Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

ID and the Science of God: Part IV

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This post originally began as a response to Andrew Sibley but the issues here may resonate with others wanting to reconcile science and religion, coming at it mainly from the religious side. My concern here, as an interested bystander, is that apologetics tends to be much too apologetic. Christianity, in particular, has a much stronger hand to play with regard to the support of science.

 

I am intrigued by the caution, if not squeamishness, that ID supporters – especially Christian ones – express towards the pursuit of theodicy. Since these reservations come from people on both sides of the Atlantic, they do not seem to be exclusively tied to the particular legal issues surrounding the separation of church and state in the US Constitution.

 

Maybe these reservations concern the idea that the Bible might be understood literally yet fallibly, as the theodicists seemed to do.  They read the Bible as we would a scientific treatise, namely, as some admixture of socio-historic construction (of the theorist) and timeless reality (of the theorized). Certainly our Darwinist opponents read Origin of Species in that spirit. They venerate the text and its author but they do not deny its flaws. Instead they dedicate their lives to correcting its errors and offering a better version of the original vision. Thus, Darwin is read as literal, fallible and corrigible.

 

I believe that the original 17th century Scientific Revolutionaries, including the theodicists, read the Bible exactly in this way – and would have been surprised, if not appalled, to learn that it opened the door to intense religious scepticism and even atheism over the next two centuries. After all, the likes of Newton believed that the Bible was indeed inspired by God but equally that it is an alloy text. It demands that we distinguish the divine inspiration from the inevitable noise introduced by the people originally entrusted with capturing that inspiration. To engage in this separation of wheat from chaff is to attempt to get closer to God. Of course, one might get the task horribly wrong, which might even result in eternal damnation. Nevertheless, we – as those created in the image and likeness of God – are called to engage in this risky business.

 

But note: The relevant engagement is not prayer or special revelation – but science itself. Nature’s design is not a sign that God wants to communicate with us. It is a message that has been already sent to us, and our job is to decode it and offer a fitting response – which is to say, to make the world a better place, in keeping with the divine plan. At least, if one wishes to remain a Biblical literalist and be robustly committed to science, this is how one should think about the science-religion relationship. My view is that this is how the theodicists Leibniz and Malebranche, as well as Newton and many of his illustrious successors – Whewell, Faraday, Maxwell, Kelvin – thought about the matter.

 

This is not the familiar dodge of claiming that the Bible is ‘metaphorically’ or ‘ethically’ true. Such an attitude effectively denies the need to reconcile the Book of God and the Book of Nature: We can live in a world of multiple truths for multiple occasions. On this basis, there would never have been a Scientific Revolution, whose protagonists, after all, parted ways with the Pope because of Catholicism’s fundamental distrust of humanity’s Biblical entitlement to exercise its own creative reason to arrive at a unified understanding of reality. Perhaps the most artful expression of this point about Catholicism’s latent ‘bad faith’ is Dostoevsky’s ‘Grand Inquisitor’ episode in The Brothers Karamazov.

 

But what’s the specifically religious
payoff of this line of thought? I see two major ones, though both controversial.

 

First of all, it helps to explain how Christianity managed to surpass Islam as a scientific culture – especially if we think of science the modern self-critical sense that followed in the wake of the Protestant Reformation. Muhammad is usually presented as an illiterate vessel for the divine truth recorded in the Qur’an. His lack of personal authorship, and hence lack of personal responsibility, has made it very difficult to raise the fallibility of Islam’s sacred book without courting charges of blasphemy. (Consider the fate of Averroes.) To be sure, the Qur’an gives pride of place to humanity in nature and encourages the pursuit of knowledge. But it provides little if no scope for challenging specific claims made in the sacred book itself, since everything said there is presumed to be exactly as God wanted it to be said.

 

Put another way, Muhammad is not presented as a sufficiently independent thinker to have possibly resisted or misunderstood what God said to him. In contrast, from day one, there have been disputes about whether the Biblical authors got God right, which has had major consequences, not least for which books ought to be included in the Bible. I would trace Christianity’s historic openness to the questioning of even its most sacred texts to the strength of its Judaic heritage, as Jesus himself is portrayed as a precocious master of rabbinical criticism. 

 

Second, and perhaps more provocatively, I believe that the style of  ‘scientific theology’ exemplified by theodicy helps to serve Christianity’s proselytising mission – i.e. conversion of the unbelievers. I have spent a fair amount of time (including at the Dover trial) defending the idea that certain religious beliefs have outright facilitated – not impeded – scientific discovery. But I would also make the reverse case, namely, that as more of the natural world is illuminated by hypotheses concerning the designer, thus enabling us to get a more exact understanding of the design, the closer science comes to communion with God. Indeed, if design were as illusory or superficial as Darwinists maintain, then the concept of design should not be so illuminating — even for evolutionists who continue to operate with stealth notions of design in the guise of, say, ‘adaptation’ or ‘optimisation’.

 

Nobody denies the metaphorical, even poetic, appeal of conceiving of nature as an artefact. However, an explanation is required for why turning the poetry into prose works even better, though not infallibly. That we are created in the image and likeness of the creative deity is the most straightforward explanation on offer. Of course, that doesn’t ‘prove’ God’s existence but it does provide grounds for selling the Biblical deity on scientific grounds – indeed, as the Jesuits were doing in China at the same time they were holding Galileo’s feet to the fire in Rome.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Comments
"the designer must have the physical tools necessary to bring his design to fruition." Maybe. But what tools did a designer use in creating the universe? Our concept of tools may not exactly match what the designer has available. Darth Vader and the Emperor used a method called the "Force." If such a thing was possible, what would be the tool there? The Force? Some claim telekinesis may be possible. It doesn't seem possible with humans but who knows there may be others out there with powers we can only imagine. Maybe in another galaxy far, far away.jerry
January 22, 2009
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Jay M @74 " I’m saying that if we see characteristics A, B, and C in an artifact we have determined to be designed, that tells us something about the designer. If we find those characteristics are shared across a set of designed artifacts, that tells us even more." I would agree here. Yay! From this paragraph at least, you appear to approach it from a "design evidence first" instead of "assumption of characteristics of some arbitrary designer"....other than what we would already assume.....intelligence, purposefulness, choice-making. "Why? The Judeo-Christian God is omnipotent. He could design the universe any way he wanted, by definition." Yes, I agree. The Judeo-Christian God, being omnipotent, could have created a universe with no life or with no intelligent life, or a universe that would be different to a degree that life would not be possible. The universe could have been much different. The fact that it appears so optimally suited for such a wide range of earthly life and scientific observability should clue you in about the motives and care of God. In my opinion, and using your line of reasoning, the universe appearing as it does with significant evidence of fine-tuning for intelligent life would seem to tell us something about the designer; That God cares enough about those intelligent beings for which the universe is designed, so those intelligent beings can enjoy the universe, observe it, admire it and study it. When somebody asks me "who or what is the designer?"..I always say..."ID presents a scientific inference for design, while my own personal, theological assumption is that the Judeo-Christian God is the designer". Khan @ 76 "the designer must have the physical tools necessary to bring his design to fruition." What if the designer created all the physical tools....from nothing?Bantay
January 22, 2009
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“Detection of design requires some assumptions about the nature of the designer” Yes, I agree. The designer must have intelligence. Anything else?
the designer must have the physical tools necessary to bring his design to fruition.Khan
January 22, 2009
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"Detection of design requires some assumptions about the nature of the designer" Yes, I agree. The designer must have intelligence. Anything else?jerry
January 22, 2009
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Bantay @69
I just want to make sure i understand what you’re implying. Are you implying that we should ask..”IF (G)god exists, then such (G)god would have characteristics A, B & C. If this is true, then we would expect the appearances of design A, B & C.” ??
Not at all. I'm saying that if we see characteristics A, B, and C in an artifact we have determined to be designed, that tells us something about the designer. If we find those characteristics are shared across a set of designed artifacts, that tells us even more.
Well that’s a no-brainer. In the case of the apparent design of the universe, if the Judeo-Christian God exists, then we would expect to such God to design a universe the way we see it.
Why? The Judeo-Christian God is omnipotent. He could design the universe any way he wanted, by definition.
Let’s consider an assumption of a supposed designer. It would be intelligent.
What does that mean, though? Are there intelligences other than human intelligences? If so, what is the nature of those intelligences and how would that impact the designs they create?
It would be purposeful. It would make choices. Dawkin’s intelligent aliens could be a likely candidate for that. Seems to me it is more relevant to recognize the minimal characteristics of design, rather than the characteristics of the designer.
That's exactly what can't be done in a vacuum. Detection of design requires some assumptions about the nature of the designer. As I keep asking, how can we say that the flagella is designed but a rock is not unless we make some implicit assumptions about the designer?
We already have a minimal set of characteristics for design, as demonstrated by human intelligence.
Those suffice for identifying design by humans or human-like intelligences. If the designer is God, making those assumptions is inappropriate (and, by some lights, heretical). JJJayM
January 21, 2009
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StephenB -- well said at 68. You know your philosophy.tribune7
January 21, 2009
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This information can be used to generate testable models of the designer’s capabilities and limitations.
The outcome of design demonstrates abilities, but not limitations. A human designer can create an abacus and Pentium. A skilled artist can also write his name in the dirt with a stick. Can we infer limitations from what we observe? The onlyScottAndrews
January 21, 2009
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StephenB @68
“The problem is that we cannot detect design without making at least some assumptions about the nature of the designer. If ID theory is scientific, those assumptions cannot include non-natural characteristics.”
In effect, you are suggesting that ID is a tautological exercise and therefore cannot really be an inferential science. A tautology consists of smuggling the conclusion into the assumption.
That wasn't what I meant to suggest, quite the opposite in fact! ID theory is about the detection of design. In order to do that, we have to determine one or more characteristics that uniquely identify design vs. non-design. ID theory posits CSI as this distinguishing characteristic. That, in and of itself, makes implicit assumptions about the designer. Specifically, it assumes that, if CSI can be identified, a designer exists and that the designer is capable of producing CSI. More information about the designer can be gleaned from patterns found as additional designed artifacts are identified. This information can be used to generate testable models of the designer's capabilities and limitations. There is no tautology here.
when we do a scientific inference, we reason our way FROM reason’s first principles, through the data, TO a designer. We do not begin by assuming anything about the designer.
I agree up until the last sentence. It is simply logically impossible to make no assumptions about the designer. Without some minimal assumptions, there is no reason to consider a rock undesigned but a flagella designed. Maybe the designer likes granite. JJJayM
January 21, 2009
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Upright BiPed @65
With all due respect, JayM are you a sock puppet?
I suspect my screen name is closer to my real name than yours is. Are you a sock puppet?
the detection of design inherently provides information about the designer
Would you please provide an inventory of what the evidence of design tells you about the designer?
As noted here and in other threads, at a minimum evidence of design shows that a designer exists. In fact, it shows a great deal more. The characteristics of the designed object provide information about the means used to produce it, and therefore about the nature of the designer capable of using such means. As more designed artifacts are identified, commonalities that emerge provide even more information about the designer, i.e. "The designer tends to use this approach but never that approach." which, in turn point to the capabilities, preferences, and constraints of the designer. These kinds of inferences can define, at the very least, the general nature of the designer and suggest additional research directions. JJJayM
January 21, 2009
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on Jay @63 "The problem is that we cannot detect design without making at least some assumptions about the nature of the designer. If ID theory is scientific, those assumptions cannot include non-natural characteristics." Is this the same kind of assumption that strict materialists make? I just want to make sure i understand what you're implying. Are you implying that we should ask.."IF (G)god exists, then such (G)god would have characteristics A, B & C. If this is true, then we would expect the appearances of design A, B & C." ?? Well that's a no-brainer. In the case of the apparent design of the universe, if the Judeo-Christian God exists, then we would expect to such God to design a universe the way we see it. Does that contribute to anything toward evidence of design? No. Let's consider an assumption of a supposed designer. It would be intelligent. It would be purposeful. It would make choices. Dawkin's intelligent aliens could be a likely candidate for that. Seems to me it is more relevant to recognize the minimal characteristics of design, rather than the characteristics of the designer. We already have a minimal set of characteristics for design, as demonstrated by human intelligence.Bantay
January 21, 2009
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----Jay J: "The problem is that we cannot detect design without making at least some assumptions about the nature of the designer. If ID theory is scientific, those assumptions cannot include non-natural characteristics." In effect, you are suggesting that ID is a tautological exercise and therefore cannot really be an inferential science. A tautology consists of smuggling the conclusion into the assumption. It is very easy to discern when this is and is not happening. If, for example, one begins by assuming some attribute about the designer, then obviously one will find design in nature. In that case, the conclusion is imbedded in the hypothesis. If, on the other hand, the scientist begins with the observation that certain patterns are present in a DNA molecule, he can, through the use of systematic methods, analyze those patterns and draw inferences about how those patterns resemble designs that we already know about. A scientific inference requires no prior commitment to a designer. If it did, it would not be an inference, it would be a presupposition. ID critics tend to confuse tautological thinking with reason’s first principles, not knowing that, while tautologies do indeed constitute bad reasoning, first principles define the necessary conditions for reason itself and must be assumed PRIOR the investigation. Many Darwinists, for example, on learning that science requires metaphysical foundations, (they generally don’t know that) begin by denying THAT fact and, when they can deny it no longer, exploit their newly acquired information by concluding, mistakenly, that those foundational assumptions must be tautologies. Anyone who has had to wade through their confusion can attest to the almost frustrating difficulty in trying to explain to them this point: We reason FROM first principles [law of non-contradiction etc]; we cannot reason our way TO them. On the other hand, when we do a scientific inference, we reason our way FROM reason's first principles, through the data, TO a designer. We do not begin by assuming anything about the designer.StephenB
January 20, 2009
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Furthermore, we may be able to psychoanalyze the designer if we have any evidence that all intelligence has something in common and that we can tell something about the designer's psychology through his effects. Do humans leave any markings of the state of their psychology through the effects that they produce? Is there a common thread among all intelligence, where that could be exploited?CJYman
January 20, 2009
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Evidence of design in life would tell me that the designer possess foresight (as the ability to model the future), possesses creativity (as the ability to use a system of signs to represent something that is not connected to those signs by necessity), is more intelligent than humans are at the moment, and is most likely extra-terrestrial [possibly extra-universal].CJYman
January 20, 2009
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With all due respect, JayM are you a sock puppet?
the detection of design inherently provides information about the designer
Would you please provide an inventory of what the evidence of design tells you about the designer?Upright BiPed
January 20, 2009
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Uncommon Descent is a pretty interesting blog! It's not just blind ideology and name calling but thought and controversy. Thus PaulBurnett in 44,
I have wondered for years if the Intelligent Designer may have contracted out Creation (or some portions of Creation), much as King Solomon contracted with Hiram of Tyre to build the Temple in Jerusalem.
And then this fragment from Steve Petermann in 58,
If theology can move beyond ‘the Fall did it’ and develop more nuanced ideas in theodicy ...
And Evil Snack in 53,
Apparently God never intended this life to be a permanent state of affairs for any of its inhabitants. We gotta die, and we gotta die from something, and dying usually involves setting off and defeating various mechanisms that during life survive to keep us alive. Hence, life is finite, and its end is not pleasant.
Which reminds me of this Solzhenitsyn gem:
If humanism were right in declaring that man is born to be happy, he would not be born to die. Since his body is doomed to die, his task on earth evidently must be of a more spiritual nature. It cannot be unrestrained enjoyment of everyday life. It cannot be the search for the best ways to obtain material goods and then cheerfully get the most out of them. It has to be the fulfillment of a permanent, earnest duty so that one’s life journey may become an experience of moral growth, so that one may leave life a better human being than one started it.
It's a great conversation, and though I'm on the side of keeping ID simple and clear and a Big Tent, we ought to be talking about these other things anyway---not having to agree, of course. If ID ever triumphs in the academy then everyone’ll be in on the conversation.Rude
January 20, 2009
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Bantay @62
We all know what the implications are of some features of the universe and of living things showing evidence of design. Even ID critics know. But shouldn’t ID advocates be more focused on establishing evidence for design itself, and letting the theologians and philosophers wrangle it out about who or what the designer is?
The problem is that we cannot detect design without making at least some assumptions about the nature of the designer. If ID theory is scientific, those assumptions cannot include non-natural characteristics. Because it is clear that design detection does require such assumptions, ID opponents can conclude that the refusal of ID proponents to address the issue means that the designer is automatically assumed to be supernatural, that is, God. We know ID theory does not make this assumption, so there is no rational, scientific reason to exclude consideration of the nature of the designer. In fact, we cannot logically do so. JJJayM
January 20, 2009
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I think this entire line of threads is going in the wrong direction. I mean, I applaud the discussion itself, but listen. ID has suffered enough bad press for it supposedly being "creationist" and "religious". I (and many of you I'm sure) have gone out of my way to show a lot of people who wouldn't know otherwise (and some who do know better), that statements like "ID is religious" or "ID is just creationism in a cheap tuxedo" is just the critic's way to introduce a religious component into the discussion for no other reason than to turn around and accuse ID of being religious. All the while ignoring the fact that ID does not have a religious premise. Now here on the foremost ID blog in all of blogdom, is a thread called "ID And The Science Of God", and there is no mention of any scientific evidence for God. This isn't helping fellas. We all know what the implications are of some features of the universe and of living things showing evidence of design. Even ID critics know. But shouldn't ID advocates be more focused on establishing evidence for design itself, and letting the theologians and philosophers wrangle it out about who or what the designer is?Bantay
January 20, 2009
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Timaeus @60
The problem I see with your answer, which appears to apply to Prof. Fuller’s position as well, is this: Granted, we could start from a theological orientation and use that orientation to guide scientific research, to see where that orientation leads and whether it improves our understanding of nature. However, since theologies differ, we have to choose one as our starting point.
I suggest that we work bottom up, rather than top down. As I've argued here and in other threads, the detection of design inherently provides information about the designer. Steve Peterman made this point extremely well @56. Further, detection of design requires some minimal assumptions to be made about the designer. At the very least, the designer must be assumed to exist. ID theory goes further and asserts that CSI is the hallmark of the designer. So far there is no need for theodicy. The designer could be a completely natural phenomena or entity. Unless ID theory asserts a priori that the designer is God, there is no need to go through the logical and rhetorical contortions necessary to attempt to separate the inseparable detection of design and knowledge of the designer. Where Dr. Fuller's recommendations do come into play is after enough designed artifacts are identified. By that point we'll have learned a great deal about the designer, both from observation of the artifacts and knowing which assumptions provide the most predictive power. At this point, assuming that the evidence points to God as the designer, theodicy (in the broad meaning of the term advocated by Dr. Fuller) will become absolutely necessary. JJJayM
January 19, 2009
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Mr. Petermann: Your answer makes sense to me, and perhaps it is what Steve Fuller is driving at. And let me add that I am not leading a charge against Prof. Fuller's ideas; I'm just trying to figure out exactly what he is recommending and how he is proposing to implement it. The problem I see with your answer, which appears to apply to Prof. Fuller's position as well, is this: Granted, we could start from a theological orientation and use that orientation to guide scientific research, to see where that orientation leads and whether it improves our understanding of nature. However, since theologies differ, we have to choose one as our starting point. And this is where I don't follow Prof. Fuller. If we choose, say, Barthian Christianity, we probably won't be able to do design theory at all, since Barthians are generally opposed to the idea that nature displays anything of the divine mind, or at least, anything detectable by the rational mind. But even if we resolve to choose a theology more amenable to design theorizing, we still have to make a decision. Out of the multitude of possible theologies, which shall we choose? Among Christian understandings of God, creation, and evil there are many options, from the East, from Rome, and from Protestantism. And then there are theologies coming out of Judaism, Islam, Zoroastrianism, and Hinduism. Is the suggestion that we pick one of these theologies, use it as the basis for our working assumptions, and then launch our researches into design? Maybe that would work; but the cost would be that ID would have to give up some of its central public defenses. It would no longer be able to claim that it was religion-neutral, and was merely following empirical evidence. This would be attacked on methodological grounds (modern science is supposed to be neutral regarding ultimate questions), and it would be attacked on legal and constitutional grounds (if ID openly admits to being religious, then it is right to keep it out of the public schools). So it seems to me that if we follow Prof. Fuller's advice, we have to admit that the Dover trial judge was right about the religious character of ID, and that Ken Miller and Eugenie Scott and the NCSE are right in their characterization of ID as a departure from metaphysics-neutral science. We have invested vast amounts of money, time, intellect, and emotional energy rebutting these criticisms of ID. Are we now to retract our arguments and admit that the critics have been right all along? Are we to do a 180-degree turn, and frankly and advisedly tie the future of ID to adherence to a particular theology? Is our new defense to be: "Yes, we are creationists in a tuxedo, but it's not a cheap one, and we're not ashamed of it, and we think we can do some good empirical research while we're wearing it?" If so, what will happen to the thousands of thoughtful agnostic ID supporters (including some important scholars, writers, and bloggers), who have supported ID up to now, but will bail out if any particular religion takes over the notion? It is hard to see how the gains of such a move will outweigh the losses. T.Timaeus
January 18, 2009
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Steve Petermann (#58) wrote: "...your example of malaria is a great example. As you mentioned there could be a deeper reason (that is benevolent) for diseases... How do we know that the intelligent designer wasn't a malaria hyperprotozoan who designed humans as fodder for the creatures He created in His image? Can you prove this hypothesis wrong?PaulBurnett
January 18, 2009
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Timaeus, I think the issue is whether it is necessary or even desirable to strike a sharp demarcation between empirical investigations and theology. Certainly this has not been the case in the history of natural theology.
As for the designer’s “values”, how can we tell what the designer “values”, when we don’t yet know anything about the designer?
Science, per se, may not claim to know anything about the designer, but religious folk would say they do. This is where there could be a synergy between the two. In the past science has often informed theologians to adapt their theology. Could it be that the reverse can be the case with ID? Theology says something about the goals, values, and constraints of God. Whether or not those theological assertions hold up when faced with empirical explorations is always in play. But if theological hypotheses about the designer could be integrated into ID and tested, then ID would become more than just a biological SETI. I'm not saying this would be easy. It wouldn't. But I see no reason not to try. For instance, your example of malaria is a great example. As you mentioned there could be a deeper reason (that is benevolent) for diseases, natural disasters, etc. This is where theology can ponder its notions about God and soak up all the empirical data it can to reevaluate those formulations. If theology can move beyond "the Fall did it" and develop more nuanced ideas in theodicy then it might enable ID predictions. The question I have for those who find Fuller's prodding in a negative light, what is the valid reason for not even trying to integrated current ID with theology?Steve Petermann
January 18, 2009
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Mr. Petermann: I'm unsure how you think that the team, or any of its members, could even begin to determined the "goals, values, and constraints" of the designer. The only "goal" that would follow from the empirical data is that the designer wanted this particular kind of deadly killer to exist in the world. As for the designer's "values", how can we tell what the designer "values", when we don't yet know anything about the designer? If I find a gun, and determine that it is designed, I might infer that the designer values tyranny, and that he invented the gun to enslave others, or I might infer that the designer values liberty, and that he invented the gun to defend his people from invasion by others. My science (which detects the design of the gun) cannot tell me what the designer had in mind. In fact, I cannot even tell that he intended the gun for use on human beings; it might have been intended only for hunting, or for some other purpose. So I am ignorant of the designer's values. In the case of malaria, the designer may have introduced it into the world to serve some long-term good which I cannot fathom, or out of malice or caprice. How can science decide? Regarding design constraints, whether there are any such constraints (beyond logical constraints) depends on whether or not the designer is omnipotent. But I cannot determine whether the desiger of malaria was omnipotent based on the science I used to detect design. I need theology for that. So my question to Dr. Fuller is: how can I simply assert a particular theology, within the context of science, which is supposed to be theology-neutral? T.Timaeus
January 18, 2009
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Timaeus:
In the light of this example, how can theodicy ever hope to become, not merely an optional adjunct to ID science, but an essential part of ID science?
and
And since science is not just a theoretical but a practical activity (of hypothesis forming, experiment, observation, inference, etc.), I don’t yet see how your discussion about theodicy is guiding us toward the improvement of ID as science.
If ID is merely about design detection it seems to be missing out on many of the features of science you mention. I would also add prediction. Detecting design certainly has a scientific bent to it, but if ID never makes a testable prediction, is it legitimate to call it ID science? So how would ID make a testable prediction? If certain features are designed then from an engineering perspective one would need to hypothesize about the goals, values, and constraints of the designer. That known reasonable predictions could be made about other designs coming from the same designer. Lousy human designers consistently produce lousy designs, and vise versa. Since your hypothetical team would presumably come up with different sets of goals, values, and constraints of the designer (even for the Demiurge), they could each propose hypotheses about what to expect from other designs and test them.Steve Petermann
January 18, 2009
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Paul Burnett (#42), Your complaint about the recurrent laryngeal nerve is a common one, but misguided. You have to keep in mind that living organisms are not made the way we would make an automobile, for example. If we install a new electrical device on the dashboard, we can simply run a new wire either from an existing wire or the battery, whichever is more efficient. And we can base our wiring pattern primarily on efficiency, and secondarily on avoiding wires too close to dangerous areas such as the engine bloc (because of heat). In living organisms any designer faces a different problem. Inside the DNA and whatever epigenetic data storage there also is, there is not a blueprint as to how to create a human or chimpanzee or giraffe (or oak tree for that matter). Rather, it is more like a recipe. At this stage produce a three-layer organization, at this stage divide it into somites, at this stage produce limb buds, a heart and blood vessels, etc. We at present have no idea how to produce a giraffe, and thus have no way of knowing whether we could produce a better one than the existing one, so we cannot say with any confidence that the fundamental design is suboptimal with regard to the laryngeal nerve or anything else. Suboptimal implies that there is an optimal, and that the design misses this optimal design. Having said this, I believe that there is suboptimal design in nature, and that the malaria parasite (and cystic fibrosis) may very well be a good example of it. But the recurrent laryngeal nerve is not yet a good example of it.Paul Giem
January 18, 2009
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----"tribune 7: StephenB — I’ve been thinking some about meth-nat overnight and my arson-investigation example. Meth-nat seems appropriate to invoke there i.e. the automatic rejection of a non-natural cause." Right. Indeed, methodological naturalism is almost always the right way to go. Everything turns on the word ALMOST. One might even say that using the explanatory filter consists of applying methodological naturalism for the first two steps, and then abandoning it in the last step. Of course, strictly speaking, MN forbids taking that final step.StephenB
January 18, 2009
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PaulBurnett: "I have wondered for years if the Intelligent Designer may have contracted out Creation (or some portions of Creation), much as King Solomon contracted with Hiram of Tyre to build the Temple in Jerusalem." I have wondered if the angels that designed the megafauna of Africa and Australia tended to drink a bit. The ones in charge of Europe and North America were much better artists. In any event, the problem of suffering is only a problem if the circular argument of assuming that there is no afterlife is present in one's arguments. Apparently God never intended this life to be a permanent state of affairs for any of its inhabitants. We gotta die, and we gotta die from something, and dying usually involves setting off and defeating various mechanisms that during life survive to keep us alive. Hence, life is finite, and its end is not pleasant.EvilSnack
January 18, 2009
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Jay, great points. Why is ID theory not useful in the obvious further questions about the nature of the designer? Why can’t we say more? It's not so much that we can't say more, it's just that should we do so by invoking ID? If ID as described by Behe & Dembski fulfills its promise it will create a principle as hard as anything cooked up by Newton i.e. if this, this and this are present you can be certain the object is designed, and be applicable for anything where signal must be discerned from static. Now, thinking people will always make inferences with regard to designed objects of unknown origin -- you find a piece of flint, determine (perhaps by Dembski's method) that it is an arrowhead (and designed) and infer that the person that made it was a carnivore. Its quite a logical and reasonable assumption -- and it's not a bad thing to make such assumptions -- but it's not a certainty. My vote is to keep ID compartmentalized. Any offshoots of ID can easily be named something else. It would make it easier to articulate a very important point, make us less of a target for insincere critics and still in no way inhibit or demean those offshoots.tribune7
January 18, 2009
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WeaselSpotting @14
StephenB @13
if the ID scientist finds functionally specified complex information in a DNA molecule, methodological naturalism simply throws the evidence out or insists that it be re-interpreted to fit the Darwinist paradigm
More commonly, they just pretend that CSI doesn’t exist, tossing out all the math simply because it hasn’t been vetted through their cliquish journals.
This sounds similar to the issues raised by Dr. Fuller at the Dover trial. There does appear to be a history of this type of behavior from journal editors. Is anyone maintaining a list of ID supportive or sympathetic papers that were submitted but rejected from peer-reviewed journals? It would be very helpful to have a substantive, demonstrable counter to the "ID isn't science because ID researchers don't publish in scientific journals." argument. Being able to hold an ID opponent's feet to the fire about why an otherwise well-researched and well-written paper was rejected would just be a nice side benefit. ;-) JJJayM
January 18, 2009
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JayM asked (#48): "The Wikipedia entry itself said that Dr. Fuller called for “affirmative action” for ID. I didn’t see that term in the transcript either. Did you actually say that, Dr. Fuller?" "A quote that is associated with me at the trial was my statement that ‘intelligent design needed affirmative action’." - http://www.thomasmoreinstitute.org.uk/node/19 "Fuller...actually testified in favor of teaching Intelligent Design in the recent Dover trial, saying he was in favour of "affirmative action for fringe science..." - http://realityconditions.blogspot.com/2006/03/steve-fuller-at-crooked-timber-seminar.htmlPaulBurnett
January 18, 2009
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JayM @48: Responding to myself, I did find the quote:
And in one of my earlier books, The Governance of Science, I actually talked about this as an affirmative action strategy with regard to disadvantaged theories. It's not obvious in the normal system of science that these theories will get a fair hearing.
In context it doesn't sound anywhere near as bad as Wikipedia makes it out. JJJayM
January 18, 2009
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