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Logic and First Principles, 15: On the architecture of being. Or, are certain abstract entities (“abstracta”) such as numbers, natures, truth etc real? If so, how — and where?

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For some weeks now, an underlying persistent debate on the reality of numbers has emerged in several discussion threads at UD. In part, it has been cast in terms of nominalism vs platonic realism; the latter being the effective view of most working mathematicians. Obviously, this is a first principles issue and is worth focussed discussion.

Now, No. 14 in this series, on objectivity of aesthetics principles as canons of beauty, begins by pointing to an underlying challenge:

We live in a Kant-haunted age, where the “ugly gulch” between our inner world of appearances and judgements and the world of things in themselves is often seen as unbridgeable. Of course, there are many other streams of thought that lead to widespread relativism and subjectivism, but the ugly gulch concept is in some ways emblematic. Such trends influence many commonly encountered views, most notably our tendency to hold that being a matter of taste, beauty lies solely in the eye of the beholder.

Of course, F H Bradley, long since pointed out that to claim the un-know-ability of things in themselves is already to claim a major point of just such knowledge. So, this is self-referentially absurd. Wisdom, then, is to acknowledge that we can and do err but even that is a point of undeniably certain knowledge therefore we can and do confidently know some aspects of reality as it is, not just as it appears to us. Reality is in part intelligible, it is not utterly inscrutable. Already, this is a hint that there is a rational . . . a logical . . . structure to being which rational creatures may seek to understand, succeeding part of the time. Where of course aspects of that structure will be quantitative.

Let me highlight the core argument (and pardon the inflexibility of the new block style WP is using):

>>to assert that in effect conceptualism about abstracta is true, one relies on abstracta being in reality, e.g. here that a description or assertion can hold a relationship of accurate description with things as they are. Absent the reality of such a relationship independent of our individual or collective concepts, truth is meaningless. If only the concrete exists in reality, truth, an abstract relationship using symbolic representation (other abstracta!) is a case of non-being, illusion. Actually, illusion is another abstract relationship. Meaninglessness is next up, but this too is an abstract state of affairs. The infinite regress of abstracta begging to be acknowledged as real yawns open.

The reality of core abstracta is inescapably the case, i.e. it is necessarily true on pain of not being able to think, communicate conceptually, reason [implication is abstract], speak truth, demonstrate, warrant, know etc.

The serious issue then follows: in what way are such things real?

The best I can answer for now is that such abstracta are connected to the logic of being for worlds or things in the world. They are logically relevant characteristics of being, which in many cases are shared across beings as archetypes that are in-common, or even are in-common across possible worlds. In some cases such as numbers they are in common to all possible worlds as part of the fabric of any distinct possible world.

We may recognise or discover them and try to identify what they precisely are, but in many cases they defy particular definition in words.

Where do they come from, where are they? They come from the logic of being and are embedded as constraints on being. For instance, no entity E is such that it has two core characteristics x and y where y = ~x.

That is why square circles are impossible of being. Regardless of how we may form a fuzzy imagination that oscillates between the shapes or may try to superpose and blend the two.

There are squares, there are circles but no square circles

Thus, abstracta are part of the distinct identity, nature and being of any particular entity. That is, the principle of distinct identity has ontological, not just conceptual, significance. That’s why we recognise it as a first principle of right reason.

So, not a spooky, mysterious, metaphysical world of forms, just the architecture of — rational principles or “logic” of — being or possible being (and of impossibility of being). Where of course a considerable part of that embedded architecture of being is structural and quantitative. That is, Mathematical. Mathematics has in key part ontological import. Hence, Wigner’s point on its astonishing power. The music of the spheres is written in the language of mathematics, with — I daresay — Fourier leading the charge.>>

Fourier in action:

And again (a mechanical implementation in our hearing . . . relevant to octaves and fifths in music etc):

Let me then set it in the context of an ongoing exchange in the thread on beauty, and I take liberty to headline comment 390:

KF, 390: >>H, Let’s roll the tape a bit:


H, 377: >>kf writes,
What happens in the world is independent of [–> antecedent to and insofar as it is intelligible, influences] our thoughts about it [which thoughts in many cases may and do accurately describe reality, concrete and abstract.”
I’ll agree that the world is antecedent to our thoughts: we experience the world and then form thoughts about.
I’ll agree that “insofar as it is intelligible, [the world] influences our thoughts about it, which thoughts in many cases may and do accurately describe reality, concrete and abstract” [sorry, WP suppressed strike-throughs]>>

KF, 378: >>H, that apparent rejection of the reality of certain abstracta, if so, is fatally self-referential for much the same reason as nominalism (which is a form of such rejection) fails.>>

H, 379: >>I’ve explained my position, and see nothing “fatally self-referential” in it. The world is intelligible, and we are intelligent, so our understandings provide reasonably accurate maps of the world. We use abstractions to describe the world, but the world itself is “concrete” in the sense that it is its behavior which we observe that is the source of the material for our abstractions.
Probably no need for you (or me) to repeat ourselves again (although I do have a new thought on the matter that I may share later in the day when I have some time.)>>

KF, 380: >>when an objective matter is on the table, agreement or disagreement is immaterial. Just to make statements you have had to repeatedly rely on abstracta being the case not just perceptions. Indeed, truth is an abstract relationship of statements to what is the case, belief or disbelief, agreement or disagreement too. The reality of core abstracta is inescapable.>>

H, 381: >> I have clearly said that we use abstractions – we have to – just to talk about the world, so of course I agree with you when you write, “Just to make statements you have had to repeatedly rely on abstracta being the case not just perceptions.” Perceptions of the world bring in the data from which we create our abstractions, but abstractions are a necessary, central aspect of our ability, as rational, logical creatures, to understand the world.
Is this the point upon which you think my position is “fatally self-referential”?, because if so it misrepresents me. Perhaps you could explain more about your “fatally self-referential” statement.>>

KF, 382: >>this begins to approach the inescapability of the laws of thought, which embed cases in point. To attempt to deny one is forced to accept implicitly. For instance, you are affirming or implying that somethings are true, are accurate descriptions of reality, which is itself an abstract relationship, indeed the words and what they represent involve abstract relations. That is telling us something — we are at a start-point.>>

H, 383: >>Yes, I have continually said that we use abstract concepts to make statement about reality that are, to various degrees, accurate descriptions.>>

KF, 386: >>we cannot escape core abstracta and they are inescapably true or real as appropriate.>>

H, 389: >>kf writes “that apparent rejection of the reality of certain abstracta, if so, is fatally self-referential.” I accept the reality of the abstract concepts we create that describe the reality we experience. How is that “fatally self-referential”? I don’t see how you have explained that.>>

Notice, how you repeatedly affirm certain things to be true, i.e. to actually accurately describe real states of affairs? That is itself an abstract relationship, which must be real albeit abstract or discussion collapses. Likewise, the Mobius strip’s behaviour pivots on how it has ONE edge, ONE surface, etc. So if by cutting we introduce one or two further edges, it will form a longer loop or two interlocked loops. One-ness, two-ness, three-ness and consequences on the logic of being are abstract but take effect in space and bodies. It does so independent of our thoughts, concepts, expectations, as the relevant abstract properties are part of its core characteristics.

Above, at 375, I again laid out a demonstration as to why numbers are necessary entities that will manifest in any possible world, antecedent to our thoughts about a world. We are contingent beings within an already formed world.

Going back to the self-reference, to assert that in effect conceptualism about abstracta is true, one relies on abstracta being in reality, e.g. here that a description or assertion can hold a relationship of accurate description with things as they are. Absent the reality of such a relationship independent of our individual or collective concepts, truth is meaningless. If only the concrete exists in reality, truth, an abstract relationship using symbolic representation (other abstracta!) is a case of non-being, illusion. Actually, illusion is another abstract relationship. Meaninglessness is next up, but this too is an abstract state of affairs. The infinite regress of abstracta begging to be acknowledged as real yawns open.

The reality of core abstracta is inescapably the case, i.e. it is necessarily true on pain of not being able to think, communicate conceptually, reason [implication is abstract], speak truth, demonstrate, warrant, know etc.

The serious issue then follows: in what way are such things real?
The best I can answer for now is that such abstracta are connected to the logic of being for worlds or things in the world. They are logically relevant characteristics of being, which in many cases are shared across beings as archetypes that are in-common, or even are in-common across possible worlds. In some cases such as numbers they are in common to all possible worlds as part of the fabric of any distinct possible world.
We may recognise or discover them and try to identify what they precisely are, but in many cases they defy particular definition in words.
Where do they come from, where are they? They come from the logic of being and are embedded as constraints on being. For instance, no entity E is such that it has two core characteristics x and y where y = ~x.
That is why square circles are impossible of being. Regardless of how we may form a fuzzy imagination that oscillates between the shapes or may try to superpose and blend the two.

Thus, abstracta are part of the distinct identity, nature and being of any particular entity. That is, the principle of distinct identity has ontological, not just conceptual, significance. That’s why we recognise it as a first principle of right reason.

So, not a spooky, mysterious, metaphysical world of forms, just the architecture of — rational principles or “logic” of — being or possible being (and of impossibility of being). Where of course a considerable part of that embedded architecture of being is structural and quantitative. That is, Mathematical. Mathematics has in key part ontological import. Hence, Wigner’s point on its astonishing power. The music of the spheres is written in the language of mathematics, with — I daresay — Fourier leading the charge.

Speaking of architecture, that does point to architect. But that is an onward discussion tied to the necessary being root of reality. >>

So, what is now on the table is the architecture of — i.e. rational principles or “logic” of — being or possible being or even impossibility of being. Which, in part we may tabulate:

Where also, it is worth the effort to also headline from 375:

KF, 375: >>[W]e can show that key abstract elements of structure and quantity are necessary aspects of the logic of being a distinct possible world.

Consider a distinct possible world, W which is distinct from near neighbours (say W’, W’) by having some aspect of core characteristics A, unique to itself. Were there no A, the world would be indistinguishable from near neighbours and we would recognise that distinct labels have been attached to the same underlying possible world. Such allows us to view W as a structured set:

W = {A|~A}

Now, nothing is in W that is not in A or else ~A, the dichotomy is empty and there is no x in W but not in A or else ~A. This is the quantitative property, nullity; thus zero is present, {} –> 0. Likewise, A is a distinct thing, a unit. Unity is present, so one. Following von Neumann, {0} –> 1, where also A manifests unity. In a different sense, ~A is a complex unity, collecting many other things, pointing to collectives, to systems, to organisation, to function based on organisation etc. For our purposes, ~A is a unit but one different from A, so we need to recognise duality, two-ness, thus two: {0,1} –> 2. Obviously, such succession continues without limit and manifests the naturals, also implying the transfinite ordinals on the premise of order type {0,1,2 . . . } –> w (omega).

Likewise, we may contemplate an inverse such that -x + x –> 0, which is a vector of one dimension. We now have integers. Ratios of integers gives rise to rationals and convergent sums yield the rest of the reals. This gives us continuum. From this, the vector rotation operator i*x repeated twice to give – x allows us to have 2-d vectors in a continuum, a plane. An abstract plane that we may contemplate but which pervades any possible world. Where such a world is sufficiently spatially extended and actualised, we may observe continua, dimensions, vectors, rotations, trajectories etc.

So, we see where any possible world, simply on being distinct, manifests directly 0,1,2 and by extension on the logic of being, N, Z, Q, R, C. The vector phenomenon captured from Z on, allows us to extend the abstract continuum to arbitrarily many dimensions. (Notice the distinction between world manifestations and our extension to n-dimensional entities, n arbitrarily high.In physics we speak of 10^22 degrees of freedom routinely, for statistical thermodynamics, just for a reasonably accessible case.)

Our world manifests three spatial dimensions on the macro scale, and we can observe things like Mobius strips etc.

The underlying point is, that we see intelligible, abstract, necessary, structural and quantitative entities as part of the fabric of any distinct world, part of its framework, part of the logic of its being as a distinct possible world.

In that context, we may identify certain facts of structure and quantity that necessarily obtain.

For instance consider five distinct units and how they may be partitioned into a pair and a triple: ||||| –> || + |||. Obviously, this can be reversed, || + ||| –> |||||. Addition and subtraction have a natural sense of partitioning and combining units. Multiplication and division are extensions as are many onward operations, relations and functions. And so forth.

The point is, that there are abstract, structural and quantitative entities that are intelligible on logic of being which are necessary corollaries of any distinct possible world. These abstracta, we recognise and observe through the effects of the logic of being, we do not invent. They are not merely concepts and constructs we invent and project to a world of things in themselves. That, being in reality just an inner game on the appearances we have and imagine as reflecting the outer world. No, the Kantian ugly gulch fails and we have no good reason to imagine the behaviour of a Mobius strip is some sort of contemplative inner dream. Such dreams we could modify at will, the logic of being is far less yielding than that.

So, we need to frame an understanding of Mathematics that recognises that we may study the logic of structure and quantity, but this is not isolated from the intelligible substance of structure and quantity manifest in the world. Yes, our sense of being and of cause needs to adapt to the logic of being that involves necessary albeit abstract entities. For instance, nullity, the empty set, zero are manifest in a myriad circumstances, indeed in any possible, distinct world. But as {} is indistinguishable from {} there is good reason to see that it is one and the same common entity. Which is a characteristic shown by many abstract entities. >>

So, now, let us further reflect. END

Comments
I wasn't pretending anything, Stephen. There have been multiple threads with extended discussions about the nature of mathematical truths, and I don't think you have been a part of them. I don't want to go track them down, and I don't want to start a new conversation with you about them.hazel
March 31, 2019
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SB: If an abstract reality, such as the Pythagorean Theorem, can be discovered, it must exist first as an extra-mental reality in order to be discovered.” Hazel
No. I have addressed that multiple times, but you have to read a bit to find the relevant portions of the threads.
If you had covered this ground before, you would likely have provided evidence of that fact rather than ask me to chase it down. It would be more honest for you to say that you have no answer to my challenge rather than to pretend that you have already addressed it. SB: Either you think that abstract realities exist only in the mind and are therefore, “made up,” or you think that they exist as abstract realities outside you mind and are, therefore, “discovered.” You cannot have it both ways.
You have created a dichotomy where one half is a strawman: I don’t think that abstract realities are just “made up.”
You appear not to understand the implications of your own philosophy. If, as you claim, all abstract realities exist in the mind, and no abstract realities exist outside the mind, it also means that all abstract realities originate in the mind, which is the same as saying that they are made up and are not discovered. In truth, abstract realities must exist outside the mind in order to be discovered and understood by the mind. If you discover or apprehend the Pythagorean Theorem, for example, it can only be because its truth as an extra-mental reality preceded your discovery of it. In spite of your claims to the contrary, you have not addressed this point.StephenB
March 31, 2019
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StephenB writes, "If an abstract reality, such as the Pythagorean Theorem, can be discovered, it must exist first as an extra-mental reality in order to be discovered." No. I have addressed that multiple times, but you have to read a bit to find the relevant portions of the threads. StephenB writes, “Either you think that abstract realities exist only in the mind and are therefore, “made up,” or you think that they exist as abstract realities outside you mind and are, therefore, “discovered.” You cannot have it both ways. You have created a dichotomy where one half is a strawman: I don’t think that abstract realities are just “made up.” And you write, “I do not need a model of the world in order to know that 2+2 = 4.” Yes, in fact you do use a model of the world to know that 2 + 2 = 4, because the abstractions about quantity, summation, and equality are in fact abstractions in your mind. Without the abstractions, you would be like the monkey I discussed a ways back.hazel
March 31, 2019
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Hazel
“yes”: the abstract notion that men exist as a class and that we have observed and generalized that all men die exists only in our minds.
This is an error and I think it is the basis for your misunderstanding with KF. If an abstract reality, such as the Pythagorean Theorem, can be discovered, it must exist first as an extra-mental reality in order to be discovered. For some reason, you refuse to address this issue. You have two choices: Either you think that abstract realities exist only in the mind and are therefore, "made up," or you think that they exist as abstract realities outside you mind and are, therefore, "discovered." You cannot have it both ways.
The things we discover we express with abstractions and logic. The world is intelligible, and we are intelligent, so we create abstractions which can, to various degrees, accurately model the reality we observe.
Forming models of the world can be useful in some cases, but they have nothing to do the way we know things at the most basic level. I do not need a model of the world in order to know that 2+2 = 4, or that evil exists, or that a dogs nature is different from that of a cat. I did not "create" these abstractions, I "discovered them."StephenB
March 31, 2019
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I understand completely, Dave. I appreciate lightening the atmosphere.hazel
March 31, 2019
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hazel, Just to be clear, my post was not intended to dissuade you from "shouting" or anything else. Just a humorous commentary on our situation.daveS
March 31, 2019
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Thanks, Dave. I'll hyper down. :-)hazel
March 31, 2019
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hazel,
Maybe shouting will help?
It's worth a try, I guess. On the other hand, this. :-)daveS
March 31, 2019
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Another pointless comment: kf writes, "My point is, that you cannot escape using implication, " OF COURSE WE CAN'T. HUMAN BEINGS HAVE TO USE THE ELEMENTS OF LOGIC TO THINK, TALK, AND DESCRIBE THE WORLD. Maybe shouting will help? :-) Another pointless comment: "Substantial reality that we discover and contemplate, through the power of truth, not just notions swirling around in our heads that we invent or may not invent." YES, REALITY IS SUBSTANTIAL, AND YES WE DISCOVER THINGS ABOUT IT. WE DON"T JUST MAKE STUFF UP! The things we discover we express with abstractions and logic. The world is intelligible, and we are intelligent, so we create abstractions which can, to various degrees, accurately model the reality we observe. (I got tired of typing in all caps.)hazel
March 31, 2019
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H, implication is a relationship, which reflects a logic of being or even potential being. If it is so that Socrates is a man . . . member of a class -- abstract relationship, and that men are mortal -- characteristic of members of said class [another abstract entity], then it is implied -- abstract logical relationship -- Socrates (as a man) is a mortal. My point is, that you cannot escape using implication, regardless of whether or not you hold opinions pro or con on the matter. This is a proper first principle of right reason. Note, appeal to dismissed claim does not undermine its point, and is here incorrect: I here point out that partition and union of sets of discrete units is connected to and an implication of their cardinality. That is, implication is here embedded in reality as an abstract relationship and was so before there ever were humans to name and contemplate it. You also fail to see that the reality of man-ness, of mortality of members of that class and the implied conclusion that Socrates -- a man -- is antecedent to our contemplations. Men have a common substantial nature with characteristics including mortality, which carries with it the implication on logic of being that a particular man is mortal. Substantial reality that we discover and contemplate, through the power of truth, not just notions swirling around in our heads that we invent or may not invent. KFkairosfocus
March 31, 2019
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KF, agreed.daveS
March 31, 2019
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DS, propositions do not exist materially (they are not equal to glyphs in a chain or brain wiring etc), but if true the substance they refer to can be and is manifest in reality. Socrates is a man is not the glyphs nor brain electrochemistry but a truth, a reality accurately described, which may then be logically contemplated. KFkairosfocus
March 31, 2019
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Kf writes, “Implication is in fact yet another inescapable truth of reasoning, as H would discover ....” True. I accept logical reasoning. I can’t imagine why you think I don’t. No sense in continuing to respond to kf’s repetition of what I see as a confusion between what the world is and what we think about the world. I will note that he repeats the 2 + 3 = 5 example, which I addressed a while back in thinking about a monkey observing the five pebbles. But one last example: he writes,
H, is it just in our heads that we hold an abstract notion that men exist as a class and that being human entails mortality as a key characteristic? Is it just an abstract notion with no reliable reference to reality that Socrates of Athens is a man?
The answer to the first question is “yes”: the abstract notion that men exist as a class and that we have observed and generalized that all men die exists only in our head minds. The answer to the second question is of course our abstract notions have reference to reality. The fact that kf continues to make statements like that shows that he does not understand my position. I know he and I disagree. What is frustrating is that he doesn’t understand what we disagree about, and continually attributes things to me that I don’t believe.hazel
March 31, 2019
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MG, KF, hazel, The more I look at this argument, the more I am convinced it has serious problems:
5) Statement P is self-referential: P itself is an abstract proposition. If P is true, then P exists only within minds. Therefore P is not universally true in the physical universe, contradicting the assumption that P is true.
Let me try varying it slightly. Let P be the proposition "Propositions do not exist in the physical universe". Surely P is true, right? Unless someone here has converted to physicalism. I don't know what to make of the next step, but I presume MG would say that "P is not universally true in the physical universe" just as before. Hence we conclude that P is false. That is, some propositions do exist in the physical universe, which is absurd. Therefore I don't think this argument succeeds.daveS
March 31, 2019
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H, is it just in our heads that we hold an abstract notion that men exist as a class and that being human entails mortality as a key characteristic? Is it just an abstract notion with no reliable reference to reality that Socrates of Athens is a man? Is it just a mere matter of a logic-game in our heads with no reliable reference to reality that Socrates is therefore mortal and thus predictably prone to the effects of judicially imposed Hemlock in an "appropriate" dose? Is it just an abstraction that the executioner said, no one may not pour out a libation from the fatal dose in the cup of Hemlock, as it is exact? Was it just a coincidence unconnected to real-world causality that on drinking said cup of Hemlock, Socrates proceeded to die under sentence of the Areopagus? KFkairosfocus
March 31, 2019
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H, kindly observe 107. Neither you nor I nor anyone else can escape implicit reliance on implication, even to infer oh errors exist, I am error prone so in my thought I may err so I hedge around my conclusions with that possibility and build a scheme of thought on it. By contrast, it is a plumb-line truth that Error exists, an undeniably certain and self evident truth. Thus, not all truths are prone to error, there are specific, necessary truths that are inescapably true, relatively few but vital, truths that apply to reality and are not just locked up inside the circle of our error-prone minds; indeed, truths that express logic of being, here being an unavoidable part of the nature of causes and effects. This includes the logic of implication which governs inference and particularly Mathematics. Which, is an application of the principle that to prove that logic is necessary or valid requires the use of logic, i.e. it is inescapable. KFkairosfocus
March 31, 2019
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MG (& attn H and DS): Yesterday was an emergency, given regional legal developments involving a Chief Justice who set out to single-handedly amend a Constitution from the judge's bench. So, pardon effective absence and focus elsewhere. MG, your argument is correct in the main, though I would not use the what goes up must come down case, as there is such a thing as escape velocity and the onward premise that in principle one could climb a ladder to the moon. Escape velocity is a threshold whereby "all at once" an object would have enough kinetic energy to escape a gravitational potential well. There is a reason why Copi and others use combustion as the classic empirical example of causality, it demonstrates how a cluster of enabling conditions are each necessary and are together jointly sufficient for an effect to occur. This is thus a key example or case study on implication logic and its link to causality. Which, of course, was challenged by Hume et al. (Itself a warning.) We also observe in reasoning, that there is a general condition of implication, whereby p is sufficient for q, and q necessary for p; in key part captured by the material implication truth table. For simple example, if Tom is a cat, then Tom is an animal. It is sufficient for Tom's animality that he is a cat, and animality is necessary for Tom to be a cat. However as there are other ways to be an animal, animality is not sufficient for Tom to be a cat, he could be a boy or a pig. That is, implication is not equivalence, that requires double-implication as a further component. (However, [p => q AND q => p] is not yet sufficient to establish identity of p and q, we need to move beyond mutual presence to identity, i.e. there are no distinctives so p and q are different labels for the same thing.) And notice the reflexivity here, I used implication in discussing implication. Implication is in fact yet another inescapable truth of reasoning, as H would discover were she to draw out the chain by which she has yet again injected the epistemology of potential error -- yet another inference turning on implication logic -- into a matter of logic of being and first principles of reason which are antecedent to our problems with knowing what is so. Let's observe:
[H, 106:] I see that by non-negotiable you meant absolute. I think I’ve already addressed the fact that I am not claiming absolute certainty about my beliefs, nor claiming that they have special claim to deductive truth. See post 101 for more on that . . . . [101:] I don’t at all believe that my views have some special warrant to truth. I may be wrong, although as I have said many times, I think the “real” nature of the reality of both the world and minds is probably forever beyond our comprehension. I also don’t know what you mean by a “universal proposition” in this regard. I have pointed out that “abstract concepts exist only in human minds” is not a purely logical proposition, but rather a belief about the world and human beings, with all the attendant possible disclaimers and provisions that go along with such beliefs. It includes various concepts, including the concept of abstract concepts themselves, as well as “exists” and “human minds”, all of which are full of problematic and unknown elements. To say P must be either true or false is to treat it as purely logical proposition, which it is not.
Notice, the chaining of argument and implicit propositional claims(such as the potential for error) as well as explicit ones? As a Mathematical practitioner and/or educator, H knows that reasoning from givens or axioms and established results requires chained implications. She knows that such implications are inextricably embedded in Mathematics and that such mathematics is often manifestly relevant to the real world (including of course the Mobius strip snip around examples I have so often referenced to hammer home a plumb-line test case). She knows that this extends to reasoning in general, she must know the material implication truth table and its application to real-world examples such as a fire, where the Chemistry of combustion chain reactions now undergirds the longstanding empirical facts that are of such great importance to civilisation. How does she handle this, let's see:
[H, 106:] we observe things happen and then generalize them into abstractions: that is what I said in 103. You write, ” If I toss a rock into the air, then it returns to the surface. Is this not a special case of implication?” No, there is an event in the world, which is one of many which leads to an abstract conclusion “If I throw …, etc.”, but there is no actual abstraction conditional proposition out there when the thrown object goes up and down.
Of course, inductive inference is not merely by blind psychological association, but pivots on awareness of cause as a case of implication. Similarly, we infer on tested reliable signs [such as Hippocrates' facies of death] precisely because we are aware of causal connexions and associated logic of implication. This is part of the inescapable first principles of right reason. That is, our concept-forming abstraction on seeing a fire or (absent awareness of escape velocity etc) of projected rocks falling etc is due to a prior logical structure. But if such is kept implicit and hedged about with the epistemology of potential error, especially on induction, it can be evaded. That evasiveness must cease. Do we or do we knot rely on logically complelling inference from premises to conclusions, not only in Mathematics but generally? Are we or are we not able to escape using such, i.e. starting from givens p then drawing out consequents q? I put it, that we cannot escape such in reasoning, life and disciplined study, in general. Thus, we are looking at an inescapably true first principle of right reason connected to the logic of being. Cat-ness entails animality as part of identity and core characteristics, so if Tom is a cat, that is sufficient to establish animality; which can be independently recognised. Likewise, man-hood implies mortality, so id Socrates is a man, it is only a reminder that men are mortal which then leads to closing the syllogism, Socrates is mortal. Similarly, given addition as clustering and partition as subtraction, we observe both: ||||| --> || + ||| AND || + ||| --> ||||| That is if we partition a five set by separation of a pair, we are left with a trio, necessarily based on what cardinality of a five set means. Similarly, clustering a two-set with a three set yields a five set. These are implications, simple and self-evident ones. We know the inescapability of implication, to the point of its being a self-evident, undeniable truth that is just as certain as that error exists. Indeed, let us use E to symbolise this proposition. Given that this is a proposition -- an assertion that is either true or else false [notice, this too has been obscured under a fog of epistemological doubts] -- we can freely contrast ~E. But we see -- by direct implication -- that ~E has a meaning: it is an error to assert that error exists. So, patently, E is undeniably so as its attempted denial immediately implies its truth. And yes, one may argue about a self-evident truth even though its truth is primarily seen based on understanding what the claim means i/l/o sufficient experience and insight to recognise its force. In particular, such arguments typically draw out the absurdity of the attempted denial. This SET is of course directly relevant to H's persistent objection on the possibility of error by way of mismatch between our abstractions and the world of things in themselves. The very claim that error exists is itself a certain truth, undeniably true and thus bridging our inner world of contemplated abstracta and the external world of an ordered, intelligible in part cosmos. Yes, we may and do err but even this is an illustration that often we do know the truth, sometimes to incorrigible certainty. But of course yet another evasive problem is, what is truth. Though it has been challenged as unhelpful, that perception seems to be an error regarding Aristotle: truth says of what is, that it is; and of what is not, that it is not. Truth accurately describes reality, things in themselves, on particular points and aspirationally on the whole. Where, on logic turning on inescapably true first principles of reason, observation and insight, we may so warrant certain truth-claims [that is, propositions] that they are credibly deemed knowledge. This being warranted, credibly true (and so, reliable) belief. And yes, there is room for provisionality in this definition, though certain truths can be known to certainty. Maybe, Locke has something to teach us, if we will listen:
[Essay on Human Understanding, Intro, Sec 5:] Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, since he hath given them (as St. Peter says [NB: i.e. 2 Pet 1:2 - 4]) pana pros zoen kaieusebeian, whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery, the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concernments [Prov 1: 1 - 7], that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties [cf Rom 1 - 2, Ac 17, etc, etc]. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grasp everything . . . It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant [Matt 24:42 - 51], who would not attend his business by candle light, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The Candle that is set up in us [Prov 20:27] shines bright enough for all our purposes . . . If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do muchwhat as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.
KFkairosfocus
March 31, 2019
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MG our posts crossed in the mail, so to speak. You write, "Regarding point 3), how do we generalize implication to the formal P —> Q if not from real world examples?" That is what we do: we observe things happen and then generalize them into abstractions: that is what I said in 103. You write, " If I toss a rock into the air, then it returns to the surface. Is this not a special case of implication?" No, there is an event in the world, which is one of many which leads to an abstract conclusion "If I throw ..., etc.", but there is no actual abstraction conditional proposition out there when the thrown object goes up and down. As I discussed when we were discussing monkeys (I have no idea whether you followed that or if it meant anything to you), we can’t talk about, or even conceive of, the world without using our abstract terms and models, so it is easy to believe that our abstractions have a “life of their own” in the world, so to speak. However, my belief (and I have had some interesting psychological experiences in regards to this) is that it is possible to experience the world with a direct immediacy that clearly separates that existence of the world as it is from our thinking about the world. P.S. I see that by non-negotiable you meant absolute. I think I've already addressed the fact that I am not claiming absolute certainty about my beliefs, nor claiming that they have special claim to deductive truth. See post 101 for more on that.hazel
March 30, 2019
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editing ...hazel
March 30, 2019
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"Non-negotiable" is a euphemism for "absolute" and was not intended to imply actual negotiations. Regarding point 3), how do we generalize implication to the formal P ---> Q if not from real world examples? If I toss a rock into the air, then it returns to the surface. Is this not a special case of implication? Historians of science note that application of logic to understanding and predicting physical phenomena did not really work in ancient China, say, because of philosophical beliefs regarding the chaos of nature. Modern science depends on the assumptions of underlying laws that have logical consequences. Point 3) does not assume KF's posts about logic being a foundation of underlying reality (although it is consistent with KF's posts). ....I have pointed out that “abstract concepts exist only in human minds” is not a purely logical proposition.... On the contrary, P (as stated in quotation marks) is in fact a logical proposition by definition since there is an actual T/F assignment to it. It seems that what you are actually proposing as your belief is an unstated variant P' that contains quantifiers regarding minds and abstracta. (Please don't try to redefine "exists". Recall that all formal systems have undefined terms as their starting points. Arguing that something depends on the meaning of "is" doesn't even get out the starting gate.) If P' seems too complicated to express exactly, perhaps use some universal quantifiers.math guy
March 30, 2019
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I agree, Dave. This is the main point for me. Yes, we live in a world that is causally connected, but we create abstract propositions that "if this then" that by generalizing from what we observe. Conditional propositions are descriptions of the world, but they themselves are not in the world: they are not part of causality itself.hazel
March 30, 2019
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MG & hazel, Regarding (5), I wouldn't expect to see implication (a relation between abstract entities) in the physical universe. Causation, yes.daveS
March 30, 2019
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re 100, to MG Even though I know you don’t have time for very many, or frequent, posts, I’ll comment Points 1-3 have been discussed at length in previous threads. Point 3 is particular is the heart of the matter in respect to my thoughts about abstraction, but I’m not going to repeat things I’ve said multiple times about that. I don’t understand point 4. First, I don’t know what “non-negotiable” means here. What is even being negotiated? My belief that abstract concepts exists only in human minds is partially based on the evidence I see, and partially based on some philosophical perspectives related to point 3. Some people strongly disagree with me about some of of this, and some people seem to agree. We are sharing thoughts, but I don’t see how we are negotiating anything. My beliefs are not set in stone, and unlike some* (I’ll name no names :-) ), I don’t at all believe that my views have some special warrant to truth. I may be wrong, although as I have said many times, I think the “real” nature of the reality of both the world and minds is probably forever beyond our comprehension. I also don’t know what you mean by a “universal proposition” in this regard. I have pointed out that “abstract concepts exist only in human minds” is not a purely logical proposition, but rather a belief about the world and human beings, with all the attendant possible disclaimers and provisions that go along with such beliefs. It includes various concepts, including the concept of abstract concepts themselves, as well as “exists” and “human minds”, all of which are full of problematic and unknown elements. To say P must be either true or false is to treat it as purely logical proposition, which it is not. The two other alternatives that have been offered are a Platonic one, in which abstractions exist in some non-material realm independent from human beings, or one in which abstractions exist embedded in the physical world. I see problems with both those views, which I’ve been discussing for several months, so on balance I’m currently thinking that the belief I’ve been stating makes the most sense to me. YMMVhazel
March 30, 2019
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Recap: 1) We agree that correct use of classical logic is necessary (although not sufficient) for understanding science, cause & effect, mathematics, and just plain everyday life in the human world. (Roger Bacon taught us that pure logic without empirical evidence is insufficient for an accurate model of physical reality.) 2) We agree that there are known truths about the physical world: for instance KF's example of combustion requiring an oxidant among other factors. There are also known truths about the human world, such as "error exists". 3) KF argues that implication is manifested in the actual physical universe. The denial of this leads to absurdity. Besides, how did platonists get the idea about universals, like the existence of abstract implication, other than through numerous examples seen in the physical universe? Please note the difference between "manifested in the physical universe" and "exists independent of the physical universe". The latter assumes the platonist viewpoint, the former merely says that we (the only observers in the neighborhood) recognize instances of implication in the world (like "what goes up must come down", etc.) 4) So let us apply 1) to the statement P: "Abstracta exist only within minds". For simplicity it can be assumed that "minds" mean "human minds" in this context. Some of us believe that P has truth value T, others say F. For some* who claim T, this is a non-negotiable universal truth, else the platonist school of thought has a foot in the doorway, so to speak. (Aside: the Wittgenstein/Ayers school of philosophy will dodge the issue by saying that P has no meaning. To my way of thinking, that denies 1). Selective non-use of logical reasoning is rigging the game, putting one's thumb on the scale, or any other euphemism for cheating.) 5) Statement P is self-referential: P itself is an abstract proposition. If P is true, then P exists only within minds. Therefore P is not universally true in the physical universe, contradicting the assumption that P is true. 6) Since P cannot be universally true, it should be modified to a weaker version P' that avoids the contradiction above. I look forward to logically examining such a P'. *In staying consistent with post 88, I am not insinuating that any particular UD commentators take the viewpoint that P is a universal truth. But my aim is to show that such a viewpoint is contradictory.math guy
March 30, 2019
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Thanks, and thanks to Dave's for his comment.hazel
March 30, 2019
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H @ 88 In light of DS @ 93, I should grant you benefit of doubt regarding my assumptions about your understanding. I will attempt to do so.math guy
March 30, 2019
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OT: progress on the sum of three cubes problem.daveS
March 29, 2019
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DS, I have spoken of tangents that occur when there is persistent subject switching. Such as this right now. KFkairosfocus
March 29, 2019
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KF, I was referring to your own use of the word 'tangential'. That word seems to appear when certain pointed questions which require precise answers are raised.daveS
March 29, 2019
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DS, the issue is not tangential, it is a plumb-line test case on abstract structure and quantity manifestly, objectively in real space and bodies independent of our thought. Your objection fails. KFkairosfocus
March 29, 2019
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