Survival of the Sickest, Why We Need Disease

_{Salvador Cordova

April 27, 2009

Darwinism, Intelligent Design}

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“It’s not a bug, it’s a feature!”

This is a phrase a software engineer will use to jokingly confess his software has a defect.

When Sharon Moalem wrote the NY Times Bestseller, Survival of the Sickest: Why We Need Disease, he probably did not intend to make a joking confession of flaws in Darwin’s theory, but he succeed in doing so.

Recall the words of Darwin:

Natural Selection is daily and hourly scrutinising, throughout the world, the slightest variations; rejecting those that are bad, preserving and adding up all that are good.

C.DARWIN sixth edition Origin of Species — Ch#4 Natural Selection

If Darwin’s claim is true, why then are we confronted with numerous, persistent, hereditary diseases?

Can it be that Darwin was wrong? The obvious answer is yes. But in the face of an obvious flaw in Darwin’s ideas, Moalem argues that what appears to be a flaw in Darwin’s theory is actually an ingenious feature! Moalem extols the virtues of disease, and since disease is virtuous, natural selection will favor it.

It is accepted that sickle-cell anemia persists because of natural selection, but what about other diseases? Moalem explores many other diseases like diabetes, hemochromatosis, high cholesterol, early aging, favism, obesity, PANDAS, CCR5-delta32, xenophobia, etc. showing how natural selection incorporated these “virtuous” diseases into our species.

Moalem is not alone in arguing that natural selection creates through the process of destruction. For example, Allen Orr suggests that natural selection is the cause of blindness in Gammarus minus. In the world of Darwin, what happened to Gammarus minus isn’t the loss of vision, it is the creation of blindness. And since selection favors blindness in Gammarus minus, blindness is a functional improvement! Once again, Darwinism is immune to any testability through the process of constantly redefining what is considered “good”.

The net result is that Moalem’s book becomes an unwitting critique of Darwinian evolution. It highlights numerous empirical examples of how natural selection actually goes against Darwinian ideas of constant progress, and instead demonstrates how natural selection can be an agent of demise.

Comments

"I have never yet met a Darwinist who accepts this principle." Have you ever had an actual conversation with an evolutionary biologist? To me, your constant, unsubstantiated charges against us, and your consistent mischaracterization of all of us (apparently on the basis of your hatred for Richard Dawkins) indicates that you haven't actually met anyone who disagrees with your position. This, of course, makes for powerful polemics, but is death to rational argument.Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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On a roll, indeed, but toward what?Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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Atheist Darwinists didn’t choose methodological naturalism because they were science purists. They chose it because allowed them to practice atheism openly while, at the same time, enjoying the benefits of “strategic ambiguity” of “plausible deniability.” [“What? Me an theist? Why no! My methodological naturalism has nothing at all to do with my metaphysical naturalism.”]
Again, false. As you have studiously avoided acknowledging, there is no necessary connection between being an evolutionary biologist and being an atheist. I have repeatedly cited famous examples to the contrary, and you have consistently ignored them. Indeed, you have asserted in your parenthetical statement at the end of the comment that you, like Dawkins, think your opponents are either deluded, insane, or lying (and since all of us recognize the reference, evil as well). You have, in other words, consistently put words in other people's mouths, charged them with misguided and/or negative intentions and motivations, and deliberately mischaracterized all arguments and evidence to the contrary. Why, exactly, do you do this, stephen?Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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Sorry, I should have referred to teleology as a "good" thing in the previous comment. ID supporters see teleology is not only "good" but as irremovably rooted in "that which is the source of all goodness". Empirical scientists (at least those who do not have a prior commitment to ontological naturalism) see teleology as unnecessary, not "bad" (those who – like Dawkins et al – have a prior commitment to ontological naturalism assert, without evidence, that it does not exist).Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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To follow up, this is also the reason why Darwin is often referred to as the "Newton of biology". He extended Newton's methodological naturalism to biology, by proposing an hypothesis (i.e. natural selection) in which the origin of the teleological characteristics of living organisms (i.e. adaptations) could be fully explained by a non-teleological process. So, why is teleology such a "bad" thing, so bad that it seems to invalidate all of methodological naturalism? Simple: without teleology, there is no need for an Intelligent Designer. If one has a prior (i.e. metaphysical) commitment to the existence of such an entity, then one cannot, on principle, push the Divine foot out of the door.Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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In #139 stephenB asserted:
"Prior to Darwin and the world view that he inspired, no one had ever approached science [using methodological naturalism]."
This statement is demonstrably false. Indeed, that was Ned Burtt's whole point in his monumental book, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. In that book professor Burtt emphasized precisely this point: that Newton adhered to methodological naturalism in his science, while hewing to metaphysical theism in his personal beliefs. Hence, his famous dictum "I make no hypotheses!" refers only to his science, as anyone who has read his meandering and ultimately fruitless musings on alchemy can attest. This is basic history and philosophy of science, stephen, and you have clearly gotten it completely and demonstrably wrong.Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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Nakashima-san in #138: Indeed, "catalytic" was precisely the word I was searching for, but failed to find. Once again you have shown superior discernment! My humblest and most heartfelt thanks...Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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In #137 UprightBiped wrote:
"A metaphysical materialist is one who operates under the unquestioned assumption that the empirical evidence will indefinitely - or even currently - support chance and necessity as being the manifest cause of a non-physically-contingent, poly-functional, convention-based symbol system of instructions being embedded (with inherent, detectable, obvious meaning) inside of a physical object."
Given your definition, then I am definitely not a "metaphysical materialist". And so, you are indeed forgiven for being completely wrong.Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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Nakashima: Please forgive me for comparing you with someone else. We are all of us, incomparable, all of the time, in all conceivable circumstances. I shall in the future attempt to forgo all attempts at invidious comparison...Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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eligoodwin: If you can't tell the difference between the two scenarios, then you're not being thoughtful enough---or, perhaps honest enough. What you propose that clouds can do, clouds actually do---you and I have both eexperienced it. Now the question is: would you expect the machine I described to 'randomly' produce the image of a squirrel. This question is for you to honestly consider and answer.PaV_{April 29, 2009
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In #139 stephenB wrote:
As E. A. Burtt put it, “The world view is the final controlling factor in all thinking whatever.”
It's very interesting that you would bring up my old friend/Friend Ned Burtt. He was one of the founders of the Ithaca Monthly Meeting of Friends, of which I am a member. He ans his wife, Marjory, were long-time Friends, and I recall fondly many, many meetings in which Ned spoke "to the Light" and "in the Spirit of Truth". I consider him to be one of my personal mentors, and miss his calm, loving presence in meeting very much. And I agree that all worldviews are ultimately founded on a metaphysical choice. In my case, I have chosen methodological naturalism as the most reliable guide for doing science. That said, I personally believe that this choice is not logically connected in any way to my choice to not accept ontological naturalism as valid. To do the latter, one must use completely different logical criteria than to do the former, and I do not (contra Dawkins, et al) think that asserting that methodological naturalism necessarily requires ontological naturalismAllen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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I've been corresponding via email with a former member of our argument here. I thought that some of her/his comments might be useful or interesting to those still engaged on this topic:
I've been following the 'Survival of the Sickest' thread and have some comments on it and on your essay on the (un)reality of adaptations. First, a major area of agreement between us is that Salvador's OP is fatally flawed by 1) his assumption that "Darwinism" implies "constant progress", and 2) his failure to understand that fitness is always defined relative to a particular environment, and that environments change over time. You made the latter point quite cogently in your comment on Type II diabetes. Now, on to some points of disagreement: You mentioned Gould and Vrba's 1982 paper on exaptation, and wrote: The reason is quite simple: if (as Gould, Lewontin, and Vrba argue) adaptation isn't legitimately part of what evolutionary theory is about, then the whole idea of "design" and "function" is read completely out of evolution, leaving only descent with modification.
I was very strongly influenced on this topic by Warren Allman, director of the Paleontological Research Institute here in Ithaca. He asserted that all adaptations are actually exaptations. His rationale for this assertion was that the term "adaptation" has built into it an assumption of teleology: literally translated, it means "toward usefulness". It's the "toward" part that is the problem. As you and I both understand it, evolution (including natural selection, but not artificial selection) does not tend toward anything. It has no goal as far as we can tell. Ergo, it builds on what has gone before, but without any specific goal "in mind". This is why "exaptation" expresses better how we understand natural selection. It builds "away from" non-functionality (or even away from previous functionality), but never really "toward" anything at all as far as we can tell. And, if Sewall Wright's "shifting balance" theory is a reasonable model of evolution, then it never really "arrives" anywhere at all, since the "goal" is constantly shifting anyway.
I'm wondering why you think that Gould and Vrba regard adaptation as being outside the legitimate scope of evolutionary theory. My take on the paper is not that they regard the concept of adaptation as illegitimate, but just that it has been typically construed too broadly and should be broken down into the categories of true 'adaptation' and 'exaptation', where they define a true adaptation thusly: "Following Williams, we may designate as an adaptation any feature that promotes fitness and was built by selection for its current role."
The problem I have with this definition is the inclusion of the words "promotes" and "for". "Promotion" means exactly what it says: "motion towards" something. Ergo, using this word immediately suggests teleology, and as I have pointed out above, teleology cannot be a valid assumption in the origin of the products of evolution at any level. This is not because including teleology allows for "a divine foot in the door" (Lewontin), but rather because it requires that the "plan" for the teleological process must exist prior to the realization of that process. When we do things, this assumption is perfectly valid, but when something happens in nature, such an assumption is entirely unwarranted. Where, in nature, would such a pre-existing plan exist? As for the word "for, I always point out to my students that teleological explanations virtually always reduce to sentences that include the phrase "in order to". This can be shortened even further to "to" (leaving out the "in order"). However, the entire phrase "in order to" can be replaced with the word "for" without changing its meaning. Ergo, the definition quoted above is still irreducibly teleological, and therefore includes an assumption that we should not make in evolutionary biology. In my paper on the evolution of the capacity for religious experience, I began with a succinct definition of "adaptation", from which I lay out four criteria that a characteristic (i.e. a "trait") must meet to be considered a genuine adaptation. An evolutionary adaptation is any heritable phenotypic character whose frequency of appearance in a population is the result of increased reproductive success relative to alternative versions of that heritable phenotypic character. Here are the four criteria that I believe must be met for a characteristic to be considered to be an adaptation: 1) An evolutionary adaptation will be expressed by most of the members of a given population, in a pattern that approximates a normal distribution; 2) An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with underlying anatomical and physiological structures, which constitute the efficient (or proximate) cause of the evolution of the adaptation; 3) An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with a pre-existing evolutionary environment of adaptation (EEA), the circumstances of which can then be correlated with differential survival and reproduction; and 4) An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with the presence and expression of an underlying gene or gene complex, which directly or indirectly causes and influences the expression of the phenotypic trait that constitutes the adaptation. I would now modify criterion #4 to state that such genes/gene complexes must be shown to have been conserved, relative to other sequences in the genome. However, one must keep in mind that such conservation, while necessary, is not sufficient. As we know now, some sequences are conserved, but can be knocked out, with no discernible effect on phenotype. Ergo, to fully satisfy criterion #4, a characteristic must be shown to be associated with a particular gene or gene complex, the knocking out of which can be shown to have significant negative effects on fitness. Obviously, this means that a great many characteristics that we observe in living organisms will not qualify as adaptations. I believe that this is fully justified, following Williams' assertion that the concept of adaptation is "onerous" and should only be resorted to "in the last resort". It is only by doing so that we may avoid the otherwise almost inevitable pitfall of appealing to teleology in our explanations.
They close their paper with this: "The argument is not anti-selectionist, and we view this paper as a contribution to Darwinism, not as a skirmish in a nihilistic vendetta. The main theme is, after all, cooptability for fitness. Exaptations are vital components of any organism's success."
There's that nasty little word "for" again! Fitness is immediately measurable as relative differential reproductive success, but "adaptation" can only be legitimately inferred retrospectively. We can't say that something is a genuine adaptation until it already is, and this seems to me the kind of logical circularity that has also plagued Herbert Spencer's phrase "survival of the fittest". If we stick to the four criteria listed above, we will rarely fall into the trap that teleological thinking always sets for us.
Also, you later wrote the following, which seems to acknowledge that Gould and Vrba did regard adapation as a legitimate part of evolutionary theory: "Yes, indeed, except that I believe that Gould, Lewontin (and later, Vrba) were, like Darwin, unwilling to take their principles to their logical conclusion: that adaptations (like species) are a figment of the human imagination, and do not actually exist in nature (or, to be even more precise, do not have to exist in nature)."
What I meant by this is that the only way we can actually "detect" the presence of adaptation is by inferring it. In that sense, adaptations are not "primary" characteristics; that is, characteristics that can be directly observed (such as differential reproductive success). Rather, such "secondary" characteristics must be indirectly inferred. In that sense, they are indeed "imaginary"; we must "imagine" that they exist (as the result of our application of inferential logic), as we cannot observe them directly.
Am I missing something? Are you trying to say that although Gould and Vrba regarded adaptations as real, they nevertheless thought they should be excluded from evolutionary theory?
No, I'm saying what Williams was saying, only I'm saying it more strongly and consistently: that we should never include any hint of teleology in our explanations, as such inclusion includes the biological equivalent of that old bugaboo of physics: "action at a distance" in physics is the equivalent of "goals preceding causes" in biology. When I reread Williams' famous 1966 book, Adaptation and Natural Selection, which supposedly read teleology out of evolutionary biology, I was astonished to find it shot through with the same kind of teleological reasoning that he was supposedly trying to eliminate. I think I could find all the "hidden teleology" in Williams because I have spent so much time debating with ID supporters. They are the ultimate teleologists, and can always find where we have subtly woven teleological assumptions into our biology.
Finally, you wrote: "To be as clear as I can, I believe that asserting a position of "metaphysical materialism" is just that: a metaphysical, not a scientific assertion. Confusing metaphysics with science is nearly as pernicious as confusing "ought" and "is". The former makes for questionable science and the latter makes for questionable ethics." I would agree that science has no say on metaphysical questions that don't have observable consequences (although I would argue that even then, Ockham's razor should cause us to prefer simpler metaphysical systems to needlessly complex ones). However, some metaphysical assertions do have observable consequences. For example, I consider the existence of the YEC God to be a metaphysical assertion that has nevertheless been decisively falsified by science.
I agree, but the same cannot be said for the more subtle versions of teleology found in Behe or Dembski. Their books (especially Dembski's) present a much more subtle and less easily refuted version of teleological explanation, one that is easily reinforced by our own unwitting resort to teleological explanations. Evolutionary adaptation is where the rubber of both evolutionary theory and ID hit the pavement.
Now on to your essay "Are Adaptations 'Real'?" You wrote: "That is, although there are characteristics of organisms that are correlated with relatively high reproductive success (and would therefore be considered by most evolutionary biologists to qualify as "adaptations"), it becomes problematic to decide exactly which of those characteristics are the "real" adaptations and which are merely 'accidental'".
The problem, of course, is the words "real" and "accidental". If we are genuinely dedicated to rooting out teleology in all of our explanations of the origins of biological objects and processes, then all adaptations are "accidental", in the sense that they are all unplanned. We perceive them as having "functions" because our naive viewpoint of reality is always teleological. We can think non-teleologically only with very great difficulty. It's like special relativity and quantum mechanics; we have to twist our minds to be able to even begin to conceive of them, and even then we constantly slide back into our naive (and unwarranted) views of reality.
True, if by "accidental" adaptations you mean exaptations. But while it may sometimes be difficult to tell whether an adaptation is "real" or "accidental", that is not evidence that "real" adaptations don't exist. Indeed, the only scenario I can envision in which "real" adaptations would not exist would be one in which every fitness-enhancing feature was an exaptation.
Exactly!
But that would mean, among other things, that every incremental improvement to the eye would have to have been the accidental result of changes that were selected for some reason other than improved vision. That seems far-fetched to me. Am I misunderstanding your position?
It's not that that every incremental improvement to the eye would have to have been the accidental result of something, it's that every incremental change to the eye would have had to originate accidentally, but then be "caught" by natural selection. If we think the way you worded it (and we almost always think that way), then the teleological trap is that all of the incremental changes are somehow "predestined" and that complex eyes must be the inevitable result. But this just plays into the hands of the ID supporters. When we argue that "half an eye is still adaptive" we unwittingly include the assumption that "half an eye" is just that: half of what will ultimately evolve by natural selection. But our knowledge of the natural history of vision has shown us over and over again that "half an eye" is the whole thing in many cases. We can only say that the eyes of, say, flatworms, are "half an eye" because we already know that such a thing as a "whole eye" exists in cephalopods and vertebrates. We have to disabuse ourselves of the idea that any characteristic is only partially the whole deal. All characteristics of all organisms are the whole deal for those organisms, period, end of story, that's all She wrote. Anything else contains the beginnings of teleology, and that way lies error, endlessly compounded.
We now have the ability to selectively delete individual characteristics from many different organisms. This makes possible something that natural selection does not: the precise determination of the selective "value" of particular characteristics. This has already been done, and the surprising outcome has been that even some gene sequences that were thought to have been very important in selection (due to having been "conserved" over deep evolutionary time) are apparently insignificant or useless. We know this because knocking them out of the genome has no discernible effect on the survival or reproduction of the "knock-out" progeny.
Precisely my point, above.
That interpretation seems to depend on the hidden assumption that the environment hasn't changed significantly in the recent history of the organism, and that the experimental environment is fully representative of the historical environment over the entire time during which the features in question evolved. In the case of knocked-out sequences that have no apparent effect on fitness, how sure are we that the experimental environment is fully representative in this way?
No, but to assume that we are making the opposite mistake - assuming that some characteristic really has some function, even if that function is entirely unobservable - is once again to fall into the "teleology trap". This is essentially the same argument that ID people make about "junk DNA". Just because we haven't found any function for it, doesn't mean that all of it has no function. They argue that all of it must have some function. They are, like the evolutionary biologists for whom Williams, Gould and Lewontin, and Gould and Vrba wrote their warnings about assuming teleology in evolution, "pan-adaptationists".
As a hypothetical example, imagine a bacterial DNA sequence that is expressed only during the formation of spores to protect the organism during periods of extreme environmental conditions. Knock out the sequence and test the viability of the resulting variant. If the experimental environment doesn't include the extreme conditions that induce spore formation, the organism will never attempt to express the knocked-out sequence, and so its absence will not be noticed. If the experimenter concludes that the sequence is insignificant or useless, she is mistaken.
True, but I would strongly prefer that adaptation be considered a "diagnosis by exclusion" rather than our first and most important resort. By focusing on adaptation and natural selection, we teeter on the edge of the "teleology trap" and often (maybe even usually) fall in, despite our best efforts to avoid doing so.
Too bad I couldn't post all of this on the thread at UD, where it belongs. Oh well.
I'll see if there is something I can do about that. Barry (and especially Sal) don't seem to view themselves as censors/keepers of the faith. Having been shot down several times, and risen each time from "bannination/moderation hell", the only thing I can suggest is to keep telling them that you will henceforth always "play nice", and would they please let you rejoin the argument? This is part of my bedrock philosophy of life: if you don't ask, it won't happen. If you do ask, it may still not happen, but if you don't ask, it definitely won't happen. So, if you want to stay in the argument, keep asking to rejoin it. The worst that can happen is that they will say no.Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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Ellijacket,
“What’s wrong with simply admitting that these are reasonable doubts?”. Great question
The reason it is never answered (in a straight and forthright manner) is because of the position it protects. The rules of opposing force apply. If the position can only be maintained by power, and not by reason - then zero tolerance is its only refuge. In other words, materialism cannot attack itself to improve its position - the reasoning behind its support.Upright BiPed_{April 29, 2009
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Allanius, That's my point as well. Not only is there reasonable doubt that the genetic code could arise naturally there is evidence pointing to the fact that it requires intelligence. "What's wrong with simply admitting that these are reasonable doubts?". Great question.ellijacket_{April 29, 2009
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So Allen, here’s where the “worldview” comes in. There is reasonable doubt about whether purely natural processes can produce the information necessary to life. There is reasonable doubt about whether purely natural processes can produce the fine-tuning that has been demonstrated in the universe. There is reasonable doubt that purely natural processes can produce complex structures like a cell or a body plan. There is reasonable doubt that purely natural processes can produce the excellence of form seen in the species, and indeed in everything that exists. A worldview is evident when reasonable doubts are suppressed in order to protect the reigning paradigm. After all, Allen, what’s wrong with simply admitting that these are reasonable doubts?allanius_{April 29, 2009
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Hi allen,
That said, however, I would find even the most robust evidence that particular tRNAs “naturally” (i.e. spontaneously and without enzymatic assistance) associate with particular amino acids to be indirect evidence at best. One could infer that this is a plausible explanation for the origin of the genetic code, but plausibility is not the same as entailment
Oh, I agree 100%. I doubt if we will ever be able to recreate the actual conditions and events.Dave Wisker_{April 29, 2009
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Stephen Well said. All reasoning -- including scientific reasoning -- has worldview roots. 1] Whyzatt? One way to see that is the old "why accept A" argument:
Take a generic claim A Why do we accept it? Because of B, some body of further evidence of the senses, argument, assumptions, models/explanations etc that make A plausible. (Often B is called background knowledge -- which in effect is warranted, credibly true belief. But, given our finitude and fallibility -- not to mention intellectual blind spots -- that is not in turn certain beyond all question.) But, why accept B? Well, C. Thence, D, etc . . . So, we either face an infinite regress [which is impossible for us, as we are FINITE and FALLIBLE], or else we stop at a set of first plausibles, F. F is the core of our worldview, our faith point. To avoid begging the question, we may then look at live options F1, F2, F3, . . . Fn, and compare them using methods of philosophical inquiry such as comparative difficulties across factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power [elegantly simple, but not simplistic; and certainly not an ad hoc patchwork].
Thus, since science in particular is based on the abductive pattern of inference to best explanation, wiorldview level considerations and provisional warrant based on comparative difficulties of alteranticve explanations, is deeply embedded in the core of all scientific research programmes. And, of course, as Lakatos pointed out, such cores are partly protected by a belt of auxiliary models and theories, which serve to articulate the core view and couple it to empirical data. However, as protective implies, these also serve to insulate the core from critique, to a significant extent. Lewontin in 1997 gives us a classic illustration . . . 2] Lewontinian materialism: In a now notorious 1997 NY review of Books article on Sagan's last 9appar posthumously published) book, this leading scientist and member of the US NAS wrote: >> . . . to put a correct view of the universe into people's heads we must first get an incorrect view out . . . the problem is to get them to reject irrational and supernatural explanations of the world, the demons that exist only in their imaginations, and to accept a social and intellectual apparatus, Science, as the only begetter of truth . . . . To Sagan, as to all but a few other scientists, it is self-evident that the practices of science provide the surest method of putting us in contact with physical reality, and that, in contrast, the demon-haunted world rests on a set of beliefs and behaviors that fail every reasonable test . . . . Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. The eminent Kant scholar Lewis Beck used to say that anyone who could believe in God could believe in anything. To appeal to an omnipotent deity is to allow that at any moment the regularities of nature may be ruptured, that miracles may happen. >> Of course, this rests on a strawman caricature of the older teleological view of science: a world created by the Judaeo-Christian God as presented in the Bible and in Jewish and Christian thought over the ages is one of "order not confusion." That order speaks of his glory and nature. Also, miracles, if they are to stand out as signs that point beyond the general run of nature, MUST contrast sharply to the general predictable order of Creation. Thirdly, if we are to be morally accountable creatures, actions must have predictable consequences in general, so that we make responsible choices. And so it is no surprise to see that in say Newtgon's General Scholium to the Principia -- the greatest work of modern science, and by the greatest modern scientist -- we see a view that reflects just this frame of thought. indeed, Newton grounds his order of reality and the foundaiton of the space-time matrix in which his laws act, in the judaeo-Christian view of God. But, thanks to the dominance of materialism as Lewontin documents so tellingly, few learn of that today. Indeed, few even know that such a document as the General Scholium exists. But, it is plain that worldviews play a key role in the way science is done in any era. And right now, a priori imposed materialism is dominant but under serious challenge. _______________ GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{April 29, 2009
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StephenB, Crank it up man. Your on a roll.Oramus_{April 28, 2009
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Allen MacNeill @132 wrote: ----"As I have pointed out repeatedly in the past and in other venues, metaphysics has literally nothing to do with the empirical sciences." This statement is false. As E. A. Burtt put it, “The world view is the final controlling factor in all thinking whatever.” Metaphysics has everything to do with empirical science. It was the Christian metaphysics that launched the entire scientific enterprise in the first place, and there can be little doubt that metaphysical beliefs are just as important today as they were centuries ago. Indeed, it is metaphysics of monistic atheism that introduced this novelty approach to science called “methodological naturalism.” Prior to Darwin and the world view that he inspired, no one had ever approached science in this way. Atheist Darwinists didn’t choose methodological naturalism because they were science purists. They chose it because allowed them to practice atheism openly while, at the same time, enjoying the benefits of "strategic ambiguity" of “plausible deniability.” [“What? Me an theist? Why no! My methodological naturalism has nothing at all to do with my metaphysical naturalism.”] One of the reasons why Darwinists will not budge from their position is because their global world metaphor, materialism or some metaphysical equivalent, rules out any possibility of interpreting patterns of information as evidence for design. Why argue design with someone who would not accept it under any circumstances? Also, notice the way they completely ignore or rationalize away the evidence for the “anthropic principle.” Only a firmly held world view of the most bizarre kind could prompt someone who is familiar with the evidence for a fine-tuned universe to discount the design explanation and speculate about infinite multiple universes. If, tomorrow, a pattern was found in a DNA molecule that read, “Yahweh was here,” monists would find a way to rationalize it away. Since it is their metaphysics calling the shots, it almost seems fruitless to argue science with them. Possibly the most destructive world view of all is the one which questions reason’s foundational principle, the proposition that we have rational minds, that we live in a rational universe, and that there is a correspondence between the two. It is this intellectual harmony between the investigator and the object of investigation that sustains rationality. Without a correspondence between the mind and the real world, there can be no rationality. Put another way, unless there is a vehicle [mind] and a destination [truth], there obviously can be no intellectual journey. I have never yet met a Darwinist who accepts this principle. Given that kind of myopia, what hope is there that they could appreciate the even more important fact that a supernatural agent [God] had to set up such a correspondence in the first place? How can we expect them to make the intellectual journey to truth, when they don’t believe that there is any destination at the end of the journey? In keeping with that principle, what can we say about the rationality of those who question very conditions necessary for rationality? Can we not say that they have chosen irrationality?StephenB_{April 28, 2009
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Mr MacNeill, That said, however, I would find even the most robust evidence that particular tRNAs “naturally” (i.e. spontaneously and without enzymatic assistance) associate with particular amino acids to be indirect evidence at best. Why insist on a lack of enzymatic assistance? The motif of 'scaffolding' has reappeared many times in OOL discussions. Ahh, perhaps catalytic is a more general term, and more apt?Nakashima_{April 28, 2009
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Allen and Hazel, Both of you share something in common – neither of you addressed the question raised. A metaphysical materialist is one who operates under the unquestioned assumption that the empirical evidence will indefinitely - or even currently - supports chance and necessity as being the manifest cause of a non-physically-contingent, poly-functional, convention-based symbol system of instructions being embedded (with inherent, detectable, obvious meaning) inside of a physical object. I think that describes both of you, so you’ll have to forgive me if I am wrong. - - - - - - - - - Start with the nose on your face and follow its existence back through time, back through all of the material-chemical changes and origins, back through everything, and you will come to a point where you can go no further. That spot is where the material-chemical changes do not describe the next step along your way. The line of physicality has come to an end. That spot also happens to be the point where inanimate materials are powerless to become living tissue. Such are the facts. You ignore them to badger about twentieth-century tyrants and theological shortcomings, the anthropic principle, forum moderation, and computer simulations that know in advance the targets they seek. Let’s start a new thread about ID being the science-stopper and see if either of you have anything to say.Upright BiPed_{April 28, 2009
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Mr MacNeill, Please do not compare anyone to me! I am sure Mr isker has accomplishments far beyond mine in his own area. We should all be heard on the basis of a shared concept of human dignity - which is what is so sad about these problems of inconsistent moderation. If the forum mods just took everyone out of moderation who has ever posted a rational comment, pro or con, they would be reducing their own burden and at the same time improving the level of discourse by keeping it on point.Nakashima_{April 28, 2009
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Once again I am forced to ask, is there a double standard at work here, and if so, why?
Allen, I'm not involved in decisions as to who is placed in the moderation queue, but if I may offer a consideration in terms of pure numbers. In order for UD to succeed as a weblog serving the ID community, some equalization of numbers of participants in the comment section should be in order. The weblog could be shut down by swarming tactics, and such attempts have been made. I think a 60/40 balance (60 pro-ID, 40 anti-ID) would keep UD alive. If that balance is destroyed, I think readership will fall off. These informal discussions have their value, but I don't consider internet blogs necessarily the best venue for careful scholarly discussion. So, I would not fault the moderators with double standards. The essentially serve as editors for the benefit of our readers. As a matter of experience, ID proponents will lose the numbers game quite easily if there were not any filtering. Many of our readers come here to hear the pro-ID position, and we have some obligation to deliver that. Consider that I created a thread like the one regarding David Abel's paper. I was swarmed with almost 100-200 opposing postings, most of which were directed at me. Even if I felt competent to answer many of the biggest concerns, it's a fairly substantial workload. For the record, I've not deleted any comments from this thread. So I plead a little forebearance in light of the fact that the ID proponents are probably outnumbered on the net. My personal experience puts the figure at about 20 to 1. Remember we are vastly outnumbered by qualified evolutionary biologists like yourself.scordova_{April 28, 2009
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On a related note, Upright Biped writes,
Perhaps the metaphysical materialists on this thread would venture to answer an inconsistency in their conclusions.
Perhaps if the person who was defending materialism hadn't had his posts inexplicably deleted you might still have a materialist to try to answer that question. Back to waiting for consistent moderation ...hazel_{April 28, 2009
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Why is Dave Wisker in permanent moderation? As far as I can tell, his comments have always adhered to the rules of courtesy and argumentation supported by evidence outlined in the moderation rules. Indeed, his comments have often been more concise and to the point than mine, and are at least the intellectual equivalent of those posted by David Kellogg and Nakashima. Once again I am forced to ask, is there a double standard at work here, and if so, why?Allen_MacNeill_{April 28, 2009
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In #121 UprightBiped wrote:
"Perhaps the metaphysical materialists on this thread would venture to answer an inconsistency in their conclusions."
Not being a metaphysical materialist, I must defer to those on this thread who would willingly ascribe to this moniker (if any). As I have pointed out repeatedly in the past and in other venues, metaphysics has literally nothing to do with the empirical sciences. Like Newton, "I make no hypotheses!" To be as clear as I can, I believe that asserting a position of "metaphysical materialism" is just that: a metaphysical assertion, not a scientific one. Confusing metaphysics with science is nearly as pernicious as confusing "ought" and "is". The former makes for questionable science and the latter makes for questionable ethics.Allen_MacNeill_{April 28, 2009
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This was one of the books that got me thinking about my personal theory of ID, where design "flaws" actually turn out to be the things that were designed.AmerikanInKananaskis_{April 28, 2009
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Clive hayden in #116: It is clear to me now that we don't so much have a "disagreement" as a "failure to communicate". You seem to be using the terms "natural" and "law" in a fundamentally different way than these terms are usually used by most scientists. This is why I have suggested that someone with posting privileges initiate a thread on the various meanings of these terms. I think all of us would find this illuminating, and might clear up quite a few of the misunderstandings that seem to have dogged our discussions so far.Allen_MacNeill_{April 28, 2009
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Nakashima in #122 and Dave Wisker in #126: Don't get me wrong; as a stated in my comment to which you are reacting, I find the question of the origin of life and the genetic code to be quite fascinating, and would certainly encourage those biochemical geneticists with an interest in the subject to investigate possible scenarios. That said, however, I would find even the most robust evidence that particular tRNAs "naturally" (i.e. spontaneously and without enzymatic assistance) associate with particular amino acids to be indirect evidence at best. One could infer that this is a plausible explanation for the origin of the genetic code, but plausibility is not the same as entailment. The real problem here is that we have no direct or indirect evidence analogous to the fossil record to indicate that such a mechanism is indeed how it actually happened. This is not the case with most of evolutionary biology. Unless one is a YEC, the fossil record is a direct record of what organisms lived in the past. Yes, the relationships between fossil organisms must still be inferred (as must the absolute ages of the strata from which they were obtained), but the fossils are there, to be examined by anyone who wishes to view the evidence. To me the difference between the laboratory recreation of the OOL and the reconstruction of phylogenies using evidence from fossils, comparative anatomy, and comparative genomics seems to me to be analogous to the difference between circumstantial and direct evidence in criminal justice. Defendants are indeed convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence, but there is always a lingering doubt, compared with convictions obtained through the use of direct evidence. And, of course, in neither case can one ever be certain. In evolutionary biology, like all of the empirical sciences, the criterion is always "beyond a reasonable doubt", not absolute certainty.Allen_MacNeill_{April 28, 2009
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In #110 sal wrote:
"...diabetes is fundamentally a bad thing."
Not exactly. Type I diabetes is indeed a bad thing; everyone who had it before the discovery of insulin and the development of insulin treatment died from it, quite horribly. Type II diabetes, however, is quite different. There is quite good evidence to indicate that certain phylogenetic lines in humans are strongly predisposed towards the development of Type II diabetes. Furthermore, it is also quite clear that Type II diabetes is primarily an "environmental" disease. That is, if one has the requisite genetic predisposition, one develops it only if one is exposed to the right environment. To be specific, people with a genetic tendency toward Type II diabetes will develop it if they are in an environment in which they 1) get relatively little exercise, and 2) consume a diet in which a large fraction of their calories are derived from foods with a high glycemic index (sugars and easily digested starches). Under these conditions, such people develop a tendency to produce too much insulin in response to the ingestion of high glycemic index foods, which has the effect of "burning out" their insulin receptors (the physiology of this reaction is complex and doesn't really involve "burning"; I would be happy to explain it if there is sufficient interest). This is a bad thing, as it eventually causes them to be unable to regulate their blood glucose concentrations. However, having a tendency toward "hyperinsulinism" is actually a good thing, if one lives in an environment where foods with a high glycemic index are rare and only intermittently available, and in which periodic starvation is common. Under such conditions, people who can very rapidly mobilize the glucose in those rare foods that contain a lot of it would be at a definite advantage over people who could not do so. Furthermore, having a slightly elevated blood concentration every now and then also means that when everyone who does not have the same tendency is semi-comatose from hypoglycemia, the people with slightly elevated blood glucose are "feelin' just fine". So, in the case of Type II diabetes, what causes a disease in us today (in our overly sugared, under-exercised environment) had exactly the opposite effect in our under-sugared, over-exercised evolutionary past. This is just one example of how particular physiological adaptations that had the effect of increasing fitness in past environments can have the opposite effect in our current environment. Our tendencies to consume too much sodium and too much fat can also be explained by very similar evolutionary circumstances, as can the genetic predisposition toward such nasty genetic diseases as sickle-cell anemia (and related thalasemias), cystic fibrosis, and even such mental diseases as depression and schizophrenia. What is maladaptive today can very well have been adaptive in our evolutionary past, and that seems to me to be the main point when one is considering those diseases that have evolutionary underpinnings.Allen_MacNeill_{April 28, 2009
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