The Inconsistencies of Materialism

This is getting beyond absurd. What about “fully explains” is it that you do not understand? I eject myself from this discussion.

Evidently, you do not understand causality. I suspect that you are the only living human being who thinks that an omnipotent God could not possibly create humans with free will. This logical error leaks into all your comments. Even atheists do not go that far. Did it ever occur to you that if you are all alone in your opinion that you should consider revising it? StephenB

SB

Ori: If God, as a universal mover of man’s will, fully explains man’s will movement, then man is not free.

SB: No. It fully explains the fact of the movement, but it does NOT fully explain the direction of the movement ...

This is getting beyond absurd. What about "fully explains" is it that you do not understand? I eject myself from this discussion. Origenes

SB: There is nothing to wonder about. God causes (creates, designs, sustains, gives) free will to man; man, not God, decides how he will use it. Ori

Both man and “free will” have God as a sufficient cause. Therefore man’s “decision” is derived from God, it is like the movement of a billiard ball set in motion purely by something else.

That doesn’t follow. Man’s decisions are not derived from God. Only the power to make them is derived from God. God gives man the power, man decides how he will use it. It is not like the movement of billiard balls. Leave a replyDefault Comments (278)Facebook Comments Logged in as StephenB. Log out? Requir StephenB

Ori

If God as a universal mover of man’s will is a sufficient cause of man’s will, then man is not free.

SB: That doesn’t work at all. If God is the sufficient cause of man’s will, the man must be free by definition, ….

If God, as a universal mover of man’s will, fully explains man’s will movement, then man is not free.

. No. It fully explains the fact of the movement, but it does NOT fully explain the direction of the movement, which is under the control of the human agent. However, this completely ignores my point. If a man has a *will* he is free. The will, by definition, is a faculty that makes free choices. If God causes the will to exist in a man, then God causes the man’s freedom to exist in that same act. The movement of billiard balls is a different kind of causality. Billiard balls do not have wills and cannot choose their direction or their fate.. That is why your ABC analogy doesn’t work. If a man possesses a will, that man is free to use it. If he is not free, then what he possess is not a will. It is something else.

Put differently, if the universal movement of God fully determines man’s will movement …. if a man is like a billiard ball that derives its motion purely from something else …. then man is not free.

As indicated, that doesn’t work. Billiard balls do not have the capacity to choose their direction. They are total slaves to their environment. Humans, by contrast, are not slaves to the elements, so any comparison between them is irrational. Ori:

In Aquinas’s model, we, our reason, and everything else about us, have God as a sufficient cause.

SB: Everything else? My knowledge of mathematics did not have God as a sufficient cause. It was caused by me, my math teacher, and my intellectual faculty.

None of the items you list prevent God from being the sufficient cause of your knowledge of mathematics. Because all the items you list (you, your math teacher, and your intellectual faculty) have God as their 100% sufficient cause. They are all “instrumental causes” of God.

Excuse me, but that is ridiculous. God didn’t teach me mathematics, my teacher did. God didn’t decide to do my homework, I did. God didn’t decide to skip my homework, I did. I should know; I was there, To suggest that God made those decisions is to totally lose contact with reality. SB: There is nothing to wonder about. God causes (creates, designs, sustains, gives) free will to man; man, not God, decides how he will use it. Both man and “free will” have God as a sufficient cause. Therefore man’s “decision” is derived from God, it is like the movement of a billiard ball set in motion purely by something else. That doesn’t follow. Man’s decisions are not derived from God. Only the power to make them is derived from God. God gives man the power, man decides how he will use it. It is not like the movement of billiard balls. StephenB

SB A sufficient cause of X fully explains effect X. An insufficient cause of X partly explains effect X.

Ori: If God as a universal mover of man’s will is a sufficient cause of man’s will, then man is not free.

SB: That doesn’t work at all. If God is the sufficient cause of man’s will, the man must be free by definition, ….

I thought my formulation was clear. Let me try to be clearer: If God, as a universal mover of man’s will, fully explains man’s will movement, then man is not free. Put differently, if the universal movement of God fully determines man’s will movement …. if a man is like a billiard ball that derives its motion purely from something else …. then man is not free.

Ori: In Aquinas’s model, we, our reason, and everything else about us, have God as a sufficient cause.

SB: Everything else? My knowledge of mathematics did not have God as a sufficient cause. It was caused by me, my math teacher, and my intellectual faculty.

None of the items you list prevent God from being the sufficient cause of your knowledge of mathematics. Because all the items you list (you, your math teacher, and your intellectual faculty) have God as their 100% sufficient cause. They are all "instrumental causes" of God.

SB: God was present when I didn’t have that knowledge and, therefore, cannot be its sufficient cause.

Nonsense. Of course, a sufficient cause exists before the effect it causes. Here God operates as the first cause in a causal chain occupied by instrumental causes.

Ori: God is the first cause of man’s free will, but man is free nonetheless. How does that work one wonders.

SB: There is nothing to wonder about. God causes (creates, designs, sustains, gives) free will to man; man, not God, decides how he will use it.

Both man and “free will” have God as a sufficient cause. Therefore man’s “decision” is derived from God, it is like the movement of a billiard ball set in motion purely by something else. Origenes

Origenes

If God as a universal mover of man’s will is a sufficient cause of man’s will, then man is not free.

That doesn’t work at all. If God is the sufficient cause of man’s will, the man must be free by definition, since the will is the faculty by which we make choices and determine actions.

In Aquinas’s model, we, our reason, and everything else about us, have God as a sufficient cause.

Everything else? My knowledge of mathematics did not have God as a sufficient cause. It was caused by me, my math teacher, and my intellectual faculty. God was the first cause of all the operations that made it possible. Aquinas would never say that God was the “sufficient” cause of my math knowledge. A sufficient cause is one that will infallibly produce the effect. God was present when I didn’t have that knowledge and, therefore, cannot be its sufficient cause.

God is the first cause of man’s free will, but man is free nonetheless. How does that work one wonders.

There is nothing to wonder about. God causes (creates, designs, sustains, gives) free will to man; man, not God, decides how he will use it. StephenB

Alan Fox

So I wonder about how non-physical causes bring about physical effects. Where is the interface? At such moments, the laws of physics must break down.

Unless the non-physical operates on the quantum level, that must be true, I agree. If things at the quantum level are indeterminate such that they are significantly adjustable within the limits of the laws of physics, then it remains under the radar. Could it be that manipulation by the non-physical at the quantum level is going on in the brain? I don’t think it is inconceivable. Perhaps it even takes place in every living cell.

The physical effect can be observed and measured (presumably) but the non-physical cause cannot. We would at least observe an unsymmetrical breach of action and reaction being equal and opposite. Yet, whenever, wherever, however we look, such interfaces remain utterly elusive and the physical laws of the Universe remain intact.

Many times a day long strings of chromosomes in our cell get into knots. *Enter Topoisomerases *

Some topoisomerases cut just one strand of the double helix, allow it to wind or unwind around the other strand, and then reconnect the severed ends. This alters the supercoiling of the DNA. Other topoisomerases cut both strands, pass a loop of the chromosome through the gap thus created, and then seal the gap again. [Talbott]

These precision actions of the topoisomerase are unexplained. Why is there no way to measure if there is something “unlikely” about its movements? Why does such a small molecule arrive at just the right place on the chromosome? Its movements will be in accord with the laws, but arriving at the wrong places will be too. Origenes

He [Aquinas] wants God to be the first and sufficient cause of man’s free will, and he wants God not to be the sufficient cause, in order for man to move himself. As I said, God as the sufficient cause does not allow for man’s freedom, and God as the insufficient cause implies that man actually moves himself, which is inconsistent with the theory of act and potency.

I have no problem conceiving of God initially creating the Universe with its physical properties, laws and limits. God can be omnipotent but his creation has the limits imposed at its creation. So I wonder about how non-physical causes bring about physical effects. Where is the interface? At such moments, the laws of physics must break down. The physical effect can be observed and measured (presumably) but the non-physical cause cannot. We would at least observe an unsymmetrical breach of action and reaction being equal and opposite. Yet, whenever, wherever, however we look, such interfaces remain utterly elusive and the physical laws of the Universe remain intact. Alan Fox

~ Aquinas posits that God is the first cause of man’s free decisions ~ Here I want to address this specific idea of Aquinas’s theory, which I do not consider relevant to my main argument, but which contains a logical error that needs pointing out.

Aquinas: Free will is the cause of its own motion, because by his free will man moves himself for the sake of acting. Nevertheless, it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither is it required for one thing to be the cause of another that it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, moving both natural and voluntary causes. And just as by moving natural causes he does not divert their acts from being natural, so by moving voluntary causes he does not divert their actions from being voluntary; but rather he produces this ability in them: for he operates in each thing according to its own nature. [ST Ia 83.1]

Let's have a closer look:

Free will is the cause of its own motion, because by his free will man moves himself for the sake of acting.

Aquinas’s argument from motion, and his theory of act and potency, informs us that nothing can move itself, with the exception of God. Only a being of pure actuality (God) can move itself. So, his statement here “man moves himself” should surprise us. And what we will see in the next few lines, is that Aquinas tries to have it both ways, that is, man can move himself, but, at the same time he cannot.

Nevertheless, it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither is it required for one thing to be the cause of another that it be the first cause.

It is not necessary for man to be the first cause of his self-movement, according to Aquinas. Note that he has stated earlier “free will is the cause of its own motion”, so the idea that something other than man can be the first cause of man’s free will is in need of an explanation.

God, therefore, is the first cause, moving both natural and voluntary causes. And just as by moving natural causes he does not divert their acts from being natural, so by moving voluntary causes he does not divert their actions from being voluntary; but rather he produces this ability in them: for he operates in each thing according to its own nature.

God is the first cause of man’s free will, but man is free nonetheless, according to Aquinas. How does that work, one might wonder. Elsewhere he writes:

God moves man’s will, as the universal mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot will anything, but man determines himself … (…) But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself …

Here is the problem with this compatibilist model: 1.) If God as a universal mover of man’s will is a sufficient cause of man’s will, then man is not free. 2.) If God as a universal mover of man’s will is not a sufficient cause of man’s will, then man moves himself, which is impossible according to the theory of act and potency. It is clear from Aquinas’s texts that he wants both. He wants God to be the first and sufficient cause of man’s free will, and he wants God not to be the sufficient cause, in order for man to move himself. As I said, God as the sufficient cause does not allow for man’s freedom, and God as the insufficient cause implies that man actually moves himself, which is inconsistent with the theory of act and potency. Origenes

SB @

SB: God doesn’t determine those choices, the human agents do.

Aquinas: BUT MAN *DETERMINES HIMSELF* ...

An appeal to both Aquinas and SB: zoom out and see the causal chain in its entirety; read #268. The proper context is the causal chain that starts with God as the 100% sufficient cause of every fiber of the human agent.

SB: God does not determine our choices

God determines every fiber of our being. Therefore we & our "choices" are 100% determined by God. Everything that is involved, when we make a "choice", is 100% determined by God.

Your perennial claim that Aquinas’s model leaves no room for human free will has been refuted by Aquinas’s own words.

For clarity, I am aware of the fact that Aquinas tries to have it both ways. He wants God to be the first cause of everything, and he wants man to be free. It's called compatibilism, and, properly understood, it doesn't work. Origenes

Origenes:

I think our conversation is again coming to an end.

Good idea.

You see freedom and responsibility for the human agent in Aquinas’s model, and I see neither.

It isn't a question of perception, it is a matter of unassailable fact. According to Aquinas, human agents are free to make their own choices and be responsible for them. God doesn't determine those choices, the human agents do. Your perennial claim that Aquinas's model leaves no room for human free will has been refuted by Aquinas's own words.

God moves man’s will, as the universal mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot will anything, BUT MAN *DETERMINES HIMSELF* BY HIS REASON TO WILL THIS OR THAT, WHICH IS TRUE OR APPARENT GOOD.

God does not determine our choices or impose them on us, though God moves our will from the outside in a universal sense insofar as he has decided that our will should pursue what is good. StephenB

SB

This means that God does not determine our choices or impose them on us, though God moves our will from the outside in a universal sense insofar as he has decided that our will should pursue what is good.

In my view, these details are irrelevant. In Aquinas’s model, God is the sufficient cause of the agent and all his aspects. That means that He is the first cause of the causal chain of everything that happens next. Nowhere in this causal chain is a disconnect. Everything traces back to the same first cause.

However, God allows defects in the human agents will, which causes them to pursue something bad that is perceived to be good.

In Aquinas’s model, God is the sufficient cause of the human agent, his faculties, his will, and everything else. If there are any defects, then God bears full responsibility. Human agents neither create themselves nor their defects.

Indeed, Aquinas says that God moves us to determine ourselves by our reason.

In Aquinas’s model, we, our reason, and everything else about us, have God as a sufficient cause. You offer no new insights. - - - - - - - I think our conversation is again coming to an end. You see freedom and responsibility for the human agent in Aquinas’s model, and I see neither. Origenes

Origenes:

I note here, that my argument does not at all depend on God being the first mover of will. My argument is about causation in general and states roughly that because God is the sufficient cause of “free” will, every “free” will act traces back to God.

Yes, I understand your position, but you are seriously wrong. Internal acts by the human agent DO NOT trace back to God – even though God does, indeed, move the will. Aquinas says,

If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself as we have stated, it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit."

This means that God does not determine our choices or impose them on us, though God moves our will from the outside in a universal sense insofar as he has decided that our will should pursue what is good. However, God allows defects in the human agents will, which causes them to pursue something bad that is perceived to be good. Indeed, Aquinas says that God moves us to determine ourselves by our reason. In one place, an objection is presented, "If, therefore, man's will were moved by God alone, it would never be moved to evil." Aquinas answers,

God moves man's will, as the universal mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot will anything, but man determines himself by his reason, to will this or that, which is true or apparent good.

So you are not just making a casual error, you are getting it exactly wrong and this error permeates everything that you write. StephenB

Suppose 3 billiard balls A, B, C. Suppose further that A strikes B, causes B to move, and that this movement of B results in a collision of B with C. Let’s have a closer look at the latter collision in this scenario; the collision between B and C. Focusing on this particular collision, one could say: the collision is purely between B and C, and, therefore, nothing else is involved in this collision. And one could postulate that a “new causal chain” started with B. But when we zoom out and incorporate the role of billiard ball A into our deliberations, then we see that A is the sufficient cause of B’s movement. We see that B’s movement is 100% derived from the movement of A. Now we see a causal chain that starts with A. “So, was it A or B that collided with C ?”, one might ask. And the answer is, of course, “B.” However, the proper context is the entire causal chain, and here the First Cause is A, the responsibility lies with A, and the only true actor is A. Considering the entire causal chain, B is not free and did not make a decision prior to its movement. ~ Note that in Aquinas’s model, there is an A that is the sufficient cause of B in every aspect (not just movement). Origenes

SB

It is important to read Aquinas in context. Aquinas is saying that God is the first agent of willing and voluntary action by virtue of having created the faculty of will …

You have often claimed that Aquinas means by “first cause” of the will, the “creator” of the will, as opposed to the actual “mover” of the will. According to you, the movement of the will is a new causal chain that starts with the agent. This is what Aquinas says:

“God, therefore, is the first cause, moving both natural and voluntary causes. And just as by moving natural causes he does not divert their acts from being natural, so by moving voluntary causes he does not divert their actions from being voluntary; but rather he produces this ability in them: for he operates in each thing according to its own nature. [ST Ia 83.1]”

I note here, that my argument does not at all depend on God being the first mover of will. My argument is about causation in general and states roughly that because God is the sufficient cause of "free" will, every "free" will act traces back to God.

The existence of that faculty (or any “operation”) can be traced back to God as its first cause. That doesn’t mean that God causes the decisions that his created agents make. Quite the contrary.

You are mistaken. It means exactly that God causes the decisions that his created agents make. If you are the sufficient cause of X, then all X’s actions trace back to you as the first cause. If A is the sufficient cause of B, then B’s causal powers and what flows from them are derived from A.

SB: Here, among other places, Aquinas makes the point about the independent volitional power of intelligent agents:

Aquinas: For some beings so exist as God’s products that, *possessing understanding*, they *bear His likeness and reflect His image.* Consequently, they are not only ruled but are also *rulers of themselves,* inasmuch as *their own actions are directed* to a fitting end.

As an aside, addressing your claim that Aquinas is not a compatibilist, here we see compatibilism in action: “they are not only ruled but are also rulers of themselves …” Translation: they are determined AND they are free. Freedom is (supposedly) compatible with being determined. God created every fiber of our being, sustains our existence, God is the first mover of our will, and we are determined towards a “fitting end.” And we are free? That is pure compatibilism. To address Aquinas's quote, he may say that human beings are (also) “rulers of themselves”, but that is an empty claim, it does not make sense in his deterministic model.

Ori: Because the capacities and faculties you describe (also) have God as a sufficient cause, logically, they have their causal powers derivatively from God.

Their causal powers are, indeed, derived from God, as I have indicated many times, but the uses they make of those powers, that is, their free will decisions, are not derived from God at all; they come from the agent.

The agent also has God as its 100% sufficient cause, therefore everything the agent is and does traces back to God as the sufficient cause.

Ori: When billiard ball A sets billiard ball B into motion, then billiard ball B has its movement derived from billiard ball A. This means that the derived movement of billiard ball B does not originate from itself. And so it is with the derived “decisions” of agents, in Aquinas’s model they do not originate from the agent. If A causes B, and we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B.

Origenes

cancel StephenB

Origenes:

Aquinas states that God is the first cause of “both natural and voluntary” action. He states that God is the “first agent of willing”, “every movement of a will …. is reduced to God” and, “every operation should be attributed to God.”

It is important to read Aquinas in context. Aquinas is saying that God is the first agent of willing and voluntary action by virtue of having created the faculty of will, which is the necessary condition for any free will act. The existence of that faculty (or any “operation”) can be traced back to God as its first cause. That doesn’t mean that God causes the decisions that his created agents make. Quite the contrary. The faculties of intellect and will were made for a purpose: To give human agents the power to know the truth and pursue the good. Both require free will. Here, among other places, Aquinas makes the point about the independent volitional power of intelligent agents: :

For some beings so exist as God’s products that, *possessing understanding*, they *bear His likeness and reflect His image.* Consequently, they are not only ruled but are also *rulers of themselves,* inasmuch as *their own actions are directed* to a fitting end.

They rule themselves and direct their own actions. Thus, they have free will and the prospect of determinism is ruled out. Then we have Aquinas’ own testimony in other places about his support of free will and his rejection of determinism. Any other interpretation is a consequence of reading him out of context.

Because the capacities and faculties you describe (also) have God as a sufficient cause, logically, they have their causal powers derivatively from God.

Their causal powers are, indeed, derived from God, as I have indicated many times, but the uses they make of those powers, that is, their free will decisions, are not derived from God at all; they come from the agent. This is Aquinas' position. StephenB

SB

It seems evident that the cause is God’s decision to create an agent with decision-making capacities and the effect is the agent’s decision to use those capacities by starting a new causal chain.

To be clear, “starting a new causal chain” is your proposition. Instead, Aquinas states that God is the first cause of “both natural and voluntary” action. He states that God is the “first agent of willing”, “every movement of a will …. is reduced to God” and, “every operation should be attributed to God.”

These capacities (the faculties of intellect and will) allow human agents to deliberate, consider options, and make one specific decision among several possible alternatives, which is the essence of free will.

Because the capacities and faculties you describe (also) have God as a sufficient cause, logically, they have their causal powers derivatively from God. In such cases Aquinas speaks of a “secondary cause”, to make clear that it is not the start of the causal chain. When billiard ball A sets billiard ball B into motion, then billiard ball B has its movement derived from billiard ball A. This means that the derived movement of billiard ball B does not originate from itself. And so it is with the derived “decisions” of agents, in Aquinas’s model they do not originate from the agent. If A causes B, and we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B. Origenes

Origenes:

So, something that is 100% created by God, who lives in a world 100% made by God, and cannot get to the next second in time without God sustaining his existence, is *somehow* disconnecting (?) from God, and starts to make his “own” independent decisions. How does this idea make any sense? Explain it. (From a causal perspective).

I am still not clear on why this is perceived to be a problem. Perhaps you can help me to better understand your objection here. This is my proposition: It seems evident that the cause is God’s decision to create an agent with decision-making capacities and the effect is the agent’s decision to use those capacities by starting a new causal chain. These capacities (the faculties of intellect and will) allow human agents to deliberate, consider options, and make one specific decision among several possible alternatives, which is the essence of free will. (This model differs from one which has the Creator making decisions *through* a human agent, in which case the agent’s will is not free to make its own choices, which have been determined). In the free will model, the Creator builds a measure of independence into the agent’s nature by endowing it with intellectual and volitional capabilities which are, in themselves, God like powers that allow created agents to make their own decisions, even though God is 100% responsible for their existence. What that means is that God can create and sustain these intellectual and volitional capacities without controlling them. Indeed, the Creator designs the free will agent to do most of the controlling. That is where the independence comes from. God doesn’t mind it when his creatures grow and build in their own way, provided that they use their free will to act in accordance with their nature. From that standpoint, free will agents who use their intelligence to make decisions that God equipped them to make can be compared to dam-making beavers who use their instincts to build dams that God equipped them to build. God doesn’t make human decisions or build beaver dams, even though he is 100% responsible for the existence of human intelligence and animal instinct. The add-on would be this: humans, unlike animals, can ask God for wisdom, which is helpful to the task of making sound decisions. None of this means that human decision makers become disconnected from God as their cause when they make an independent, free will decision. The small portion of independence that they do have is a gift and the receiver of that gift is tied to the giver in the same way that an effect is tied to a cause. StephenB

SB

Only God is pure actuality and everything, including the actions of a created intelligent agent, is caused by God *in the sense* that He created and sustains the agent’s capacity to think and make decisions. Thus, God cooperates with the decision maker without determining the specific nature of the decision.

Let me get this straight: So, we have something that is 100% made by God, and we call it an “agent.” Not one fiber of this being is not 100% sufficiently caused and is not 100% fully determined, by God. And this agent is going to make his “own” decisions? So, something that is 100% created by God, who lives in a world 100% made by God, and cannot get to the next second in time without God sustaining his existence, is *somehow* disconnecting (?) from God, and starts to make his “own” independent decisions. How does this idea make any sense? Explain it. What kind of causality allows for an effect (the agent) to act independently from its 100% sufficient cause (God)? Where in this 100 % deterministic scenario can there possibly be any independence from the Cause? How can something that is entirely made by God, do anything that is independent of God?

Those actions are also caused by the intelligent agent himself *in the sense* that he makes a specific decision, based on his personal preferences, knowledge, and beliefs, using those gifts of intelligence and free will.

Just like that.

Accordingly, Aquinas is neither a compatibilist or a determinist.

…. Origenes

SB: If it *cannot be the case* and *cannot be true,* it follows that it contains logical errors. Origenes:

No, that does not follow. When a premise is incorrect one arrives necessarily at the wrong conclusion despite perfectly logical reasoning.

Of course. I understand that. I am referring to the reasoning that forms the premises.

I hold that something is off with his (Aquinas') theory of act and potency and that those premises that are based on it (premises 2,3, and 4) are incorrect. His theory of act and potency implies that only pure actuality, that is God, can move itself, and, in fact, makes the entire argument.

All the premises in the argument are true, including 2, 3, and 4. So is the conclusion. Only God is pure actuality and everything, including the actions of a created intelligent agent, is caused by God *in the sense* that He created and sustains the agent’s capacity to think and make decisions. Thus, God cooperates with the decision maker without determining the specific nature of the decision. Those actions are also caused by the intelligent agent himself *in the sense* that he makes a specific decision, based on his personal preferences, knowledge, and beliefs, using those gifts of intelligence and free will. The intelligent agent, who starts a new causal chain, is being moved by God in the first sense, that is, the sense in which the agent’s existence and capacities are being sustained. At least two causes are in play: God causes the movement, the agent gives it direction. That is why human agents can militate against God’s will, something that is impossible without free will. So “self movement” can be understood in two ways, in an absolute sense and in a relative sense. Only God can move himself in an absolute sense. That is what Aquinas is referring to and that is what makes the argument work. Human agents, on the other hand, can move themselves in a relative sense. That kind of movement is enough to allow for free will and rule out determinism. That is because human agents can choose one course of action from among many possible alternatives. That is what free will means and that is the way I define it. Accordingly, Aquinas is neither a compatibilist or a determinist. By contrast, your definition of free will, i. e. "self determinism," doesn't really address any of the major issues. Who can possibly know what that means? Total dominion? Without limit? Self knowledge? (What about the will?) Self creating? (which you seem to attribute to yourself). How does that definition relate to the moral life (a term you seldom if ever use) or the purpose of our existence. What about the problem of Good and Evil? Right and wrong? On all these matters you are silent.

The Feser quote in #255 confirms that this is fundamental for Aquinas’s “Argument from Motion.”

Yes, that leads me once again to my question, which you continue to evade. Why do you trust Ed Feser’s judgment in describing Aquinas’ argument and yet, at the same time, distrust his judgment when he says that Aquinas’ argument is valid. Indeed, why do you distrust his judgment when he assures us that Aquinas believes in free will, which is what Aquinas says about himself?

You have denied all of this over and over. You have said again and again that Aquinas didn’t mean that only God can move Himself, that he didn’t mean that there is no self-movement of other things.

I have said that Aquinas allows for self movement *as you understand the meaning of the term,* which is not what Aquinas means by self movement – as Indicated above. This is why I often ask you to define your terms. StephenB

SB: Reading Feser is a good start. I recommend that you keep reading him. until you understand why he accepts and defends Aquinas’ argument and why …. You might even consider reading his book, “Five proofs for the existence of God.”

A word of warning. Before the gentle onlooker goes out to purchase Feser’s book, I want to make sure that he knows that Edward firmly rejects intelligent design. Instead, he accepts Darwinistic evolution and holds that it is compatible with the creation story. In my estimation, this is indicative of an overall compatibilist mindset. For someone who manages to hold theistic evolution to be a coherent idea, holding free will and determinism to be compatible is straightforward. BTW his post The trouble with William Paley is one of the dumbest articles I have ever read. I sincerely regret quoting him, and will not make the same mistake again. --- edit: Feser's website is rejected by Wordpress. Maybe I can offer the links like this: https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/05/id-versus-t-roundup.html https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/11/trouble-with-william-paley.html Origenes

SB In your post #256, you are talking about Aquinas’s “Argument from Motion” and you are telling me that I should read Feser in order to understand why my claim that it contains logical errors is mistaken. I have never made the claim that the argument from motion contains logical errors.

SB: You said, — “Given that I am rational, it *cannot be the case* (per Aquinas) that God moves all things, my thoughts included. ‘God moves all things’, and ‘Nothing can move itself except for God’ *cannot be true.* If it *cannot be the case* and *cannot be true,* it follows that it contains logical errors.

No, that does not follow. When a premise is incorrect one arrives necessarily at the wrong conclusion despite perfectly logical reasoning.

The First Way: Argument from Motion 1.) Our senses prove that some things are in motion. 2.) Things move when potential motion becomes actual motion. 3.) Only an actual motion can convert a potential motion into an actual motion. 4.) Nothing can be at once in both actuality and potentiality in the same respect (i.e., if both actual and potential, it is actual in one respect and potential in another). 5.) Therefore nothing can move itself. 6.) Therefore each thing in motion is moved by something else. 7.) The sequence of motion cannot extend ad infinitum. 8.) Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

I hold that something is off with his theory of act and potency and that those premises that are based on it (premises 2,3, and 4) are incorrect. His theory of act and potency implies that only pure actuality, that is God, can move itself, and, in fact, makes the entire argument. The Feser quote in #255 confirms that this is fundamental for Aquinas’s “Argument from Motion.”

And the argument from motion claims that only that which is pure actuality— that which is, as it were, “already” fully actual and thus need not (indeed cannot) have been actualized by anything else — can be causally fundamental or underived in an absolute sense. [Feser]

Based on the premises following from his theory of act and potency Aquinas arrives at his 5th premise:

5.) Therefore nothing can move itself.

And from here on, again by perfectly logically executed reasoning, Aquinas arrives at his conclusion:

8.) Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

“Nothing can move itself” includes you and me, and exempts only God. Only God can move Himself, everything else (you and me included) derives its movement from God. If something other than God moves and is a cause, then it is an “instrumental” cause, which means an instrument by God (see the Feser quote #255). As Aquinas himself said: “every operation should be attributed to God.” In Aquinas’s model all movement is derived from God. Aquinas’s model is total determinism. There is but one actor. I dare anyone to come up with a more deterministic model. It cannot be done. Things cannot possibly get any more deterministic than this. You have denied all of this over and over. You have said again and again that Aquinas didn’t mean that only God can move Himself, that he didn’t mean that there is no self-movement of other things. You have fundamentally misunderstood Aquinas and his argument from motion, and I have your posts to prove it. - - - - - - - With this deterministic model as a basis, Aquinas proceeds with an attempt to fit in free will.

SB: Again, you said “First Thomas says ‘man moves himself’ and next he says ‘God is the first cause of the (voluntary) movement of man.’ “The latter does not make sense.” If it doesn’t make sense, it means that it contains logical errors.

This is not about Aquinas's argument from motion, which I have never claimed to contain logical errors. This is about Aquinas's subsequent compatibilist effort to fit free will in his deterministic model. You are correct that I claim that this effort fails on logical grounds. I have tried to discuss his compatibilism with you in another thread, e.g. in post #26 and #153, only to be met with another round of ridicule and blind obstruction. Origenes

SB:… and why your claim that (Aquinas' argument) contains logical errors is mistaken.

Not my claim. Yet another false statement.

You said, --- "Given that I am rational, it *cannot be the case* (per Aquinas) that God moves all things, my thoughts included. 'God moves all things', and 'Nothing can move itself except for God' *cannot be true.* If it *cannot be the case* and *cannot be true,* it follows that it contains logical errors. Again, you said "First Thomas says 'man moves himself' and next he says ‘God is the first cause of the (voluntary) movement of man.’ "The latter does not make sense." If it doesn't make sense, it means that it contains logical errors. However, in the spirit of absolute moral precision, I will retract my comment that you made a direct claim to that effect and simply say that you implied that it contains logical errors and did it often. In the same sense you *implied* that Aquinas' argument was not valid by saying that it only works as an argument against determinism, which is yet another way of saying that it doesn't work at all, presumably because it contains logical errors. Meanwhile, you avoided the substance of my comment. Ed Feser, whom you quoted with apparent approval, accepts and defends the validity of Aquinas's argument. Do you now agree with his conclusion? StephenB

SB

... and why your claim that it contains logical errors is mistaken.

Not my claim. Yet another false statement. Origenes

Origenes

Edward Feser on ‘The Argument from Motion’:.....

Reading Feser is a good start. I recommend that you keep reading him. until you understand why he accepts and defends Aquinas' argument and why your claim that it contains logical errors is mistaken. You might even consider reading his book, "Five proofs for the existence of God." StephenB

Edward Feser on 'The Argument from Motion':

Now it is essentially ordered series rather than accidentally ordered series that necessarily have a first member. But “first” here doesn’t mean “the member that comes at the head of the line, before the second, third, fourth, etc.” Rather, “first” means “fundamental” or “underived.” The idea is that a series of instrumental causes – causes that have their causal power only derivatively, only insofar as they act as instruments of something else – must necessarily trace to something that has its causal power in a non-instrumental way, something which can cause without having to be made to cause by something else. And the argument from motion claims that only that which is pure actuality -- that which is, as it were, “already” fully actual and thus need not (indeed cannot) have been actualized by anything else -- can be causally fundamental or underived in an absolute sense. [Source: Feser's Blog]

Origenes

Silver Asiatic @248

We often confuse the kind of movement that Aquinas is referring to as “things moving around” but he’s talking about the movement of change – from potentiality to act.

In Aquinas's view, all things are a mixture of potentiality and actuality, except for God who is pure actuality. According to his theory of potency and act, only pure actuality can move itself, and it is impossible for mixtures of potentiality and actuality (such as us) to actualize (e.g. to move) themselves. That is precisely the reason why he arrives at his 5th premise: “therefore nothing can move itself.”

In that case, we ourselves are not self-moved. We are contingent on other things to move us.

We are in agreement. And, to be clear, if we are indeed “contingent on other things to move us”, just like billiard balls are, then we are fully determined and not self-moved & free. So here is the problem: according to Aquinas, we cannot move ourselves. Arguably self-movement, self-determination, is the essence of freedom, so, clearly, Aquinas’s model has a problem allowing for free rational self-moved agents. Origenes

~ StephenB and the Exclusion that Never was ~

Ori: Do you remember the 5th premise of Aquinas’ “The First Way: Argument from Motion”? Here it is: 5.) Therefore nothing can move itself.

SB: Sure.

Ori: Yet, self-movement exists, as you have said.

SB: Right again.

Ori: So, how does that work? How does self-movement fit in a world where nothing can move itself?

SB: It isn’t a problem.. Aquinas means that there is no self-movement in the *natural world.* He doesn’t mean there is no self movement *at all.*

So, when Aquinas says “therefore nothing can move itself”, he is only talking about observable moving objects that exist in the natural world, he is not talking about e.g. billiard players.

SB: The key point here is to realize that when Aquinas uses words like “something” or “a thing” in this context, he is alluding to observable moving objects that exist in the natural world, none of which can move themselves.

Are you sure that Aquinas does not mean billiard players as well when he says that “nothing can move itself”? I am asking because the 5th premise of his argument from motion, “therefore nothing can move itself”, is essential for his argument that each and every movement traces back to the First Mover. If instead, there is self-movement of things, such as billiard players, then his entire argument fails.

SB: He certainly doesn’t mean that there is no self-movement at all.

Really? So, “nothing can move itself” excludes intelligent agents, such as billiard players.

As you pointed out, and as Aquinas understood, that would be a false proposition. (...) Origenes thinks Aquinas made a logical error by implying that there are no agent causes and that the billiard player is just as much of a slave to the elements as the billiard balls he moves.

Summing up: when Aquinas says “nothing can move itself” he is talking about “things”, about “observable moving objects that exist in the natural world”, and he is not talking about intelligent agents such as billiard players. HOWEVER, when Aquinas states that God is the first cause of “both natural and voluntary” action, he seems to be talking about agents as well. And when he states that God is the “first agent of willing”, “every movement of a will …. is reduced to God” and, “every operation should be attributed to God”, then contrary to your claim, he seems to be talking about agents as well. So, what is going on here, is Aquinas excluding intelligent agents when he says “nothing can move itself” or isn’t he?

SB: He is not excluding intelligent agents. God is the first cause of everything.

Good to have that cleared up. Origenes

Origenes:

Anyway, it follows from what you are telling me that Aquinas “First Way, the Argument from Motion” is not valid.

No. StephenB

I think it’s fair to say that Aquinas does not write very clearly.

Clarity is always lost in a summary. His extended proof, which you did not allude to, is much more expansive.

When he states that God is the first cause of “both natural and voluntary” action, he is not clear about excluding intelligent agents.

He is not excluding intelligent agents. God is the first cause of everything. He acts as the first cause of intelligent agents by providing them with the intellectual capacity to start a new causal chain. StephenB

Silver Asiatic.

We often confuse the kind of movement that Aquinas is referring to as “things moving around” but he’s talking about the movement of change – from potentiality to act.

Yes, that is my understanding as well. However, Origenes thinks Aquinas made a logical error by implying that there are no agent causes and that the billiard player is just as much of a slave to the elements as the billiard balls he moves. In that context, I think it is appropriate to characterize the former as a self-moving agent who is capable of beginning new causal chains, much like the train's engine is, so to speak, a self mover of all the cars that follow. Clearly, billiard balls do not have that kind of power. At the same time, we realize that the billiard player is not absolutely self moving because the Creator caused and continues to sustain existence and his decision making capacities. In other words, I am working with Origenes understanding of "movement" (moving things around) to show that Aquinas would not disagree with the proposition that human causal agents really do exist and that the substance of their free will decisions come from them, not from God. StephenB

SB:

The key point here is to realize that when Aquinas uses words like “something” or “a thing” in this context, he is alluding to observable moving objects that exist in the natural world, none of which can move themselves. Aquinas means that there is no self-movement in the *natural world.* He doesn’t mean there is no self movement *at all.*

I think it's fair to say that Aquinas does not write very clearly. When he states that God is the first cause of “both natural and voluntary” action, he is not clear about excluding intelligent agents. And when he states that God is the “first agent of willing”, “every movement of a will …. is reduced to God” and, “every operation should be attributed to God.” he is also not making it clear that he is only referring to 'observable moving objects that exist in the natural world', as you call them. Anyway, it follows from what you are telling me that Aquinas “First Way, the Argument from Motion” is not valid. I guess it is not the case that only pure actuality can move itself. Aquinas argues from the 5th premise “nothing can move itself” that we necessarily arrive at a first mover. But you tell me that is not really true. It is actually not the case, as he asserts, that “each thing in motion” must necessarily be traced back to the First Mover. Aquinas knew this but wrote his argument anyway. He knew full well that the motion of a thing can also trace back to something other than the First Mover, (e.g. a billiard player) because, as you say, it is not the case that there is no self movement *at all.* Origenes

We often confuse the kind of movement that Aquinas is referring to as "things moving around" but he's talking about the movement of change - from potentiality to act. In that case, we ourselves are not self-moved. We are contingent on other things to move us. One thing we're contingent on is "life itself". That is something we did not create - so we don't create our own power of self-movement. In the same way, human nature is given to us - we don't create it. So, we are not independent agents that can move ourselves without reliance on things given. For example, we change from potency to act as we mature. But we are not moving ourselves when we grow older - like a plant doesn't move itself when it grows. Silver Asiatic

Origenes:

Giving self-movement the name “agency cause” is not an explanation.

Self movement can be explained in no other way. It is a mind/body problem that no one can solve.

The movement of a billiard ball is explained by the presence of a cause.

Of course.

The traditional causal model of cause & effect is not restricted to physical causes, as you suggest, because some physical things are intelligently designed, so they do not have a physical cause (but a cause nonetheless).

Right. Also, there are many other kinds of causes besides efficient causes (where one thing causes another thing to move, change, or come to be) such as formal, material, and final causes. Along about the time of Bacon, formal and final causes fell out of favor, but that was a mistake. Also, there is the problem of methodological naturalism which holds that nature should be studied as if nature is all there is.

Do you remember the 5th premise of Aquinas’ “The First Way: Argument from Motion”? Here it is: 5.) Therefore nothing can move itself.

Sure.

Yet, self-movement exists, as you have said.

Right again.

So, how does that work? How does self-movement fit in a world where nothing can move itself? Are you now beginning to see the problem here?

It isn't a problem.. Aquinas means that there is no self-movement in the *natural world.* He doesn't mean there is no self movement *at all.*

I can hardly formulate the question coherently, perhaps this will work: If nothing can move itself, what explains self-movement?

You are doing fine. It is not an easy question to formulate. That is why I juxtaposed the self movement of the pool player with the non-self movement of the billiard balls so it would be easy to understand that self movement "fits in" (your words) with efficient causality. The key point here is to realize that when Aquinas uses words like "something" or "a thing" in this context, he is alluding to observable moving objects that exist in the natural world, none of which can move themselves. He certainly doesn't mean that there is no self-movement at all. As you pointed out, and as Aquinas understood, that would be a false proposition. StephenB

SB

The self-movement is explained as an agency cause.

Giving self-movement the name “agency cause” is not an explanation.

The moving billiard balls are explained as physical causes, traditional physical causes, if you like.

The movement of a billiard ball is explained by the presence of a cause. The traditional causal model of cause & effect is not restricted to physical causes, as you suggest, because some physical things are intelligently designed, so they do not have a physical cause (but a cause nonetheless). - - - - - Do you remember the 5th premise of Aquinas’ “The First Way: Argument from Motion”? Here it is:

5.) Therefore nothing can move itself.

Yet, self-movement exists, as you have said. So, how does that work? How does self-movement fit in a world where nothing can move itself? Are you now beginning to see the problem here? I can hardly formulate the question coherently, perhaps this will work: If nothing can move itself, what explains self-movement?

Thus, the agency cause interacts with the physical causes, indicating that the former fits in with the latter. Very simple.

You thought that a billiard player making a shot answered my question ..... Origenes

Origenes:

Here you simply assume what needs to be explained, namely, the self-movement of a billiard player. The question is how do you explain self-movement?

The self-movement is explained as an agency cause. The moving billiard balls are explained as physical causes, traditional physical causes, if you like. Thus, the agency cause interacts with the physical causes, indicating that the former fits in with the latter. Very simple. If you disagree, make your case. Why do you think that agency cause (self movement) doesn't fit in with traditional physical causes? StephenB

SB @241

The older version of the boy is in the military; the 12 year old version is not, and cannot be. You cannot both be in the military and not be in the military at the same time. Law of non-contradiction.

You pretend that I claim that the 12-year-old is “in the military.” My intention was to clarify what becoming means by offering a comparison. The seed is becoming the tree, would be another one. In my view, human beings are also "becoming", meaning that we are on our way to becoming completely free beings.

You cannot both *have free will* and *be on your way to getting it* at the same time.

As I have attempted to explain earlier in #215, I propose that each of us is on an individual path toward “complete freedom and complete self-knowledge”, both of which, most of us, obviously, have not acquired yet. Being on the path obviously implies that one has acquired (limited) freedom already. And in #209 I argue that self-determination, which I consider to be the essence of freedom, is foundational to the entire process of becoming.

Free will is an integral part of our human nature. You cannot, as you mistakenly believe, acquire it by working at it.

In my view, each human being is in a continual process of self-liberation. Freedom is not a static property, but rather is in a continual process of becoming.

Ori: I still say that. In my view, all aspects of a human being are in a process of becoming.

SB: Still say? This is the second or third time you have changed your story. First, you said what you are saying now. Then, when I described aspects of a human being that are not in a state of becoming, you acknowledged that only *some* things about humans are in a state of becoming.

You are mistaken. What I actually said was:

Ori: In a way, that is what *becoming* entails. Some things are in a process of transition from state A to state B. Growth is real. Not everything is frozen in time. Not everything is static.

This is no acknowledgment of anything you have said. It is clear that I speak about the concept of becoming in general. I am simply saying that some things in the world are in a process of transition, that is, *becoming*. And nowhere do I say, or imply, that I am talking about a limited set of aspects of a human being. Origenes

Querius, thanks very much for your stimulating input. I agree with your observations that definitions are vital, free will is a kind of midpoint between two extremes, and that emotions are exceedingly complicated. and often difficult to account for. To me, the most entertaining part of your comment was the parenthetical phrase (which should be obvious to non-lawyers). StephenB

SB @241 ~ on Self-movement and Traditional Causality

Ori: In #215 I have pointed out that there is a problem fitting self-movement in a traditional causal model where A causes B.

There is no problem. A *self moving* billiards player causes billiard ball a to move billiard ball b. The player is free to do move or not move; the billiard balls, neither of which are – or could ever be – self moving, follow the physical laws of cause and effect. Thus, self movement is compatible with traditional causality. If you need other examples, let me know.

This is getting ridiculous. Here you simply assume what needs to be explained, namely, the self-movement of a billiard player. The question is how do you explain self-movement? And specifically, how do you explain it (how does it fit) in a traditional causal setting? In traditional causality, there are no self-movers. In traditional causality, things are moved by something else. You keep saying that self-movement fits traditional causality nonetheless. Show me how you explain self-movement with a traditional causal model (other than by simply assuming it, as you just did once again). This is the umpteenth time that I ask you the same question. Is the question too difficult for you to understand? Origenes

Origenes

:In #215 I have pointed out that there is a problem fitting self-movement in a traditional causal model where A causes B.

There is no problem. A *self moving* billiards player causes billiard ball a to move billiard ball b. The player is free to do move or not move; the billiard balls, neither of which are - or could ever be - self moving, follow the physical laws of cause and effect. Thus, self movement is compatible with traditional causality. If you need other examples, let me know.

So, I was right all along: self-movement does not fit a traditional causal model where A causes B. Correct?

Incorrect. As my example makes clear, you were wrong all along. If you still disagree, make your case. A bald assertion repeated over and over again will not suffice. SB: A 12 year old boy that dreams of being a soldier in the military cannot also be a soldier in the military.

Yet, as you will surely understand, the boy and the soldier are the same person.

Irrelevant. The older version of the boy is in the military; the 12 year old version is not, and cannot be. You cannot both be in the military and not be in the military at the same time. Law of non-contradiction.

These are some of the difficulties when we are dealing with *becoming*, which an over-simplistic application of logic cannot tackle.

It is through logic that we understand the difference between being and becoming. A three month old fetus develops *as* a human being, not *into* a human being. Baby killers often try to deny this fact by claiming that it was not yet human when they killed it. In the same sense, a human being grows *as* a free will agent, not *into* a free will agent. It is not logically possible to grow *as* and *into* at the same time. You cannot both *have free will* and *be on your way to getting it* at the same time. Free will is an integral part of our human nature. You cannot, as you mistakenly believe, acquire it by working at it.

I still say that. In my view, all aspects of a human being are in a process of becoming.

Still say? This is the second or third time you have changed your story. First, you said what you are saying now. Then, when I described aspects of a human being that are not in a state of becoming, you acknowledged that only *some* things about humans are in a state of becoming. Now you have reverted back to your original claim. Please provide your final answer since it is difficult to correct a moving target. StephenB

StephenB and Origenes, Your conversation and disagreement is both thoughtful and interesting. Let me just add my observation that so much depends on definitions and perspectives regarding free will, and that it's most likely that the truth exists somewhere between the binary extremes. In my view, the relationships between areas of compulsion, whim, emotion, motivation, etc. are likely at least as complex as thermodynamics, and we have no mathematical resources to address these relationships. For example, some articulable "free will" options might never enter the mind of a person:

In a hypothetical ethics class required for law school, the following ethical problem was presented to the class in a mid-term: "4. You have gone into partnership with another lawyer. One of your clients has paid you in cash, however two of the hundred-dollar bills were stuck together, so your client accidentally paid you a hundred dollars extra. Here's the ethical question: Do you tell your partner about the extra hundred dollars? You may use both sides of the paper, if necessary."

Does the option (which should be obvious to non-lawyers) not considered in the example mean that the lawyer (or the law professor) had no free will? -Q Querius

SB

SB: Your logic @209 fails, especially when you say “Perhaps it makes good sense to say that the boy who will one day become a soldier, is already a soldier.” Not if you define your terms. A 12 year old boy that dreams of being a soldier in the military cannot also be a soldier in the military.

Yet, as you will surely understand, the boy and the soldier are the same person. You seem to want to make a definite distinction/separation between the 12-year-old boy and the soldier on the level of identity, which cannot be done. The 12-year-old StephenB is not the philosopher that you are now. However, also here, there is but one person. These are some of the difficulties when we are dealing with *becoming*, which an over-simplistic application of logic cannot tackle.

SB: You are trying to justify your claim that humans can fashion their own free will through their own efforts. It cannot happen.

I disagree.

You quietly moved the goal posts. Earlier, you said that we are “becoming beings,” period.

I still say that. In my view, all aspects of a human being are in a process of becoming.

Ori: Acquiring self-knowledge is not “mysterious.”

SB: Notice that you completely avoid the point with a silly distraction. A human being cannot create or attain free will for himself. It is logically impossible.

Not sure what you mean here. I have argued before that by acquiring self-knowledge freedom is expanded. On a more general note, free will, like self-movement, can only come from the human being itself. Origenes

SB ~ On Self-movement and Traditional Causality ~ You have confirmed that “freedom includes self-movement”. In #215 I have pointed out that there is a problem fitting self-movement in a traditional causal model where A causes B. I posed the general question:

Ori: … does self-movement fit the good old traditional causal model where A causes B?

In # 234 your answer to my question was clear and short:

SB: Yes.

and you went on to say that “there is no logical problem here.” But you did not provide a traditional causal model which describes self-movement. So, in #236, I again asked you:

Ori: How does it fit then? How does A cause B to self-move?

Your answer, in #237:

SB: As I said, Billiard ball A doesn’t cause billiard ball B to *self* move. Billiard ball A moves billiard ball B. It was all right there on the page waiting to be read.

Here, despite earlier claims to the contrary, you seem to confirm that there is no traditional causal model where A causes B to self-move. So, I was right all along: self-movement does not fit a traditional causal model where A causes B. Correct? Origenes

SB If we grow *into* free will agents, (as opposed to growing *as* free will agents) it would mean that we didn’t have free will until the growth occurred, which is the incorrect model. Origenes:

No, as I have argued in #209, it doesn’t mean that.

Yes, it means exactly that. Your logic @209 fails, especially when you say “Perhaps it makes good sense to say that the boy who will one day become a soldier, is already a soldier." Not if you define your terms. A 12 year old boy that dreams of being a soldier in the military cannot also be a soldier in the military. He may not even live long enough to become one. Your claim to the contrary violates the law of non-contradiction. In the same way, it would make no sense to say that since you will die someday, you are already dead. You are trying to justify your claim that humans can fashion their own free will through their own efforts. It cannot happen.

In a way, that is what *becoming* entails. Some things are in a process of transition from state A to state B. Growth is real. Not everything is frozen in time. Not everything is static.

You quietly moved the goal posts. Earlier, you said that we are “becoming beings,” period. I corrected that overstatement to show that some things about humans are unchanging and others are in a state of becoming. Now, you acknowledge that only *some* things are in a state of transition, which was my point all along, not yours. SB: It is also logically impossible for a human being to create his own free will or attain it through some mysterious process?

Acquiring self-knowledge is not “mysterious.”

Notice that you completely avoid the point with a silly distraction. A human being cannot create or attain free will for himself. It is logically impossible. (On causation)

How does it fit then? How does (billiard ball) A cause (billiard ball) B to self-move?

As I said, Billiard ball A doesn’t cause billiard ball B to *self* move. Billiard ball A moves billiard ball B. It was all right there on the page waiting to be read. StephenB

SB

If we grow *into* free will agents, it means that we didn’t have free will until the growth occurred, which is the incorrect model.

No, as I have argued in #209, it doesn’t mean that.

It cannot be both at the same time.

In a way, that is what *becoming* entails. Some things are in a process of transition from state A to state B. Growth is real. Not everything is frozen in time. Not everything is static.

It is also logically impossible for a human being to create his own free will or attain it through some mysterious process?

Acquiring self-knowledge is not “mysterious.”

Freedom includes self-movement, (…)

Does self-movement fit the good old traditional causal model where A causes B?

Yes. (…) There is no logical problem here.

How does it fit then? How does A cause B to self-move? Origenes

AF, you know full well that I have not misinterpreted Lehninger and heirs. They went to the extreme, as linked below, of comparing DNA in a bacterium -- spilling out of it actually -- with a cuneiform stele. That you have to deny facts on the table and project falsehoods speaks volumes as to the true state on the merits. KF PS, for record, here is the key citation and link, you were already publicly corrected but are still trying to deny. All I have to do is cite, and in the linked, show a capture of the relevant page:

"The information in DNA is encoded in its linear (one-dimensional) sequence of deoxyribonucleotide subunits . . . . A linear sequence of deoxyribonucleotides in DNA codes (through an intermediary, RNA) for the production of a protein with a corresponding linear sequence of amino acids . . . Although the final shape of the folded protein is dictated by its amino acid sequence, the folding of many proteins is aided by “molecular chaperones” . . . The precise three-dimensional structure, or native conformation, of the protein is crucial to its function." [Principles of Biochemistry, 8th Edn, 2021, pp 194 – 5. Now authored by Nelson, Cox et al, Lehninger having passed on in 1986. Attempts to rhetorically pretend on claimed superior knowledge of Biochemistry, that D/RNA does not contain coded information expressing algorithms using string data structures, collapse. We now have to address the implications of language, goal directed stepwise processes and underlying sophisticated polymer chemistry and molecular nanotech in the heart of cellular metabolism and replication.]

See https://uncommondescent.com/darwinist-debaterhetorical-tactics/protein-synthesis-what-frequent-objector-af-cannot-acknowledge/ kairosfocus

SB: We do not grow *into* free will agents, we grow *as* free will agents. Origenes

I say that both statements can be true when one accepts that being free is not a static property and that there is a gradual process toward something like complete freedom and complete self-knowledge.

Both statements cannot be true. If we grow *as* free will agents, it means that we were free will agents before we started growing, which is the correct model. If we grow *into* free will agents, it means that we didn’t have free will until the growth occurred, which is the incorrect model. It cannot be both at the same time. Law of Non-contradiction. It is also logically impossible for a human being to create his own free will or attain it through some mysterious process?

Perhaps it makes good sense to say that the boy who will one day become a soldier, is already a soldier.

Not if you define your terms. A boy of 12, who dreams of becoming a soldier in the military, is not yet a soldier in the military. He may not even live long enough to become one. So your statement violates the Law of non-contradiction (LOC). You wouldn’t want to say, for example, that since you will die one day, you are a dead man.

I have stated that self-determination is the essence of freedom. You did neither object nor agree.

I object to your definition of self-determination as I understand it, especially the notion that we can grow into, or somehow acquire, free will. More broadly, I object to the idea that we can “determine” our own existence or our own nature. We can only determine what we do with these gifts once we have them.

Others, like Kairosfocus, often speak of “self-moved agency.”

Yes. Humans, by virtue of their nature, can be causal agents because they have been endowed with the gift of free will, which allows them to make moral decisions and carry them out.

As we both know, “nothing can move itself (except God)” is the mantra of Aquinas.

Aquinas is talking about observed movement in detectable non human objects found in the natural world. He is not talking about human agents who have the power to start new causal chains.

But if freedom is indeed self-movement, if freedom is self-determination…

Freedom includes self-movement, but it is much more than that. It is also, for example, the power to act according to one’s nature. So we can’t say that freedom *is* self movement, since that would be a gross oversimplification. On the matter of “self determination,” again, everything turns on what you mean by that term. If, as it appears, you mean that, among other things, we can “determine” our own existence or our own nature, then, again, that would violate the law of non-contradiction. It would mean that we existed before we existed, At the same time, human beings *are* self-determined in the sense that they can choose their fate or final destination (union with God or separation from God) by using the gifts they have already been given.

can something (billiard ball A perhaps) cause something else (billiard ball B perhaps) to move itself?

No.

Is there a role at all for billiard ball A in this scenario?

Yes, billiard ball b was moved by billiard ball a, which, in turn, was moved by the cue stick, which was moved by the player’s movement, which was moved by the players decision to move it, which was the beginning of the causal chain.

IOW does self-movement fit the good old traditional causal model where A causes B?

Yes.

Put differently, can something (God) gift something else (a person) with free will?

Of course. There is no other possible source of free will. God provides us with our nature, which includes the gift of free will, just as He provides animals with a nature, which includes instinct, but not free will. Humans (or animals) certainly can’t give those gifts to themselves.

I intuit a logical problem (impossibility even) that I cannot express succinctly.

There is no logical problem here.

Our freedom expands by self-knowledge, and self-knowledge expands by experiencing oneself.

Our freedom expands primarily by growing in virtue. Self knowledge does play an important role, though. Among other things. self knowledge can tell us if we are growing in virtue or if we are failing to grow. It can also alert us about which virtues we should be working on. Strong men normally need more humility, weak men normally need more courage. Without exercising our moral muscles, we cannot become better human beings.

There is no free choice on this point because we are non-static *becoming* beings, and we cannot change that fact, other than by completing the path.

Again, this is an oversimplification. We are not *solely* “becoming beings.” Throughout our life, we are the same person, with the same faculty of free will, with the same nature, the same soul, and the same sex. All these things are unchanging and are not, therefore in a state of becoming. At the same time, some of our attributes *are* in a state of becoming, such as our character, our education, our preferences, our fears, our attitudes, which pathway we are choosing (more or less freedom) and, most importantly, the sense in which we are getting closer to or more distant from the purpose for which we were made. (total freedom and union with God). SB: However, there are two roads that can be travelled. The first road leads to more freedom, which consists of a growth in virtue and an elimination of vice. The second road leads to slavery, which consists of a growth in vice and a dismissal of virtue.

My general point is: we are all learning, there is no escape.

The question is. are we learning what we are supposed to learn (the truth, as discovered by the faculty of intellect) and are we growing in the right way (moral goodness as achieved by the faculty of will). The alcoholic is on a pathway, yes, but is he on the right pathway? If, through self knowledge, he learns about the truth of his condition, that is a good start on the road of increasing his freedom, but he must get help and learn how to cultivate the virtues of temperance and self control by training his will to prefer a life of sobriety. That is where the hard work comes in. If he fails to train his will in that direction (perhaps through a 12 step program, or through his own determination) his self knowledge will not help him. SB: When we say that hard work is necessary for growth, we need to specify what kind of work we mean, that is, the work of growing in virtue and eliminating vice.

I was being unclear. I meant to say, that life poses challenges to everyone. We are all struggling through life; life is tough; that is why I said: “becoming free is hard work.”

We are already free inasmuch as we have free will from the very beginning of any process or pathway that we choose. One must already have free will in order to do the choosing. The question is, will we choose a pathway that increases the freedom we already have, or will we choose a pathway that decreases our freedom and binds us in slavery. StephenB

Kairosfocus @217, While I agree with everything you said about Pi, let me point out that the string 999999 (six nines in a row) is indeed found once in the first million digits of Pi after less than 800 decimal places. My point was that the examination of this substring of 999999 might automatically be assumed to be non-random, but this cannot then be projected to Pi. To your point then, complexity within random (or pseudorandom) values can indeed generate highly improbable combinations, but they require infinite resources for which the particles in the universe over the seconds of time it’s believed to have existed fall FAR SHORT of the assurance that complexity can emerge from noise probabilistically, and more specifically, language. -Q Querius

ChuckDarwin should learn the history of professional baseball. It started out as a competition between men’s clubs. Thus, currently baseball clubs and club houses. The winning team at the end of season, was given a pennant to fly over their club. Umpires are essentially the same as referees. They don’t where stripes though. Another nit to pounce on. Do you realize how small all these petty remarks make you look? jerry

Re David Coppedge reviewing Nick Lane’s work or getting one’s metaphors right: Baseball doesn’t have “referees.” Baseball has umpires. Got the wrong crew calling this ballgame……. chuckdarwin

AF [attn CD], your quarrel is with the consensus epitomised by Lehninger and heirs etc, not me.

I have no problem with Lehninger. I don't really have a problem with KF's misinterpreting Lehninger either, as it is pretty ineffective. UB is pretty ineffective too. Like I've remarked before, les chiens aboient, but the mainstream just gets on with stuff. Alan Fox

AF [attn CD], your quarrel is with the consensus epitomised by Lehninger and heirs etc, not me. That you cannot acknowledge such a well established point tells us just how forceful it is. And that then speaks volumes to your reactions to the history put on the table by UB. KF kairosfocus

Game Over? Nick Lane Wants Another Inning David Coppedge - October 7, 2022 Excerpt: A Plausible Scenario? The gist of the hypothesis is that acetyl phosphate (AcP), a simple molecule with the formula C2H5O5P, can phosphorylate ADP into ATP in water, if ferric ion (Fe3+) is present. The team believes their lab work offers a plausible scenario for prebiotic ATP formation without the need for ATP synthase.,,, Sounds Impressive. Can It Work? The team tells the referee about additional surprising benefits of their intermediate. Visions of the Miller spark apparatus come to mind:,,, Questions & Answers What about hydrothermal vents?, the referee asks. Aren’t those the preferred locations for prebiotic environments? “[O]ur results do not exclude submarine hydrothermal systems as potential environments for this chemistry,” they beam with pleasure. But it couldn’t happen today, they explain, because “high concentrations of Mg2+ (50 mM) and Ca2+ (10 mM) precluded ATP synthesis, implying that this chemistry would not be favoured in modern oceans.” The referee, frowning a bit, senses some special pleading going on. Other referees walk up to see what the commotion is about. After listening in, they start asking questions. Did you try this in a natural setting? No, we bought chemicals from Fischer and from Sigma-Aldrich, and then mixed them in our lab under controlled conditions. (See the Materials and Methods section.) How did you get the ingredients to link up? We used store-bought catalysts and mixed them with store-bought nucleotides and phosphorylating agents. Then we shook them and heated them. Why do you think that represents a plausible prebiotic environment? “AcP is unique among a panel of relevant phosphorylating agents in that it can phosphorylate ADP to ATP, in water, in the presence of Fe3+. AcP is formed readily through prebiotic chemistry and remains central to prokaryotic metabolism, making it the most plausible precursor to ATP as a biochemical phosphorylator.” Are you likely to find sufficient concentrations of AcP and ferric ion in natural water conditions for this to have happened on the early earth? Uh, we didn’t test that. Wait a second; adenosine is a nucleoside base that includes ribose. How did that form in water? That is a problem, we agree. Did you test for chirality? Uh, no. Did you come up with a plausible container to hold the ATP? That was not part of our investigation, no. OK, so you get some ATP under special conditions. ATP has a half-life of under 5 minutes in water. Do you expect it to hang around long enough to be useful in some protocell? We did not think about that in this paper, no. ATP is not alive, obviously. What would happen next? Presumably some primitive metabolic process could utilize it for energy. Like what? “Recent experimental work shows that the core of autotrophic metabolism can occur spontaneously in the absence of genes and enzymes. This includes nonenzymatic equivalents of the acetyl CoA pathway and parts of the reverse Krebs cycle, glycolysis and the pentose phosphate pathway, gluconeogenesis, and amino acid biosynthesis. Recent work demonstrates that some nucleobases can also be formed following the universally conserved biosynthetic pathways, using transition metal ions as catalysts. The idea that ATP could have arisen as a product of protometabolism starting from H2 and CO2 is therefore not unreasonable….” What, exactly, is “protometabolism”? Does it have any meaning outside of a living context? (Silent stares.) Who decides what is reasonable? I guess we do. The paper says that “biological purine synthesis specifically involves 6 phosphorylation steps that are catalysed by ATP in modern cells.” Adenine is a purine. How do you get past the chicken-and-egg problem of needing ATP to make ATP?“If ATP was indeed formed in a monomer word via a biomimetic protometabolism, then an earlier ATP equivalent must have driven the phosphorylation steps in purine synthesis.” Can you describe a plausible earlier ATP equivalent? Actually, “A major question for prebiotic chemistry is how could an energy currency power work” if not ATP. And how did ATP come to replace it, whatever it was? “Why this early phosphorylating agent was replaced, and specifically with ATP rather than other nucleoside triphosphates, remains a mystery.” So how did your simple ATP-generating process get replaced by ATP synthase? Well, it is well known that “the ATP synthase powers a disequilibrium in the ratio of ADP to ATP, which amounts to 10 orders of magnitude from equilibrium in the cytosol of modern cells. Molecular engines such as the ATP synthase use ratchet-like mechanical mechanisms to convert environmental redox disequilibria into a highly skewed ratio of ADP to ATP.” But we cannot say how that happened. But how could a simple prebiotic system composed mostly of monomers sustain a disequilibrium in ATP to ADP ratio that powers work? Well, “One possibility is that dynamic environments could sustain critical disequilibria across short distances such as protocell membranes.” Didn’t you just assume the existence of a protocell with a membrane? Where did those come from? Look, we’re not trying to come up with a complete picture of how life originated. We’re just trying to explain why ATP is the universal energy currency for life as it exists today, and how it might have emerged. Emerged… by chance, you mean? Isn’t that circular reasoning? How so? What other possibility is there? There’s intelligence, the only cause ever observed that is capable of assembling complex parts into a functional whole. Sorry; we thought this was a scientific baseball diamond. It is. So what is your explanation for the functional information in the simplest life? Your paper admits that “ATP links energy metabolism with genetic information.” What is the source of that genetic information? Uh, some sort of intermediate or other. The referees convene and shout out, “GAME OVER!” https://evolutionnews.org/2022/10/game-over-nick-lane-wants-another-inning/

bornagain77

AF/222 LOL……. The Lane video is excellent chuckdarwin

Nick Lane on OoL https://youtu.be/NxGZzcx4GF4 Alan Fox

I’ll ignore the sophomoric ad hominem and simply assume that you have no answer(s) to my questions

Something that could be said for 99.99% of ChuckDarwin’s comments. Irony at its best!!! We’re you looking in the mirror when you conjured that up? jerry

KF/221 I'll ignore the sophomoric ad hominem and simply assume that you have no answer(s) to my questions @219. I'm not talking about information already encoded in the cell, at that point, cell physiology and genetics are pretty well understood. I'm talking about the origin and nature of this information (a/k/a complex alphanumeric code) prior to encoding. It has to exist somewhere, in some form since you insist that it is "antecedent" to "cell based life on earth." chuckdarwin

BTW, to whom it may concern, this blog has been timing out and slowing to a snail’s pace early during the day–just a heads up to the site administrator…

I've mentioned it a couple of times. I am also bombarded with inappropriate ads when I visit. (Inappropriate in that they are in Icelandic and completely inscrutable, even with the accompanying illustrations.) Alan Fox

Oh dear, this confusion over biological processes and language seems to be spreading like a weed. Alan Fox

CD, we all know the story, with von Neumann '48 as just prior context. Go, look up Crick's Mar 19, 1953 letter to his son, then follow the elucidation over the next couple of decades. We all know that machine code is working at machine level, the online vids on protein synthesis are there for those who find reading a challenge, and Lehninger et al are quite clear. If all you can do is to try to follow Alinsky tactic personalise-polarise, that tells us beyond reasonable doubt that you know you do not have a substantial answer. Of course, Darwin did not address this, it was a century in the future, though he might have found it thought provoking to address Paley's self replicating time keeping watch in Ch 2, which foreshadows what von Neumann brought out. KF PS, just to refresh memory:

"The information in DNA is encoded in its linear (one-dimensional) sequence of deoxyribonucleotide subunits . . . . A linear sequence of deoxyribonucleotides in DNA codes (through an intermediary, RNA) for the production of a protein with a corresponding linear sequence of amino acids . . . Although the final shape of the folded protein is dictated by its amino acid sequence, the folding of many proteins is aided by “molecular chaperones” . . . The precise three-dimensional structure, or native conformation, of the protein is crucial to its function." [Principles of Biochemistry, 8th Edn, 2021, pp 194 – 5. Now authored by Nelson, Cox et al, Lehninger having passed on in 1986. Attempts to rhetorically pretend on claimed superior knowledge of Biochemistry, that D/RNA does not contain coded information expressing algorithms using string data structures, collapse. We now have to address the implications of language, goal directed stepwise processes and underlying sophisticated polymer chemistry and molecular nanotech in the heart of cellular metabolism and replication.]

See https://uncommondescent.com/darwinist-debaterhetorical-tactics/protein-synthesis-what-frequent-objector-af-cannot-acknowledge/ kairosfocus

Really

The Pounce! ChuckDarwin believes he has found something and makes a big deal of it. Longer than his usual wise-ass remark. Just to let you know, the hypothesis referenced has nothing to do with ID. It may be true or not true. Aside: The really amazing thing is ChuckDarwin is up early. Getting ready for church, Chuck?

to whom it may concern, this blog has been timing out and slowing to a snail’s pace early during the day–just a heads up to the site administrator

it’s called weeding out the unfit. It generated a lot of time for myself that would have been spent reading inane comments. Look at it as a plus. jerry

KF/217

Likewise the clear case of coded, complex alphanumeric code in D/RNA tells us language is antecedent to cell based life on earth.

Really? And exactly how does that work? Is this "complex alphanumeric code" just floating around in the ether somewhere? In the interstices between being and non-being? And where does the primordial biological cell come from into which this "language" gets deposited or inserted or installed or whatever it gets? Is there like a transcendental service department that does the installation? When are you IDers gonna take five minutes out of your 24/7 Darwin-bashing schedule to figure this stuff out and explain to us hoi polloi just how this works? We're waiting. We've been waiting for quite some time....... BTW, to whom it may concern, this blog has been timing out and slowing to a snail's pace early during the day--just a heads up to the site administrator.... chuckdarwin

F/N. gave a lot of trouble. And 2^[3.27*10^150] kairosfocus

Q, pi is determined by definition [ circle, take c/D ~ 22/7 or 3.14159 . . . ] and is a transcendental with no repeating block, it is irrational. The value of pi and the decimal, place value system [separately defined] are uncorrelated, so the clash of the two is one way to generate a pseudorandom decimal digit sequence commonly thought to encompass every arbitrary [short] bit string, for example I just searched 000, 0000, 00000 and 000000 in the first million digits, unsurprisingly the six member chain does not appear. For example, too, 000 first appears after 601 digits. Within reason, we here have a poor man's random number table. However, that illustrates the search resources problem commonly overlooked by those trying to use a paint the target after you shoot objection: 10*57 atoms in the sol system for 10^17 s cannot search the config space of a similar number of 500 coin trays, each atom serving as an observer and running at say 10^13 searches per second: 57 + 17 + 13 = 87 and 10^87 is a negligible fraction of 3.27 * 10 ^ 150. Search for a golden search, being search among possible subsets, comes from the power set of the later set of possible configs from 0000 . . . 0 to 1111 . . . 1, 2 * [3.27^10^150] possibilities, so that is even worse, raising questions of higher level design if poof, magic, we see a golden search. Design by the self moved reflexively acting agent [whether limited as we are or ultimate as God is] has far greater power, to create a desired bit string. But more directly, if we are not rational, responsible, significantly free creatures the credibility of our claimed reasoning (including that of objectors) becomes suspect, self referentially self discrediting. We simply need to recognise that whatever else obtains, we must be going concern responsible agents capable of serious reasoning. This then constrains our logic of being and that of the world we inhabit, there must be adequate root of reality for such a world. Brains as blindly programmed computational substrates with equally blind architectures does not cut it. Likewise the clear case of coded, complex alphanumeric code in D/RNA tells us language is antecedent to cell based life on earth. But, we have powerful factions at work, determined not to go where such things clearly point. KF kairosfocus

Kairosfocus @213,

Q, yes, a single die resting 3 uppermost is indistinguishable after the fact as to chance or choice. However, 6^n > 10^150, leads to n = 193. A string of that many dice expressing a coded message becomes readily distinguishable from a chance outcome.

Yes, I agree. However it's not so clear with substrings. For example, with the infinite number of decimals in Pi, one can find any specified string somewhere in it, including my telephone number and yours. Yes, this is a mathematical version of "the Texas sharpshooter fallacy." -Q Querius

StephenB

In your judgement, does this process begin with the agent having no free will, or does it begin with the agent having limited free will? (...) It seems to me that everything turns on the answer. My answer is simple: We do not grow *into* free will agents, we grow *as* free will agents.

I say that both statements can be true when one accepts that being free is not a static property and that there is a gradual process toward something like complete freedom and complete self-knowledge. Perhaps it makes good sense to say that the boy who will one day become a soldier, is already a soldier.

Free will must be there from the beginning in some primitive form as a gift from a source outside of us, namely God.

I have stated that self-determination is the essence of freedom. You did neither object nor agree. Others, like Kairosfocus, often speak of “self-moved agency.” This brings us to a territory of causality which is not as clear-cut as billiard ball A moves billiard ball B. This is more complicated, here we have billiard ball B moving itself. As we both know, “nothing can move itself (except God)” is the mantra of Aquinas. But if freedom is indeed self-movement, if freedom is self-determination, then the following question becomes relevant: can something (billiard ball A perhaps) cause something else (billiard ball B perhaps) to move itself? Is there a role at all for billiard ball A in this scenario? IOW does self-movement fit the good old traditional causal model where A causes B? Put differently, can something (God) gift something else (a person) with free will? I intuit a logical problem (impossibility even) that I cannot express succinctly.

Ori: We *are* not free as a static fact, instead, we are in a process of *becoming* free. It can be said that freedom is hard work, it doesn’t come for free.

SB: To say that we are in the in the process of “becoming,” and that free will “doesn’t come for free,” and that it is the product of “hard work” is to say that it is something that you must earn and isn’t there in the beginning.

I was being unclear. I meant to say that we are all in an individual process of becoming, whether we want it or not. Our freedom expands by self-knowledge, and self-knowledge expands by experiencing oneself. There is no free choice on this point because we are non-static *becoming* beings, and we cannot change that fact, other than by completing the path.

Returning to my theme, I say that we do not grow *into” free will agents; we grow *as* free will agents since we must have to ability to pursue growth as a goal, which requires free will in the beginning.

I can agree in the sense that one can freely embrace growth as a goal, and possibly speed up the process. On the other hand, I repeat that, in my view, there is no choice. The process of becoming goes on no matter what, because that is what we *are.*

However, there are two roads that can be travelled. The first road leads to more freedom, which consists of a growth in virtue and an elimination of vice. The second road leads to slavery, which consists of a growth in vice and a dismissal of virtue.

The second road also leads to self-knowledge. My general point is: we are all learning, there is no escape.

When we say that hard work is necessary for growth, we need to specify what kind of work we mean.

I was being unclear. I meant to say, that life poses challenges to everyone. We are all struggling through life; life is tough; that is why I said: "becoming free is hard work.” Origenes

SB, I agree, and without freedom at the core, growth in rational, responsible behaviour is impossible. We are seeing a challenge of failing to see where we must stand, just to begin. KF kairosfocus

Q, yes, a single die resting 3 uppermost is indistinguishable after the fact as to chance or choice. However, 6^n > 10^150, leads to n = 193. A string of that many dice expressing a coded message becomes readily distinguishable from a chance outcome. I note that when someone tried the keyboard exercise with real monkeys, they kept pressing S, readily seen as not random. Which, BTW is precisely what the 500 bit threshold is about on sol system scale. Of course for DNA in living forms, we start at 100 - 1,000 kbases, so far beyond threshold that quibbles over redundancy, possible junk DNA etc are irrelevant. kairosfocus

Seversky at 206, I am reminded of something: "Your mind is conrolled by a transistor radio in a parking lot." relatd

SB: In your judgement, does this process begin with the agent having no free will, or does it begin with the agent having limited free will? Origenes:

This a profound question, to which I have no definite answer.

It seems to me that everything turns on the answer. My answer is simple: We do not grow *into* free will agents, we grow *as* free will agents. Free will must be there from the beginning in some primitive form as a gift from a source outside of us, namely God. Earlier, you said this:

We *are* not free as a static fact, instead, we are in a process of *becoming* free. It can be said that freedom is hard work, it doesn’t come for free.

To say that we are in the in the process of "becoming," and that free will "doesn't come for free," and that it is the product of "hard work" is to say that it is something that you must earn and isn't there in the beginning. Further, it means that you either get to your destination without knowing why you are on that road or that you DO know why you are on that road (purpose driven hard work) and consciously decide to pursue free will as a worthy goal. That leads to my earlier question, which I assume that you missed: How can you decide to work hard in pursuit of free will if you do not already have the free will necessary to make such a decision? Returning to my theme, I say that we do not grow *into" free will agents; we grow *as* free will agents since we must have to ability to pursue growth as a goal, which requires free will in the beginning. However, there are two roads that can be travelled. The first road leads to more freedom, which consists of a growth in virtue and an elimination of vice. The second road leads to slavery, which consists of a growth in vice and a dismissal of virtue. When we say that hard work is necessary for growth, we need to specify what kind of work we mean. To be precise, the hard work consists of building good habits and eliminating bad habits. It is our habits that make us or break us. Our task, then, is to decide if we will become more free or less free. We can decide to become more free by practicing such virtues, as justice, temperance, humility, courage, compassion, charity, persistence, kindness, valor, selflessness, prayer etc. Or we can take a second road and simply give in to our passions, by watching pornography, being lazy, being ungrateful, being selfish, always taking/never giving, abusing our neighbor, eating too much, drinking too much, taking recreational drugs, lying, cheating, using our friends etc. this road leads to a loss of the freedom we already have and, eventually to slavery. The good news is that we can change, but sometimes we need help from heaven to pull it off. But we must first acknowledge the objective differences between good and evil/ right and wrong. Otherwise, we have no road map to guide us back on the road to freedom. Virtue begins by being hard and ends up being easy. Vice begins by being easy and ends up being hard -- very hard. Free will is the capacity to take either road. We are free to grow in wisdom or allow ourselves to be fools. StephenB

@199

In my view, each human being is in a continual process of self-liberation. The measure of one’s freedom is determined by multiple progressing factors, such as self-knowledge, the ability of independent will, thought, feeling, and understanding. So, I would say that a question like: ‘Is man absolutely free or not?’, cannot be posed, because one’s freedom is not a static property, but rather is in a continual process of becoming. Each one of us is on an individual path edging toward freedom. Some people are freer than others, and, in principle, we are all freer than we once were. . . . A free act by a person is an act that is determined by the person, as opposed to an act that is determined by something beyond the control of the person. Free will, is the ability to determine one’s actions; self-determination.

I very much like this, and I quite agree with this! (This is also pretty much Spinoza's view, for whatever that might be worth.) PyrrhoManiac1

StephenB

Ori: Each one of us is on an individual path edging toward freedom. Some people are freer than others, and, in principle, we are all freer than we once were.

SB: In your judgement, does this process begin with the agent having no free will, or does it begin with the agent having limited free will?

This a profound question, to which I have no definite answer. Some (sketchy) thoughts: The process of becoming free starts with the self-aware conscious agent, otherwise there is nothing that can be free. As I have argued before, self-awareness presupposes the self observing the self. IOW self-observance is constitutive of self-awareness consciousness. Therefore the self observing the self is self-determination. The self-determination that brings about self-aware consciousness is the foundational self-determination that underlies all the subsequent self-determination; which I have defined as freedom; see #199. I imagine that, at the onset, the self-aware conscious agent has no flexible control over its unformed content. The hierarchical control over one's content, that you and I have now, has yet to be established.

SB: If you contract a viral infection, can you decide not to be affected by it?

As you know, I do not regard the body to be an inseparable aspect of the person. To answer your question, I do not have that ability and I do not know if there is anyone who does. - - - - - As a complete aside, this ’universal antidote’ has cured me of a very severe illness more than once. I’m just putting it out there, and do not expect anyone to take it seriously.

SB: Let’s return to my example of the decision to wear gloves on a cold winter morning. I say that the decision was *influenced by,* not *determined by* the cold weather. It was a free will decision because it was one choice made among many possible alternatives, which is my definition of free will. Other options available include enduring the discomfort of exposing bare skin to the elements, limiting the time of exposure, or simply staying home. I say that the free will agent, not the cold weather, determined the choice, even though the cold weather played a role in that decision. Do you agree? If not, why not?

I agree. The decision stems from the free person. Origenes

Seversky

In other words, if we suppose that literally anything we think or do was determined, how could we ever distinguish between having free will and not having free will and would it make any difference? Either way we still feel like we have free will, even if we don’t really.

Recall that a free will choice is a product of the faculties of intelligence and will working in concert. The role of the intellect is especially important to your question because intelligence seeks knowledge. In this case, the free will agent who chooses to wear gloves does not simply *feel* that he has several other options, he *knows* it to be a fact. Knowledge is a reliable guide, feelings are not. Thus, determinism, which recognizes only one possibility, the one that just happened to have been chosen, does not, in this situation, reflect the facts in evidence. Yes, it does make a difference. Because they live in the real world, free will proponents can weigh options and tradeoffs. If gloves are worn in the car, control of the steering mechanism may be compromised, if gloves are not worn at all, frostbite is a possibility, if the journey is not made, maximum safety is assured, but an important opportunity may have been lost. Determinists, if they are true to their principles, do not weigh the costs and benefits of manifold options with the same serious attention and are, therefore. less likely to make wise decisions. StephenB

Seversky @206,

Just for the sake of argument, let’s suppose the Universe is absolutely deterministic.

But we know that this isn't true. So, your conclusions to this hypothetical are irrelevant. -Q Querius

Just for the sake of argument, let's suppose the Universe is absolutely deterministic. Let's suppose that your choice to wear gloves at that time and in that place was determined not just by your reasoning but was inevitable. Let's suppose your sense of exercising free will and your rejection of the very notion that you aren't free are themselves determined. Let's suppose that your decision to try and thwart determinism by not wearing gloves on a cold day was itself determined. In other words, if we suppose that literally anything we think or do was determined, how could we ever distinguish between having free will and not having free will and would it make any difference? Either way we still feel like we have free will, even if we don't really. Seversky

Origenes:

A free act by a person is an act that is determined by the person, as opposed to an act that is determined by something beyond the control of the person. Free will, is the ability to determine one’s actions; self-determination.

Let’s return to my example of the decision to wear gloves on a cold winter morning. I say that the decision was *influenced by,* not *determined by* the cold weather. It was a free will decision because it was one choice made among many possible alternatives, which is my definition of free will. Other options available include enduring the discomfort of exposing bare skin to the elements, limiting the time of exposure, or simply staying home. I say that the free will agent, not the cold weather, determined the choice, even though the cold weather played a role in that decision. Do you agree? If not, why not? StephenB

Kairosfocus @202, Yes, exactly! What's so amazing is how surprisingly fast the initial micro-perturbations magnify to macro differences. Initial conditions are never the same (essentially at infinitesimal probability). Thus, ignoring or waving off chaos as being determinate is falsified in practice. What completely blows my mind is the fact that reality manifests itself from mathematical probability waves on observation. Deliberately setting a dice to 1-6 is indistinguishable from a chaotic or a random outcome. However, quantum reality diverges from your macro die roll in at least three respects: 1. Observing the die roll in progress doesn't immediately yield a final outcome (1-6). 2. Rolling two dice doesn't ever produce destructive interference, only constructive. (2-12) 3. Observing one of the two dice doesn't instantaneously affect the outcome of the other one (such as entanglement and conjugate variables). Entanglement would be like shaking two dice, shipping one to Timbuktu, and then (knowing that the sum of the two dice always adds up to 7) observing a 2 locally would mean that the die in Timbuktu would be a 5. Conjugate variables would result in measuring one die to be "less than four" (1-3) has the result in that the MAXIMUM precision of measuring the other die would be "greater than three" (4-6). Paradoxically, the quantum Zeno effect would be like continually observing a die roll but never having it resolve to a 6 until you stop observing the die. Thus, the mathematical probability field of reality is intrinsically integrated with information. It also indicates that our conscious observation (~knowledge?), our free will (~warrant based on Bayesian reasoning?) have a significant but limited effect on reality. -Q Querius

A free act by a person is an act that is determined by the person, as opposed to an act that is determined by something beyond the control of the person. Free will, is the ability to determine one’s actions; self-determination.

Let's return to my example of deciding to wear gloves ln a cold winter morning. I say that the choice made is influenced by, but not determined, by the cold weather, since the free will agent had other possible options available, such as putting up with the discomfort of cold bare skin, limiting the time of exposure, or simply staying home. Thus, wearing gloves was a free will decision since *one choice was made among many possible alternatives,* which is my definition of free will. The decision was not determined by the cold weather; It was determined by the free will agent, even though the cold weather played a role in that decision. Do you agree? StephenB

Q, chaos in effect is sensitive dependence to initial conditions such that tiny initial differences produce large differences in outcome after enough time. This is how say a standard die is effectively random when tossed and as it settles. However, my point is, that a stochastic, random aspect [e.g. Zener noise] is not determined as to outcome even before we come to decision-making free agents. Not everything is like that [a die falls under g for example], but absent self-moved, rational responsible freedom [we can set a die to read as we please, from 1 to 6], reasoning, warrant and knowledge collapse. KF kairosfocus

Origenes:

My claim is that knowing and understanding the cause, maneuvers you into a position where you can make a choice: allow the cause to affect you or not.

If you contract a viral infection, can you decide not to be affected by it? StephenB

Origenes:

Each one of us is on an individual path edging toward freedom. Some people are freer than others, and, in principle, we are all freer than we once were.

In your judgement, does this process begin with the agent having no free will, or does it begin with the agent having limited free will? StephenB

StephenB @198 In my view, each human being is in a continual process of self-liberation. The measure of one’s freedom is determined by multiple progressing factors, such as self-knowledge, the ability of independent will, thought, feeling, and understanding. So, I would say that a question like: ‘Is man absolutely free or not?’, cannot be posed, because one’s freedom is not a static property, but rather is in a continual process of becoming. Each one of us is on an individual path edging toward freedom. Some people are freer than others, and, in principle, we are all freer than we once were.

How do you define a free act, or if you like, how do you define free will?

A free act by a person is an act that is determined by the person, as opposed to an act that is determined by something beyond the control of the person. Free will, is the ability to determine one’s actions; self-determination. - - - - - WJM @197

There is no spoon.

:) Origenes

Origenes

A free act is not required to be ‘causeless’, but rather one can allow the cause to affect oneself after one has come to know it and still be free.

How do you define a free act, or if you like, how do you define free will?

We *are* not free as a static fact, instead, we are in a process of *becoming* free. It can be said that freedom is hard work, it doesn’t come for free.

How can you decide to work hard in pursuit of free will if you do not already have the free will necessary to make such a decision? StephenB

Origenes @194, I do agree and I am indeed amused.

There is a newly created distance between you and the cause established by insight. Through self-knowledge, your freedom has increased.:

There is no spoon. William J Murray

StephenB

Ori: A free act is not required to be ‘causeless’, but rather one can allow the cause to affect oneself after one has come to know it and still be free.

I am not clear on what you are saying here.

Suppose you always get irritable when being with person X, but do not know why. But then, on a good day, you understand what makes being with person X irritable. My claim is that knowing and understanding the cause, maneuvers you into a position where you can make a choice: allow the cause to affect you or not. A new situation. There is a newly created distance between you and the cause established by insight. Through self-knowledge, your freedom has increased.

So you are saying that we do not have free will until we attain it through hard work?

Becoming free, through self-knowledge and self-experience, is hard work. In my view, that is what life is for. Origenes

Origenes

A free act is not required to be ‘causeless’, but rather one can allow the cause to affect oneself after one has come to know it and still be free.

I am not clear on what you are saying here. Could you define precisely what you mean by “free act?” I say that a free act (an exercise in free will) is one in which the decision maker can choose one course of action from among several possible alternatives. It appears that you do not agree. How do you define a free act by a free will agent? Meanwhile, you can always decide on the way you will react to outside events, but you cannot always decide not to be affected by them. Free will (by my definition) does not imply that kind of power. You seem to be using the term “freedom” far more expansively than what is normally meant by the term “free will,” which is why I an asking you to define your terms.

We *are* not free as a static fact, instead, we are in a process of *becoming* free. It can be said that freedom is hard work, it doesn’t come for free.

So you are saying that we do not have free will until we attain it through hard work? How can you decide to work hard in pursuit of free will if you do not already have the free will necessary to make such a decision? StephenB

WJM @169 The following Hegelian text seems to be in perfect alignment with your post #169. Perhaps you agree and you will be amused:

On the purely conceptual level, the universal moment of freedom concerns the absolute freedom of the I. The I, the subject of freedom, continues to be what it is independent of whatever it exists as. A human being can take on a host of different identities, it can be embodied as a specific gender, it can have long or short hair, it can have this or that profession, and so on. Some or these identities are a matter of choice, others are not, but that is inconsequential here. The point is that in itself the I remains independent (and in this way free) of any such identification; it never loses itself completely in any form or way of existing. As Hegel states, the will is inherently free, and this fundamental freedom consists precisely in the ability to remove oneself (in thought) from any specific existence without ceasing to be. [Terje Sparby on Hegel (PDF)]

Origenes

StephenB asks:

How does one use that consciousness/experience model to explain the coming-to-be of the universe itself, which preceded the existence of (human) consciousness and experience.

I don't believe that the universe precedes consciousness, and I believe there is only one consciousness. Origenes said:

If there is but one unity that encompasses everything that exists, if there is but one set of causal laws for all things, then the maximum number of free persons is one.

Well, there is one free consciousness/observer/will that assumes the roles of countless "persons," IMO. William J Murray

I don't know what the deal is, but DD might be having a more severe case of my own issues, which is that it has been extremely difficult to log into UD lately. I don't have this problem with any other sites. William J Murray

AnimatedDust @190, Several possibilities come to mind: a. GENUINE. Docdoc had a genuine personal/family emergency. This is a generous assumption, and, if it's unfortunately true, I hope he'll be able to resolve it quickly with help and encouragement from friends and family. b. SARCASTIC. Perhaps he's evolving a brilliant defense, but this takes a lot of time. So far, it's at the METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL stage. c. COMMON. He's hiding out, and may eventually return with some deprecation such as, "There was nothing worth responding to." d. SUSPICIOUS. Hmmm. One persona disappears and other one pops up. e. Other. Take your pick. I'll take a. for now. -Q Querius

I wonder what happened to DogDoc. AnimatedDust

A free act is not required to be ‘causeless’, but rather one can allow the cause to affect oneself after one has come to know it and still be free. Note the essential role of self-knowledge here. In order to be free, or rather to become free, one needs a clear understanding of the causes of one’s actions. Only by seeing and understanding such causes the “I” can abstract itself from them, and does it become a choice to allow them to affect one or not. We *are* not free as a static fact, instead, we are in a process of *becoming* free. It can be said that freedom is hard work, it doesn’t come for free. Origenes

Origenes:

The idea is that everything is determined by something else, except what ‘necessarily’ exists, or, put differently, what eternally exists. The First Mover sets out the system and the laws. Note that materialists have adopted this deterministic system, all they did was remove the explanation.

If anything at all exists, which of course is the case, then there must be a necessary (and eternal) being that confers existence on everything else. Except for that necessary being, everything else must be endowed with existence by an outside source, which again, is the necessary being. This endowment also applies to human beings, whose existence and free will are gifts. Humans cannot provide their own existence or their own freedom or their own rationality. The human's inner world is *influenced by,* not *determined by* the outside world. If, on a cold winter day, I decide to use my free will to wear gloves, it means that I was free to either suffer the cold on my bare skin or protect it with extra clothing. It most assuredly does not mean that my choice was determined because I could have easily decided to brave it, or for that matter, to not even go out at all.

The inner world of a free rational person is a domain causally separate from the outer world.

Our inner world is connected to the outside world and must be in order for rationality to even be possible.. The outer world, for example, is comprehensible (Intelligent design) and our inner world can comprehend it (design detection). There is a correspondence between the two, courtesy of the Creator’s decision to provide his creatures with a rational universe. No correspondence = no rationality. StephenB

Origenes @186, Also note that I've frequently posted that there's no evidence from the Standard Model of particle physics of a property called "consciousness." What's usually invoked is one of the gods of the gaps named "EMERGED" (along with MUSTA and MIGHTA) since there's ZERO physical evidence of even the illusion of consciousness. -Q Querius

Nothing that exists, including the human faculty of will, can come into existence without being caused.

The idea is that everything is determined by something else, except what ‘necessarily’ exists, or, put differently, what eternally exists. The First Mover sets out the system and the laws. Note that materialists have adopted this deterministic system, all they did was remove the explanation. The inner world of a free rational person is a domain causally separate from the outer world. In the name of rationality, it has to be so, since it cannot be, it is unthinkable even, that the outer world determines what goes on in the inner world of the free person. If there is but one unity that encompasses everything that exists, if there is but one set of causal laws for all things, then the maximum number of free persons is one. If universal causal laws apply to everything, if everything is an aspect of one coherent unity, then there can be no causally separate inner worlds of free persons. Origenes

A free person cannot be controlled/determined by something else. Therefore, from the (outside) perspective of 'something else', a free person is unpredictable. This is where the association with "randomness" comes in. A random event is also not controllable/determinable/predictable by something else. However, I maintain that a free person has nothing to do with randomness. It is not an "inner-dice" that makes me a free person, instead, it is self-determination. Origenes

WJM

I’m pretty sure what we currently call “cause and effect” is an artifact of a limited perspective and a form of reification, much like calling gravity a “cause.” I think the only real cause and effect going on is mind/consciousness causing sequences of experiences in consciousness. In any event, there’s no way to demonstrate otherwise.

How does one use that consciousness/experience model to explain the coming-to-be of the universe itself, which preceded the existence of (human) consciousness and experience. StephenB

Kairosfocus and Origenes, According to a conversation I once had with a notable physical chemist, determinism and randomness are not binary. Chaos has elements of both, and reality seems to be layered at different levels of abstraction. On forums dominated by determinists, the consensus is that chaos is deterministic. However, in practical situations, their deterministic chaos isn't only partially deterministic. For example, let's say that you pick an arbitrary point in space and map it onto an infinitely detailed Mandelbrot set. 1. Your arbitrary point in space will be overwhelmingly likely to have irrational coordinates. 2. If this point is mapped onto a colored Mandelbrot set near an edge between regions at a given level of abstraction, the color of the point may require infinite deterministic processing to arrive at its color, which cannot be known beforehand . . . unless, it far enough away from an apparent boundary. 3. Thus, I contend that chaotic systems are neither random nor deterministic, but rather their own thing. I've also watched Dr. Hossenfelder squirm at having to admit there are random processes at work in her deterministic universe. But once one lets in a little randomness, it "corrupts" the entire lump of determinism. Likewise, a little determinism embedded in a sea of randomness also corrupts the entire lump of randomness. Also, I have no idea how she can separate randomness from chaos. -Q Querius

KF @179

Somehow, the rise of evolutionary materialistic scientism is leading some to lose sight of that level in our activities and thoughts. Without it, however, even arguments of scientism collapse into self-referential self defeat.

On this you and I fully agree: in the name of rationality and truth, we must assume to be free. It cannot be the case that something beyond our control induces in us the false notion that we understand. In my view, the assumption to be a free self-moved rational person should be at the very foundation of every coherent (non-self-defeating) philosophy.

KF: … to be made is not to be determined, even a dynamic-stochastic computing substrate shows this insofar as it has stochastic behaviour. (Think here, a noise producing element leading to randomness in part.) We go beyond this to rational responsible, self-moved freedom.

In my understanding, to be made is to be determined. A random/unpredictable process that is made is determined to be a random process. Moreover, I really do not associate freedom with randomness. Freedom must be self-determination, as Vividbleau said. Perhaps the question is: can self-determination be made/established by something else ? Origenes

Nothing that exists, including the human faculty of will, can come into existence without being caused.

I'm pretty sure what we currently call "cause and effect" is an artifact of a limited perspective and a form of reification, much like calling gravity a "cause." I think the only real cause and effect going on is mind/consciousness causing sequences of experiences in consciousness. In any event, there's no way to demonstrate otherwise. William J Murray

Origenes @178

Can it be said that the “I” is free when the “I” itself is determined/produced by something else? On this issue, theists and materialists agree, both hold that the “I” is ‘made’ by something else.

I don't know what that makes me, but I disagree. William J Murray

O, to be made is not to be determined, even a dynamic-stochastic computing substrate shows this insofar as it has stochastic behaviour. (Think here, a noise producing element leading to randomness in part.) We go beyond this to rational responsible, self-moved freedom. Somehow, the rise of evolutionary materialistic scientism is leading some to lose sight of that level in our activities and thoughts. Without it, however, even arguments of scientism collapse into self-referential self defeat. KF kairosfocus

What is personal freedom?

Vividbleau@61: I also believe that every choice we make is free and every choice we make is determined but what determines it is me, my choices are self determined. Self determination is the essence of freedom.

It has to be.

William J Murray @169: So, if reasons are not causal, then the question is, what Is actually causing the choices? I know what is actually causing my choices: I am.

Indeed. But there is an important question left to be answered: Can it be said that the “I” is free when the “I” itself is determined/produced by something else? On this issue, theists and materialists agree, both hold that the “I” is ‘made’ by something else. Origenes

KF @174. Thanks. It always deepens understanding when the same topic is analyzed from different, albeit compatible, vantage points. StephenB

Vivid, the source of our freedom and ability to love, do right and live by truth is of like order and these are gifts to be treasured not disdained and trampled. KF kairosfocus

Q, dogs are modified wolves and will fight one another, but to seek to play with such fighting seems a strange practice indeed, KF kairosfocus

SB, always good to see you. I think we have two aspects of the issue, I was looking at the being caught up in the chain. You are addressing the notion of self cause as refers to origin, a case of circular retrocausation. I spoke to mind as going concern and its reflexive self moved nature. What is moved, itself even as we routinely move our own bodies. We learn, grow intellectually and in character, change our minds and more, including the objectors. Such need to acknowledge such basic facts. and that of course generally we would see that our minds are a precious gift of our creation as creatures able to by grace love and in loving live by truth and right, never mind our struggles. KF kairosfocus

DD “Given that, we see our choices cannot be free unless our beliefs and desires are freely chosen. Since we cannot ultimately choose our beliefs and desires, our choices cannot be free.” I disagree. Whatever the source of my beliefs and desires these beliefs and desires are part of me, they make up my “self”. So it is my self that determines my choices and re 61 self determination is the essence of freedom. “As I illustrated with the charity example, your beliefs and desires are not ultimately chosen by you, so when you deliberate over your beliefs and desires and decide on some choice, that choice is based on reasons that were not chosen by you.” Based on your previous posts and the above I interpret this to mean that my beliefs are chosen ultimately by nobody, my desires are ultimately chosen by nobody and my reasons are ultimately chosen by nobody. Because all these are ultimately chosen by nobody and I also have not chosen them free choice does not exist. Is this a fair representation? If so where are they coming from? We have all these choices happening but no one is doing the choosing. Can we even call them choices ? Vivid vividbleau

Kairosfocus @170,

I trust, sufficient has been shown to highlight the relevance and significance of the self referentiality issue.

Well yes, you have indeed. But I'm not seeing Dogdoc respond to the chorus of challenges. Or maybe he's preparing a brilliant rebuttal, we don't know. Still, maybe you can see why I'd like to see how he would confront an actual, practical, real-life, situation involving someone who's a trainer or a spectator in dog fights @165 with respect to his self-referential worldview. Let's name Dogdoc's antagonist . . . "Codgod." This guy, Codgod, is a sport fisherman and currently has four beautiful dogs in training to compete in bloody dog fights. Codgod loves the excitement and profit from this blood-sport competition, and resents the judgmental intrusion by Dogdoc on his self-referential beliefs. -Q Querius

Dogdoc

Libertarian free will is incoherent (on what basis could an uncaused will make decisions?) but not because of determinism.

False premise. Nothing that exists, including the human faculty of will, can come into existence without being caused.

If determinism were true, then the reason people would try to convince others of its truth is, obviously, because their actions are determined!

You miss the point. Whenever anyone tries to convince anyone of anything, it is because the persuader believes that the one to be persuaded can choose the preferred course of action from among other possible alternatives, which is the very definition of free will. Thus, your attempt to convince us that free will doesn’t exist is based on the presupposition that (our) free will does exist and we can use it to change our position.

Good and evil are perceptions, not divine commands.

Bad logic. Good or evil, by definition, refers to intrinsically good or intrinsically evil acts that exist in the objective realm and apply to everyone. On the other hand, perceived good or evil, as you understand them, refers to personal moral preferences that are subjective in nature and have no universal application.

Actually ID never defines what it means by “intelligence”,

Yes it does. Intelligence is the ability to arrange matter for a purpose.

And yes, causa sui is required for the sort of free will I think most people intuit they have,

This is an exceedingly reckless comment. Most people who believe in free will -- the power to choose one course of action among several other possible alternatives -- do not also believe that the human will is the cause of its own existence. One has nothing to do with the other. Querius to Dogdoc

OK. So you don’t believe in any God or Gods. You still DO believe in absolutes, in this case that dogfighting competitions are wrong for anyone to engage in.

Querius, I think you are misreading Dogdoc. His position is that there is no such thing as intrinsic good or evil. For him, nothing is good or bad in itself, which is just another way of saying that objective morality doesn’t exist. In his judgment, there is no moral code that can bind him or anyone else; he will never say that competitive dogfighting is wrong for everyone. He may say that it is wrong *for him* but that would just be an expression of his moral subjectivism. The idea is to emphasize how strong his personal feelings are on the matter and hope that it will cover for his failure to condemn it as a universal outrage. Notice his reply: and my notes [in brackets]

My beliefs against dogfighting are steadfast and unwavering and if that is what you mean then yes, I believe in absolutes. [What you (Querius) mean, I think, is that competitive dogfighting is *objectively* and *universally* wrong. I don't think Dogdoc will go there. Dogdoc continues, I do not believe that my beliefs are transcendent [they do not transcend from my personal boundaries to an extra-mental moral universe, that is, they don’t extend to a universal code or a Natural Moral Law that binds humans or holds them accountable. and it doesn’t matter if God exists or doesn.t exist. Morality is subjective and personal and that is the end of it].

Dogdoc does not grasp the irony. By rejecting objective morality, he rules out free will in principle. If there is no such thing as a good or bad moral objective, then obviously no one is “free” to pursue it. Try to forget that he presupposed the existence of free will when he invited us to use our free will to change our position. StephenB

DD, notice that WE in "how we know the truth"? It is a hint at the self referentiality. That puts a constraint on our arguments on such matters. Let's make a few excerpts, starting with 1 above: DD, 1: >>Modern physics does not include contra-causal mental powers,>> 1: Actually,physics starts with going concern, credible minds credibly observing and interacting with our in common world, and able to communicate, so if our minds are not self-moved, the self referentiality sets up precisely the problem highlighted by Plato in The Laws, Bk X, c 360 BC:

Ath. . . . when one thing changes another, and that another, of such will there be any primary changing element? How can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving principle? . . . . self-motion being the origin of all motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second. [--> notice, the self-moved, initiating, reflexively acting causal agent, which defines freedom as essential to our nature, and this is root of discussion on agents as first causes.] [[ . . . .] Ath. If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound-how should we describe it? Cle. You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving power life? Ath. I do. Cle. Certainly we should. Ath. And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same-must we not admit that this is life? [[ . . . . ] Cle. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul? Ath. Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things? Cle. Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things. Ath. And is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower number which you may prefer? Cle. Exactly. Ath. Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is the ruler?

2: Patently, if our minds are bound up in the scheme of blind, dynamic-stochastic processes, at best they are computational devices, limited by GIGO and by their underlying architecture and programming. Computational devices are dynamic-stochastic machines and are non rational -- witness the various bugs afflicting the Intel series of processors and co processors. >> but neither does it assume deterministic causality.>> 4: Physical processes are dynamic-stochastic but doing physics pivots on credible mind to do and communicate physics. Every physics lab, lecture hall, seminar room, conference, journal and monograph or text is a witness. >> Libertarian free will is incoherent (on what basis could an uncaused will make decisions?)>> 5: Strawman caricature, what is on the table is the self-moved, responsible, rational, significantly free agent who is a first cause, ever since Plato as cited. 6: Thence, too, an entity caught up in a dynamic-stochastic physical causal chain CANNOT and DOES NOT actually make decisions, it simply has effects and events in a causal cascade. >> but not because of determinism.>> 7: Dynamic-stochastic entities are not deterministic [the stochastic part, esp if the source is quantum], but are physically closed and inherently non rational. 8: in that context, as you would be caught up in your own web of reference, you will face what you projected to the other, incoherence. >> If determinism were true, then the reason people would try to convince others of its truth is, obviously, because their actions are determined!>> 9: Strawman carried forward. >>Good and evil are perceptions, not divine commands.>> 10: Good and evil are knowable aspects of that government by first duties that shapes and governs our argument, including your implication that your interlocutor[s] are failing in duty to truth, right reason and warrant. Inescapable, so self evident, branch on which we sit first principles. 11: You may be happy to assert away the Divine, but such does not change the realities of the necessary being root of a domain of reality involving inescapably morally governed creatures, us. DD, 6: >>obviously quantum physics is not deterministic in the way Newtonian physics is.>> 12: So, you know that physical systems are dynamic-stochastic. DD, 9: >>I just got through making crystal clear that I perceive animal abuse to be horrible, so of course I do not believe anyone is welcome to abuse animals, and I sincerely hope you agree>> 13: Attempting to have your cake and eat it. Without knowable first principles, there is only what Plato warned about earlier in the said 360 BC text:

Ath[enian Stranger, in The Laws, Bk X 2,360 ya]. . . .[The avant garde philosophers and poets, c. 360 BC] say that fire and water, and earth and air [i.e the classical "material" elements of the cosmos -- the natural order], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art . . . [such that] all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only [ --> that is, evolutionary materialism is ancient and would trace all things to blind chance and mechanical necessity; observe, too, the trichotomy: "nature" (here, mechanical, blind necessity), "chance" (similar to a tossed fair die), ART (the action of a mind, i.e. intelligently directed configuration)] . . . . [Thus, they hold] that the principles of justice have no existence at all[--> notice the reduction to zero] in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.-

[ --> Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT, leading to an effectively arbitrary foundation only for morality, ethics, so too justice, law and government: accident of personal preference, the ebbs and flows of power politics, accidents of history and and the shifting sands of manipulated community opinion driven by "winds and waves of doctrine and the cunning craftiness of men in their deceitful scheming . . . " cf a video on Plato's parable of the cave; from the perspective of pondering who set up the manipulative shadow-shows, why.]

These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might,

[ --> Evolutionary materialism -- having no IS that can properly ground OUGHT -- leads to the promotion of amorality on which the only basis for "OUGHT" is seen to be might (and manipulation: might in "spin"), opening the door to cynicism, hyperskepticism and nihilism . . . this is actually an infamous credo of nihilism . . . also, it reeks of cynically manipulative lawless oligarchy . . . ]

and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [ --> Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality "naturally" leads to continual contentions and power struggles influenced by that amorality at the hands of ruthless power hungry nihilistic agendas], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is,to live in real dominion over others [ --> such amoral and/or nihilistic factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless abuse and arbitrariness . . . they have not learned the habits nor accepted the principles of mutual respect, justice, fairness and keeping the civil peace of justice, so they will want to deceive, manipulate and crush -- as the consistent history of radical revolutions over the past 250 years so plainly shows again and again], and not in legal subjection to them [--> nihilistic will to power not the spirit of justice and lawfulness] . . .

__________ I trust, sufficient has been shown to highlight the relevance and significance of the self referentiality issue. KF kairosfocus

So, if reasons are not causal, then the question is, what Is actually causing the choices? I know what is actually causing my choices: I am. I am not my reasons, beliefs or desires. Those are things I experience, like my physical body and the world. I am the mote of observational will that experiences these things and ultimately directs my attention and intention (choices) as I navigate those experiential conditions. All of those conditions can and do change - even my personality and beliefs - but the observational mote of will never changes. It is beyond all that because it is that which has experiences. In that sense, I only experience myself as the experiencer, not as any of that which is being experienced, although it is common for many people to mistake part of the experienced for aspects of the experiencer. William J Murray

Dogdoc: If the reasons are not causal, then regardless of how compelling the reasons are, they are not what causes the choice. The phrase "compelled by reasons" is thus, it seems, misleading. You either mean that the reasons cause the choice, or you do not. If not, then it doesn't matter if the reasons are "compelling" or not, because that has no causal power over the choice. You don't get to exclude causality from the argument for those rebutting your argument, and then sneak it back in time and time again using terminology that directly implies it in context. Why say a choice is "compelled by reasons" if you don't mean it is caused by those reasons? William J Murray

Dogdoc @144, How is "compelled by reasons" significantly different from "caused by reasons?" William J Murray

Dogdoc: ~ Nothing can ever guarantee that you are right about anything ~

The above is Dogdoc’s unfiltered message. Note the unadulterated absolutism: “nothing can ever ….” Dogdoc is forcefully claiming that he is absolutely sure that he can never be sure about anything. Of course, to make such a statement requires the total blindness for self-referentiality that defines all skeptics.

AnimatedDust: The pretzels we are willing to twist ourselves into, at all costs, lest we be accountable to someone far greater than ourselves.

It is baffling indeed. Origenes

Dogdoc @136, Seems like your philosophy is being shredded and I really don't want to pile on. But my observations are that you really are back-peddling on all your stated beliefs, simply by asserting that others don’t understand them or denying the obvious logical conclusions. So, let’s try this practical example from one of your statements: 1. You confront a dogfighting owner/enthusiast/organizer about the dogs that are obviously being seriously injured. You stated that “If I was face-to-face with someone who was violently brutalizing a dog, I would use every means available to me to prevent them from continuing, including physically defending the animal by forcibly constraining its tormentor.” Every means available. Hmmm. 2. Assuming that the dogfighting owner/enthusiast/organizer meets your force with an equal or greater amount of force, it would be reasonable to assume neither you or the other person would back down. Instead the violent encounter would escalate, possibly with fatal consequences, either to you or the other person. 3. Once one of you has either been disabled, knocked cold, or murdered, the conflict of between your beliefs will at least temporarily be resolved. Of course, murder would settle the conflict of your irreconcilable beliefs (for which neither of you are responsible) once and for all. Thus, this is clearly and ultimately a kill-or-be-killed situation. Do you disagree with these points, or do you want to proceed to “might makes right”? -Q Querius

Vividbleau,

So you’re not a causal determinist and you rely on mental reasoning.

Yes.

And a rational choice is one that is made based on our beliefs and desires and our choices “will be determined by our beliefs and desires, but not in a causal sense”

Yes.

I don’t know if I am just not smart enough but I am having a hard time understanding what you are trying to say. The Oxford definition of “determine” is to CAUSE (something) to occur in a particular way, be the decisive factor. Definition 2 is to ascertain or establish exactly, typically as a result of research or calculation. I suppose reasoning is more in line with 2, is this what you mean?

Similar to #2, yes (I would call it an entailment relation).

If so your beliefs and desires are not determined by you but you reason from those determined beliefs and desires and make choices therefore it follows that your reasons are not determined?

As I illustrated with the charity example, your beliefs and desires are not ultimately chosen by you, so when you deliberate over your beliefs and desires and decide on some choice, that choice is based on reasons that were not chosen by you.

I know I am struggling here but am I somewhere in the ballpark?

I think you are, and applaud your openness! dogdoc

Ori “I absolutely guarantee myself, that I exist. Total clarity.” Can I say amen! evidently I can heh heh. It all starts from the law of identity. Vivid vividbleau

DD I am going to go step by step and if my observations are not accurate let me know. “Great, thanks. Ok, so most people envision free will as something opposed to causal determinism. I think causality is poorly (or not) understood, so I take another approach, and focus instead on our mental reasoning rather than physical causation.” So you’re not a causal determinist and you rely on mental reasoning and a rational choice is one that is made based on our beliefs and desires and our choices “will be determined by our beliefs and desires, but not in a causal sense” I don’t know if I am just not smart enough but I am having a hard time understanding what you are trying to say. The Oxford definition of “determine” is to CAUSE (something) to occur in a particular way, be the decisive factor. Definition 2 is to ascertain or establish exactly, typically as a result of research or calculation. I suppose reasoning is more in line with 2, is this what you mean? If so your beliefs and desires are not determined by you but you reason from those determined beliefs and desires and make choices therefore it follows that your reasons are not determined? I know I am struggling here but am I somewhere in the ballpark? Vivid vividbleau

Origenes. Masterful. The pretzels we are willing to twist ourselves into, at all costs, lest we be accountable to someone far greater than ourselves. AnimatedDust

Vividbleau@158

I am enjoying this conversation so back on track I think I do understand most of your argument but I want to process your post at 150. As you know from 61 I believe my choices are both free and determined. The only way I can process your statement that “nobody is”in answer to my question is full blown determinism which I don’t think you are espousing , if not how do you reconcile that?

Great, thanks. Ok, so most people envision free will as something opposed to causal determinism. I think causality is poorly (or not) understood, so I take another approach, and focus instead on our mental reasoning rather than physical causation. When we make a rational choice, no matter what the underlying physics (or whatever you think our minds may arise from), we deliberate over our reasons. In other words, our choices are rationally entailed by our beliefs and desires. If we act rationally, then our choices will be determined by our beliefs and desires, but not in a causal sense. This is similar to a logical inference, where the conclusion is determined by the premises and the rules of logic, not by physics. Given that, we see our choices cannot be free unless our beliefs and desires are freely chosen. Since we cannot ultimately choose our beliefs and desires, our choices cannot be free. This means that we do, as agents, deliberate over our beliefs and desires, which is a type of freedom. But in turn, our beliefs and desires are not deliberately chosen by us, so that sort of ultimate freedom cannot exist. dogdoc

Dogdoc @156

DD: In other words, you haven’t found any mistake in my reasoning, you’re just unhappy with the conclusion.

I hate to break it to you, but your “reasoning” is self-defeating and, frankly, worthless.

Ori: Free persons can freely apprehend true beliefs.

Your apprehensions may be correct or incorrect.

I exist.

DD: Nothing can ever guarantee that you are right about anything.

I absolutely guarantee myself, that I exist. Total clarity. Dear onlooker, do you see what I see, namely: Dogdoc revealing himself as the pathetic skeptic that he is? Self-defeating nonsense, but, for some reason, he has to come out at this point.

DD: I think that bothers you greatly …

Your projections mean nothing to me. There is no value in your self-defeating nonsense. Go home. Start over. Origenes

DD 157 Thank you I am enjoying this conversation so back on track I think I do understand most of your argument but I want to process your post at 150. As you know from 61 I believe my choices are both free and determined. The only way I can process your statement that “nobody is”in answer to my question is full blown determinism which I don’t think you are espousing , if not how do you reconcile that? Vivid vividbleau

Vividbleau@154 Do you want to continue our discussions or do you want to belittle my questions? If it so obvious then I am a dolt to even ask the question.

Honestly it was not my intention at all to belittle the question, truly sorry it came across that way. I did my level best to clarify my position for you. I certainly did not mean to say that your question was silly or stupid, only that once you actually understand the argument it becomes clear that we are imbued, by our inheritance and our experience, with our beliefs, and we do not generate them out of thin air. dogdoc

Origenes@153,

DD: Eventually you will see that you ultimately are compelled by beliefs and desires that you did not choose. OR: By saying this, you are implying that something is irreparably wrong.

In other words, you haven't found any mistake in my reasoning, you're just unhappy with the conclusion.

Ori: Free persons can freely apprehend true beliefs.

Your apprehensions may be correct or incorrect. Nothing can ever guarantee that you are right about anything. I think that bothers you greatly, but the fact that you're bothered doesn't make it false. dogdoc

Vividbleau On an ultimate level far beyond the reach of our will, there is Mr. Nobody who is feeding us with his beliefs. :) Origenes

“Nobody’s, obviously!” Do you want to continue our discussions or do you want to belittle my questions? If it so obvious then I am a dolt to even ask the question. Vivid vividbleau

DD @ 152

Eventually you will see that you ultimately are compelled by beliefs and desires that you did not choose.

By saying this, you are implying that something is irreparably wrong. Again, I’m asking you to confirm the obvious.

Ori: Your argument fails to take into consideration: 1.) We cannot choose what is true and what is not. 2.) Free persons can freely apprehend true beliefs.

DD: I agree with (1). I don’t understand (2)

Allow me to quote myself:

Ori: All that is required for free understanding is that I am the one who understands, that it is not the case that something beyond my control induces in me the false notion that I understand them.

Origenes

Origenes@151

DD: I think we all agree that people may have true or false beliefs, right? ORI: Sure.

OK! We agree that our beliefs may be true or false, good.

DD: My argument makes or implies nothing about how trustworthy or untrustworthy our beliefs are. ORI: Yes, it does. You say that we hold beliefs that we did not choose and that can be true or false.

You just got finished agreeing that our beliefs may be true or false.

By saying that we hold (potentially) false beliefs and that we have no choice in doing so, you are implying that something is irreparably wrong. I’m asking you to confirm the obvious.

I'm pointing out the obvious fact that we hold beliefs we did not choose. But don't worry - it seems to me you have plenty of reasons to choose to make sure your beliefs are correct, and you will continue to reflect on your beliefs, change those you no longer think are true, and so on! But you must ask what are your reasons for wanting to ensure your beliefs are true, and believing you can positively impact the trustworthiness of your deliberations. Eventually you will see that you ultimately are compelled by beliefs and desires that you did not choose. (Please read my response to Vivid @150 for my best effort to explain this point).

My refutation of your argument has to do with true beliefs.

Indeed, which is why your refutation fails. Again read @150 to see why - whether your beliefs are true or false, you ultimately have no ultimate control over them. This doesn't change our epistemology at all - we will still have true and false beliefs, and we can still update and change our beliefs - but if you read @150 hopefully you will see why we do not have ultimate control.

Your argument fails to take into consideration: 1.) We cannot choose what is true and what is not. 2.) Free persons can freely apprehend true beliefs.

I agree with (1). I don't understand (2) - we might be correct or incorrect in our apprehensions.

I address the heart of your argument by pointing out that your demand that we, in order to be free, must choose our beliefs does not make sense (is irrational) when it comes to true beliefs because we cannot choose what is true and what’s not. Your argument has failed to take this into consideration.

We cannot choose what is true, and we can be mistaken about what is true. This is the case no matter what we believe about free will!

When formulating your argument you have omitted to make that crucial distinction. You would not have made the argument if you had understood that we do not choose true beliefs, but instead, freely apprehend them.

I understand that we do not ultimately choose our beliefs, true or false, and that this means our choices are not ultimately free. Again, I don't think I can make the point any clearer than I have @150. If you read it and still disagree, I will thank you for a good-faith debate and agree to disagree. dogdoc

Dogdoc @148

Ori: However, if your argument implies that our beliefs are not trustworthy, then I hold that this shocking implication deserves mention.

DD: I have no idea what you are talking about. I think we all agree that people may have true or false beliefs, right?

Sure.

DD: My argument makes or implies nothing about how trustworthy or untrustworthy our beliefs are.

Yes, it does. You say that we hold beliefs that we did not choose and that can be true or false. By saying that we hold (potentially) false beliefs and that we have no choice in doing so, you are implying that something is irreparably wrong. I’m asking you to confirm the obvious.

DD: You’re trying very hard to find some way to connect my argument to epistemology, but there is no such connection.

The connection is obvious. - - - -

Ori: I suppose we both agree that it is highly inappropriate (nonsensical) to say that one “chooses” A=A to be true, or “chooses” 2+3=5 to be true.

DD: My argument has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of any of our beliefs.

My refutation of your argument has to do with true beliefs.

DD: You seem unwilling to accept this, but you can’t find a single statement where I even consider the truth of any belief – because my argument has nothing to do with that!

Failing to take into consideration is not quite the same as having “nothing to do with that.” Your argument fails to take into consideration: 1.) We cannot choose what is true and what is not. 2.) Free persons can freely apprehend true beliefs.

DD: You, however, are unwilling to engage the heart of my argument – that since rational choices are based on beliefs and desires, and it is impossible for us to rationally choose our beliefs and desires, then our rational choices are not free.

I address the heart of your argument by pointing out that your demand that we, in order to be free, must choose our beliefs does not make sense (is irrational) when it comes to true beliefs because we cannot choose what is true and what’s not. Your argument has failed to take this into consideration.

DD: I’ll just say it once again: My argument has nothing to do with the truth or the falsity of any belief.

When formulating your argument you have omitted to make that crucial distinction. You would not have made the argument if you had understood that we do not choose true beliefs, but instead, freely apprehend them. Origenes

Vivid@149,

Ultimately keeps popping up throughout your posts so obviously it’s important regarding your view on things. How are you using it as it relates to choices?

Let's say I am faced with a decision: I have $1 and can put it in the charity bucket buy a candy bar. I might make a random or arbitrary decision, like a flip of the coin, and this might be considered "free", because the result is not pre-determined. But I don't consider a random decision to be an exercise of the sort of free will worth wanting. I could also make a decision based on my beliefs and desires, which is (by definition) a rational decision. Would that decision be an example of free will? It might seem so, since nobody else is making the decision for me, and nobody is coercing me, so we would generally say that I am "free to choose" either option. This is what I would call a "free choice" without the qualification of "ultimate". But look more closely: While I make my decision based on my beliefs and desires, we have to look at where those beliefs and desires came from. Why? Because if I have no control over my beliefs and desires, then I have no control over my rational choices. Imagine the case where some brain pathology causes me to believe that the person with the charity bucket is Satan, and I do not want to support Satan, so I choose to buy the candy bar instead. Is this still a free choice? I would say no - I was compelled to my decision by a belief over which I had no control. So that is why I argue that we must be able to freely choose our beliefs and desires in order for our rational choices to be ultimately free. To look even more closely, let's say my reason for giving to the charity is that I believe it's important to help the needy, and I say yes, I really did choose to believe that it's important to help the needy. Does that make it a free choice? Again, we have to make sure that choice was also made for reasons of my own choosing. For what reason did I choose to believe in the importance of charity? Let's say it's because I have an acute sense of empathy. Did I choose to have that sense of empathy? And so on and so on, until finally we reach some reason that we did not voluntarily choose (for me, it would be my sense of empathy - I never deliberated over whether I should feel empathy or not, I simply find that I do). At that point we see that my beliefs are not ultimately chosen by me. So that is why I call it "ultimate" free choice, and why I say it is impossible.

if they are not “ultimately “my own whose are they “ultimately”?

Nobody's, obviously! dogdoc

“My view is that if our inclinations (or beliefs and desires) are not chosen by us, then our choices are not ultimately our own.” Ultimately keeps popping up throughout your posts so obviously it’s important regarding your view on things. How are you using it as it relates to choices? if they are not “ultimately “my own whose are they “ultimately”? Vivid vividbleau

Origenes@146,

However, if your argument implies that our beliefs are not trustworthy, then I hold that this shocking implication deserves mention.

I have no idea what you are talking about. I think we all agree that people may have true or false beliefs, right? My argument makes or implies nothing about how trustworthy or untrustworthy our beliefs are. You're trying very hard to find some way to connect my argument to epistemology, but there is no such connection. It is actually comical for you to say I've made a shocking implication about the trustworthiness of our beliefs..

DD: As far as my argument is concerned, my conclusion (impossible to be ultimately responsible for our choices) is based on the observation that we cannot ultimately choose any of our beliefs. ORI: When it comes to true beliefs I can agree. I suppose we both agree that it is highly inappropriate (nonsensical) to say that one “chooses” A=A to be true, or “chooses” 2+3=5 to be true.

My argument has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of any of our beliefs. You seem unwilling to accept this, but you can't find a single statement where I even consider the truth of any belief - because my argument has nothing to do with that! You, however, are unwilling to engage the heart of my argument - that since rational choices are based on beliefs and desires, and it is impossible for us to rationally choose our beliefs and desires, then our rational choices are not free.

DD: …. until we settle our discussion about ultimate responsibility. But perhaps we’ve settled that, and the answer is that you use a different definition for free choice than I have been using. ORI: Our main disagreement centers on true beliefs, I have pointed out repeatedly that we cannot choose what is true.

I'll just say it once again: My argument has nothing to do with the truth or the falsity of any belief. I would assent to the obvious and innocuous claim that some beliefs are true and some are false, but this statement is simply irrelevant to anything I have argued.

Remarkably in #95, you agreed with me: “Agreed we can’t choose what is true and what is not.” However, now you are back on the old war path and maintain that every belief (true or not) should be chosen to be freely held.

I can't figure out how you are so confused about what I'm saying. I am not saying beliefs "should" be chosen, I am saying that beliefs "cannot" be chosen, and since they cannot be chosen, then our choices based on those beliefs are not free.

DD: For you, even if your choice is based on beliefs you did not choose to have, you would still consider that choice to be free. ORI: Indeed.

OK! Good clarification!

Suppose I choose to have 4 cars. I have 2 cars and decide to buy 2 more. Here my choice would be based in part on a true belief that I “did not choose to have” [because we cannot choose what is true and what is not], namely 2+2=4. In this scenario, I do not see any threat to the liberty of my choice to own 4 cars.

MY ARGUMENT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF ANY BELIEF. If you chose to buy 2 more cars, then that choice is either arbitrary (made for no reason) or it is made in accord with your beliefs and desires (whether or not you beliefs are true). I focus only on non-arbitrary beliefs, those made based on your beliefs and desires. Maybe one of those desires is that you'd like to have four cars, and one of your beliefs is that 2+2=4, and those together compel your rational choice to buy 2 more cars. Or, maybe one of your desires is to have to 9 cars, and one of your beliefs is that if you by 100 more cars then you will end up with 9 total - obviously a false belief. But with regard to my argument, it makes no difference that one example is of a true belief and the other involves a false belief. In both cases, you are making choices that are entailed by your beliefs and desires. In either case, your choice of how many cars to buy is based on your beliefs (true or not) and your desires (whatever they may be). My argument shows that it is not possible for you to freely choose the beliefs and desires that lead you to your choice regarding how many cars to buy. Why? Because in order to choose those beliefs and desires, you would have to base that choice on yet other beliefs and desires, and so on in a regress. And that regress can only end in beliefs and desires that you did not rationally choose.

p.s. I do not see why your kindergarten massacre scenario applies to my arguments.

The kindergarten scenario demonstrates that unless we can choose the reasons for our choices, those choices are not free. The killer did not choose to have a brain tumor, and he did not choose to have that tumor cause him to have delusions about alien monster children that need to be killed in order to save the world, and even though he acted in accord with his (delusional) beliefs, I would not consider his actions to be free. We don't choose our true beliefs, we don't choose our false beliefs, we don't choose our desires. And our choices are based upon nothing but our beliefs (true or false) and desires (including preferences, values, commitments, etc). Thus, in this important sense, we have no free will. dogdoc

Vivid@ 61

Perhaps this will help answer your question. I believe we always choose according to our strongest inclination given the options available to us at the time the choice is made.

This sounds like my view; the way I say it is we deliberate over our beliefs and desires.

I also believe that every choice we make is free and every choice we make is determined but what determines it is me, my choices are self determined. Self determination is the essence of freedom.

My view is that if our inclinations (or beliefs and desires) are not chosen by us, then our choices are not ultimately our own. dogdoc

Dogdoc @143

Ori: Is it your claim that we hold beliefs that we did not choose and that can either be true or false?

DD: Yes.

Ori: If so, does it follow that our beliefs are not trustworthy?

DD: That is simply not relevant to my argument – I have not brought up any aspect of epistemology here.

Indeed you did not bring that up. However, if your argument implies that our beliefs are not trustworthy, then I hold that this shocking implication deserves mention. - - - -

DD: As far as my argument is concerned, my conclusion (impossible to be ultimately responsible for our choices) is based on the observation that we cannot ultimately choose any of our beliefs.

When it comes to true beliefs I can agree. I suppose we both agree that it is highly inappropriate (nonsensical) to say that one “chooses” A=A to be true, or “chooses” 2+3=5 to be true. - - - -

DD: …. until we settle our discussion about ultimate responsibility. But perhaps we’ve settled that, and the answer is that you use a different definition for free choice than I have been using.

Our main disagreement centers on true beliefs, I have pointed out repeatedly that we cannot choose what is true. Remarkably in #95, you agreed with me: “Agreed we can’t choose what is true and what is not.” However, now you are back on the old war path and maintain that every belief (true or not) should be chosen to be freely held.

DD: For you, even if your choice is based on beliefs you did not choose to have, you would still consider that choice to be free.

Indeed. Suppose I choose to have 4 cars. I have 2 cars and decide to buy 2 more. Here my choice would be based in part on a true belief that I “did not choose to have” [because we cannot choose what is true and what is not], namely 2+2=4. In this scenario, I do not see any threat to the liberty of my choice to own 4 cars. p.s. I do not see why your kindergarten massacre scenario applies to my arguments. Origenes

FYI I think the term free will is an oxymoron, did you miss that? I did miss that, sorry. How so? Because my will is not free from my beliefs and desires LOL. I would refer you to my posts # 52,53,and 61 for more color. Vivid vividbleau

William J Murray,

If that’s your argument, then I guess I don’t understand why anyone is bothering to argue against it, since none of those reasons are postulated as causal wrt choices.

Rational choices require deliberating over reasons, and thus one's beliefs and desires compel one's choices. There is no need to bring in a discussion of causality, and argue Hume and Kant and so on, because if we are compelled by our beliefs to make a particular choice (which we must be if our choice is rational) then that's sufficient for my argument. dogdoc

Origenes@139,

I can arguendo accept your argument and maintain that we are free.

Ok, then you're saying it doesn't matter that our choices result from beliefs and desires we do not choose, you still call that free, that's fine..

I would then argue that the regress terminates in a true belief that we (of course) did not choose, but instead, freely apprehend.

You are interested in talking about which of our beliefs are true and how we know them to be true. While that could be an interesting conversation, it is not the one I'm trying to advance here.

We can freely apprehend true beliefs, such as 2+2=4, and the fact that we cannot choose what true beliefs are does not make us not free, as you seem to suggest.

I am not suggesting anything regarding the truth or falsity of beliefs, period. I am talking about the origin of our beliefs, not their veracity.

Is it your claim that we hold beliefs that we did not choose and that can either be true or false?

Yes.

If so, does it follow that our beliefs are not trustworthy?

That is simply not relevant to my argument - I have not brought up any aspect of epistemology here.

WRT true beliefs, involuntarism is correct, because it makes no sense to say that we “choose” to believe that 2+2=4. Instead, we freely apprehend that 2+2=4.

As far as my argument is concerned, my conclusion (impossible to be ultimately responsible for our choices) is based on the observation that we cannot ultimately choose any of our beliefs. Voluntarism was an aside, not necessary for my argument, which is based on the regress of beliefs that cannot ever begin with a free choice.

The truth is that dogs do not lay eggs.

Well yes, we agree, but I regret mentioning voluntarism until we settle our discussion about ultimate responsibility. But perhaps we've settled that, and the answer is that you use a different definition for free choice than I have been using. For you, even if your choice is based on beliefs you did not choose to have, you would still consider that choice to be free. Let me illustrate why I don't think your definition of free choice reflects what many believe about freedom: Imagine a man suffers a brain lesion in the amygdala and as a result starts believing the children are alien monsters, and then shoots up a kindergarten because of his desire to save the world. In your view, that would be an exercise of free will because he was, after all, acting in accord with his beliefs and desires. But I do not see any freedom in that act, as he was compelled by beliefs that he did not choose. dogdoc

Vividbleau@138,

DD: “Well, you believe that Paris is not the capitol of Italy. What we’ve proven here is that when you believe something, you can not voluntarily choose to disbelieve it (or the reverse).” VB:Now I am happy to move on to “infinite regress” but not until we resolve the above. You seem to be waffling because we have gone from “ proven” to “rather debating let’s move on” and “I believe it to be true” none of which comes close to “ proven”. So no I am not moving on.

Don't know why I chose the word "proven" - a fraught and unnecesary notion. I have demonstrated why our choices cannot ultimately originate freely.

So I am clear by “involuntary” you mean not under our conscious control., that all my beliefs are not under my conscious control, correct?

I suggest we skip the complication introduced by considering doxastic voluntarism, and stick with the argument I'm making regarding free will. I argue that all rational choices must be based upon our beliefs and desires, and that in order for us to be ultimately responsible for our choice we must be ultimately responsible for choosing our beliefs and desires, but we can't rationally choose our beliefs and desires until we have already chosen our beliefs and desires, which is impossible.

FYI I think the term free will is an oxymoron, did you miss that?

I did miss that, sorry. How so? dogdoc

Dogdoc said:

My argument demonstrates we can only make rational decisions according to reasons that are not of our own choosing, ...

If that's your argument, then I guess I don't understand why anyone is bothering to argue against it, since none of those reasons are postulated as causal wrt choices. I mean, to take other people's perspective here for a moment, it's not like we chose what is good and evil, and it's not like we chose to exist, to be born, where we were born or in what time, to what parents and of what gender, skin-color, etc. It's not like we made up our own physics, math, logic, and geometry. It's not like we chose any of these countless conditions internal or external. DD is not claiming those conditions, reasons, beliefs etc. cause any of your choices. Why are you arguing against his position? William J Murray

“Now I am happy to move on to “infinite regress. … Strike the infinite part. Vivid vividbleau

Dogdoc @137

DD: But that is not what I rely on in this argument I’m making. Instead, I point out that if you could choose your beliefs, that choice would necessarily be based on other beliefs, and so on in a regress. The way the regress terminates is necessarily in some belief that you did not choose.

I can arguendo accept your argument and maintain that we are free. I would then argue that the regress terminates in a true belief that we (of course) did not choose, but instead, freely apprehend. We can freely apprehend true beliefs, such as 2+2=4, and the fact that we cannot choose what true beliefs are does not make us not free, as you seem to suggest. - - - - What did you mean when you wrote this: “... everything you learn from others, from books, from your observations, and everything you were born knowing – all of this (whether true or false) is unchosen, and every choice based on those beliefs are likewise not freely chosen.”

DD: I meant just what I said – we do not choose what we believe. This doesn’t imply we are brainwashed or that anyone forces us to believe things.

Is it your claim that we hold beliefs that we did not choose and that can either be true or false? If so, does it follow that our beliefs are not trustworthy? - - - -

DD: Involuntarism is the belief that it is impossible to willfully choose one’s beliefs.

WRT true beliefs, involuntarism is correct, because it makes no sense to say that we "choose" to believe that 2+2=4. Instead, we freely apprehend that 2+2=4.

DD: The easiest way to see what this means is to simply try to believe something that you do not currently believe, such as that dogs lay eggs.

The truth is that dogs do not lay eggs. Obviously, we cannot choose what is true. However, we can freely apprehend true beliefs, such as 2+2=4, and the fact that we cannot choose what true beliefs are does not make us not free, as you seem to suggest. Origenes

“Rather than debating whether something done involuntarily can be considered a choice, I would say more simply that what we believe is not under our conscious control” Not so fast, It was you that said the following “Well, you believe that Paris is not the capitol of Italy. What we’ve proven here is that when you believe something, you can not voluntarily choose to disbelieve it (or the reverse).” Now I am happy to move on to “infinite regress” but not until we resolve the above. You seem to be waffling because we have gone from “ proven” to “rather debating let’s move on” and “I believe it to be true” none of which comes close to “ proven”. So no I am not moving on. So I am clear by “involuntary” you mean not under our conscious control., that all my beliefs are not under my conscious control, correct? “people often have views of free will that they hold very dearly that are challenged by my argument.” FYI I think the term free will is an oxymoron, did you miss that? Vivid vividbleau

Origenes@133,

DD: I am saying that if a choice can be ultimately traced back to beliefs and desires that we did not deliberately choose to hold, then that choice is not ultimately free. ORI: I am saying that we can freely apprehend true beliefs, such as 2+2=4, and the fact that we cannot choose what true beliefs are does not make us not free, as you seem to suggest.

No, that's not what I'm saying. I am not talking about the truth or falsity of our beliefs. I'm talking about any belief that you have. It could be that you are smarter than your cousin, or that it's important to floss your teeth at night, or that dogs like their ears scratched. Now, I happen to believe that it is simply impossible to consciously, delberately decide to believe something. But that is not what I rely on in this argument I'm making. Instead, I point out that if you could choose your beliefs, that choice would necessarily be based on other beliefs, and so on in a regress. The way the regress terminates is necessarily in some belief that you did not choose.

What did you mean when you wrote this: DD: everything you learn from others, from books, from your observations, and everything you were born knowing – all of this (whether true or false) is unchosen, and every choice based on those beliefs are likewise not freely chosen.

I meant just what I said - we do not choose what we believe. This doesn't imply we are brainwashed or that anyone forces us to believe things.

According to you our beliefs are unchosen and can be true or false, but when I say that this implies that our beliefs are not to be trusted, you tell me that I am “absolutely wrong”?

That's correct, why would "unchosen" equate to "untrustworthy"? How do you know your "insights" are trustworthy? Anyway, here we're delving into epistemology, which is not relevant to my argument.

I’d be happy to agree that no beliefs are voluntarily chosen, a position that is known as doxastic involuntarism (which I happen to believe).

This is just what I reiterated in the beginning of this post. Involuntarism is the belief that it is impossible to willfully choose one's beliefs. The easiest way to see what this means is to simply try to believe something that you do not currently believe, such as that dogs lay eggs. Obviously even if you say you've chosen to believe that, you know you don't actually believe it. There are people who believe in voluntarism (or "indirect voluntarism") who disagree with me on this point, which again is why I do not rely on this claim to support my argument against free will. dogdoc

Querius@132,

Most people have a normal moral sense which recoils at the thought of cruelty to animals. An appeal to a majority view is simply a democratic version of “might makes right.”

No, I was not making an argument ad populum here. You had said that my philosophy boils down to "kill or be killed" (it is bizarre for you to say that). So I was listing a set of observations in an attempt to illustrate my philosophy doesn't have practical implications any different from yours. So you again make a mistaken assumption about my position - that I would appeal to popular view to see if something is a moral act - when I have repeatedly explained that my moral judgements are perceptions that I cannot deny.

So, what? According to your stated philosophy, that doesn’t make any of us more right than anyone else .

No, I have never said that of course (it would help if you quoted me exactly rather than paraphrased inaccurately). Again, the difference between us in this matter is not what we approve of, condone, or feel is "right". Rather, it is how we answer when asked to articulate how we know right from wrong. I consider it a perception, akin to a sensory perception or a perception of logical truth. You consider it as coming from divine commands. But we both think animal abuse is wrong.

There are other people who do not share that sense – some religious, some not. Both of us would resort to force to prevent those people from perpetrating such cruelty. No, I would most certainly not resort to force!

Fair enough, I apologize for making this assumption. If I was face-to-face with someone who was violently brutalizing a dog, I would use every means available to me to prevent them from continuing, including physically defending the animal by forcibly constraining its tormentor. But I respect that you would make a different choice in that situation.

DD: The fact that you attribute your sense to some god that you believe in doesn’t change any of that one iota. Q: Yes, to me it makes a profound difference, but it doesn’t make any difference according to your BELIEFS that were somehow conferred on you and that you’re emphatically not responsible for.

I meant it makes no difference in the sense that we both abhor animal cruelty, and that the differing foundations we identify for our morality doesn't change our desire to prohibit cruelty or our effectiveness in doing so.

No, actually, you would have considered yourself the winner based on your immutable BELIEFS for which you cannot be held responsible and are your sole basis of your perceptions and opinions derived from them.

I can't make sense of this, you have made too many mistakes. My beliefs are not immutable - it doesn't even make sense to say that since we all learn throughout our lives. We can indeed be held responsible in a legal sense for what we do, since we are the immediate cause of our actions. It makes no sense at all to say my beliefs are the sole basis of my perceptions. It is also unclear what you mean by saying my beliefs are the sole basis of my opinions.

I certainly don’t think of you as an “enemy,” but I am indeed intent on demonstrating to you that your faith in some type of conferred BELIEF for which you cannot possibly be held responsible is not worthy of your allegiance.

Allegiance is a funny word to use here. "Allegiance" usually refers to loyalty to a group, a leader, or a cause. As I've explained, my moral perceptions are involuntary (I believe yours are too - you could not choose to enjoy cruelty), and do not derive from my loyalty to anyone or any group.

I’m concerned enough to try to demonstrate to you that such a belief system leads inevitably only to • Kill or be killed. • Might makes right. when confronted with animal blood sports such as competitive dogfighting.

Again, since we both judge these things to be wrong, why is it that you think my judgement leads to "might makes right" while your judgement doesn't? What does this have to do with killing?

If it’s true that people have no control over their BELIEFS, then I’d ask you, “What’s the point, when Dogdoc knows that everyone else is wrong?”

I can't make sense of this either.

But, let’s say, hypothetically, that there exists, in fact, an intensely conscious, caring, and brilliant Creator—and I’m most definitely not talking about religion—then Querius could be certain that he has no monopoly on the truth and wisdom, and that Querius would be interested in gaining insights from others, learning from nature, and nature’s God. Querius would continually be learning new things that would shape his perspectives.

I continually learn new things that shape my perspective of course, why on Earth would you think otherwise? I do not claim to have a monopoly on truth and wisdom of course. I honestly do not understand why you would think these things. It really seems like you are making up both sides of this argument instead of actually trying to respond to what I'm really saying.

Querius would treasure everything that the Creator somehow brought into being, and deeply appreciate and delight in the genius he is bound to discover in the creation. He would be concerned about ideologies that lead people into animal blood sports, or racism in the name of Darwinism.

I'm not a Darwinist and have no idea why you would bring that up. I don't believe that animal blood sports are the result of ideology, and would like you to try and provide evidence for that assertion.

Querius would want to peacefully and firmly convince animal blood sport enthusiasts, at least those who don’t have immutable BELIEFS, that there’s a much better way of life!

It is absolutely weird for you to characterize my beliefs as "immutable" - what did I say that made you think that? My beliefs change and evolve over time, just like everyone else's. Anyway, if you find success in eradicating animal abuse by preaching religion to them, then I encourage you sincerely to do so! dogdoc

Vividbleau@131,

Your position is that I do not voluntarily choose my beliefs thus to me this means I involuntarily choose them is that what you are saying?

Rather than debating whether something done involuntarily can be considered a choice, I would say more simply that what we believe is not under our conscious control. Let me be clear, though - while this position (doxastic involuntarism) is something I believe is true, my argument against free will does not rely on it. (Rather, it relies on the regress of beliefs that would be needed if we could choose our beliefs). dogdoc

William J Murray@130,

I repeat, my argument does not consider causality at all – not necessary causes, not sufficient causes, not deterministic or non-deterministic or any other type of causes. ..

Yes, this is correct.

PM: At this point I’m still not convinced that “the sort of free will that most people want to have” is the kind of free will that you’re arguing is impossible. I agree with PM here,...

Well that's fine, but of course my argument is what it is no matter what other positions people may hold. Still I agree it is important to understand others' views on the matter.

and that’s what I was trying to discuss, but you insisted that what I thought the argument was about – the causality of choices – was 100% NOT what you were arguing about.

Yes, once again I repeat: My argument is not dependent upon any notion of causality - it refers only to rational entailments.

You repeatedly said your argument had nothing to do with causality in any way.

Yes, that is 100% the case! I have given summary after summary of my argument on this page, and as you can see, none of it refers to causality, determinism,and so on.

You responded to PM’s statement above @128: We’d have to take a poll, but certainly on this site I find people believe uncritically in ultimate, libertarian, contra-causal free will.

Yes I think that is true, but without a poll I could not state that the majority of posters shared that view of free will.

Since you are “not” making an argument that reasons and beliefs cause choices instead of a free will, libertarian causal agency, how is your argument about reasons and beliefs a challenge against “ultimate, libertarian, contra-causal free will?”

I didn't intend my characterization of how others view free will as a target for my argument. In fact I have expressly and repeatedly said that other people have different definitions of free choice than I am employing, and my argument does not apply to that. I'm not addressing the problems of libertarianism - they are plenty, but I've restricted my argument to something simple enough to debate on a forum like this. My argument demonstrates we can only make rational decisions according to reasons that are not of our own choosing, and in my experience (just read this page!) people often have views of free will that they hold very dearly that are challenged by my argument. dogdoc

Dogdoc

DD: I am saying that if a choice can be ultimately traced back to beliefs and desires that we did not deliberately choose to hold, then that choice is not ultimately free.

I am saying that we can freely apprehend true beliefs, such as 2+2=4, and the fact that we cannot choose what true beliefs are does not make us not free, as you seem to suggest. - - - -

Ori: ~ Dogdoc’s argument is self-defeating ~ Dogdoc argues that we cannot be responsible for our beliefs because they are ultimately based on basic beliefs that we did not author and are forced upon us.

DD: Please try to quote me accurately. I never said everything about “basic” beliefs, nor did I ever mention beliefs being “forced” upon us.

What did you mean when you wrote this:

DD: everything you learn from others, from books, from your observations, and everything you were born knowing – all of this (whether true or false) is unchosen, and every choice based on those beliefs are likewise not freely chosen.

Ori: It seems to me that a consequent Dogdoc must argue that none of our beliefs can be trusted.

DD: Absolutely wrong! My argument is not concerned with the truth of any belief.

According to you our beliefs are unchosen and can be true or false, but when I say that this implies that our beliefs are not to be trusted, you tell me that I am "absolutely wrong"? What did you mean when you wrote this:

I’d be happy to agree that no beliefs are voluntarily chosen, a position that is known as doxastic involuntarism (which I happen to believe).

Origenes

Dogdoc @129,

Most people have a normal moral sense which recoils at the thought of cruelty to animals.

An appeal to a majority view is simply a democratic version of “might makes right.”

You and I both share that sense.

So, what? According to your stated philosophy, that doesn’t make any of us more right than anyone else .

There are other people who do not share that sense – some religious, some not. Both of us would resort to force to prevent those people from perpetrating such cruelty.

No, I would most certainly not resort to force!

The fact that you attribute your sense to some god that you believe in doesn’t change any of that one iota.

Yes, to me it makes a profound difference, but it doesn’t make any difference according to your BELIEFS that were somehow conferred on you and that you’re emphatically not responsible for.

Were that [an ad hominem attack] the case, I would obviously have been declared the winner of this argument many posts ago.

No, actually, you would have considered yourself the winner based on your immutable BELIEFS for which you cannot be held responsible and are your sole basis of your perceptions and opinions derived from them.

What’s really important is this, though: You come across as angry, and you treat this discussion as a competition.

No, I’m not angry. I’m actually both amused and concerned.

Try thinking about it a different way: I am not your enemy or opponent, even if we disagree about things.

I certainly don’t think of you as an “enemy,” but I am indeed intent on demonstrating to you that your faith in some type of conferred BELIEF for which you cannot possibly be held responsible is not worthy of your allegiance. I’m concerned enough to try to demonstrate to you that such a belief system leads inevitably only to • Kill or be killed. • Might makes right. when confronted with animal blood sports such as competitive dogfighting.

Use this forum to clarify you own views and your understanding of others’ instead of as a boxing match.

If it’s true that people have no control over their BELIEFS, then I’d ask you, “What’s the point, when Dogdoc knows that everyone else is wrong?” But, let’s say, hypothetically, that there exists, in fact, an intensely conscious, caring, and brilliant Creator—and I’m most definitely not talking about religion—then Querius could be certain that he has no monopoly on the truth and wisdom, and that Querius would be interested in gaining insights from others, learning from nature, and nature’s God. Querius would continually be learning new things that would shape his perspectives. Querius would treasure everything that the Creator somehow brought into being, and deeply appreciate and delight in the genius he is bound to discover in the creation. He would be concerned about ideologies that lead people into animal blood sports, or racism in the name of Darwinism. In that case, the tired aphorisms of • Kill or be killed. • Might makes right. would seem grotesque in comparison, and Querius would want to peacefully and firmly convince animal blood sport enthusiasts, at least those who don’t have immutable BELIEFS, that there’s a much better way of life! -Q Querius

“Well, you believe that Paris is not the capitol of Italy. What we’ve proven here is that when you believe something, you can not voluntarily choose to disbelieve it (or the reverse).” I gotta a lot of questions and I am honestly trying to understand where we disagree or maybe not. I don’t think you have proven anything at the moment but let’s go with this. Your position is that I do not voluntarily choose my beliefs thus to me this means I involuntarily choose them is that what you are saying? I think the answer is yes but I want to make sure I am not misrepresenting your position. Vivid vividbleau

@117 Dogdoc said:

I repeat, my argument does not consider causality at all – not necessary causes, not sufficient causes, not deterministic or non-deterministic or any other type of causes. ..

@124 PM said:

At this point I’m still not convinced that “the sort of free will that most people want to have” is the kind of free will that you’re arguing is impossible.

I agree with PM here, and that's what I was trying to discuss, but you insisted that what I thought the argument was about - the causality of choices - was 100% NOT what you were arguing about. You repeatedly said your argument had nothing to do with causality in any way. You responded to PM's statement above @128:

We’d have to take a poll, but certainly on this site I find people believe uncritically in ultimate, libertarian, contra-causal free will.

Since you are "not" making an argument that reasons and beliefs cause choices instead of a free will, libertarian causal agency, how is your argument about reasons and beliefs a challenge against "ultimate, libertarian, contra-causal free will?" William J Murray

Querius@125, Most people have a normal moral sense which recoils at the thought of cruelty to animals. You and I both share that sense. There are other people who do not share that sense – some religious, some not. Both of us would resort to force to prevent those people from perpetrating such cruelty. The fact that you attribute your sense to some god that you believe in doesn’t change any of that one iota.

Woohoo! An ad hominem attack! This is a de facto admission that I’ve won the argument!

Were that the case, I would obviously have been declared the winner of this argument many posts ago. What's really important is this, though: You come across as angry, and you treat this discussion as a competition. Try thinking about it a different way: I am not your enemy or opponent, even if we disagree about things. Use this forum to clarify you own views and your understanding of others' instead of as a boxing match. dogdoc

PyrrhoManiac1@124,

I think that some version of doxastic involuntarism is true, at least in the following sense: (1) one cannot choose not to endorse a belief that one takes to be true, and one cannot choose to endorse a belief that one takes to be false; (2) one cannot, by mere fiat, make oneself believe something that one does not believe.

We agree. Likewise we cannot consciously choose our desires.

That is, we lack an immediate or direct control over our beliefs.

I would say direct conscious control, yes, and the same goes for our desires.

At the same time, I think it’s true that we are responsible for our beliefs. What we believe guides what we do. If I believe that it is morally wrong to drink alcohol on Sunday mornings, I am more likely to vote for a local ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcohol on Sunday mornings. That entails imposing my belief on other people who don’t share it.

You can pick different criteria for responsibility, but I would say acting on beliefs and desires that are not of our own deliberate choosing does not qualify. An extreme case that has been mentioned here makes the case: If one is brainwashed (via torture, drugs, etc) to believe something false and then one acts on that imposed belief, we would typically refrain from holding the brainwashed person responsible.

I have obligations, to myself as a rational being and to others as rational beings, to ensure that my beliefs are supported with evidence, to investigate the legitimacy of my beliefs, to take seriously the arguments of people who disagree with me, and to consider whether my own beliefs are fully justified in light of the criticisms they have received.

You believe you have that obligation. Did you voluntarily choose to believe you had that obligation? Could you voluntarily choose not to have that obligation? I think those answers will be "no", but even if you say you did voluntarily choose to believe you had that obligation, for you to be ultimately responsible we'd have to ensure that you voluntarily chose the reason for your choice to believe in that obligation. And so on.

The dissolution of this paradox lies in recognizing that the absence of immediate or direct control over my beliefs is compatible with the presence of mediate or indirect control over my beliefs: I cannot change my beliefs by mere fiat, but I can take actions that are likely to increase (or decrease) my confidence in what I endorse and on what basis.

Indirect doxastic voluntarism merely removes the problem one step - you still must answer the question of why you decided to take actions that are likely to change your beliefs or desires.

At this point I’m still not convinced that “the sort of free will that most people want to have” is the kind of free will that you’re arguing is impossible.

We'd have to take a poll, but certainly on this site I find people believe uncritically in ultimate, libertarian, contra-causal free will.

I rather suspect the contrary — that “rational choices based on one’s beliefs and desires” is all the free will that most people want.

I think there are lots of ways to show that isn't what people want, including the brainwashing example above. Or imagine someone who believes that children are alien monsters and shoots up a kindergarden because of his desire to save the world. Would that be an exercise of free will because they are, after all, acting in accord with their beliefs and desires? How about after discovering a tumor in this person's amygdala, and finding that the removal of that tumor removed that person's delusional beliefs? I think most people would say that since the killer did not voluntarily choose those delusional beliefs, his criminal actions were not freely chosen (even if they hold them responsible!). These extreme examples make the point, but one doesn't have to posit brainwashing or brain tumors in order to see that if we can't freely choose our beliefs and desires, we can't make free choices. dogdoc

Vivid @122,

DD: “Go ahead, choose to believe something that you don’t believe, such as that Paris is the capitol of Italy. Did it work?” VIVID: Of course it did not work because Paris is not the capitol of Italy. However if tomorrow for some reason Italy made Paris it’s capitol I would change my belief.

Well, you believe that Paris is not the capitol of Italy. What we've proven here is that when you believe something, you can not voluntarily choose to disbelieve it (or the reverse).

I don’t think though that you are disputing that one’s beliefs can change over time, correct?

Of course our beliefs change constantly - we make new observations, rethink evidence, have different moods - all sorts of things change our beliefs. But we cannot consciously decide what to believe. We discover our beliefs, we do not consciously cause them.

What do you mean by “ultimate freedom”

Ultimate freedom would be the ability to make a rational choice that was based on reasons (beliefs and desires) that we consciously chose to hold. dogdoc

KF@121, You haven't read the arguments, but you drive by with an irrelevant appeal to self-referential nonsense. Nothing about my argument refers to how we know the truth. Nothing about my demonstration disproving ultimate free will refers to the credibility of our minds. Try harder! dogdoc

Docdoc @119,

I have supported my argument endlessly on this page.

No, you haven’t. All you’ve done is produced more unsupported assertions. Are you of the opinion that your unsupported assertions constitute irrefutable truth? Let me suggest that according to your philosophy, the logically derived answer is “yes.” Why? Because your beliefs somehow are immutably and irrevocably bestowed on you by some unknown magical force in the universe, your perceptions and every opinion are inextricably locked to this apparently arbitrary belief. Why do I say arbitrary? This is because someone else has been bestowed the belief that animal blood sports such as competitive dog fighting is wonderful entertainment! These two positions are contradictory, irreconcilable, and could easily have been reversed between you and the other person. As a result, if you met that dogfight person, the passionate disagreement in your beliefs could only be resolved ultimately by one or both of the following: • Kill or be killed • Might makes right Neither one of you has other option that doesn’t involve death or coercion!

Since you haven’t yet grasped why our beliefs and desires are beyond our responsibility . . .

Woohoo! An ad hominem attack! This is a de facto admission that I’ve won the argument! -Q Querius

@80

I’d be happy to agree that no beliefs are voluntarily chosen, a position that is known as doxastic involuntarism (which I happen to believe).

I think that some version of doxastic involuntarism is true, at least in the following sense: (1) one cannot choose not to endorse a belief that one takes to be true, and one cannot choose to endorse a belief that one takes to be false; (2) one cannot, by mere fiat, make oneself believe something that one does not believe. That is, we lack an immediate or direct control over our beliefs. At the same time, I think it's true that we are responsible for our beliefs. What we believe guides what we do. If I believe that it is morally wrong to drink alcohol on Sunday mornings, I am more likely to vote for a local ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcohol on Sunday mornings. That entails imposing my belief on other people who don't share it. I have obligations, to myself as a rational being and to others as rational beings, to ensure that my beliefs are supported with evidence, to investigate the legitimacy of my beliefs, to take seriously the arguments of people who disagree with me, and to consider whether my own beliefs are fully justified in light of the criticisms they have received. So, the following would seem to be a paradox: how I can be responsible for something over which I have no immediate control? The dissolution of this paradox lies in recognizing that the absence of immediate or direct control over my beliefs is compatible with the presence of mediate or indirect control over my beliefs: I cannot change my beliefs by mere fiat, but I can take actions that are likely to increase (or decrease) my confidence in what I endorse and on what basis. I can't simply decide to start believing in God, but I could do things such as: start attending services with a friend, read some theology, try praying and see how I feel more content, relaxed, or happier as a result. I can, in other words, cultivate habits over time, and my beliefs (and desires) will shift and adjust as new habits modify or replace old habits. (This may also involve a change in social or even physical environment as well.)

It poses a problem for the sort of free will I think most people want to have, where you are the ultimate author of your choices. On one hand you do make rational choices based on nothing but your own beliefs and desires – so that is a sort of freedom – but on the other hand you are not willfully responsible for holding those beliefs and desires.

At this point I'm still not convinced that "the sort of free will that most people want to have" is the kind of free will that you're arguing is impossible. I rather suspect the contrary -- that "rational choices based on one's beliefs and desires" is all the free will that most people want. PyrrhoManiac1

Dodoc said:

I repeat, my argument does not consider causality at all – not necessary causes, not sufficient causes, not deterministic or non-deterministic or any other type of causes.

I appreciate you clearing this up. William J Murray

“Go ahead, choose to believe something that you don’t believe, such as that Paris is the capitol of Italy. Did it work?” Of course it did not work because Paris is not the capitol of Italy. However if tomorrow for some reason Italy made Paris it’s capitol I would change my belief. I don’t think though that you are disputing that one’s beliefs can change over time, correct? “Ok, that’s similar to what Origenes is arguing, I believe. Again I argue this is a type of freedom, but not the type of ultimate freedom that many people here believe we have.” What do you mean by “ultimate freedom” Vivid vividbleau

DD et al, as I highlighted in L&FP 64 , a key cause of the difficulties in addressing hard, core questions is self referentiality. Your attempts to question ultimate responsibility pivot on the credibility of our minds including your own. So, to issue an invitation or worse implication or assertion that undermines credibility of mind is blatantly self defeating. That, plainly, is what you have done. Back to the drawing board. KF kairosfocus

Origenes@103

So, we agree that choice s not relevant WRT apprehension of truth. I can apprehend that 2+2=4, but it makes no sense to say that I choose 2+2=4 to be true.

I agree that people do not choose their beliefs.

“Free”, in your view, ALWAYS implies choice. I do not agree.

This is a matter of definition. I am defining a rational free choice as one that is made for reasons, and those reasons must also be freely chosen in order for the chooser to be responsible for the choice, and I show that according to this definition, our rational choices cannot be free. I have always acknowledged that there are other definitions of freedom that my argument does not apply to.

In my view, an action is free when it causally traces back to me and stops there.

Yes, I have explicitly referred to this definition too (see @93), and explained that we do indeed have that sort of freedom. But first, I am not discussing causality here, only semantic entailment. And second, if the reasons for our choices are not of our own choosing, our choices are clearly not ultimately our own, but only immediately or proximally so.

Only if the action can be causally traced back to something beyond my control, it is “not free.” So, when I say that I “freely understand” that 2+2=4 I mean to say that the understanding of it is purely mine. IOW that it is not the case that my understanding that 2+2=4 can be causally traced back to something beyond my control.

Well, I'm happy that we are clarifying our definitions! I am saying that if a choice can be ultimately traced back to beliefs and desires that we did not deliberately choose to hold, then that choice is not ultimately free.

DD: But everything you learn from others, from books, from your observations, and everything you were born knowing – all of this (whether true or false) is unchosen, and every choice based on those beliefs are likewise not freely chosen. ORI:This comes down to a sweeping claim that our “understanding” is thoroughly determined by our environment. That we are brainwashed and that there is no such thing as free understanding.

First, you missed the part about everything you were born knowing (including how to deduce new facts from old ones, infer new facts from observations, and so on). Second, you use the loaded term "brainwashed" which is unnecessary. But most importantly, you need to explain what else could possibly come into play besides innate and learned beliefs? That's all there is, and neither of those types of beliefs can be voluntarily chosen. @108

~ Dogdoc’s argument is self-defeating ~ Dogdoc argues that we cannot be responsible for our beliefs because they are ultimately based on basic beliefs that we did not author and are forced upon us.

Please try to quote me accurately. I never said everything about "basic" beliefs, nor did I ever mention beliefs being "forced" upon us.

It seems to me that a consequent Dogdoc must argue that none of our beliefs can be trusted.

Absolutely wrong! My argument is not concerned with the truth of any belief.

Because, if we are not responsible for our beliefs, and some undefined force beyond our control is, then we have a reason to withhold belief in them.

You made up this whole issue of "force". Nothing "forces" us to learn from experience or to be born with innate knowledge. It is simply what happens. Whether or not you trust your beliefs is an entirely different (and epistemological) question.

The problem with Dogdoc’s theory is, that this belief, and any position that leads to it, is self-defeating: if it is true, we no longer have any reason for believing it to be true. It is hoist with its own petard.

I know this type of argument (cf. the EAAN) is hugely popular on this site, but it is utterly irrelevant to my argument. Again, my argument observes only that one does not voluntarily choose the beliefs and desires that form the basis for one's choices, and this has nothing to do with whether those beliefs are true or not. @114

“…. we cannot make rational, free choices.” Should I choose to believe Dogdoc or not? If I choose to believe him, then it follows that my choice was not rational and not free …

No, you made a mistake in logic. What follows is that your choice was not both rational and free. It might be rational, and it might be free (i.e. an arbitrary or random choice), but it can't be both.

On the second premise of Dogdoc’s argument (see #92). 2.) In order for a choice to be free, those beliefs and desires must be deliberately chosen, based on one’s beliefs and desires. I reject his second premise. As I have argued in #103, a true belief cannot be chosen, instead, it can only be (freely) apprehended.

If you apprehend some truth without consciously deliberating about whether or not to have this insight, in what sense are you responsible for having that insight? It was not under your conscious, voluntary control to apprehend this truth, and if you did not have that insight, that would not have been a conscious decision on your part either. Thus, you can't be ultimately responsible for choices you make based on that belief. dogdoc

Querius@102,

I simply asked “And our observations are based on our perceptions and our perceptions on our beliefs and our beliefs on our observations?” Your response was the unsupported assertion that our beliefs and desires are beyond out responsibility. Oh really?

I have supported my argument endlessly on this page. To your point about observations and perceptions, I replied thus:

DOGDOC@83 As far as my argument is concerned, aside from the fact that your beliefs and desires are ultimately not freely chosen, it makes no difference at all how they are acquired. Your choices are based upon your beliefs and desires, but since you are not ultimately responsible for your beliefs and desires, you are not ultimately responsible for your choices.

Since you haven't yet grasped why our beliefs and desires are beyond our responsibility, I will tell you once again: 1) In order to make a rational choice, one's choice must be based on one's beliefs and desires. 2) Therefore in order to be fully responsible for a rational choice, one must have freely chosen the beliefs and desires upon which that choice depends. 3) However, the choice of those beliefs and desires, like all choices, must in turn rest upon one's beliefs and desires, and those beliefs and desires must likewise be freely chosen. 4) Thus, at no time is one able to freely choose one's beliefs and desires, because they need to already have their beliefs and desires in order to make that choice. (This type of problem is called a "bootstrapping" problem) 5) Therefore, one can never be fully responsible for a rational choice.

• Then what right do you have to condemn or prevent anyone from “animal sports” such as hosting dog fight competitions? • After all, YOU are the one insisting that a person is not responsible for their beliefs and desires. • Thus, YOUR beliefs and desires are perfectly free then to apply COERCION on someone else’s beliefs and desires, which presumably are ALSO beyond their responsibility.

Of course, we all do this.

• However, you have no extrinsic authority to declare your beliefs and desires as superior to anyone else’s. • Thus, you can only resort to naked FORCE. Conversely, the dog fight enthusiast with your same philosophy will also ultimately resort to naked FORCE against you! • When push comes to shove, your philosophy boils down to “kill or be killed.”

This is all ridiculous. Most people have a normal moral sense which recoils at the thought of cruelty to animals. You and I both share that sense. There are other people who do not share that sense - some religious, some not. Both of us would resort to force to prevent those people from perpetrating such cruelty. The fact that you attribute your sense to some god that you believe in doesn't change any of that one iota. dogdoc

Vividbleau @100,

What if one chooses to believe in an irrational belief does that make that belief rational?

First, I'm of the opinion that we do not choose our beliefs. Just try it and see! Go ahead, choose to believe something that you don't believe, such as that Paris is the capitol of Italy. Did it work? Second, my argument has nothing to do with the rationality of our beliefs. Rather, I point out that in order to make decisions rationally, one must deliberate over one's beliefs and desires.

Self determination is the essence of freedom.

Ok, that's similar to what Origenes is arguing, I believe. Again I argue this is a type of freedom, but not the type of ultimate freedom that many people here believe we have. dogdoc

William J Murray@99,

When I asked you what your argument is about if not causality, since you use the phrase “choices based on reasons,” and your argument was “Not at all” about causality, you responded: In general these are the same, – talking about “caused by” and “based on.”

That's right, most of the time when people give explanations for things the explanation is causal. But not all the time. This doesn't have anything to do with my argument, though, because my argument has nothing to do with causality.

So which is it? Are you arguing that reasons are the sufficient cause for all rational choices, even the choice of reasons?

I repeat: My argument has nothing to do with causality. Rather, I am talking about rational decision making, which by definition requires deliberation over reasons. If one's choice is rational, it must be in accord with one's beliefs and desires. If it is not, then the choice is arbitrary. My argument addresses only rational choices; arbitrary choices can be freely made by people (or machines) but they are not worth wanting. @101,

But I’m still not sure I really understand what argument you’re actually making, if it is about sufficient cause or not.

I repeat, my argument does not consider causality at all - not necessary causes, not sufficient causes, not deterministic or non-deterministic or any other type of causes. Instead, it rests only on the observation that rational decision making by definition requires that one's choice be made according to one's beliefs and desires, and that it is impossible for one's beliefs and desires to be freely chosen (because one needs one's beliefs and desires in order to choose one's beliefs and desires). dogdoc

PyrrhoManiac1@98,

At this point, I think I’m skeptical that “the sort of freedom we care about” is one that assumes that “we freely choose our beliefs and desires”. A great deal depends on who is meant by “we”, after all!

I don't disagree, but it's hard to talk about free will if you don't posit an agent. Anyway, in my experience people do believe that we are the ultimate authors of our beliefs and the ultimate origin of our choices, and I believe this argument successfully demonstrates that view can't be right.

I also suspect that lurking in the neighboring bushes is the question of whether the self is something ontologically separate from (perhaps prior to) the beliefs and desires that it has, or if the self is just the fantastically complex web of beliefs, desires, attitudes, preferences, motivations, assumptions, biases, etc.

But my argument seeks to strip all of the metaphysical questions away! Ontology, determinism, causality itself - none of these concepts have any role in my argument. What's left is the bare observation that we do not - can not - be ultimately responsible for our choices. (Again, I do qualify this with "ultimately" because we can be the immediate (I often call it proximate) decider even if we aren't ultimately in control of our choices. It's like a self-driving car: The car is the proximate explanation for why it ran over a toddler, but the ultimate responsibility accrues to the engineers, the safety testers, and so on. Even though the car makes many choices each second, it can also be seen to have had no real choice in the accident.

This all assumes that the concept of “the self” is philosophically coherent, which is at least open to doubt, depending on how seriously one takes central themes of Buddhist philosophy (see Losing Ourselves and Attention, Not Self).

Risking (more) abuse here, I think the concept of self as a causal entity is quite simply a confusion :-) dogdoc

On the second premise of Dogdoc's argument (see #92).

2.) In order for a choice to be free, those beliefs and desires must be deliberately chosen, based on one’s beliefs and desires.

I reject his second premise. As I have argued in #103, a true belief cannot be chosen, instead, it can only be (freely) apprehended. Origenes

Dogdoc concludes:

“…. we cannot make rational, free choices.”

Should I choose to believe Dogdoc or not? If I choose to believe him, then it follows that my choice was not rational and not free … What am I to do here? I choose not to believe him. Origenes

Dogdoc

1) In order for a choice to be rational, it must be made based on one’s beliefs and desires 2) In order for a choice to be free, those beliefs and desires must be deliberately chosen, based on one’s beliefs and desires 3) At any time, one cannot freely choose one’s beliefs and desires based on beliefs and desires they have freely chosen (again by “free” here I do not mean “arbitrary”, I mean “originating wholly from the person’s free choice”). 4) Since we cannot freely choose our beliefs and desires, we cannot make rational, free choices.

I think you are conflating two related but distinct moral capacities. Let’s reflect on the complimentary roles of human intelligence and will because these two human faculties do, or should, operate in concert to make moral decisions. An analogy may help. The intellect provides the moral target (knowledge of the truth) and the will shoots the arrow (pursuit of the good). Yes. we do have free will but our power to make decisions is limited. We cannot decide, for example, that we will have a moral nature, or on the purpose of our existence. those decisions were made for us. However, we can decide if we will pursue what is good or chase after what is evil. Free will is all about making moral choices. It is not about controlling or deciding about the environmental conditions in which those choices will be made. Free will does not extend that far. However, there is a third word missing in your formulation. Yes, we should make moral decisions, in part, on what we “believe,” and in part, what we “desire,” if and only if those instincts are grounded in reason, but more importantly, our moral direction should be informed by what we *know,* which is a reflection of reason itself. The problem is that our beliefs can be false and irrational and our desires can be perverse and evil. At least in the beginning, the only rational approach is to follow up on what we know and form our beliefs on that basis. In other words, we should use our intelligence to establish the moral target, the natural moral law (our innate knowledge of right/wrong and good/evil), and then shoot the arrow in that direction by learning how to love what is good and hate what is evil. Put another way, we begin by refusing to lie, cheat, murder and steal, because we know that those things are wrong. (Unless we have formed evil habits that compromise our intellect and weaken our will, but that is another story). From there we can build on our knowledge as our understanding of morality improves and our belief system becomes more sophisticated. Typically, Materialists do not reject objective morality because they think it doesn’t exist; they reject it because, in many, maybe most cases, they are too narcissistic to respect any truth outside of themselves, especially those truths that would invite them to cultivate the virtues of humility and self control. Some of them are honest enough to admit it. Among the worst of them, their ethical standards can be summarized as, “I want what I want --- I think with my glands --- I want power and control over others --- and I want to militate against God, His moral universe, and his intrusive moral code.” “If you don’t believe me, watch as I castrate this confused twelve year old boy on the grounds that there is no such thing as a twelve year old boy, only a young, non-binary, something or other.” I don’t simply “believe” that such a perverted world view is evil; I know that it is evil: it violates nature and the inherent dignity of the human person. Humans have dignity because they have been endowed with the God-like qualities of intelligence and free will. Thus, in order for me to pursue what is good, which I try to do, I shoot the behavioral arrow in the direction of the moral target (human dignity should be preserved) and argue on that basis. Without knowable and objective moral truths to guide us in the primary stages of analysis, we cannot hope to attain any semblance of an rational ethical code. Neither can we hope to find a reasonable approach to choosing which religion we might embrace, since the natural moral law tells us that religious faith should be reasonable, that is, it should be rationally defensible, though it may present truths that reason cannot fully explain or could never have been known in any other way. StephenB

PM1 @109 You may very well be correct. Perhaps Dogdoc is a compatibilist WRT responsibility. An indication is that in general he is very consistent with adding the term “ultimately” when he speaks about responsibility. However, in favor of my claim of self-defeat #108, sometimes he does not:

DD #80: I’d be happy to agree that no beliefs are voluntarily chosen, a position that is known as doxastic involuntarism (which I happen to believe).

And sometimes he reverts to 'compatibilist speak' (the sort of speak that makes me want to talk about billiard balls):

DD #80: On one hand you do make rational choices based on nothing but your own beliefs and desires – so that is a sort of freedom – but on the other hand you are not willfully responsible for holding those beliefs and desires.

He also mentions that analyzing our beliefs leads to a regress ending in an ‘unchosen belief’ that I understand as being forced upon us.

DD #77: The regress can end in any sort of unchosen belief. Clearly many beliefs and desires are innate. Perhaps I was born with a genetic predisposition to believe that altruism is good, or I was conditioned to it as I developed, etc. So innate tendencies and environment factors shape my charitable tendencies, but these things cannot have been freely chosen by me.

DD #93: That initiates a regress that can only end in beliefs and desires that we hold but that we did not choose.

Origenes

PyrrhoManiac1 @109,

I don’t think it follows from anything Dogdoc has said that we cannot be responsible for our beliefs at all.

Dogdoc made no such qualification about what he asserts are our intrinsic and involuntary (beyond our choices) beliefs. What you're asserting then is that Dogdoc's beliefs fall into at least two major categories, some that he CAN be held responsible and some that he cannot be held responsible for. Despite your valiant effort in trying to rescue him, but this defense would raise two more questions: 1. How would someone--either him or someone holding him responsible--be able to differentiate between these two classes of beliefs? 2. What entity could possibly hold Dogdoc responsible under any authority except naked FORCE, which would then also imply that "might makes right." So far, we have two corollaries under Dogdoc's rickety philosophy: • Kill or be killed. • Might makes "right." Note: Under Docdoc's philosophy, "right" is hypothetical and doesn't really exist, nor does being held responsible. However, I agree with your observation that the word, "ultimately," hides some philosophical mischief, as you put it. For example, many people don't believe in anything "ultimate," which means that "ultimate" extends into infinity, making it the philosophical equivalent of a mathematical divide-by-zero error. -Q Querius

Bornagain77 @107, Yes, exactly. And there are a number of things plainly stated in the Judeo-Christian scriptures that the Judeo-Christian God CANNOT do and DOES NOT do. But that list is for a different forum. My point is that definitions, especially superlative definitions can be treacherous and not to be trusted. -Q Querius

@103

Dogdoc argues that we cannot be responsible for our beliefs because they are ultimately based on basic beliefs that we did not author and are forced upon us. It seems to me that a consequent Dogdoc must argue that none of our beliefs can be trusted. Because, if we are not responsible for our beliefs, and some undefined force beyond our control is, then we have a reason to withhold belief in them.

I don't think it follows from anything Dogdoc has said that we cannot be responsible for our beliefs at all. He has said that we cannot be ultimately responsible for our beliefs. I suspect that this word "ultimately" is doing some philosophical mischief here! PyrrhoManiac1

~ Dogdoc’s argument is self-defeating ~ Dogdoc argues that we cannot be responsible for our beliefs because they are ultimately based on basic beliefs that we did not author and are forced upon us. It seems to me that a consequent Dogdoc must argue that none of our beliefs can be trusted. Because, if we are not responsible for our beliefs, and some undefined force beyond our control is, then we have a reason to withhold belief in them. The problem with Dogdoc’s theory is, that this belief, and any position that leads to it, is self-defeating: if it is true, we no longer have any reason for believing it to be true. It is hoist with its own petard. Allow me to quote the eloquent Jim Slagle once more:

To put this another way, those who claim that all beliefs, acts of reasoning, etc., are nonveracious are positing a closed circle in which no beliefs are produced by the proper methods by which beliefs can be said to be veracious or rational. Yet at the same time, they are arrogating to themselves a position outside of this circle by which they can judge the beliefs of others, a move they deny to their opponents. Since the raison d’être of their thesis is that there is no outside of the circle, they do not have the epistemic right to assume a position independent of it, and so their beliefs about the nonveracity of beliefs or reasoning are just as nonveracious as those they criticize. If all of the beliefs inside the circle are suspect, we cannot judge between truth and falsity, since any such judgment would be just as suspect as what it seeks to adjudicate. We would have to seek another argument, another chain of reasoning, another set of beliefs, by which we can judge the judgment—and a third set to judge the judgment of the judgment, ad infinitum . At no point can they step out of the circle to a transcendent standpoint that would allow them to reject some beliefs as tainted while remaining untainted themselves.

Origenes

Thanks for the heads up Querius. Not to offer a full defense of such syllogisms, (since I agree with your overall point), but I just note that while I am aware that there are ways to offer a valid defense against the 'Can God create a rock he can't lift?" argument, for instance this one.

The Rock God Can’t Lift: Actually, It’s NOT Complicated! - 2019 https://www.ncregister.com/blog/the-rock-god-can-t-lift-actually-it-s-not-complicated

,,, while I am aware that there are ways to offer a valid defense against the 'Can God create a rock he can't lift?" argument, I am not aware of any valid defenses against the many, if not all, of Dr. Craig's syllogisms that he used against atheistic naturalism For prime example, in this very thread, all the arguments claiming that free will does not really exist have been, in my honest opinion, fairly easily shot down by Origenes and you, bornagain77

PyrrhoManiac1 @98, Good points. Your questions about definitions are exactly the kind of problems encountered in amateur philosophy. The problems encountered with more advanced philosophy is that they tend to become nuanced and complex beyond practical comprehension and application. Someone once wrote that death refutes all philosophy. So, if a transcendent God doesn't exist, what does it matter in a millennium whether someone is an existentialist, a Buddhist, or a Catholic? It all becomes a big, fat "So, what." But, we still have a yearning for significance and eternity. We all have a desire to suppress evil and to rationalize our behavior as not being evil. My poodle, the sweetest dog I've known, has no such yearnings. -Q Querius

Bornagain77 @86, Thanks, but please remember that I'm deeply suspicious of such syllogisms. I encountered similar ones from Spinoza. Even though, I don't disparage his obvious intellect, the problem with such reasoning is that it's vulnerable to the vagaries of definitions, they tend to force binary taxonomies on complex relationships, and comparing them to, for example, equations found in physics, they're at a very primitive level of mathematics. For example, "If God is all powerful, can He create a rock that He cannot lift?" The skeptic then concludes that an all-powerful God cannot logically exist. But I believe this is fallacious reasoning on multiple counts. -Q Querius

“2) In order for a choice to be free, those beliefs and desires must be deliberately chosen, based on one’s beliefs and desires” Why? I believe our choices are both free and determined, see my post at 61. Q “After all, YOU are the one insisting that a person is not responsible for their beliefs and desires.” I am sure Alex Murdaugh would like DD to be on the jury regarding his trial. Vivid vividbleau

Dogdoc @97

Ori: Let’s examine my belief that 2+2=4, are you arguing that I “decided to hold this truth”?

DD: No! I believe that truths like these are completely involuntary – you cannot choose to believe them if you don’t, and you cannot choose to disbelieve them if you do believe them.

So, we agree that choice s not relevant WRT apprehension of truth. I can apprehend that 2+2=4, but it makes no sense to say that I choose 2+2=4 to be true.

DD: I really don’t understand, then, what you mean when you say you “freely understand”. How is that different from merely “understand”? If you don’t freely choose to believe that 2+2=4 then I would not say you “freely understand” it.

“Free”, in your view, ALWAYS implies choice. I do not agree. In my view, an action is free when it causally traces back to me and stops there. Only if the action can be causally traced back to something beyond my control, it is “not free.” So, when I say that I “freely understand” that 2+2=4 I mean to say that the understanding of it is purely mine. IOW that it is not the case that my understanding that 2+2=4 can be causally traced back to something beyond my control.

Ori: All that is required for free understanding is that I am the one who understands, that it is not the case that something beyond my control induces in me the false notion that I understand.

DD: But everything you learn from others, from books, from your observations, and everything you were born knowing – all of this (whether true or false) is unchosen, and every choice based on those beliefs are likewise not freely chosen.

This comes down to a sweeping claim that our "understanding" is thoroughly determined by our environment. That we are brainwashed and that there is no such thing as free understanding. In the name of rationality, I firmly reject your proposal! Origenes

Docdoc @83

Querius: And our observations are based on our perceptions and our perceptions on our beliefs and our beliefs on our observations? (chortle) Docdog: You’re trying hard to make this complicated, but it really isn’t . . . Your choices are based upon your beliefs and desires, but since you are not ultimately responsible for your beliefs and desires, you are not ultimately responsible for your choices.

Predictably, you’re shifting the focus from YOUR unsupported assertions to me, and then you’re accusing me of making this complicated? I simply asked “And our observations are based on our perceptions and our perceptions on our beliefs and our beliefs on our observations?” Your response was the unsupported assertion that our beliefs and desires are beyond out responsibility. Oh really? • Then what right do you have to condemn or prevent anyone from “animal sports” such as hosting dog fight competitions? • After all, YOU are the one insisting that a person is not responsible for their beliefs and desires. • Thus, YOUR beliefs and desires are perfectly free then to apply COERCION on someone else’s beliefs and desires, which presumably are ALSO beyond their responsibility. • However, you have no extrinsic authority to declare your beliefs and desires as superior to anyone else’s. • Thus, you can only resort to naked FORCE. Conversely, the dog fight enthusiast with your same philosophy will also ultimately resort to naked FORCE against you! • When push comes to shove, your philosophy boils down to “kill or be killed.” Yes, of course you’ll try to squirm out of this one, too, by pushing some random accusation against me. But, why not be honest with yourself? -Q Querius

Dogdoc, I will agree with your premise that the rules of rationality (logical principles, math, geometry, etc.) are not voluntary. You cannot "not choose" them. Similarly, one cannot not be motivated by desire, most fundamentally, to enjoy. You don't get to choose to not have that motivation (reason) ultimately behind every choice. But, as far as I can tell, these are the necessary conditions for sentient, rational choices. They are not the sufficient cause for making any particular choice. It looks to me like you're making a fundamental category error. But I'm still not sure I really understand what argument you're actually making, if it is about sufficient cause or not. William J Murray

“1) In order for a choice to be rational, it must be made based on one’s beliefs and desires” What if one chooses to believe in an irrational belief does that make that belief rational? Vivid vividbleau

Dogdoc said:

I am not talking about causality at all, only reason-responsiveness.

When I asked you what your argument is about if not causality, since you use the phrase "choices based on reasons," and your argument was "Not at all" about causality, you responded:

In general these are the same,

- talking about "caused by" and "based on." You added as the reason you don't use the term "causal"

...but I try to strip away unnecessary issues that people might get mired in.

So which is it? Are you arguing that reasons are the sufficient cause for all rational choices, even the choice of reasons? I don't understand what's going on here. What does "in general" mean? Are there non-general, special situations where "based on" does not mean "caused by" in your argument here? William J Murray

@93

I am not claiming that we cannot make choices – we all make choices based on our beliefs and desires – and that is a type of freedom, but not the sort of freedom we care about. We care about making choices that are ultimately derived wholly from ourselves, which entails that we freely choose our beliefs and desires. That initiates a regress that can only end in beliefs and desires that we hold but that we did not choose.

At this point, I think I'm skeptical that "the sort of freedom we care about" is one that assumes that "we freely choose our beliefs and desires". A great deal depends on who is meant by "we", after all! I also suspect that lurking in the neighboring bushes is the question of whether the self is something ontologically separate from (perhaps prior to) the beliefs and desires that it has, or if the self is just the fantastically complex web of beliefs, desires, attitudes, preferences, motivations, assumptions, biases, etc. This all assumes that the concept of "the self" is philosophically coherent, which is at least open to doubt, depending on how seriously one takes central themes of Buddhist philosophy (see Losing Ourselves and Attention, Not Self). PyrrhoManiac1

Origenes @96,

Let’s examine my belief that 2+2=4, are you arguing that I “decided to hold this truth”?

No! I believe that truths like these are completely involuntary - you cannot choose to believe them if you don't, and you cannot choose to disbelieve them if you do believe them. I was just saying that IF you somehow disagreed with this, and by "freely apprehend the truth" you meant that you did somehow choose to believe these propositions, then just like all other choices it would either be arbitrary or be based upon yet other beliefs.

Are you arguing that it is by “choice”? If so, I would not agree. I freely understand that 2+2=4. I do not choose that 2+2=4.

I really don't understand, then, what you mean when you say you "freely understand". How is that different from merely "understand"? If you don't freely choose to believe that 2+2=4 then I would not say you "freely understand" it. But it seems we do agree on this anyway - you find that you believe 2+2=4, you haven't voluntarily chosen to believe it. So again, if you made some choice and the belief that 2+2=4 factored into your decision, you would not be freely choosing those implications; you had no choice other than to believe them.

Ori: All that is required for free understanding is that I am the one who understands, that it is not the case that something beyond my control induces in me the false notion that I understand.

But everything you learn from others, from books, from your observations, and everything you were born knowing - all of this (whether true or false) is unchosen, and every choice based on those beliefs are likewise not freely chosen. (I need to go to work, but I'm enjoying our discussion). dogdoc

Dogdoc @95

Ori: You argue that the fact that we did not choose them prevents us from freely holding them. I do not agree with this assessment.

DD: But if you freely decided to hold them (versus discarding or revising them), then that decision must – you guessed it – be based on your beliefs and desires, which you did not choose.

Let’s examine my belief that 2+2=4, are you arguing that I “decided to hold this truth”? Are you arguing that it is by “choice”? If so, I would not agree. I freely understand that 2+2=4. I do not choose that 2+2=4.

Ori: I would say that truth exists and that we as free rational persons are able to freely apprehend the truth. However, what we cannot do is choose the truth.

DD: Agreed we can’t choose what is true and what is not. But when you say “freely apprehend the truth” I’m not what that means.

Allow me to quote myself:

Ori: All that is required for free understanding is that I am the one who understands, that it is not the case that something beyond my control induces in me the false notion that I understand.

Origenes

Origenes@94,

Suppose I arguendo accept this analysis. I would then argue that we freely hold those “beliefs and desires that we hold but that we did not choose.” You argue that the fact that we did not choose them prevents us from freely holding them. I do not agree with this assessment.

But if you freely decided to hold them (versus discarding or revising them), then that decision must - you guessed it - be based on your beliefs and desires, which you did not choose.

As I have argued before: I would say that truth exists and that we as free rational persons are able to freely apprehend the truth. However, what we cannot do is choose the truth.

Agreed we can't choose what is true and what is not. But when you say "freely apprehend the truth" I'm not what that means. We evaluate propositions for truth based either on involuntary insights, or on our beliefs which we do not choose.

The truth is one thing and cannot be arbitrarily chosen [among alternatives]. If one comes to hold a true belief then one did not choose that belief, instead, one (freely) apprehends the true belief.

Again, if you decide to hold a true belief, then it is because you believe it is true, right? But you did not freely choose to believe it is true - your belief may be involuntarily apprehended as an "insight", or it may be derived from reasoning over other beliefs. In the case of involuntary insight, that is not a deliberate, free choice. And in the case of deriving the belief based on other beliefs, then ultimately you did not choose those other beliefs. In neither case has the truth you hold been rationally and freely chosen by you.

As an aside, I do not like your continued mixing of beliefs with desires. I freely hold the beliefs ‘A = A’, ‘error exists’, and ‘2+2=4’, but it is not clear to me that my desires are relevant in this context.

Decisions require desires - if you have no desires, there is nothing compelling you to do or choose anything at all. But in your example you aren't making any choice at all - you did not choose to believe these propositions (and you could not choose to disbelieve them either!). dogdoc

Dogdoc @93

We care about making choices that are ultimately derived wholly from ourselves, which entails that we freely choose our beliefs and desires. That initiates a regress that can only end in beliefs and desires that we hold but that we did not choose.

Suppose I arguendo accept this analysis. I would then argue that we freely hold those “beliefs and desires that we hold but that we did not choose.” You argue that the fact that we did not choose them prevents us from freely holding them. I do not agree with this assessment. As I have argued before:

I would say that truth exists and that we as free rational persons are able to freely apprehend the truth. However, what we cannot do is choose the truth. The truth is one thing and cannot be arbitrarily chosen [among alternatives]. If one comes to hold a true belief then one did not choose that belief, instead, one (freely) apprehends the true belief. (…) All that is required for free understanding is that I am the one who understands, that it is not the case that something beyond my control induces in me the false notion that I understand them.

- - - - As an aside, I do not like your continued mixing of beliefs with desires. I freely hold the beliefs 'A=A', 'error exists', and '2+2=4', but it is not clear to me that my desires are relevant in this context. Origenes

PyrrhoManiac1

I worry that the word “ultimate” is doing a lot of work for you here. Could you unpack for us why “ultimate” is important for your view?

I am not claiming that we cannot make choices - we all make choices based on our beliefs and desires - and that is a type of freedom, but not the sort of freedom we care about. We care about making choices that are ultimately derived wholly from ourselves, which entails that we freely choose our beliefs and desires. That initiates a regress that can only end in beliefs and desires that we hold but that we did not choose.

Suppose I’m reading Kant on ethics and I come across the idea that the supreme principle of morality is “act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end in itself also and never as a means only”. After some time struggling with the verbiage here, I decide that Kant is right about what the supreme principle of morality is. (I don’t, in fact, think Kant was right — just using this as an example.)

For any decision you make, there must be reasons. Why did you decide Kant is right? Either you had a set of reasons or your decision was arbitrary - those are the only options. If your decision was arbitrary then it's not a sort of freedom worth wanting. If you decision was based on your beliefs and desires then it can only be a free decision if you freely chose those beliefs and desires. Hence the regress.

In one sense, becoming a Kantian about ethics is not ‘up to me’ — it is not arbitrary, after all! — and it is certainly and profoundly influenced by all sorts of cultural and psychological factors. But I nevertheless engage in an act of critical reflection in which I decide to endorse Kant’s view about the supreme principle of morality.

Yes exactly - you have a type of freedom, but since your critical reflection is based on beliefs and desires that you did not choose, it is not the ultimate freedom that people believe they have. dogdoc

Origenes

I do not agree with your demand that all beliefs must be chosen, in order to hold them freely.

If I make choice based on my beliefs and desires, but I did not freely choose those beliefs and desires, then my choice is not free - it was compelled by beliefs and desires that I did not myself ever choose to have.

The “problem” stems from the incoherent demand that all free beliefs must be arbitrarily chosen.

What? I am not demanding all free beliefs be arbitrarily chosen of course! If a choice is arbitrary, you might call it "free", but making random or arbitrary choices is not the sort of freedom that anyone cares about. Rather, I am saying 1) In order for a choice to be rational, it must be made based on one's beliefs and desires 2) In order for a choice to be free, those beliefs and desires must be deliberately chosen, based on one's beliefs and desires 3) At any time, one cannot freely choose one's beliefs and desires based on beliefs and desires they have freely chosen (again by "free" here I do not mean "arbitrary", I mean "originating wholly from the person's free choice"). 4) Since we cannot freely choose our beliefs and desires, we cannot make rational, free choices.

Thinking about the origin of Dogdoc’s hypothesis that all beliefs are arbitrarily chosen...

Again, this is not what I've said!!! Read 1-4 above carefully please. Again, if you understand the term "bootstrapping", this is a bootstrapping problem. You need your beliefs in order to choose your beliefs. dogdoc

William J Murray,

“Based on” is not “caused by,” as you yourself have said.

In general these are the same, but I try to strip away unnecessary issues that people might get mired in. A choice can be made for reasons (i.e. a rational choice) or arbitrarily, but the latter isn't the sort of choice we care about. So I focus on choices made for reasons, and show that we cannot possibly choose the reasons upon which we make our decisions. dogdoc

Origenes at 88, yes I agree. The Budziszewski quote is great. I remember when I first read his paper, "Why I am not an Atheist", perhaps 15 years ago now. I remember that the light went on for me. I had an 'AHA" moment as it is called. In case you can't open the paper, here is an audio recording of Professor Budziszewski giving a lecture on his "Why I am not an Atheist" paper.

- A Professor's Journey out of Nihilism: Why I am not an Atheist - lecture University of Wyoming J. Budziszewski – https://soundcloud.com/thomisticinstitute/atheism-to-catholicism-a-professors-journey-out-of-nihilism-prof-j-budziszewski

And here is a more complete quote from the paper

A Professor's Journey out of Nihilism: Why I am not an Atheist - University of Wyoming - J. Budziszewski Excerpt "There were two great holes in the argument about the irrelevance of God. The first is that in order to attack free will, I supposed that I understood cause and effect; I supposed causation to be less mysterious than volition. If anything, it is the other way around. I can perceive a logical connection between premises and valid conclusions. I can perceive at least a rational connection between my willing to do something and my doing it. But between the apple and the earth, I can perceive no connection at all. Why does the apple fall? We don't know. "But there is gravity," you say. No, "gravity" is merely the name of the phenomenon, not its explanation. "But there are laws of gravity," you say. No, the "laws" are not its explanation either; they are merely a more precise description of the thing to be explained, which remains as mysterious as before. For just this reason, philosophers of science are shy of the term "laws"; they prefer "lawlike regularities." To call the equations of gravity "laws" and speak of the apple as "obeying" them is to speak as though, like the traffic laws, the "laws" of gravity are addressed to rational agents capable of conforming their wills to the command. This is cheating, because it makes mechanical causality (the more opaque of the two phenomena) seem like volition (the less). In my own way of thinking the cheating was even graver, because I attacked the less opaque in the name of the more. The other hole in my reasoning was cruder. If my imprisonment in a blind causality made my reasoning so unreliable that I couldn't trust my beliefs, then by the same token I shouldn't have trusted my beliefs about imprisonment in a blind causality. But in that case I had no business denying free will in the first place." – J. Budziszewski - homepage http://www.undergroundthomist.org/

bornagain77

@83

You’re trying hard to make this complicated, but it really isn’t. As far as my argument is concerned, aside from the fact that your beliefs and desires are ultimately not freely chosen, it makes no difference at all how they are acquired. Your choices are based upon your beliefs and desires, but since you are not ultimately responsible for your beliefs and desires, you are not ultimately responsible for your choices.

I worry that the word "ultimate" is doing a lot of work for you here. Could you unpack for us why "ultimate" is important for your view? I also wonder if there's a distinction needed hereabouts between what is selected and what is endorsed. Suppose I'm reading Kant on ethics and I come across the idea that the supreme principle of morality is "act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end in itself also and never as a means only". After some time struggling with the verbiage here, I decide that Kant is right about what the supreme principle of morality is. (I don't, in fact, think Kant was right -- just using this as an example.) In one sense, becoming a Kantian about ethics is not 'up to me' -- it is not arbitrary, after all! -- and it is certainly and profoundly influenced by all sorts of cultural and psychological factors. But I nevertheless engage in an act of critical reflection in which I decide to endorse Kant's view about the supreme principle of morality. PyrrhoManiac1

Bornagain77 @86 Imagine having to debate madman Rosenberg ... The Budziszewski quote is great. First, he points out that physical causality is not exactly a naturalist-friendly concept. What are laws? And why on earth are they obeyed? Berlinski made the same observation.

Joel Primack, a cosmologist at the University of California, Santa Cruz, once posed an interesting question to the physicist Neil Turok: “What is it that makes the electrons continue to follow the laws.” Turok was surprised by the question; he recognized its force. Something seems to compel physical objects to obey the laws of nature, and what makes this observation odd is just that neither compulsion nor obedience are physical ideas. [Berlinski, ‘The Devil’s Delusion’ p.132]

It is an important point that perhaps deserves more attention. - - -

The other hole in my reasoning was cruder. If my imprisonment in a blind causality made my reasoning so unreliable that I couldn’t trust my beliefs, then by the same token I shouldn’t have trusted my beliefs about imprisonment in a blind causality.[Budziszewski]

Exactly right. Rationality breaks down. Some do not seem to realize this horrendous implication. There are people, like Rosenberg, who argue that we do not exist as persons, that our thoughts are fully determined by non-rational physical forces, and, despite their claims, they seem to expect a rational debate to follow. They do not seem to realize that, if they are right, there cannot be a rational debate. Origenes

//Follow-up #85// Thinking about the origin of Dogdoc's hypothesis that all beliefs are arbitrarily chosen, I came to think of his response to my belief that truth exists, which was:

DD: ... a somewhat dubious claim in my opinion, but let’s accept it arguendo and not change the subject

His hypothesis that all beliefs can arbitrarily be chosen is consistent with the idea that truth does not exist. So, maybe his response is relevant to the discussion. I would say that truth exists and that we as free rational persons are able to freely apprehend the truth. However, what we cannot do is choose the truth. The truth is one thing and cannot be arbitrarily chosen. If one comes to hold a true belief then one did not choose that belief, instead, one (freely) apprehends the true belief. Origenes

Origenes and Querius, you guys may appreciate this,

5.) Argument from freedom 1. If naturalism is true, I do not do anything freely. 2. I am free to agree or disagree with premise (1). 3. Therefore naturalism is not true. - Is Metaphysical Naturalism Viable? - William Lane Craig - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HzS_CQnmoLQ

To get a taste of just how insane atheistic naturalism actually is, here is Dr. Craig’s entire refutation of atheist Professor Alex Rosenberg’s (Duke University) book “The Atheist’s Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions”

1.) Argument from intentionality 1. If naturalism is true, I cannot think about anything. 2. I am thinking about naturalism. 3. Therefore naturalism is not true. 2.) The argument from meaning 1. If naturalism is true, no sentence has any meaning. 2. Premise (1) has meaning. 3. Therefore naturalism is not true. 3.) The argument from truth 1. If naturalism is true, there are no true sentences. 2. Premise (1) is true. 3. Therefore naturalism is not true. 4.) The argument from moral blame and praise 1. If naturalism is true, I am not morally praiseworthy or blameworthy for any of my actions. 2. I am morally praiseworthy or blameworthy for some of my actions. 3. Therefore naturalism is not true. 5.) Argument from freedom 1. If naturalism is true, I do not do anything freely. 2. I am free to agree or disagree with premise (1). 3. Therefore naturalism is not true. 6.) The argument from purpose 1. If naturalism is true, I do not plan to do anything. 2. I (Dr. Craig) planned to come to tonight's debate. 3. Therefore naturalism is not true. 7.) The argument from enduring 1. If naturalism is true, I do not endure for two moments of time. 2. I have been sitting here for more than a minute. 3. Therefore naturalism is not true. 8.) The argument from personal existence 1. If naturalism is true, I do not exist. 2. I do exist! 3. Therefore naturalism is not true. - Is Metaphysical Naturalism Viable? - William Lane Craig - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HzS_CQnmoLQ

:) Insanity, thy name is Darwinian metaphysics. Of supplemental note:

A Professor's Journey out of Nihilism: Why I am not an Atheist - University of Wyoming - J. Budziszewski Excerpt page12: "There were two great holes in the argument about the irrelevance of God. The first is that in order to attack free will, I supposed that I understood cause and effect; I supposed causation to be less mysterious than volition.,,, ,,, To call the equations of gravity "laws" and speak of the apple as "obeying" them is to speak as though, like the traffic laws, the "laws" of gravity are addressed to rational agents capable of conforming their wills to the command. This is cheating, because it makes mechanical causality (the more opaque of the two phenomena) seem like volition (the less). In my own way of thinking the cheating was even graver, because I attacked the less opaque in the name of the more. The other hole in my reasoning was cruder. If my imprisonment in a blind causality made my reasoning so unreliable that I couldn't trust my beliefs, then by the same token I shouldn't have trusted my beliefs about imprisonment in a blind causality. But in that case I had no business denying free will in the first place." https://www.scribd.com/document/339125829/J-Budziszewski-Why-I-Am-Not-an-Atheist

bornagain77

Dogdoc

I’d be happy to agree that no beliefs are voluntarily chosen, a position that is known as doxastic involuntarism (which I happen to believe).

I do not agree with your demand that all beliefs must be chosen, in order to hold them freely.

It poses a problem for the sort of free will I think most people want to have, where you are the ultimate author of your choices.

The "problem" stems from the incoherent demand that all free beliefs must be arbitrarily chosen. I am the ultimate author of my beliefs, such as ‘truth exists’, ‘I exist’, ‘error exist’, ‘A=A’, ‘2+2= 4’, and so on, by freely understanding them. I am not forced by something other than myself to understand these beliefs as I understand them.

Do you recall deliberately weighing your decision to experience this insight?

No, but why exactly is this required for free understanding? All that is required for free understanding is that I am the one who understands, that it is not the case that something beyond my control induces in me the false notion that I understand them.

And [Do you recall] for what reasons did you decide to have the insight?

No, but why exactly is this required? Origenes

Dogdoc said:

I am not talking about causality at all, only reason-responsiveness.

I guess I don't understand why you're talking about this, or what any of these debates are about. "Based on" is not "caused by," as you yourself have said. All the non-materialists care about is whether or not choices are caused by something other than the self. You are apparently not trying to make that case. I'm not really sure what case you're trying to make or why you think it is meaningful to anyone here if it does not address the causality involved in individual choices. I don't mean that critically, I just mean to say that I really don't understand why you're making this argument here. I have a feeling I've been misinterpreting this because I have thought of this in terms of you positing a challenge to non-materialists, but that doesn't actually seem to be the case. William J Murray

Querius, You're trying hard to make this complicated, but it really isn't. As far as my argument is concerned, aside from the fact that your beliefs and desires are ultimately not freely chosen, it makes no difference at all how they are acquired. Your choices are based upon your beliefs and desires, but since you are not ultimately responsible for your beliefs and desires, you are not ultimately responsible for your choices. dogdoc

Docdoc @81, And our observations are based on our perceptions and our perceptions on our beliefs and our beliefs on our observations? (chortle) -Q Querius

Querius@79,

Ooh, I love this! LOL And pray tell, where do our “unchosen” beliefs and desires come from? Our perceptions? LOL

Please refer to my response to Origenes regarding unchosen beliefs. And yes as I mentioned before of course we do indeed form beliefs based on our observations. dogdoc

Origenes@78,

It is not coherent to say that we acquire rational beliefs only by choosing them.

A bit of confusion here, I think. First, I did not talk about "rational beliefs" at all. Whatever beliefs support your choices may be rational or irrational, but that doesn't concern the point I'm making. The point here is that in order to make a decision that is rational, your choice must be made according to your beliefs and desires. Second, I did not say that choosing your beliefs was the only way you could acquire beliefs. Rather, my point is that if you base a choice on some set of beliefs and desires, but you did not freely choose to hold those beliefs and desires, then your choice is not free.

For instance, I hold the belief that truth exists, however, I would never say that I have come to this belief by my “choice”.

Oh, I quite agree! Again, my argument rests on the observation that we can not freely chose our beliefs and desires, which is why our choices are not ultimately free.

That truth exists is rather something that I (freely) understand. It is an insight that I have made my own. By understanding that truth exists I have internalized that belief. As a belief/insight, it is partly based on logic, which I have likewise made my own. For instance, A = A is also not a belief that I have “chosen”, rather I have freely understood it.

In that case, at what point in your life did you choose to have the sort of mind that is capable of reasoning from first principles and concluding that truth exists (a somewhat dubious claim in my opinion, but let's accept it arguendo and not change the subject)? Do you recall deliberately weighing your decision to experience this insight? And for what reasons did you decide to have the insight?

So, certain beliefs are not chosen, but in my view, that fact does not pose a problem with freedom.

I'd be happy to agree that no beliefs are voluntarily chosen, a position that is known as doxastic involuntarism (which I happen to believe). It poses a problem for the sort of free will I think most people want to have, where you are the ultimate author of your choices. On one hand you do make rational choices based on nothing but your own beliefs and desires - so that is a sort of freedom - but on the other hand you are not willfully responsible for holding those beliefs and desires. dogdoc

Docdoc @76,

If we make a choice without rational deliberation, then yes, our choice is random and arbitrary and not the sort of free choice worth wanting. Only if we base our choice on our beliefs and desires can it be rational, but we cannot ultimately choose our beliefs and desires.

Ooh, I love this! LOL And pray tell, where do our "unchosen" beliefs and desires come from? Our perceptions? LOL And thank you, Origenes! I'm rubbing my hands together in gleeful anticipation. Did you want the drumstick or the wing? How about some "white meat" with gravy? :D -Q Querius

We are never able to choose our beliefs based on existing beliefs of our own choosing – there is no way to bootstrap the process.

It is not coherent to say that we acquire rational beliefs only by choosing them. For instance, I hold the belief that truth exists, however, I would never say that I have come to this belief by my “choice”. That truth exists is rather something that I (freely) understand. It is an insight that I have made my own. By understanding that truth exists I have internalized that belief. As a belief/insight, it is partly based on logic, which I have likewise made my own. For instance, A = A is also not a belief that I have “chosen”, rather I have freely understood it. So, certain beliefs are not chosen, but in my view, that fact does not pose a problem with freedom. Origenes

Origenes@75,

DD: … in order for us to be ultimately responsible for our choices, we must freely choose our beliefs and desires. O: Let’s restrict the argument to beliefs if you will. I would say that you are right, we must freely choose our beliefs in order to be responsible for them.

Without desires we couldn't really make decisions, right? Say I believe that God wants me to give to charity, I would still have to desire to do what God wants me to in order to rationally decide to do it.

DD: But like any choice, those choices must likewise be based upon our beliefs and desires. O: As an aside, how about based on observation? You seem to avoid that term.

If I follow your question, you're suggesting that observations can be reasons for making choices. If that's what you mean, then yes of course "observations" can be added to the list of reasons. I usually just say beliefs and desires because most reasons can be reduced to these - for example, observations can be reasons for a choice because they lead you to believe something.

DD: But it is impossible for us to have freely chosen beliefs and desires before we have freely chosen beliefs and desires. O: Your argument is based on the idea of an infinite regress of beliefs. Right?

Not infinite, no. The regress can end in any sort of unchosen belief. Clearly many beliefs and desires are innate. Perhaps I was born with a genetic predisposition to believe that altruism is good, or I was conditioned to it as I developed, etc. So innate tendencies and environment factors shape my charitable tendencies, but these things cannot have been freely chosen by me. We are never able to choose our beliefs based on existing beliefs of our own choosing - there is no way to bootstrap the process. dogdoc

Querius@74,

DD:But like any choice, those choices must likewise be based upon our beliefs and desires. Q:Once again, then these are necessarily determined randomly and arbitrarily unless you can come up with a supportable cause.

Not sure what you're getting at here. If we make a choice without rational deliberation, then yes, our choice is random and arbitrary and not the sort of free choice worth wanting. Only if we base our choice on our beliefs and desires can it be rational, but we cannot ultimately choose our beliefs and desires. dogdoc

Dogdoc @73

… in order for us to be ultimately responsible for our choices, we must freely choose our beliefs and desires.

Let’s restrict the argument to beliefs if you will. I would say that you are right, we must freely choose our beliefs in order to be responsible for them.

But like any choice, those choices must likewise be based upon our beliefs and desires.

As an aside, how about based on observation? You seem to avoid that term.

But it is impossible for us to have freely chosen beliefs and desires before we have freely chosen beliefs and desires.

Your argument is based on the idea of an infinite regress of beliefs. Right?

Therefore, that sort of ultimate responsibility is impossible.

According to you, there is no bottom. Every belief is based on a belief. Is that your idea? Origenes

Docdoc @73,

But like any choice, those choices must likewise be based upon our beliefs and desires.

Once again, then these are necessarily determined randomly and arbitrarily unless you can come up with a supportable cause. -Q Querius

Origenes @69,

What you are saying is that we cannot make a choice independent from the way we are, independent from who we are.

Not exactly, no. What I'm saying is that in order to make a rational choice, our choice must be based upon reasons. What sorts of reasons can support a rational choice? Certainly our beliefs and desires (including our values, preferences, priorities, fears, hopes, and anything else that might factor into our deliberations). So it's not a matter of identity (who we are) but rather a matter of what we believe and what we desire.

So, we are what we are and our choices are necessarily based on what we are.

Again: our rational choices are necessarily based upon our beliefs and desires, etc.

But your idea that a free choice is only free when it is made independent from what one is, independent from oneself, is a very out-of-the-ordinary concept of free choice.

No, that is not my conception of free choice. Rather, I argue that in order for us to be ultimately responsible for our choices, we must freely choose our beliefs and desires. But like any choice, those choices must likewise be based upon our beliefs and desires. But it is impossible for us to have freely chosen beliefs and desires before we have freely chosen beliefs and desires. Therefore, that sort of ultimate responsibility is impossible. dogdoc

Nonlin.org @70, Nicely stated! -Q Querius

Querius@67,

So concerning your own conviction or those of anyone else, its basis is from a limited set, as you’ve pointed out:

I wasn't attempting to enumerate an exhaustive set of moral foundations; I was trying to make a point that from a practical point of view what we identify as our moral foundations wouldn't matter.

Have you ever examined yourself as to why you believe as you do? Where did your values originate from?

Honestly I don't know how to answer that. Why do I love my family? Why do I think sunsets are beautiful? I suppose I could make up some answers but I don't think they'd be true.

Concerning e. above, yes, the Bible includes strict laws...

Why do you think so many Christians believe in God but it doesn't help them to act in accordance with these admonitions? Why doesn't religious belief correlate strongly with good behavior? If what you think about the roots of morality were true, it would seem the correlation would be obvious, but it is not. Maybe people can be good or bad no matter what their beliefs about God are, no?

Yes, and some of them are now among my best and most trusted friends! Not only have they come to “believe in God,” but they have been radically transformed by their faith and the presence of Jesus in their lives, continually demonstrating this in their actions and attitudes!

I'm sure that's true, and it's terrific, really.

I can give you some amazing examples, but you’d just spit on them and they deserve better than that. They have my respect, friendship, and trust.

That's quite an unfair assumption on your part. Are you so quick to judge me because I don't believe in God like you do? I think that's a problem. In any case, I wish only the best for people who have had trouble finding their way - I've known my share. dogdoc

Quantum mechanics indeterminacy invalidates determinism.  There are no ifs and buts of the type "its own way", "some interpretations", "superdeterminism" and other such nonsense. When proof to the contrary will be available, we'll reconsider. In the double slit experiment, one can have a perfectly deterministic setup (theoretically) yet every time the experiment is repeated, it cannot be known (except statistically) where the particle will end up even if the setup is calibrated to the n-th degree. This is totally different than the deterministic systems (hereby invalidated!) where the normal distribution of outputs can be narrowed by tightening the inputs / set-up with the theoretical conclusion that perfect inputs / set-up will result in perfect outputs (determinism). Nonlin.org

Dogdoc @49

The reasons for our actions derive from the way we are, and we cannot freely choose the way we are because our choices depend on the way we are.

Let's examine: 1.) The reasons for our actions derive from the way we are ... True 2.) … and we cannot freely choose the way we are because our choices depend on the way we are. What you are saying is that we cannot make a choice independent from the way we are, independent from who we are. So, we are what we are and our choices are necessarily based on what we are. But your idea that a free choice is only free when it is made independent from what one is, independent from oneself, is a very out-of-the-ordinary concept of free choice. I would argue that the opposite is true. If a choice is made independently from oneself, then it is, by definition, not a free choice. Origenes

Free Will is the belief that at least some of our actions are not completely determined by agencies beyond our power. “Some” is more than “none”, but it does not have to be “most” or even “many”. Thus, the burden of proof against Free Will is impossibly high, as all – not just some – of our actions would have to be entirely – not just partly – determined by external forces to disprove Free Will. This proof has not and cannot be provided. Illusion of control and interference with one's will experiments do not - in fact - disprove free will. Nonlin.org

DocDoc @58,

This is true if my perception is the only basis for my conviction, but it is also true for any other basis I could have. We could scream and cry that what they are doing is disgusting, horrifying and vile, and they would continue to perceive it as entertaining and wholesome. Or, we could attempt to argue from first principles of empathy and the obvious goodness of minimizing the suffering of sentient beings, and they would continue to torture animals. Or, you could scream that the Bible prohibits such behavior and that God will be angry at them and perhaps condemn them to Hell- and they would laugh and continue their festivities.

Finally, we’re starting to get somewhere! So concerning your own conviction or those of anyone else, its basis is from a limited set, as you’ve pointed out: a. Random, based on an arbitrary choice, preference, or your limited perceptions. b. Chosen based on what seem to be preprogrammed values such as empathy. c. Majority opinion at the moment, perhaps with social or legal coercion. d. Personal benefit, including financial or other benefit such as self-esteem or self-justification. e. External from a higher power: God, Allah, Brahma, Zeus, etc. Have you ever examined yourself as to why you believe as you do? Where did your values originate from? Are they in essence random and arbitrary? Concerning e. above, yes, the Bible includes strict laws regarding treatment of all animals. Keeping it short, it starts out with human custodianship over the earth (including all animal and plant life), an original mandate for a vegetarian diet for humans, reverence for animal life, and closes with the promise that God will “destroy those who destroy the earth.”

Jails are chock-full of violent criminals who believe in God.

Yes, and some of them are now among my best and most trusted friends! Not only have they come to “believe in God,” but they have been radically transformed by their faith and the presence of Jesus in their lives, continually demonstrating this in their actions and attitudes! I can give you some amazing examples, but you'd just spit on them and they deserve better than that. They have my respect, friendship, and trust. -Q Querius

Bornagain77 @60, DD, Vividbleau @61 I completely agree with Bornagain’s assessment that the following statement by DD is incoherent.

DD: “I do in fact control what I say and do. It’s just that the reasons why I choose one thing or another do not originate with me.”

There is really nothing substantial to add to BA’s clear analysis. It hardly makes sense to state the obvious again; here goes anyway: If billiard ball A causes billiard ball B to move, then B’s movement is derivative from A. The movement of billiard ball B originates from billiard ball A. B is (obviously) not in control of its movement. All compatibilist versions of free will are utter nonsense. - - - - VividBleau @61

Self determination is the essence of freedom.

Hear! Hear! I could not agree more. Origenes

"I am very wary of people who say this, because it makes me think that if they had not been educated in the Bible, they would willfully cause others to suffer." DD, So now you are resorting to insinuations/smears. Sigh. Andrew asauber

Dogdoc, seeing as I think your posts are irrational, I really don't care what you think of my posts. I don't write for your benefit. In fact, in my first posts, 11 thru 13, which you complained about me not addressing your 'arguments', I was addressing a main topic of the OP, not you. I did not even read any of your posts before I posted 11 thru 13. I could have cared less what you wrote. And now that I have read some of what you wrote, I care even less what you wrote. bornagain77

Bornagain77@60, I think your post was a vast improvement over your previous ones. You haven't yet grasped the essence of compatibilist versions of free will, so your arguments are more like foot-stomping than reasoned rebuttals, but I sincerely applaud your contributing to the discussion in a constructive way. OOPS... I spoke too soon. I see you just edited your post to add a ton of utterly irrelevant copypasta. Oh well. dogdoc

Asauber@59,

In fact, nowhere in your entire comment do you address the fact that you have no reasonable basis for your conviction.

Our perceptions form the basis for our decisions. You decide to stop your car when you see something you perceive as a stop sign. I decide to stop animal abusers when I see something I perceive as wrongful treatment of animals.

God is the Lord of His creation, and His creatures live for Him at His pleasure. That is the basis for respect for animals, and there is no other.

I am very wary of people who say this, because it makes me think that if they had not been educated in the Bible, they would willfully cause others to suffer. To me, that is unimaginable. We all agree here that animal abuse is horrible. It will forever be the case that people will believe in different religions, or no religion at all, so it seems best to focus on the fact that we agree on our moral precepts rather than attack each other regarding where we believe they originate! dogdoc

Origenes 54 Perhaps this will help answer your question. I believe we always choose according to our strongest inclination given the options available to us at the time the choice is made. I also believe that every choice we make is free and every choice we make is determined but what determines it is me, my choices are self determined. Self determination is the essence of freedom. Vivid vividbleau

DD: "I do in fact control what I say and do. It’s just that the reasons why I choose one thing or another do not originate with me." So Dogdoc claims that "I do in fact control what I say and do", but in the same breath he claims, "the reasons why I choose one thing or another do not originate with me"??? I agree with Origenes, we are not dealing with rational people here. Dogdoc can't claim that he is in control of what he says and does, but, in the same breath, claim he is really not in control of what he says and does because his reasons for choosing what he says and does don't originate with himself. Either Dogdoc is a completely helpless meat puppet to circumstances that are totally beyond his control, or else he has an immaterial mind and free will in some real and meaningful sense. And as Origenes has repeatedly pointed out, unless people have free will in some real and meaningful sense, then rationality itself is lost. Here are a few notes to that effect

Sam Harris's Free Will: The Medial Pre-Frontal Cortex Did It - Martin Cothran - November 9, 2012 Excerpt: There is something ironic about the position of thinkers like Harris on issues like this: they claim that their position is the result of the irresistible necessity of logic (in fact, they pride themselves on their logic). Their belief is the consequent, in a ground/consequent relation between their evidence and their conclusion. But their very stated position is that any mental state -- including their position on this issue -- is the effect of a physical, not logical cause. By their own logic, it isn't logic that demands their assent to the claim that free will is an illusion, but the prior chemical state of their brains. The only condition under which we could possibly find their argument convincing is if they are not true. The claim that free will is an illusion requires the possibility that minds have the freedom to assent to a logical argument, a freedom denied by the claim itself. It is an assent that must, in order to remain logical and not physiological, presume a perspective outside the physical order. http://www.evolutionnews.org/2012/11/sam_harriss_fre066221.html Of note: Martin Cothran is author of several textbooks on traditional logic https://www.amazon.com/Martin-Cothran/e/B00J249LUA/ref=dp_byline_cont_pop_book_1 Naturalism and Self-Refutation Michael Egnor -January 31, 2018 Furthermore, the very framework of Clark’s argument — logic — is neither material nor natural. Logic, after all, doesn’t exist “in the space-time continuum” and isn’t described by physics. What is the location of modus ponens? How much does Gödel’s incompleteness theorem weigh? What is the physics of non-contradiction? How many millimeters long is Clark’s argument for naturalism? Ironically the very logic that Clark employs to argue for naturalism is outside of any naturalistic frame. The strength of Clark’s defense of naturalism is that it is an attempt to present naturalism’s tenets clearly and logically. That is its weakness as well, because it exposes naturalism to scrutiny, and naturalism cannot withstand even minimal scrutiny. Even to define naturalism is to refute it. https://evolutionnews.org/2018/01/naturalism-and-self-refutation/ Is God Real? Evidence from the Laws of Logic J. Warner Wallace January 9, 2019 Excerpt: (1) The Objective Laws of Logic Exist We cannot deny the Laws of Logic exist. In fact, any reasonable or logical argument against the existence of these laws requires their existence in the first place. The Objective Laws of Logic Are Conceptual Laws These laws are not physical; they are conceptual. They cannot be seen under a microscope or weighed on a scale. They are abstract laws guiding logical, immaterial thought processes. The Objective Laws of Logic Are Transcendent The laws transcend location, culture and time. If we go forward or backward a million years, the laws of logic would still exist and apply, regardless of culture or geographic location. The Objective Laws of Logic Pre-Existed Mankind The transcendent and timeless nature of logical laws indicates they precede our existence or ability to recognize them. Even before humans were able to understand the law of non-contradiction, “A” could not have been “Non-A”. The Laws of Logic were discovered by humans, not created by humans. (2) All Conceptual Laws Reflect the Mind of a Law Giver All laws require law givers, including conceptual laws. We know this from our common experience in the world in which we live. The laws governing our society and culture, for example, are the result and reflection of minds. But more importantly, the conceptual Laws of Logic govern rational thought processes, and for this reason, they require the existence of a mind. (3) The Best and Most Reasonable Explanation for the Kind of Mind Necessary for the Existence of the Transcendent, Objective, Conceptual Laws of Logic is God The lawgiver capable of producing the immaterial, transcendent laws preceding our existence must also be an immaterial, transcendent and pre-existent mind. This description fits what we commonly think of when we think of a Creator God. The Christian Worldview accounts for the existence of the transcendent Laws of Logic. If God exists, He is the absolute, objective, transcendent standard of truth. The Laws of Logic are simply a reflection of the nature of God. God did not create these laws. They are a reflection of His rational thinking, and for this reason, they are as eternal as God Himself. You and I, as humans, have the ability to discover these laws because we have been created in the image of God, but we don’t create or invent the laws. https://coldcasechristianity.com/writings/is-god-real-evidence-from-the-laws-of-logic/

Verse and quotes:

John 1:1 “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” ‘the Word’ in John 1:1 is translated from ‘Logos’ in Greek. Logos is also the root word from which we derive our modern word logic http://etymonline.com/?term=logic What is the Logos? Logos is a Greek word literally translated as “word, speech, or utterance.” However, in Greek philosophy, Logos refers to divine reason or the power that puts sense into the world making order instead of chaos.,,, In the Gospel of John, John writes “In the beginning was the Word (Logos), and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1). John appealed to his readers by saying in essence, “You’ve been thinking, talking, and writing about the Word (divine reason) for centuries and now I will tell you who He is.” https://www.compellingtruth.org/what-is-the-Logos.html Isaiah 1:18 “Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord: though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool.”

bornagain77

"Hardly! As we say in animal rescue, “Saving one dog will not change the world, but surely for that one dog, the world will change forever.” And that says nothing about the feelings of meaning and purpose that I get by never giving up the fight." This is irrelevant to Q's point. In fact, nowhere in your entire comment do you address the fact that you have no reasonable basis for your conviction. God is the Lord of His creation, and His creatures live for Him at His pleasure. That is the basis for respect for animals, and there is no other. Andrew asauber

Querius@55,

I participate in society, and condemn and take action against people who mistreat animals. I reject their moral sense, and they reject mine, and it is as clear to me as the sky is blue (literally) that my moral sense is correct and theirs is faulty. Yes, exactly. And they will condemn and take action against you for not allowing “animal sports.” To them, it’s also as clear as the sky is blue.

That is correct, we are in complete agreement.

But sadly, since you lack any BASIS for your conviction that your moral sense is “correct,” all you can offer is your groundless opinion, which is impotent.

I suppose this is the very crux of our disagreement on the matter. Let's begin with a practical view. We agree that if someone perceives animal abuse as a respectable pastime, we will not be successful at convincing them otherwise, and the only option is to forcibly prevent them from acting on their perceptions. This is true if my perception is the only basis for my conviction, but it is also true for any other basis I could have. We could scream and cry that what they are doing is disgusting, horrifying and vile, and they would continue to perceive it as entertaining and wholesome. Or, we could attempt to argue from first principles of empathy and the obvious goodness of minimizing the suffering of sentient beings, and they would continue to torture animals. Or, you could scream that the Bible prohibits such behavior and that God will be angry at them and perhaps condemn them to Hell- and they would laugh and continue their festivities. Jails are chock-full of violent criminals who believe in God. And there are other problems with your view, including the fact that different religions present somewhat different sets of divine commands, and that different believers in any particular God can have very different interpretations of what those commands mean. And beyond that, think about this: I do not believe that there is a transcendent, God who has beliefs and desires about what we should and shouldn't do. But as certain as you are about God, I feel that certain about my condemnation of animal abuse; there could be nothing more certain in my mind.

Maybe you will campaign against them. And they will campaign against you. Pointless, right?

Hardly! As we say in animal rescue, “Saving one dog will not change the world, but surely for that one dog, the world will change forever.” And that says nothing about the feelings of meaning and purpose that I get by never giving up the fight. dogdoc

Asauber @56, Wasn't there also recently horrific experiments on beagle puppies? Here's what I found: https://www.factcheck.org/2021/11/answering-questions-about-beaglegate/ -Q Querius

What about the gruesome and unbelievably cruel experimentation on mice and other creatures in the name of the god Science? Andrew asauber

Dogdoc @38,

I participate in society, and condemn and take action against people who mistreat animals. I reject their moral sense, and they reject mine, and it is as clear to me as the sky is blue (literally) that my moral sense is correct and theirs is faulty.

Yes, exactly. And they will condemn and take action against you for not allowing “animal sports.” To them, it’s also as clear as the sky is blue. But sadly, since you lack any BASIS for your conviction that your moral sense is “correct,” all you can offer is your groundless opinion, which is impotent. Their argument is actually better in that “animal sports” is demonstrably entertaining, profitable, a charming cultural tradition, and an exciting social event. You have no counter argument. All you can do is abstain and feel morally superior. And they will continue with their carnage of animals: • Dog fighting • Cock fighting • Bull fighting • Bull versus bear fights • Sport hunting of large mammals • The use of animals as military assets (i.e. dolphins trained to deliver explosive charges against ships, blow up pipelines and cables, etc. along with themselves) Maybe you will campaign against them. And they will campaign against you. Pointless, right? -Q Querius

VB @52

... for the many years here I have always been an outlier regarding the term “free will” I will repeat for the umpteenth time I consider the term to be an oxymoron.

I too hold that the term is problematic. Can you agree with the following statements? - In order to be a coherent term "free will" must refer to a free action by a free person. - An action by a person is free if the action cannot be causally traced back to something beyond the control of the person. Origenes

DD “ I have said over and over my argument is not based on determinism or causality. It is based on the fact that rational choices must be based on reasons (beliefs, desires, etc).” I don’t know about the rational part but I gotta agree with you regarding “desires” If I am making choices contrary to my desires ( what I desire most given the options available to me at the time the choice is made) then how can that possibility be a free choice? Vivid vividbleau

“Dogdoc is arguing against a specific way of conceptualizing free will. That is not the same as arguing against free will altogether.” Agreed. FYI for the many years here I have always been an outlier regarding the term “free will” I will repeat for the umpteenth time I consider the term to be an oxymoron. Vivid vividbleau

@46

. If our actions and beliefs are due to unconscious processes, beyond our control, then we are not rational. For me, it is (very) difficult to understand that some people do not see this implication as a compelling reason to firmly reject Wegner’s claim. He cannot be right, because it cannot be the case that we are not rational (period).

I am not familiar with Wegner's research. But from what little I can glean from Wikipedia, he has shown that under some conditions, subjects can be manipulated so as to believe that their actions are under their control when they are not. That's quite interesting, but it certainly doesn't show that therefore, none of our actions are ever under our control. At most it might show that mere introspection alone is not sufficient to determine if an action is under our control. I'm not even sure if it shows that! -- I wouldn't comment on that without reading his work. PyrrhoManiac1

PyrrhoManiac1@41,

There is certainly something very intriguing about this argument. The idea (as I understand it) that while we can and do act on the basis of reasons, we cannot choose what those reasons are.

EXACTLY SO.

My main concern is whether this argument makes too synchronic and static a process that is really diachronic and dynamic. At any given time*, I can act on basis of reasons, and I can also reflect upon what my reasons are for why I do what I do. In doing so I can realize that what I had thought were good reasons are actually not. I can thus revise my reasons for why I do what I do.

Yes, but your realizations (or meta-realizations) must likewise be based upon reasons, or else they are not rational.

Now, it is certainly right that this activity of reflection and reason-revision is itself guided by reasons. And the reason-revising reasons are not themselves the reasons that are being revised.

Ah yes. (I'm giving BA77 an illustration of how I respond to arguments one idea at a time).

However, it seems plausible to me that the reason-revising reasons that are not under revision in that particular episode of self-reflection could very well become subject to revision in some subsequent episode of self-reflection.

Certainly so, but the point remains: Whenever a choice is made, it is wholly based on rational deliberation over reasons, or it is not. So, whatever aspect of the deliberation that was not based on reasons is non-rational, and if that is the "free" aspect of our choices, then "free" equates to "non-rational".

Thus while we can never revise all of our reasons all at once, we can engage in a process of continual self-correction, whereby various reasons are revised in light of other reasons, those reasons in turn become revised in light of other reasons, etc.

Yes I agree, that is what we do.

In other words, the metaphor of Neurath’s boat

Sure, but each time we replace a beam we must deliberate on its construction and installation, based on how the boat is currently constructed.

Dogdoc is arguing against a specific way of conceptualizing free will. That is not the same as arguing against free will altogether. And obviously (at least I hope it would be obvious) one can reject libertarian freedom without rejecting agent causation altogether.

Exactly so (cf. my previous response to BA77).

I wouldn’t put it that way. He very clearly rejects the idea that consciousness is an illusion. He just thinks that it’s not an obviously absurd idea. Perhaps that is because he has actually taken the time to understand it.

Exactly so, thank you! dogdoc

Origenes @43

Determinism is unacceptable because it does not allow for rationality.

Like BA77, you are not reading and understanding my argument. I have said over and over my argument is not based on determinism or causality. It is based on the fact that rational choices must be based on reasons (beliefs, desires, etc). We can indeed act rationally according to our beliefs and desires, but we cannot possibly be the original authors of our beliefs and desires. You have already agreed with me that our free choices must be rational, which means based on reasoned deliberation. It simply follows from that that we cannot freely choose our reasons, in the same way we cannot lift ourselves up by our own bootstraps.

Dogdoc understands all this, but his allegiance is to materialism nonetheless, so what does he do?

Like BA77, you impute opinions to be that I do not hold. Not only would I not say I am a materialist (the term is anachronistic), I actually hold that conscious awareness is not something we can understand by attempting to reduce it to our current physicalist conceptions. Try responding to what I actually say instead of trying to categorize my arguments into things you think you know how to counter. The reasons for our actions derive from the way we are, and we cannot freely choose the way we are because our choices depend on the way we are. dogdoc

BA77, I see you trying to advance your own arguments rather than simply regurgitating others' opinions, which I think is commendable. Unfortunately you don't seem to be reading and understanding what I say. My comments have nothing whatsoever to do with "Darwinism", so you get off to a bad start. You then imagine I'm saying I don't control what I do, which is also not what I've said - I do in fact control what I say and do. It's just that the reasons why I choose one thing or another do not originate with me. And so on. It would help you to quote each thing I say and respond to it directly, the way I normally do (see my previous post to WJM for example). That way you won't just be making up both sides of the argument! dogdoc

William J Murray@39,42

Do you internally experience a causal gap between “reasons” and an actualized choice?

I am not talking about causality, only reason-responsiveness. If free will is merely non-rational coin-flipping, then it is not a free will worth wanting. But if free will is about rational choices, then there must be reasons for each choice. If there is a "gap", and something else steps in to make the final decision, then that something else must likewise have reasons for its choice. (As far personal experience, I actually don't believe we have conscious access to our decision-making; rather our decisions are made unconsciously and then we consciously generate a narrative that makes sense of our unconscious decisions, rationalized by our beliefs and desires).

This all depends on how one defines and characterizes the basic premise of “what I am.” If you begin with the premise that “what I am” includes “reasons,” then you’re just making a circular argument by assuming your conclusion in the premise.

When I refer to "the way you are" when you make a decision, then yes what I am referring to are all possible reasons (beliefs and desires, including priorities, values, etc) that can account for our choices. But my argument is not circular; rather, it points out a circularity in the idea that we are the ultimate authors of our free rational choices: 1) Rational free choices are based on our beliefs and desires 2) We cannot freely choose our beliefs and desires because in order to do so we must already have freely chosen to have our beliefs and desires.

Reasons do not force you to make any choice. I don’t know about anyone else, but I know this to be true of my choices. Reasons do not flip the switch; I do. I am not my reasons.

I won't argue what you mean by "I" aside from the reasons upon which you base your choices. But this "I" who has the final say must base its choice on reasons, or else that "I" is not a rational chooser.

The problem with this line of thought is that it just assumes that since all choices involve the experiential quality of “reasons,”

No, my argument makes no reference to what aspects of decision making are experiential. Rather, I argue that rational free choices must be based on reasons, or else they are not rational.

...then those reasons are causal.

I am not talking about causality at all, only reason-responsiveness.

Reasons are a necessary condition for a free will choice, but they are not a sufficient cause.

You posit another factor of decision-making aside from rational deliberation over one's beliefs and desires. If some other factor makes the decision, then that factor must either be based on reasons, or else it is not rational. dogdoc

Dogdoc and ~ The Illusion of Conscious Will ~

Wegner conducted a series of experiments in which people experience an illusion of control, feeling that their will shapes events which are actually determined by someone else.[1] He argued controversially that the ease with which this illusion can be created shows that the everyday feeling of conscious will is an illusion or a "construction"[9] and that this illusion of mental causation is "the mind's best trick". He argued that, although people may feel that conscious intentions drive much of their behavior, in reality both behavior and intentions are the product of other, unconscious mental processes. [Wiki]

If Wegner is right, then we are not rational. If our actions and beliefs are due to unconscious processes, beyond our control, then we are not rational. For me, it is (very) difficult to understand that some people do not see this implication as a compelling reason to firmly reject Wegner’s claim. He cannot be right, because it cannot be the case that we are not rational (period).

Dogdoc: I do believe that we have illusions regarding how we make choices (as has been illustrated in experiments by Daniel Wegner and others). I do not believe that consciousness is causal, but rather it is perceptual.

Consciousness is perceptual by what? Similarly, consciousness is an illusion to what (if not consciousness)? If consciousness is not causal Dogdoc (and Wegner), then we are not rational, and nothing is left to be said. We can all go home and spend the remainder of our days in silence. Origenes

@44

Dogdoc argues against free will, according to him (libertarian) free will is incoherent. Yet he also claims that each individual controls his own actions.

Dogdoc is arguing against a specific way of conceptualizing free will. That is not the same as arguing against free will altogether. And obviously (at least I hope it would be obvious) one can reject libertarian freedom without rejecting agent causation altogether.

Moreover, as an aside, he promotes the idea that consciousness is an illusion.

I wouldn't put it that way. He very clearly rejects the idea that consciousness is an illusion. He just thinks that it's not an obviously absurd idea. Perhaps that is because he has actually taken the time to understand it. (See his @31.) PyrrhoManiac1

BA77 @40 In my view, the claims by Dogdoc are incoherent. As you rightly point out, on the one hand, we are dealing with ...

Dogdoc’s self refuting claim that we have no free will, and yet his acting as if we actually do have free will ..

… but on the other hand, Dogdoc also makes contradictory claims like:

DD: Obviously our physical and behavioral traits result from heritable and environmental factors, because there is nothing else, but that doesn’t mean each individual doesn’t control their own actions.

To me, this seems confused. Dogdoc argues against free will, according to him (libertarian) free will is incoherent. Yet he also claims that each individual controls his own actions. Moreover, as an aside, he promotes the idea that consciousness is an illusion. I do not know what to make of his argument. Origenes

Determinism is unacceptable because it does not allow for rationality. If we are not in control of our thoughts, then we are not rational and we all should stop participating in this conversation. If we hold beliefs not because we understand them, but because something beyond our control induces in us the false notion that we understand them, then we understand nothing, and we are not rational. Materialism posits that everything is physical and has a physical cause, so it seems that physical determinism follows. Dogdoc understands all this, but his allegiance is to materialism nonetheless, so what does he do? First, he denies that determinism implies that we do not control our actions:

Obviously our physical and behavioral traits result from heritable and environmental factors, because there is nothing else, but that doesn’t mean each individual doesn’t control their own actions.

Strictly speaking, this is simply not true:

1.) If determinism is true, then all our actions and thoughts are consequences of events and laws of nature in the remote past before we were born. 2.) We have no control over circumstances that existed in the remote past before we were born, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature. 3.) If A causes B, and we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B. Therefore 4.) If determinism is true, then we have no control over our own actions and thoughts.

However, Dogdoc’s larger claim is that materialism does not imply determinism.

Modern physics does not include contra-causal mental powers, but neither does it assume deterministic causality.

Dogdoc points out that there are undetermined events.

… obviously quantum physics is not deterministic in the way Newtonian physics is.

Is Dogdoc’s defense of materialism successful? Materialistic determinism would not allow for rationality, however there are undetermined events, so everything is ok? I would argue that 50% determinism also does not allow for rationality. If we hold 50% of our beliefs without understanding, then we are irreparably not rational. However, do undetermined events help Dogdoc's case at all? Do undetermined events allow for freedom, self-control, and rationality? Not according to Van Inwagen:

“Let us look carefully at the consequences of supposing that human behavior is undetermined … Let us suppose that there is a certain current-pulse that is proceeding along one of the neural pathways in Jane’s brain and that it is about to come to a fork. And let us suppose that if it goes to the left, she will make her confession;, and that if it goes to the right, she will remain silent. And let us suppose that it is undetermined which way the pulse goes when it comes to the fork: even an omniscient being with a complete knowledge of the state of Jane’s brain and a complete knowledge of the laws of physics and unlimited powers of calculation could say no more than: ‘The laws and present state of her brain would allow the pulse to go either way; consequently, no prediction of what the pulse will do when it comes to the fork is possible; it might go to the left, and it might go to the right, and that’s all there is to be said.’ Now let us ask: does Jane have any choice about whether the pulse goes to the left or to the right? If we think about this question for a moment, we shall see that it is very hard to see how she could have any choice about that. …There is no way for her to make it go one way rather than the other. Or, at least, there is no way for her to make it go one way rather than the other and leave the ‘choice’ it makes an undetermined event.” [Van Inwagen]

Origenes

The reasons for our actions derive from the way we are, and we cannot freely choose the way we are because our choices depend on the way we are.

This all depends on how one defines and characterizes the basic premise of "what I am." If you begin with the premise that "what I am" includes "reasons," then you're just making a circular argument by assuming your conclusion in the premise. Reasons do not force you to make any choice. I don't know about anyone else, but I know this to be true of my choices. Reasons do not flip the switch; I do. I am not my reasons. The problem with this line of thought is that it just assumes that since all choices involve the experiential quality of "reasons," then those reasons are causal. This is not a logical implication. Reasons are a necessary condition for a free will choice, but they are not a sufficient cause. William J Murray

@29

The reasons for our actions derive from the way we are, and we cannot freely choose the way we are because our choices depend on the way we are.

There is certainly something very intriguing about this argument. The idea (as I understand it) that while we can and do act on the basis of reasons, we cannot choose what those reasons are. My main concern is whether this argument makes too synchronic and static a process that is really diachronic and dynamic. At any given time*, I can act on basis of reasons, and I can also reflect upon what my reasons are for why I do what I do. In doing so I can realize that what I had thought were good reasons are actually not. I can thus revise my reasons for why I do what I do. Now, it is certainly right that this activity of reflection and reason-revision is itself guided by reasons. And the reason-revising reasons are not themselves the reasons that are being revised. However, it seems plausible to me that the reason-revising reasons that are not under revision in that particular episode of self-reflection could very well become subject to revision in some subsequent episode of self-reflection. Thus while we can never revise all of our reasons all at once, we can engage in a process of continual self-correction, whereby various reasons are revised in light of other reasons, those reasons in turn become revised in light of other reasons, etc. In other words, the metaphor of Neurath's boat:

We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction.

applies just as much the process of individual rational reconstruction and intellectual development as it does to the process of collective rational advancement. * subject to various constraints, such as being developmentally normal and not being severely cognitively impaired, having reached a developmental stage where I can appreciate and act upon reasons, etc. PyrrhoManiac1

To add to Origenes succinct refutations of Dogdoc's claims,,,, In this very thread Dogdoc has refuted his own Darwinian worldview numerous times. For instance, in post 1 Dogdoc argues that he has no choice but to try to convince others that free will is an illusion simply because he actions are determined,,,, "If determinism were true, then the reason people would try to convince others of its truth is, obviously, because their actions are determined!" i.e. He claims that he has no control over whether or not he tries to convince other people that free will is an illusion! Yet, in post 18 Dogdoc complains that my posts are not 'enjoyable' for him to read since I am quote-unquote, "like a search engine that regurgitates reams of output based on a few keywords. Instead, try reading what people write and responding to it yourself!" Dogdoc can't have it both ways, either free will is an illusion and I have no choice but to be "like a search engine that regurgitates reams of output based on a few keywords" or else I have free will and I can contemplate what people write and meaningfully, (and hopefully thoughtfully), decide to respond to what they write. In other words, Dogdoc claims that he has no free will, but he acts, and expects other people to act, as if they have free will. As is usual for Darwinian materialists, Dogdoc is not putting his money where his mouth is.

The Heretic - Who is Thomas Nagel and why are so many of his fellow academics condemning him? - March 25, 2013 Excerpt:,,, Fortunately, materialism is never translated into life as it’s lived. As colleagues and friends, husbands and mothers, wives and fathers, sons and daughters, materialists never put their money where their mouth is. Nobody thinks his daughter is just molecules in motion and nothing but; nobody thinks the Holocaust was evil, but only in a relative, provisional sense. A materialist who lived his life according to his professed convictions—understanding himself to have no moral agency at all, seeing his friends and enemies and family as genetically determined robots—wouldn’t just be a materialist: He’d be a psychopath. https://www.sott.net/article/260160-The-Heretic-Who-is-Thomas-Nagel-and-why-are-so-many-of-his-fellow-academics-condemning-him

In short, and as Dogdoc himself gives evidence to in this very thread, Darwinian atheists are simply incapable of living their lives consistently as if their Darwinian worldview were actually true. Don't take my word for it, many leading Darwinists themselves have honestly admitted that they are incapable of living their lives as if they actually had no free will, and/or moral agency.

Darwin's Robots: When Evolutionary Materialists Admit that Their Own Worldview Fails - Nancy Pearcey - April 23, 2015 Excerpt: Even materialists often admit that, in practice, it is impossible for humans to live any other way. One philosopher jokes that if people deny free will, then when ordering at a restaurant they should say, "Just bring me whatever the laws of nature have determined I will get." An especially clear example is Galen Strawson, a philosopher who states with great bravado, "The impossibility of free will ... can be proved with complete certainty." Yet in an interview, Strawson admits that, in practice, no one accepts his deterministic view. "To be honest, I can't really accept it myself," he says. "I can't really live with this fact from day to day. Can you, really?",,, In What Science Offers the Humanities, Edward Slingerland, identifies himself as an unabashed materialist and reductionist. Slingerland argues that Darwinian materialism leads logically to the conclusion that humans are robots -- that our sense of having a will or self or consciousness is an illusion. Yet, he admits, it is an illusion we find impossible to shake. No one "can help acting like and at some level really feeling that he or she is free." We are "constitutionally incapable of experiencing ourselves and other conspecifics [humans] as robots." One section in his book is even titled "We Are Robots Designed Not to Believe That We Are Robots.",,, When I teach these concepts in the classroom, an example my students find especially poignant is Flesh and Machines by Rodney Brooks, professor emeritus at MIT. Brooks writes that a human being is nothing but a machine -- a "big bag of skin full of biomolecules" interacting by the laws of physics and chemistry. In ordinary life, of course, it is difficult to actually see people that way. But, he says, "When I look at my children, I can, when I force myself, ... see that they are machines." Is that how he treats them, though? Of course not: "That is not how I treat them.... I interact with them on an entirely different level. They have my unconditional love, the furthest one might be able to get from rational analysis." Certainly if what counts as "rational" is a materialist worldview in which humans are machines, then loving your children is irrational. It has no basis within Brooks's worldview. It sticks out of his box. How does he reconcile such a heart-wrenching cognitive dissonance? He doesn't. Brooks ends by saying, "I maintain two sets of inconsistent beliefs." He has given up on any attempt to reconcile his theory with his experience. He has abandoned all hope for a unified, logically consistent worldview. http://www.evolutionnews.org/2015/04/when_evolutiona095451.html

Richard Dawkins himself stated that it would be quote-unquote "intolerable' for him to live his life as if people had no moral agency, and that they were not responsible for their actions,

Who wrote Richard Dawkins’s new book? – October 28, 2006 Excerpt: Dawkins: What I do know is that what it feels like to me, and I think to all of us, we don't feel determined. We feel like blaming people for what they do or giving people the credit for what they do. We feel like admiring people for what they do.,,, Manzari: But do you personally see that as an inconsistency in your views? Dawkins: I sort of do. Yes. But it is an inconsistency that we sort of have to live with otherwise life would be intolerable. http://www.evolutionnews.org/2006/10/who_wrote_richard_dawkinss_new002783.html

In what should be needless to say, if it is impossible for a person to live consistently as if their atheistic worldview were actually true, then their atheistic worldview cannot possibly reflect reality as it really is but their atheistic worldview must instead be based on a delusion.

Existential Argument against Atheism - November 1, 2013 by Jason Petersen 1. If a worldview is true then you should be able to live consistently with that worldview. 2. Atheists are unable to live consistently with their worldview. 3. If you can’t live consistently with an atheist worldview then the worldview does not reflect reality. 4. If a worldview does not reflect reality then that worldview is a delusion. 5. If atheism is a delusion then atheism cannot be true. Conclusion: Atheism is false. - per answers for hope

In conclusion, in posts 11-13, (which Dogdoc did not find "enjoyable' to read), I shortly laid out the case for why the denial of free will is irrational and unscientific. And even briefly touched upon the fact that rightly recognizing Intelligent causation and legitimate form of causation in science solves many outstanding problems in science.,,, Dogdoc just complained that my posts were not 'enjoyable' for him to read, and did not present any scientific evidence whatsoever to the contrary. Moreover, in this very thread, Dogdoc's self refuting claim that we have no free will, and yet his acting as if we actually do have free will, (especially when he implored me to not act like a mindless search engine), only buttresses and solidifies my claim that the denial of free will is an irrational position to hold In short, Dogdoc has not refuted, but has only further solidified, my claim that free will is a real and tangible part of reality. So thus, given that I hold that it is obvious that Dogdoc has free will in a real and meaningful sense, might I also implore Dogdoc, as he did me, to not act like a search engine, but to meaningfully contemplate these things and to then act, and/or choose, appropriately?

Deuteronomy 30:19 This day I call the heavens and the earth as witnesses against you that I have set before you life and death, blessings and curses. Now choose life, so that you and your children may live. John 11:25 Jesus said to her, ‘I am the resurrection and the life. The one who believes in me will live, even though they die."

bornagain77

Dogdoc, Do you internally experience a causal gap between "reasons" and an actualized choice? I don't mean a time delay, I mean a gap in terms of directly experiencing the fact that you can do and can not do that thing? I ask because I personally, directly experience that gap. I am always aware that the reasons I have are not causal - meaning, they cannot force me to take any action. There is always a gap there. However, I wonder if this is something that a large number of people do not experience, because they behave as if there is no gap, as if the reasons do actually force them into their individually programmed behavioral patterns. William J Murray

Querius @35,

Ok, so you don’t believe in any God or gods. You still DO believe in absolutes, in this case that dogfighting competitions are wrong for anyone to engage in.

I think we're not being clear about what you mean by "absolutes". My beliefs against dogfighting are steadfast and unwavering, so if that's what you mean then yes I believe in absolutes. I do not believe that my beliefs are transcendent, or that they derive from a transcendent being.

But, if perception is your ultimate authority,...

I've not referred at all to "authority". I am compelled by my moral sense, but whatever legal authority is involved is derived from social interactions, not by gods. As for moral authority, that is a claim that my perception is accurate and those who disagree have faulty perceptions, just like I would say about someone who claims the sky is green.

...we do know that there are people with different perceptions–dogfight competitions EXIST and the people engaging in this horrible activity derive pleasure from it.

Yes of course that is true. It has always been true and will always be true. A great majority of people share my moral sense, but not everyone.

So under what authority can you judge dogfighting enthusiasts?

See above.

How can you put your own perception above anyone else’s perception?

What do you mean? I participate in society, and condemn and take action against people who mistreat animals. I reject their moral sense, and they reject mine, and it is as clear to me as the sky is blue (literally) that my moral sense is correct and theirs is faulty.

Are you advocating that if the majority of people in a region enjoy such an event (I’m thinking of bullfights and cockfights that do EXIST), does it make the activity into “good, clean fun?”

Again, I recoil in horror from all such activity, so of course I would not advocate allowing it to proceed in any region no matter who was in favor of it.

I think you’re trying to maintain moral relativism while simultaneously asserting absolutes.

Not in the least. (see above regarding the meaning of "absolutes").

While that might satisfy you, it’s simply not logical.

What have I said that is not logical?

And speaking of illogical, you’re presenting me with an impossible hypothetical about Jesus.

You object that my counterfactual is unimaginable because Jesus wouldn't ever condone animal abuse. But what if there were no Bible passages explicitly dealing with animal abuse? How would you know that Jesus was against it? Because animal abuse is wrong and Jesus wouldn't advocate doing anything wrong? (yes, it's just the Euthyphro dilemma).

Remember, dogfighting competitions do EXIST in fact and the poor animals get torn up and killed.

I've not forgotten. dogdoc

Origenes @34, Your rational choices must be based on your beliefs and desires, but you can't possibly be the ultimate author of your beliefs and desires, because in order to rationally choose your beliefs and desires you must already have your beliefs and desires. It's a simple argument, but you still don't understand it. That's not because you are a moron, it's because it undermines too many of your cognitive commitments. It is that to which you truly have allegiance - your existing belief structures. dogdoc

Dogdoc @ ,AnimatedDust @32

DD: I’m fairly sure you don’t understand Hofstadter’s viewpoint, and even more certain you don’t understand his intelligence.

I understand his viewpoint perfectly. It is a viewpoint located well outside the realm of rationality. If someone says: "I am an illusion, I am 'a strange loop', I am, in fact, 'a myriad infinitesimal entities and the invisible chemical transactions taking place among them'", then this person has departed from the realm of rationality. That's ok. Everyone is free to do so. I have no problem with that at all. But PLEASE do not ask me to take such a person (moron) seriously. I have zero respect for the opinions of "illusions" and/or the opinions of "chemical transactions." Absolutely ZERO. - - - - AnimatedDust @32

I vote moron. And I am in my 60s.

Also in my 60s, and I also vote moron. :) Origenes

Dogdoc @26,

First, divine commands are defined as absolute, not empirically observed. (I do not believe that divine commands exist). Second, divine commands are no more absolute than perceptions, because they can vary from god to god.

You're still evading my question. Ok, so you don't believe in any God or gods. You still DO believe in absolutes, in this case that dogfighting competitions are wrong for anyone to engage in. But, if perception is your ultimate authority, we do know that there are people with different perceptions--dogfight competitions EXIST and the people engaging in this horrible activity derive pleasure from it. So under what authority can you judge dogfighting enthusiasts? How can you put your own perception above anyone else's perception? Are you advocating that if the majority of people in a region enjoy such an event (I'm thinking of bullfights and cockfights that do EXIST), does it make the activity into "good, clean fun?" I think you're trying to maintain moral relativism while simultaneously asserting absolutes. While that might satisfy you, it's simply not logical. And speaking of illogical, you're presenting me with an impossible hypothetical about Jesus. What if 1 + 1 = 3 or light is darkness? What if LISP code with unequal left and right parens actually ran, or if divide-by-zero expressions evaluated to the numerator? If a premise of an argument is wrong, the conclusion based on it is invalid. Remember, dogfighting competitions do EXIST in fact and the poor animals get torn up and killed. The command you're suggesting that Jesus hypothetically makes to me DOES NOT EXIST in fact--and won't without self-contradiction. -Q Querius

~ Dogdoc’s argument against free will ~

The reasons for our actions derive from the way we are, and we cannot freely choose the way we are because our choices depend on the way we are.

Dogdoc, to what is your allegiance? Think about it. Let me tell you about my allegiance to truth and rationality. This is what I understand: I must be free in order to be rational. I must be in full control of my thoughts, or else I am not rational. Specifically, my understanding of things must originate purely from me. Understanding something must be entirely my effort. If there is an alien source (or co-source) of my understanding, if something other than me, something beyond my control, induces in me the false notion that I understand something, then I do not understand anything, and I am not rational and all is lost. Finally, should I even mention that in order for me to be rational it can also not be the case that my "I" is an illusion? If my demands are incompatible with physicalism, and they surely are, then so be it. Unlike others, I do not owe physicalism anything. Origenes

I vote moron. And I am in my 60s.

Physically perhaps :-) dogdoc

“What is an "I", and why are such things found (at least so far) only in association with, as poet Russell Edson once wonderfully phrased it, "teetering bulbs of dread and dream" -- that is, only in association with certain kinds of gooey lumps encased in hard protective shells mounted atop mobile pedestals that roam the world on pairs of slightly fuzzy, jointed stilts?” “I would like to understand things better, but I don’t want to understand them perfectly.” “For now, what is important is not finding the answer, but looking for it.” “My feeling is that the concept of superrationality is one whose truth will come to dominate among intelligent beings in the universe simply because its adherents will survive certain kinds of situations where its opponents will perish. Let’s wait a few spins of the galaxy and see. After all, healthy logic is whatever remains after evolution’s merciless pruning.” I had never heard of Hofstadter before this thread. I vote moron. And I am in my 60s. AnimatedDust

Origenes @30,

According to the moron Douglas R. Hofstadter the “I” is a grand illusion.

You think Hofstadter is a moron. My guess is you are a relatively young person. As one grows older and (hopefully) gains wisdom, you realize that when people see things differently it is often not because they are stupid (and often because you haven't actually understood their viewpoint). For example, when I was very young I thought anyone who believed in something as ridiculous as a human-like god who knows each human on Earth had to be utterly moronic. By the time I was twenty I recognized that it was me who was being ridiculous, and religious people could be quite brilliant. I didn't change my mind about the existence of anthropomorphic dieties; I changed my mind about ascribing such beliefs to stupidity. I'm fairly sure you don't understand Hofstadter's viewpoint, and even more certain you don't understand his intelligence. In the OP in this thread was a common accusation: Anyone who disbelieves in free will is stupid, and this is evidenced by the fact that they try to convince others they are correct. As I pointed out, whatever one thinks of free will and determinism, this particular argument is obviously silly (once you posit determinism, the answer to why people argue for determinism is because they are causally determined to do so). But the worse error is to think that all of the people who have studied and written on the topic against free will would make some mistake that any child (or presumptuous internet poster) can instantly see using nothing but common sense. Likewise with those who argue that consciousness is an illusion. It is a far more subtle argument than you make this out to be. I do not subscribe to that view (I believe conscious awareness is mysterious and wanting of explanation), but I do believe that we have illusions regarding how we make choices (as has been illustrated in experiments by Daniel Wegner and others). I do not believe that consciousness is causal, but rather it is perceptual. And I'm not a moron :-) dogdoc

DogDoc

If you’re not familiar with Douglas Hofstadter (and his wonderful book Godel Escher Bach) I’d recommend him to you – he believes something similar to what you’re expressing – that consciousness arises via “strange loops” of recursion.

PM1: Loved that book. That was my first encounter with the ideas of recursion and feedback loops, which have been central to my thinking ever since.

According to the moron Douglas R. Hofstadter the “I” is a grand illusion.

"You make decisions, take actions, affect the world, receive feedback from the world, incorporate it into yourself, then the updated 'you' makes more decisions, and so forth, round and round," (...) "anatomically invisible, terribly murky thing called I." (...) "In the soft, ethereal, neurology-free world of these players, the typical human brain perceives its very own 'I' as a pusher and a mover, never entertaining for a moment the idea that its star player might merely be a useful shorthand standing for a myriad infinitesimal entities and the invisible chemical transactions taking place among them." [ I AM A STRANGE LOOP, by Douglas R. Hofstadter]

I may have mentioned it before. The idea that the “I” is an illusion is one of the dumbest ideas ever. As the great Bill Vallicella wrote:

Consciousness cannot be an illusion for the simple reason that we presuppose it when we distinguish between reality and illusion.  An illusion is an illusion to consciousness, so that if there were no consciousness there would be no illusions either.

And that’s all you need to know. That’s it. There is nothing to add. Shame on DogDoc for promoting this nonsense! No blame falls on PM1, he simply doesn’t understand these issues. Origenes

Origenes @27

When Aquinas wrote “Liber est Causa Sui”, he did not mean that a free man creates himself, instead, he meant that a free man causes his own movement.

I was using the term in a modern sense, a la Nietzsche or Strawson.

Again, that’s not the only meaning. And when you used the term causa sui you were not talking about a person who brings himself into existence. You were talking about, self-relationship; a person controlling himself; self-control.

Nope, I meant that the reasons for our actions derive from the way we are, and we cannot choose the way we are because our choices depend on the way we are.

Here is your argument against free will...

That is not my argument. I guess you forgot our long previous conversation about this. Once again, as simple as I can make it without you misconstruing it: The reasons for our actions derive from the way we are, and we cannot freely choose the way we are because our choices depend on the way we are. dogdoc

PyrrhoManiac1@25

My background is mostly in epistemology and philosophy of mind (esp the grumpy Germans), lately I’ve been getting very interested in philosophy of cognitive science and theoretical biology, so philosophy of AI was not far behind.

Very cool! Just as quantum physics professionals weren't often interested in foundations and interpretations, my AI colleagues had little interest in philosophy of mind. Thank you for the book references, I will definitely check them out! I completely agree that we have no idea how our minds work, although I confess I was shocked the first time I played with ChatGPT. GOFAI failed spectacularly (though it was fun trying), and I've been waiting decades for something to pass the Turing test, and now it's arguably passed and all people can talk about are AI's limitations and dangers (both obviously vitally important to understand but still...) There may be something in deep nets that hint at how some of our cognition works; if I was young I'd work in integrating symbolic reasoning with connectionist models. dogdoc

DogDoc @23

Causa sui does not refer to self-propulsion ...

When Aquinas wrote “Liber est Causa Sui”, he did not mean that a free man creates himself, instead, he meant that a free man causes his own movement. So, causa sui (self-causation) does refer to self-movement, or more generally self-relationship (self-organization, self-control, self-sustainment, self-observance), and certainly in the context of free will discussion.

...it refers to “something being the cause of itself”. It is logically impossible because in order for A to cause A to come into existence, it must already exist.

Again, that’s not the only meaning. And when you used the term causa sui you were not talking about a person who brings himself into existence. You were talking about, self-relationship; a person controlling himself; self-control.

DD: …. but that doesn’t mean each individual doesn’t control their own actions. It’s just that the word “control” here does not imply causa sui, which is impossible.

- - - - -

DD: Calling something “magic” is not the same as saying it is unexplained.

Claiming that some event occurs without any reason, without any cause, as a definitive judgment .... Saying: "This is an undetermined event [end of all analysis]" is in my view no different than saying: "This is **magic**."

DD: Yes I believe that we have no single, compelling interpretation of what is going in quantum physics. And as PyrrhoManiac pointed out, the whole notion of causality is quite problematic. This is why my argument against free will does not talk about causality at all, but rather only reason-responsiveness.

Here is your argument against free will, which you claim “does not talk about causality at all”:

DD: Modern physics does not include contra-causal mental powers, but neither does it assume deterministic causality. Libertarian free will is incoherent (on what basis could an uncaused will make decisions?) but not because of determinism.

Origenes

Querius@9,

In @1, you asserted that Good and evil are perceptions, not divine commands. So, I asked myself, “How are perceptions different than divine commands?” A reasonable answer is that perceptions vary from person to person, but divine commands are absolute.

First, divine commands are defined as absolute, not empirically observed. (I do not believe that divine commands exist). Second, divine commands are no more absolute than perceptions, because they can vary from god to god.

Thus, I can see why you squirmed so much when I pressed you on the issue to cruelty of animals.

Um, no, I didn't squirm at all. Believe me, I really have no ambivalence at all about my feelings regarding cruelty to animals.

Thankfully, you agree that such behavior is an absolute, and not relative to the perception of the person after all!

You are misreading just about everything I'm saying. Again: Our moral sense manifests as a perception, like a sense perception. Just as we are generally unable to consciously choose what color to see when we look at the sky, we are unable to consciously choose whether or not we see animal abuse as wrong. Most people see the sky as blue, and most people see torture of animals as wrong.

Your hypothetically “lost chapter” would be completely out of character with the other scriptures and a fraud.

Now who's squirming? What if Jesus Himself appeared to you and told you that cruelty to animals was a wholesome and pleasant pastime that you should enjoy with your family? I'm not saying He would, I'm presenting a counterfactual conditional to expose the fact that your moral sense is independent of what you find in religious texts.

So considering your absolute stance on cruelty inflicted on dogs and puppies (I bet you’ve seen some heart-wrenching cases), my follow-up question is, “What other actions fall into your absolute category?”

Yes, cases of animal neglect and abuse seem even more despicable because (like child abuse) the victims are so innocent. As for what other things I would put in the same category, the list is long of course, and I'm quite certain it would align quite closely with yours. But I don't think it's because there is a god who tells us what is right or wrong, any more than we see a blue sky because God says it's blue. dogdoc

mind! Started programming in LISP as a result and had a 35year career in AI.

Interesting. My background is mostly in epistemology and philosophy of mind (esp the grumpy Germans), lately I've been getting very interested in philosophy of cognitive science and theoretical biology, so philosophy of AI was not far behind. Lately I've read Mitchell's Artificial Intelligence: A Guide for Thinking Humans (she's a Hofstadter student and it shows!), Larson's The Myth of Artificial Intelligence, and Cantwell Smith's The Promise of Artificial Intelligence. All three seem to agree that real-world AI is fascinating, potentially disruptive, potentially helpful, but that there's no discernible path from real-world AIs like Watson or AlphaZero to AGI. AGI would require a really profound transformation in our understanding of what intelligence is, and we have no idea what that would even look like. PyrrhoManiac1

Docdoc @9, In @1, you asserted that

Good and evil are perceptions, not divine commands.

So, I asked myself, “How are perceptions different than divine commands?” A reasonable answer is that perceptions vary from person to person, but divine commands are absolute. Thus, I can see why you squirmed so much when I pressed you on the issue to cruelty of animals. Thankfully, you agree that such behavior is an absolute, and not relative to the perception of the person after all!

If scholars found a lost chapter of the Bible which showed that God wants you to torture puppies for your pleasure, my guess is that you would still perceive that act as abhorrent.

Your hypothetically “lost chapter” would be completely out of character with the other scriptures and a fraud.

The righteous care for the needs of their animals, but the kindest acts of the wicked are cruel. – Proverbs 12:10

Many such attempts have already been exposed on the basis of a chain of custody and several types of internal and external inconsistencies (historical linguistics, materials used, context, style, etc.). So considering your absolute stance on cruelty inflicted on dogs and puppies (I bet you’ve seen some heart-wrenching cases), my follow-up question is, “What other actions fall into your absolute category?” -Q Querius

Origenes @21

DD: causa sui is logically impossible. So, something cannot cause itself to move. If something moves it must be due to an external cause.

Frustrating, yes. Causa sui does not refer to self-propulsion, it refers to "something being the cause of itself". It is logically impossible because in order for A to cause A to come into existence, it must already exist. It relates to free will in that free will requires that one freely chooses the way one is, but in order to do that one must already be the way one is.

So, what is the cause then? Or is it completely unexplained? As in POOF**Magic** ?

Calling something "magic" is not the same as saying it is unexplained. Yes I believe that we have no single, compelling interpretation of what is going in quantum physics. And as PyrrhoManiac pointed out, the whole notion of causality is quite problematic. This is why my argument against free will does not talk about causality at all, but rather only reason-responsiveness. dogdoc

PyrrhoManiac1@20,

Right, but quantum mechanics is still deterministic in its own way: the Schrodinger equation is fully deterministic, in that it gives exact values for each probability. It just doesn’t tell you which of those probabilities will be observed!

That's right, and why I said "not deterministic in the way Newtonian physics is." (BTW there are still fully deterministic interpretations of QM).

Interestingly enough, some physicists have argued that causality is not fundamental but emerges from deeper structures — and Bertrand Russell suggested doing away with it altogether, as far as physics goes!

Yes, and Hume before that.

Loved that book. That was my first encounter with the ideas of recursion and feedback loops, which have been central to my thinking ever since.

Yes, I had poorly-formed intuitions about recursion, self-reference, etc, then found the book and it blew my mind! Started programming in LISP as a result and had a 35year career in AI.

I think you’re making the mistake of anthopomorphizing BA77.

Hahahaha dogdoc

// A frustrating conversation with DogDoc //

DD: causa sui is logically impossible.

So, something cannot cause itself to move. If something moves it must be due to an external cause.

I do not believe every event has an external cause.

Ori: An undetermined event has no external cause, so what is it if not causa sui?

DD: It is undetermined.

An undetermined event has no external cause, AND, according to you, it does not cause itself. So, what is the cause then? Or is it completely unexplained? As in POOF**Magic** ? Do you not see a problem with that?

DD: I have no trouble with undetermined events.

I guess not. Well, that’s good to know. Good day sir. Origenes

I don’t think physics assumes anything about causality per se. Rather, it describes observable regularities in nature and attempts to build models that predict and explain them. But obviously quantum physics is not deterministic in the way Newtonian physics is.

Right, but quantum mechanics is still deterministic in its own way: the Schrodinger equation is fully deterministic, in that it gives exact values for each probability. It just doesn't tell you which of those probabilities will be observed! Interestingly enough, some physicists have argued that causality is not fundamental but emerges from deeper structures -- and Bertrand Russell suggested doing away with it altogether, as far as physics goes!

If you’re not familiar with Douglas Hofstadter (and his wonderful book Godel Escher Bach) I’d recommend him to you – he believes something similar to what you’re expressing – that consciousness arises via “strange loops” of recursion.

Loved that book. That was my first encounter with the ideas of recursion and feedback loops, which have been central to my thinking ever since.

The debates on this site would be so much more enjoyable without you filling up every page with your endless copypasta, almost all of which is nonresponsive to the arguments being made! You’re like a search engine that regurgitates reams of output based on a few keywords. Instead, try reading what people write and responding to it yourself!

I think you're making the mistake of anthopomorphizing BA77. It may produce text similar to what a person would produce, but it's more like ChatGPT -- a neural net that's been trained to post the same texts over and over again. I doubt it could pass the Turing test. PyrrhoManiac1

Dogdoc @

You are assuming the existence of a self that has causal powers, but I don’t think there is a self that exists independently of the person.

A self that exists independently of the person? What on earth are you talking about? Origenes

BA77, The debates on this site would be so much more enjoyable without you filling up every page with your endless copypasta, almost all of which is nonresponsive to the arguments being made! You're like a search engine that regurgitates reams of output based on a few keywords. Instead, try reading what people write and responding to it yourself! dogdoc

WJM @15,

Reasons are not causes

There is much to debate regarding what constitutes a reason, but still, most reasons are causes. In any case this is why my argument against ultimate free will refers only to reasons and not to causes. dogdoc

Origenes, I mistakenly responded to Querius about the first point rather than you:

What types of causality does modern physics assume?

I don’t think physics assumes anything about causality per se. Rather, it describes observable regularities in nature and attempts to build models that predict and explain them. But obviously quantum physics is not deterministic in the way Newtonian physics is. Then @10:

Is your point that there are undetermined physical events not describable by laws of physics? If so, can you explain their relevance to free will?

Depends on what you mean by "free will". And @14:

You seem to say that “uncaused will” is an incoherent concept. I suppose you mean that self-caused will is an incoherent concept. Elsewhere you write that causa sui is “impossible.”

Yes, as I made clear in a very long thread a little while ago, that is what I mean, and yes causa sui is required for the sort of free will I think most people intuit they have, and yes causa sui is logically impossible.

First, I note that in your view there is also a problem with the concept of an undetermined event, which you seem to accept in the context of quantum mechanics.

No, I have no trouble with undetermined events - I was pointing out that modern physics is not deterministic.

An undetermined event has no external cause, so what is it if not causa sui?

It is undetermined.

Second, if you are correct and causa sui is impossible if every event has an external cause, we run into the incoherence of an infinite causal regress.

I do not believe every event has an external cause.

Would you agree with me that self-awareness is a case of causa sui?

No, I don't think we understand what causes self-awareness. You are assuming the existence of a self that has causal powers, but I don't think there is a self that exists independently of the person. If you're not familiar with Douglas Hofstadter (and his wonderful book Godel Escher Bach) I'd recommend him to you - he believes something similar to what you're expressing - that consciousness arises via "strange loops" of recursion. dogdoc

Libertarian free will is incoherent (on what basis could an uncaused will make decisions?

Reasons are not causes. William J Murray

DogDoc

Libertarian free will is incoherent (on what basis could an uncaused will make decisions?) but not because of determinism.

You seem to say that “uncaused will” is an incoherent concept. I suppose you mean that self-caused will is an incoherent concept. Elsewhere you write that causa sui is “impossible.” Some comments: First, I note that in your view there is also a problem with the concept of an undetermined event, which you seem to accept in the context of quantum mechanics. An undetermined event has no external cause, so what is it if not causa sui? Second, if you are correct and causa sui is impossible if every event has an external cause, we run into the incoherence of an infinite causal regress. Lastly, an example of what I consider to be a case of causa sui. The self observes the self and self-awareness follows. Without self-observation, there is no self-awareness. Put differently, the self, by observing itself, causes its self-awareness. Would you agree with me that self-awareness is a case of causa sui? Origenes

And now Anton Zeilinger and company have closed the last remaining setting independence and/or ‘freedom of choice’ loophole.

Cosmic Bell Test Using Random Measurement Settings from High-Redshift Quasars – Anton Zeilinger – 14 June 2018 Excerpt: This experiment pushes back to at least approx. 7.8 Gyr ago the most recent time by which any local-realist influences could have exploited the “freedom-of-choice” loophole to engineer the observed Bell violation, excluding any such mechanism from 96% of the space-time volume of the past light cone of our experiment, extending from the big bang to today. https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevLett.121.080403

As Anton Zeilinger stated in an interview, "what we perceive as reality now depends on our earlier decision what to measure. Which is a very, very, deep message about the nature of reality and our part in the whole universe. We are not just passive observers.”

“The Kochen-Speckter Theorem talks about properties of one system only. So we know that we cannot assume – to put it precisely, we know that it is wrong to assume that the features of a system, which we observe in a measurement exist prior to measurement. Not always. I mean in certain cases. So in a sense, what we perceive as reality now depends on our earlier decision what to measure. Which is a very, very, deep message about the nature of reality and our part in the whole universe. We are not just passive observers.” Anton Zeilinger – Quantum Physics Debunks Materialism – video (7:17 minute mark) https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=4C5pq7W5yRM#t=437

Thus regardless of how Steven Weinberg and other atheists may prefer the universe to behave, with the closing of the last remaining ‘freedom of choice’ loophole in quantum mechanics, “humans are (indeed) brought into the laws of nature at the most fundamental level”, and thus these recent findings from quantum mechanics directly undermine, as Weinberg himself honestly admitted, the “vision that became possible after Darwin, of a world governed by impersonal physical laws that control human behavior along with everything else.” Moreover, when we rightly allow the Agent causality of God ‘back’ into physics, (as the Christian founders of modern science originally held with the presupposition of ‘contingency’), and as quantum mechanics itself now empirically demands with the closing of the “freedom-of-choice” loophole by Anton Zeilinger and company), then rightly allowing the Agent causality of God ‘back’ into physics provides us with a very plausible resolution for the much sought after ‘theory of everything’ in that Christ’s resurrection from the dead bridges the infinite mathematical divide that exists between General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics and provides us with an empirically backed reconciliation, via the Shroud of Turin, between Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity into the much sought after ‘Theory of Everything”

Oct. 2022 – And although there will never be a purely mathematical ‘theory of everything’ that bridges the infinite mathematical divide that exists between quantum mechanics and general relativity, all hope is not lost in finding the correct ‘theory of everything’.,,,, https://uncommondescent.com/cosmology/from-iai-news-how-infinity-threatens-cosmology/#comment-766384

Verse:

Colossians 1:15-20 The Son is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn over all creation. For in him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things have been created through him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all things hold together. And he is the head of the body, the church; he is the beginning and the firstborn from among the dead, so that in everything he might have the supremacy. For God was pleased to have all his fullness dwell in him, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether things on earth or things in heaven, by making peace through his blood, shed on the cross.

All in all, when we rightly, (and sanely I might add), recognize free will, agent causation, and/or intelligent causation, as legitimate form of causation in science, the many outstanding, seemingly irresolvable, problems in science find ready solutions. Whereas, on the other hand, denying the reality of free will, agent causation, and/or intelligent causation, as a legitimate form of causation in science creates situations where, as George Ellis pointed out, “we will have instances of uncaused changes in the world; I presume we wish to avoid that situation.,,,”

Recognising Top-Down Causation – George Ellis Excerpt: Causation: The nature of causation is highly contested territory, and I will take a pragmatic view: Definition 1: Causal Effect If making a change in a quantity X results in a reliable demonstrable change in a quantity Y in a given context, then X has a causal effect on Y. Example: I press the key labelled “A” on my computer keyboard; the letter “A” appears on my computer screen.,,, Definition 2: Existence If Y is a physical entity made up of ordinary matter, and X is some kind of entity that has a demonstrable causal effect on Y as per Definition 1, then we must acknowledge that X also exists (even if it is not made up of such matter). This is clearly a sensible and testable criterion; in the example above, it leads to the conclusion that both the data and the relevant software exist. If we do not adopt this definition, we will have instances of uncaused changes in the world; I presume we wish to avoid that situation.,,, Excerpt: page 5: A: Both the program and the data are non-physical entities, indeed so is all software. A program is not a physical thing you can point to, but by Definition 2 it certainly exists. You can point to a CD or flashdrive where it is stored, but that is not the thing in itself: it is a medium in which it is stored. The program itself is an abstract entity, shaped by abstract logic. Is the software “nothing but” its realisation through a specific set of stored electronic states in the computer memory banks? No it is not because it is the precise pattern in those states that matters: a higher level relation that is not apparent at the scale of the electrons themselves. It’s a relational thing (and if you get the relations between the symbols wrong, so you have a syntax error, it will all come to a grinding halt). This abstract nature of software is realised in the concept of virtual machines, which occur at every level in the computer hierarchy except the bottom one [17]. But this tower of virtual machines causes physical effects in the real world, for example when a computer controls a robot in an assembly line to create physical artefacts. Excerpt page 7:,,, The mind is not a physical entity, but it certainly is causally effective: proof is the existence of the computer on which you are reading this text. It could not exist if it had not been designed and manufactured according to someone’s plans, thereby proving the causal efficacy of thoughts, which like computer programs and data are not physical entities. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1212.2275.pdf

In short, and in conclusion, the denial of agent causality, intelligent causation, and/or free will, as a legitimate form of causation by Atheistic Naturalists, is the primary, and fatal flaw, in their worldview. A fatal flaw that, contrary to whatever they may erroneously believe otherwise, prevents their worldview from ever being a truly 'scientific' worldview in the first place.

1 Thessalonians 5:21 but test all things. Hold fast to what is good.

bornagain77

In fact, an essential presupposition that lay at the founding of modern science in medieval Christian Europe was the belief in 'contingency'. Which is to say, the Christian founders of modern science did not believe that the universe had a 'necessary' existence, (as the Ancient Greek philosophers were prone to believe), but instead the Christian founders of modern science believed that the universe is 'contingent' upon the will of God for its existence, i.e. the universe 'could have been otherwise'.'

“Science in its modern form arose in the Western civilization alone, among all the cultures of the world”, because only the Christian West possessed the necessary “intellectual presuppositions”. – Ian Barbour Presupposition 1: The contingency of nature “In 1277, the Etienne Tempier, the bishop of Paris, writing with support of Pope John XXI, condemned “necessarian theology” and 219 separate theses influenced by Greek philosophy about what God could and couldn’t do.”,, “The order in nature could have been otherwise (therefore) the job of the natural philosopher, (i.e. scientist), was not to ask what God must have done but (to ask) what God actually did.” Presupposition 2: The intelligibility of nature “Modern science was inspired by the conviction that the universe is the product of a rational mind who designed it to be understood and who (also) designed the human mind to understand it.” (i.e. human exceptionalism), “God created us in his own image so that we could share in his own thoughts” – Johannes Kepler Presupposition 3: Human Fallibility “Humans are vulnerable to self-deception, flights of fancy, and jumping to conclusions.”, (i.e. original sin), Scientists must therefore employ “systematic experimental methods.” (Francis Bacon’s championing of inductive reasoning over and above the deductive reasoning of the ancient Greeks) – Stephen Meyer on Intelligent Design and The Return of the God Hypothesis – Hoover Institution https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z_8PPO-cAlA

As Sir Isaac Newton, the father of modern physics, himself stated, ‘Without all doubt this world...could arise from nothing but the perfectly free will of God... From this fountain (what) we call the laws of nature have flowed, in which there appear many traces indeed of the most wise contrivance, but not the least shadow of necessity. These therefore we must not seek from uncertain conjectures, but learn them from observations and experiments."

Is Krauss Right? Isaac Newton Does Not Think So - 2013 Excerpt: ‘Without all doubt this world...could arise from nothing but the perfectly free will of God... From this fountain (what) we call the laws of nature have flowed, in which there appear many traces indeed of the most wise contrivance, but not the least shadow of necessity. These therefore we must not seek from uncertain conjectures, but learn them from observations and experiments.",,, - Sir Isaac Newton - (Cited from Religion and the Rise of Modern Science by Hooykaas page 49). https://thirdspace.org.au/comment/237

And indeed the essential Christian presupposition of 'contingency', i.e. that the universe is dependent upon the will of God who called it into being, has now been born out empirically. Namely, evidence from Big Bang cosmology, and General Relativity, have now both shown that the entire material universe had a definite beginning. Moreover, besides a transcendent beginning to the entire material universe, evidence from quantum mechanics has now shown that the universe is also dependent on a non-local, i.e. a transcendent, beyond space and time, cause for its continual existence. As the following article notes, “Our result gives weight to the idea that quantum correlations somehow arise from outside spacetime, in the sense that no story in space and time can describe them,”

Looking beyond space and time to cope with quantum theory – 28 October 2012 Excerpt: “Our result gives weight to the idea that quantum correlations somehow arise from outside spacetime, in the sense that no story in space and time can describe them,” https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/10/121028142217.htm

And as Anton Zeilinger stated towards the end of his 2022 Nobel prize lecture, "These predictions (of quantum mechanics) are completely independent of the relative arrangements of measurements in space and time. That tells you something about the role of space and time. There’s no role at all.”,,,

“There’s one important message I want to say here. When you look at the predictions of quantum mechanics for multi-particle entanglement,, so you could have one measurement here, one (measurement) there, an earlier (measurement), a later (measurement), and so on. These predictions (of quantum mechanics) are completely independent of the relative arrangements of measurements in space and time. That tells you something about the role of space and time. There’s no role at all.”,,, – Anton Zeilinger – 2022 Nobel Prize lectures in physics – video (1:50:07 mark) https://youtu.be/a9FsKqvrJNY?t=6607 Alain Aspect: From Einstein’s doubts to quantum technologies: non-locality a fruitful image John F. Clauser: Experimental proof that nonlocal quantum entanglement is real Anton Zeilinger: A Voyage through Quantum Wonderland – Alain Aspect, John F. Clauser and Anton Zeilinger were awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics 2022 “for experiments with entangled photons, establishing the violation of Bell inequalities and pioneering quantum information science”.

Darwinists, with their reductive materialistic framework, and especially with the falsification of 'hidden variables', simply have no beyond space and time cause that they can appeal so as to be able to explain the non-local quantum coherence and/or entanglement.

Not So Real - Sheldon Lee Glashow - Oct. 2018 Excerpt: In 1959, John Stewart Bell deduced his eponymous theorem: that no system of hidden variables can reproduce all of the consequences of quantum theory. In particular, he deduced an inequality pertinent to observations of an entangled system consisting of two separated particles. If experimental results contradicted Bell’s inequality, hidden-variable models could be ruled out. Experiments of this kind seemed difficult or impossible to carry out. But, in 1972, Alain Aspect succeeded. His results contradicted Bell’s inequality. The predictions of quantum mechanics were confirmed and the principle of local realism challenged. Ever more precise tests of Bell’s inequality and its extension by John Clauser et al. continue to be performed,14 including an experiment involving pairs of photons coming from different distant quasars. Although a few tiny loopholes may remain, all such tests to date have confirmed that quantum theory is incompatible with the existence of local hidden variables. Most physicists have accepted the failure of Einstein’s principle of local realism. https://inference-review.com/article/not-so-real

Whereas on the other hand, the Christian Theist readily does have a beyond space and time cause that he can appeal to so as to explain the non-locality of quantum entanglement. And Christians have been postulating just such a beyond space and time cause for a few thousand years now. As Colossians 1:17 states, “He is before all things, and in him all things hold together.”

Colossians 1:17 He is before all things, and in him all things hold together.

Moreover, free will is also now shown to be integral in quantum mechanics. As the late Steven Weinberg, an atheist, explained, “In the instrumentalist approach (in quantum mechanics) humans are brought into the laws of nature at the most fundamental level.,,, the instrumentalist approach turns its back on a vision that became possible after Darwin, of a world governed by impersonal physical laws that control human behavior along with everything else.,,, In quantum mechanics these probabilities do not exist until people choose what to measure,,, Unlike the case of classical physics, a choice must be made,,,”

The Trouble with Quantum Mechanics – Steven Weinberg – January 19, 2017 Excerpt: The instrumentalist approach,, (the) wave function,, is merely an instrument that provides predictions of the probabilities of various outcomes when measurements are made.,, In the instrumentalist approach,,, humans are brought into the laws of nature at the most fundamental level. According to Eugene Wigner, a pioneer of quantum mechanics, “it was not possible to formulate the laws of quantum mechanics in a fully consistent way without reference to the consciousness.”11 Thus the instrumentalist approach turns its back on a vision that became possible after Darwin, of a world governed by impersonal physical laws that control human behavior along with everything else. It is not that we object to thinking about humans. Rather, we want to understand the relation of humans to nature, not just assuming the character of this relation by incorporating it in what we suppose are nature’s fundamental laws, but rather by deduction from laws that make no explicit reference to humans. We may in the end have to give up this goal,,, Some physicists who adopt an instrumentalist approach argue that the probabilities we infer from the wave function are objective probabilities, independent of whether humans are making a measurement. I don’t find this tenable. In quantum mechanics these probabilities do not exist until people choose what to measure, such as the spin in one or another direction. Unlike the case of classical physics, a choice must be made,,, http://quantum.phys.unm.edu/466-17/QuantumMechanicsWeinberg.pdf

In short, Weinberg did not reject the instrumentalist approach because of any inherent irrationality within the instrumentalist approach, (as he did with the realist approach), but he rejected the instrumentalist approach simply because of his a priori philosophical commitment to Atheistic Naturalism, and to Darwinian evolution in particular. To repeat Weinberg, “the instrumentalist approach turns its back on a vision that became possible after Darwin, of a world governed by impersonal physical laws that control human behavior along with everything else”. I consider Weinberg's rejection of the 'instrumentalist approach', simply because of his Darwinian metaphysics, to be yet another prime example that clearly demonstrates how Darwinian ideas undermine science itself. But anyways, regardless of how Weinberg and other atheists may prefer the world to behave, quantum mechanics itself could care less how atheists prefer the world to behave. Although there have been several major loopholes in quantum mechanics over the past several decades that atheists have tried to appeal to in order to try to avoid the ‘spooky’ Theistic implications of quantum mechanics, over the past several years each of those major loopholes have been closed one by one. The last major loophole that was left to be closed was the “setting independence”, “freedom of choice”, and/or the ‘free-will’ loophole:

Closing the ‘free will’ loophole: Using distant quasars to test Bell’s theorem – February 20, 2014 Excerpt: Though two major loopholes have since been closed, a third remains; physicists refer to it as “setting independence,” or more provocatively, “free will.” This loophole proposes that a particle detector’s settings may “conspire” with events in the shared causal past of the detectors themselves to determine which properties of the particle to measure — a scenario that, however far-fetched, implies that a physicist running the experiment does not have complete free will in choosing each detector’s setting. Such a scenario would result in biased measurements, suggesting that two particles are correlated more than they actually are, and giving more weight to quantum mechanics than classical physics. “It sounds creepy, but people realized that’s a logical possibility that hasn’t been closed yet,” says MIT’s David Kaiser, the Germeshausen Professor of the History of Science and senior lecturer in the Department of Physics. “Before we make the leap to say the equations of quantum theory tell us the world is inescapably crazy and bizarre, have we closed every conceivable logical loophole, even if they may not seem plausible in the world we know today?” https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/02/140220112515.htm

bornagain77

The denial of free will, agent causation, and/or intelligent causation by atheistic naturalists is irrational. As Paul Nelson noted, methodological naturalism "entails an ontology in which minds are the consequence of physics, and thus, can only be placeholders for a more detailed causal account in which physics is the only (ultimate) actor. You didn’t write your email to me. Physics did, and informed you of that event after the fact. "That’s crazy," you reply, "I certainly did write my email." Okay, then — to what does the pronoun "I" in that sentence refer? Your personal agency; your mind. Are you supernatural?,,, You are certainly an intelligent cause, however, and your intelligence does not collapse into physics. (If it does collapse — i.e., can be reduced without explanatory loss — we haven’t the faintest idea how, which amounts to the same thing.) To explain the effects you bring about in the world — such as your email, a real pattern — we must refer to you as a unique agent.",,, "some feature of "intelligence" must be irreducible to physics, because otherwise we’re back to physics versus physics, and there’s nothing for SETI to look for."

Do You Like SETI? Fine, Then Let’s Dump Methodological Naturalism - Paul Nelson - September 24, 2014 Excerpt: Assessing the Damage MN (methodological naturalism) Does to Freedom of Inquiry Epistemology — how we know — and ontology — what exists — are both affected by methodological naturalism. If we say, "We cannot know that a mind caused x," laying down an epistemological boundary defined by MN, then our ontology comprising real causes for x won’t include minds. MN entails an ontology in which minds are the consequence of physics, and thus, can only be placeholders for a more detailed causal account in which physics is the only (ultimate) actor. You didn’t write your email to me. Physics did, and informed you of that event after the fact. "That’s crazy," you reply, "I certainly did write my email." Okay, then — to what does the pronoun "I" in that sentence refer? Your personal agency; your mind. Are you supernatural?,,, You are certainly an intelligent cause, however, and your intelligence does not collapse into physics. (If it does collapse — i.e., can be reduced without explanatory loss — we haven’t the faintest idea how, which amounts to the same thing.) To explain the effects you bring about in the world — such as your email, a real pattern — we must refer to you as a unique agent. If ID satisfied MN as that philosophical doctrine is usually stated, the decades-long dispute over both wouldn’t have happened. The whole point of invoking MN (by the National Center for Science Education, for instance, or other anti-ID organizations) is to try to exclude ID, before a debate about the evidence can occur, by indicting ID for inferring non-physical causes. That’s why pushing the MN emergency button is so useful to opponents of ID. Violate MN, if MN defines science, and the game is over. ,,, some feature of "intelligence" must be irreducible to physics, because otherwise we’re back to physics versus physics, and there’s nothing for SETI to look for. https://evolutionnews.org/2014/09/do_you_like_set/

Besides being irrational, the denial of the reality of free will, agent causality, and/or intelligent causation, by atheistic naturalists is also unscientific. As George Ellis noted, "if Einstein did not have free will in some meaningful sense, then he could not have been responsible for the theory of relativity – it would have been a product of lower level processes but not of an intelligent mind choosing between possible options. I find it very hard to believe this to be the case – indeed it does not seem to make any sense."

Physicist George Ellis on the importance of philosophy and free will - July 27, 2014 Excerpt: And free will?: Horgan: Einstein, in the following quote, seemed to doubt free will: “If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the Earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord…. So would a Being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, watching man and his doings, smile about man’s illusion that he was acting according to his own free will.” Do you believe in free will? Ellis: Yes. Einstein is perpetuating the belief that all causation is bottom up. This simply is not the case, as I can demonstrate with many examples from sociology, neuroscience, physiology, epigenetics, engineering, and physics. Furthermore if Einstein did not have free will in some meaningful sense, then he could not have been responsible for the theory of relativity – it would have been a product of lower level processes but not of an intelligent mind choosing between possible options. I find it very hard to believe this to be the case – indeed it does not seem to make any sense. Physicists should pay attention to Aristotle’s four forms of causation – if they have the free will to decide what they are doing. If they don’t, then why waste time talking to them? They are then not responsible for what they say. http://www.uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/physicist-george-ellis-on-the-importance-of-philosophy-and-free-will/

And indeed the detail of free will, as Ellis noted, does not make any sense. Besides not making any 'common sense', it also does not make any 'scientific sense'. For prime example, In order for Einstein to be able to formulate the theories of relativity, Einstein had to, via his free will, choose the correct mathematical axioms. As Douglas S. Robertson noted, "Human mathematicians are able to create axioms, but a computer program cannot do this without violating information conservation. Creating new axioms and free will are shown to be different aspects of the same phenomena: the creation of new information."

Algorithmic Information Theory, Free Will and the Turing Test - Douglas S. Robertson Excerpt: Chaitin’s Algorithmic Information Theory shows that information is conserved under formal mathematical operations and, equivalently, under computer operations. This conservation law puts a new perspective on many familiar problems related to artificial intelligence. For example, the famous “Turing test” for artificial intelligence could be defeated by simply asking for a new axiom in mathematics. Human mathematicians are able to create axioms, but a computer program cannot do this without violating information conservation. Creating new axioms and free will are shown to be different aspects of the same phenomena: the creation of new information. http://cires.colorado.edu/~doug/philosophy/info8.pdf

And while we have abundant evidence that human mathematicians, via their free will, can create new axioms in mathematics, atheistic naturalists simply have no evidence that it is possible for computers to imitate genuine mathematical insight. As professor of mathematics James Franklin noted, "the intellect (is) immaterial and immortal. If today’s naturalists do not wish to agree with that, there is a challenge for them. ‘Don’t tell me, show me’: build an artificial intelligence system that imitates genuine mathematical insight."

The mathematical world – James Franklin – 7 April 2014 Excerpt:,,, the intellect (is) immaterial and immortal. If today’s naturalists do not wish to agree with that, there is a challenge for them. ‘Don’t tell me, show me’: build an artificial intelligence system that imitates genuine mathematical insight. There seem to be no promising plans on the drawing board.,,, - James Franklin is professor of mathematics at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. https://aeon.co/essays/aristotle-was-right-about-mathematics-after-all

In fact, as Gregory Chaitin, via extension of Godel's incompleteness theorem, has demonstrated, "an infinite number of true mathematical theorems exist that cannot be proved from any finite system of axioms."

The Limits Of Reason – Gregory Chaitin – 2006 Excerpt: Unlike Gödel’s approach, mine is based on measuring information and showing that some mathematical facts cannot be compressed into a theory because they are too complicated. This new approach suggests that what Gödel discovered was just the tip of the iceberg: an infinite number of true mathematical theorems exist that cannot be proved from any finite system of axioms. https://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/The_Limits_of_Reason_Chaitin_2006.pdf

Scientifically speaking, this is NOT a minor problem for atheists. As the late Stephen Weinberg, an atheist, honestly admitted to Richard Dawkins, "I don't think one should underestimate the fix we are in. That in the end we will not be able to explain the world. That we will have some set of laws of nature (that) we will not be able to derive them on the grounds simply of mathematical consistency. Because we can already think of mathematically consistent laws that don't describe the world as we know it. And we will always be left with a question 'why are the laws nature what they are rather than some other laws?'. And I don't see any way out of that."

"I don't think one should underestimate the fix we are in. That in the end we will not be able to explain the world. That we will have some set of laws of nature (that) we will not be able to derive them on the grounds simply of mathematical consistency. Because we can already think of mathematically consistent laws that don't describe the world as we know it. And we will always be left with a question 'why are the laws nature what they are rather than some other laws?'. And I don't see any way out of that. The fact that the constants of nature are suitable for life, which is clearly true, we observe,,," (Weinberg then comments on the multiverse conjecture of atheists) "No one has constructed a theory in which that is true. I mean,, the (multiverse) theory would be speculative, but we don't even have a theory in which that speculation is mathematically realized. But it is a possibility." Steven Weinberg – as stated to Richard Dawkins at the 8:15 minute mark of the following video Leonard Susskind – Richard Dawkins and Steven Weinberg – 1 in 10^120 Cosmological Constant points to intelligent design – video https://youtu.be/z4E_bT4ecgk?t=495

And whereas atheists, as the late Steven Weinberg himself honestly admitted, are in a pretty bad 'fix' in regards to there being "an infinite number of true mathematical theorems exist that cannot be proved from any finite system of axioms", Christian Theists have a ready solution for this. Namely, as Bruce Gordon stated, “the transcendent reality on which our universe depends must be something that can exhibit agency – a mind that can choose among the infinite variety of mathematical descriptions and bring into existence a reality that corresponds to a consistent subset of them.”

Bruce Gordon: Hawking’s irrational arguments – October 2010 Excerpt: ,,,The physical universe is causally incomplete and therefore neither self-originating nor self-sustaining. The world of space, time, matter and energy is dependent on a reality that transcends space, time, matter and energy. This transcendent reality cannot merely be a Platonic realm of mathematical descriptions, for such things are causally inert abstract entities that do not affect the material world,,, Rather, the transcendent reality on which our universe depends must be something that can exhibit agency – a mind that can choose among the infinite variety of mathematical descriptions and bring into existence a reality that corresponds to a consistent subset of them. This is what “breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe.” Anything else invokes random miracles as an explanatory principle and spells the end of scientific rationality.,,, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/1/hawking-irrational-arguments/

bornagain77

DogDoc @6 Sewell wrote about materialists:

… they often claim there is no real free will, that everything we do is determined by the laws of physics.

You objected that modern physics does not “assume deterministic causality”, and you further added that “quantum physics is not deterministic in the way Newtonian physics is.” Is your point that there are undetermined physical events not describable by laws of physics? If so, can you explain their relevance to free will? Origenes

Querius @7

So, someone else who “perceives” that animal abuse is perfectly fine, such as spectator dogfights, is as far as you’re concerned, welcome to their “perception,” regardless of your revulsion, right?

I just got through making crystal clear that I perceive animal abuse to be horrible, so of course I do not believe anyone is welcome to abuse animals, and I sincerely hope you agree.

Thus, you won’t have any grounds to condemn someone whose perception is different than yours, since it’s simply a matter of individual “perception.” Is that what you’re promoting?

We all have every reason to condemn animal abuse, or the intentional infliction of suffering on any sentient being. Since I perceive (no scare quotes needed) that abuse is wrong, I am compelled to condemn it.

This is where I differ from you.

Good grief - you think it's okay to abuse animals? That's horrible!

I wouldn’t attempt to rationalize someone else’s cruelty to a poor, trusting dog by asserting that “I could never choose to perceive it otherwise.”

On one hand I'm relieved to see you don't mean you'd actually condone abuse. But you're confused about my position. I am stating as a fact that I would be unable to simply choose whether or not I perceive abuse as wrong, any more than I could choose to perceive the sky as green. I can't imagine how you think that could "rationalize someone else's cruelty".

Instead, I’d say that person was a monster and report them to the authorities!

Excellent, we agree 100%! Now, what is it that you think we're in disagreement about again? If scholars found a lost chapter of the Bible which showed that God wants you to torture puppies for your pleasure, my guess is that you would still perceive that act as abhorrent. I know I would. dogdoc

Determinism is dead as far as we know. Let's not circle back. Quantum physics killed it: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indeterminism Yet free will cannot be killed as simply and elegantly as determinism has been. If ever. This silly debate is over for now. Free will won by KO. Nonlin.org

Dogdoc @6,

I am horrified at animal abuse, yes. I do not think of such behavior, or of my reaction to it, as transcendent. I perceive it as vile and disgusting and offensive, and I could never choose to perceive it otherwise.

So, someone else who "perceives" that animal abuse is perfectly fine, such as spectator dogfights, is as far as you're concerned, welcome to their "perception," regardless of your revulsion, right? Thus, you won't have any grounds to condemn someone whose perception is different than yours, since it's simply a matter of individual "perception." Is that what you're promoting? This is where I differ from you. I wouldn't attempt to rationalize someone else's cruelty to a poor, trusting dog by asserting that "I could never choose to perceive it otherwise." Instead, I'd say that person was a monster and report them to the authorities! -Q Querius

Querius @3,

Yet I have no doubt that you’re instinctively horrified at how some people mistreat their dogs. I don’t think you’d simply wave off these horrors merely as your perceptions rather than transcendent and intrinsic.

I am horrified at animal abuse, yes. I do not think of such behavior, or of my reaction to it, as transcendent. I perceive it as vile and disgusting and offensive, and I could never choose to perceive it otherwise.

What types of causality does modern physics assume?

I don't think physics assumes anything about causality per se. Rather, it describes observable regularities in nature and attempts to build models that predict and explain them. But obviously quantum physics is not deterministic in the way Newtonian physics is. dogdoc

DogDoc & PM1 Nice commentary. I look forward to the fear and loathing that will likely result……. chuckdarwin

DogDoc @1

Modern physics does not include contra-causal mental powers, but neither does it assume deterministic causality.

What types of causality does modern physics assume? Origenes

Docdoc @1

Good and evil are perceptions, not divine commands.

Yet I have no doubt that you're instinctively horrified at how some people mistreat their dogs. I don't think you'd simply wave off these horrors merely as your perceptions rather than transcendent and intrinsic. If not, do you treat abused animals only because you're paid to care? PyrrhoManica1 @2,

No one at Uncommon Descent who fulminates against “materialism” understands what it means.

Would you claim that you know everything that's physically knowable? If not, then how could you claim that you're NOT also in the group that doesn't understand materialism? Would you claim that every concept in mathematics must necessarily be physically instantiatable to exist? -Q Querius

@1 No one at Uncommon Descent who fulminates against "materialism" understands what it means. They're just attacking a figment of their own imaginations. Leave them do it. PyrrhoManiac1

For example, they often claim there is no real free will, that everything we do is determined by the laws of physics.

Modern physics does not include contra-causal mental powers, but neither does it assume deterministic causality. Libertarian free will is incoherent (on what basis could an uncaused will make decisions?) but not because of determinism.

But if they really believed this, why would they bother trying to convince the rest of us?

This one is always so funny. If determinism were true, then the reason people would try to convince others of its truth is, obviously, because their actions are determined!

Whether or not we will accept their conclusion has already been pre-determined, it is completely beyond our control.

Exactly, just as the materialists' arguments would be!

Certainly our behavior is influenced, maybe to a large degree, by our heredity and environment but no one would possibly conclude that he has no control over his own behavior if he were not forced to this conclusion by materialist philosophy.

Obviously our physical and behavioral traits result from heritable and environmental factors, because there is nothing else, but that doesn't mean each individual doesn't control their own actions. It's just that the word "control" here does not imply causa sui, which is impossible.

Materialists are also forced—if they are consistent—to believe that there is no real good or evil, for how can some actions be “good” and others “evil,” if everything we do is beyond our control and determined by the laws of physics?

Good and evil are perceptions, not divine commands.

While there is substantial disagreement among humans over the details of moral codes even atheists know in their hearts that there is a difference between good and evil.

Of course! But atheists know things more in their brains than in their hearts :-)

Have you ever known an atheist who did not appeal to morality to justify his actions, or to criticize those who disagree with him?

Of course not!

Materialists are also forced to believe that human brains are just advanced computing machines, and this leads to one of the most interesting inconsistencies of materialism.

No, materialism does not actually imply that thought is algorithmic (there may be non-computable effects of the sort Roger Penrose suggests, for example).

The current ID debate can be reduced to the question: is everything we see today simply the result of unintelligent causes or is an intelligent cause required to explain some things?

What does "intelligent" mean in this context? AI does things that would be called intelligent if a human being did them, but it is completely algorithmic.

But what does “intelligent” mean?

EXCELLENT QUESTION!!!

Since humans are the only known intelligent beings in the universe,

Sort of a ridiculous thing to say, really - watch some videos on animal intelligence, they're not hard to find on the internet :-). I would say that every living organism is intelligent (and in all of our experience, every intelligent thing is a living organism).

...when we argue that a cause is intelligent, we can only mean “like humans.”

Ok, which specific abilities do you choose as the criteria?

But if you really believe that human intelligence, like everything else in the universe, is just matter in motion what difference does it make if a cause is like humans or like rocks? Both are just matter in motion!

This is a tiresome strawman - nobody believes that everything is just matter in motion, of course - that is such an anachronistic view of physics. Perhaps you believe everything reduces to fire, earth, water, and air?

A consistent materialist would have to conclude that the ID debate is over a trivial distinction.

Actually ID never defines what it means by "intelligence", so it's actually a debate about why anthropomorphic religious projections don't count as scientific explanations of anything. dogdoc