational capability of the human mind to contact reality into question. Which would let grand delusion loose and would undermine having a discussion to begin with. But then, that is a characteristic problem of evolutionary materialism. (Hence my challenge to Pindi above to first get to a coherent "I" rooted in that worldview as a basis for further discussion. I think a second line of discussion pivots on being and the root of reality:
as a start point, being. Candidates can be possible or impossible, the latter such that core characteristics stand in mutual contradiction so no such entity may exist in any possible world. Think square circles. Possible beings would exist in at least one possible world. Of such, contingent beings depend on on/off enabling causal factors that if off in a possible world would block the beginning or continuation of existence. Think, a fire i/l/o the fire tetrahedron used to fight such. Then conceive of beings with no such dependence on external enabling factors, i.e. there is no possible world in which they do not exist. For example try to see how a world could be without two-ness in it thus also the abstract contrast A vs ~A (which is foundational to rationality). That is necessary beings are root-level elements of the framework for a world to exist and no possible world can be without such. This addresses the “far fetched[ness]” of the concept, necessary being. Now contrast non-being, a genuine nothing. Such hath not causal capability and were there ever utter nothing, such would forever obtain — so much for the rhetorical trick of pulling a world out of a non-existent hat. Further to this the immediate consequence is, as a world manifestly is, SOMETHING ALWAYS WAS AT WORLD-ROOT LEVEL, a necessary being, root-cause of existence. The issue is, what is the best candidate. Especially in a world with morally governed, evidently responsibly and rationally substantially free beings — or else rational discussion evaporates.
This puts on the table the issue of serious candidates to be that root of reality. And it immediately, decisively puts the God of ethical theism in so vastly different a category from known works of fiction that your remarks as cited work rather to reveal a lack of seriousness on your part. Indeed, it suggests, frankly, that -- despite readily accessible serious evidence to the contrary -- you wish it to be so that God is fiction. I note, from my comment to WJM:
clever people can come up with all sorts of hypotheses. Once something like methodological naturalism or scientism or selective hyperskepticism is allowed in the door, that then reduces this strategy to question-begging in a lab coat or the like. Next, it ignores the issues of inference to the best current explanation, the inherent provisionality of inductive reasoning, and the need for sober comparative difficulties. In short this is a rhetorical defense mechanism (or a club to beat down those one does not agree with) not a serious approach to warrant. Also, it injects double standards of warrant, closing minds. In effect, unless there is an utter breakdown, there is no open-minded investigation of truth. Prestige of Science is being abused. Further, double standards of warrant are inherently incoherent. Then, when we deal with cases where the implication of one’s view is general delusion, that is even more manifestly incoherence at work. This is part of why I have stressed the need to get to a credible “I” who can responsibly and logically reason. We should not discount the temptation to contempt for the other . . .
On pain of the collapse of reasoned discourse, we are responsibly, rationally free beings, demanding that the world-root being be able to ground ought. Where this is going, is that we need to assess serious candidate necessary being roots of reality. In a world that includes credibly responsibly free and rational, morally and logically governed beings, that poses the question of adequacy. We need at root-level an IS capable of grounding OUGHT. After centuries of debate, one serious candidate exists: the inherently good creator God, a necessary, maximally great being worthy of loyalty and the responsible reasonable service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature. If you doubt this, simply suggest and justify a case for another: _______ on comparative difficulties. Where, parodies like flying spaghetti monsters need not apply (starting with, composite constructed entities would be contingent). In short, it is plain that informed ethical theism is a responsible, rational worldview, not something to be skewered and dismissed with one liners about comparing evidence for the reality of God to fictional characters. Where, AD just above is manifestly right on the whole:
Classical theism is the thesis that there is a necessarily existent ultimate reality which is simple (i.e., without any composition), immaterial (not spatially extended, immutable, timeless, omnipotent, and because it is immaterial, is analogous to a mind, and freely maintains all of contingent reality in existence. This view is shared by Jews, Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and many Greeks of late antiquity, following the classical arguments for God’s existence laid out by Aristotle and Plotinus. This thesis is obviously different from belief in Zeus or Marduk or Quetzalcoatl, insofar as the latter are themselves contingent beings. Nevertheless, those who do not believe in the gods of paganism are not atheists with respect to them, no more than Republicans or Democratsare anarchists with respect to Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump respectively.
And that is before we get to the evidential basis of the gospel and its positive, life transforming impact for 2000 years. The time for a serious rethinking has come. KFkairosfocus_{September 3, 2016
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Seversky said: "I’m sure that he, like most other people, is atheist with respect to the vast majority of deities in which human beings have believed over the millennia for that reason. Is that also an irrational position?" Classical theism is the thesis that there is a necessarily existent ultimate reality which is simple (i.e., without any composition), immaterial (not spatially extended, immutable, timeless, omnipotent, and because it is immaterial, is analogous to a mind, and freely maintains all of contingent reality in existence. This view is shared by Jews, Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and many Greeks of late antiquity, following the classical arguments for God's existence laid out by Aristotle and Plotinus. This thesis is obviously different from belief in Zeus or Marduk or Quetzalcoatl, insofar as the latter are themselves contingent beings. Nevertheless, those who do not believe in the gods of paganism are not atheists with respect to them, no more than Republicans or Democratsare anarchists with respect to Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump respectively. Nevertheless, this irrational canard, viz., "I believe in one less god than you" refuses to die out.Autodidaktos_{September 3, 2016
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... Evidently I'm late to the party. Anyway, let me add my own two cents. Theism, or at least classical theism is not a scientific hypothesis, such that there can be any evidence that can show CT to be more likely than atheism. This is because scientific evidence is drawn from observing the particular effects of a postulated cause; for example, the postulate that space-traveling aliens exist would be supported by reliably documented sightings of UFOs or finding remnants of UFO crashes. But given that God by definition is the cause of all of contingent reality, there can be no particular evidence as such, for the universe itself is that evidence. Of course, this depends upon demonstrating the necessary truth of the principle of causality, which can be easily done as follows: 1. Premise: For every being 'x' there is some principle 'y' that differentiates it from non-being. 2. If false, then: 3. For every being 'x' there is not some principle 'y' that differentiates it from non-being. 4. If the premise is false, then there is some being 'x' that is indistinguishable from non-being. 5. But, a being cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same manner. 6. Therefore, there must be some principle 'y' that differentiates beings from non-being. 7. Now, the principle that differentiates being from non-being must needs be a principle that causes the existence of beings 8. But, any principle that differentiates being from non-being must be that which accounts for the existence of a being, i.e., the principle of causality.Autodidaktos_{September 3, 2016
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"the largely apocryphal story about Isaac Newton being inspired to formulate a theory of gravity by an apple falling on his head."
A Professor's Journey out of Nihilism: Why I am not an Atheist - University of Wyoming - J. Budziszewski Excerpt page12: "There were two great holes in the argument about the irrelevance of God. The first is that in order to attack free will, I supposed that I understood cause and effect; I supposed causation to be less mysterious than volition. If anything, it is the other way around. I can perceive a logical connection between premises and valid conclusions. I can perceive at least a rational connection between my willing to do something and my doing it. But between the apple and the earth, I can perceive no connection at all. Why does the apple fall? We don't know. "But there is gravity," you say. No, "gravity" is merely the name of the phenomenon, not its explanation. "But there are laws of gravity," you say. No, the "laws" are not its explanation either; they are merely a more precise description of the thing to be explained, which remains as mysterious as before. For just this reason, philosophers of science are shy of the term "laws"; they prefer "lawlike regularities." To call the equations of gravity "laws" and speak of the apple as "obeying" them is to speak as though, like the traffic laws, the "laws" of gravity are addressed to rational agents capable of conforming their wills to the command. This is cheating, because it makes mechanical causality (the more opaque of the two phenomena) seem like volition (the less). In my own way of thinking the cheating was even graver, because I attacked the less opaque in the name of the more. The other hole in my reasoning was cruder. If my imprisonment in a blind causality made my reasoning so unreliable that I couldn't trust my beliefs, then by the same token I shouldn't have trusted my beliefs about imprisonment in a blind causality. But in that case I had no business denying free will in the first place." http://www.undergroundthomist.org/sites/default/files/WhyIAmNotAnAtheist.pdf A Professor's Journey out of Nihilism: Why I am not an Atheist - 2012 lecture University of Wyoming J. Budziszewski – above quote taken at the 34:30 minute mark http://veritas.org/talks/professors-journey-out-nihilism-why-i-am-not-atheist/?view=presenters&speaker_id=2231 Agent Causality (of Theists) vs. Blind Causality (of Atheists) – video https://youtu.be/7pnnT0QvWr4 “In materialism all elements behave the same. It is mysterious to think of them as spread out and automatically united. For something to be a whole, it has to have an additional object, say, a soul or a mind.” Kurt Gödel – Hao Wang’s supplemental biography of Gödel, A Logical Journey, MIT Press, 1996. [9.4.12] “This most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being. And if the fixed stars are the centres of other like systems, these, being formed by the like wise counsel, must be all subject to the dominion of One;,, This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all; and on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God pantokrator, or Universal Ruler;,,, The Supreme God is a Being eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect;,,, from his true dominion it follows that the true God is a living, intelligent, and powerful Being; and, from his other perfections, that he is supreme, or most perfect. He is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; that is, his duration reaches from eternity to eternity; his presence from infinity to infinity; he governs all things, and knows all things that are or can be done. He is not eternity or infinity, but eternal and infinite; he is not duration or space, but he endures and is present. He endures for ever, and is every where present”: Sir Isaac Newton - Quoted from what many consider the greatest science masterpiece of all time, his book "Principia" NEWTON'S REJECTION OF THE "NEWTONIAN WORLD VIEW": THE ROLE OF DIVINE WILL IN NEWTON'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY Abstract: The significance of Isaac Newton for the history of Christianity and science is undeniable: his professional work culminated the Scientific Revolution that saw the birth of modern science, while his private writings evidence a lifelong interest in the relationship between God and the world. Yet the typical picture of Newton as a paragon of Enlightenment deism, endorsing the idea of a remote divine clockmaker and the separation of science from religion, is badly mistaken. In fact Newton rejected both the clockwork metaphor itself and the cold mechanical universe upon which it is based. His conception of the world reflects rather a deep commitment to the constant activity of the divine will, unencumbered by the "rational" restrictions that Descartes and Leibniz placed on God, the very sorts of restrictions that later appealed to the deists of the 18th century. http://home.messiah.edu/~tdavis/newton.htm The War against the War Between Science and Faith Revisited - July 2010 Excerpt: …as Whitehead pointed out, it is no coincidence that science sprang, not from Ionian metaphysics, not from the Brahmin-Buddhist-Taoist East, not from the Egyptian-Mayan astrological South, but from the heart of the Christian West, that although Galileo fell out with the Church, he would hardly have taken so much trouble studying Jupiter and dropping objects from towers if the reality and value and order of things had not first been conferred by belief in the Incarnation. (Walker Percy, Lost in the Cosmos),,, Jaki notes that before Christ the Jews never formed a very large community (priv. comm.). In later times, the Jews lacked the Christian notion that Jesus was the monogenes or unigenitus, the only-begotten of God. Pantheists like the Greeks tended to identify the monogenes or unigenitus with the universe itself, or with the heavens. Jaki writes: Herein lies the tremendous difference between Christian monotheism on the one hand and Jewish and Muslim monotheism on the other. This explains also the fact that it is almost natural for a Jewish or Muslim intellectual to become a pantheist. About the former Spinoza and Einstein are well-known examples. As to the Muslims, it should be enough to think of the Averroists. With this in mind one can also hope to understand why the Muslims, who for five hundred years had studied Aristotle’s works and produced many commentaries on them failed to make a breakthrough. The latter came in medieval Christian context and just about within a hundred years from the availability of Aristotle’s works in Latin,, If science suffered only stillbirths in ancient cultures, how did it come to its unique viable birth? The beginning of science as a fully fledged enterprise took place in relation to two important definitions of the Magisterium of the Church. The first was the definition at the Fourth Lateran Council in the year 1215, that the universe was created out of nothing at the beginning of time. The second magisterial statement was at the local level, enunciated by Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris who, on March 7, 1277, condemned 219 Aristotelian propositions, so outlawing the deterministic and necessitarian views of creation. These statements of the teaching authority of the Church expressed an atmosphere in which faith in God had penetrated the medieval culture and given rise to philosophical consequences. The cosmos was seen as contingent in its existence and thus dependent on a divine choice which called it into being; the universe is also contingent in its nature and so God was free to create this particular form of world among an infinity of other possibilities. Thus the cosmos cannot be a necessary form of existence; and so it has to be approached by a posteriori investigation. The universe is also rational and so a coherent discourse can be made about it. Indeed the contingency and rationality of the cosmos are like two pillars supporting the Christian vision of the cosmos. http://www.scifiwright.com/2010/08/the-war-against-the-war-between-science-and-faith-revisited/
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As WJM points out, there is evidence for God in much the same way as there is evidence for the Dark Lord Sauron or Darth Vader or the Starship Enterprise. Whether such evidence is sufficient to compel belief in the existence of such beings is for each person to decide. For atheists it is not sufficient, for believers, it is. Unless, I suppose, the question of God's existence arose out of a legal case as in the fictional movie "The Man Who Sued God". Contra WJM, atheism, in the sense of not believing in the existence of a god rather than positively denying it, is a perfectly rational position concerning the existence of God or gods. Put simply, it would be irrational to believe in the existence of something for which there is insufficient reason or evidence. I'm sure that he, like most other people, is atheist with respect to the vast majority of deities in which human beings have believed over the millennia for that reason. Is that also an irrational position? The phenomena that HeKS cites as evidence for God are, in themselves, observational data about the Universe. They raise perfectly reasonable questions about what caused them but they only become evidence in the context of an hypothesis or theory or other explanatory framework. A God who can do anything is not an explanatory framework in that sense. For example, take the largely apocryphal story about Isaac Newton being inspired to formulate a theory of gravity by an apple falling on his head. Apples falling to the ground when they detach from the branches from which they were hanging is a widely-observed phenomenon. If you formulate an hypothesis that the falling is due to an invisible force that operates between all massive objects, then all those observations become evidence for that explanation On the other hand, citing God as the ultimate cause of all such phenomena is not an explanation in that sense. It is a claim about 'who', rather than a tentative explanation of 'how', which is what is expected of science.Seversky_{September 3, 2016
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WJM, one of the problems here is, it seems the idea is that if X is regarded as evidence pointing to God then if one can somehow come up with some other explanation that is more comfortable (especially one that can be dressed up in a lab coat) -- regardless of how far fetched it would be on common sense -- then the existence of such a hypothesis AUTOMATICALLY discounts any tendency of evidence to point to God. The underlying failures of reason are manifold. First, clever people can come up with all sorts of hypotheses. Once something like methodological naturalism or scientism or selective hyperskepticism is allowed in the door, that then reduces this strategy to question-begging in a lab coat or the like. Next, it ignores the issues of inference to the best current explanation, the inherent provisionality of inductive reasoning, and the need for sober comparative difficulties. In short this is a rhetorical defense mechanism (or a club to beat down those one does not agree with) not a serious approach to warrant. Also, it injects double standards of warrant, closing minds. In effect, unless there is an utter breakdown, there is no open-minded investigation of truth. Prestige of Science is being abused. Further, double standards of warrant are inherently incoherent. Then, when we deal with cases where the implication of one's view is general delusion, that is even more manifestly incoherence at work. This is part of why I have stressed the need to get to a credible "I" who can responsibly and logically reason. We should not discount the temptation to contempt for the other. More can be said, but the dynamics of self-reinforcing, polarising error are already evident. In this thread, the dismissal that there is >no evidence" for God is a clear sign; never mind the pull-back into a more subtle form here because it was effectively challenged. So is the talking point that the reality of God is so "far fetched" that one needs not take it seriously. (In that context it is take-it-to-the-bank obvious the thought on God that has been looked at is in the main arguments against God. That such arguments are characteristically surprisingly weak and have serious counters, alongside of there being a powerful inductive, cumulative worldview level case for God most likely has not been given a sober hearing. For just one example the argument against God on evil more than meets its match when confronted with the reality and desirability of good and virtue, which points to the need for responsible, rational freedom in order to create a new order of the good. Which then necessarily entails the possibility of evils and vices etc. And in this context, it is possible to show that the existence of evil is consistent with the reality of God.) It seems a re-thinking is indicated. KFkairosfocus_{September 3, 2016
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So, the point here is: intellectually honest people admit there is evidence of some sort of god, but that they find that evidence unconvincing. They don't try to assert special case conditions, caveats, disclaimers and modifiers so that they can dismiss the evidence for god as evidence for god. That would be intellectually dishonest. I admit there is evidence of all sorts of things; that doesn't in any way mean those things are proven to exist (or to be true) or that any reasonable person should accept that evidence as convincing.William J Murray_{September 3, 2016
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WJM, you've probably seen this before, but anyways for others, Darwin himself also tried to "characterize “evidence” in such a way that it can be used to exclude the evidence for god as evidence for god":
Why Evolutionary Theory Cannot Survive Itself – Nancy Pearcey – March 8, 2015 Excerpt: Darwin’s Selective Skepticism People are sometimes under the impression that Darwin himself recognized the problem. They typically cite Darwin’s famous “horrid doubt” passage where he questions whether the human mind can be trustworthy if it is a product of evolution: “With me, the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy.” But, of course, Darwin’s theory itself was a “conviction of man’s mind.” So why should it be “at all trustworthy”? Surprisingly, however, Darwin never confronted this internal contradiction in his theory. Why not? Because he expressed his “horrid doubt” selectively — only when considering the case for a Creator. From time to time, Darwin admitted that he still found the idea of God persuasive. He once confessed his “inward conviction … that the Universe is not the result of chance.” It was in the next sentence that he expressed his “horrid doubt.” So the “conviction” he mistrusted was his lingering conviction that the universe is not the result of chance. In another passage Darwin admitted, “I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man.” Again, however, he immediately veered off into skepticism: “But then arises the doubt — can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animal, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions?” That is, can it be trusted when it draws “grand conclusions” about a First Cause? Perhaps the concept of God is merely an instinct programmed into us by natural selection, Darwin added, like a monkey’s “instinctive fear and hatred of a snake.” In short, it was on occasions when Darwin’s mind led him to a theistic conclusion that he dismissed the mind as untrustworthy. He failed to recognize that, to be logically consistent, he needed to apply the same skepticism to his own theory. http://www.evolutionnews.org/2015/03/why_evolutionar094171.html Nancy Pearcey - How Darwin's Theory Undercuts Itself – audio/video https://www.facebook.com/philip.cunningham.73/videos/vb.100000088262100/1125689630777302/ “An example of self-referential absurdity is a theory called evolutionary epistemology, a naturalistic approach that applies evolution to the process of knowing. The theory proposes that the human mind is a product of natural selection. The implication is that the ideas in our minds were selected for their survival value, not for their truth-value. But what if we apply that theory to itself? Then it, too, was selected for survival, not truth — which discredits its own claim to truth. Evolutionary epistemology commits suicide. Astonishingly, many prominent thinkers have embraced the theory without detecting the logical contradiction. Philosopher John Gray writes, “If Darwin’s theory of natural selection is true,… the human mind serves evolutionary success, not truth.” What is the contradiction in that statement? Gray has essentially said, if Darwin’s theory is true, then it “serves evolutionary success, not truth.” In other words, if Darwin’s theory is true, then it is not true.” - Nancy Pearcey - Why Evolutionary Theory Cannot Survive Itself - March 2015 http://www.evolutionnews.org/2015/03/why_evolutionar094171.html Darwinian evolution, and atheism/naturalism in general, are built entirely upon a framework of illusions and fantasy – July 2016 https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Q94y-QgZZGF0Q7HdcE-qdFcVGErhWxsVKP7GOmpKD6o/edit
bornagain77_{September 3, 2016
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Pindi said:
I just regard the God hypothesis as so far fetched as to not be worth spending too much time on.
This brings to the fore something I was thinking about last night. I think that many atheists have this same perspective - that the idea of a god is so ridiculously absurd it doesn't even warrant serious consideration. They are so certain that atheistic naturalism must be true that they spend little or no time either investigating theism in good faith or applying serious critical analysis to their views to see how they hold up. As a result, they have very little preparation when it comes to defending their views or being rationally critical of theism. IMO, such people comfort themselves by believing that surely many other very smart people have come to the same conclusion that they have and surely they have thought all this stuff out and surely they are better thinkers than theists. They think this relieves them of doing the self-critical work necessary to actually defend their own views. Which is why they come in here and assert such absurd, unsupportable universal claims of fact like "there is no evidence for god".William J Murray_{September 3, 2016
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rvb8 said:
Yes WJM, testimony is a form of evidence.
Good. Then we agree that there is evidence of god, because countless people have testified to having experienced a god of some sort throughout history.
And when the testimony is rebutted by physical evidence, then those testifying are given one of two special english designations to describe them; they are liars,or they are dillusional.
No, rvb8. They can also simply be mistaken. It is well known that two entirely honest and non-delusional witnesses can give contradictory eyewitness testimony; it is also well-known that expert witnesses can offer contradictory testimony. It happens all the time. They are not necessarily liars or delusional. As for the "physical evidence", rvb8, any physical evidence brought before the jury is only connected to the crime via the testimony of witnesses. Pindi said:
WJM, yes testimony can be evidence under strictly controlled conditions. Without those controls, testimony is highly unreliable.
What strictly controlled circumstances? Before you answer, Pindi, I'd like you to carefully consider, in a self-critical way, how much of your life utterly depends on accepting and acting on the testimony of others. I'd like to challenge both you and rvb8 to stop defending the dismissal of such evidence for god as evidence for god, and instead take a critical view of your apparent attempts to dismiss and devalue such evidence as evidence. There are thousands of years of testimony from perhaps hundreds of millions or even billions of people that they have experienced a god of some sort. You may not find such testimony convincing, but that doesn't mean it is not evidence at all. Even anecdotal evidence is still evidence, regardless of how much or how little weight one gives it. And, a thing can be evidence for two separate conclusions or propositions at the same time, so there being the possibility of "other explanations" doesn't exclude a thing from also being evidence for the first explanation. Remember, this argument is about the claim that "there is no evidence of god". The point is, of course there is. Even anti-theistic scientists have admitted such evidence exists (fine-tuning, biological design for a purpose) and have attempted to characterize that evidence as either illusionary or that some other non-purposeful agency was responsible for the apparent design. If one person (let alone billions) testifies about experience of god, that is evidence by definition. That's not the issue; the issue is whether or not one one finds that evidence convincing. This is what is called a trivial fact. Testimony is a form of evidence. We rely on formal and informal testimony every day of our lives to make decisions both short term and long term. We have relied on it since we could understand language to form our views about the world about what is true and what is not true, what exists and what doesn't exist. What it appears you two are doing (consciously or not) is attempting to define and characterize "evidence" in such a way that it can be used to exclude the evidence for god as evidence for god. You want to add disclaimers, conditions and modifiers that will separate testimony (and other evidences) for the existence of god from testimony and other evidences about other things. However, you cannot make such distinctions without running into logical problems about the way we all gather and use evidence about everything else in our lives.William J Murray_{September 3, 2016
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Pindi, something is deeply, tellingly wrong with your dismissive term, "far fetched." This has been addressed above and you need to respond to it, on pain of some pretty sobering conclusions becoming warranted. KFkairosfocus_{September 3, 2016
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This following recent video by Inspiring Philosophy is of related interest. Is Atheism a Delusion? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Ii-bsrHB0o Short answer to the question "Is Atheism a Delusion?" Yes it is, and there are many studies backing up the claim that atheists, whether consciously or not, are actively suppressing their 'natural', non-delusional, belief in God.bornagain77_{September 3, 2016
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Origines, maybe read more carefully. There is nothing contradictory in what I said.Pindi_{September 3, 2016
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Pindi, I'm having trouble reconciling the following two statements of yours. Perhaps you can elucidate.
#16: I just regard the God hypothesis as so far fetched as to not be worth spending too much time on.

#22: ... evidence of God ... yes I really do think about a lot of these things. Deeply.
Origenes_{September 3, 2016
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F/N: One of the common skeptical tactics (and wider problems of exchanges) in discussion threads is to ignore and bury key points that are inconvenient in onward discussion of everything but those points. Which of the two is at work, we need not decide. It is enough to note that at 21 above, the issue of what is "far fetched" at world roots level was taken up and has been buried, unanswered. So, let us clip and look:
as a start point, being. Candidates can be possible or impossible, the latter such that core characteristics stand in mutual contradiction so no such entity may exist in any possible world. Think square circles. Possible beings would exist in at least one possible world. Of such, contingent beings depend on on/off enabling causal factors that if off in a possible world would block the beginning or continuation of existence. Think, a fire i/l/o the fire tetrahedron used to fight such. Then conceive of beings with no such dependence on external enabling factors, i.e. there is no possible world in which they do not exist. For example try to see how a world could be without two-ness in it thus also the abstract contrast A vs ~A (which is foundational to rationality). That is necessary beings are root-level elements of the framework for a world to exist and no possible world can be without such. This addresses the “far fetched[ness]” of the concept, necessary being. Now contrast non-being, a genuine nothing. Such hath not causal capability and were there ever utter nothing, such would forever obtain — so much for the rhetorical trick of pulling a world out of a non-existent hat. Further to this the immediate consequence is, as a world manifestly is, SOMETHING ALWAYS WAS AT WORLD-ROOT LEVEL, a necessary being, root-cause of existence. The issue is, what is the best candidate. Especially in a world with morally governed, evidently responsibly and rationally substantially free beings — or else rational discussion evaporates.
In short, we tend to be unfamiliar with the logic of being. Once this is focussed, things that on a superficial look seem outlandish can be seen to have a point. KF PS: Where this is going, is that we need to assess serious candidate necessary being roots of reality. In a world that includes credibly responsibly free and rational, morally and logically governed beings, that poses the question of adequacy. We need at root-level an IS capable of grounding OUGHT. After centuries of debate, one serious candidate exists: the inherently good creator God, a necessary, maximally great being worthy of loyalty and the responsible reasonable service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature. If you doubt this, simply suggest and justify a case for another: _______ on comparative difficulties. Where, parodies like flying spaghetti monsters need not apply (starting with, composite constructed entities would be contingent). In short, it is plain that informed ethical theism is a responsible, rational worldview, not something to be skewered and dismissed with one liners about being "far-fetched." That claim above needs to be withdrawn, explained as to how such a blunder arose and frankly apologised for.kairosfocus_{September 3, 2016
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RVB8, as an example of loaded strawman caricatures that go to character, look again at your remarks about "four good CHRISTIAN eyewitnesses" above. KFkairosfocus_{September 3, 2016
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PS: More from Greenleaf, on responsible approaches to evidence; in his Testimony of the Evangelists:
1] THE ANCIENT DOCUMENTS RULE: Every document, apparently ancient, coming from the proper repository or custody, and bearing on its face no evident marks of forgery, the law presumes to be genuine, and devolves on the opposing party the burden of proving it to be otherwise. [p.16.] 2] Conversance: In matters of public and general interest, all persons must be presumed to be conversant, on the principle that individuals are presumed to be conversant with their own affairs. [p. 17.] 3] On Inquiries and Reports: If [a report] were "the result of inquiries, made under competent public authority, concerning matters in which the public are concerned" it would . . . be legally admissible . . . To entitle such results, however, to our full confidence, it is not necessary that they be obtained under a legal commission; it is sufficient if the inquiry is gravely undertaken and pursued, by a person of competent intelligence, sagacity and integrity. The request of a person in authority, or a desire to serve the public, are, to all moral intents, as sufficient a motive as a legal commission. [p. 25.] 4] Probability of Truthfulness: In trials of fact, by oral testimony, the proper inquiry is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but whether there is a sufficient probability that it is true. [p. 28.] 5] Criteria of Proof: A proposition of fact is proved, when its truth is established by competent and satisfactory evidence. By competent evidence is meant such as the nature of the thing to be proved requires; and by satisfactory evidence is meant that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind, beyond any reasonable doubt. [pp. 28 - 9.] 6] Credibility of Witnesses: In the absence of circumstances which generate suspicion, every witness is to be presumed credible, until the contrary is shown; the burden of impeaching his credibility lying on the objector. [p. 29] 7] Credit due to testimony: The credit due to the testimony of witnesses depends upon, firstly, their honesty; secondly, their ability; thirdly, their number and the consistency of their testimony; fourthly, the conformity of their testimony with experience; and fifthly, the coincidence of their testimony with collateral circumstances. [p.31.] 8] Ability of a Witness to speak truth: the ability of a witness to speak the truth depends on the opportunities which he has had for observing the facts, the accuracy of his powers of discerning, and the faithfulness of his memory in retaining the facts, once observed and known . . . It is always to be presumed that men are honest, and of sound mind, and of the average and ordinary degree of intelligence . . . Whenever an objection is raised in opposition to ordinary presumptions of law, or to the ordiary experience of mankind, the burden of proof is devolved on the objector. [pp. 33 - 4.] 9] Internal coherence and external corroboration: Every event which actually transpires has its appropriate relation and place in the vast complication of circumstances, of which the affairs of men consist; it owes its origin to the events which have preceded it, it is intimately connected with all others which occur at the same time and place, and often with those of remote regions, and in its turn gives birth to numberless others which succeed. In all this almost inconceivable contexture, and seeming discord, there is perfect harmony; and while the fact, which really happened, tallies exactly with every other contemporaneous incident, related to it in the remotest degree, it is not possible for the wit of man to invent a story, which, if closely compared with the actual occurrences of the same time and place, may not be shown to be false. [p. 39.] 10] Marks of false vs true testimony: a false witness will not willingly detail any circumstances in which his testimony will be open to contradiction, nor multiply them where there is a danger of his being detected by a comparison of them with other accounts, equally circumstantial . . . Therefore, it is, that variety and minuteness of detail are usually regarded as certain test[s] of sincerity, if the story, in the circumstances related, is of a nature capable of easy refutation, if it were false . . . . [False witnesses] are often copious and even profuse in their statements, as far as these may have been previously fabricated, and in relation to the principal matter; but beyond this, all will be reserved and meagre, from fear of detection . . . in the testimony of the true witness there is a visible and striking naturalness of manner, and an unaffected readiness and copiousness in the detail of circumstances, as well in one part of the narrative as another, and evidently without the least regard to the facility or difficulty of verification or detection . . . the increased number of witnesses to circumstances, and the increased number of circumstances themselves, all tend to increase the probability of detection if the witnesses are false . . . Thus the force of circumstantial evidence is found to depend on the number of particulars involved in the narrative; the difficulty of fabricating them all, if false, and the great facility of detection; the nature of the circumstances to be compared, and from which the dates and other facts to are be collected; the intricacy of the comparison; the number of intermediate steps in the process of deduction; and the circuity of the investigation. The more largely the narrative partake[s] of these characteristics, the further it will be found removed from all suspicion of contrivance or design, and the more profoundly the mind will rest in the conviction of its truth. [pp. 39 - 40.] 11] Procedure: let the witnesses be compared with themselves, with each other, and with surrounding facts and circumstances.[p. 42.] Here, we supplement: J W Montgomery observes of the NT accounts -- and following the McCloskey and Schoenberg framework for detecting perjury -- that the modern approach to assessing quality of such testimony focusses on identifying internal and external defects in the testimony and the witness: (a) Internal defects in the witness himself refer to any personal characteristics or past history tending to show that the "witness is inherently untrustworthy, unreliable, or undependable." (b) But perhaps the apostolic witnesses suffered from external defects, that is, "motives to falsify"? (c) Turning now to the testimony itself, we must ask if the New Testament writings are internally inconsistent or self-contradictory. (d) Finally, what about external defects in the testimony itself, i.e., inconsistencies between the New Testament accounts and what we know to be the case from archaeology or extra-biblical historical records? --> In each case, the answer is in favour of the quality of the NT, as can be observed here. 12] The degree of coherence expected of true witnesses: substantial truth, under circumstantial variety. There is enough of discrepancy to show that there could have been no previous concert among them, and at the same time such substantial agreement as to show that they all were independent narrators of the same great transaction, as the events actually occurred. [p.34. All cites from The Testimony of the Evangelists (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Classics, 1995).]
kairosfocus_{September 3, 2016
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Pindi,
testimony can be evidence under strictly controlled conditions. Without those controls, testimony is highly unreliable.
There you go again with imposing selectively hyperskeptically manipulating terms of evaluating evidence and reasonable degree of warrant. (Nor, has it escaped notice, that you are picking and choosing what to further discuss and what you wish to studiously ignore or sweep away with loaded dismissive talking points. You are in a worldviews, comparative difficulties, dialectic context in which factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power count in assessing alternative frames of global thought. Lawyerly/rhetorical tactics of manipulative persuasion and cherry-picking points of attack etc simply do not count here, other than to inadvertently show up gaps in your thought. Where also, it has to be understood that pistis, rhetorical proof that seeks to ground trustworthy conviction on the merits, is closely connected to the world of inductive reasoning in the modern sense of arguments of support as opposed to deductive demonstration on axioms; the world of science etc and degrees of confidence in conclusions ranging up to moral certainty. Where, you have a worldview, plainly evolutionary materialistic scientism multiplied by a rhetorical tendency to selective hyperskepticism. Before going further key facts and issues on the table include that you need to ground the "far-fetched hypothesis" that you are a coherent "I" able to engage in reasonable, responsible discussion. Also, that you need to account for the evidence that we are under moral government implied by your reliance on the general urge to seek truth and warrant that one is right. All of these are relevant evidence, as is the evidence that evolutionary materialism is irretrievably self-referentially incoherent [cf. 101 here], and that scientism contradicts itself when it asserts or implies a claim to effective monopoly on credible knowledge, for the suggestion that big-S Science is "the only begetter of truth" is an epistemological, that is philosophical, claim that would discredit such claims. Likewise, it is telling on your tactics to see above the "no evidence" card now backed off to a subtler version of same on being challenged from multiple directions. Similarly, the "far fetched" card followed by studious ignoring of a summmary as to why something like the theistic view is NOT far fetched, cf. 21 above.) Let's address your dismissal of testimony a bit more. Testimony of people credibly there is eyewitness testimony, period. It is evidence, full stop -- rhetorical gerrymandering in your comment as cited notwithstanding. (Gerrymandering which clearly and tellingly reveals intent to impose selectively hyperskeptical double-standards of warrant.) Testimony by those qualified to be eyewitnesses is evidence, period. Record of such is also evidence, period. And as general lying would utterly break down society, we are entitled to the presumption that most of the time people speak the truth as they perceive it. So, we do not presume general delusion or deceit or conspiracy absent specific warrant to do so. Especially, when it suits an ideological agenda. Anything that implies we live in a global Plato's Cave world of shadow shows or the like undermines rationality, discussion and hopes of truth. Such should be set aside as reflecting the fallacy of grand delusion. Testimony of people of reasonable character carries significant weight. This, when put on record, is the basis of history and reasonable, sound history - broad sense -- is the basis of almost everything else. You don't get to impose artificial, self-serving, selectively hyperskeptical demands on the body of history or human experience and report. It is evidence, and when significant numbers are involved, it becomes highly reliable. (Cf here for how this relates to the credibility of the Christian gospel. And remember, just my being here alive to discuss is evidence of miraculous answer to prayer by God. There are literally millions of cases out there. Where cumulative reliability of evidence mounts up exponentially. Say, odds of error are e. For n converging credibly independent witnesses on a point, odds of joint error run like ( e)^n. If e = 0.001 and n = 12, we are looking at 10^-3 x 12 = 10^-36. And converging on a common error point by point makes this far stronger yet.) Further to this, physical evidence does not have independent character from this. It is accessed through our conscious experience and testimony. And insofar as the physical evidence is in regards to traces of events or circumstances we cannot directly observe, we have to rely on testimony, record, report and inference to the best current explanation. Where, for example, computer simulations are not actual physical evidence, reconstructed pictures and models, ditto, same for reconstructions of the remote past of origins -- such are explanatory constructs that are always of provisional character. Also, consensus of schools of experts dominated by ideological or worldview commitments can often be more driven by bias than by evidence, for example so-called methodological naturalism and its gerrymandering of definitions of science, also its methods and conclusions. So, we need to look at things on balance case by case instead of resorting to loaded blanket statements that tend to feed cherry picking and selective hyperskepticism. In the case of this thread, you first need to get to "I" on your worldview foundations. Second, the experience and testimony of millions on life-transforming encounter with God is not to be studiously ignored or swept away with a blanket dismissal that implies at best grand delusion. For that instantly undermines the credibility of mind, reasoning, ability to access real experience. For, there are no firewalls in our cognitive experience and faculties. Nor is imposition of selectively hyperskeptical shields against inconvenient bodies of testimony much of an improvement. So, it is quite clear that dismissive rhetoric above about God being a far fetched hypothesis is ill-founded and should be withdrawn. Ethical theism is long since generally known to be a serious, live option worldview and the tactic of trying to sweep it away with a clever, barbed dismissal speaks volumes; not in your favour. KFkairosfocus_{September 3, 2016
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Who did I misrepresent scuzzaman?Pindi_{September 2, 2016
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