The common sense law of physics

_{Granville Sewell

July 29, 2010

Intelligent Design}

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I was discussing the second law argument with a scientist friend the other day, and mentioned that the second law is sometimes called the “common sense law of physics”. This morning he wrote:

Yesterday I spoke with my wife about these questions. She immediately grasped that chaos results on the long term when she would stop caring for her home.

I replied:

Tell your wife she has made a perfectly valid application of the second law of thermodynamics. In fact, let’s take her application a bit further.

Suppose you and your wife go for vacation, leaving a dog, cat and a parakeet loose in the house (I put the animals there to cause the entropy to increase more rapidly, otherwise you might have to take a much longer vacation to see the same effect). When you come back, you will not be surprised to see chaos in the house. But tell her some scientists say, “but if you leave the door open while on vacation, your house becomes an open system, and the second law does not apply to open systems…you may find everything in better condition than when you left.”

I’ll bet she will say, if a maid enters through the door and cleans the house, maybe, but if all that enters is wind, rain and other animals, probably not.

This is an application of the main point in chapter 5 of my new book : “If an increase in order is extremely improbable when a system is closed, it is still extremely improbable when the system is open, unless something is entering that makes it NOT extremely improbable.”

For a slightly more technical version of this story, complete with a mathematical analysis of the equations for entropy change, see my video .

(For those who don’t watch the video, or give up on it before the end, and thus don’t understand what this story has to do with evolution, I should include the punch line):

If we found evidence that DNA, auto parts, computer chips and books entered through the Earth’s atmosphere at some time in the past, then perhaps the appearance of humans, cars, computers, and encyclopedias on a previously barren planet could be explained without postulating a violation of the second law here. But if all we see entering is radiation and meteorite fragments, it seems clear that what is entering through the boundary cannot explain the increase in order observed here.

Comments

aiguy: "May I point out that you are using the term “design” here without specifically noting if you are referring to the actions of a complex physical organism? If so, then you are talking about something in our experience, but also something that logically could not be responsible for creating the first complex physical organisms. If not, then you are talking about something that is unknown to our experience." One other note. That quote of yours above is akin to stating that we can't discuss the Big Bang, or past evolution as a scientific hypothesis because then we would be talking about something that is unknown to our experience. I've never experienced anything remotely akin to either the Big Bang or past evolution. Have you or anyone else? Yet, we have all experienced, first hand, the generation of FSCI when we write comments like this. Thus, the connection between FSCI and foresight (regardless of the mode of operation of whatever produces foresight) is based on stronger evidence than anything that the Big Bang or past evolution from mud to consciousness or anything we can't presently experience is based on.CJYman_{August 3, 2010
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aiguy: "Most neuroscientists believe that “intelligence” and “will of purpose” is nothing more than the action of neurochemistry. You already know that I am not taking that position myself, and I remind us all that we have no scientific way of resolving this ancient puzzle. So if you and Meyer are wrong and “will of purpose” is nothing but the action of physical mechanism, then without physical mechanism there can be no designer." 1. If Penrose and Hameroff's theory -- the most coherent one out there with an actual theoretical, testable, and potentially falisifiable construct -- about consciousness is correct, then this brings the status of the study of consciousness out of philosophy and into science while at the same time placing consciousness at a level at least as fundamental as matter and energy. 2. I've already explained how even though our uniform and repeated experience shows physical complexity to be associated with consciousness (possibly required for the expression of consciousness) this provides no problem for ID Theory as Meyers argues for it based on uniform and repeated observations. The only addition we need to realize is that in our repeated and uniform experience we observe a closed loop from intelligence to FSCI and back to intelligence. And since, neither FSCI nor intelligence are defined by law (as mathematical descriptions of regular patterns) nor best explained by chance (based on correlations and improbabilities required for FSCI and intelligence) then we have a closed causal loop between FSCI and intelligence, each requiring the other, with no room for chance and law *on their own* to account for either. Furthermore, we have no repeated and uniform observations associated with only law+chance generating either FSCI or intelligence. aiguy: "Just don’t pretend that the answer is known to our uniform and repeated experience the way Meyer does!" Eh?!?!?! You've never used your foresight (intelligence) to produce FSCI? Is there any foresight in these comments of yours? aiguy: "May I point out that you are using the term “design” here without specifically noting if you are referring to the actions of a complex physical organism? If so, then you are talking about something in our experience, but also something that logically could not be responsible for creating the first complex physical organisms." That is completely correct, and the simple resolution is to identify the fact, from a scientific vantage point, that life may not be the *first* complex physical organism. The universe itself may be a complex physical organism and if Penrose and Hameroff are correct, may contain a type of proto-consciousness, detectable through the mathematics and experiments that would support their theory. However, this does nothing to detract from what we *do* regularly experience -- a closed loop between FSCI and intelligence. Thus, FSCI requires intelligence and intellgience requires FSCI. The two can not exist without each other -- akin to the relationship between matter and energy -- and neither FSCI nor intelligence are defined purely by law+chance without reference to FSCI or intelligence. aiguy: "I merely point out that neither possibility represents a known cause which could account for the creation of the first complex living organism." The first living thing is the first occasion of a self-replicating computational machine within our universe (not including the universe itself -- read Seth Lloyd and Lee Smolin). As such, it can be defined in terms of FSCI. This brings us back to the question: "In our repeated and uniform experience, what generates FSCI?" I don't see how you can say that there is no known cause, accessible to our uniform and repeated experience, regardless of whether that known cause (foresight utilizing system) is above natural law or not from either a scientific or a metaphysical perspective.CJYman_{August 3, 2010
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KF,
Your insinuation of semantic sleight of hand is out of order, patently rude, and beyond the pale of civil discussion, especially in this context.
I certainly don't mean to be rude, much less patently so. Forgive me if I put the charge indelicately. Would it be beyond the pale of civil discourse to suggest that some ID authors may be unintentionally equivocating on the meaning of the term "designer"?
You have had more than enough evidence to see why there is an empirically based inference from empirically grounded sign to signified action of design, and without a priori metaphysical assumption.
May I point out that you are using the term "design" here without specifically noting if you are referring to the actions of a complex physical organism? If so, then you are talking about something in our experience, but also something that logically could not be responsible for creating the first complex physical organisms. If not, then you are talking about something that is unknown to our experience.
The nature of the implied designer — on grounds that designs on experience we have of and as designers come from designers — is a further and separable issue.
I would submit that by the law of the excluded middle, ID's designer must either be a complex living organism or not. I merely point out that neither possibility represents a known cause which could account for the creation of the first complex living organism.aiguy_{August 3, 2010
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AIG: Not at all. Your insinuation of semantic sleight of hand is out of order, patently rude, and beyond the pale of civil discussion, especially in this context. You have had more than enough evidence to see why there is an empirically based inference from empirically grounded sign to signified action of design, and without a priori metaphysical assumption. The nature of the implied designer -- on grounds that designs on experience we have of and as designers come from designers -- is a further and separable issue. In particular, ans as has been discussed at length at UD and elsewhere ever since the foundational works of ID in the 1980s, inferred design of life on earth standing by itself has not further direct implication that the designer -- individual or collective -- is in or out of the cosmos. In fact where ID inferences have a more profound pointer in such a direction is another issue: inferred design of the observed universe on its finetuned functional specificity. Even there the design inference is to DESIGN, not designer. It is the context of the design that would point beyond he observed cosmos to a powerful, intelligent extra-cosmic designer. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{August 3, 2010
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CannuckianYankee,
To be fair to Meyer, he is not saying that we have a uniform and repeated experience with non-physical entities, which produce information; but with physical entities (namely humans- ourselves); which produce the kind of information we also find present in DNA. This part of Meyer’s argument does not require any commitment to a metaphysical assumption at all.
Well that's the point exactly. It really is this bit of semantic sleight-of-hand employed by ID that is the basis of my objection. Yes, human beings build complicated machines, and that fact is very much known to our experience. But Meyer (and ID in general) replaces "human beings" with "intelligent agents" (a term from philosophy, not science) and pretends there is this whole class of things known to our experience that can build machines, and humans are just one member of that class. All I'm doing is pointing out that there is no such class of things. Human beings (and perhaps other living animals) are the only thing known to our experience that can build machines. Thinking observably requires the operation of a complex physical mechanism (and this is true whether not it also requires interaction with immaterial mind-stuff). To imagine something could exist prior to life (i.e. that didn't have a complex physical body) which could also think is an unsupported speculation that is contrary to our uniform and repeated experience. It may be true of course, but it is not known to our experience.
I’m not aware of where Meyer makes the duality distinction you refer to. In my understanding, having read his book, as well as having seen several interviews on video, he simply talks about designers, and how they operate, and then compares their intellectual product – designed mechanisms containing FSCI to something very similar in biology.
Here the equivocation is on the word "designers" rather than "intelligent agents". Same thing.
It all boils down to an observable phenomenon – humans making complex things from the collected efforts of their rational thinking. Whether you believe that our ability to be rational developed through Darwinian evolution, or that it is a separate non-physical consciousness, makes little difference to the strength of his argument.
In fact I believe neither of these things - the ID debate is chock-full of these false dichotomies! (Like Penrose I believe that physics is tied to mentality in a way we don't understand, but that the human mind and consciousness is quite specific to the structure of the human brain; and I also believe that the brain's structure emerged according to processes we do not understand, not just Darwinian evolution). But it is quite obviously central to Meyer's argument that his metaphysics is right, and mind can exist independently of complex mechanism. That's his philosophical stance that he wrongly presents as a truth confirmed by experience.
We simply have experience with this, and in our experience, it is our intelligence and will of purpose, which allows us to be designers.
But once again you are making a statement that is metaphysical. Most neuroscientists believe that "intelligence" and "will of purpose" is nothing more than the action of neurochemistry. You already know that I am not taking that position myself, and I remind us all that we have no scientific way of resolving this ancient puzzle. So if you and Meyer are wrong and "will of purpose" is nothing but the action of physical mechanism, then without physical mechanism there can be no designer.
We have no verifiable experience with our ability to design outside of these factors (namely via chance and necessity).
And this is just another metaphysical claim. You may be right, but you may be wrong, and nobody knows the answer. Perhaps neuroscientists are correct when they say that our thinking proceeds according physical processes (chance+necessity) in our brains.
If we can’t throw things together and expect them to work, why should we expect that an unseen process such as Darwinian evolution can simply throw things together and expect them to work?
I don't want to discuss Darwinian evolution here - I'm not defending evolutionary theory.
Now remove any apriori metaphysical assumptions, and Meyer has a very valid argument based on a very solid premise.
Without a priori metaphysical assumptions, Meyer makes a claim that is utterly unsupportable: Something that was not itself a complex living organism could somehow manage to perceive and process information (and act upon the world to build things) like a living, physical human being can.
I think your problem actually arises out of the particulars. DNA contains FSCI. How did it get there?
As I said, I don't know. But Meyer doesn't either! (none of us do of course) KF,
I was simply pointing out, rather, that our mere possession of physical bodies as such is not the grounds of the intelligent behaviour of said bodies.
So you say, but this is a metaphysical claim that can't be settled by appeal to experience. If you disagree, please tell us what sort of experiment we can conduct to settle the matter (you will become very famous if you can do that!)
It is not the chance-patterns or the mechanical necessity that we — unless we happen to be a priori extreme materialists...
And on and on, KF. Maybe dualism is true, or physicalism, or any of dozens of flavors of metaphysical positions on the mind/body problem is true... I don't know which is true. You think you know what is true, and you might be right, but there is nothing we observe in our uniform and repeated experience that will answer the question. You insist that your metaphysics is true, while I say maybe you are right and maybe you are wrong. You are the one who is committed to a specific a priori metaphysical stance, not me. Meyer is also committed to the same metaphysics that you are. So the right thing for you and Meyer to do is to own up to your committments and argue for them! You want to argue that mind is fundamentally more than (and ontologically distinct from) physical cause - that's fine. You can join all of the philosophers who have been arguing this position for the past five thousand years or so... and against all of the philosophers who have been arguing the opposite the whole time! Today there are plenty of philosophers who argue on your side (dualism, basically) - and there are even more philosophers who argue the contrary. That's all good. Just don't pretend that the answer is known to our uniform and repeated experience the way Meyer does!aiguy_{August 3, 2010
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AIG: Lastly for the moment, let us look at a slice of the cake that has in it all the ingredients, in an exchange with CJY:
CJY: Basically, it is in our uniform and repeated experience that we observe a closed loop between FSCI and intelligence (both requiring each other), with no room for only law+chance to produce either FSCI or intelligence. AIG: By saying that law+chance is incapable of producing intelligence you are saying that intelligence (mind) transcends physical causality. In other words, you are denying the metaphysics of physicalism. You may be right, and you may be wrong, but it is not a question that can be resolved by appeal to our experience.
1 --> Obviously, CJY has SAID no such thing, as the highlighted words underscore. 2 --> CJY has instead emphasised that we reliably OBSERVE a certain routine causal pattern and sign of it at work. 3 --> When you refer to it, this is transmuted -- per your own worldview assumptions and perceptions of what others say in its light -- into CY asserting an impossibility [one presumes, physical or logical or both]. 4 --> But in fact, CJY has asserted a commomplace thing in this scientific era: he summarises an observational pattern and its routine result. Namely, when we directly see FSCI being actually caused, it is routinely and only seen to result from actions that are intelligent. 5 --> BTW, it seems that there is now a commonplace confusion about the meaning of to observe, so let's cite Sense 1 from AmHD: "1. To be or become aware of, especially through careful and directed attention; notice," which we can augment by adding in measurements and action of instruments that extend our senses. Observations produce relevant credible facts, which we then infer to best explanation to account for. 6 --> So, you have erected and knocked over a metaphysical strawman, instead of addressing the empirical fact of our routine observation on the source of FSCI. 7 --> Your proper challenge is to address instead the observable empirical connexion between intelligence as acting cause and FSCI as a characteristic sign of it. 8 --> Show that there are cases where 1,000 or more bits worth of functionally specific coded information comes about by undirected chance and mechanical necessity only [remember, GAs are intelligently designed constrained searches in islands of function] and you have an adequate answer that empirically rebuts the empirical claim that FSCI is per observation reliably the product of intelligence. 9 --> But the root of that challenge is a thermodynamics issue, as we know on both experience and analysis that when contingency spaces explode beyond astronomical size [as the 1,000 bit threshold guarantees] undirected trial and error by happenstance configurations and mechanical necessity are hopelessly inadequate mechanisms for finding islands of function. (cf here.) 10 --> So, you need to address what was actually said, not what you substituted for it to your rhetorical advantage. ___________ GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{August 3, 2010
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F/N: Excerpting the appendix 8 of my always linked note: ____________________ >> As at April 2008, a thread at UD has drawn out an interesting link between the inference to design and the origin and nature of mind [and thence, of morality]. The heart of that connexion may be seen from an adapted form of an example by Richard Taylor: . . . suppose you were in a train and saw [outside the window] rocks you believe were pushed there by chance + necessity only, spelling out: WELCOME TO WALES. Would you believe the apparent message, why? Now, it is obviously highly improbable [per the principles of statistical thermodynamics applied to, say, a pile of rocks falling down a hill and scattering to form randomly distributed patterns]. But, it is plainly logically and physically possible for this to happen. So, what would follow from -- per thought experiment -- actually having "good reason" to believe that this is so? 1 --> We know, immediately, that chance + necessity, acting on a pile of rocks on a hillside, can make them roll down the hillside and take up an arbitrary conformation. There thus is no in-principle reason to reject them taking up the shape: "WELCOME TO WALES" any more than any other configuration. Especially if, say, by extremely good luck we have seen the rocks fall and take up this shape for ourselves. [If that ever happens to you, though, change your travel plans and head straight for Las Vegas before your "hot streak" runs out! (But also, first check that the rocks are not made of magnetite, and that there is not a magnetic apparatus buried under the hill's apparently innocent turf! "Trust, but verify.")] 2 --> Now, while you are packing for Vegas [having verified that the event is not a parlour trick writ large . . . ], let's think a bit: [a] the result of the for- the- sake- of- argument stroke of good luck is an apparent message, which was [b] formed by chance + necessity only acting on matter and energy across space and time. That is, [c] it would be lucky noise at work. Let us observe, also: [d] the shape taken on by the cluster of rocks as they fall and settle is arbitrary, but [e] the meaning assigned to the apparent message is as a result of the imposition of symbolic meaning on certain glyphs that take up particular alphanumerical shapes under certain conventions. That is, it is a mental (and even social) act. One pregnant with the points that [f] language at its best refers accurately to reality, so that [g] we often trust its deliverances once we hold the source credible. [Indeed, in the original form of the example, if one believes that s/he is entering Wales on the strength of seeing such a rock arrangement, s/he would be grossly irrational to also believe the intelligible and aptly functional arrangement of rocks to have been accidental.] 3 --> But, this brings up the key issue of credibility: should we believe the substantial contents of such an apparent message sourced in lucky noise rather than a purposeful arrangement? That is, would it be well-warranted to accept it as -- here, echoing Aristotle in Metaphysics, 1011b -- "saying of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not"? (That is, (i) is such an apparent message credibly a true message? Or (ii) is any observed truth in it merest coincidence?) 4 --> The answers are obvious: (i) no, and (ii) yes. For, the adjusted example aptly illustrates how cause-effect chains tracing to mechanical necessity and chance circumstances acting on matter and energy are utterly unconnected to the issue of making logically and empirically well-warranted assertions about states of affairs in the world. For a crude but illuminating further instance, neuronal impulses are in volts and are in specific locations in the body; but the peculiarly mental aspects -- meaningfulness, codes, algorithms, truth and falsehood, propositions and their entailments, etc -- simply are not like that. That is, mental concepts and constructs are radically different from physical entities, interactions and signals. 5 --> So, it is highly questionable (thus needs to be shown not merely assumed or asserted) that such radical differences could or do credibly arise from mere interaction of physical components under only the forces of chance and blind mechanical necessity. For this demonstration, however, we seek in vain: the matter is routinely assumed or asserted away, often by claiming (contrary to the relevant history and philosophical considerations) that science can only properly explain by reference in the end to such ultimately physical-material forces. Anything less is "science-stopping." 6 --> But in fact, in say a typical real-world cybernetic system, the physical cause-effect chains around a control loop are set up by intelligent, highly skilled designers who take advantage of and manipulate a wide range of natural regularities. As a result, the sensors, feedback, comparator, and forward path signals, codes and linkages between elements in the system are intelligently organised to cause the desired interactions and outcomes of moving observed plant behaviour closer to the targetted path in the teeth of disturbances, drift in component parameters, and noise. And, that intelligent input is not simply reducible to the happenstance of accidental collocations and interactions of physical forces, bodies and materials . . . >> _______________________ AIG, these are some of the challenges that lurk on the topics you have broached. Onward, there are many more . . .kairosfocus_{August 3, 2010
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PS: Vivid, if you want, you may look here to see how I address the issue of the mind in more details than a blog comment warrants. AIG, you may also want to look into it, starting with the implications of the Welcome to Wales thought experiment as adapted from Taylor. PPS: CY, well said.kairosfocus_{August 3, 2010
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Vivid: I see your summary of AIG: I hate to disagree with you but I think what AIG is saying is that to say that intelligence is “non physical” is a metaphysical position not something we know scientifically. I note also his immediate agreement with your summary:
Thank you, Vivid – again, that is precisely what I’ve argued. I am not a materialist, but I don’t pretend that I can support any particular ontological stance by appeal to our uniform and repeated experience. Dualism may be true, physicalism may be true, or maybe the truth is that the ultimate nature of reality is still unknown or even unknowable. These are ancient and profound philosophical conundrums which have not yielded to scientific inquiry.
But, I have not said any such thing as is being asserted, that is a misreading of my remarks. I was simply pointing out, rather, that our mere possession of physical bodies as such is not the grounds of the intelligent behaviour of said bodies. It is not the chance-patterns or the mechanical necessity that we -- unless we happen to be a priori extreme materialists of the self-refuting Crick or Provine sort -- revert to to explain say posts in this thread, but our intelligence. And, we know on the direct implications of the vast configuration spaces involved that the letter strings that make up a post are not credibly produced by lucky noise and mechanical necessity. Just so, the motion of my fingers to type this is a physical, bodily act, but it is not a result of just mechanical necessity of the tendons that pull on the bones and the hands being in particular start positions by happenstance [i.e. they could just as easily have been in any other], but it is intelligently directed. As we know from direct experience and observation. Indeed, we take courses in the art of correctly positioning and moving fingers on keyboards, whether to type or to play music. Intelligent behaviour, in short -- and on routine observation -- is radically distinct from what we routinely see caused by undirected chance and/or mechanical necessity, as this post demonstrates by contrast with: (a) what a stuck key does: kkkkkkkkkkkkkk . . ., or (b) what at-random keystrokes do: fhafgwr23i3fhfceiuerkdoeuytndxhyfrtoekxbhvdoedufxslpsiehfn . . . Anyone who cannot or will not see the decisive difference is being blinded by his own a priori commitments. So, AIG is wrong, and wrong in a fundamental way; one that has been long pointed out, by Liebniz in his discussion of the analogy of the windmill. I excerpt, from The Monadology:
17. . . . perception, and that which depends upon it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find anything to explain perception. It is accordingly in the simple substance, and not in the compound nor in a machine that the perception is to be sought. Furthermore, there is nothing besides perceptions and their changes to be found in the simple substance. And it is in these alone that all the internal activities of the simple substance can consist.
In short, the organised and purposeful structure and specific functionality of a mill does not consist in the gears grinding and shafts and wheels turning by happenstance of co-location and mere mechanical necessity. The composition of organised physical parts into a complex functional whole in the shape of a wind or water driven mill is not self-explanatory, nor is it credibly explained by a tornado or the equivalent assembling it by chance. Nor, do we need to have directly observed the assembly to know that, nor do we need to have ever seen a mill beforehand to see that. Instead, and on RELIABLY REPEATED EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION, COMPLEX FUNCTIONALLY SPECIFIC ORGANISATION AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION ARE THE RESULT OF INTELLIGENCE AT WORK. That is a routine fact of our experience when we look around us at the directly observed origin of complex, functionally organised objects, especially those that have in them digitally coded functionally specific complex information. That is, we are here following the method of making a well-tested inductive inference on causal factors across the observed triad, chance, mechanical necessity, and intelligence, and we are explaining like by like per reliable sign; even in cases where we did not directly observe the causal events. This is of course precisely the approach used by Lyell and Darwin when they sought to explain the remote past on analogy to directly observed causal patterns in the present; and that inescapable methodological equivalence is key to answering many objections that are made. We explain the fact that a heavy object if unsupported routinely falls by the mechanical necessity of gravity. We explain the face that it shows uppermost if it is a fair die by the chance circumstances that could as easily have been otherwise so that it rests from 1 to 6 in a statistically flat distribution. But, for good reason, we explain a string of 200 or so dice counting 1 to 6 in succession over and over again (or expressing a coded pattern) by intelligent organisation. And, we recognise intelligence not on a metaphysical a priori but on direct experience and define it by summarising that experience in a concept, similar to how we address any other major concept used to describe our world. Using the UD glossary, from Wiki:
Intelligence: “capacities to reason, to plan, to solve problems, to think abstractly, to comprehend ideas, to use language, and to learn.”
Further, for intelligence as just summed up to affect the material world we observe -- by virtue of our intelligence that gives us conscious perception -- does not imply material embodiment or constitution; but only the ability to interact with the material, i.e. that is how we observe it, from its acts. To infer to intelligence from its actions sand their observable signs closely similar to known cases of intelligence is an empirically based endeavour, not argument on a metaphysical a priori. Now, I am very aware that objectors tot he design inference are eager to try to turn it into a metaphysical a priori, in a de facto turnabout rhetorical tactic, as they know or should know full well that so-called methodological naturalism IS based on implicit a priori imposition of materialism, as Lewontin so directly confesses:
To Sagan, as to all but a few other scientists, it is self-evident that the practices of science provide the surest method of putting us in contact with physical reality, and that, in contrast, the demon-haunted world rests on a set of beliefs and behaviors that fail every reasonable test . . . . It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. [[“Billions and Billions of Demons,” NYRB, January 9, 1997.]
Observe the a priori, and the motive for it, which obtains even in cases where we see nominal theists who decide to "play the game of science" by the prevailing rules, on whatever excuse. Such metaphysically loaded rules are inherently unjustifiable, though, as they compromise the ability of science to be an unfettered (but intellectually and ethically responsible) progressive pursuit of the truth about our cosmos based on observation & experiment, inference, analysis, and logical discussion among the informed. That is, by injecting a materialist a priori by the back door, science as a serious pursuit of the truth about our world is compromised, and turned into the handmaiden for an evolutionary materialistic ideological agenda. The real, and hitehrto unmet burden of proof is for evolutionary materialists, of whatever stripe -- metaphysical materialists or accommodators of so-called methodological naturalism -- to provide us with directly observed cases where especially digitally coded, complex and specifically functional information and associated algorithms, codes and effecting machinery originate by chance and mechanical necessity without intelligent direction. Then, they will have an empirically anchored base for suggesting that the digitally coded information and associated implementing machines in the cell originated by chance and necessity without intelligent direction. Until and unless that happens, the reasonable inference from present observed patterns of causdation to similar effectsin the deep past that we did not diorectly observe being caused, is by the routinely observed cause of such dFSCI. Intelligent action. Of course, since the relevant configuration spaces are so vast for the information entities -- 1,000 bits of capacity has 1.07 *10^301 possible configs, more than the square of the number of Planck time atomic states of the 10^80 or so atoms of our observed cosmos across its thermodynamically credible lifespan -- we have high confidence that spontaneous undirected emergence of such codes from chance and mechanical necessity is utterly implausible [on the same grounds routinely used in statistical thermodynamics to ground the credibility of say the 2nd law of thermodynamics]; not just un-demonstrated so far. It is precisely because of that unmet empirical challenge that we see so much reversion to attempts to imply unjustified metaphysical a prioris on our part while suppressing challenges to the a prioris on their part. If we want to discuss a prioris, that needs to be on a level playing field, and on comparative difficulties across factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power. On those grounds the existence and action of intelligence will be a far superior answer to undirected chance plus necessity on the topic of explaining the dFSCI in say the living cell. That is why the turnabout tactic is what we meet, instead of either a serious inductive methodology or a level playing field discussion of comparative difficulties of metaphysical alternatives. In short, in our day, science has been taken ideological hostage to evolutionary materialism. Which is inherently and inescapably self-refuting. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{August 3, 2010
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aiguy re: 89 To be fair to Meyer, he is not saying that we have a uniform and repeated experience with non-physical entities, which produce information; but with physical entities (namely humans- ourselves); which produce the kind of information we also find present in DNA. This part of Meyer's argument does not require any commitment to a metaphysical assumption at all. I'm not aware of where Meyer makes the duality distinction you refer to. In my understanding, having read his book, as well as having seen several interviews on video, he simply talks about designers, and how they operate, and then compares their intellectual product - designed mechanisms containing FSCI to something very similar in biology. So it's not in that very argument where one must forfeit physicalism. Physicalism may need to be forfeited in the particulars of the argument - given the factors of the amount of complexity, time, as well as the lack of parsimony in current theories of abiogenesis. I think Meyer knows what he is doing when he essentially begins with an argument, which does not force a committal to any particular metaphysic. But you can't throw out the entire argument based on a perception (a false one, I believe) that he's interjected dualism without first understanding where he's coming from. I realize that you don't reject dualism per se, but that's neither here nor there. It all boils down to an observable phenomenon - humans making complex things from the collected efforts of their rational thinking. Whether you believe that our ability to be rational developed through Darwinian evolution, or that it is a separate non-physical consciousness, makes little difference to the strength of his argument. We simply have experience with this, and in our experience, it is our intelligence and will of purpose, which allows us to be designers. We have no verifiable experience with our ability to design outside of these factors (namely via chance and necessity). In fact, we find that when we do depend on chance, we limit our ability to be precise enough to arrive at the kind of complexity required for the development of machines capable of complex tasks (and I mean machines like computers, automobiles, and others, wich depend upon precision engineering). And this is a gross understatement. If we can't throw things together and expect them to work, why should we expect that an unseen process such as Darwinian evolution can simply throw things together and expect them to work? Now remove any apriori metaphysical assumptions, and Meyer has a very valid argument based on a very solid premise. I think your problem actually arises out of the particulars. DNA contains FSCI. How did it get there? This is where one is forced to examine his/her metaphysical assumptions.CannuckianYankee_{August 3, 2010
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Vivid,
I am not what you would call an ID theorist and I know there are others who are more qualified than I to dialog with you on this subject. However I do want to see this thread continue since I do not think you have received an adequate rebuttal to your objections. So in the spirit of keeping things going I will put my head on the chopping block.
I appreciate your interest, Vivid. I agree I have not received an adequate rebuttal.
Let me summarize Meyers central argument. 1) The activity of a conscious and rational deliberative agent best explains the origin of the information necessary to produce the first living cell. 2) He argues for this because of two things. a) We know from our uniform and repeated experience that intelligent agents have demonstrated the capacity to produce large amounts of functionally specified information (especially in a digital form). b) No undirected chemical process has demonstrated this power. 3) Hence ( using reason to inform the evidence) he concludes intelligent design provides the best—most causally adequate—explanation for the origin of the information necessary to produce the first life from simpler non-living chemicals. In other words, intelligent design is the only explanation that cites a cause known to have the capacity to produce the key effect in question.
Yes, that is Meyer's argument.
Your position is That in our uniform and repeated experience, all designers (i.e. producers of FSCI) are complex physical organisms. Thus the claim by Stephen Meyer that there is cause which is known to our uniform and repeated experience which could account for the origin of life is false (because obviously the first complex physical organism could not have been created by another complex physical organism, and no other type of intelligent agent is known in our uniform and repeated experience). AIGuy anything else you would like to add?
That's my position exactly. It really is hard for me to imagine anyone finding anything to argue against in my position, except perhaps to say that ghost sightings or religious visions ought to count as valid observations which indicate intelligent agents needn't have complex physical bodies. But since Meyer chooses that phrase explicitly - "repeated and uniform experience" - I really don't think he's relying on paranormal phenomena to make his case.
KF: AIG is simply refusing to note that he explanation for the acts of intelligence and FSCI is not our physicality but our intelligence VIVID: KF I hate to disagree with you but I think what AIG is saying is that to say that intelligence is “non physical” is a metaphysical position not something we know scientifically.
Thank you, Vivid - again, that is precisely what I've argued. I am not a materialist, but I don't pretend that I can support any particular ontological stance by appeal to our uniform and repeated experience. Dualism may be true, physicalism may be true, or maybe the truth is that the ultimate nature of reality is still unknown or even unknowable. These are ancient and profound philosophical conundrums which have not yielded to scientific inquiry. CJYMan,
Basically, it is in our uniform and repeated experience that we observe a closed loop between FSCI and intelligence (both requiring each other), with no room for only law+chance to produce either FSCI or intelligence.
By saying that law+chance is incapable of producing intelligence you are saying that intelligence (mind) transcends physical causality. In other words, you are denying the metaphysics of physicalism. You may be right, and you may be wrong, but it is not a question that can be resolved by appeal to our experience.
The logical conclusion IMO, is simply that this places both FSCI and intelligence at a level at least as fundamental alongside matter and energy. So, the fundamental fabric of our universe consists of matter, energy, FSCI, and intelligence. This interpretation of what we observe is consistent with what both Granville and aiguy are stating and provides an excellent “diving board” into ID Theory.
Yes, of course it does. That is precisely why ID Theorists like Dembski concede that ID requires an expanded ontology. In other words, ID only makes sense if you adopt a particular metaphysical stance - one which denies physicalism. (As an aside, at this point most people make the mistake of complaining that evolutionary theory rests on materialism the way ID rests on non-materialism. But this isn't true at all: Evolutionary theory is perfectly compatible not only with physicalism, but also with dualisms of all flavors as well as the various non-physicalist monisms).
Furthermore, that interpretation also fits very well with Penrose and Hameroff’s theory of consciousness which places a type of proto-consciousness at a level at least alongside matter and energy and possibly fundamental to matter and energy. That’s all I’ve got for now. Education calls.
First let me say that I'm both interested in an sympathetic to Penrose/Hameroff's ideas (and others like them). The difference between what they are doing and what ID does is important, though: Penrose characterizes this fundamental proto-thought-stuff in a way that does not assume characteristics extraneous to his theory. He is not talking about a thinking, feeling, conscious being who thinks about how to build a platypus and has the wherewithall to make it (and anything else) happen. Rather, he describes a realm of platonic logic - a mathematical structuring of the fabric of reality - that could interact with particular complex physical properties of the brain to produce what humans experience as consciousness. Anyway, all that is fun and speculative stuff. But it is miles removed from something we know by virtue of our uniform and repeated experience!aiguy_{August 2, 2010
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Hey everyone, Sorry I'm butting in a little late in the discussion, and I apologize but I won't be able to hang around for long. With that said, here is my two sense. IMO, both sides to this discussion have a point. It is true that in our uniform and repeated experience we observe that FSCI arises from intelligence (systems utilizing foresight) and that intelligence is itself founded upon FSCI. But this is not a problem for ID Theory as aiguy seems to imply. There is no problem with intelligence requiring a foundation built upon FSCI. I have been using that understanding to argue for ID Theory for quite some time now. Basically, it is in our uniform and repeated experience that we observe a closed loop between FSCI and intelligence (both requiring each other), with no room for only law+chance to produce either FSCI or intelligence. The logical conclusion IMO, is simply that this places both FSCI and intelligence at a level at least as fundamental alongside matter and energy. So, the fundamental fabric of our universe consists of matter, energy, FSCI, and intelligence. This interpretation of what we observe is consistent with what both Granville and aiguy are stating and provides an excellent "diving board" into ID Theory. Furthermore, that interpretation also fits very well with Penrose and Hameroff's theory of consciousness which places a type of proto-consciousness at a level at least alongside matter and energy and possibly fundamental to matter and energy. That's all I've got for now. Education calls.CJYman_{August 2, 2010
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The conversation will probably have already passed me by, by the time this gets out of moderation, but anyway.... KF, he has already said on a number of occasions that he is not a materialist, so what has your second para got to do with anything? And surely your first para is a tautology? The explanation for our acts of intelligence is our intelligence?? And yes I agree with you Vivid, what he is simply saying is that we have no experience of intelligence/complexity - call it what you will - being produced by a non-physical entity.zeroseven_{August 2, 2010
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"AIG is simply refusing to note that he explanation for the acts of intelligence and FSCI is not our physicality but our intelligence; as has been pointed out over and over, with adequate reasons. " KF I hate to disagree with you but I think what AIG is saying is that to say that intelligence is "non physical" is a metaphysical position not something we know scientifically. Vividvividbleau_{August 2, 2010
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Vivid: AIG is simply refusing to note that he explanation for the acts of intelligence and FSCI is not our physicality but our intelligence; as has been pointed out over and over, with adequate reasons. Beyond that, the root issue is not a physical one but a worldview one, as already addressed. Evolutionary materialism is inherently incoherent. Gkairosfocus_{August 2, 2010
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AIGuy, I am not what you would call an ID theorist and I know there are others who are more qualified than I to dialog with you on this subject. However I do want to see this thread continue since I do not think you have received an adequate rebuttal to your objections. So in the spirit of keeping things going I will put my head on the chopping block. Let me summarize Meyers central argument. 1) The activity of a conscious and rational deliberative agent best explains the origin of the information necessary to produce the first living cell. 2) He argues for this because of two things. a) We know from our uniform and repeated experience that intelligent agents have demonstrated the capacity to produce large amounts of functionally specified information (especially in a digital form). b) No undirected chemical process has demonstrated this power. 3) Hence ( using reason to inform the evidence) he concludes intelligent design provides the best—most causally adequate—explanation for the origin of the information necessary to produce the first life from simpler non-living chemicals. In other words, intelligent design is the only explanation that cites a cause known to have the capacity to produce the key effect in question. Your position is That in our uniform and repeated experience, all designers (i.e. producers of FSCI) are complex physical organisms. Thus the claim by Stephen Meyer that there is cause which is known to our uniform and repeated experience which could account for the origin of life is false (because obviously the first complex physical organism could not have been created by another complex physical organism, and no other type of intelligent agent is known in our uniform and repeated experience). AIGuy anything else you would like to add? Vividvividbleau_{August 2, 2010
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Vivid,
“Hence, intelligent design provides the best—most causally adequate—explanation for the origin of the information necessary to produce the first life from simpler non-living chemicals”
Yes - this is the just part where he's wrong (since no causally adequate explanation exists in our uniform and repeated experience).
For the record AI I have not accused you of being a materialist
Quite right - thank you!aiguy_{August 2, 2010
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"which was “Second, no undirected chemical process has demonstrated this power.”) Followed by "Hence, intelligent design provides the best—most causally adequate—explanation for the origin of the information necessary to produce the first life from simpler non-living chemicals" For the record AI I have not accused you of being a materialist. Vividvividbleau_{August 2, 2010
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Vivid,
Perhaps it would be helpful to include the whole paragraph which includes the second of the “two things” which are the basis of his argument.
(which was "Second, no undirected chemical process has demonstrated this power.") Well, if we know of nothing that could account for the creation of FSCI in biology, then we ought to just say so and keep looking. That's what research is all about - trying to figure out what might be behind all of the phenomena we don't understand. So I don't see how this is relevant to my argument at all. It remains the case the Meyer tries to tell us there is a cause known to our experience which could account for the first living cell, but he's wrong. Kairos,
First, what we are discussing is not first life in absolute, but first life on earth in light of the observed life forms in the world around us and the record of the fossils.
Perhaps you'd like to talk about that, but Meyer is talking about "the first living cell", period.
The inference from observation of dFSCI to design, based on its routinely observed cause and the known search resources challenge faced by chance-driven stochastic processes to find islands of function in the relevant configuration spaces, does not entail anything about the originators of cell-based life on earth; than that they were evidently intelligent.
I don't understand this. If there were other living things in the universe before life came to exist on Earth, then the simplest hypothesis would be that we are the descendents of these prior life forms rather than the products of their advanced bioengineering efforts. After all, the only known cause of complex living things is biological reproduction! People (like Crick, or the Raelians) have been talking about that for a long time, but nobody pays much attention because there is no evidence that extra-terrestrial life forms ever existed, much less that their offspring came to Earth.
So, the objections about complex embodied intelligences above are revealed as resting on reasoning in a materialistic circle. Circular reasoning has always seemed entirely logical to those taken in by its assumptions.
Wow - you folks have a very hard time understanding that not all criticisms of ID are materialist! I am not a materialist, and I have never made an argument based on the assumption of materialism, but the only recourse you seem to be able to find when faced with my simple argument is to accuse me of materialism and reductionism! Curious. All in all, I've yet to see anyone who can refute the simple argument that I've made here, which is that when Meyer refers to a cause known to our uniform and repeated experience which could account for the first living cell, he is mistaken.aiguy_{August 2, 2010
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"First, what we are discussing is not first life in absolute, but first life on earth in light of the observed life forms in the world around us and the record of the fossils." Yes. I was going to get around to this in response to this from AIG "Either the intelligent thing that ID hypothesizes is a complex physical organism or it is not. If it is, then ID fails to explain the origin of complex physical organisms" I was not aware that ID has claimed that we can scientifically explain the origin of information. The origin of information in an absolute sense would seem to me to transcend science. Then again I am no ID theorist. Vividvividbleau_{August 2, 2010
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AIG (and Vivid): First, what we are discussing is not first life in absolute, but first life on earth in light of the observed life forms in the world around us and the record of the fossils. The inference from observation of dFSCI to design, based on its routinely observed cause and the known search resources challenge faced by chance-driven stochastic processes to find islands of function in the relevant configuration spaces, does not entail anything about the originators of cell-based life on earth; than that they were evidently intelligent. How that intelligence was based or in what form it appeared is a further and plainly separable question. When we move up to the level of the evident finetuning of the observed cosmos, and its resulting adaptability to C-chemistry, cell based life, then that raises and tends to warrant the inference that the cosmos too is designed. That points to something or someone beyond the cosmos that is very powerful and highly intelligent and purposeful. Something that is beyond matter as we know it. So, the objections about complex embodied intelligences above are revealed as resting on reasoning in a materialistic circle. Circular reasoning has always seemed entirely logical to those taken in by its assumptions. I suggest therefore that AIG take a look here and in the immediately following comment(in a parallel thread), to begin to understand how evolutionary materialism begins to fall apart into self-referential incoherence and amorality. Evolutionary materialism is inescapably self-referentially incoherent and whatever else is true, it cannot be. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{August 2, 2010
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Perhaps it would be helpful to include the whole paragraph which includes the second of the "two things" which are the basis of his argument. "The central argument of my book is that intelligent design—the activity of a conscious and rational deliberative agent—best explains the origin of the information necessary to produce the first living cell. I argue this because of two things that we know from our uniform and repeated experience, which following Charles Darwin I take to be the basis of all scientific reasoning about the past. First, intelligent agents have demonstrated the capacity to produce large amounts of functionally specified information (especially in a digital form). Second, no undirected chemical process has demonstrated this power. Hence, intelligent design provides the best—most causally adequate—explanation for the origin of the information necessary to produce the first life from simpler non-living chemicals. In other words, intelligent design is the only explanation that cites a cause known to have the capacity to produce the key effect in question" Vividvividbleau_{August 2, 2010
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I let the ID Theorists themselves define what scientific reasoning is all about. Here is what Stephen Meyer himself says: HERE
The central argument of my book is that intelligent design—the activity of a conscious and rational deliberative agent—best explains the origin of the information necessary to produce the first living cell. I argue this because of two things that we know from our uniform and repeated experience, which following Charles Darwin I take to be the basis of all scientific reasoning about the past. ...In other words, intelligent design is the only explanation that cites a cause known to have the capacity to produce the key effect in question.
So at this point are we all in agreement here that Meyer is wrong about this?aiguy_{August 2, 2010
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"I have not defined “scientific” at all, so I’m afraid you are again mistaken. My argument is not about what is “scientific” and what is not. Rather, my argument is about what Meyer calls “a cause known to our uniform and repeated experience”. Got it. Vividvividbleau_{August 1, 2010
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Vivid,
If you insist Meyers should only make scientific claims,...
I have never said any such thing. Rather, I have said that if Meyer claims to offer a cause known to our experience, it should indeed be known to our experience.
science being defined “uniform and repeated experience” you should also. I have already given two claims by you that are not scientific as per your definition.
I have not defined "scientific" at all, so I'm afraid you are again mistaken. My argument is not about what is "scientific" and what is not. Rather, my argument is about what Meyer calls "a cause known to our uniform and repeated experience".
I would also ask you if you frequent Darwinist sites to tell them how unscientfic their theories are? After all that is the dominant paradigm, I mean ID is small potatoes compared to Darwinism.
I do often point out that scientists in all fields are likely to underestimate the likelihood that their theories are fundamentally incomplete; this has been famously the case in physics for example. I think the same is true of evolutionary biology.
While you are at it would you answer my question in #61?
("Is it your position that only that which can be empirically confirmed through repeated observation and experience defines what is and is not scientific") I am adopting Meyer's notion of what commends his own theory as being scientific, and have no interest in submitting my own definition. Meyer's theory fails by his own criterion. above,
I’m not dismissing your concern I am merely dismissing it as an adequate argument against ID. In my very first post I stated that I too thought of that so I do acknowledge it. However, I also said that the force of such concern and whether or not it can be a valid argument against ID depends on one’s prior assumptions.
No, it doesn't. It's just the facts of our experience.
Like you said, under dualism the human being is comprised of both a material and an immaterial substance. Now, when a software engineer for example, creates FSCI for a program, which of the two parts is it that acts as the author of such FSCI? The immaterial mind of course.
Now THAT is an ontological assumption!!! Can't you see you are projecting onto me exactly what you are doing yourself? As far as I'm concered, it may be the immaterial mind and it may be purely physical cause - I take no stand either way on these questions!!!. It is you, and only you, who is making these assumptions and insisting that one answer (dualism) is true!
The reason I bring up the example of the past which you refused to address is not because I think you should defend darwinism but rather to show that if you were to use your objection against ID then the same objection would apply to other areas of science, from physics to biology.
I disagree, but I am not arguing about that here, and I don't want to change the subject.
Along with the example I gave of the inability to observe the past, here is another one: Chance. Have you or anyone else ever observed chance? No, and yet it has become part of orthodox darwinism.
Also not germain to my argument (but it is confused to believe that evolutionary biologists - or anyone else - considers "chance" to be a cause, rather than a description of the independence of effects).
We can continue this for the remainder of the day if you like (doubt I will be able to continue this after today though) or we can simply agree that we disagree on the degree of the force of your objection/concern. If that’s something you think you are ok with then we’re good.
. Oh, I think we still disagree pretty fundamentally :-) (and zeroseven #75 - quite right)aiguy_{August 1, 2010
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above, Have you ever seen a mind that didn't have a body attached create software? Given that you state both the body and the mind are in action when the engineer creates a program, why do you go on to assume that the mind could do it on its own? From your example it is just as valid (invalid) to say since the mind could not exist without the body (certainly no evidence of such a thing), it must be the body that does it.zeroseven_{August 1, 2010
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@aiguy -“I really think you are misconstruing my remarks pretty dramatically. I am not equating “intelligence” with “complex physical organism” at all, and none of my comments suggest otherwise. Rather, I am saying while it would be imaginable for something which is not a complex physical organism to be intelligent, there is no such thing in our uniform repeated experience. So no matter how hard you try, you cannot dismiss my argument by saying it rests on materialistic presuppositions – it does not” I’m not dismissing your concern I am merely dismissing it as an adequate argument against ID. In my very first post I stated that I too thought of that so I do acknowledge it. However, I also said that the force of such concern and whether or not it can be a valid argument against ID depends on one’s prior assumptions. -“Sorry, but you just could not be more confused on this point. Of course under dualism humans are not just complex physical entities, but that does not change the fact that they are indeed complex physical entities!!! Under dualism, we have dual natures – one is our material body and one is our immaterial mind. That means that we are spiritual entities AND ALSO material entities! Not just one or the other.” No, I’m not confused at all. I know exactly what dualism entails. Like you said, under dualism the human being is comprised of both a material and an immaterial substance. Now, when a software engineer for example, creates FSCI for a program, which of the two parts is it that acts as the author of such FSCI? The immaterial mind of course. So when I sit next to the engineer and observe him create the program, I am observing both the body AND the mind in action. Now since the body without the mind would not be able to author FSCI it’s logical to conclude that it’s the intelligence of the person that is the cause of FSCI. Now, unless one holds the naïve empiricist position I mentioned earlier and denies logical inference, I don’t see how the objection to ID can be sustained. Basically, the difference between you and me is that I address the matter as a simple concern whereas you utilize it as an objection. That’s the part where we disagree on. -“I am in delimma whatsoever. Who ever said I would defend evolutionary theory?” The reason I bring up the example of the past which you refused to address is not because I think you should defend darwinism but rather to show that if you were to use your objection against ID then the same objection would apply to other areas of science, from physics to biology. Along with the example I gave of the inability to observe the past, here is another one: Chance. Have you or anyone else ever observed chance? No, and yet it has become part of orthodox darwinism. Logical inference is a necessary pillar of science without which it would collapse to the ground. That is what I think Vividbleau is addressing in his posts. So if one were to follow your lead then a big part of modern science is in trouble. We can continue this for the remainder of the day if you like (doubt I will be able to continue this after today though) or we can simply agree that we disagree on the degree of the force of your objection/concern. If that’s something you think you are ok with then we’re good!above_{August 1, 2010
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"I’m having trouble understanding your point. How am I being inconsistent?" If you insist Meyers should only make scientific claims, science being defined "uniform and repeated experience" you should also. I have already given two claims by you that are not scientific as per your definition. I would also ask you if you frequent Darwinist sites to tell them how unscientfic their theories are? After all that is the dominant paradigm, I mean ID is small potatoes compared to Darwinism. While you are at it would you answer my question in #61? Vividvividbleau_{August 1, 2010
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Vivid, I'm having trouble understanding your point. How am I being inconsistent?aiguy_{August 1, 2010
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"This is a statement that true by virtue of the meaning of the word “first”. I hope we do not start doubting the meaning of every word. All I mean is that if X is the first complex organism, then no other complex organism could by definition have existed prior to P." Of course why repeat what has already been said? However if we are going to limit science to our uniform and repeated experience is it to much to ask for consistency on your part? Vividvividbleau_{August 1, 2010
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