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Why you can’t be a Darwinist and a “human exceptionalist”

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The vast majority of people who live in Louisiana hold beliefs about the human mind and about free will which are broadly compatible with those of Darwin’s contemporary, Alfred Russel Wallace (pictured right), but diametrically opposed to those of Charles Darwin (pictured left). However, the National Center for Science Education wants Darwin’s materialistic version of evolution, which denies free will, to be taught in American high schools.
Left: A photo of Charles Darwin taken circa 1854. Center: St. Louis Cathedral, New Orleans. Right: A photo of Alfred Russel Wallace in 1862. Images courtesy of Messrs. Maull and Fox, Nowhereman86, James Marchant and Wikipedia.

(Part three of a series of posts in response to Zack Kopplin. See here for Part one and here for Part two.)

This series of posts is dedicated to the people of Louisiana, most of whom support the 2008 Louisiana Science Education Act (LSEA), which allows teachers to encourage the open and objective discussion of scientific theories, including evolution and origin-of-life theories, in high school science classrooms. The Louisiana Senate Bill 374, which was filed by Senator Karen Peterson, would take away this freedom, and require high school students to be taught the Darwinian theory of evolution which is presented in officially approved science textbooks – and no other theory.

Many people who would describe themselves as “theistic evolutionists” see Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution as compatible with their theological beliefs. Science, they would say, describes how things happen, while religion explains why they happen. Science is about the physical world, while religion is about the underlying spiritual dimension of reality, which science does not attempt to explain. Consequently, they reason, Darwin’s theory of evolution has nothing to say about the religious belief that each of us has an immortal, spiritual soul created by God, or that each of us has free will. If people want to believe these things, they can, while still remaining good Darwinists. Many Catholics, in particular, rationalize their support of Darwinian evolution in this way. About 25% of Louisiana’s population are Catholics, so I hope some of them are reading this.

The aim of this post will be to demonstrate that belief in Darwinian evolution is totally incompatible with belief in an immaterial human soul and belief in free will, in the ordinary sense of the term. I shall attempt to demonstrate that Darwinian evolution is essentially a materialistic, deterministic theory. The reason why I maintain that the Darwinian theory of evolution is essentially materialistic and deterministic has to do with what counts as a proper scientific explanation, for Darwinists.

Before I do that, however, I’d like to compare the beliefs of the people of Louisiana with those of Charles Darwin, regarding the human soul and free will. The reason why I’m doing this is a very simple one: for those readers who live in the United States, it’s your money which is funding the high schools in your state. Why should taxes paid by decent, hard-working Louisianans, or people in any other American state for that matter, be spent on the indoctrination of their children in a worldview which is diametrically opposed to the beliefs of ordinary Americans on matters of morality, not to mention religion? Common sense would suggest that’s just not right. I shall attempt to demonstrate in this post that materialism and the denial of free will – notions that most Americans would vehemently reject – are part-and-parcel of the Darwinian theory of evolution. The implications of this debate on Darwinism should be obvious enough. Anyone who thinks that students’ moral behavior will remain unaffected after they are convinced that they don’t have free will clearly has rocks in his head.


What do the people of Louisiana believe about the human soul and about free will?


Baton Rouge skyline. Courtesy of UrbanPlanetBR and Wikipedia.

Citing the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Wikipedia lists the current religious affiliations of the people of Louisiana as follows:

Christian: 90%

Protestant: 60%

Evangelical Protestant 31%
Historically black Protestant: 20%
Mainline Protestant 9%

Roman Catholic: 28%
Other Christian: 2%
Jehovah’s Witnesses: 1%

Other Religions: 2%

Islam: 1%
Buddhism: 1%
Judaism: less than 0.5%

Non-religious (unaffiliated): 8%

Looking at these figures, we can see that the vast majority of Louisianans hold beliefs about the human soul and about free will which are totally at variance with the teachings of Darwinian evolution. A solid majority of people in the state of Louisiana would accept the following three propositions:

1. Each human being has an immaterial and immortal soul, created by God.

2. Our higher mental acts – in particular, our thoughts and our free decisions – cannot be identified with movements of neurons in the brain. Rather, they are immaterial, spiritual actions.

3. Each human being has libertarian free will: that is,
(i) our choices are not determined by circumstances beyond our control, such as our heredity or environment; and
(ii) whenever we make a choice, we could have chosen otherwise.

The vast majority of Christians, as well as many Jews and Muslims, would subscribe to propositions 1 and 2. Jews, Buddhists and nearly all Christians would subscribe to proposition 3, as well as many people who would not describe themselves as religious. Darwinian evolution denies all three propositions.

But before I go on, I’d like to briefly focus on the beliefs of the Catholic Church, which is Louisiana’s largest religious community.


The teaching of the Catholic Church concerning the human soul

Curiously, there are some highly educated people who call themselves Catholics, and who are under the mistaken impression that belief in an immortal, immaterial soul is an “optional extra” which Catholics are no longer required to accept, and which the Church will quietly drop in another 50 years or so. Nothing could be further from the truth.

It is an article of faith among Catholics that each and every human soul is immaterial, that it is created immediately by God, and that it survives bodily death. As the Catechism of the Catholic Church puts it in paragraph 366:

366 The Church teaches that every spiritual soul is created immediately by God – it is not “produced” by the parents – and also that it is immortal: it does not perish when it separates from the body at death, and it will be reunited with the body at the final Resurrection.(235)

The footnote (#235) gives the following citation:

235 Cf. Pius XII, Humani Generis: DS 3896; Paul VI, CPG 8; Lateran Council V (1513): DS 1440.

The first reference is to Pope Pius XII’s 1950 encyclical Humani Generis, which states in paragraph 36 that “the Catholic faith obliges us to hold that souls are immediately created by God.”

The second reference is to Pope Paul VI’s Credo of the People of God (issued on June 30, 1968), which contains the following statement:

We believe in one only God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, creator of things visible such as this world in which our transient life passes, of things invisible such as the pure spirits which are also called angels, and creator in each man of his spiritual and immortal soul.

The third reference is to a proclamation made by Pope Leo X on 19 December 1513, at the eighth session of the ecumenical Fifth Lateran council, and ratified by that council, declaring that each human being has a unique, immaterial soul:

… [W]e condemn and reject all those who insist that the intellectual soul is mortal, or that it is only one among all human beings, and those who suggest doubts on this topic.

Well, I hope that puts to rest the canard that belief in a spiritual soul, created by God, is no longer Catholic doctrine.

Catholics make up one-quarter of Louisiana’s population. One would therefore expect them to be appalled at the very suggestion that their children should be taught a scientific theory which is avowedly materialistic and deterministic, while they are attending high school. (In case readers are wondering, the percentage of Catholic children attending parochial schools in the United States is minuscule: according to Wikipedia, only 15 percent of Catholic children in America attended Catholic elementary schools, in 2009, and among Latinos, the fastest-growing group in the Catholic Church — soon to comprise a majority of Catholics in the United States — the proportion is just 3 percent.)

I therefore find it odd that there has been a deafening silence from the Catholic Church on the question of whether high school students should be exposed to alternatives to Darwinian evolution in science classes, such as Alfred Russel Wallace’s theory, which acknowledges the reality of a spiritual realm while accepting the common descent of living organisms. I therefore hope that this post will serve as a little wake-up call to the Church hierarchy. And for those clergymen who are worried about another Galileo case, I would reply that: (a) unlike Darwin, Galileo was firmly convinced of the reality of the human soul (as I’ll show in my sixth post), and (b) a biological theory which is essentially materialistic and deterministic, and which is taught to high school science students as an established fact, will destroy the faith of the next generation of Catholics far more effectively than any public tussle between science and religion.


Why a Darwinian evolutionist cannot consistently believe in the human soul or in free will

There are two reasons why a Darwinian evolutionist is committed to a materialistic account of the human mind.

First, if you want to call yourself a believer in neo-Darwinian evolution, then you have to believe that it is an all-encompassing theory of living things, just as the atomic theory is an all-encompassing theory of chemistry. You have to believe that the theory of evolution is capable of explaining all of the characteristics of each species of organism. The theory of evolution stands or falls on its claim to be a complete biological theory. As Theodosius Dobzhansky memorably put it in a 1973 essay in The American Biology Teacher (volume 35, pages 125-129): “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.” Consequently, if you believe that there are organisms on this planet, such as human beings, that possess characteristics which evolution is unable to account for, then you cannot call yourself an evolutionist, and you certainly cannot call yourself a bona fide Darwinist.

Human beings are animals. One feature which human beings possess is consciousness. If you believe that consciousness cannot be explained in materialistic terms, then you cannot call yourself a consistent Darwinian evolutionist.

The second reason has to do with the nature of a scientific explanation. As we’ll see, Darwin and his followers held that the only proper kind of scientific explanation is one that brings a class of phenomena under the scope of a universal law, which is fixed and deterministic. Any other kind of explanation is inadequate, because it fails to generate useful predictions. Darwin and his fellow evolutionists looked forward to the day when everything in Nature would be explained in the same way that scientists explain the orbits of the planets: in terms of fixed, deterministic laws.

In this post, I’m going to examine in detail what Charles Darwin wrote, in his scientific works and his private notebooks, about the evolution of the human mind. What I shall endeavor to show is the following:

(a) For Darwin, a good scientific explanation is one which appeals to physical laws, which are conceived of as fixed and deterministic;

(b) Darwin maintained that our thoughts could be explained in terms of law-governed physical processes;

(c) Darwin explicitly rejected the view that there was anything special about human intellectual capacities;

(d) Darwin viewed the difference between humans and other animals as being one of degree rather than kind;

(e) Darwin held that natural selection was fully capable of explaining the origin of human mental faculties, and actively opposed Wallace’s view that only the guidance of a Higher Intelligence could account for the origin of man; and

(f) Darwin was a determinist who maintained that human choices were also the outcome of blind natural forces, and that none of us was responsible for our actions.

N. B. In the quotations below, all bold emphases are mine, while those in italics are the author’s.


(a) For Darwin, a good scientific explanation is one which appeals to deterministic physical laws


The bodies in our solar system move according to fixed, deterministic laws. Darwin and his champion, Thomas Henry Huxley both maintained that any genuine scientific explanation should explain phenomena according to such laws. Without fixed and deterministic laws, a scientific theory is useless for making predictions. Image courtesy of NASA and Wikipedia.

In order to better grasp why Darwinism could never tolerate making a special exception for human beings, we need to understand what Darwin believed a genuine scientific explanation should be able to accomplish.

Darwin set out the conditions that he believed a good scientific explanation must satisfy in a short essay which he jotted down while he was reading selected passages from Dr. John MacCullough’s book, Proofs and Illustrations of the Attributes of God (London, James Duncan, Paternoster Row, 1837). For those who are interested, here’s the reference: Darwin, C. R. ‘Macculloch. Attrib of Deity’ [Essay on Theology and Natural Selection] (1838). CUL-DAR71.53-59. Viewers can read it here at Darwin Online.)

Darwin’s essay contains a telling passage in section 5, which succinctly summarizes why Darwin believed that the only good explanation is one which appeals to physical laws, and why he believed appeals to “the will of God” explained nothing:

N.B. The explanation of types of structure in classes — as resulting from the will of the deity, to create animals on certain plans, — is no explanation — it has not the character of a physical law /& is therefore utterly useless.— it foretells nothing/ because we know nothing of the will of the Deity, how it acts & whether constant or inconstant like that of man.— the cause given we know not the effect.

We can see from this passage that Darwin was looking for a theory of origins which explained everything in terms of physical laws, which enable scientists to predict effects from causes, in a deterministic fashion. Supernatural explanations were rejected by Darwin, precisely because they cannot yield such predictions – “the cause given we know not the effect.” Other scientists in Darwin’s time were coming around to the same view, as historian of science Ronald Numbers narrates in his essay, “Science without God: Natural Laws and Christian Beliefs” (in When Science and Christianity Meet, ed. by David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers, Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2003):

Within a couple of decades many other students of natural history (or naturalists, as they were commonly called) had reached the same conclusion. The British zoologist Thomas H. Huxley, one of the most outspoken critics of the supernatural origin of species, came to see references to special creation as representing little more than a “specious mask for our ignorance.” (Numbers, 2003, p. 279.)

Thomas Henry Huxley was the ablest and most forthright exponent of Darwin’s views, earning him the nickname, “Darwin’s bulldog.” Huxley’s remark on special creation, which is cited by Ronald Numbers in his essay, is taken from from an article entitled, Darwin on the Origin of Species, which published in The Westminster Review in April 1860. It is worth quoting the above-cited remark by Huxley in its proper context, because it perfectly illustrates Darwinian thinking on the nature of scientific explanations:

A phenomenon is explained when it is shown to be a case of some general law of Nature; but the supernatural interposition of the Creator can, by the nature of the case, exemplify no law, and if species have really arisen in this way, it is absurd to attempt to discuss their origin.

Or lastly, let us ask ourselves whether any amount of evidence which the nature of our faculties permits us to attain, can justify us in asserting that any phenomenon is out of the reach of natural causation. To this end it is obviously necessary that we should know all the consequences to which all possible combinations, continued through unlimited time, can give rise. If we knew these, and found none competent to originate species, we should have good grounds for denying their origin by natural selection. Till we know them, any hypothesis is better than one which involves us in such miserable presumption.

But the hypothesis of special creation is not only a specious mask for our ignorance; its existence in Biology marks the youth and imperfection of the science. For what is the history of every science, but the history of the elimination of the notion of creative, or other interferences, with the natural order of the phenomena which are the subject matter of that science? When Astronomy was young “the morning stars sang together for joy,” and the planets were guided in their courses by celestial hands. Now, the harmony of the stars has resolved itself into gravitation according to the inverse squares of the distances, and the orbits of the planets are deducible from the laws of the forces which allow a schoolboy’s stone to break a window.
(Huxley, T.H. 1860. Darwin on the origin of Species. Westminster Review 17 (n.s.): 541-70. The above excerpt, which is available at Darwin Online is taken from page 559. This essay is also available online in Lay Sermons, Addresses and Reviews by Thomas Henry Huxley. Elibron Classics, 2005, Adamant Media Corporation. Facsimile of the edition published by Macmillan & Co., London, 1906. Chapter XII, pp. 245-246.)
(Bold emphases mine – VJT. Note: In the passage above, I’ve modernized the spelling of “phaenomenon” to “phenomenon.”)

Finally, it is important for the modern reader to understand that for Darwin and his contemporaries, any explanation of a phenomenon in terms of physical laws had to be a deterministic explanation. As Darwin wrote in his autobiography:

Everything in nature is the result of fixed laws.
(Barlow, Nora ed. 1958. The autobiography of Charles Darwin 1809-1882. With the original omissions restored. Edited and with appendix and notes by his grand-daughter Nora Barlow. London: Collins. Page 87. Available online here at Darwin Online.)

Or as Darwin’s bulldog, Thomas Henry Huxley, memorably put it:

If there is anything in the world which I do firmly believe in, it is the universal validity of the law of causation.
(‘Science and Morals’ (1886). In Collected Essays (1994), Vol. 9, 121.)

Let us recapitulate here. For Darwin and Huxley, the only proper way of explaining a phenomenon scientifically is to bring it under the scope of some general natural law, which permits scientists to predict the phenomenon in a deterministic fashion. Supernatural explanations explain nothing, according to Darwin, because they do not enable scientists to predict anything.


(b) Darwin believed our thoughts could be explained in terms of law-governed physical processes

Charles Darwin shared the belief of the French physiologist Pierre Cabanis (1757-1808) that the human brain secretes thought just as the liver secretes bile. Left: Drawing of the human brain, showing several of the most important brain structures. Right: A sheep’s liver. Images courtesy of National Institute for Aging and Wikipedia.

Darwin’s Notebooks, which trace the development of his thought over time, were not published during his lifetime. Fortunately, they are now available online, after having been originally transcribed by Paul Barrett in 1974. What they reveal is that as far back as 1838, over twenty years before he published his Origin of Species in 1859, Darwin was an avowed materialist, who insisted that natural selection had to be able to account for human consciousness.

In his Notebook C: Transmutation of species (2-7.1838), Darwin espoused a mechanistic account of the human mind:

Why is thought, being a secretion of brain, more wonderful than gravity a property of matter? – It is our arrogance, it our admiration of ourselves. (Paragraph 166)

Darwin’s assertion that thought is “a secretion of brain” echoes a famous remark by the French physiologist Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis (1757-1808), who wrote in his Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme (1802) that “to have an accurate idea of the operations from which thought results, it is necessary to consider the brain as a special organ designed especially to produce it, as the stomach and the intestines are designed to operate the digestion, (and) the liver to filter bile…” (English translation, On the Relation Between the Physical and Moral Aspects of Man by Pierre-Jean-George Cabanis, edited by George Mora, translated by Margaret Duggan Saidi from the second edition, reviewed, corrected and enlarged by the author, 1805. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1981, p. 116). This remark is usually cited as the pithy maxim: “The brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile.

In the same paragraph in Notebook C: Transmutation of species (2-7.1838), Darwin playfully scolds himself for being a materialist. He must have appreciated the humor of the situation, given that he had previously studied to be an Anglican clergyman! The mis-spellings and grammar and punctuation errors are Darwin’s:

Thought (or desires more properly) being heredetary.- it is difficult to imagine it anything but structure of brain heredetary,. – analogy points out to this.- love of the deity effect of organization. oh you Materialist! – Read Barclay on organization!! (Paragraph 166)

In his Notebook M [Metaphysics on morals and speculations on expression (1838) CUL-DAR125], which was marked “Private”, Darwin was more forthright about his materialism:

It is an argument for materialism, that cold water brings on suddenly in head, a frame of mind, analogous to those feelings, which may be considered as truly spritual. (Paragraph 20)

Not wishing to scandalize his friends, however, Darwin decided to keep quiet about his materialist views when discoursing in public. He therefore resolved:

To avoid stating how far, I believe, in Materialism, say only that emotions, instincts degrees of talent, which are heredetary are so because brain of child resembles parent stock. (Paragraph 57)

Keeping quiet about his materialism was undoubtedly a very wise decision on Darwin’s part. In 1748, the French physician, Julien Offray de La Mettrie had asserted that man was merely a machine (La Mettrie J. Leyden: Luzac; 1748. L’Homme Machine) – a claim that got him into so much trouble that he was compelled to flee abroad for his safety. In 1816, the English physician Sir William Lawrence had candidly declared his conviction that “physiologically speaking… the mind is the grand prerogative of the brain” (Lawrence W. London: Callow; 1816, An introduction to comparative anatomy and physiology), but his writings provoked an uproar, and he was pressured to recant his materialist views. After he did so, he later became President of the Royal College of Surgeons of London and Serjeant Surgeon to the Queen.


(c) Darwin explicitly rejected the view that there was anything special about human intellectual capacities

In defiance of the common view that human beings were unique, Darwin argued that there was nothing particularly special about man’s intellectual capacities. In his Notebook B: Transmutation of species (1837-1838), he downplayed human uniqueness in this regard:

People often talk of the wonderful event of intellectual Man appearing – the appearance of insects with other senses is more wonderful… (Paragraph 207)

It is absurd to talk of one animal as being higher than another.We consider those, where the cerebral structure {intellectual faculties} most developed, as highest. – A bee doubtless would when the instincts were. (Paragraph 74)

Darwin wrote those words in 1838. Even at that time, he did not regard human intellectual capacities as lying outside the province of the laws of Nature.


(d) Darwin viewed the difference between humans and other animals as one of degree rather than kind


An ant carrying an aphid. According to Darwin, the difference in mental abilities between an ant and an aphid is much greater than the intellectual difference between a man and an ape. Image courtesy of Wikipedia.

Darwin’s work, The Origin of Species, was published in 1859, but Darwin’s only allusion to human evolution in this volume was his cryptic statement in the last chapter that in the distant future, “light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history.” It was not until 1871 that Darwin explicitly addressed the subject of human origins in his long-awaited work, The Descent of Man. In this book, Darwin argued that the difference between man and other animals was one of degree rather than kind, and that the transition from ape-like creatures to man had occurred gradually and not suddenly:

In the following passage, Darwin supports his claim that the mental faculties of humans and other animals differ only in degree by arguing that the difference in mental faculties between the higher and lower insects exceeds the mental difference between man and other mammals:

Some naturalists, from being deeply impressed with the mental and spiritual powers of man, have divided the whole organic world into three kingdoms, the Human, the Animal, and the Vegetable, thus giving to man a separate kingdom. (1. Isidore Geoffroy St.-Hilaire gives a detailed account of the position assigned to man by various naturalists in their classifications: ‘Hist. Nat. Gen.’ tom. ii. 1859, pp. 170-189.) Spiritual powers cannot be compared or classed by the naturalist: but he may endeavour to shew, as I have done, that the mental faculties of man and the lower animals do not differ in kind, although immensely in degree. A difference in degree, however great, does not justify us in placing man in a distinct kingdom, as will perhaps be best illustrated by comparing the mental powers of two insects, namely, a coccus or scale-insect and an ant, which undoubtedly belong to the same class. The difference is here greater than, though of a somewhat different kind from, that between man and the highest mammal. The female coccus, whilst young, attaches itself by its proboscis to a plant; sucks the sap, but never moves again; is fertilised and lays eggs; and this is its whole history. On the other hand, to describe the habits and mental powers of worker-ants, would require, as Pierre Huber has shewn, a large volume; I may, however, briefly specify a few points. Ants certainly communicate information to each other, and several unite for the same work, or for games of play. They recognise their fellow-ants after months of absence, and feel sympathy for each other. They build great edifices, keep them clean, close the doors in the evening, and post sentries. They make roads as well as tunnels under rivers, and temporary bridges over them, by clinging together. They collect food for the community, and when an object, too large for entrance, is brought to the nest, they enlarge the door, and afterwards build it up again. They store up seeds, of which they prevent the germination, and which, if damp, are brought up to the surface to dry. They keep aphides and other insects as milch-cows. They go out to battle in regular bands, and freely sacrifice their lives for the common weal. They emigrate according to a preconcerted plan. They capture slaves. They move the eggs of their aphides, as well as their own eggs and cocoons, into warm parts of the nest, in order that they may be quickly hatched; and endless similar facts could be given. (Chapter VI. On the Affinities and Genealogy of Man.)

Darwin was also quite explicit that the intellectual transition from ape-like creatures to man was an imperceptible one, and that the human mind had evolved gradually:

Whether primeval man, when he possessed but few arts, and those of the rudest kind, and when his power of language was extremely imperfect, would have deserved to be called man, must depend on the definition which we employ. In a series of forms graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature to man as he now exists, it would be impossible to fix on any definite point where the term “man” ought to be used. (Chapter VII, On the Races of Man.)


(e) Darwin held that natural selection was fully capable of explaining the origin of human mental faculties, and actively opposed Wallace’s view that only the guidance of a Higher Intelligence could account for the origin of man


Human and chimpanzee skull and brain. Illustrations by Dr. Paul Gervais, 1854, in Histoire naturelle des mammiferes, avec l’indication de leurs moeurs, et de leurs rapports avec les arts, le commerce et l’agriculture. Image courtesy of Vlastni fotografie and Wikipedia.

In his 1871 work The Descent of Man, Darwin argued that because human intelligence conferred a survival advantage on its possessors, the gradual improvement of intelligence in our ape-like ancestors could easily be explained by his theory of evolution by natural selection:

The case, however, is widely different, as Mr. Wallace has with justice insisted, in relation to the intellectual and moral faculties of man. These faculties are variable; and we have every reason to believe that the variations tend to be inherited. Therefore, if they were formerly of high importance to primeval man and to his ape-like progenitors, they would have been perfected or advanced through natural selection. Of the high importance of the intellectual faculties there can be no doubt, for man mainly owes to them his predominant position in the world. We can see, that in the rudest state of society, the individuals who were the most sagacious, who invented and used the best weapons or traps, and who were best able to defend themselves, would rear the greatest number of offspring. The tribes, which included the largest number of men thus endowed, would increase in number and supplant other tribes. (Chapter V. On the Development of the Intellectual and Moral Faculties during Primeval and Civilised Times.)

For those readers who may be wondering, the “Mr. Wallace” referred to in the passage above was none other than the great naturalist, Alfred Russel Wallace. Part of the reason why Darwin wrote The Descent of Man in 1871 was to rebut the view, put forward by Wallace in an essay in in the Quarterly Review of April 1869, that the special intervention of a Higher Intelligence was necessary in order to account for the evolution of human beings from ape-like ancestors. According to Wallace, this Higher Intelligence had carefully directed our evolution from ape-like creatures in a manner similar to the way in which human beings breed organisms for their own special purposes, such as seedless bananas, and milch cows that produce extra milk. For Darwin, Wallace’s championing of this view felt like a personal betrayal. Darwin and Wallace had closely collaborated in developing the theory of evolution by natural selection, and at that time, Wallace had given no indications that he harbored any reservations about the theory’s ability to account for human evolution. Indeed, Wallace had even highlighted the role played by natural selection in the evolution of man in an 1864 essay entitled, The Origin of Human Races and the Antiquity of Man Deduced From the Theory of “Natural Selection”, published in the Journal of the Anthropological Society of London (Vol. 2, 1864, pp. clviii-clxxxvii), which was highly praised by Darwin.

Darwin was therefore deeply pained in 1869, when he heard that Wallace intended to publish an essay in the Quarterly Review (April 1869, pp. 359-394), arguing that the appearance of human mental faculties could not be explained in terms of blind, mechanical processes, but required the intervention of a Higher Intelligence. While he was awaiting the publication of the essay in the Quarterly Review, Darwin wrote to Wallace:

As you expected, I differ grievously from you, and I am very sorry for it. I can see no necessity for calling in an additional and proximate cause in regard to man. (Letter of Charles Darwin to A. R. Wallace, Down, April 14, 1869.)

When he finally read Wallace’s essay, which argued that natural selection, left to itself, would only have given human beings a brain “a little superior to that of an ape,” Darwin was so appalled that he scribbled “NO!!!!” in the margin and even underlined the word “NO” three times. Darwin later expressed his disappointment over Wallace’s views on the origin of man in a personal letter, and chided him for back-sliding from his earlier enthusiastic support of natural selection as the explanation of human mental capacities: “But I groan over Man – you write like a metamorphosed (in retrograde direction) naturalist. And you, the author of the best paper that ever appeared in the Anthropological Review! Eheu! Eheu! Eheu! — Your miserable friend, C. Darwin.” (Letter of Charles Darwin to A. R. Wallace, Down, January 26, 1870. In The correspondence of Charles Darwin, volume 18: 1870. Edited by Frederick Burkhardt, James A. Secord, Sheila Ann Dean, Samantha Evans, Shelley Innes, Alison M. Pearn, Paul White. Cambridge University Press 2010. See page 17.)

The striking differences between Wallace’s and Darwin’s views on the origin of human mental faculties led to an intellectual rift between them that was never healed. Although the two scientists remained on friendly terms, Wallace was no longer part of Darwin’s “inner circle.”


(f) Darwin was a determinist who maintained that human choices were also the outcome of blind natural forces


An American judge talking to a lawyer. According to Charles Darwin, none of us is responsible for our actions. Criminals should be punished solely in order to deter others from committing crimes, but they are not to blame for what they do. Image courtesy of maveric2003 and Wikipedia.

As we have seen, Darwin made no secret of the fact that he believed natural selection could account for our distinctively human traits. We have also seen that for Darwin and his evolutionist contemporaries, any good scientific explanation of a phenomenon (such as human consciousness) had to be a deterministic one, which brought the phenomenon under the scope of some universal scientific law.

From the foregoing premises, the reader might deduce that Darwin did not believe in libertarian free will, or the view that our choices are free from determination, and that whenever we make a choice, we could have chosen otherwise. During his lifetime, however, Darwin was extremely guarded on the subject of human free will, not wishing to alarm the masses with his views on the subject. For this reason, he said little about free will in his published writings. However, his private notebooks reveal that as far back as 1837, Darwin was a thorough-going determinist.

On the 15th of July, 1838, Charles Darwin began a private notebook which he labeled as “M”, in which he intended to write down his correspondence, discoveries, musings, and speculations on “Metaphysics on Morals and Speculations on Expression”. To this day, the contents of the notebook are little known, among the general public.
On page 27 of that notebook, he expressed his skepticism regarding free will, and suggested that all of our actions (and, by extension, our thoughts and intentions) are the result of our “hereditary constitution” and “the example…or teaching of others”:

The common remark that fat men are goodnatured, & vice versa Walter Scotts remark how odious an illtempered fat man looks, shows same connection between organization & mind.—thinking over these things, one doubts existence of free will every action determined by hereditary constitution, example of others or teaching of others.— (NB man much more affected by other fellow-animals, than any other animal & probably the only one affected by various knowledge which is not heredetary & instinctive) & the others are learnt, what they teach by the same means & therefore properly no free will.
(See Darwin’s Notebook M, pp. 26-27. [Metaphysics on morals and speculations on expression (1838)]. CUL-DAR125.- Transcribed by Kees Rookmaaker. (Darwin Online, http://darwin-online.org.uk/))

Darwin was a consistent determinist. In his other metaphysical writings from that period (c. 1837), Darwin made it clear that he did not really regard human beings as morally responsible for their good or bad choices. He also held that criminals should be punished solely in order to deter others who might break the law:

(a) one well feels how many actions are not determined by what is called free will, but by strong invariable passions — when these passions weak, opposed & complicated one calls them free will — the chance of mechanical phenomena.— (mem: M. Le Comte one of philosophy, & savage calling laws of nature chance)…

The general delusion about free will obvious.— because man has power of action, & he can seldom analyse his motives (originally mostly INSTINCTIVE, & therefore now great effort of reason to discover them: this is important explanation) he thinks they have none.

Effects.— One must view a wrecked man like a sickly one — We cannot help loathing a diseased offensive object, so we view wickedness.— it would however be more proper to pity them [than] to hate & be disgusted with them. Yet it is right to punish criminals; but solely to deter others.— It is not more strange that there should be necessary wickedness than disease.

This view should teach one profound humility, one deserves no credit for anything. (yet one takes it for beauty & good temper), nor ought one to blame others.

(See Darwin’s Old and USELESS Notes about the moral sense & some metaphysical points written about the year 1837 & earlier, pp. 25-27. For original transcription, see Paul Barrett, et. al., Charles Darwin’s Notebooks, 1836-1844, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 608.)

Summary of Darwin’s views

We have seen that Darwin believed that his natural selection could explain the emergence of man from ape-like ancestors by a gradual process, and that natural selection could account for the entire gamut of man’s mental faculties. However, natural selection is a physical process, which operates in a deterministic manner. Thus there is no room in Darwin’s view of evolution for an immaterial soul, or for a mysterious human capacity to make undetermined choices.

To sum up: if you accept Darwinian evolution, you have to be a materialist and a determinist. In my fourth post, I’m going to produce my list of twenty-one Nobel Laureate scientists who rejected these beliefs.

Comments
I realized something while considering all of this a few months ago while writing my book. If God is timeless, that prevents Him from changing (again by definition because change by definition includes a time component), but it does not prevent him from making a choice. It only prevents Him from making a different choice than He made before, since there is no before. That means when He chose to be what He has revealed Himself to be, Love, Goodness, Mercy, etc., those were choices made for all times and all places at once. So it is entirely consistent with the Biblical understanding of God's unchanging and transcendent nature. As for the two wills argument made by Mr. Garvey, I do believe something like that exists for human beings who are born again. But you'd probably have to read my book to understand what I mean. I'm not going to go through it all here. Mr. Garvey:
There is only one “I”, which is why I am held equally accountable for my will, my actions, my thoughts. One difference is that, being a created being, I am not completely self-determined as God is: I am what God made me – but sadly I’m also what I have made myself through rebelling against God.
How can I "make myself" anything if there is only one "I"? If there is only one "I", then I cannot make myself anything, I merely "am what I am."tragic mishap
April 19, 2012
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April 19, 2012. Day 5: Italicized text still assails a thread where some are attempting to have a meaningful discussion. I'm beginning to wonder of italics are really gremlins, or demons which hide in the slants between the letters they possess. They are coming. It's too late for me, save yourselves. https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/why-you-cant-be-a-darwinist-and-a-human-exceptionalist/#comment-423653material.infantacy
April 19, 2012
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Hey Jon, Very thought provoking answers. I'll do my best to respond meaningfully.
"“God’s will is preeminent; it’s before any other attribute of his being. It is the primary attribute of his ‘self’.” How and why does God (said to be “simple” in the classic formulations) have to have a pre-eminent attribute? “God is what he chooses to be” and “God chooses to be what he is” seem to me totally equivalent. His OT name, after all, can be translated both “I am what I am” and “I will be what I will be.” I’ve heard many suggest that “God is love”, but never that “God is will.”
I like the idea of "simple" being a descriptor of God's nature. In order for that to be true however, the causeless God should have a central causeless attribute, from which the other aspects of his total nature are determined. He should not be internally riddled with attributes which are all axiomatic, and which are, in some combination, determinative of his choices. Not only does this make him complicated, it subjects his will to be a causal result of a set of potentially complicated factors. So I think simplicity as an assumption, "simplifies" things for my view that his will is preeminent. "God chooses" is the central assumption of both of the statements you mentioned above. For that reason, I would agree that they are equivalent. If God chooses to be what he is, then it follows logically that he is what he chooses to be. As a rhetorical question, is God good because he does good things, or does he do good things because he is good? We don't avoid problems with either formulation of the relationship, in my opinion. The first allows God to choose his nature as a consequence of his actions, yet it implies an independent standard of "good."; the second defines God's choices to be the very result of an independent standard of "good." Perhaps I'm more comfortable with the first, because it allows God's goodness to be a consequence of a primary axiom: God wills. I admit that "God chooses to be good" does not necessarily help, and so I don't think that the preeminent, causeless will is free from any mystery or seeming contradictions. "I will be what I will be" seems to imply that God's nature is determined by his will. This is consistent with my view that God's will is preeminent. The only other reading that presents itself implies change -- "will be" as in someday, but not yet -- and so directly contradicts special revelation (Hebrews 13:8). So I think that even the alternate translation is at least suggestive of his will's preeminence. God is certainly love, but God is also good. God is faithful, he is just, he is unchanging. These are not elemental components of god, but qualities which describe the nature of his being. Otherwise, these along with the rest of his attributes, appear to make for a somewhat complicated god. However, if these attributes are consequences of his internal self -- his will -- it seems to simplify (although certainly not demystify) the concept of God. I would like to consider the Trinity for a moment. While I'm not necessarily comfortable reducing the triune God to a set of descriptors, I think this one is somewhat helpful. Father, Son, and Holy Spirt can be rudimentarily described as a relationship between will, word, and activity. These things are harmonious in God because they are reflective of his nature. What God wills he speaks, and what he speaks, he does. This is in some sense a cause-effect relationship, but not a mechanistic one. We know that Jesus testifies of the father: "By myself I can do nothing; I judge only as I hear, and my judgment is just, for I seek not to please myself but him who sent me." -- John 5:30 "So Jesus said, "When you have lifted up the Son of Man, then you will know that I am [the one I claim to be] and that I do nothing on my own but speak just what the Father has taught me." -- John 8:28 We also know that the Holy Spirit testifies of Jesus. "When the Counselor comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who goes out from the Father, he will testify about me." -- John 15:26 These seem to have their root in the first person of the trinity, the Father. Jesus makes several references to the "father's will" or "the will of my father" in the gospels. I think it might be difficult to show that the whole of Jesus' ministry had a root in anything other than the Father's will. Since God is a triune being, does it make sense for all of those other attributes (love, justice, mercy, etc.) to be co-present causally with Father, Son, and Holy Spirit? Rather I think it makes more sense, with the father as the first person of the trinity, to begin with will, since it's the attribute Jesus appeals to as the very cause for his words and actions. "I make known the end from the beginning, from ancient times, what is still to come. I say: My purpose will stand, and I will do all that I please." -- Isaiah 46:10 The above is a declaration that God announces his intentions beforehand. This is an expression of the Word. If he announces it, he wills it; and if he wills it, he does it, through the power of the Holy Spirit; will -> word -> act. If you accept that this is even mildly representative of the trinity, then it begins with will as the necessary causal beginning of anything God does. I think the preeminent attribute is necessary to avoid a problem of God's will (that which he chooses) being subservient to any other attribute. For one, because if God's will is determined by other aspects of his nature, then it elevates attributes above choices, and God is no longer a free moral agent. The only way he can be a free moral agent, is if he is free to violate any constraint except for his own will (which is logically incoherent). We agreed that "cannot" might mean "will not" for an unchanging being. If this is so, then the "will not" isn't constrained by the "cannot" but rather the "cannot" is determined by the "will not."
As you say above, our attributes are only in confusion because of our corruption – but that’s my whole point. They are central to our *fallen* being, making us significantly less free than Adam was."
Yes, I agree, that the measure of our will to do good, or perhaps to even know good from evil in many circumstances, is largely in question here. (Knowledge of good and evil is not necessarily the same as knowledge of good from evil.) But if nature is determinative of will, then I can hardly see a point in holding individuals responsible for their actions, either in a temporal sense or an eternal one. In whatever way things have changed after the fall, we should be able to agree that at least Adam had a free moral choice to obey or to disobey. And I would add, that If Adam had that choice, then it's because free moral agency is an "image attribute." If free will is an image attribute, then it is an attribute of God; and if God's will is determined by his nature, then it is not free, but instead determined. That's my long-winded take. More to come when I get the chance…material.infantacy
April 19, 2012
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MI/TM Replying to MI's questions might be the most helpful reponse at this point. "God’s will is preeminent; it’s before any other attribute of his being. It is the primary attribute of his ‘self’." How and why does God (said to be "simple" in the classic formulations) have to have a pre-eminent attribute? "God is what he chooses to be" and "God chooses to be what he is" seem to me totally equivalent. His OT name, after all, can be translated both "I am what I am" and "I will be what I will be." I've heard many suggest that "God is love", but never that "God is will." As you say above, our attributes are only in confusion because of our corruption - but that's my whole point. They are central to our *fallen* being, making us significantly less free than Adam was. Hence: "Because we are made in God’s image, our will is the primary attribute of our ‘self’." False - it is one facet of a holistic soul analogous to God's essence. There is only one "I", which is why I am held equally accountable for my will, my actions, my thoughts. One difference is that, being a created being, I am not completely self-determined as God is: I am what God made me - but sadly I'm also what I have made myself through rebelling against God. Paul's "two wills" talk in Romans 7 (TM still hasn't answered me on that, BTW) is best taken metaphorically, but its imagery implies that the will of the flesh is such a hopeless case that God has to implant a new one in rivalry to it. I think the reality is that our original will is pulled hither and yon by the old habits and corruption and by the new spiritual nature, and although Paul implores us (ie our wills)to submit to the Spirit rather than the flesh (ie give up our freedom to sin), the passage ends with an appeal to the grace of Christ. Even the regenerate will is not yet fully free. "Due to the fall, our will is corrupted: we desire to do evil." Agree true. But that desire is described as "slavery to sin" in the Bible. That surely must imply that our freedom not to sin is lessened. I'm still free to do what I want, but what I want is limited by my sin. That's all I'm arguing for. If as you contend, the will is primary, it makes things simpler, actually. Our will is corrupted = I am corrupted = I am unable to uncorrupt myself because my primary faculty is set against it. TM doesn't believe in original sin, so would, I think, say the will is uncorrupted and remains as free as the air - which does beg the question of why everyone chooses to sin without any inbuilt bias towards it. "Because our will is corrupted, we can never desire nor choose to do good." "Can" and "will" again. The will (we actually agree) is not externally constrained by anything (my argument is that since it cannot be divided from our other faculties they are not constraints, but participants, of the will). Therefore (continuing with your "will is primary" assumption) if my will has corrupted itself through its habitual choice (say) its always wanting to sin is culpable, even if it is therefore "unable" to will otherwise. The only constraint is itself - its corruption is not an external coercion, but its voluntary self-destruction. It can't because it won't. How is it not accountable for that? "No one can approach the Father without the Son, and nobody can come to the Son unless the Father draws him." True. But why so, if the will is genuinely undetermined? Nothing constrains the will - all it has to do is choose to follow Christ. Or even choose never to sin again. Arising from this is the key salvation question: does this spiritual intervention kick start the process, or does God only draw those who have already freely choosen to overcome the corruption of their will, though that corruption is why they've never chosen so to do in the first place? "Spiritual intervention is required on some level or another to bring a sinner to Christ." Obviously I agree, though TM may not, perhaps - Pelagius equated grace with mere external helps like commands, warnings etc. Again, why, though, is such intervention required if the will can always freely choose to follow Christ? And if grace is applied equally to all, then the only explanation for some not to believe is that their will is more corrupt - they're more determined not to believe than others. Either it's the relatively good who save themselves, given equal grace - or the relatively bad may receive more grace for salvation. "Without a measure of Grace, nobody would be saved." True, but again why? Is the will not free to choose obedience? "Everybody who is judged according to their sin because they rejected Christ, will have been given ample opportunity to accept him." Actually that's not quite on the topic of free will. But if sin is only (as you and TM seem to agree) a conscious choice to disobey God, your words suggest that God's judgement is effectively not for sin at all but for conscious rejection of Christ, adequately presented. That raises the interesting question of evangelism being the means by which people are given the chance to put their heads in the noose, because their sins would have been overlooked if they remained in ignorance. I'm also not sure how that squares with the necessary spiritual grace in the point above - does "ample opportunity" include that grace, and to whom and how is it given? "Everybody who is judged according to their sin because they rejected Christ, will have been subject to God’s direct efforts to save them." Again, this is off the topic of free will. But the implication is that if people freely choose to reject Christ and remain in their freely-chosen sins, they would not nevertheless not be accountable if God did not also direct personal effort to saving them? Further - we distinguished earlier God's determinative will (and, I believe, agreed that it would always come to pass) and God's prescriptive will. So when you speak of God's "direct efforts" are they from his determinative or his prescriptive will, or some other faculty? If the first, then man's free will is more effectual than God's determinative will. If not, what does "direct effort" mean? How does such direct effort make the already free will more free? Your final paragraph says a lot. I dealt with many abuse victims, including Christians, in a long medical career. Forgiving was a choice many of them found almost impossible, and being free of false guilt even more so. Yet their wills were, I'm being told, as free as yours or mine or Adam's: why should we not condemn them for just not pulling themselves together? Or do we rather pray for God's grace for them as we do for the unsaved (unless we believe that lack of grace would just let the unsaved off the hook anyway?)Jon Garvey
April 19, 2012
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Jon and TM, I'm curious where you two stand on these, if either of you would like to answer. I've added my own already. -- God's will is preeminent; it's before any other attribute of his being. It is the primary attribute of his 'self'. True. -- Because we are made in God's image, our will is the primary attribute of our 'self'. True. -- Due to the fall, our will is corrupted: we desire to do evil. True. -- Because our will is corrupted, we can never desire nor choose to do good. False. -- God holds us responsible for our moral choices, and our choice about whether to accept or reject Christ. True. -- No one can approach the Father without the Son, and nobody can come to the Son unless the Father draws him. True. -- Spiritual intervention is required on some level or another to bring a sinner to Christ. True. -- Without a measure of Grace, nobody would be saved. True. -- Everybody who is judged according to their sin because they rejected Christ, will have been given ample opportunity to accept him. True. -- Everybody who is judged according to their sin because they rejected Christ, will have been subject to God's direct efforts to save them. True. ******* Free will of course does not mean that we are free to do anything we desire. We are not free to flap our arms and fly. We are not free to waltz right in through the gates of heaven on our own terms. We are not free to remain perpetually young, etc. This is obvious of course. However we are free to come or to go, to stay or to leave, to become enraged or to remain calm, to speak gently or harshly, to face a problem or to hide from it, to help or to hinder a person or cause, to murder or not, to steal or not, to show respect or behave flippantly, to be rude or polite, etc. Yet there are others not as easily understood. For instance, do we always know the difference between right and wrong? Are we free from sins of ignorance? Are we free from things like lust and envy? Are abuse victims free from the consequences of the way they were treated or conditioned? Maybe these are not all in the same category, but they are more difficult.material.infantacy
April 18, 2012
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Testing again.
material.infantacy
April 18, 2012
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tragic mishap,
"In my view, God is a being capable of choosing and He chose to be Love, Mercy, Justice, Holiness and all that, so His nature is subordinate to His will."
I agree. I cannot see God's will being subordinate to any other attribute of his being. I believe this probably holds true for us, as it must have been true for Adam; and I believe it was true for Adam because free will is an "image attribute" (that's italicized, btw) -- that is, it's an attribute we possess because we were made "in the image of god." I had made a similar point previously, <em>"We could perhaps blame pride, understanding that it is the root of sin and the ruler of our nature, and protest that we had no choice but to fall at its feet. But there would still be Adam, who was under no obligation to sin by his nature. We are Adam, and we have inherited the curse of his sin, yet still retain his freedom to choose. We may have lost our sight as a result of the curse, so that we may not see the glory of God, but that cannot mean (in my estimation) that we have lost the essential property of the freedom given to Adam, as an aspect of his created nature (made in the image of God) to choose to obey or to rebel. Just because we all choose rebellion at some point does not mean that obedience was never an option."</em> I believe that God's will is necessarily preeminent, and as you suggested, axiomatic of his being.
(God cannot sin by definition, because the definition of sin is a choice made against the will of God, and God cannot choose against his own will by definition. Will is the capacity to choose.)
Well said. God's will, his word, and his actions are always in perfect harmony. This means he does not lie, and he does not break promises. (If I could define all of the attributes of "goodness," those would top the list.) We on the other hand, have no such harmony amongst that trinity of attributes. We lie with ease, and break vows and obligations. This seems to imply the corruption of our will, but I don't know how that would make it any less central to our being. I don't know if that would make it any less free. We want to sin, but does this mean we have to? This is where I go off the rails. m.i. ******* I find myself in a somewhat awkward position of having agreement with Jon and agreement with TM. I say "awkward" because I'm not comfortable dancing around in gray areas most of the time. However if TM's formulation of the primary difference between their views is accurate, then I am clearly more aligned with TM's views. (Sorry Jon!)material.infantacy
April 18, 2012
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Testing 1: Attempting to modify font style... Testing 2 Did it work?material.infantacy
April 18, 2012
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Also just some advice to a British friend: Avoid saying "blow me" when talking to Americans. ;)tragic mishap
April 18, 2012
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Mr. Garvey:
* Is the will free from the directing power of understanding? No: it is impossible that I should understand a dozen reasons for doing a thing, and none against, and then do the opposite. If I did, the will would be free of *me*.
I think that's the real difference between us. I believe the will is "me." You believe a set of traits is "me." I believe a "person" is a being capable of making independent choices. You think a "person" is an independent set of character traits. In my view, all traits are nothing more than accumulated choices. In your view, the will must conform to the axiomatic character traits. For you, God is Love, Mercy, Justice, Holiness, and all that, and His will is subordinate to that. In my view, God is a being capable of choosing and He chose to be Love, Mercy, Justice, Holiness and all that, so His nature is subordinate to His will. I've suspected this was the difference since you said this (20):
The libertarian concept says, “But he could sin if he wanted to, or he’s not free.” But how can one legitimately theorise about something that is eternally untrue?
(God cannot sin by definition, because the definition of sin is a choice made against the will of God, and God cannot choose against his own will by definition. Will is the capacity to choose.)
Therefore God’s will is “constrained” to good by his nature (or better he is entirely free always to express his nature). If that is true of God, why is it not true of man?
Indeed. God's nature, His values, His traits, are all superior to His will. They simply exist as an axiom, whereas I say His will simply exists as an axiom. I don't think it would be hard to show that God's nature must encompass all possible situations He would encounter or it would be meaningless, and therefore His will is not free in any meaningful sense, and neither is man's on this model. I think this satisfactorily explains our differences. I think if we continued this I could show that your conception of the "will" is not free in any meaningful sense, just as my conception of values or traits are constantly beholden to the will. Incidentally, M.I. is much closer to my point of view (34):
God is not mechanistically obligated to act according to his nature, as if his nature “causes” his actions. I believe he chooses them. He may be morally obligated to his choices because of his nature, and he honors that obligation because of that very same nature; but I can’t see a way to elevate God’s nature in such a way that his will is merely subject to it, as a matter of cause and effect, because I believe that his will is preeminent.
tragic mishap
April 18, 2012
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Thanks Jon! That's two fun facts about italics in one day! More to come...material.infantacy
April 18, 2012
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εν αρχη ην ο λογος Still there! It must be oblique type; I don't imagine there are too many italicized Greek fonts. =D This applet converts Greek characters to their appropriate HTML codes. http://code.cside.com/3rdpage/us/entity/converter.htmlmaterial.infantacy
April 18, 2012
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Well, that's ascertained that italics don't work in Greek text but question marks that replace them do...Jon Garvey
April 18, 2012
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?? ??????? ???? ?? ??????? ???? ????? ???? ?? ???????Jon Garvey
April 18, 2012
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Interesting fact about italics #1. A true italic typeface is a stylized version of calligraphic type. However oblique type, usually considered italicized type, is merely a slanted (skewed) form of another typeface. The italic style visible on this thread, dominating all of the comments after post #30, appears to be the oblique form of the Verdana typeface.material.infantacy
April 18, 2012
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I personally can only thank the likes of Will Provine for being honest in this matter. Just curious what's going on in their heads.Eugene S
April 18, 2012
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Who do I gotta boink around here to get these italics fixed? I'm ready to deal. https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/why-you-cant-be-a-darwinist-and-a-human-exceptionalist/#comment-423653material.infantacy
April 17, 2012
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"At this point, I’d like to learn if V.J. Torley sees/hears any connection between intelligent design theory and human exceptionalism or not."
Sure, no problem. Take care.material.infantacy
April 17, 2012
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Thanks M.I. and no worries, I've disregarded the phrase you mention. At this point, I'd like to learn if V.J. Torley sees/hears any connection between intelligent design theory and human exceptionalism or not. You write, "ID theory, in my opinion, does not speak directly to human exceptionalism, but it has implications to it..." Would V.J. Torley agree? In my view, the two simply cannot be separated. Iow, we (human beings) theorise 'intelligent design' (if we do) precisely because we are exceptional. Likewise, our exceptionality allows us to theorise intelligent design, which is what marks a difference with '(neo-)Darwinism,' the main point of the thread.Gregory
April 17, 2012
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Please disregard the phrase "I'd like to see a test performed" at the end of the fifth paragraph in post #58.material.infantacy
April 17, 2012
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Gregory, you wrote,
"Let us be clear upfront that ID is being used as both a thing and as a theory."
Regardless of how ID is used, the theory is the theory. Let's call the following the ID hypothesis: "The theory of Intelligent Design holds that certain features of the universe and of living systems that are best explained by an intelligent cause, rather than by undirected processes." Everyone interested in ID "uses" ID, both adherents and detractors. The same use math to suit their own purposes in accordance with their consciences.
IDers (expecting this is the most respectful of the labels, so I use it here) are those who hold theories or hypotheses about the supposed ‘intelligent design’ of the universe, of nature, of society, of families, etc. Having a theory about the ‘existence’ of design is what IDers admit as their ‘design inference.’
IDers (Intelligent Design proponents) all pretty much support the ID hypothesis as stated previously; additionally they accept that its empirically possible to detect design. After that the views can go anywhere. Many Christians support ID, from pretty much all major denominations, even non-denominationalism (which can in many cases be considered its own denomination.) ID proponents are quite up front about the fact that design is an objectively observable phenomenon, in part because it's an unremarkable statement. Even if one denies that the apparent design in biology is real design, and excludes it from consideration, there's no mistaking things which have been designed for a purpose. I'd like to see a test performed
Saying ID has nothing to do with families, however, would contradict even William Dembski, founder of this site, who writes about ‘intelligent design’ (e.g. 2004: p. 58) being ‘uncontroversial’ wrt human artifacts.
I don't understand this thing with families, so I'm just going to ignore it. The implications of ID are of course perceived differently, depending on one's worldview. Yes, Dembski would agree I'm sure, that intelligent design is uncontroversial with regard to human artifacts.
“ID doesn’t screen its adherents’ theological beliefs.” – M.I. Indeed, it would be unusual for any natural scientific theory to distinguish the theological beliefs of those who promote it.
Good, we agree I think. Anyone of any stripe is free to support ID, assuming they accept the ID hypothesis.
The challenge is to discover how inevitably intertwined the non-scientific ‘implications’ of ID are with the core of the scientific theory. If there were no implications suggested, we probably wouldn’t be here at UD having this conversation. It would not be important enough for frustration to become involved.
The theory is not "intertwined" with the implications. The implications follow from the theory. If the ID hypothesis is indeed true, then things designed for a purpose bear the hallmarks of intelligent agency. It is your political beliefs, and your specific type of political activism, which make ID look dangerous to you.
M.I. writes that “ID may have theological implications.” But that does not go far enough. ID simply *does* have theological implications. Jonathan Wells agrees with me about this and said so directly after I asked Dembski in front of an audience of IDers why ID is not more open about its connection of theology in dialogue with science and philosophy.
Why get tangled in my prose. That ID has theological implications is simply non-controversial; it does not need to be demonstrated because it is uncontested.
The most fascinating IDer living today, Steve Fuller, openly contends that ID theory simply must become more forthright in making clearer this connection (2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, many statements). It may be that politically in the USA this is difficult, but that doesn’t refute that the task still needs to be done. The atomism and specialisationism of ‘western’ science is no excuse for IDers to hide their heads in the sand on this issue.
I'm aware that Steve Fuller believes that ID theory in general should be more unified with claims about theology, if that's a fair characterization. Frankly, I'm bored and perhaps annoyed by attempts to expand on the central ID hypothesis to include theistic language. Steve Fuller seems like a delightfully interesting fellow, but I take no interest in a theism-ID unification at the theory level, and will actively resist it.
The compromise is that ID would be a narrowly specialist theory in biology. Instead, it could be seen (like many here at UD believe) as a holistic approach to humanity, including social, cultural, ethical, economical and physical laws. This was what the ‘Wedge’ document predicted would eventually happen, though that statement of mission has already fallen behind the times on its hopeful plans.
Use ID theory in whatever way you see fit. The rest of us will do the same. I'm just not interested in this idea that "ID should be so much more than it is." I like it how it stands, and I think it's most effective that way, given my personal beliefs. I have no problem with people using ID for their private and political purposes. I do so myself. What I do care about is misrepresentations of ID's claims.
As someone who studies social movements, yes, the beliefs of “who should and shouldn’t be a member of the movement” (M.I.) are very important. How could they not be? Un-reflexivity is totally unacceptable for/in social movements (e.g. Occupy without a primary mission?!). You have spoken here about the ID ‘movement’ and are now speaking with an expert on this topic, indeed one-in-a-million.
The ID movement is grass roots. Doors are open, come on by. There are no membership roles to sign, all we ask is that you support the ID hypothesis, and support the general notion that design is detectible by its hallmarks. Here's some hats and tee shirts. It's clear to me that you believe either, 1) ID theory is a dangerous idea; or 2) ID theory is a dangerous idea, but if we attach a bunch of subjective theology and political meaning to it, it could be great. I've haven't heard whether you believe the core hypothesis is factual. Could you be clear on whether "certain features of the universe and living systems are best explained as the result of an intelligent cause" is supported by the evidence?
“nothing about a historical Adam and Eve has any bearing on whether “certain features of the universe and living systems are best explained as a product of intelligence”.” – Material Infancy This is cloudy denialist thinking (say it three times and the rooster crows). This topic (creation, evolution, ID + alternatives) has *everything* to do with intelligence and ‘detecting’ intelligence that we are or are not created ‘imago Dei.’ That is in fact the main topic of this thread. Human exceptionalism is defined, according to Torley (and W.J. Smith), not merely by quantitative indicators, but extends from the ‘reality’ that we are created exceptionally (notice the ‘kind’ vs. ‘degree’ question awaits response?). It is useless to avoid this.
I'm not sure what I'm denying. It seems pretty clear to me that the theory of ID is not in the same category as whether Adam and Eve are historical figures or not. If you believe that ID confirms Imago Dei, fantastic. But your apparently intense desire to transform ID theory into some bizarre form of religious doctrine is disconcerting to me. I believe your political blinders make it impossible for you to be objective about ID's claims versus its implications. I suspect you believe that ID's claims are basically factual, but perhaps you are revulsed by the ID's political right and the biblical fundamentalist ID proponents. You dream of a world where ID has expelled those subgroups from amongst its ranks, I'm supposing. Or perhaps not. You're not leaving me with a lot of choice but to try and guess at what you believe about anything. Nothing I've read appears to be a statement of your intellectual stand on anything, just a bunch of vague, sort of emotionally driven statements that are mostly expressions of distaste for some aspect of ID or another. I believe that intelligence is a legitimate causal force in the universe and that its effects are objectively detectible. I believe in the Christian God. I believe that ID's factual basis has implications for my beliefs and the defense and promotion of them. I believe ID should be popularly accepted as a legitimate arena of scientific thought. I believe that ID's factual basis is strongly supportive of theism. I believe that ID attempts to quantify that which we observe and detect instinctually, that is, the artifacts of intelligence. Moreover, I believe that our ability to detect design is about as innate and reasonable as the correspondence of our observations to physical reality; in other words, we are designed to detect design, just as we are designed to perceive the universe, and both of these have a direct observational correspondence to reality. I have no problem being up front about my beliefs.
The metascientific claims of ID (historical method, “information always comes from an intelligent source” – Meyer, “new vision of science and the world” – Dembski) hinge on this exact issue, so dismissing it (the created intelligence of Adam-like creatures) is merely wordplay, dishonesty or convenient deception.
No, the confusion and word play is yours. If you cannot reasonably separate the claims of ID with your belief about creation, to such an extent that you feel compelled to fault ID and its proponents for not recognizing some imaginary, necessary relationship between design inferences and creation events, then I'm wasting my time with someone who is confused about the difference between objective facts and their implications to world views.
Indeed “what one believes about either really” actually has everything “to do with evaluating the evidence.” Do you not see how you are asking people to dehumanisethem-selves in order to act as some kind of robot instead of as persons, against the thrust of Michael Polanyi’s works?
No, I do not. If you would like to construct an argument that design detection is logically inseparable from a biblical creation scenario, or that big bang cosmology speaks to the Abomination of Desolation, or that mathematics cannot be considered separately from the Law of Moses, I promise to read it. Really, I do not understand where you are coming from. In my opinion, you should either make an argument for or against the notion that design is objectively detectible, or you should make your argument that design detection as a science is inextricable from some specific theology.
Please understand, there may be knowledge of human living that you have not yet confronted, thanks to advances made in human social sciences on this topic. Are you open to learning about them too?
Yes, there may be knowledge that I haven't confronted, and there may be knowledge that you haven't confronted, but I could care less about what social sciences says about design detection because I have seen nothing compelling to give me any indication that the two are related in any way. If you want to make a case that ID theory and social sciences are somehow intertwined, I will to read it. I might even comment. But don't hold your breath about winning any converts. If you're appealing to social science as to why ID should be religious in nature, then you've hopelessly confused political, religious, and empirical issues, and I will just yawn and move on.
You seem to want to talk about ‘design’ without any reference to the actual, real, historical ‘intelligent agency’ whereas I’m more interested in speaking about the ‘intelligent agency’ that ‘designs’ and about the ‘intelligent interpreter’ who observes and identifies the design pattern in question, i.e. ‘us’ (nod to ‘John Connor’ in T3). Do you acknowledge the difference here?
Design has everything to do with historical agency! But perhaps you're referring to the Christian god. I can have conversations all day long about how ID provides factual support for my firm faith in the Christian god, but I'm unlikely to confuse ID theory and religious thought. As to your distinction between intelligent agency and intelligent interpreters of agency, I'm unclear. Perhaps you insist humans only design in one way, and God only designs in another, and the two can't be compared in any way because that would be sacrilegious. I can't answer your question directly because I don't understand it. Again I'm having to guess, because you won't just come out and say what you believe to be the case; most everything you say is framed as some sort of rhetoric.
Re: “the claims of ID versus the empirical evidence” – this is a difficult topic. With such a ‘big tent’ one can seemingly never be sure which ‘empirical evidence’ an IDer is referencing. I’ve corresponded with atheists (even physicists!) who quite openly accept ‘design in nature.’ But as for me, if there is no G-d, then there is no design/Design – this is the standard position of Abrahamic believers. Combining rather than compartmentalising science, philosophy and religion is the preferred option, which I don’t see happening with insistence on the ‘ID-is-science-only’ position. (Noted, however, that M.I. acknowledges usefullness of ID for apologetics.)
We're referencing the empirical evidence that designers leave artifacts of their activity. This is non-controversial. Your references to the 'big tent' lead me to believe you don't like the fact that certain groups are supporters of ID theory. Please be up front about your biases and beliefs. It looks like you're just playing a game here. I agree that, no god, no design, as a matter of causal relations, not as a matter of empirical investigation. In other words, I believe that both God and humans leave unmistakable signs of their design activities, but that if God didn't create the universe, we would not be observing design. Of course I acknowledge the usefulness of ID to apologetics. I'm not sure why this is surprising to you. Christian apologetics makes use of actual evidence in support of biblical claims. This is entirely non-controversial. I suppose I have the advantage here of not being the one with a political agenda to morph ID into some conglomeration of natural science, religion, philosophy, and social science. That makes absolutely no sense to me. I recommend that you incorporate ID theory into whatever movement you think will advance your political causes, and have at it; but you will get no support from me in attempting to kick ID into the realm of subterfuge.
By all means, send your resistances against (neo-)Darwinism re: human exceptionalism if you will. Yet this still doesn’t explain anything about the ID pro-human exceptionalism position. What about ID theory, if anything, says that humans are ‘exceptional’? V.J. Torley?
ID theory, in my opinion, does not speak directly to human exceptionalism, but it has implications to it; just like ID has implications to any theological or anti-theological, or non-theological world views.
And how about you, M.I., do you really believe that if you didn’t already think human beings are ‘exceptional’ that you would still believe in/accept intelligent design/Intelligent Design?
I believe that the implications of ID theory to my world view confirm what I believe to be objective evidence, that human beings are exceptional. I take my views from both general and special revelation. I believe that most ID proponents have religious beliefs, and that those beliefs make ID very attractive. I believe that most anti-ID folks have religious beliefs, and that those beliefs make ID very unattractive. I believe that ID is entirely supportive of theism, but necessarily silent on it, because it attempts to quantify the artifacts of intelligence as a category of causal phenomena. I believe ID theory is scientific, and as a method of noting effects and their causes, should have nothing to do with the politics of any single religious group or denomination. I believe ID theory should be agnostic to the personal beliefs of its proponents, and accept that those of varying political and religious beliefs and affiliations are going to find much to support about ID theory, just as they would find much to support about mathematics, cosmology, physics, and chemistry. Gregory, what do you believe? Do you believe that design is objectively detectible in the universe and in living systems? Please do me the courtesy of answering my questions directly, as I've done for you; there aren't that many throughout the post. Best, m.i.material.infantacy
April 17, 2012
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* Aren’t some habits so strong that they leave very little freedom? Yes: addiction for example is so strong that AA programs depend on the acceptance of a Higher Power (see 12 steps - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twelve-step_programs). Clearly the will is not totally erased or the desire to join the program wouldn't be there (though having worked with addicts it's usually an apparent work of grace that kindles the desire), and studies show agnostics can benefit too - though those with belief do better. But you said before that we are in the same position as Adam vis a vis sin: in your reply here your "not entirely erased" implies there are degrees of freedom: we are made less free as we develop bad habits. What evidence do you have that habits might not enslave us to the point where only God can free us? * Is anyone free from God’s laws and judgements? No: and his judgements have included "giving them over to a depraved mind (Rom 1.28)". * Is anyone free from God’s dominion, and his disposing will, by which he does what he likes with his own? No. * Is the will free from the directing power of understanding? No: it is impossible that I should understand a dozen reasons for doing a thing, and none against, and then do the opposite. If I did, the will would be free of *me*. * Are we at liberty from the oversight of angels? Hmm - the Bible has example both of guiding and deceiving angels: but we don't have a theology of angels nowadays, unlike the seventeenth century boys. * Are we at liberty from the rule and education, reproofs and corrections of parents, masters and tutors? No - you evidently have never been persuaded by anyone. But, you'll say, "I was persuaded to change my will freely." But the will, then, wasn't totally independent. * Are we at liberty from laws and punishments of the country? In Baxter's day the punishments might include being branded or blinded: amazing what persuasive power that has. When I did social psychology, I learned that people coerced into actions have a strong tendency to end up persuading themselves they wanted to do them and continuing to do them voluntarily. * Is any child of Adam free from original sin, and depravity inciting them to evil, and making them averse to holy good? You never replied to my comments on Romans 7. But as I pointed out then, even Arminius believed in Original Sin, like the whole mainstream Church until a generation ago. We didn't actually agree that sin is "an action defined by making a conscious choice against the will of God." The definition didn't include "action" and it didn't include "conscious". Jesus says lusting in ones heart is a sin, and the Mosaic Law had sacrifices for inadvertant sin. Your definition could have been lifted directly from Pelagius. As for sin as a state, consider Jer 17.9, Matt 15.19, Luke 6.45. * Is any unsaved person free from the dominion of this sin, and sinful habits? No. It's Baxter's question, not mine, but he has in mind passages like Rom 6.6,12,14,16,17,18,20,22; 7.14,23, etc. And maybe Genesis 4.7. But you're right in saying it's a personification of our sinful will, not an entity in itself any more than the will is. That's why it's a moral enslavement, a slavery to ourselves (and secondarily to Satan who thereby becomes our master, according to Scripture). * Is any regenerate man perfectly free from sinful inclinations? No. You say "the will is free to do as it wants" but that's a tautology. The will doesn't want anything: it is only what *we* want. If we have sinful inclinations, we want to sin. So to that extent we have curtailed our freedom not to sin. * Is any man free from all actual sin? No. "We don’t have to sin, but we do." Why? God's design fault? If the will is totally free, why is there not an even scatter of people from horrendously corrupt to perfectly righteous? If a supposedly unbiased coin always lands on tails, you'll be alone if you continue to think it's unbiased. * Is anyone free from Satan’s temptations? No. "I can give it up any time I want. I just don't happen to have wanted to yet." Yeah, right. * Is anyone free from the temptations of false teachers, flatterers, tyrants, persecutors, enemies and other wicked men? No. We don’t have to succumb, but blow me, we do it all the time. * Are we free from all sorts of material temptations? Ditto. * Are we free from our own senses, appetites, etc. Ditto. Rom 8.5-8. Baxter wrote "Catholick Theologie" to forge a via media between the extremes of Arminianism and Calvinism. He makes some mistakes, but he's second to none at unpoicking logical fallacies on either side. Disingenuous he is not.Jon Garvey
April 17, 2012
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Yes, that's it. I must be unwilling to work through the issues. I'll just agree with the nine numbers and go through the questions one by one, answering them by what I think is true. Then maybe we can sort out any differences we have if you answer them as well. * Aren’t some habits so strong that they leave very little freedom? Yes but not so strong that freedom of the will is entirely erased. And habits are formed by a series of similar choices in the first place. * Is anyone free from God’s laws and judgements? No. But His judgments and laws allow humans free will. * Is anyone free from God’s dominion, and his disposing will, by which he does what he likes with his own? No. * Is the will free from the directing power of understanding? A thousand times yes. * Are we at liberty from the oversight of angels? Yes. * Are we at liberty from the rule and education, reproofs and corrections of parents, masters and tutors? Yes. * Are we at liberty from laws and punishments of the country? Yes, the will is free from those things. * Is any child of Adam free from original sin, and depravity inciting them to evil, and making them averse to holy good? Yes, I don't believe in original sin. All have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God. Sinning is an action, not a state of being. It's an action defined by making a conscious choice against the will of God, as we agreed earlier. * Is any unsaved person free from the dominion of this sin, and sinful habits? All have sinned. I don't know what you mean by "dominion of this sin." Sin is not an agent that it can rule over anything. * Is any regenerate man perfectly free from sinful inclinations? The will is free to do as it wants. Certainly we have sinful inclinations. * Is any man free from all actual sin? All have sinned. We don't have to sin, but we do. * Is anyone free from Satan’s temptations? We don't have to succumb, but we are tempted. * Is anyone free from the temptations of false teachers, flatterers, tyrants, persecutors, enemies and other wicked men? We don't have to succumb, but we are tempted. * Are we free from all sorts of material temptations? We don't have to succumb, but we are tempted. * Are we free from our own senses, appetites, etc. We don't have to succumb, but we are tempted. I feel like some of those questions were disingenuous. "Are we free from (blank)" means "Does (blank) happen to us?" So yes, these things happen to us. But our will is not subjugated to them. We can resist temptation by our own choice. We are free to resist our influences if we so choose. Will you answer your questions so we can compare differences?tragic mishap
April 17, 2012
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Let us be clear upfront that ID is being used as both a thing and as a theory. IDers (expecting this is the most respectful of the labels, so I use it here) are those who hold theories or hypotheses about the supposed ‘intelligent design’ of the universe, of nature, of society, of families, etc. Having a theory about the ‘existence’ of design is what IDers admit as their ‘design inference.’ Saying ID has nothing to do with families, however, would contradict even William Dembski, founder of this site, who writes about ‘intelligent design’ (e.g. 2004: p. 58) being ‘uncontroversial’ wrt human artefacts. “ID doesn’t screen its adherents’ theological beliefs.” – M.I. Indeed, it would be unusual for any natural scientific theory to distinguish the theological beliefs of those who promote it. The challenge is to discover how inevitably intertwined the non-scientific ‘implications’ of ID are with the core of the scientific theory. If there were no implications suggested, we probably wouldn’t be here at UD having this conversation. It would not be important enough for frustration to become involved. M.I. writes that “ID may have theological implications.” But that does not go far enough. ID simply *does* have theological implications. Jonathan Wells agrees with me about this and said so directly after I asked Dembski in front of an audience of IDers why ID is not more open about its connection of theology in dialogue with science and philosophy. The most fascinating IDer living today, Steve Fuller, openly contends that ID theory simply must become more forthright in making clearer this connection (2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, many statements). It may be that politically in the USA this is difficult, but that doesn’t refute that the task still needs to be done. The atomism and specialisationism of ‘western’ science is no excuse for IDers to hide their heads in the sand on this issue. The compromise is that ID would be a narrowly specialist theory in biology. Instead, it could be seen (like many here at UD believe) as a holistic approach to humanity, including social, cultural, ethical, economical and physical laws. This was what the ‘Wedge’ document predicted would eventually happen, though that statement of mission has already fallen behind the times on its hopeful plans. As someone who studies social movements, yes, the beliefs of “who should and shouldn’t be a member of the movement” (M.I.) are very important. How could they not be? Un-reflexivity is totally unacceptable for/in social movements (e.g. Occupy without a primary mission?!). You have spoken here about the ID ‘movement’ and are now speaking with an expert on this topic, indeed one-in-a-million. “nothing about a historical Adam and Eve has any bearing on whether “certain features of the universe and living systems are best explained as a product of intelligence”.” – Material Infancy This is cloudy denialist thinking (say it three times and the rooster crows). This topic (creation, evolution, ID + alternatives) has *everything* to do with intelligence and ‘detecting’ intelligence that we are or are not created ‘imago Dei.’ That is in fact the main topic of this thread. Human exceptionalism is defined, according to Torley (and W.J. Smith), not merely by quantitative indicators, but extends from the ‘reality’ that we are created exceptionally (notice the ‘kind’ vs. ‘degree’ question awaits response?). It is useless to avoid this. The metascientific claims of ID (historical method, “information always comes from an intelligent source” – Meyer, “new vision of science and the world” – Dembski) hinge on this exact issue, so dismissing it (the created intelligence of Adam-like creatures) is merely wordplay, dishonesty or convenient deception. Indeed “what one believes about either really” actually has everything “to do with evaluating the evidence.” Do you not see how you are asking people to dehumanise them-selves in order to act as some kind of robot instead of as persons, against the thrust of Michael Polanyi’s works? Please understand, there may be knowledge of human living that you have not yet confronted, thanks to advances made in human social sciences on this topic. Are you open to learning about them too? You seem to want to talk about ‘design’ without any reference to the actual, real, historical ‘intelligent agency’ whereas I’m more interested in speaking about the ‘intelligent agency’ that ‘designs’ and about the ‘intelligent interpreter’ who observes and identifies the design pattern in question, i.e. ‘us’ (nod to ‘John Connor’ in T3). Do you acknowledge the difference here? Re: “the claims of ID versus the empirical evidence” – this is a difficult topic. With such a ‘big tent’ one can seemingly never be sure which ‘empirical evidence’ an IDer is referencing. I’ve corresponded with atheists (even physicists!) who quite openly accept ‘design in nature.’ But as for me, if there is no G-d, then there is no design/Design – this is the standard position of Abrahamic believers. Combining rather than compartmentalising science, philosophy and religion is the preferred option, which I don’t see happening with insistence on the ‘ID-is-science-only’ position. (Noted, however, that M.I. acknowledges usefullness of ID for apologetics.) By all means, send your resistances against (neo-)Darwinism re: human exceptionalism if you will. Yet this still doesn’t explain anything about the ID pro-human exceptionalism position. What about ID theory, if anything, says that humans are ‘exceptional’? V.J. Torley? And how about you, M.I., do you really believe that if you didn’t already think human beings are ‘exceptional’ that you would still believe in/accept intelligent design/Intelligent Design?Gregory
April 17, 2012
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TM "Or you are saying that the will and the personality are equivalent? This would also mean you don’t really believe in free will." You may not understand me, but I think I've been more careful and nuanced in actually defining and describing "free will" than you have. Material.infantacy is clearly on the page with it. You cannot dissect out the human will, any more than you can dissect out intelligence, or emotion. They are all descriptors of distinguishable, but not separable, chracteristics of actual people. All people exercise their will, but there are no wills floating around apart from people. The will is the faculty of decision-making of the human personality (think "soul", in the Thomist sense). So clearly personality, the total, is greater than the part, just as it is greater than intelligence. Intelligence is what I know, or can reason. Will is what I want. Will is personality directed at an aim, so the personality's characteristics circumscribe the aims. How could it be otherwise? Here's a reasonable summary of the will's positive faculties, again based on Baxter who's in many ways good on this: 1 The will is naturally a self-determining principle, and lord of its own acts, able to determine itself with due objects and helps, without the external action of either God or creatures. 2 The will commands other faculties, some indirectly, some directly. 3 That will is directly and properly subject to none but God, eg angels can help, devils tempt, but neither determine the will. 4 No man can determine the will by whatever power or violence, or deceit or oratory. 5 No objects can determine it, though they may necessitate the sense and appetite. 6 Neither can our senses or imagination determine it. 7 Passions, etc, can molest and hinder the will, but not determine it. 8 The intellect can guide the will right or wrong, but not determine it. 9 None of these can therefore determine the will to evil acts or evil habits. But he then adds a list of provisos to that freedom. You cannot talk of free will as an absolute, because:- * Aren't some habits so strong that they leave very little freedom? * Is anyone free from God's laws and judgements? * Is anyone free from God's dominion, and his disposing will, by which he does what he likes with his own? * Is the will free from the directing power of understanding? * Are we at liberty from the oversight of angels? * Are we at liberty from the rule and education, reproofs and corrections of parents, masters and tutors? * Are we at liberty from laws and punishments of the country? * Is any child of Adam free from original sin, and depravity inciting them to evil, and making them averse to holy good? * Is any unsaved person free from the dominion of this sin, and sinful habits? * Is any regenerate man perfectly free from sinful inclinations? * Is any man free from all actual sin? * Is anyone free from Satan's temptations? * Is anyone free from the temptations of false teachers, flatterers, tyrants, persecutors, enemies and other wicked men? * Are we free from all sorts of material temptations? * Are we free from our own senses, appetites, etc. Like those interviewers who listen to a complex argument and then say, "Sum it up in one word," resolving everything into a "Are you for or against free will?" shibboleth indicates an unwillingness to work through the issues.Jon Garvey
April 17, 2012
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"Do you seriously see ‘intelligent design’ theory contributing in any way to this? This is a theory that predominantly disregards anthropology, sociology and economics, as you well know. It’s main focus is biology (Dembski 2004: p. 71). Theology would be great alone to change the world, or wouldn’t it? And ‘media,’ does ID make even a faint breath of impact on ‘media theory’?!"
I really don't understand this. Why is ID obligated to be anything other than how it defines itself? How does physics take into account the things you're critical of ID for not embracing? Is physics unhelpful? How about algebra? Should we ditch chemistry because it's not as world-transforming as theology? These are mostly rhetorical questions. You're inventing a standard for ID that just doesn't exist for any other intellectual enterprise. Either consciously or unconsciously, you are highly resistant to letting the claims of ID versus the empirical evidence speak for itself. It would be helpful if you could articulate why. m.i.material.infantacy
April 16, 2012
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Gregory, maybe I'm the one whose a little frustrated. =Dmaterial.infantacy
April 16, 2012
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To sum up, as with any observable aspect of reality, it's up to the individual, religious or otherwise, to decide as a matter of God-given liberty, whether certain ideas are appropriate for themselves and for their children. What so many appear to be afraid of is, that if given the choice, most people would view ID as entirely reasonable and falsifiable; hence the massive amounts of distortions about ID's claims -- and if you want examples of the immense amount of insane bigotry that assails those who believe that ID reflects reality in a testable way, look no further than Dembski, Marks, Gonzales, Sternberg, Crocker, Behe, Coppedge, and all the others. Who did I miss?material.infantacy
April 16, 2012
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Hi Gregory, short answer: yes I believe so, as ID is a formal expression of objective truth -- that designing agents leave recognizable hallmarks of their activity. Truth about the nature of nature is unavoidably helpful in aiding people to make responsible decisions about their temporal and spiritual lives. Do I think ID is a replacement for the gospel? In no way, and so it is with any natural or formal knowledge. Do I think that ID is useful in apologetics? Absolutely, as is the case with any of the hard sciences. However this isn't about the gospel and it isn't about apologetics. Either ID's claims are true, that designers (big ones or little ones) consistently leave recognizable artifacts; or it is false, and they do not. I do not care to have the truth claims of ID hidden behind a veil of ecclesiastical politics. This is not some sort of dangerous knowledge we're talking about here, at least to those not predisposed to, A) religious bigotry; B) denominational bigotry. It's not like we're talking heresy here, in any way shape or form (as it is with promoting Darwinian evolution as an alternative to special creation). We're not talking about ideas so disturbing that we should lock them in a vault so as not to upset the ignorant masses. I'm all for letting big claims withstand big scrutiny on a fact per fact basis. And I'm for letting the masses make judgments for themselves about the factuality of scientific and philosophical claims.material.infantacy
April 16, 2012
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"Seriously though, this dead world can take its toll. I’m ready to see a few world news headlines: “Child exploitation and hunger eliminated, never to be seen again” and “Rape down %100 for the next infinity years” and “New survey shows that sorrow, neglect, and loneliness have disappeared completely, with even the memory of them faded away.” There are a few more I’d like to see. Of course, that will require a very new, new media." - M.I. Do you seriously see 'intelligent design' theory contributing in any way to this? This is a theory that predominantly disregards anthropology, sociology and economics, as you well know. It's main focus is biology (Dembski 2004: p. 71). Theology would be great alone to change the world, or wouldn't it? And 'media,' does ID make even a faint breath of impact on 'media theory'?! This is not an expression of 'frustration' but rather merely 'perception' freed from the chains (no anthropology, no sociology, no economics, no media studies) you are used to in ID-present. Still #28 awaits an answer.Gregory
April 16, 2012
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