We Should Care About Your Personal Incredulity Why Now?

_{Barry Arrington

November 20, 2017

Intelligent Design}

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Prominent atheist John W. Loftus gives us an example of a common atheist argument from the size of the universe when he writes:

I think it’s [i.e., the vast size of the universe] even more damaging when it comes to an omnipotent God who supposedly created the universe for the specific purpose of gaining the affections of people on this lone planet of ours. If this is what he desired (for some irrational egotistical reason) he could have simply created us on a flat disk in a much smaller universe like the one the ancients believed existed.

This argument is a hot mess, a mishmash of factual errors,* self-serving assumptions and faulty logic. But let us set most of that aside and focus on Loftus’ argument from personal incredulity.

The argument from personal incredulity takes the form of “I cannot imagine how this could be true; therefore, it must be false.” Notice how Loftus exhibits this fallacy. His argument boils down to the assertion that he cannot imagine why God, if he existed, would have created a large universe. A large universe surely exists. Therefore, God does not exist.

Here is the critical question that is left unanswered: Why should the poverty of John Loftus’ imagination concerning God’s motivations matter to us?

The argument from personal incredulity is a species of the “argument from ignorance.” Duco A. Schreuder writes: “These arguments fail to appreciate that the limits of one’s understanding or certainty do not change what is true. They do not inform upon reality.”

Just so. The limits of Loftus’ understanding about God’s motivations does not change what is true. Indeed, if a God powerful enough to create such a vast universe exists, we can be certain that our understanding of him would be extremely limited. Therefore, it is absurd to suggest that very limited understanding should be the foundation of an argument for his non-existence.

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*His assertion that the ancients had no conception of the scale of the universe, for example, is pure bunkum: “The earth, in relation to the distance of the fixed stars, has no appreciable size and must be treated as a mathematical point.” Ptolemy’s Almagest, Book I, Chapter 6. See also, Psalm 8 (“When I consider thy heavens . . . What is man, that thou art mindful of him?”).

Comments

Headlined: https://uncommondescent.com/philosophy/what-is-knowledge/kairosfocus_{November 26, 2017
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Origines, Generally, I would argue that "knowledge" is used in a weak form sense: warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief. Drawing out, slightly:
Warranted -- there is an available account (as opposed to internal to the given knower, who may simply accept a message from reliable sources . . . ) that, properly understood, would justify accepting or treating belief x as true in serious contexts. Credibly true -- the warrant for and circumstances of belief x are such that we can have good confidence that the belief is likely to be true or capture enough truth that we are entitled to trust it. Reliable -- the warrant for x is such that if we act on the belief that-x in a consequential situation, we are unlikely to be let down. Belief -- that which is accepted, perceived, or held to be so; often in this context, for good reason.
Of course in today's day and age, "faith" and "belief" are often despised and dismissively contrasted with "science," "reason/rationality" and "knowledge," etc. as though acknowledged faith/trust/belief is invariably ill-warranted. Such reflects dominance of radical secularism and evolutionary materialistic scientism, which, ironically are not well warranted, are not trustworthy (being fallaciously rooted, esp. through self-referential incoherence and/or the fostering of ill-advised cognitive biases) and should not be permitted to act as gate-keepers on what we regard as knowledge. KFkairosfocus_{November 26, 2017
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F/N: I took a moment to do a DDGo search and this essay is there among the top several hits: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ethical-monotheism Kindly note, "theism" is a short form for "monotheism." The essay will provide useful food for thought, though it fails to understand Christian ethics i/l/o say Eph 2:8 - 10, salvation is by grace through faith not by works [given our radical moral failure] but leads to good works as the necessary overflow of a transformed person being brought to manifest holiness and goodness. KFkairosfocus_{November 25, 2017
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PPPS: BTW, as an appeal to basic courtesy in argument and basic responsibility, I should note that your constant projection of a false claim to me and others about attempting to secure immunity to "criticism" is little more than a strawman caricature of your own manufacture. What do you think that my pointing to comparative difficulties across factual adequacy, coherence and balanced explanatory power is, i/l/o the infinite regress/ circularity/ finitely remote start point is, but the very opposite of locking out responsible discussion of alternatives? Have you not understood that: that a self-evident truth will be seen (by one of sufficient background to see clearly) as true and as necessarily true on pain of patent absurdity on the attempted denial, is nothing but a gross failure before the comparative difficulties challenge? Do you not see the significance of using "error exists" as a capital example of what a self evident truth is and how it is established? Likewise, to ask the courtesy of allowing a worldview to speak in its own voice is little more than asking that one try to understand the other instead of imposing loaded strawman caricatures. On fair comment, you have caricatured both ethical theism and the recognition that observation and experience are valid approaches to knowledge. Not to mention, inductive reasoning [modern sense] as a legitimate approach in logic and epistemology.kairosfocus_{November 25, 2017
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PS: FYI, here is Plato in The Laws, Bk X:
Athenian Stranger: . . . They [the skeptical objectors] will make some irreverent speech of this sort:-“O inhabitants of Athens, and Sparta, and Cnosus,” they will reply, “in that you speak truly; for some of us deny the very existence of the Gods, while others, as you say, are of opinion that they do not care about us; and others that they are turned from their course by gifts. Now we have a right to claim, as you yourself allowed, in the matter of laws, that before you are hard upon us and threaten us, you should argue with us and convince us-you should first attempt to teach and persuade us that there are Gods by reasonable evidences, and also that they are too good to be unrighteous, or to be propitiated, or turned from their course by gifts. For when we hear such things said of them by those who are esteemed to be the best of poets, and orators, and prophets, and priests, and by innumerable others, the thoughts of most of us are not set upon abstaining from unrighteous acts, but upon doing them and atoning for them. When lawgivers profess that they are gentle and not stern, we think that they should first of all use persuasion to us, and show us the existence of Gods, if not in a better manner than other men, at any rate in a truer; and who knows but that we shall hearken to you? If then our request is a fair one, please to accept our challenge.” . . . . At Athens there are tales preserved in writing which the virtue of your state, as I am informed, refuses to admit. They speak of the Gods in prose as well as verse, and the oldest of them tell of the origin of the heavens and of the world, and not far from the beginning of their story they proceed to narrate the birth of the Gods, and how after they were born they behaved to one another. Whether these stories have in other ways a good or a bad influence, I should not like to be severe upon them, because they are ancient; but, looking at them with reference to the duties of children to their parents, I cannot praise them, or think that they are useful, or at all true. Of the words of the ancients I have nothing more to say; and I should wish to say of them only what is pleasing to the Gods. But as to our younger generation and their wisdom, I cannot let them off when they do mischief. For do but mark the effect of their words: when you and I argue for the existence of the Gods, and produce the sun, moon, stars, and earth, claiming for them a divine being, if we would listen to the aforesaid philosophers we should say that they are earth and stones only, which can have no care at all of human affairs, and that all religion is a cooking up of words and a make-believe . . . . . . . . [[The avant garde philosophers, teachers and artists c. 400 BC] say that the greatest and fairest things are the work of nature and of chance, the lesser of art [[ i.e. techne], which, receiving from nature the greater and primeval creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are generally termed artificial . . . They say that fire and water, and earth and air [[i.e the classical "material" elements of the cosmos], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in order-earth, and sun, and moon, and stars-they have been created by means of these absolutely inanimate existences. The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them-of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures of opposites which have been formed by necessity. After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only . . . . [[T]hese people would say that the Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- [[Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT. (Cf. here for Locke's views and sources on a very different base for grounding liberty as opposed to license and resulting anarchistic "every man does what is right in his own eyes" chaos leading to tyranny.)] These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might [[ Evolutionary materialism leads to the promotion of amorality], and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [[Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality "naturally" leads to continual contentions and power struggles; cf. dramatisation here], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others [[such amoral factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless tyranny; here, too, Plato hints at the career of Alcibiades], and not in legal subjection to them . . . . [[I]f impious discourses were not scattered, as I may say, throughout the world, there would have been no need for any vindication of the existence of the Gods-but seeing that they are spread far and wide, such arguments are needed; and who should come to the rescue of the greatest laws, when they are being undermined by bad men, but the legislator himself? . . . . Ath. Then, by Heaven, we have discovered the source of this vain opinion of all those physical investigators; and I would have you examine their arguments with the utmost care, for their impiety is a very serious matter; they not only make a bad and mistaken use of argument, but they lead away the minds of others: that is my opinion of them. Cle. You are right; but I should like to know how this happens. Ath. I fear that the argument may seem singular. Cle. Do not hesitate, Stranger; I see that you are afraid of such a discussion carrying you beyond the limits of legislation. But if there be no other way of showing our agreement in the belief that there are Gods, of whom the law is said now to approve, let us take this way, my good sir. Ath. Then I suppose that I must repeat the singular argument of those who manufacture the soul according to their own impious notions; they affirm that which is the first cause of the generation and destruction of all things, to be not first, but last, and that which is last to be first, and hence they have fallen into error about the true nature of the Gods. Cle. Still I do not understand you. Ath. Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of the nature and power of the soul [[ = psuche], especially in what relates to her origin: they do not know that she is among the first of things, and before all bodies, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions. And if this is true, and if the soul is older than the body, must not the things which are of the soul's kindred be of necessity prior to those which appertain to the body? Cle. Certainly. Ath. Then thought and attention and mind and art and law will be prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and light; and the great and primitive works and actions will be works of art; they will be the first, and after them will come nature and works of nature, which however is a wrong term for men to apply to them; these will follow, and will be under the government of art and mind. Cle. But why is the word "nature" wrong? Ath. Because those who use the term mean to say that nature is the first creative power; but if the soul turn out to be the primeval element, and not fire or air, then in the truest sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to exist by nature; and this would be true if you proved that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise. [[ . . . .] Ath. . . . when one thing changes another, and that another, of such will there be any primary changing element? How can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving principle? . . . . self-motion being the origin of all motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second. [[ . . . .] Ath. If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound-how should we describe it? Cle. You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving power life? Ath. I do. Cle. Certainly we should. Ath. And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same-must we not admit that this is life? [[ . . . . ] Cle. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul? Ath. Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things? Cle. Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things. Ath. And is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower number which you may prefer? Cle. Exactly. Ath. Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is the ruler? [[ . . . . ] Ath. If, my friend, we say that the whole path and movement of heaven, and of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path. [[Plato here explicitly sets up an inference to design (by a good soul) from the intelligible order of the cosmos.]
PPS: Let me also add, from F H Bradley, Appearance and Reality as I suspect some of the Kantian ugly gulch issue may be at work in all this:
We may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole [--> i.e. the focus of Metaphysics is critical studies of worldviews] . . . . The man who is ready to prove that metaphysical knowledge is wholly impossible . . . himself has, perhaps unknowingly, entered the arena . . . To say the reality is such that our knowledge cannot reach it, is a claim to know reality ; to urge that our knowledge is of a kind which must fail to transcend appearance, itself implies that transcendence. For, if we had no idea of a beyond, we should assuredly not know how to talk about failure or success. And the test, by which we distinguish them, must obviously be some acquaintance with the nature of the goal. Nay, the would-be sceptic, who presses on us the contradictions of our thoughts, himself asserts dogmatically. For these contradictions might be ultimate and absolute truth, if the nature of the reality were not known to be otherwise . . . [such] objections . . . are themselves, however unwillingly, metaphysical views, and . . . a little acquaintance with the subject commonly serves to dispel [them]. [Appearance and Reality, 2nd Edn, 1897 (1916 printing), pp. 1 - 2; INTRODUCTION. At Web Archive.]
kairosfocus_{November 25, 2017
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CR, Metaphysics and epistemology are considerably different subject matters, though both are main components of Philosophy. Let's try AmHD:
met·a·phys·ics (m?t??-f?z??ks) n. 1. (used with a sing. verb) Philosophy The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute, possibility and actuality. e·pis·te·mol·o·gy (?-p?s?t?-m?l??-j?) n. The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of knowledge, its presuppositions and foundations, and its extent and validity.
Again, you have refused to address things as they are, and have tried to weaponise "assertion" by way of evading reasonable discussion. It should be obvious that matters of epistemology will come up in metaphysics, and that matters of metaphysics will come up in epistemology, just as matters of logic and ethics will come up or be implicit while doing both. But each of the four will be distinct. Trying to collapse any of the four into the others will impoverish one's thought. Going further, your attempt to characterise theism as in effect implicitly fallacious appeal to authority is more of an accusation than a reasonable view. As was already pointed out, ethical theism is a worldview which can be summarised. Summary that describes how some people view the world is a matter of accurate description, open onwards to comparative difficulties analysis, not an imposition of a demand for blind adherence to any given authority. Philosophy by its very nature is not authoritarian. The empirical, likewise, is a description of responsiveness to experience and/or observation, not a fallacious imposition of blind loyalty to a given authority. AmHD again, by way of summarising what is generally meant:
em·pir·i·cal (?m-pîr??-k?l) adj. 1. a. Relying on or derived from observation or experiment: empirical results that supported the hypothesis. b. Verifiable or provable by means of observation or experiment: empirical laws. 2. Guided by practical experience and not theory, especially in medicine.
This is closely linked to the challenge of warrant of knowledge claims, but not in a vicious or fallacious manner. Now, this can be turned into empiricism, summarised by AmHD:
em·pir·i·cism (?m-pîr??-s?z??m) n. 1. The view that experience, especially of the senses, is the only source of knowledge.
That is a particular epistemological viewpoint, and it is plainly fundamentally flawed. But one can appeal to the empirical where it is relevant without implying or committing oneself to empiricism. You continue to use your favourite dismissive assertion that I have merely asserted, when you touched on my observation on infinite regress. At this point, you are speaking with disregard to truth, as not only is the challenge of such regress well known -- i.e. the Münchhausen/Agrippa trilemma -- but I outlined it several times above. In a blog comment thread, one cannot reproduce reams of debates on every point. Especially, when the matter is obvious: A requires warrant on B, but B now requires C etc. So, we face infinite regress or question-begging circularity or some reasonable, non-question-begging finitely remote start-point framework. This similarly applies to a regress of contingent causes. It is easily seen that it is futile to try to cross an endless span in finite-stage steps. For, after any finite degree of k steps, k, k+1, k+2 etc can be put in endless 1:1 onward match with the set of naturals 0, 1, 2 etc. A property of endless incremental succession. Besides our own finitude will run out in finite time and we will never reach an endlessly remote or extensive "far side". For causal succession, it is the endless succession that counts. A causal circle [involving origin of each stage], likewise will require that something causes its own origin. For warrant, the fallacy of grand question-begging is obvious. The solution to this last is to recognise that by applying comparative difficulties at worldviews level, one is not begging the question when one stops at his or her first plausibles constituting a faith-point. For causality, we face a finitely remote world root that as was outlined, will need to be a necessary being. The issue then is, what are reasonable or serious candidates. Where, this last is constrained by the fact that just to reason responsibly and freely about it, we are morally governed, thus the IS-OUGHT gap has to be bridged. This BTW is more than enough to answer the no job opening rhetorical gambit. And the self referentiality is a caution. As to my use of ethical as a modifier for theism, I have long since pointed out in answer to you that this is by way of emphasis on a point that is too often neglected, not a distinct school of thought. The null result on a Google search simply underscores that neglect. Surely, you will understand that the IS-OUGHT gap is fundamental, and that it is a longstanding issue that the follies of the gods etc are no proper context for bridging the gap. That's a point highlighted by Plato in the Laws Bk X 2350+ years past. As I clipped on just this morning in another thread. The inherently good creator-God, a necessary and maximally great being worthy of loyalty and the reasonable, responsible service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature is a serious answer and it draws out why the emphasis is important. Likewise, I pointed out that it is a generally true fact that we find ourselves morally governed towards the truth, a matter that is BTW at the focus of arguments. Unless, the whole point is cynical manipulation. And in evidence I pointed out that your own citation inadvertently revealed the force of this impulse that governs us. See 38 above, just before my point 14 in response:
if one too strongly endorses even a true theory like this, one might seem dogmatic
In context of the argument you cited with seeming approval, this was self-referentially incoherent. We could go on and on but enough has been pointed out for me to call on you to revise your approach to date. G'night, KFkairosfocus_{November 25, 2017
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CR, I have no idea how your comments apply to the posts Ive written. It seems like a large miscommunication is going on, but I don't know what it is. It's probably not worth pursuing further, though.jdk_{November 25, 2017
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CR What is your definition of valid knowledge?Origenes_{November 25, 2017
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@JDK
I am interested in what other have to say about this point.
If there is no way of taking that seriously, for the purpose of criticism, then in what sense is what other people have to say important? Are you suggesting what they say isn't criticism? If they do not consider other ideas they think to be true, in reality, as part of that criticism, then how is this a fruitful endeavor? If everything is possible and there are no consequences to our ideas then how can we ever hope to find errors in them?critical rationalist_{November 25, 2017
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Wha's the difference, in practice, between "I believe that X is a moral value or duty, rooted by God" and "I believe X is a moral value or duty."? How does adding God to the equation help when face with concrete moral problems? For example, take the problem of unwanted and dangerous pregnancies. Of the top of my head, this would include the knowledge of how to transform raw materials into an artificial womb or the knowledge of how to implant embryos into mothers that cannot conceive and want children? Isn't that moral knowledge? What good does God "rooting" enforcement of some unknown values and duties help in the face of that specific problem?critical rationalist_{November 25, 2017
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First, this is not correct, as metaphysics [roughly, study of worldviews] is not reducible to epistemology:
An assertion is not an argument. Why is in not reducible to epistemology? How is this not a tenet of a specific epistemological view? To quote Deutsch.
Misconceptions about what Popper's epistemology says are held in place by preconceptions about what an epistemology *can possibly* say.
Are you saying that both empirical observations and theism do not share the key feature of being authoritative sources? You seem to argue for at least one of those in this very thread.
Second, despite the many attempts to dismiss the idea of a finitely remote start-point for reasoning and warranting knowledge claims that is readily seen from the emergence of chains of warrant. They cannot go on forever, or we would get nowhere. We have finitely remote start points, which may be partly based on what we observe, partly on how we reason and seek coherence, partly what is self-evident, partly, what seems good to us. In short, there is an irreducible element of faith.
You keep asserting this despite being presented alternate explanations for the growth of knowledge. Again, I'm saying that when we stop, we do not do so merely to prevent an infinite regress. We stop because we lack good criticisms of an idea. Good explanations are few and far between. Even more so are good criticisms of those explanations. One of the properties of good explanations is that they are hard to vary without significantly reducing their ability to explain the phenomena in question. So, we don't need to arbitrary stop at some point. We stop because we've run out of good explanations and criticisms of those explanations. Again, when presenting any ideas as basic beliefs, why did you present those specific ideas instead of others? Because you criticized them in relation to other ideas. The ones you picked you found as lacking good criticisms. If you held them immune to criticism, then you'd have no reason to present them specifically, as opposed to some other ideas. Right?
Next, we cannot escape seeking truth at some level, as even the case you cited and demanded a response demonstrated.
Seeing truth cannot mean seeking to discard errors in conjectured ideas? It's unclear how "seeking truth" requires a specific epistemology being true. If you define seeking truth as a specific epistemology that would be an argument by definition.
After this, Theism is not a system of blind appeal to the authority of God to ground knowledge etc. In relevant part, it answers, how do we get a world in light of the logic of being, and in light of our presence as rational and responsible significantly free creatures who are inevitably morally governed.
I'm having problems finding expanded details on the exact terms "ethical theism" when searching via Google. Perhaps you can provide links that unpack that or go into more detail by what you mean by "a world in light of the logic of being" or "our presence as rational and responsible significantly free creatures who are inevitably morally governed." It seems to me that you are trying to account for things that have yet to be established. Or as I mentioned, earlier, it's unclear there actually is a job opening for which God is the best candidate. Even if there was such an opening, perhaps you can explain how God performs that job? Would it be accurate to state that you believe in God because you believe there must be some necessary being to account for [logic|morality|rationality] and that you believe God is that necessary being? If so, wouldn't that be putting the cart before the horse? Furthermore, are you saying we do not have moral moral knowledge, but only some reason to assume that moral knowledge, if we had it, was enforceable? Even if that were the case, which I'm not suggesting, what good is that when we find ourselves in concrete moral problems? If you find yourself in situation X do you say, "there is some moral value or duties we must obey... if only I just knew what that value or duties was?" If God isn't the source of moral knowledge, then what good is it when people are actually faced with moral problems? If we have to guess what is the right moral knowledge in a specific situation, then criticize our guesses, then why should I be under some obligation to follow them? IOW, why should I care if some values or duties are inferable if we don't know what they are? How does that actually solve the problem? And if it was though criticism that we choose specific values and duties, then isn't the details of the contents of that criticism that makes it moral knowledge, as opposed to some authority? it's as if someone conjectured the solution to the problem of getting an aught from an is by suggests there is some being that bridges the gap in some inexplicable way. But that just pushes it up a level without improving it because people still do not agree on what values or duties one would need to adhere to. Without a means of deriving what those aughts are, which would be moral knowledge, then what good is it? How does it improve our situation?
As is predictable, you do not have another such candidate. Or, you would have long since provided it.
The above is criticism of the idea for the existence of said job opening and the idea that "hiring" God to fit it would actually improve our situation, in practice. Why would I present a candidate for a position that doesn't exist and cannot be filled?critical rationalist_{November 25, 2017
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@jdk, your #35 and #37 'Sure it’s a theological, speculative hypothesis. But the question is whether it is possibly a reasonable hypothesis, or whether there is a reason, theological or otherwise, to think it unlikely, or even rule it out.' I don't see how it could be ruled out, jdk, but I don't think you accorded the ideas which you said you'd already pondered, the merit they deserve; neither the ineluctable finitude of all matter, nor the aspect that primarily persuades me, namely, the combination of our littleness and our possible relative sparsity being meaningless to God, are in any way able to detract from his love and esteem for us, plausibly deliberately intended to indicate to us the gulf between the whole of material creation and our essentially spiritual nature, each one of us uniquely loved, as if God had created no one else.Axel_{November 25, 2017
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JDK, 85: No, there are many types of knowledge that are introspective and logical, e.g. Mathematics etc. Some things are self evident. others are known by logical entailment from things taken as true etc. However, in many cases, we are dealing with knowledge that is warranted on support not entailment, support that is a lot less than utterly or even morally certain. For example, scientific knowledge especially where we go beyond direct observation. Observation is also subject to challenge in at least some cases, e.g. optical illusions etc. So, we need to recognise how much of our knowledge base is a matter of acting on confidence in warrant that is not beyond all doubt or even all reasonable doubt. KFkairosfocus_{November 25, 2017
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DS, yes. KFkairosfocus_{November 25, 2017
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KF, Obviously one has to be clear on precisely what definitions are being used.daveS_{November 25, 2017
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DS, it seems to me that US practice is different on counting Presidents, where you have had Grover Cleveland counted as 22 and 24 separately, this being the same individual. I doubt that for example the UK would count Sir Winston Churchill as two separate Prime Ministers given his term in the 1940's and his term in the 1950's; the UK being where English came from, but then US praxis is that of the largest population of native English speakers in the world. (I think India has the largest population of English speakers in a country where English is an Official Language, but for most English will not be their Mother Tongue.) In Jamaica, I doubt that the cases of separated terms would be counted as two different Prime Ministers each, also. Next time I can ask someone from the DR, I will ask about their practice. So, definition is a critical issue here above and beyond that of how facts are established as accurate to reality and with what degree of certainty. KFkairosfocus_{November 25, 2017
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KF @83: Thank you for pointing to those comments in that thread. I've read some of them. Definitely deep and always timely.Dionisio_{November 25, 2017
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KF,
However, note in 57: “Is this proposition true or false?” This requires soundness not just entailment, and so it necessitates addressing warrant for the premises and even the issue of definitions.
I agree with this, although I'm not sure about definitions---I treat those as abbreviations, essentially, so I don't see them creating any issues unless they are not well-formed.daveS_{November 25, 2017
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DS, I hear you, and I do not deny that that is there too. However, note in 57: "Is this proposition true or false?" This requires soundness not just entailment, and so it necessitates addressing warrant for the premises and even the issue of definitions. Once that is in hand, we face issues of support rather than onward entailment alone or self evidence. KF PS: Thanks to WJM and some onward reading, I found some further materials in the other thread that are worth pondering on my basic point. When Wm Colby of the CIA warns as I found, regarding the Franklin case, we should sit up and take duly sobered notice.kairosfocus_{November 25, 2017
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KF, I guess we'll have to consult JAD for more clarification on context. What I see in #65 is an argument that a conclusion follows from a collection of premises (i.e., deduction).daveS_{November 25, 2017
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DS, My context is that empirical observation, record etc can mount up to moral certainty but they do not assure utter certainty. Yes, if we accept the US way of counting JAD's conclusions are entailed by the premises but that also happens when a Sci Hyp is used to make predictions we set out to test. My context is the warranting of the facts is also on the table. BTW, in Jamaica IIRC, we have had three Prime Ministers with separated terms, Michael Manley, Portia Simpson-Miller and Andrew Holness. I doubt that Jamaicans would accept the US style count. Busta, Sangster, Shearer, Manley, Seaga, Manley again, Patterson, Simpson-Miller [first woman], Golding, Holness, Simpson Miller again, Holness again. In the DR I gather there were two who exchanged office for many years too. KFkairosfocus_{November 25, 2017
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PS to my #84: If I were to suddenly blurt out, apropos of nothing, "Dawkins is a man; all men are mortal; therefore Dawkins is mortal", then ask you whether I am engaging in inductive or deductive reasoning, then obviously everyone would respond "deductive". This example is simpler, yet parallel to JAD's, AFAICT. PPS: What JAD does in #65 is explain how a conclusion follows (with absolute certainty) from a collection of premises. That's clearly deduction.daveS_{November 25, 2017
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Hmmm. That makes every bit knowledge, aside from direct observation, a product of inductive reasoning. I can see how technically that might be true, but it seems to me that some nuances might be useful. I can see, outside my window, that I own a blue car. I've seen it often. That's a pretty direct observation. And yet, if I tell someone "I own a blue car" when the blue car is not in fact present, that is now an inductive, and hence provisional, conclusion. I think there was a cat in one of the Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy books that took this philosphical position.jdk_{November 25, 2017
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KF (& jdk, et al), It seems to me that the reasoning JAD used in #65 is purely deductive. In this context, it appears we are to assume that the cited information regarding who was president at various times is simply true. For example, I don't think we're meant to assume that there is some uncertainty about who occupied the White House in 1967. Furthermore, no one who looked at the puzzle has concluded that it's (say) 99.999% certain that 44 men have been president of the US and Trump is the 45th president. We've all said that the original statement is flatly true. In particular, I don't see any induction in post #65, which is really what the question is about.daveS_{November 25, 2017
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Dionisio, well said. You may enjoy the exchange that begins with this comment -- https://uncommondescent.com/off-topic/what-do-ricky-gervais-and-the-assyrian-king-sennacherib-have-in-common/#comment-644240 -- and the one I made right after it. KFkairosfocus_{November 25, 2017
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JDK, Pardon but you are unfortunately using an older understanding of inductive reasoning, which would now be regarded as a part of the case. The modern view is in short, that arguments where premises (which may be descriptions of experience or observation etc) SUPPORT as opposed to entailing the conclusion are inductive. Let me clip Wikipedia again as at 54 above:
Inductive reasoning (as opposed to deductive reasoning or abductive reasoning) is a method of reasoning in which the premises are viewed as supplying strong evidence for the truth of the conclusion. While the conclusion of a deductive argument is certain, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument may be probable, based upon the evidence given.[1] Many dictionaries define inductive reasoning as the derivation of general principles from specific observations, though some sources disagree with this usage.[2] The philosophical definition of inductive reasoning is more nuanced than simple progression from particular/individual instances to broader generalizations. Rather, the premises of an inductive logical argument indicate some degree of support (inductive probability) for the conclusion but do not entail it; that is, they suggest truth but do not ensure it. In this manner, there is the possibility of moving from general statements to individual instances (for example, statistical syllogisms
That reports and other data support the claim that Mr Washington was first President (under the 1787 Constitution . . . ) do not entail that he was such in reality. The warrant is morally certain as qualified by me -- I gather others held a presidency under the 1778 arrangements -- but that is not the same as logical entailment. KFkairosfocus_{November 25, 2017
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kf, I don't believe that I know that George Washington was the 1st president through inductive reasoning. It's just a fact. I suppose you could say I know it inductively because lots of different sources have told me that over the years, and there have been no counter-examples or denials, but I don't really think that is how the word inductive is intended to mean used. However, if "induction" is meant to cover all of our knowledge that is arrived at via observation and experience, on the grounds that all we ever do is accumulate conclusions which are in theory provisional (no matter how very unlikely that is), then I could paraphrase what I said earlier by saying all deductive reasoning about the world must necessarily also include propositions whose truth is arrived at inductively. I'm not sure that is a standard understanding of induction, but I may be wrong.jdk_{November 25, 2017
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KF @79, Yes, this is off topic in this thread. Mine was a rhetorical question, intended mainly for your interlocutor and other readers here, so they realized that words have meaning established above and beyond our own personal preferences. All true followers of Christ are His priests in the OT meaning, as it is written in 1 Peter 2, regardless of denomination. Actually, there are no denominations in the church founded by Christ, who is the true High Priest, as it was understood in the OT. Also all true followers of Christ are His saints, though still He's changing each of us -a process called 'sanctification' in the NT. This was an opportunity to present the Scriptures to the readers, some of whom might be lost sheep who will recognize the voice of Truth. Those opportunities should be used every time they appear. You do it relatively often. Definitely more often than anybody else here. Well done! Thanks.Dionisio_{November 25, 2017
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Dionisio, yes, I understand the NT context but assumed that J-Mac was speaking in the cultural sense. He would likely not know that Priest is Presbyter, elder. Bishop is Episkopos, overseer, as in supervisor. Saint is one set aside to God in Christ and more. I have not been ordained in any denomination that has "priests." All this is of course tangential to the issues in the thread above. KFkairosfocus_{November 25, 2017
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KF, BTW, NT priests of the High Priest are also His saints.Dionisio_{November 25, 2017
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