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UB Sets It Out Step-By-Step

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UD Editors:  No one has come close to refuting UB’s thesis after 129 comments.  We are moving this post to the top of the page to give the materialists another chance.

I take the following from an excellent comment UB made in a prior post.  UB lays out his argument step by step, precept by precept.  Then he arrives at a conclusion.  In order for his argument to be valid, the conclusion must follow from the premises.  In order for his argument to be sound, each of the premises must be true.

Now here is the challenge to our Darwinist friends.  If you disagree with UB’s conclusion, please demonstrate how his argument is either invalid (as a matter of logic the conclusion does not follow from the premises) or unsound (one or more of the premises are false).  Good luck (you’re going to need it).

Without further ado, here is UB’s argument:

1.  A representation is an arrangement of matter which evokes an effect within a system (e.g. written text, spoken words, pheromones, animal gestures, codes, sensory input, intracellular messengers, nucleotide sequences, etc, etc).

2.  It is not logically possible to transfer information (the form of a thing; a measured aspect, quality, or preference) in a material universe without using a representation instantiated in matter.

3.  If that is true, and it surely must be, then several other things must logically follow. If there is now an arrangement of matter which contains a representation of form as a consequence of its own material arrangement, then that arrangement must be necessarily arbitrary to the thing it represents. In other words, if one thing is to represent another thing within a system, then it must be separate from the thing it represents. And if it is separate from it, then it cannot be anything but materially arbitrary to it (i.e. they cannot be the same thing).

4.  If that is true, then the presence of that representation must present a material component to the system (which is reducible to physical law), while its arrangement presents an arbitrary component to the system (which is not reducible to physical law).

5.  If that is true, and again it surely must be, then there has to be something else which establishes the otherwise non-existent relationship between the representation and the effect it evokes within the system. In fact, this is the material basis of Francis Crick’s famous ‘adapter hypothesis’ in DNA, which lead to a revolution in the biological sciences. In a material universe, that something else must be a second arrangement of matter; coordinated to the first arrangement as well as to the effect it evokes.

6.  It then also follows that this second arrangement must produce its unambiguous function, not from the mere presence of the representation, but from its arrangement.  It is the arbitrary component of the representation which produces the function.

7.  And if those observations are true, then in order to actually transfer recorded information, two discrete arrangements of matter are inherently required by the process; and both of these objects must necessarily have a quality that extends beyond their mere material make-up. The first is a representation and the second is a protocol (a systematic, operational rule instantiated in matter) and together they function as a formal system. They are the irreducible complex core which is fundamentally required in order to transfer recorded information.

8.  During protein synthesis, a selected portion of DNA is first transcribed into mRNA, then matured and transported to the site of translation within the ribosome. This transcription process facilitates the input of information (the arbitrary component of the DNA sequence) into the system. The input of this arbitrary component functions to constrain the output, producing the polypeptides which demonstrate unambiguous function.

9.  From a causal standpoint, the arbitrary component of DNA is transcribed to mRNA, and those mRNA are then used to order tRNA molecules within the ribosome. Each stage of this transcription process is determined by the physical forces of pair bonding. Yet, which amino acid appears at the peptide binding site is not determined by pair bonding; it is determined  by the aaRS. In other words, which amino acid appears at the binding site is only evoked by the physical structure of the nucleic triplet, but is not determined by it. Instead, it is determined (in spatial and temporal isolation) by the physical structure of the aaRS. This is the point of translation; the point where the arbitrary component of the representation is allowed to evoke a response in a physically determined system – while preserving the arbitrary nature of the representation.

10.  This physical event, translation by a material protocol, as well as the transcription of a material representation, is ubiquitous in the transfer of recorded information.

CONCLUSION:  These two physical objects (the representation and protocol) along with the required preservation of the arbitrary component of the representation, and the production of unambiguous function from that arbitrary component, confirm that the transfer of recorded information in the genome is just like any other form of recorded information. It’s an arbitrary relationship instantiated in matter.

Comments
Upright BiPed, A much better 1000th comment would be what keiths posted on The Skeptical Zone. While I've been trying to get you to put your argument into some coherent form, keiths took the more holistic approach of applying his own intelligence to create something coherent out of your word salad and addressing the most fair interpretation of it:
Upright, Thank you for responding to my rebuttal of your argument. I enjoy the rare moments when you come out of hiding and actually engage those critics of yours who have been banned from UD. That said, I won’t hide my disappointment at the evasiveness of your response. You failed to address my key points — points which are fatal to your argument, as you and I both know. Your argument is that 1) Darwinian evolution depends on the “transfer of recorded information”; 2) the “transfer of recorded information” requires two distinct arrangements of matter, a “representation” and a “protocol”; 3) the representation is necessarily distinct from the thing it represents, with the protocol providing the “bridge” between the two; 4) the representation and the protocol form an irreducibly complex system; and 5) though you’re oddly afraid to say so explicitly, you are inviting readers to conclude that this irreducibly complex system must have been designed. Now consider self-replicating molecules. a. Information can be transferred from a self-replicating molecule to its “offspring”. In my rebuttal, I described how a message could be sent from sender to receiver via a chain of self-replicating molecules. b. A self-replicating molecule is its own representation, yet in your argument you incorrectly claim that the representation must be distinct from the thing it represents. c. You claim that besides the representation, there must be a distinct arrangement of matter that you call the “protocol”. Well, there is no second arrangement of matter in the case of self-replicating molecules, so the “protocol” doesn’t exist. Yet information gets transferred anyway. So your claim that a protocol is required is incorrect. d. If you were to try to argue that the self-replicating molecule is both the representation and the protocol, you would run into another problem, because your claim was that the representation and the protocol are separate arrangements of matter, and that together they form an irreducibly complex system. Your argument is therefore still wrong, even if you try this maneuver. e. Another gambit would be for you to claim that self-replicating molecules don’t really transfer information, but that would be absurd because I’ve already showed how you could send a message using self-replicating molecules. You would be claiming that sending a message does not constitute a “transfer of recorded information”, which would be ridiculous. f. You could attempt to argue that Darwinian evolution depends on the kind of information transfer you envision, with a representation and a distinct protocol. However, that’s just not correct. To get Darwinian evolution, all you need is replication with heritable variation and differential reproductive success. Your argument is in tatters, Upright.
His summary sentence is spot on.onlooker
November 15, 2012
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UB:
I did not tell you that among the kinds of causes that ‘cannot originate semiosis’ are those that require information to function.
But earlier: RB:
Also, please tell us what class of mechanisms you, or semiotic theory, claim cannot create the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state.
UB:
also add to this any process that requires recorded information in order to function
?Reciprocating Bill
November 15, 2012
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Reciprocating Bill, I am still interested in the answers you assured you’d provide from the preceding exchange: >> Which one of the observations at the top of this page have you shown (or can show) to be false? >> Have you shown, or can you show an example of invalid logic in the conclusions stemming from the observations at the top of this page? >> Do you believe that the working scientists and researchers who are proponents of biosemiosis (even those who profess complete methodological materialism in their discipline) are incorrect in their assessment that the translation of recorded information from the genome demonstrates a semiotic state? If so, how are they mistaken, and what would you say to them to correct their error(s)?Upright BiPed
November 15, 2012
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Reciprocating Bill,
UB: If it is a matter of universal observation that all examples of semiosis on this planet originate/operate from massive pre-existing organization, on what grounds am I obligated to exclude that observation when considering the origin of semiosis on this planet? RB: On the grounds that you just stated that among [the] kinds of causes that observation tells us cannot create/originate/cause the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state are those that require recorded information to function. Do not all living agents require recorded information to function? If so, why aren’t they excluded on that ground?
First, the technical flaw I did not tell you that among the kinds of causes that 'cannot originate semiosis' are those that require information to function. Second, the logical flaw To follow your logic: When considering a potential source for semiosis on this planet, I should exclude the universal observation (that all examples of semiosis on this planet originate from massive pre-existing organization) because such a source may also require massive pre-existing organization. One does not follow from the other. A deliberate exclusion of the material observations does not follow from any proposed requirement for the existence of the source. The question at hand is the source of semiosis on this individual planet roughly 3 billion years ago, not the ultimate source of organization in any conceivable context. Thirdly, the metaphysical assumption Since you do not incorporate the observations within the argument into (at minimum) an open question, but instead insist that the material observations be excluded altogether, you necessarily put yourself into the metaphysical position that agency is a phenomenon which began singularly on earth. There is, of course, no material support for this position, and it has no advantage (logical or otherwise) over those who incorporate the observations to whatever degree they do so. And finally, the unanswered question Will excluding the observation negate the material requirements?Upright BiPed
November 15, 2012
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Reciprocating Bill,
However, to me you have just affirmed that semiotic theory itself tells us neither what mechanisms can give rise to a semiotic state nor what mechanisms cannot give rise to a semiotic state.
Again, are you suggesting that we should attempt to apprehend a causal mechanism without understanding what is necessary of it? This does not square with your follow-on comment; “Of course a description of the system we wish to understand is a crucial element in the search for causes.” As has already been explained via the example of the fire tetrahedron; the tetrahedron defines (without exception) what is required for a fire to occur, but does not identify who or what may have caused the fire. Yet, if a fuel and heat source (specific material conditions) are required, then we know that the cause of that fire will have had to provide those requirements if they are not locally accounted for otherwise. This is non-controversial.
The question is, does adding “the system is semiotic” as defined in semiotic theory to that description add anything of value to our current physiochemical understanding?
It tells us that the process has a physiochemically-arbitrary relationship instantiated within it which is not only necessary for it to operate, but is also the specific source of the function it produces. And as you say, this is a “crucial element” if we wish to understand the system as it actually exist. There is no principle involved that says we should we ignore this material fact. To the contrary – and regardless of any metaphysical disposition – proper systematic investigation demands it.Upright BiPed
November 15, 2012
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Reciprocating Bill:
Because it is silent on causal history/mechanism, I fail to see the added scientific value of construing the translation of DNA into proteins as “semiotic” over and above what we already know about the process.
so? Is that supposed to be an argument against the use of the term? IS the system a semiotic system or not? If we know a system is chaotic, we should not call it chaotic because calling it chaotic adds nothing we don't already know. Is that your argument?Mung
November 15, 2012
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What a great way to highlight 1000 posts of no refutation.Mung
November 15, 2012
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RB:
However, to me you have just affirmed that semiotic theory itself tells us neither what mechanisms can give rise to a semiotic state nor what mechanisms cannot give rise to a semiotic state.
Observations and experiences take care of that.
Because it is silent on causal history/mechanism, I fail to see the added scientific value of construing the translation of DNA into proteins as “semiotic” over and above what we already know about the process.
It is semiotic RB. And what we already know should be more than enough to abandon unguided evolution.
The question is, does adding “the system is semiotic” as defined in semiotic theory to that description add anything of value to our current physiochemical understanding?
yes, it does.Joe
November 15, 2012
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keiths:
Now consider self-replicating molecules.
We cannot consider what doesn’t exist.
a. Information can be transferred from a self-replicating molecule to its “offspring”. In my rebuttal, I described how a message could be sent from sender to receiver via a chain of self-replicating molecules.
Unfortunately you still do NOT have a self-replicating molecule capable of such a thing. Your "argument" can't even get started, keiths.Joe
November 15, 2012
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UB, above (to keiths) you remind us:
the conclusion of the earlier argument is that “the search for an answer to the rise of the recorded information in the genome needs to focus on mechanisms that can give rise to a semiotic state, since that is the way we find it.”
However, to me you have just affirmed that semiotic theory itself tells us neither what mechanisms can give rise to a semiotic state nor what mechanisms cannot give rise to a semiotic state. Because it is silent on causal history/mechanism, I fail to see the added scientific value of construing the translation of DNA into proteins as "semiotic" over and above what we already know about the process.
What else constrains the evaluation of a “set of possible causal mechanisms” if not what is necessary for them to accomplish?
Of course a description of the system we wish to understand is a crucial element in the search for causes. The question is, does adding "the system is semiotic" as defined in semiotic theory to that description add anything of value to our current physiochemical understanding? Given that you have unambiguously stated that semiotic theory neither requires a nor excludes a particular kind of causation, I don't see that adding "semiosis" to the description we already have adds anything of value, or aids in that search.
If it is a matter of universal observation that all examples of semiosis on this planet originate/operate from massive pre-existing organization, on what grounds am I obligated to exclude that observation when considering the origin of semiosis on this planet?
On the grounds that you just stated that among kinds of causes that observation tells us cannot create/originate/cause the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state are those that require recorded information to function. Do not all living agents require recorded information to function? If so, why aren't they excluded on that ground?Reciprocating Bill
November 15, 2012
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RB:
However, even granting the conclusion of that chain of propositions, I don’t see anything that speaks to causation, and therefore what the theory per se has to do with either designed or unguided causation.
Except there isn't any evidence that any unguided causation can produce a semiotic system and plenty that demonstrates agencies can and do. So with that in mind, what do you think RB? Or can that fit in your little, bitty mind?Joe
November 15, 2012
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Reciprocating Bill,
Does semiotic theory per se assert that a particular class or classes of mechanism is required to create (result in, cause) the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state?
No.
Conversely, does semiotic theory per se assert that a particular class or classes of mechanism cannot create (result in, cause) the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state?
No.
If either, how does that constraint flow from the theory itself, “per se?”
Answered.
If neither, how can the theory itself can be said to constrain the set of possible causal mechanisms? Would it not be silent on causation?
What else constrains the evaluation of a “set of possible causal mechanisms” if not what is necessary for them to accomplish? Are you suggesting that we should attempt to apprehend a causal mechanism without understanding what is necessary? Are you suggesting that all causal mechanisms are equal? If these are not what you are suggesting, then knowing 'what is necessary' helps to illuminate any proposition to follow. Do you disagree?
Also, within your framework, do not living agents (displaying massive organization) require recorded information to function? Would not living agents therefore be excluded from consideration because they are processes that require recorded information in order to function?
If it is a matter of universal observation that all examples of semiosis on this planet originate/operate from massive pre-existing organization, on what grounds am I obligated to exclude that observation when considering the origin of semiosis on this planet? Will excluding the observation reverse the material requirements?
I do intend to at least begin to directly address your questions by this weekend.
Excellent. I’ll repeat them here for convenience: >> Which one of the observations at the top of this page have you shown (or can show) to be false? >> Have you shown, or can you show an example of invalid logic in the conclusions stemming from the observations at the top of this page? >> Do you believe that the working scientists and researchers who are proponents of biosemiosis (even those who profess complete methodological materialism in their discipline) are incorrect in their assessment that the translation of recorded information from the genome demonstrates a semiotic state? If so, how are they mistaken, and what would you say to them to correct their error(s)?Upright BiPed
November 14, 2012
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Alan , unfortunately, you've made yourself perfectly clear... AF: Upright Biped your argument is 'incoherent'. UB: What's incoherent about it? AF: I can't say, but it's 'impossible to parse'. UB: Well... what terms do you think are ambiguous? AF: I'm not going to say, but there's no doubt you are 'refusing to clarify' them. UB: If you can't say, then how can you even say it's incoherent? AF: Never mind about that. I've made my point. I'm moving on.Upright BiPed
November 14, 2012
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Is this Keith’s refutation?
1. Evolution requires a mechanism for the transfer of recorded information.
Yes.
2. The transfer of recorded information depends in all cases on an irreducibly complex core.
Yes.
3. The core cannot be provided by evolution, because evolution cannot even begin unless the core is already present.
Evolution by means of the transfer and translation of recorded information cannot begin until recorded information and a mechanism to transfer and translate it are present. Therefore evolution cannot be the origin of that system.
4. The core cannot be provided by ‘chance and necessity’, because it is too complex.
“Too complex” is a hopelessly vague (rhetorically loaded and useless) characterization, but in principle, there is no prohibition to chance and necessity being the origin of the system. Chance and necessity are not discounted as the origin simply because the system is “too complex”; they are discounted because there exist not one single shred of evidence anywhere in the real world that they are capable of producing the material requirements of system. On the other hand, the evidence to the contrary is overwhelming and absolute (as in universal).
5. Therefore, the Designer did it.
This is not a part of the argument. The conclusion at the top of this page is that “the transfer of recorded information in the genome is just like any other form of recorded information. It’s an arbitrary relationship instantiated in matter”, and the conclusion of the earlier argument is that “the search for an answer to the rise of the recorded information in the genome needs to focus on mechanisms that can give rise to a semiotic state, since that is the way we find it.” The argument I’ve made, and its conclusions, are about the facts on the ground. You operate under the idea that chance and necessity can account for those facts; and I do not. But neither of those positions changes the facts on the ground. In other words, you are arguing against the validity of the observations and logic because you don’t like to additional hurdle it creates for a conclusion which you prefer. That is understandable if viewed solely from an ideological perspective, but it changes nothing whatsoever about the reality.
In reality, evolution can begin as soon as there is heritable variation with differential reproductive success. Molecules that self-replicate with imperfect fidelity fit the bill.
Firstly, you steadfastly refuse to incorporate (or account for) what is known at the material level. This is the main reason why talking with you is fruitless in terms of communicating about real world material consequences. You say that evolution can begin “as soon as” there is differential reproductive success, but you fail to incorporate the fundamental requirements of that reality. Darwinian evolution functions by variation to an informational medium, a physical genotypic record, entirely distinct from the phenotype that it produces. That cannot happen without the material conditions described in the argument. This does not establish that chance and necessity cannot produce those material conditions; but it (necessarily) established the conditions which must be met in order to accomplish what must be accomplished. It is nothing more than avoidance to pretend otherwise. One gets the impression that you’d like to look to deterministic systems and establish a beachhead on the problem of having an arbitrary relationship instantiated in a physical system. Fine, provide an example.Upright BiPed
November 14, 2012
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I mean "even granting the conclusion of that chain of propositions arguendo..."Reciprocating Bill
November 14, 2012
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Well, Bill, it's amazing how you just can't seem to bring yourself to comment upon how incoherent it all is and just wish us all the best and move on. Does it bother you that you're making your partners in crime look bad by not toeing the party line?Mung
November 14, 2012
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UB, would you please clarify the following: I asked,
Please tell us what class of mechanisms you, or semiotic theory, assert is required to create (result in, cause) the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state… Also, please tell us what class of mechanisms you, or semiotic theory, claim cannot create the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state.
You responded to the first with "massive organization (i.e. living agents)" and the second with "inanimate matter acted upon by physical law from any identifiable initial condition [and] any process that requires recorded information in order to function." However, you also stated that this response "doesn’t flow from semiotic theory per se, it flows from universal observation of the physical world" (e.g., from "universal experience" and "observation.") My questions about this: Does semiotic theory per se assert that a particular class or classes of mechanism is required to create (result in, cause) the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state? Conversely, does semiotic theory per se assert that a particular class or classes of mechanism cannot create (result in, cause) the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state? If either, how does that constraint flow from the theory itself, "per se?" If neither, how can the theory itself can be said to constrain the set of possible causal mechanisms? Would it not be silent on causation? Also, within your framework, do not living agents (displaying massive organization) require recorded information to function? Would not living agents therefore be excluded from consideration because they are processes that require recorded information in order to function? I see a short circuit between your answer to my first question and your answer to my second. I do intend to at least begin to directly address your questions by this weekend. However, even granting the conclusion of that chain of propositions, I don't see anything that speaks to causation, and therefore what the theory per se has to do with either designed or unguided causation.Reciprocating Bill
November 14, 2012
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Alan Fox:
I am reminded of the old Arab proverb: Les chiens aboient, la caravane passe.
And THAT sums up TSZ rather nicely-> All they can do is bark while science passes them by. For their next trick they will roll over and piss themselves...Joe
November 14, 2012
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Alan Fox:
Your critics are just being obtuse...
They just are obtuse.
... and the scales of skepticism will eventually fall from their eyes.
Right after hell freezes over...Joe
November 14, 2012
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well keiths, I've been carefully watching your self-replicating molecule and I haven't seen it self-replicate once. Something appears to be missing. Is it perhaps asleep? Does it need to eat first? Maybe play some music?Mung
November 14, 2012
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It seems to be incoherent only to certain visitors from TSZ. What's in the water over there?Mung
November 14, 2012
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I am reminded of the old Arab proverb: Les chiens aboient, la caravane passe.Alan Fox
November 14, 2012
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What is this ambiguity you keep claiming exist?
Upright Biped, I have never used the word "ambiguous" in relation to your arguments. I think they are incoherent. It's not a problem. The possibilities, I guess, are twofold at least. One: Your argument breaks the mould and advances the breadth of human knowledge. Your critics are just being obtuse and the scales of skepticism will eventually fall from their eyes. Two: Your argument is, in fact, incoherent. Not sure where you go from here but best of luck!Alan Fox
November 14, 2012
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keiths' argument: Srm is a self replicating molecule. Srm self-replicates, creating a copy of Srm, call it Srm2. Therefore there was a transfer of recorded information from Srm to Srm2. Therefore, no semiotic system is required for the transfer of recorded information. That's his alleged "rebuttal." What a joke.Mung
November 14, 2012
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keiths:
While you’re waiting impatiently, Upright, how about responding to my rebuttal of your argument?
Obvioulsy you do NOT understand what a "rebuttal" is and obvioulsy you have no idea what UB's argument is as you have shown no indication that you understand it.Joe
November 14, 2012
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Mung @986: LOL!Eric Anderson
November 13, 2012
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Petrushka:
But suppose we do a little thought experiment. Let’s agree that gpuccio’s definition entails a threshold. Say 150 bits. That implies that 149 bits does not trigger the dFSCI indicator. The number is arbitrary, but gpuccio’s paradigm requires a threshold.
You mean the number is not connected by any direct physical mechanism? Maybe you need to define what you mean by arbitrary!Mung
November 13, 2012
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Toronto:
Information transferred without a “representation instantiated in matter”: 1) The water level is higher, therefore water has been added to the pool.
Do you ever stop talking long enough to think? That's a complete non sequitur. If you want to rely on irrational arguments go right ahead, but I have no obligation to accept your nonsensical conclusion. In fact, I measured the water level in the pool and the water level was actually lower!Mung
November 13, 2012
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Toronto on November 13, 2012 at 7:45 pm said:
You’ve defined “information” as being arbitrary.
Why, because it's not connected by any direct physical mechanism? Maybe you need to define what you mean by arbitrary!Mung
November 13, 2012
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Toronto:
Take some objects and throw them into a pool of water.
ok. I took some drops of water and threw them into a pool of water.
The ones that float are lighter than water and the ones that sink to the bottom are heavier.
I had some difficulty ascertaining the trajectory of each of the drops of water once they hit the pool of water.
No “representation instantiated in matter” was used to transfer this “information”.
What information.Mung
November 13, 2012
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