“Requirements Explosion”

_{Barry Arrington

October 20, 2011

Intelligent Design}

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In Response to InVivoVeritas, another commenter writes:

Thanks for an interesting post.

As you’re probably aware, there is a well-known phenomenon in software development called the “requirements explosion”. It’s documented, for example, in Robert Glass’s book, Facts and Fallacies of Software Engineering. Even after a specification is complete, and especially as concrete implementation of the specification gets underway (i.e. development of the actual software begins), a plethora of other requirements come out of the woodwork. Several things might account for this, including (1) the requirements were probably incomplete to begin with; (2) not all the implications of the requirements were thought through in advance; (3) the stakeholders don’t like what the “incarnation” of their specifications in functional software actually looks like, or behaves like; etc.

I observe a similar phenomena in the ongoing naturalistic-macroevolution vs. ID debate. The analogy is imperfect, but it seems to me that scientists (ironically, primarily evolutionists) are presiding over an exponential “requirements explosion” of their own creation. The more they drill down into the nitty-gritty details of life, the more strictly bounded and detailed the specifications for viable life become. And, on purely naturalistic grounds, scientists seem less and less able to account for life’s successful implementation(s) of those increasingly complex and demanding specifications.

Kent
Omaha, Nebraska, USA

I find Kent’s post very interesting, because DrRec and Dr. Liddle keep suggesting that it is all really a lot more simple than all that in defense of the un-guided OOL school. Well, DrRec and Dr Liddle, experince suggests that, if anything, we are probably underestimating the problem for un-guided OOL.

Comments

Now might be a good time to roll out that refutation of ID you've been working on. https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/the-first-gene-an-information-theory-look-at-the-origin-of-life/Mung_{November 18, 2011
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Dr Liddle, You asked me to respond to a post you made elsewhere. This is that response, but I make it here where you left our last conversation. Your counter-argument is based on a major false premise and several instances of a failure in conceptualization. These permeate your comments. I'll deal with that false premise, but first a couple of observations about your response.
So UBP’s starting point seems to be that the “information” we say a genome contains is not different from “information” in other senses.
Different information systems are different by virtue of their implementation into different substrates, and also in the types of effects that result, but the physical objects involved in the transfer share the same dynamic relationships.
A musical box is an interesting example, because unlike some other information transfer systems, like the pixels on your screen you are viewing right now and from which you are receiving information about the contents of Upright Biped’s post on UD, the sequence of pins on a music box cylinder are actually instrumental in making something else, in this case a melody, and thus bears a closer homology to the sequence of base pairs on a DNA molecule which, by a series of physical operations, results in the making of a protein.
The pixels on your screen are “making something else” as well. This is evidenced by the simple fact you know the contents of my post. The substrates change, the effects change, but the dynamics of the transfer stay the same.
UPB claims the music box represents “recorded information”, which implies that the information started elsewhere and was “recorded” on to the music box. However, I think he is making the point that without a mechanism to get the “recorded” music box back into the form of music again, the information isn’t truly recorded, which seems fair enough. After all, if I translated my post into unbreakable code, it wouldn’t really be recorded information because there would be no way of getting the information back out again. So in the music box example, the music box is a way of “recording” a piece of music composed by someone, and getting that piece of music back out again, at a different time. A phonograph recording (the old wax cylinder kind) would be an even better example.
If you took the cylinder out of a music box and then lost the box, the representations would still be “truly recorded” even if the box was lost. If you never found the music box, or a replacement, then that would simply be a melody you'll never hear. That doesn't change the representation in the cylinder. Translating your post into an unbreakable code poses some problems. An unbreakable code, as a matter of principle (practicality may differ) is a code without rules, and a code without rules isn't a code at all. Moreover, translating your post into a code with no rules has nothing to do with the word “translate”. How would you accomplish it? To say that “it wouldn’t really be recorded information because there would be no way of getting the information back out again” is to make an observation about non-existent entities that have nothing to do with the topic (recorded information transfer). It’s fluff. In my last post to you I made the point that you repeatedly try to smuggle a mind into the conversation. The reason for this is obvious; it primes the pump that the observations are anthropocentric, and therefore flawed. But it doesn't work. The fact that humans are symbol makers is not a question; of course we are. But even if we weren't, the dynamics of information transfer among humans (as in non-human transfer) wouldn't change one iota. The anthropocentric flaw is not being able to remove yourself from the sample.
No, I don’t think that works. For a start, “Lizzie has seen an apple” is not a recording of Lizzie’s thought, it is an inference about what Lizzie was thinking. Lizzie’s hearer has indeed received information from Lizzie, but not exactly the information that Lizzie sent. So it seems to me that language is a very different kind of information transfer system from a phonograph, or a musical box, or, indeed a reproducing organism.
Lizzie is a symbol-maker saying “I'd like an apple” to another symbol-maker. That fact doesn't change the dynamics of the transfer in any way; it only changes the effect of that information in the hands of the a free-agent receiver. What you describe as a “very different kind of information transfer” is only a very different kind of effect, coming as the result of a free agent being the receiver. But, the dynamics of the transfer haven't changed. Like I said, you have to remove yourself from the sample.
In these three examples, we start with a physical pattern of some kind (a performance, a melody, an organism) and we end with a recreation of that physical pattern (a rendering of that performance, the sound of that melody, a second organism). In the case of language we do not. There is no protocol that can create an apple from the word apple, although uttering the word may induce someone else to go fetch one.
Okay, so maybe it didn't occur to you that the effect of the sound pattern “apple” is not the sudden appearance of an apple coming from the pattern of the sound. The fact remains that the word “apple” has an effect, and the actualization of that effect (from the sound pattern of the word) follows the same dynamics as any other form of recorded information transfer. Again, remove yourself from the sample. Stop injecting issues that only pertain to you as a symbol-maker. Observations having to do with what a free agent can do with information does not change the physical dynamics observed in the transfer.
This, it seems to me is because the word “apple” is a symbol, or, in Saussure’s term, a signifier that is linked to a signified (aka referent) in this case a specific kind of fruit. UBP appears to want to say that this linkage between signifier (word) and signified (fruit) is equivalent to the link between the sequence on a music box cylinder and the melody that emerges, and that therefore the music box cylinder (and therefore a base sequence in a polynucleotide too) is a symbol for the sound pattern that emerges from the music box in the same way as the word “apple” is a symbol for an actual apple. But it clearly is not. When I say the word apple, and you hear it, no apple is created, though you may reproduce my image of an apple in your own inner eye. But the referent for the signifier “apple” is not “the mental image of an apple” but an actual apple. So the linkage between signifier and signified in language (the relationship of a “sign”) is qualitatively different from the relationship between a recorded physical object or pattern and its reproduction.
Well, it was obvious from the start this was where you were heading, and you've done me the favor of encapsulating your error in a single sentence: “But the referent for the signifier “apple” is not “the mental image of an apple” but an actual apple.” So my question to you is simple: Do you have an apple in your head -or- Do you have a “mental image of an apple”? Really, Dr Liddle. Have you been taught that when an animal communicates it doesn't know it's communicating, so it expects apples to appear as it gestures? And will you please take special note; none of this anthropomorphism has anything to do with the observed dynamics of information transfer, instead it revolves around a certain (repeating) disciplinary issue. I say again, you are a natural symbol-maker. You transfer information. This is what you do. Accept that, then to the best of your ability, remove yourself from the sample. Recorded information goes in a lot of different directions. It's an anthropocentric error to continually describe a particular aspect of being human as if that aspect alters the observed dynamics. It doesn't. I suspect that you probably know this, but are left to ponder the sudden appearance of apples. This is what the evidence of your rebuttal would indicate.
It seems to me that UBP is defining recorded information as something that requires a discrete protocol, then regards it as noteworthy that all instances of recorded information require a discrete protocol.
This is a question of the structure of the system. In order to make your case, it requires you to deal with what you've ignored in your objection. Recorded information is an abstraction (within a system) which is represented in an arrangement of matter/energy. For one thing to represent another thing within a system, it must be separate from it. If it is a separate thing, then there must be something that physically establishes the relationship between the two. That is what the protocol does. The dynamic involved is that all three of these physical things remain discrete, and this has been validated by observation. And finally, describing the parts of a system does not result in a circular argument.
In other words, the table – an object with pattern – was being replicated with each layer of snow, with sufficient fidelity that an observer could extract from the layer of snow the information that the table had an umbrella hole. By evening there was about 4 feet of snow on the table, but there was still a dimple in the middle, indicating that the information that beneath the snow was a table with an umbrella hole had been faithfully recorded and transferred from snow-layer to snow-layer all afternoon. Yet in this case, the “representation” was also the “effect”.
Your table wasn’t being replicated (or represented); that was just snow. What you say was a representation, wasn't a representation. A representation is an arrangement of matter in order to cause an effect within a system. It wasn't a representation you saw outside, it was table covered in snow. It had a hole in the center of it, which left a dimple in the snow. That dimple made you think of the hole. You then end this anthropic adventure by concluding the “representation was also the effect”. It wasn't. The representation was a neural pattern going to your visual cortex and beyond. The end effect was “There's a hole in the table”. Those are not the same thing - and - you've put yourself right back into the sample, making observations that only matter to a human.
However, that seems to me to be the least of the problems with UBP’s case. The far bigger problem is that there is a qualitative difference between a sign (in the Saussurian sense), namely a linked signifier with signified pair, where the signified can be a physical object, and the signifier a symbol potentially renderable in a number of media, and where the transfer of information using the signifier does not result in the physical creation of the referent, and the information transfer in a musical box or in a reproducing organism whereby a physical pattern is recorded in such a way that it can be reproduced, which, at its simplest, can be layers of snow on a table.
Here you say there is a difference between: a) A Saussurian sign [signifier+signified] where the signified can be an object and the signifier can be a symbol. ...and b) where a “signifier does not result in the physical creation of the referent” ..and c) a music box or an organism where something can be reproduced, like layers of snow on a table. I respond: a) Firstly, a Saussurian“sign” [signifier+signified] is a linguistics concept that does not invalidate biosemiotics or information theory. In any case, a signifier cannot result in a signified without a protocol. That protocol may exist in a living interpreter (such as a human, or a bee), or it can be instantiated in a machine (such as a music box or a fabric loom). In each of these cases, the protocol will be separate from the signifier and the signified, and it will establish the relationship between the two. b) There is no principle involved which would require a representation to result in the production of a physical object; only a physical effect. This is at the central false premise of your objection. When a bee dances in flight in order to direct the other bees to the feeding grounds, it is not nectar that results from the dance, just a change in flight plan (which is an effect, not an object). And once again, you've injected yourself right back into the observation. c) A representation leads to an effect within a system, and those systems vary, as does their effects. And thoughts of layers of snow becoming a “representation”, is simply anthropocentric.
BIPED: In this instance, the configuration of holes served as the representation, and the configuration of sensors served as the protocol, leading to the specified effects. Each of these is physically discrete, while sharing the immaterial relationship established by the protocol.
Well, yes, but the discreteness is, as I’ve said, only arguably intrinsic to the concept of “recorded information” and in any case, does not render it semiotic.
Here you say that discreteness is not intrinsic to recorded information, but is only arguably so. You also used the word “concept” which is a cognitive term, one which we generally use in order to know anything at all, so I will leave it aside. (If the existence of recorded information is in doubt, then that can be addressed separately). Now to your objection: Over the course of this conversation I have given many examples of the discreteness observed. These observations have been given in coherent terms. In all of those instances you have never shown that the observation is incorrect. This suggests that the 'discreteness' is inherent based upon logical observations, and is only arguably non-inherent (and is therefore falsifiable by any contrary evidence available). I have told you of the physical entailments which are evident in the transfer of recorded information. One of those qualities is a discreteness among the physical objects involved. You then return to me to say “that doesn't make it semiotic”. But I have already challenged that objection, and am awaiting a reply. You may remember the question: If in one instance we have a thing that actually is a symbolic representation, and in another we have something that just acts like a symbolic representation – then someone can surely look at the physical evidence and point to the distinction between the two.
BIPED: a) the existence of an arrangement of matter acting as a physical representation
Well, maybe, though it’s a bit imprecise. But sure, information transfer is going to entail physical arrangements of matter. And let’s allow “representation” to be the thing-that-is-read, like DNA, or the cylinder of the musical box, or even the pattern of sounds making the word “apple” and let that representation be of something (a whole organism; a melody; an apple).
...or a neural pattern related to an apple, resulting in a pattern of impulses being sent to the chest and larynx.
BIPED: b) the existence of an arrangement of matter to establish the relationship between a representation and the effect it represents within a system (the protocol)
Well, no. In the case of the linkage between the signifier “apple” and its referent, the piece of fruit, there is no “arrangement of matter”. There is some kind of “arrangement of matter” that links the signifier “apple” to the evocation of the idea of an apple in a hearer, but the “idea of an apple” is not the referent of the signifier “apple”.
Translating first sentence: 'In the linkage between the word apple and the fruit apple, there is no arrangement of matter.' If that is true, then each time you say the word “apple” you have the uncanny good fortune of inventing it from scratch. Otherwise, there is a pattern(s) in your brain that maps your knowledge of the fruit to the word and potential downstream effects on your vocal chords. And once again, you’ve plopped yourself right down in the middle of the observations. And still, none of this changes the dynamics of the transfer in any way. The apple is not the word, and neither of them is the pattern in your brain. Again, get out of the study. Translating second sentence: 'There is an arrangement of matter that links the word apple to the thought of an apple in the hearer, but the thought of an apple is not what lead the speaker to use the word.' Again, do you have an apple in your head? You are going in circles, Dr Liddle, and I am feeling rather done with this.
What links the word “apple” to apples is shared agreement among a community of speakers that “apple” means apple … And even if we allowed this as the “protocol” UBP refers to, no amount of cultural agreement that “apple ” means apple will make an apple assemble itself when someone says the word “apple”.
Speechless.
The problem seems to be entailment b, as it always has been. A semiotic system relates a signifier to a signified so that two members of a shared linguistic community can communicate ideas – i.e. one member of the community can evoke in the mind of another member the idea s/he is currently entertaining.
When a “semiotic system relates a signifier to a signified so that two members of a shared linguistic community can communicate ideas” they exchange arrangements of matter (voice patterns) that represent effects within a system (an evocation: apple) and those arrangements of matter will achieve that effect by a second arrangement of matter – a neural pattern – which is the physical instantiation of an agreement among the participants that the sound of the word “apple” represents the red fruit with the white center and the little black seeds. So, the voice is not the thought, and the agreement is neither of those. Either that, or there is zero physical distinction between knowing what an apple is, and not knowing what an apple is. The thing you need to acknowledge Dr Liddle, is that this same dynamic happens in any transfer of recorded information, not just among members of a “shared linguistic community”. Again, remove yourself from the observation.
The referents of my signifiers are not my thoughts, but real-world objects, and abstract concepts. Those real world objects and abstract concepts are not brought into actuality when I utter a word. Unfortunately.
This is becoming silly. You apparently think that when you speak the word “apple” there is an apple in your head prompting you to say the word. This ridiculous deduction comes directly from someone who specifically disavows that neural patterns prompt her words – only, she says, real-world objects can accomplish that task. Well, I am a different person. I only have my sensory/cognitive systems prompting my words. Moreover, this is simply wallowing in an anthropocentric malaise. My background in research is certainly different than yours (we are humans measuring humans, so we tend to get out of the way). Consequently, this is not something I will continue to do. I now need to find a stopping point. In its entirety, your argument is based a false premise. You believe that you have identified a distinction in the effects of information transfer, and somehow by virtue of this distinction, the semiotic argument (based on observed physical dynamics) fails. So let us put your distinction in play and follow it to its logical end. Let us say that only information transfer that produces objects is semiotic. That would mean that the exchange of words is not semiotic. Obviously that is incorrect. So let us say that only information transfer that does not produce objects is semiotic. In that case, there is no such thing as machine code (as machine codes are specifically representations and protocols which produce things). This second view suggest that machine code cannot have anything to do with representations, protocols, and effects. In other words, 01100001 is not a representation of the letter “A” and will not result in the letter “A” in a system where 01100001 is the protocol for the letter “A”. Obviously, this is incorrect as well. So your distinction first fails at the observed real-world level, but the question remains “does it change the dynamics of the transfer”. It completely fails here as well. So as I said earlier, there is no principle that information transfer must or must not result in the production of an object in order to be considered semiotic. It's only required to have a physical effect within a system following the dynamics as set out by the observations themselves. Therefore the underlying premise in your objection has entirely refuted. If I should choose not to continue engaging you in this dialogue, I would like you to know one of the reasons why. In my comments I said ... Demonstrating a system that satisfies the entailments (physical consequences) of recorded information, also confirms the existence of a semiotic state. It does so observationally. Yet, the descriptions of these entailments makes no reference to a mind. Certainly a living being with a mind can be tied to the observations of information transfer, but so can other living things and non-living machinery. … and I substantiated each of these statements by the observation of evidence. At no time have you been able to show an error in these observations. I then went on to say: But Dr Liddle, you are deliberately confusing what is at issue. The output of a fabric loom being driven by holes punched into paper cards is “a physical object” as well – an object created by representations operating in a system capable of creating fabric. The nucleotides in DNA don’t know what leucine is, any more than the hole-punched cards of a fabric loom know what “blue thread” is. Or, any more than a music box cylinder knows what the key of “c” is. Observing the critical dynamics does not require any reference to a mind in any way whatsoever, yet you are repeatedly trying (as hard as possible) to inject a mind into the observations so that you can then turn around and claim that its all about a mind. In case you have not yet noticed, you have failed at this position every time you’ve tried it, and you will continue to do so. The reason for this is simple; the observations are correct and you are wrong So instead of successfully attacking the correctness of the observations, you introduced Saussure's (specifically anthropic) concept of a “sign” and have used it as a definition that somehow isn't required to address the observations. This has the net effect of allowing you to introduce a mind without regard to the observations being made. This is, of course, pure obfuscation of the evidence. Yet, having done so, you then go on to misrepresent the argument as if none of the preceding ever occurred. You say:
[BiPed] seems to be saying: cell-reproduction is information transfer, and information transfer is semiotic, and semiotics require minds, therefore cell-reproduction requires minds.
You say this even though you know it is an absolute misrepresentation of the argument I've made. The semiotic argument is simply that the information transfer in protein synthesis is not only physical (as in all other forms of recorded information transfer) but is also semiotic (as in all other forms of recorded information transfer). I do not say that semiosis requires a mind in those physical observations, nor do I have to in order to make those physical observations. I do not say so for a specific reason. That reason is because the source of the information is in question, so to make that assumption in the observations is a logical fallacy. In other words, I do not make that assumption as a matter of evidentiary discipline, and you have used it to smuggle in a mind without addressing that same evidence. Now certainly I have thick enough skin to be misrepresented, and each time I am I will endeavor to straighten it out. But you represent a special case for two reasons. Firstly, we have been talking rather consistently in and around these observations since May of this year. For you to start blatantly misrepresenting me at this late date is, well, uninteresting. And secondly, you present as someone who simply cannot, or will not, remove themselves from the observations. And that is an argument that I must concede; I cannot argue against it.Upright BiPed_{November 13, 2011
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If YOU have ANY evidence that first life was different than modern life, that would be different. What is the evidence for YOUR claim?Joseph_{November 3, 2011
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Of course, if you have any evidence that first life was like modern life, that would be different. What is your evidence for your claim?dmullenix_{November 3, 2011
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Oh, excuse me. I meant to say 6000 years of creation. Since 4004 BC. NOTdmullenix_{November 3, 2011
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It's sad, actually- just plain ole sad.Joseph_{November 2, 2011
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Joseph: "You don’t know that- IOW all of that is just a bald assertion." ===== Actually it's called religious faith!Eocene_{November 2, 2011
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dmullenix:
Any organism alive today is the product of billions of years of evolution and contains many features, such as DNA replication, ATP, enzymes to speed up chemical reactions, etc. that the first living thing didn’t have.
You don't know that- IOW all of that is just a bald assertion.Joseph_{November 2, 2011
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Any organism alive today is the product of billions of years of evolution and contains many features, such as DNA replication, ATP, enzymes to speed up chemical reactions, etc. that the first living thing didn't have. It has also been optimized for efficiency in order to successfully compete with other evolved organisms. We can't get any idea of the complexity of the first living thing by looking at modern organisms. You're right that WE have no evidence whatsoever of what the first living thing was like. That is, neither science nor ID has any data on the first organism whatsoever. And so far as I know, ID isn't even looking for evidence. Yet various ID theorists seem to think it's a great victory when they demand to know what the first critter was like and science can't answer.dmullenix_{November 2, 2011
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Elizabeth, Taking a break is one thing, leaving altogether is another. What a relief to know that you're staying around. Thanks for the update. I take breaks from UD from time to time as well - sometimes for months at a time.CannuckianYankee_{October 28, 2011
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Will still log in and lurk, to try to clear up loose ends, but I think you guys need a break from me, and I should probably take a break from you :) Thanks for your lengthy response UBP. I will post a response at The Skeptical Zone, to which I warmly invite you, if only to drop by, and counter-respond as you wish.Elizabeth Liddle_{October 28, 2011
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Dr Liddle has left UD? Well that's too bad. Thanks for the conversations. All the best.Upright BiPed_{October 28, 2011
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Dr Liddle, “As usual”, Dr Liddle? I'll take that as a compliment that I've expressed the argument sufficiently, and needn't alter my position in order to keep you stumbling for a coherent reply. You've launched these objections before, and they are as meaningless now as they were then. The reasons have been explained at the physical level. Simply restating your objections does not change the validity of the rebuttal. If it's empiricism you aspire to, which you say is the case, then emphatically announcing what you “simply do not accept” is not a coherent argument. That's not going to cut it when there is concrete physical evidence that you’re wrong. You want to force an equivocation upon the use of certain words, yet it's the physical dynamics which are at issue. I have now told you four times that you may use whatever terms you wish; the fact remains that the observed physical dynamics are what must be accounted for. The elephant in the room, Dr Liddle, is that you keep playing off two losing positions. The first is this completely impotent ‘equivocation in terms’ thing, which has been dealt with conclusively (ie: the observations have been lucidly restated using the definitions of these terms [taken directly from a standard dictionary] in place of the terms themselves). These restated definitions are entirely faithful with respect to the dynamics being described. Your objection has therefore been refuted. Fully refuted. That refutation has been further bolstered by asking the simple question: “If in one instance we have an object that is genuinely a representation, and in another we have an object that just acts like a representation, then surely you can look at the dynamic evidence and point to the distinction”. You have thus far failed to describe this distinction – this equivocation. It seems to be invisible among the things clearly seen, yet you insist it's there. When you decide to describe it, I will respond to your objection with a sense of urgency, because only then will it be meaningful to the discussion. In other words, quite frankly, put up or shut up. ;)
“the DNA sequence can only function as a “representation” of a protein in one medium – a sequence of nucleotides. These nucleotides have physical properties that are required for the “translation” of “representation” to “object” to take place.”
Taking this first sentence at face value: 'a sequence of nucleotides can only be a representation in one medium - a sequence of nucleotides'. Okay. Your objection seems to suggest that because nucleotide sequences operate within a system dedicated to specific effect (the production of proteins, among others) then these sequences cannot be considered actual representations. But if we follow that thinking, then we can say that a music box cylinder doesn’t contain representations either, because it can only make a melody when used in a music box. Or we can say that the punch cards from an old fabric loom don’t really represent the final effect in the fabric, because all they can do is make fabric. How is it exactly that you could come to the conclusion that because a system is dedicated to an effect, the information driving the system is not what it is?
These nucleotides have physical properties that are required for the “translation” of “representation” to “object” to take place.
Exactly, and again, this has no bearing on the issue. Everything that acts as a representation must have appropriate physical properties (in order to accomplish the task). If I take a stick and spell “Dr Liddle” in the sand, then the sand was appropriate to use as a substrate to accomplish the effect. But what if I take the same stick and follow the same motion in a tub of water? What then? Apparently, a tub of water doesn't have the properties required to contain the representations I intended to convey. Similarly, wood makes a poor conductor of electrical pulses. Felt makes a poor recording tape on which to arrange lines of iron oxide. This is a thoughtless objection, Dr Liddle. Not only is it beneath the intellect of someone with your training, it speaks nothing whatsoever to the dynamics being discussed. Why won’t you attack those dynamics themselves? Why not leave these hapless arguments for the greener grass of actually refuting the evidence as we find it.
Moreover, the outcome of this “translation” process is not the shared understanding of some referent (as when I write “dog” and you understand “dog”) but a physical object.
But Dr Liddle, you are deliberately confusing what is at issue. The output of a fabric loom being driven by holes punched into paper cards is "a physical object" as well – an object created by representations operating in a system capable of creating fabric. The nucleotides in DNA don't know what leucine is, any more than the hole-punched cards of a fabric loom know what “blue thread” is. Or, any more than a music box cylinder knows what the key of “c” is. Observing the critical dynamics does not require any reference to a mind in any way whatsoever, yet you are repeatedly trying (as hard as possible) to inject a mind into the observations so that you can then turn around and claim that its all about a mind. In case you have not yet noticed, you have failed at this position every time you've tried it, and you will continue to do so. The reason for this is simple; the observations are correct and you are wrong.
So, on the one hand, we have a molecule (“representation”) that forms a template for a second molecule, that reacts with a third, that reacts with a fourth (the “referent”), thus mapping the first molecule to the fourth.
One can imagine you typing out that passage, then swiping your hands together and clapping, as if your task is done. Nothing could be further from the truth. You have deliberately ignored the critical dynamic method in which the immaterial rule “this maps to that” comes to be actualized within the system. I will repeat it here for your benefit:
BIPED: These same entailments are is found in the transfer of information from a nucleic sequence. During protein synthesis a selected sequence of nucleotides are copied, and the representations contained within that copy are fed into a ribosome. The output of that ribosome is a chain of amino acids which will then become the protein being prescribed by the input sequence. The input of information is therefore driving the output production. But the input and the output are physically discrete, as evidenced by the fact that the don’t directly interact, and that the material output is not assembled from the material input. The exchange of information (from input to output) is facilitated by a set of special physical objects – the protocols – tRNA and its entourage of aminoacyl synthetase. Acting together they make it possible for the input to alter the output, and they do so by allowing them to remain separate. The tRNA physically bridges the gap between the input and the output, acting as a passive carrier of the physical protocol. It accomplishes this by being charged with the correct amino acid by the synthetases (the only molecules in biology which actually hold the rules to the genetic code). The synthetases accomplish their tasks by being able to physically recognize both the tRNAs and the amino acids. They charge the tRNAs with their correct amino acids before they ever enter the ribosome. The actions of the synthetases are therefore completely isolated from both the input and output. In other words, the only molecules in biology that can set the rule that “this maps to that” are physically isolated from both the input and output, while the input and output remain isolated themselves.
So you see Dr Liddle, you've left the observable dynamics out of your simplistic “the RNA molecule reacts with a tRNA molecule which reacts with an amino acid” model. If you are expecting me to relinquish on that observed dynamic, I can assure you that I have no intentions of doing so. If you want to defeat the observations, you will first have to attack them with contrary evidence and valid reasoning. Thus far you have failed to do so.
On the other hand we have a human with a brain who makes a symbol (“representation”) which can be rendered in any one of a vast number of media, because what matters is the pattern not the substrate, which is then interpreted by another human with a brain, who then understands that the first human wanted to convey the concept “dog”, because they have previously agreed that that symbol means “dog”.
Here we go again with the 'let talk about minds' line of defense. Okay, I will throw you a bone and say something about a mind. You'll have plenty of fodder. I concur that a human mind can make symbols out of just about anything, but only as long as its another human mind (or perhaps a wonderful domestic animal) doing the translation. A substrate of pebbles arranged in the shape of a happy face is not too much of an accomplishment for natural symbol-makers like ourselves. Of course, if it's not another mind doing the translation, then the choices of substrates begin to close up rather quickly, don't they? Indeed, if a human wanted to record information in order for it to result in a specific effect, even in something as simple as a music box, then the choice of substrates closes up fairly quickly. In fact, as you type your responses in the UK and they appear on my monitor on the other side of the planet, those choices of substrates close up so quickly that it takes hundreds or thousands of generations of discovery just to understand how to synthesis the non-naturally-occurring materials required to get the job done. Is that not correct? So when you say “its the pattern not the substrate” you might want to keep in mind that the spareness of means (a human mind needs to interact with another human mind) is not all that interesting. In other words, these kinds of observations often have a kind of arrow attached to them. It's really more about the stunning results that can come from information if you master the substrates themselves. (Just a thought). And in a beautifully profound irony, you say 'its the information (pattern) that really matters, not the substrate' because in the instance of a mind-to-mind interaction, that is perfectly true. And you really need something perfectly true to say. Yet how odd then, in order to defend your remaining views, you believe that (in the end) it was the substrate that created the information in the first place. The details of that be damned, even against observable evidence to the contrary. And its not just any information that the substrate created, its the most incredible display of information processing to ever be seen – so much so that calling it “complex” is an insult to the fact. Mycoplasma genitalium is one of the least complex freely living organisms on Earth and it has 450+ genes consisting of 582,000 base pairs. How much of that required function do you think you can get to without a representation-translation-effect system in place; in other words, in the absence of the genuine recorded information processing we find in mycoplasma? And it really doesn't matter where you put the mark Elizabeth, wherever it is, you'll need the very simplest of chemical organizations to organically produce the immaterial representations and protocols you must have to get any further. And since we won't be dealing with any evidence to the contrary, let us open our hymnals to 1859 ... Dr Liddle will be leading. hit it sister :)Upright BiPed_{October 27, 2011
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I've heard that theory, but frankly I think it's a lot more likely that he was killed about 2000 years ago. The Romans were pretty good at that sort of thing and seldom botched an execution. I think the rumors of his resurrection are greatly exaggerated.dmullenix_{October 27, 2011
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dmullenix you ask:
Whatever happened to that Jesus fellow?
He rose from the dead and is now seated at the right hand of God the Father, whose 'realm' is the highest 'infinite dimensional' realm from which the photon of light 'collapsed'.bornagain77_{October 26, 2011
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What she said. Your opinion is not "observable evidence". Write when you get some.dmullenix_{October 26, 2011
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You worship a photon? Whatever happened to that Jesus fellow?dmullenix_{October 26, 2011
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UBP: as usual, your argument entirely relies on your assumption that you are not equivocating with the word "representation". In my view you are. "Creating and assigning representational values to physical objects and patterns" is indeed something that humans do. I simply do not accept that what humans do when they assign a signifier to a referent has any more than a superficial resemblance to the process by which a DNA sequence "represents" a particular protein. The huge, elephant-in-the-room-sized difference is that the DNA sequence can only function as a "representation" of a protein in one medium - a sequence of nucleotides. This nucleotides has physical properties that are required for the "translation" of "representation" to "object" to take place. Moreover, the outcome of this "translation" process is not the shared understanding of some referent (as when I write "dog" and you understand "dog") but a physical object. So, on the one hand, we have a molecule ("representation") that forms a template for a second molecule, that reacts with a third, that reacts with a fourth (the "referent"), thus mapping the first molecule to the fourth. On the other hand we have a human with a brain who makes a symbol ("representation") which can be rendered in any one of a vast number of media, because what matters is the pattern not the substrate, which is then interpreted by another human with a brain, who then understands that the first human wanted to convey the concept "dog", because they have previously agreed that that symbol means "dog". These two things are not the same. Making an argument on the assumption that they are is therefore fallacious.Elizabeth Liddle_{October 25, 2011
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Hello dmullenix, I provided a link.Upright BiPed_{October 25, 2011
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So the transcendent, uncollapsed, 'infinite dimensional' quantum wave state of a photon is now considered to be 'material' instead of abstract, and thus real in your worldview??? Thanks for admitting that God is 'materially' real!!!bornagain77_{October 25, 2011
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Last I heard, photons were part of the material world.dmullenix_{October 25, 2011
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Upright BiPed: "In any case, implicit in your objection is that you see this capacity in living things (of creating and assigning representational values to physical objects and patterns) as something that appears (particularly in humans) after billions of years of advancement in living organisms. But that is not what the observable evidence indicates; it documents that the opposite is true." What is this observable evidence?dmullenix_{October 25, 2011
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Hello dmullenix and eigenstate, I was not online over the weekend and did not notice your replies before I left on Friday. But I have now read them with interest, and I appreciate your comments. From my immediate perspective, you both seem to want to come at the issue on the same front (its physicality) and in doing so you are both making my point for me (the 'issue', for me, being how does information and information transfer relate to the semiotic argument for design). Dmullenix wants me to consider the atoms in my brain, and eigenstate posts an article on thermodynamics within a local system - which is more appropriately targeted at someone whose methodologies operate under the assumption that everything contains information. In large part, this is the assumption of theoretical and statistical physics, in which the state of matter becomes computable under certain methodologies. But it represents a modern re-purposing of an almost organically-understood concept; one which has a tremendous history of being so understood. The reason it has such a foundational standing is because it faithfully explains observed phenomena – we see the transfer of information in nature, we know the dynamics involved in the process, and we know those observations are not supervened upon by a re-purposed definition of the word. In other words, we see the heavens crossing the sky and we eventually conclude our planet is rotating in relation to the sun; the addition of neither relativity nor quanta will change the validity of that observation. Moreover, if we accepted for the purposes of argument that everything contains information, that fact itself would not change the validity of the observations already made. We say that an atom of carbon contains a certain number of subatomic particles, and we record their numbers on a piece of paper. We now have two distinct realities; one being that a carbon atom has these particular things, and another being that their numbers have been recorded (in abstract) as a physical object separate from the atom of carbon itself. The question raised by the linked paper (of whether or not a logically irreversible transformation can be implemented thermodynamically reversible) offers no explanation of those two observed realities. It is therefore an inter-disciplinary mistake to suggest that observations using the genuine definition of “information” (derived from the Latin root infomare; 'to give form to') which highlight a very unique physical dynamic observed in material reality, could be explained by a re-purposed definition of the word (which specifically reduces that phenomena to being entirely ubiquitous among matter). I was interested to see this being referred to by eigenstate as an “anthropocentric view of information.” As a valid model of physical dynamics, the semiotic argument for design needn't make any reference to mind; it is only about the dynamic entailments of recorded information transfer, and is in no way (specifically or even primarily) tied to human-bound information. The physical observations of information transfer are just as valid in examining transfer among organisms throughout the living kingdom, as well as among non-living machinery. Quite frankly, there could be nothing more anthropocentric than to claim there is “information” (a specific term with foundational meaning) in everything, in order that physical states (and changes to them) become statistically computable to human investigators. And please don't misunderstand me, I am not suggesting even for a moment that the work of those who have re-purposed the definiton of information have invalid work in any sense, I am saying that it is a disciplinary mistake to conflate the two. Information transfer is the transfer of a physical representation to cause an effect. To re-describe the term (to be the transfer of pure physicality instead) doesn’t change the fact that the transfer of abstract representations are still an observed physical phenomena. This is evidenced by the fact that when I see a bird flying above me and write “bird” on a piece of paper, I don't accomplish that by having a bird in my head. I have an abstract representation operating within a system, which has a relationship to the sight of the bird, and is actualized by the protocol(s) in my brain. The sight of a bird and the letters b-i-r-d do not have an intrinsic physical relationship – it is a relationship that comes about only by being in a system capable of creating it. In the end, you both want to highlight the fact that “three” and “green” are a physical states in my brain. Well, they most certainly are. That is an observation, not an explanation. The simple fact remains that they are real; 510nm wavelength on the electromagnetic spectrum is green, one Planck length is 10^-43 seconds, there is only one moon orbiting this planet. The physical protocol that establishes an immaterial relationship between a bee's dance and the effect it has among the other bee's in flight, physically exist in the bee - no doubt. They are physical things and they operate in an observable way (which you both pointed out) with observable physical dynamics (which you both ignored). In any case, implicit in your objection is that you see this capacity in living things (of creating and assigning representational values to physical objects and patterns) as something that appears (particularly in humans) after billions of years of advancement in living organisms. But that is not what the observable evidence indicates; it documents that the opposite is true. Look...this conversation (at this level) has rattled on so many times here at UD that they can't be counted. People far more studied than I have argued it on both sides of the argument. I have little desire to continue that argument (beyond understanding it to the best of my abilities). However, if you are going to confirm the existence of information transfer as it is actually observed to exist throughout the living kingdom, then it will involve a discrete arrangement of matter acting as a physical representation, it will have a discrete arrangement of matter to physically establish the effect that representation is mapped to within a system, it will have a discrete effect caused by that representation, and each of these will remain physically separate. That is the way recorded information transfer is found. If you'd like to offer your comments on these observations, then I'd be happy to hear them.Upright BiPed_{October 24, 2011
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InVivoVeritas 1.1.3: “- a very specific list of requirements for a ‘most-primitive life form’ (totally equivalent to what you call: ‘the first, simplest, Darwinian capable self replicator’) was proposed.” “- I asked you to specify exactly which of the requirements in the list should be eliminated.” “- You did not answered my invitation. Instead you declared that definitely this is not a simplest “replicator”.” “- Please prove that I am wrong and respond to Barry Arrington’s invitation (and mine) to stay on topic and indicate which items on the original list of requirements does not make sense for the “simplest replicator”.” I responded to your list and haven’t heard a word back from you. “- Definitely you will not feel comfortable discussing specific points and trying to consider the proposed empirical approach to the topic in question.” It’s hard to be empirical when we don’t know what the first living thing was. Science doesn’t know. It’s trying to find out. We’ve been making plenty of guesses for you to consider. ID doesn’t know either. As far as I can tell you’re not making any effort whatsoever to find out. You’re not even telling us what you THINK it might have been like. That’s pretty underwhelming.dmullenix_{October 24, 2011
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Yes, I think we are, Eugene. I think we are much more understanding about what is going on when minds don't work very well, and also better able to help them work betterElizabeth Liddle_{October 22, 2011
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Are we any wiser now that we can, Elizabeth?Eugene S_{October 22, 2011
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I think you are imposing those requirements yourself because your thinking is based on the idea of design.
If by "design" you think I am referring to purposeful arrangement, you misunderstand me. Whether life is intelligently arranged or randomly (dysteleologically) arranged is irrelevant to my argument. Life has specific configurations; actual organisms are physically structured in certain ways; living things have the "appearance of [purposeful] design", as Dawkins and many other materialistic evolutionists assert. Those arrangements, those configurations, those structures, those designs (in a dysteleological sense) are not what one would expect to arise from inorganic matter that's obeying the second law of thermodynamics. Scientists have empirically investigated countless inorganic systems as they proceed towards thermodynamic equilibrium. Life is unexpected ("improbable", per Dawkins) precisely because it is profoundly unlike anything we've actually observed an entropic inorganic system to produce. Furthermore, based on a reasonable extrapolation of our observations, life's designs don't look anything like what any entropic inorganic system would or could produce, even given eons of time, and massive injections of undirected energy into the system.
For OOL studies, there are requirements, because the goal is to explain the origin of the kind of life that we see. It is not certain that we can achieve those goals.
Agreed. The kind of life that we see is considered life because it satisfies a set of requirements; it qualifies, by our definition of life, as life. And yes, it is not certain that we can achieve the goals of scientifically explaining the origins of life as we see it. I would add that over time, it is becoming less and less likely, based on the empirical evidence, that those goals can be achieved on materialistic assumptions. You use the phrase "kind of life", which implies that there might be other things that would be considered life, if certain characteristics were exhibited -- i.e. if some set of specific requirements were satisfied that justified categorizing them as living things. As you rightly point out, it is not certain that life must be DNA-based or even carbon-based. Our definition of life is broad enough to encompass kinds of life which we have not yet observed, but which might potentially exist. But in whatever form a thing might come, it must certainly be viable in the biological sense, and (for Darwinism to succeed) the thing must be replicable, if it is to qualify as life. Now if viability is a requirement of life, and the laws of physics constrain what potential designs will be viable, it follows that as the number of known constraints increases, the greater will be the expected difficulty of successfully "designing" life. This is true whether the design process is random and purposeless, or intelligent and purposefully directed. There has indeed been something like a "requirements explosion", or if you prefer, a "constraints explosion", in biology during the past several decades. Abiogenesis is a harder nut to crack than science anticipated. The more we learn, the more difficult it becomes. And the more we learn, the more necessary it becomes for materialists to smuggle in certain religious assumptions to make the abiogenesis problem tractable.kdonnelly_{October 22, 2011
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Oh boy. I am neither morally nor intellectually dishonest, Mung. As I think you probably know. The accusation gets extremely tiresome.Elizabeth Liddle_{October 22, 2011
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We do understand quite a lot about brain states, and can measure them in various ways.Elizabeth Liddle_{October 22, 2011
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There obviously are many unwritten requirements (perhaps a better word would be “constraints”) imposed on life by the physical universe.
That's not obvious to me. I think you are imposing those requirements yourself because your thinking is based on the idea of design. For OOL studies, there are requirements, because the goal is to explain the origin of the kind of life that we see. It is not certain that we can achieve those goals. For life itself, I see no requirements because there is no goal. It is not a requirement that life should have developed in a way that used DNA. That people speculate about the possibility of silicon based life suggests wide recognition that it is not even a requirement that life be based on carbon chemistry.Neil Rickert_{October 22, 2011
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