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Logic and First Principles, 15: On the architecture of being. Or, are certain abstract entities (“abstracta”) such as numbers, natures, truth etc real? If so, how — and where?

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For some weeks now, an underlying persistent debate on the reality of numbers has emerged in several discussion threads at UD. In part, it has been cast in terms of nominalism vs platonic realism; the latter being the effective view of most working mathematicians. Obviously, this is a first principles issue and is worth focussed discussion.

Now, No. 14 in this series, on objectivity of aesthetics principles as canons of beauty, begins by pointing to an underlying challenge:

We live in a Kant-haunted age, where the “ugly gulch” between our inner world of appearances and judgements and the world of things in themselves is often seen as unbridgeable. Of course, there are many other streams of thought that lead to widespread relativism and subjectivism, but the ugly gulch concept is in some ways emblematic. Such trends influence many commonly encountered views, most notably our tendency to hold that being a matter of taste, beauty lies solely in the eye of the beholder.

Of course, F H Bradley, long since pointed out that to claim the un-know-ability of things in themselves is already to claim a major point of just such knowledge. So, this is self-referentially absurd. Wisdom, then, is to acknowledge that we can and do err but even that is a point of undeniably certain knowledge therefore we can and do confidently know some aspects of reality as it is, not just as it appears to us. Reality is in part intelligible, it is not utterly inscrutable. Already, this is a hint that there is a rational . . . a logical . . . structure to being which rational creatures may seek to understand, succeeding part of the time. Where of course aspects of that structure will be quantitative.

Let me highlight the core argument (and pardon the inflexibility of the new block style WP is using):

>>to assert that in effect conceptualism about abstracta is true, one relies on abstracta being in reality, e.g. here that a description or assertion can hold a relationship of accurate description with things as they are. Absent the reality of such a relationship independent of our individual or collective concepts, truth is meaningless. If only the concrete exists in reality, truth, an abstract relationship using symbolic representation (other abstracta!) is a case of non-being, illusion. Actually, illusion is another abstract relationship. Meaninglessness is next up, but this too is an abstract state of affairs. The infinite regress of abstracta begging to be acknowledged as real yawns open.

The reality of core abstracta is inescapably the case, i.e. it is necessarily true on pain of not being able to think, communicate conceptually, reason [implication is abstract], speak truth, demonstrate, warrant, know etc.

The serious issue then follows: in what way are such things real?

The best I can answer for now is that such abstracta are connected to the logic of being for worlds or things in the world. They are logically relevant characteristics of being, which in many cases are shared across beings as archetypes that are in-common, or even are in-common across possible worlds. In some cases such as numbers they are in common to all possible worlds as part of the fabric of any distinct possible world.

We may recognise or discover them and try to identify what they precisely are, but in many cases they defy particular definition in words.

Where do they come from, where are they? They come from the logic of being and are embedded as constraints on being. For instance, no entity E is such that it has two core characteristics x and y where y = ~x.

That is why square circles are impossible of being. Regardless of how we may form a fuzzy imagination that oscillates between the shapes or may try to superpose and blend the two.

There are squares, there are circles but no square circles

Thus, abstracta are part of the distinct identity, nature and being of any particular entity. That is, the principle of distinct identity has ontological, not just conceptual, significance. That’s why we recognise it as a first principle of right reason.

So, not a spooky, mysterious, metaphysical world of forms, just the architecture of — rational principles or “logic” of — being or possible being (and of impossibility of being). Where of course a considerable part of that embedded architecture of being is structural and quantitative. That is, Mathematical. Mathematics has in key part ontological import. Hence, Wigner’s point on its astonishing power. The music of the spheres is written in the language of mathematics, with — I daresay — Fourier leading the charge.>>

Fourier in action:

And again (a mechanical implementation in our hearing . . . relevant to octaves and fifths in music etc):

Let me then set it in the context of an ongoing exchange in the thread on beauty, and I take liberty to headline comment 390:

KF, 390: >>H, Let’s roll the tape a bit:


H, 377: >>kf writes,
What happens in the world is independent of [–> antecedent to and insofar as it is intelligible, influences] our thoughts about it [which thoughts in many cases may and do accurately describe reality, concrete and abstract.”
I’ll agree that the world is antecedent to our thoughts: we experience the world and then form thoughts about.
I’ll agree that “insofar as it is intelligible, [the world] influences our thoughts about it, which thoughts in many cases may and do accurately describe reality, concrete and abstract” [sorry, WP suppressed strike-throughs]>>

KF, 378: >>H, that apparent rejection of the reality of certain abstracta, if so, is fatally self-referential for much the same reason as nominalism (which is a form of such rejection) fails.>>

H, 379: >>I’ve explained my position, and see nothing “fatally self-referential” in it. The world is intelligible, and we are intelligent, so our understandings provide reasonably accurate maps of the world. We use abstractions to describe the world, but the world itself is “concrete” in the sense that it is its behavior which we observe that is the source of the material for our abstractions.
Probably no need for you (or me) to repeat ourselves again (although I do have a new thought on the matter that I may share later in the day when I have some time.)>>

KF, 380: >>when an objective matter is on the table, agreement or disagreement is immaterial. Just to make statements you have had to repeatedly rely on abstracta being the case not just perceptions. Indeed, truth is an abstract relationship of statements to what is the case, belief or disbelief, agreement or disagreement too. The reality of core abstracta is inescapable.>>

H, 381: >> I have clearly said that we use abstractions – we have to – just to talk about the world, so of course I agree with you when you write, “Just to make statements you have had to repeatedly rely on abstracta being the case not just perceptions.” Perceptions of the world bring in the data from which we create our abstractions, but abstractions are a necessary, central aspect of our ability, as rational, logical creatures, to understand the world.
Is this the point upon which you think my position is “fatally self-referential”?, because if so it misrepresents me. Perhaps you could explain more about your “fatally self-referential” statement.>>

KF, 382: >>this begins to approach the inescapability of the laws of thought, which embed cases in point. To attempt to deny one is forced to accept implicitly. For instance, you are affirming or implying that somethings are true, are accurate descriptions of reality, which is itself an abstract relationship, indeed the words and what they represent involve abstract relations. That is telling us something — we are at a start-point.>>

H, 383: >>Yes, I have continually said that we use abstract concepts to make statement about reality that are, to various degrees, accurate descriptions.>>

KF, 386: >>we cannot escape core abstracta and they are inescapably true or real as appropriate.>>

H, 389: >>kf writes “that apparent rejection of the reality of certain abstracta, if so, is fatally self-referential.” I accept the reality of the abstract concepts we create that describe the reality we experience. How is that “fatally self-referential”? I don’t see how you have explained that.>>

Notice, how you repeatedly affirm certain things to be true, i.e. to actually accurately describe real states of affairs? That is itself an abstract relationship, which must be real albeit abstract or discussion collapses. Likewise, the Mobius strip’s behaviour pivots on how it has ONE edge, ONE surface, etc. So if by cutting we introduce one or two further edges, it will form a longer loop or two interlocked loops. One-ness, two-ness, three-ness and consequences on the logic of being are abstract but take effect in space and bodies. It does so independent of our thoughts, concepts, expectations, as the relevant abstract properties are part of its core characteristics.

Above, at 375, I again laid out a demonstration as to why numbers are necessary entities that will manifest in any possible world, antecedent to our thoughts about a world. We are contingent beings within an already formed world.

Going back to the self-reference, to assert that in effect conceptualism about abstracta is true, one relies on abstracta being in reality, e.g. here that a description or assertion can hold a relationship of accurate description with things as they are. Absent the reality of such a relationship independent of our individual or collective concepts, truth is meaningless. If only the concrete exists in reality, truth, an abstract relationship using symbolic representation (other abstracta!) is a case of non-being, illusion. Actually, illusion is another abstract relationship. Meaninglessness is next up, but this too is an abstract state of affairs. The infinite regress of abstracta begging to be acknowledged as real yawns open.

The reality of core abstracta is inescapably the case, i.e. it is necessarily true on pain of not being able to think, communicate conceptually, reason [implication is abstract], speak truth, demonstrate, warrant, know etc.

The serious issue then follows: in what way are such things real?
The best I can answer for now is that such abstracta are connected to the logic of being for worlds or things in the world. They are logically relevant characteristics of being, which in many cases are shared across beings as archetypes that are in-common, or even are in-common across possible worlds. In some cases such as numbers they are in common to all possible worlds as part of the fabric of any distinct possible world.
We may recognise or discover them and try to identify what they precisely are, but in many cases they defy particular definition in words.
Where do they come from, where are they? They come from the logic of being and are embedded as constraints on being. For instance, no entity E is such that it has two core characteristics x and y where y = ~x.
That is why square circles are impossible of being. Regardless of how we may form a fuzzy imagination that oscillates between the shapes or may try to superpose and blend the two.

Thus, abstracta are part of the distinct identity, nature and being of any particular entity. That is, the principle of distinct identity has ontological, not just conceptual, significance. That’s why we recognise it as a first principle of right reason.

So, not a spooky, mysterious, metaphysical world of forms, just the architecture of — rational principles or “logic” of — being or possible being (and of impossibility of being). Where of course a considerable part of that embedded architecture of being is structural and quantitative. That is, Mathematical. Mathematics has in key part ontological import. Hence, Wigner’s point on its astonishing power. The music of the spheres is written in the language of mathematics, with — I daresay — Fourier leading the charge.

Speaking of architecture, that does point to architect. But that is an onward discussion tied to the necessary being root of reality. >>

So, what is now on the table is the architecture of — i.e. rational principles or “logic” of — being or possible being or even impossibility of being. Which, in part we may tabulate:

Where also, it is worth the effort to also headline from 375:

KF, 375: >>[W]e can show that key abstract elements of structure and quantity are necessary aspects of the logic of being a distinct possible world.

Consider a distinct possible world, W which is distinct from near neighbours (say W’, W’) by having some aspect of core characteristics A, unique to itself. Were there no A, the world would be indistinguishable from near neighbours and we would recognise that distinct labels have been attached to the same underlying possible world. Such allows us to view W as a structured set:

W = {A|~A}

Now, nothing is in W that is not in A or else ~A, the dichotomy is empty and there is no x in W but not in A or else ~A. This is the quantitative property, nullity; thus zero is present, {} –> 0. Likewise, A is a distinct thing, a unit. Unity is present, so one. Following von Neumann, {0} –> 1, where also A manifests unity. In a different sense, ~A is a complex unity, collecting many other things, pointing to collectives, to systems, to organisation, to function based on organisation etc. For our purposes, ~A is a unit but one different from A, so we need to recognise duality, two-ness, thus two: {0,1} –> 2. Obviously, such succession continues without limit and manifests the naturals, also implying the transfinite ordinals on the premise of order type {0,1,2 . . . } –> w (omega).

Likewise, we may contemplate an inverse such that -x + x –> 0, which is a vector of one dimension. We now have integers. Ratios of integers gives rise to rationals and convergent sums yield the rest of the reals. This gives us continuum. From this, the vector rotation operator i*x repeated twice to give – x allows us to have 2-d vectors in a continuum, a plane. An abstract plane that we may contemplate but which pervades any possible world. Where such a world is sufficiently spatially extended and actualised, we may observe continua, dimensions, vectors, rotations, trajectories etc.

So, we see where any possible world, simply on being distinct, manifests directly 0,1,2 and by extension on the logic of being, N, Z, Q, R, C. The vector phenomenon captured from Z on, allows us to extend the abstract continuum to arbitrarily many dimensions. (Notice the distinction between world manifestations and our extension to n-dimensional entities, n arbitrarily high.In physics we speak of 10^22 degrees of freedom routinely, for statistical thermodynamics, just for a reasonably accessible case.)

Our world manifests three spatial dimensions on the macro scale, and we can observe things like Mobius strips etc.

The underlying point is, that we see intelligible, abstract, necessary, structural and quantitative entities as part of the fabric of any distinct world, part of its framework, part of the logic of its being as a distinct possible world.

In that context, we may identify certain facts of structure and quantity that necessarily obtain.

For instance consider five distinct units and how they may be partitioned into a pair and a triple: ||||| –> || + |||. Obviously, this can be reversed, || + ||| –> |||||. Addition and subtraction have a natural sense of partitioning and combining units. Multiplication and division are extensions as are many onward operations, relations and functions. And so forth.

The point is, that there are abstract, structural and quantitative entities that are intelligible on logic of being which are necessary corollaries of any distinct possible world. These abstracta, we recognise and observe through the effects of the logic of being, we do not invent. They are not merely concepts and constructs we invent and project to a world of things in themselves. That, being in reality just an inner game on the appearances we have and imagine as reflecting the outer world. No, the Kantian ugly gulch fails and we have no good reason to imagine the behaviour of a Mobius strip is some sort of contemplative inner dream. Such dreams we could modify at will, the logic of being is far less yielding than that.

So, we need to frame an understanding of Mathematics that recognises that we may study the logic of structure and quantity, but this is not isolated from the intelligible substance of structure and quantity manifest in the world. Yes, our sense of being and of cause needs to adapt to the logic of being that involves necessary albeit abstract entities. For instance, nullity, the empty set, zero are manifest in a myriad circumstances, indeed in any possible, distinct world. But as {} is indistinguishable from {} there is good reason to see that it is one and the same common entity. Which is a characteristic shown by many abstract entities. >>

So, now, let us further reflect. END

Comments
PPS: Brown argues onward, distinguishing two kinds of abstracta, one a collective or archetypal, the other a particular but not one that is concrete, arguably, we can make out that relationships, mathematical operations and functions in the operational sense [y = e^-x] may be something distinct, blending aspects of the two:
Mathematical entities are abstract in one sense, but not in another The term ‘abstract’ has come to have two distinct meanings. The older sense per- tains to universals and particulars. A universal, say redness, is abstracted from particular red apples, red blood, red socks, and so on; it is the one associated with the many. The notions of group, or vector space perhaps ?t this pattern. Numbers, by contrast, are not abstract in this sense, since each of the integers is a unique individual, a particular, not a universal. On the other hand, in more current usage ‘abstract’ simply means outside space and time, not concrete, not physical. In this sense all mathematical objects are abstract. A simple argument makes this clear: There are in?nitely many numbers, but only a ?nite number of physical entities; so most math- ematical entities must be non-physical.
kairosfocus
April 2, 2019
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F/N: Massimo Pigliucci on Mathematical Platonism may be helpful, in issue 84 of Philosophy Now -- where, remember, it is a general rule of philosophy that every alternative answer to hard questions bristles with difficulties so the issue is to compare and see which difficulties one will live with, why:
https://philosophynow.org/issues/84/Mathematical_Platonism There is a difference between general Platonism and the mathematical flavor. For Plato, each apple, say, is but an imperfect example of the absolute (and perfect) Idea of an apple. But as Aristotle quickly realized, Plato has it exactly backwards: we arrive at the general idea of ‘apple’ by mentally abstracting a set of characteristics we think common to all actual apples. It is we who conjure the ‘perfect’ idea from the world, not the world copying the concept. But now contrast the idea of an apple with the idea of a circle. Here Aristotle’s approach becomes more problematic, as we don’t find any true circles in nature. No natural object has the precise geometric characteristics of a circle, and in a very strong sense we can also say that the circles we draw are but imperfect representations of the perfect idea of a circle. Ah – but whence does such a perfect idea come from? Consider another way to put the problem. One major difference between science and technology is that science discovers things, while technology is about human inventions. We discover the law of gravity; but we invent airplanes to allow heavier-than-air flight despite the law of gravity. But where do mathematical objects, like circles and numbers, or mathematical theorems like the Pythagorean one, or Fermat’s Last one, come from? Are they inventions of the human mind, or are they discoveries? I hope you’re beginning to feel as queasy as I did when I started to take the matter seriously, because contrary to Aristotle’s approach to knowledge, my gut feeling was that mathematicians discover things, not invent them. This was a huge paradigm shift from my days as a scientist. Of course, one can reasonably argue that if there were no mathematically-inclined minds around, nobody would be able to think about Fermat’s theorem, while gravity would still exist. True, but nobody would be able to conceive the law of gravitation either – and that doesn’t imply the law itself wouldn’t exist, yes? As Brown puts it in his book: “The thought, for example, which we express in the Pythagorean theorem, is timelessly true, true independently of whether anyone takes it to be true. It needs no bearer. It is not true for the first time when it is discovered, but is like a planet which, already before anyone has seen it, has been in interaction with other planets.” [ --> Cf. James Robert Brown’s Philosophy of Mathematics: A Contemporary Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures (Routledge, 2008)] Perhaps nobody should be particularly surprised by this, as, after all, the laws of nature physicists acknowledge also seem to be timelessly true independently of whether anyone takes them to be true. Where do they come from? Since there are somewhat mundane interpretations of what laws of nature are – including the possibility that they are accidental generalities valid in this particular universe and/or within a certain time-span – the case posed by mathematical constructs seems to be even more clear and powerful. Math, like diamonds, truly seems to be forever. If one ‘goes Platonic’ with math, one has to face several important philosophical consequences, perhaps the major one being that the notion of physicalism goes out the window. Physicalism is the position that the only things that exist are those that have physical extension [ie, take up space] – and last time I checked, the idea of circle, or Fermat’s theorem, did not have physical extension. It is true that physicalism is now a sophisticated doctrine that includes not just material objects and energy, but also, for instance, physical forces and information. But it isn’t immediately obvious to me that mathematical objects neatly fall into even an extended physicalist ontology. And that definitely gives me pause to ponder.
KF PS: I suggest, that apples exhibit apple-ness in the network of possible or actualised entities. That is, there are in-common archetypal qualities with other fruit (or, fruit-like) objects, all the way back to objects and coming back to apples having what is only in-common to apples and which reflects a known genetically coded pattern expressed by way of a certain kind of tree, the apple-bearing tree. Indeed, by their fruit and other manifestations shall ye know them. That is the genus-difference pattern obtains, likely with overlapping families of inheritance/resemblance, suppression and over-riding etc as the objects paradigm and related ideas explore in computing. Familiarity with such deep patterns allowed field biologists of old to instantly recognise say a cichlid on sight before working out details.kairosfocus
April 2, 2019
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H, Conway's game is a logical structure, a model world. Its potential outcomes on given start-points are just that, that is they specify possible worlds evolving across time. These can be accurately described, in principle just as the set of counting numbers, stepwise; with a set-building process. That potential for description implies the use of assertions as to what states of affairs are. That is, propositions. The set of accurate descriptions also carries with them a shadow of inaccurate descriptions, false propositions. So the propositions exist as part of the abstract logical structure involved. It is not that they can only exist as coded in some description language and coded in some machine somewhere, requiring actually infinite physical storage, they are there, implicit in the logic of possible worlds. So long as the states of the game may be accurately described, the propositions are there along with the logical possibilities. A playing out of the game in real time is exploring the chain from one start-point it is not inventing them out of nothing, the possibilities were there all along constituting a possible albeit restricted world. Further to all this (and though these days it is pushed outside the window of "reasonable" matters to mention -- a bad sign), arguably there is a possible mind that can contemplate all of these Possible Worlds, God's mind. Where God is at minimum a serious candidate necessary being. KF PS: The above exchanges on Platonism underscore why though I will accept that the label Mathematical Platonism is valid (the view that key mathematical entities are abstract but real and antecedent to our thoughts) the term is confusing as it tends to be conflated with general Platonism in a sense of imagining a world out there serving as repository for the famous forms. Of course, the mind of the infinite, all-pondering God would fill such a bill, except that Plato was not a theist in the modern sense. That grand expansion of a world of forms out there somewhere is not what Mathematical Platonism is about or the logic of relevant being. I think a better description is that there is a substance of structure and quantity inherent in any distinct possible world, starting with N. That logical structure is real, is at least in part intelligible to us and is embedded in the framework for any particular possible world. Such carries with it a panoply of descriptive assertions, propositions that accurately specify the world or are implicit in it or .fail to do so. Such propositions are true or false and this abstract relationship is also a necessary part of the fabric of any possible world. The cluster of specifying propositions [in a mathematical world, axioms or the like] carries implications that play out into subsequent propositions, another abstract relationship that is real. We come along and explore, perhaps creating such a world on a computer or writing it down in a book or setting up a board game etc, but it is all one and the same. Our unfolding discovery of implications or successive stages etc is a playing out of possibilities and their equally possible accurate descriptions that are antecedent to our thinking about them. We do not freely, arbitrarily invent logical chains -- we explore them stage by stage.kairosfocus
April 2, 2019
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KF
in any distinct possible world there will be two-sets and three sets that clustered yield five-sets, an abstract framework relationship showing how numbers here are necessary abstract beings in any possible world and how certain necessary relationships obtain independent of our thought about them.
Worlds certainly exist without numbers or an abstract mathematical framework. It is the human (or alien) mind that provides this abstract framework as a tool to model the world. Planets are roughly spherical because of the interactions of matter, energy and gravity. Not because Pi exists as a number inherent to the universe.Brother Brian
April 2, 2019
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Dave
Is it true that all abstract [mathematical] objects which are logically possible actually do exist independently of our minds?
Hazel injected the word "mathematical" into your definition, but I will assume that you meant exactly what you said [abstract objects] and not what she said you meant [abstract mathematical objects]. Even so, it is probably not a deal breaker either way. I suspect that a Platonist would say yes to your question. However, I am an Aristotelian, so I would put it this way: Abstract objects that are logically possible, but do not exist, exist potentially; abstract objects that do, in fact, exist, exist actually. The second order question about *where* the abstract object can exist, (inside or outside the mind) is a different matter and can be answered only on condition that you (or someone) rigorously define the meaning of an "abstract object" or "abstract mathematical? object." Mathematical models are of no help in that context. I don't think that your broader question can be answered definitively with the limited information that you and Hazel are providing. One solution would be for Hazel to answer my questions, or for you to answer them in her name, so that a true dialogue could emerge. So far, no effort has been put forth in that direction. Meanwhile, I will provide a partial answer: Clearly, there are extra-mental, non-material, truths about the nature of reality that can be identified and represented through mental concepts. Mathematics can describe them, but it cannot represent them. Only a sound philosophical approach can do that. This, I think, is what KF has in mind.StephenB
April 1, 2019
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DS @ 110 Let P denote “Propositions do not exist in the physical universe”. KF might argue P is false based on necessary conditions for any universe, but let us assume it is true. Then applying this to the specific proposition P, implies that P does not exist in the physical universe. I fail to see any contradiction. Surely you are not going to equate the sentence written above in English that symbolizes P with the abstract content/meaning of P as a logical proposition? That is a category error similar to equating the numeral 5 with the abstract idea of cardinality of five.math guy
April 1, 2019
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DS @ 132 and 145 The philosophy that all logical possibilities exist is called "full-blooded Platonism".math guy
April 1, 2019
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Totally off-topic: Go is a fascinating game. I haven't played for years, but enjoyed playing it in college many years ago, and then taught my son to play. He bought me a nice Japanese set one time, which is very aesthetically pleasing.hazel
April 1, 2019
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hazel, Coincidentally, while on a walk about an hour ago, I was pondering very similar questions about the games Go and chess. Conway's game of life is probably better because it has infinitely many states. I haven't made much progress on those questions though. It does occur to me that if abstract objects "exist" if and only if they are logically possible, then perhaps that's a very weak notion of existence.daveS
April 1, 2019
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KF, Is your answer to my question "yes"?daveS
April 1, 2019
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Dave, this pertains to your question, and it is something for Stephen to consider if he decides to answer your question. John Conway’s Game of Life John Conway’s Game of Life, henceforth Life, is not a game: it is a example of a type of mathematical system called a cellular automaton. John Conway invented it about 1970. There are other similar systems, and the whole field of iteration from a beginning configuration is an important topic in mathematics. Life is played on an infinite grid, in which each cell is either on (alive) or off (dead). You start with a beginning configuration of live cells, which is generation 0. Then a set of rules are applied to each cell, so that some live cells die and some dead cells come alive, creating the next generation. This process is continued forever, although in practice most configurations come to some kind of end, dying off completely or stabilizing in a static pattern or one that oscillates regularly. However, some patterns create figures that move off into space, so to speak, and continue for an infinite number of generations. There is a great simulation of Life, along with a description of the rules here. If you are not familiar with Life, I encourage you to go there and play a bit. There is small dropdown menu to pick a few interesting configurations to start with, or just make up your own. (See especially the Gospel Glider Gun!) You can also read about Life at Wikipedia. Now here are some points: 1. This is an axiomatic mathematical system. Once a beginning configuration is chosen, the succeeding generations are logically determined. 2. There is no algorithm for figuring out what the state of a particular generation will be without just stepping through the intervening generations. There is no way to discover (note that word) the state of a particular generation without moving through the logical chain of preceding generations. 3. There are an infinite number of possible logical situations, as there is an infinite plane upon which beginning configurations can be set, and at least some configurations continue indefinitely. And some philosophical questions and comments: 4. In what way, if any, would we say that every one of the infinite number of logical possibilities in Life exist? 5. Does every logical possibility exist outside of and independently of the human minds which have devised and expressed this system using symbols and abstract concepts? 6.If the answer to 5 is “Yes”, have they existed eternally even though the game wasn’t invented until 1970?hazel
April 1, 2019
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PS: At the end of the last sentence in #140: All logically possible abstract objects, that is.daveS
April 1, 2019
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DS, a possible entity would exist in at least one world, were it instantiated. That is what possible means. Contingent entities would occur in some worlds but not others (connected to cause), necessary ones are part of the fabric of any possible world and would exist in all worlds. These include for example numbers. When we turn to propositions, let us note that a possible world is a sufficient set of propositions that specify a given world. So, in effect if a state of affairs (a world) is possible, or actual, it can be described accurately. Where also any proposition carries with it as a shadow its denial. KFkairosfocus
April 1, 2019
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hazel,
Dave, that is the thought that started to lead me away from Platonism.
Yes, it seems quite extravagant to insist that all possible abstract objects do exist. And once you are committed to the existence of *some* abstract objects, I don't know what the rationale would be for not accepting the existence of all of them.daveS
April 1, 2019
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Stephen, above Dave asked a question,
Is it true that all abstract [mathematical] objects which are logically possible actually do exist independently of our minds?
(Note that I added the word "mathematical" to narrow the scope of the question, which may or may not have been Dave's intent.) What is your answer to this question?hazel
April 1, 2019
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Stephen you write, "You are silent on all these critical issues." You are expecting an unreasonable amount of content for one short forum post. We have been discussing all those issues, but it would take a multitude of posts, or a substantial essay, to address them all.hazel
April 1, 2019
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BB, familiarity with M-strips does not equate to adequately addressing the embedded structure and quantity that they manifest independent of our concepts. Where -- on fair comment, the rhetoric of, we have evaded or ignored or dismissed several times so how dare you raise it again, fails. Fails the plumb-line test case challenge . . . I can safely say that you have never addressed cogently the implications of having one edge and of how depending on where one cuts [already a quantitative, spatial structural matter] one sees two edges or three edges emerging (the latter for two interconnected loops, one a narrower m-strip). One, two and three at work, embedded in a body in space, antecedent to and independent of our minds and concepts, labels or contemplations and calculations . . . which, here can and do accurately and reliably refer to extra-mental realities, demonstrating another abstract entity, the relationship we term truth. Indeed, implication also lurks, where we cut around and cylinder vs m-strip imply the result that will follow. Embedded structure and quantity in bodies in space, showing abstracta at work through the logic of being. Similarly -- and as I noted in another thread -- in any distinct possible world there will be two-sets and three sets that clustered yield five-sets, an abstract framework relationship showing how numbers here are necessary abstract beings in any possible world and how certain necessary relationships obtain independent of our thought about them. || + ||| --> ||||| never began, cannot cease, is necessarily true everywhere at all times and is intimately connected to entities in any world. This is part of the logic of being of any world. KFkairosfocus
April 1, 2019
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Hazel
The issue is whether the abstract generalized mathematical descriptions of the world that exist in our minds, and which are expressed in our symbol systems, also exist anywhere else. The world is what it is, as a concrete reality*, and we describe it with abstractions.
You are taking a great many things for granted here. What is the origin of these concepts? Are they derived from some extra-mental source, such as the object of sense experience, or do they simply form in the mind? Does our knowledge begin with sense experience, or does it begin with mental models? Can our senses be trusted to inform us about extra-mental reality, or do they mislead us in serious ways? You are silent on all these critical issues. I say that the issue is the *source* of those mathematical descriptions and abstractions, which do not exist in our minds. What, for example, is the source of the Pythagorean Theorem and in what way was it discovered? Did it exist before it was discovered? What is the pathway from our experience of the concrete world to the conceptual representation of it in our minds, which tells us what a thing *is,* including its properties and qualities, as opposed to a mere mathematical *description* of it. Abstract realities are more about conceptual *representations" of concrete reality and their origins than they are about mathematical *descriptions.* Yet you emphasize the latter and completely ignore the former. KF's original question was about abstract entities (“abstracta”) such as [numbers, natures, truth etc real?] In your attempt to narrow the discussion unreasonably, you define the problem solely in terms of mathematics, and even there, you don't address the truly important questions, as I have already indicated.StephenB
April 1, 2019
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Agreed, BB. No one here denies that the physical world behaves as it does, whether it be drawing a circle in the sand with a string and a stick, as the Greeks did when they first started formalizing geometry, or cutting strips of looped paper. The issue is whether the abstract generalized mathematical descriptions of the world that exist in our minds, and which are expressed in our symbol systems, also exist anywhere else. The world is what it is, as a concrete reality*, and we describe it with abstractions. Continually pointing to the Mobius strip adds nothing to any argument about the nature of abstractions. *And of course I know the QM nature of the world shows that there is nothing "concrete" about it, but the point still stands that whatever it is, it is each and every moment of what it is, not an abstraction of our about anything.hazel
April 1, 2019
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KF
On the latter, kindly tell us whether you have made an ordinary paper loop and two Mobius loops. Then, did you cut around the first two in the middle and the other M-strip 1/3 way in from an edge? Kindly explain how the difference in outcome does not demonstrate world embedded substance and properties of structure and quantity independent of our concepts etc: ______
We are all familiar with Möbius strips. Why you continue to raise them as some sort of proof to your point is what is not understood. Unless you can explain why this is proof of the inherent existance of mathematics outside of the human mind, all you have is s parlor trick.Brother Brian
April 1, 2019
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Dave, that is the thought that started to lead me away from Platonism.hazel
April 1, 2019
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Is it true that all abstract objects which are logically possible actually do exist independently of our minds?daveS
April 1, 2019
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PS: Cf here https://uncommondescent.com/philosophy/logic-spaghetti-who-created-god/#comment-675056 in answer to 3 there, as a direct illustration of my worldviews concerns as just noted.kairosfocus
April 1, 2019
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BB, they will be to you. The problem is, there are worldview commitments involved and a little matter of self-referential incoherence and direct counter example. On the latter, kindly tell us whether you have made an ordinary paper loop and two Mobius loops. Then, did you cut around the first two in the middle and the other M-strip 1/3 way in from an edge? Kindly explain how the difference in outcome does not demonstrate world embedded substance and properties of structure and quantity independent of our concepts etc: ______ There are of course many other mathematical cases and a world of manifest, observable lawlike structural and quantitative order studied in physics and other sciences. Explain to us, then, how empirically observed laws and constants of nature reduce to our [uncertain] concepts: ____ KFkairosfocus
April 1, 2019
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For the record, I followed Hazel's previous discussions about this and, occasionally made a comment. With the caveat that I am far from being a mathematical expert, I believe that Hazel's arguments are far more compelling than those offered by KF.Brother Brian
April 1, 2019
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I don't want to take the time to do that for people who have not been invested in the ongoing conversation, which has been going on for a number of months.hazel
April 1, 2019
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Hazel "I presented my arguments elsewhere..." Hic Rhodos, hic saltaEugen
April 1, 2019
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H, I am busy elsewhere so will make only a brief remark. It is quite clear to me that by virtue of refusal to acknowledge and accept implications and import of the significance of things like actually seeing what happens when say a Mobius strip is snipped around in the middle vs 1/3 way from its edge, you are in the position of refusing to recognise evidence that there is embedded in reality -- not just our minds -- a pattern of intelligible (in part) abstract principles that help to structure the world and its contents. Things, which are antecedent to us and our thoughts. They include that various things have distinct natures pivoting on core characteristics that must be compossible -- a square circle cannot exist precisely as core characteristics are incoherent. This manifests the logic of being. So, we see that squares and circles are distinct, that men and dogs and mountains and stars are distinct. Yet, we have things in common, i.e. there is a blend of in-common characteristics and in-difference characteristics in the nature of an entity. Likewise, there are intelligible abstract principles that are embedded in reality, e.g. a suggested being is only possible if its core characteristics are mutually coherent -- proof that there is a logic of being. Similarly (and often connected), distinct things must have distinct characteristics, up to possible worlds . . . otherwise we have different labels for the same thing. Likewise again, implication is an intelligible abstract relationship embedded in the world, often tied to the nature and identity of beings and classes: men are mortal so as Socrates of Athens is a man, he will be mortal. Likewise yet again, as a man, the in-common nature to other men implied that there was a particular minimum dose of Hemlock required for his execution as is revealed in the dialogue on his death. This manifests one form of implication, cause-effect links. Such can be sufficiently known that we may reliably use them, as we do when we cross the road and avoid getting knocked down by a vehicle. Similarly, being a right angle triangle implies that the other two vertices must have complementary angles leading to a specific relationship between the sine and cosine function -- which are ways we summarise ratios of sides relative to a vertex of interest and its angle. Tied, is the Pythagorean relationship on squares on sides. There are many other cases which we discover rather than invent. Underlying all of this is the abstract nature of propositions as assertions as to what is or is not the case in reality and their capability to bridge our inner world of thought to reality by being either true or else false. A true proposition asserts an accurate description of some facet of reality, both the proposition and its truthfulness being abstract. Further to this certain propositions imply certain others, and if the first are true the second will be true. The denial or dismissal or reinterpretation as an inner mind exercise of intelligible -- so discoverable -- abstracta embedded in reality through the logic of being (and which are antecedent to as well as independent of our concepts and contemplations but may be objectively known by us) fails. KFkairosfocus
April 1, 2019
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After rereading my comments at 120 and 124, I have decided that I went too far with my critical comments to Hazel and I also failed to nail down the definitions of terms that I was using. Under the circumstances, it would be impossible for readers (including Hazel) to fully comprehend what I was saying, possibly because I didn't differentiate, among other things, between universals (things that individual things have in common, such as class) and abstract realities, such as non material existence. When I return next, I will begin by defining my terms so that everyone can understand my arguments and can discern what I mean and what I don't mean. As it is, I don't think my arguments are fully comprehensible and I hold myself, and no one else, responsible for that situation.StephenB
March 31, 2019
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Hazel
I wasn’t pretending anything, Stephen.
Yes, you were. You were pretending to have already addressed a point that you didn't really address in an attempt to evade my argument @122.
There have been multiple threads with extended discussions about the nature of mathematical truths, and I don’t think you have been a part of them.
This thread is about extra-mental abstract realities, which you claim do not exist, and their correspondence to our mental formulations about them (mental abstract realities). What you had to say about mathematics on other threads is irrelevant to the philosophical errors that you are making now.
I don’t want to go track them down, and I don’t want to start a new conversation with you about them.
Fine, I don't want to go back and track them down either. So stay with the present and don't allude to your unspecified past comments on other threads - which cannot be verified - as evidence for something that never happened.StephenB
March 31, 2019
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