Science “Proves” Nothing

_{Barry Arrington
October 1, 2014

Intelligent Design

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Intelligent Design}

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When someone says “the science is settled” one of two things is true: (1) they know better and are lying; or (2) they are deeply ignorant about the philosophy of science. Geraint Lewis, Professor of Astrophysics at the University of Sydney writes:

. . . science is like an ongoing courtroom drama, with a continual stream of evidence being presented to the jury. But there is no single suspect and new suspects regularly wheeled in. In light of the growing evidence, the jury is constantly updating its view of who is responsible for the data.

But no verdict of absolute guilt or innocence is ever returned, as evidence is continually gathered and more suspects are paraded in front of the court. All the jury can do is decide that one suspect is more guilty than another.

In the mathematical sense, despite all the years of researching the way the universe works, science has proved nothing. Every theoretical model is a good description of the universe around us, at least within some range of scales that it is useful.

But exploring into new territories reveals deficiencies that lower our belief in whether a particular description continues to accurately represent our experiments, while our belief in alternatives can grown.

Will we ultimately know the truth and hold the laws that truly govern the workings of the cosmos within our hands?

While our degree of belief in some mathematical models may get stronger and stronger, without an infinite amount of testing, how can we ever be sure they are reality?

I think it is best to leave the last word to one of the greatest physicists, Richard Feynman, on what being a scientist is all about:

I have approximate answers and possible beliefs in different degrees of certainty about different things, but I’m not absolutely sure of anything.

Or perhaps you prefer Popper:

Science does not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.

Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (New York, Routledge Classics, 1959, reprint of first English edition, 2002), 94.

Comments

In any case, the problem here is that on MN, P(naturalism) = 1
Nah, this is where you are going wrong. MN applies when you do science (because I really don't know how else you could...), but not when you do philospophy. A naturalistic explanation for some phenomenon might increase your condifence that naturalism is true, but there's always some probability that super-naturalism is true.wd400_{October 1, 2014
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I find the long debate on basic issue funny. Scientific theories are not proven till all facts are in. Once facts are verified, the theory ceases to be a theory. Isn't it obvious that all theories in science are not verified and hence 'Science is not settled' ?the bystander_{October 1, 2014
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@wd400 #54 The question you answered was ultimately leading into the next more specific question: "If the probability that mind is responsible for some effect is preemptively set at zero for methodological purposes and only one naturalistic explanation, in its rough outline, is logically possible, then is the probability that the naturalistic explanation is correct actually 1? And does it necessarily remain 1 in spite of what the evidence may tell us?" I'm not looking for a formula to make a calculation. I'm asking a philosophical question about the effect of presupposition when you are trying to explain some effect where two causes seem logically possible, but the one that is actually known to be causally adequate is ruled out by an a priori philosophical or methodological presupposition. That said...
p(theory) = [p(theory|naturalism) * p(naturalism) ] + [p(theory|not-naturalism) * p(not-naturalism)]
On Methodological Naturalism (MN), it seems this would be: P(theory) = [P(theory|naturalism) * 1] + [P(theory|not-naturalism) * 0] Without knowing the value of P(theory|naturalism) (or, the probability that the theory is true given naturalism is true), we can't give a final probability percentage. We can, however, recognize that [P(theory|not-naturalism) * P(not-naturalism)] = 0. On MN, it doesn't matter what the probability is that the theory is true given naturalism is false, because the probability of naturalism being false is already determined to be 0.
of course, if a naturalistic theory explains data well then it makes p(naturalism) higher: where p(observations|naturalism) is p(observations|theory) (or perhaps summed over all naturalistic theories that might explain the observation)
Wouldn't that be... p(naturalism|observations) = p(observations|naturalism) * P(naturalism) / [p(observations|naturalism) * p(naturalism)] + [p(observations|not-naturalism) * p(not-naturalism)] ...or am I missing something? In any case, the problem here is that on MN, P(naturalism) = 1 Methodological Naturalism is the methodological implementation of a philosophical presupposition, not the conclusion of a Bayesian probability calculation. But if we incorporate MN into a Bayesian calculation for the probability that the 'only viable naturalistic theory' (ovnt) for some effect is correct, the result is entirely predictable. P(ovnt) = [P(ovnt|naturalism) * P(naturalism)] + [P(ovnt|not-naturalism) * P(not-naturalism)] Becomes... P(ovnt) = [1 * 1] + [x * 0] [Given naturalism is true (i.e. P(naturalism) = 1), the probability that the only viable naturalistic theory is true is, by logical necessity, 1 (i.e. P(ovnt|naturalism) = 1). Meanwhile the probability that the theory would be true on not-naturalism is ultimately irrelevant because the probability of not-naturalism is 0] So, this becomes... P(ovnt) = 1 + 0 Becomes... P(ovnt) = 1 It doesn't seem to me that this is the kind of scenario that Bayes Theorem was intended for. On MN, if we find a singularly viable naturalistic theory to explain something, a Bayesian calculation that takes MN into account will always reveal to us with 100% certainty that the theory is correct. You obviously get the exact same result if you replace 'only viable naturalistic theory' (ovnt) with 'some naturalistic theory' (snt). We get certain conclusions we can hold with certainty without the need for any supporting evidence at all. We only need to deduce them from the principle of Methodological Naturalism. For example, on MN, what is the probability that the Origin of Life came about through purely naturalistic causes without any role played by a mind? Simple. The probability is 1. On MN we can know this with complete certainty even if we never figure out how it could possibly happen. I'm no expert in Bayesian analysis, but this seems philosophically problematic to me.HeKS_{October 1, 2014
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Barry:
Bill @ 13. We finally agree on something. I knew that if we searched long enough it was bound to happen.
I think we also agreed that Blade Runner is a superb science fiction film. Barry:
Bill, I’m not sure what your point is. Are you still trying to demonstrate that Feynman harbored doubts about whether the earth is round?
My point is that there is little difference between what Feynman has said (which in turn you offer to exemplify the thrust of your OP), what WD400 has said and the thrust of Wittgenstein's essay (although Feynman also famously said, "Philosophy of science is as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.") In contrast, your statements indicating your belief that there is zero probability that the earth does not travel around the sun (etc.) seem to contradict all three, even the apparent thrust of your OP. I found that confusing.
On a more serious note, wd400 still does not seem to understand the relative epistemological standing between facts on the ground and scientific models designed to account for those facts. 1. Evidence; Data; Observations. These are the facts on the ground that we apprehend though our senses. Example: “An apple drops to the ground.” 2. Scientific Theories These are the models we use to attempt to account for the facts. Example: “The apple and the earth are subject to the inverse square law of gravitation.” Observations in category 1 are in a different epistemological category than conclusions in category 2. In other words, we “know” apples fall to the ground in a different way than we “know” objects will “obey” the inverse square law of gravitation. Category 1 knowledge comes from sense impressions and is immediate and primary. Category 2 knowledge is inductive and secondary. Even the way we can doubt category 1 knowledge is different from the way we can doubt category 2 knowledge. Apples always fall to the ground. This fact has been observed countless billions of times by untold millions of observers. It is not subject to reasonable doubt. The mere fact that it is not logically impossible that all of those observations could have been in error (it is logically possible that everyone could have been in the grip of a Cartesian demon after all) does not change this fact. Category 1 knowledge (the earth is round) can be known with practical certainty. Suggesting otherwise is mere sophistry.
Now you're hedging with qualifiers like "reasonable" and "practical." Those leave open the possibility that there is a fraction of a percent of "unreasonable" and "impractical" doubt, a fraction not worth discussing, just as WD400 stated. That said, and accepting this scheme for the sake of discussion, “The earth is round” and “The Earth revolves around the sun” are category 2 statements - economical scientific models that best account for the the actual category 1 data (observations of the position of the sun and planets in the sky, for example). The fact that you construe them as category 1 "facts on the ground" demonstrates the degree to which these scientific models have, in fact, been assimilated into no-longer sensibly doubted background knowledge that you know with "practical certainty" will never be overturned.
Suggesting otherwise is mere sophistry.
Which is equivalent to WD400's even stronger statement that "some things are just so well established it would be perverse to worry about the minute fraction of probability that it’s not true."Reciprocating Bill_{October 1, 2014
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urious post...quotes from the author: "Science “Proves” Nothing Do you seriously believe there is a tiny fraction of a percent possibility that the earth is flat or that it really orbits the sun? I don’t think there is any chance whatsoever that the earth is flat. Nor do I think there is any chance whatsoever that the earth does not orbit the sun. The fact that the earth is round is settled. The fact that the earth orbits the sun is settled. These data points are indeed settled. But that does not mean the “science” is settled" From one author! I think the biggest issue is confusing data points with conclusions. Take the "data points" that the earth is round or that we orbit the sun. Those are conclusions. That is the verboten "settled science." Calling them "data points" is convenient rhetoric. What you agree with is data, the rest is theory up for discussion. The "data" include observations that are incompatible with a flat surface (mountains are observable before shorelines on a ship, angle of the sun in tropics vs. northern latitudes), circumnavigation, all the way up to geostationary satellites. A madman could dispute the data (and some do). Optical tricks on the eye. Mirage. NASA forgeries and fraud. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Why_Wikipedia_cannot_claim_the_earth_is_not_flatREC_{October 1, 2014
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Science is successful precisely because it, through experimental investigation, can deliver us a level of certainty about the ‘natural’ world not available to us through philosophy and/or reasoning alone. For instance, when I query as to the integrity of Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity to see how much trust I can have in them as theories, I find that they have been empirically tested to almost absurd levels of precision. For example, in Quantum Mechanics I find Leggett’s Inequality confirmed to 120 standard deviations,,,
Experimental non-classicality of an indivisible quantum system – Zeilinger 2011 Excerpt: Page 491: “This represents a violation of (Leggett’s) inequality (3) by more than 120 standard deviations, demonstrating that no joint probability distribution is capable of describing our results.” The violation also excludes any non-contextual hidden-variable model.The result does, however, agree well with quantum mechanical predictions, as we will show now.,,, https://vcq.quantum.at/fileadmin/Publications/Experimental%20non-classicality%20of%20an%20indivisible.pdf
The preceding experiment, and the mathematics behind it, are discussed beginning at the 24:15 minute mark of the following video:
Quantum Weirdness and God 8-9-2014 by Paul Giem – video https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=N7HHz14tS1c#t=1449
The following articles give us a small glimpse as to what it truly means for Quantum Mechanics to be confirmed to an order of ’120 standard deviations’:
Standard deviation Excerpt: Particle physics uses a standard of “5 sigma” for the declaration of a discovery.[3] At five-sigma there is only one chance in nearly two million that a random fluctuation would yield the result. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_deviation#Particle_physics SSDD: a 22 sigma event is consistent with the physics of fair coins? – June 23, 2013 Excerpt: So 500 coins heads is (500-250)/11 = 22 standard deviations (22 sigma) from expectation! These numbers are so extreme, it’s probably inappropriate to even use the normal distribution’s approximation of the binomial distribution, and hence “22 sigma” just becomes a figure of speech in this extreme case… https://uncommondescent.com/mathematics/ssdd-a-22-sigma-event-is-consistent-with-the-physics-of-fair-coins/
Thus I can have much confidence that our model is correct for Quantum Mechanics. In fact, an experiment was recently performed in Quantum Mechanics showing that Quantum Theory will never be exceeded in predictive power by a future theory with the only assumption being that measurement (conscious observation) parameters can be chosen independently (free choice, free will, assumption) of the other parameters of the theory
Can quantum theory be improved? – July 23, 2012 Excerpt: However, in the new paper, the physicists have experimentally demonstrated that there cannot exist any alternative theory that increases the predictive probability of quantum theory by more than 0.165, with the only assumption being that measurement (conscious observation) parameters can be chosen independently (free choice, free will, assumption) of the other parameters of the theory.,,, ,, the experimental results provide the tightest constraints yet on alternatives to quantum theory. The findings imply that quantum theory is close to optimal in terms of its predictive power, even when the predictions are completely random. http://phys.org/news/2012-07-quantum-theory.html
Now this is completely unheard of in science as far as I know. i.e. That a mathematical description of reality would advance to the point that one can actually perform a experiment showing that your current theory will not be exceeded in predictive power by another future theory is simply unprecedented in science! And please note that free will and consciousness are both axiomatic to Quantum Theory in that unprecedented experiment. But ‘unguided’ evolution, as it is taught in schools, which clearly excludes mind as a starting axiom in its theory, has nothing of the sort that one can hang his hat on as to the certainty of it. Berlinski puts the situation with unguided evolution like this,,,
“On the other hand, I disagree that Darwin’s theory is as `solid as any explanation in science.; Disagree? I regard the claim as preposterous. Quantum electrodynamics is accurate to thirteen or so decimal places; so, too, general relativity. A leaf trembling in the wrong way would suffice to shatter either theory. What can Darwinian theory offer in comparison?” (Berlinski, D., “A Scientific Scandal?: David Berlinski & Critics,” Commentary, July 8, 2003)
And indeed, if one looks for ANY empirical evidence for the unguided processes of evolution producing complexity, one finds, besides ZERO examples of Darwinian processes producing functional complexity, that the evidence shows that, instead of building complexity, the evidence shows that unguided processes are far more likely to degrade preexisting complexity rather than ever building it up! Dr. Behe surveyed 4 decades of evolution experiments here:
“The First Rule of Adaptive Evolution”: Break or blunt any functional coded element whose loss would yield a net fitness gain – Michael Behe – December 2010 Excerpt: In its most recent issue The Quarterly Review of Biology has published a review by myself of laboratory evolution experiments of microbes going back four decades.,,, The gist of the paper is that so far the overwhelming number of adaptive (that is, helpful) mutations seen in laboratory evolution experiments are either loss or modification of function. Of course we had already known that the great majority of mutations that have a visible effect on an organism are deleterious. Now, surprisingly, it seems that even the great majority of helpful mutations degrade the genome to a greater or lesser extent.,,, I dub it “The First Rule of Adaptive Evolution”: Break or blunt any functional coded element whose loss would yield a net fitness gain. http://behe.uncommondescent.com/2010/12/the-first-rule-of-adaptive-evolution/
Thus, even though Darwinists imagine that unguided processes can build the unfathomed complexity we see in life, the plain fact of the matter is that our 'science', i.e. our experimental evidence, gives us no indication whatsoever that unguided processes are up to the task that Darwinists have imagined for them! I would go even further and hold that our experimental evidence confirms the thesis of Genetic Entropy (J. Sanford), and disconfirms the 'Blind-Watchmaker' thesis of Richard Dawkins: To quote Richard Feynman in regards to the importance of experimental evidence in science:
The Scientific Method – Richard Feynman – video Quote: ‘If it disagrees with experiment, it’s wrong. In that simple statement is the key to science. It doesn’t make any difference how beautiful your guess is, it doesn’t matter how smart you are who made the guess, or what his name is… If it disagrees with experiment, it’s wrong. That’s all there is to it.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OL6-x0modwY
Thus as far as our science is concerned, Darwinian evolution is wrong! Verse and Music:
1 Thessalonians 5:21 Test all things; hold fast what is good. The Allman brothers Band - Soulshine - video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4L3BYTS8uxM
Supplemental note on Leggett’s inequality,, In the following article, Physics Professor Richard Conn Henry is quite blunt as to what quantum mechanics, specifically Leggett’s Inequality, reveals to us about the ‘primary cause’ of our 3D reality:
Alain Aspect and Anton Zeilinger by Richard Conn Henry – Physics Professor – John Hopkins University Excerpt: Why do people cling with such ferocity to belief in a mind-independent reality? It is surely because if there is no such reality, then ultimately (as far as we can know) mind alone exists. And if mind is not a product of real matter, but rather is the creator of the “illusion” of material reality (which has, in fact, despite the materialists, been known to be the case, since the discovery of quantum mechanics in 1925), then a theistic view of our existence becomes the only rational alternative to solipsism (solipsism is the philosophical idea that only one’s own mind is sure to exist). (Dr. Henry’s referenced experiment and paper – “An experimental test of non-local realism” by S. Gröblacher et. al., Nature 446, 871, April 2007 – “To be or not to be local” by Alain Aspect, Nature 446, 866, April 2007 (Leggett’s Inequality: Verified, as of 2011, to 120 standard deviations) http://henry.pha.jhu.edu/aspect.html
Quotes:
"As a man who has devoted his whole life to the most clear headed science, to the study of matter, I can tell you as a result of my research about atoms this much: There is no matter as such. All matter originates and exists only by virtue of a force which brings the particle of an atom to vibration and holds this most minute solar system of the atom together. We must assume behind this force the existence of a conscious and intelligent mind. This mind is the matrix of all matter." Max Planck - The Father Of Quantum Mechanics - Das Wesen der Materie [The Nature of Matter], speech at Florence, Italy (1944) (from Archiv zur Geschichte der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Abt. Va, Rep. 11 Planck, Nr. 1797) "The only reality is mind and observations, but observations are not of things. To see the Universe as it really is, we must abandon our tendency to conceptualize observations as things.,,, Physicists shy away from the truth because the truth is so alien to everyday physics. A common way to evade the mental universe is to invoke "decoherence" - the notion that "the physical environment" is sufficient to create reality, independent of the human mind. Yet the idea that any irreversible act of amplification is necessary to collapse the wave function is known to be wrong: in "Renninger-type" experiments, the wave function is collapsed simply by your human mind seeing nothing. The universe is entirely mental,,,, The Universe is immaterial — mental and spiritual. Live, and enjoy." Richard Conn Henry - Professor of Physics John Hopkins University - The Mental Universe -
bornagain77_{October 1, 2014
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HeKS #53: If the plausibility of some scientific theory relies heavily on methodological naturalism, which includes the a priori elimination of mind as a possible causal explanation for any effect, assigning it a probability of zero, how do we assess the probability that the naturalistic theory is correct?
We (our minds) do not assess anything. Obviously we are an illusion. Brain chemistry is doing the assessment for us. Surprisingly the particles in motion that comprise "our" brain, are very much interested in - and perfectly capable of - doing science and sound assessments. /sarcBox_{October 1, 2014
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If the plausibility of some scientific theory relies heavily on methodological naturalism, which includes the a priori elimination of mind as a possible causal explanation for any effect, assigning it a probability of zero, how do we assess the probability that the naturalistic theory is correct?
p(theory) = [p(theory|naturalism) * p(naturalism) ] + [p(theory|not-naturalism) * p(not-naturalism) ] of course, if a naturalistic theory explains data well then it makes p(naturalism) higher: p(naturalism|observations) = p(observations|naturalism) * P(naturalism) / [p(observations|naturalism) + p(observations|not-naturalism)] where p(observations|naturalism) is p(observations|theory) (or perhaps summed over all naturalistic theories that might explain the observation)
Your answers to the Big Philosophical Questions are going to inherit philosophical naturalism from the output of methodological naturalism unless you are either going to simply disregard scientific results in answering the Big Questions
Not discard scientific results, include them in a broader framework.wd400_{October 1, 2014
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@wd400 #46
HeKs, Methodological naturalism is, you know, methodological. Science is about explaining the natural world, I don’t really see how you can do science if you allow supernatural forces to enter the picture (how do you measure them, if you measure them in what sense are they supernatural?).
Science, and especially historical science, is not merely about measurement. It is also about offering causal explanations for observed effects. And saying that methodological naturalism is methodological does not answer the question or the problem. I'm asking whether or not you think it's appropriate that science should define itself by a methodology that, by definition, sets a prior probability of zero on the existence of non-material causes before examining the evidence relevant to any given effect. If the plausibility of some scientific theory relies heavily on methodological naturalism, which includes the a priori elimination of mind as a possible causal explanation for any effect, assigning it a probability of zero, how do we assess the probability that the naturalistic theory is correct? If the probability that mind is responsible for some effect is preemptively set at zero for methodological purposes and only one naturalistic explanation, in its rough outline, is logically possible, then is the probability that the naturalistic explanation is correct actually 1? And does it necessarily remain 1 in spite of what the evidence may tell us? If mind is eliminated as a possible explanation of any effect, is there a probability of 1 that every effect can be fully explained by reference to a material cause?
So you do your science (with methodological naturalism) then you draw your conclusions about whatever topic your interested in. So the answer to your Big Philosophical Questions can be informed from the results of science, but they don’t have to inherit the (methodological) naturalism required to do science.
This just seems confused to me. If your answers to the Big Philosophical Questions are informed by the results of science, and scientific results are either informed or determined by methodological naturalism, and methodological naturalism is merely the methodological implementation of a philosophical presupposition of naturalism/materialism, then your answers to the Big Philosophical Questions will necessarily be either informed or determined by a philosophical presupposition of naturalism/materialism. Your answers to the Big Philosophical Questions are going to inherit philosophical naturalism from the output of methodological naturalism unless you are either going to simply disregard scientific results in answering the Big Questions, or else you are going to hold internally inconsistent beliefs, such that in day-to-day life you believe X, but when considering the Big Questions you believe Not-XHeKS_{October 1, 2014
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WD, I would save the evidence is strong that natural forces are causing West Coast warming, but I would NOT say its "settled": http://www.latimes.com/science/la-sci-pacific-warming-20140923-story.htmlppolish_{October 1, 2014
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wd400- can one accept that the earth has warmed a little since 1880 but doubt that man-made CO2 is the driving factor? Is it OK to doubt climate models when weather models for one week out are doubtful?Joe_{October 1, 2014
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wd400:
Barry said something that many anti-science folks . . . say
Ah, having been thoroughly routed, wd400 pulls out the ad hominems.
I started by saying that it’s reasonable to say “the science is settled”, because some things are just so well established it would be perverse to worry about the minute fraction of probability that it’s not true.
No, you started out by making a category error which you have yet to acknowledge. Your argument is smoke and mirrors. You say some things are just so well established it would be perverse to worry about the minute fraction of probability that it’s not true. But the “things” about which you are talking are not scientific theories. Your reasoning is demonstrated by the following: 1. It is perverse to doubt that the earth orbits the sun because the probability that the observations of the earth orbiting the sun being in error are vanishingly small. 2. Therefore, in 1800 it was proper to say that “the science is settled” concerning the Newtonian laws of planetary motion because they were “so well established.” You seem incapable or unwilling to grasp the obvious epistemological distinction between observations and models explaining those observations. It is axiomatic that our confidence in inductive conclusions drawn from observations can never be as certain as the observations upon which the inductive conclusions are based. Assume that in 1800 every scientist on earth believed "the science is settled" concerning the laws of planetary motion. If that was in fact the case, every scientist was wrong. The science was not settled. Similarly, assume (counter to fact) that every scientist today believes in the global warming alarmist climate models (in the very teeth of the fact that those models have been uniformly wrong for nearly two decades now). The science would still not be "settled" for the reasons discussed in the OP.Barry Arrington_{October 1, 2014
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wd400:
Joe — if you can change your mind you weren't 100% sure.
That is incorrect. One could be 100% sure due to ignorance and then the proper education would cure that.
That’s just how probability works, I’m afraid.
But that ain't how humans work.Joe_{October 1, 2014
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PaV, I find this kind of thing from you very starnge:
So, what is the point here? Have you decided to point out to all IDers that they are “flat earth”, geocentrists who stupidly deny “Climate Change”? Is that it?
You seem to think I spend my time dreaming up ways to make IDers look dumb in some sort of PR war. I don't. The "point" is that Barry said something that many anti-science folks (from GMO critics on to global warming skeptics and everyone in between) say, but which I think it a very silly argument. I said why I think this is a silly arugment in the hope that there might be less silly arguments made, though I appear to have failed in that goal...wd400_{October 1, 2014
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Joe -- if you can change your mind you weren't 100% sure. That's just how probability works, I'm afraid.wd400_{October 1, 2014
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I haven't changed at all. I started by saying that it's reasonable to say "the science is settled", because some things are just so well established it would be perverse to worry about the minute fraction of probability that it's not true. It;s tru that "litterally everything is up for grabs", but it would be pretty stupid to spend much time worry about the , say, the possibility the the universe didn't exist until the instant. HeKs, Methodological naturalism is, you know, methodological. Science is about explaining the natural world, I don't really see how you can do science if you allow supernatural forces to enter the picture (how do you measure them, if you measure them in what sense are they supernatural?). So you do your science (with methodological naturalism) then you draw your conclusions about whatever topic your interested in. So the answer to your Big Philosophical Questions can be informed from the results of science, but they don't have to inherit the (methodological) naturalism required to do science.wd400_{October 1, 2014
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wd400- Bayes Theorem doesn't take free will into account. People are not binary. We can change our minds even when we have been 100% sure of the contrary position.Joe_{October 1, 2014
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@Barry #42 I guess you're technically correct there. Of course, I was referring to the underlying facts that the statements were based on.HeKS_{October 1, 2014
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@Daniel King #40 It seems to me that both statements would basically fall into category 1. The first statement is a logical deduction based on the limits of induction. The second is an observation. Of course, if you want to remove logically necessary statements from these categories, then the first is a logically necessary philosophical statement while the second is an observation. But it seems to me that logical deductions probably fit in the first category.HeKS_{October 1, 2014
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DK at 40. Neither. They are conclusions that follow from the categories, not examples of the categories.Barry Arrington_{October 1, 2014
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@Barry #38 An example of the difference between those categories is 1) noting that you have hands, and 2) theorizing that you came to have those hands through a process of naturalistic evolution. It's logically possible that you're a brain in a vat and that your senses telling you that you have hands are an illusion. And yet, if you see hands dangling off your wrists, you can be as certain that you have hands as it is possible to be certain of anything. Far, far more certain than you can reasonably be that the historical narrative of just-so stories put forth by evolutionary theory is true.HeKS_{October 1, 2014
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Because of the epistemological difference between category 1 knowledge and category 2 knowledge, it is not inconsistent to say “the science is never settled” and “we can be certain the earth is round.” Please clarify: Which of the quoted propositions is category 1 or 2?Daniel King_{October 1, 2014
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WD, there is a difference between saying the "science is settled" and the "science is strong". They convey different ideas. Science can be strong, but never settled. That is the point of the OP. Saying "Science is settled" is either 1 or 2 per the OP, Your 3 option is bogus sorry.ppolish_{October 1, 2014
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On a more serious note, wd400 still does not seem to understand the relative epistemological standing between facts on the ground and scientific models designed to account for those facts. 1. Evidence; Data; Observations. These are the facts on the ground that we apprehend though our senses. Example: “An apple drops to the ground.” 2. Scientific Theories These are the models we use to attempt to account for the facts. Example: "The apple and the earth are subject to the inverse square law of gravitation." Observations in category 1 are in a different epistemological category than conclusions in category 2. In other words, we “know” apples fall to the ground in a different way than we “know” objects will “obey” the inverse square law of gravitation. Category 1 knowledge comes from sense impressions and is immediate and primary. Category 2 knowledge is inductive and secondary. Even the way we can doubt category 1 knowledge is different from the way we can doubt category 2 knowledge. Apples always fall to the ground. This fact has been observed countless billions of times by untold millions of observers. It is not subject to reasonable doubt. The mere fact that it is not logically impossible that all of those observations could have been in error (it is logically possible that everyone could have been in the grip of a Cartesian demon after all) does not change this fact. Category 1 knowledge (the earth is round) can be known with practical certainty. Suggesting otherwise is mere sophistry. Contrast this with category 2 knowledge. As KF explained above, “An explanation in science may possibly be true and may even be well warranted, but because of the limitations of an empirically supported inductive argument it cannot prove its explanations beyond possibility of correction.” Those who thought otherwise for over 200 years after Newton were, quite simply, wrong. When Einstein was doubting whether Newton had given us a complete picture, he was not doubting whether apples in fact fell to the ground. Because of the epistemological difference between category 1 knowledge and category 2 knowledge, it is not inconsistent to say “the science is never settled” and “we can be certain the earth is round.”Barry Arrington_{October 1, 2014
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HeKs, Please lay off wd400, I can't bear to watch him twist and turn to get an answer out that will bear any scrutiny at all. (but just for fun) "MN is epistemologically prior to Bayesian analysis." or "MN is a useful tool, so useful in fact that if you don't pick it up, you are a useful . . ." Remember, wd400 wrote,
If you hold that there is literally no possibility that something is false, then you are saying no evidence could ever change you (sic) mind
Of course, this is only what some people are saying.Tim_{October 1, 2014
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As Pilate said: "What is truth?"Dr JDD_{October 1, 2014
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Correction: In (2) "If you accept [the possibility that the Sun can orbit the Earth], then you effectively believe in magic.PaV_{October 1, 2014
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WD400: The earth really is not flat, it really does orbit the sun and carbon dioxide really is a greenhouse gas. Not amount of freshman philosophy courses changes that. (1) There is ZERO possibility that the Earth is flat, Bayesian Theory and Cromwell's Law notwithstanding. The only way you can say that the Earth is 'flat' is by means of some sort of equivocation of that word. (2) The Laws of Gravity make it impossible for the Sun to revolve around the Earth. If you accept this position, then you effectively believe in magic. (3) Yes, CO2 is a 'greenhouse gas.' So is nitric oxide. But when you walk into a 'greenhouse,' you don't cough due to excessive amounts of CO2, but you sweat, because of an increased concentration of H20. Global warming is so pathetically wrong that it is now called (newly christened) "climate change." So, what is the point here? Have you decided to point out to all IDers that they are "flat earth", geocentrists who stupidly deny "Climate Change"? Is that it?PaV_{October 1, 2014
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@wd400 In light of your comments, I'm interested in what you think of the propriety of methodological naturalism. After all, it says that in order to do science you must set the prior probability of the existence of the supernatural or the immaterial to 0.HeKS_{October 1, 2014
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wd400’s response is amusing. At comment 1 he dismisses the OP as comparable to the rantings one might hear in a freshman philosophy course. Having been made to look foolish, by comment 30 he is citing Cromwell’s Law, a staple of freshmen level philosophy. Notice that in the course of one combox discussion wd400 has swung from saying “the science is settled” is a valid expression to saying literally everything (including whether the earth is round) is up for grabs. Nailing Jello to the wall is child’s play compared to having a rational discussion with a committed materialist. Their religion requires them to be dogmatically assertive one moment and infinitely flexible the next. Tough religion. And funny too, in a kind of sad/pathetic way.Barry Arrington_{October 1, 2014
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