Massive early galaxies defy “prior understanding of the universe”

_{Denyse O'Leary

February 24, 2023

Cosmology, Philosophy, Science}

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At ScienceDaily:

Six massive galaxies discovered in the early universe are upending what scientists previously understood about the origins of galaxies in the universe.
“These objects are way more massive? than anyone expected,” said Joel Leja, assistant professor of astronomy and astrophysics at Penn State, who modeled light from these galaxies. “We expected only to find tiny, young, baby galaxies at this point in time, but we’ve discovered galaxies as mature as our own in what was previously understood to be the dawn of the universe.” – Penn State (February 23, 2023)

Tip: If all you want is to have your prior beliefs about the universe confirmed, don’t whack a huge telescope into space and code it to send back real-life actual data. Pound lecterns on behalf of manipulated interpretations of prior data instead.

The paper is open access.

Comments

Origenes
Meanwhile, one has to wonder what “rational thought” means for someone who does not accept that 2+2=4.
I’d note that you picked 2+2=4 as a shining example of an absolute, axiomatic truth, that is immune from criticism. How did you come to choose that particular proposition as a candidate for immunity from criticism to use in your comment? Why 2+2=4 instead of, say, 3+4, why not the theorem of Pythagoras? Was it because you decided that proposition would be the best to make your point because it was the most obvious, unambiguous truth of all you considered using?critical rationalist_{March 8, 2023
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Popper....
The question about the sources of our knowledge . . . has always been asked in the spirit of: ‘What are the best sources of our knowledge—the most reliable ones, those which will not lead us into error, and those to which we can and must turn, in case of doubt, as the last court of appeal?’ I propose to assume, instead, that no such ideal sources exist—no more than ideal rulers—and that all ‘sources’ are liable to lead us into error at times. And I propose to replace, therefore, the question of the sources of our knowledge by the entirely different question: ‘How can we hope to detect and eliminate error?’
Origenes
Let’s examine: 1.) “No ideal sources of knowledge exist.” 2.) A universal and affirmative claim requires an ideal source of knowledge. 3.) “No ideal sources of knowledge exist” is a universal and affirmative claim. Therefore 4.) If (1.) is true, then Ideal sources of knowledge exist.
You continually seem to selectively ignore aspects of each excerpt when it suits your purpose. Then you add assumptions that are nowhere to be found in the quote, along with adding assumptions that are in conflict with the author, like "A universal and affirmative claim requires an ideal source of knowledge." But that's precisely what the author criticizes. It's like a game of wack-a-mole. When corrected in one area, you switch to a misrepresentation in another area, and when corrected there, you switch back to some previous misrepresentation. For example, Popper uses the words "propose" and "assume", which you proceed to leave out of your "examination". Here's a thought experiment: imagine someone claims a bank robbery was thwarted by Superman, who is now in the hospital due to gunshot wounds from a conventional hand gun and is a woman. Do I have to believe Superman actually exists to point out that Superman is supposedly a man and is supposedly impervious to conventional non-Kryptonian weapons? No, I do not. Regardless if Superman actually exists or not, we have good criticism that he would not be person that thwarted the bank robbery. IOW, I do not need to actually believe Superman exists to take that proposition (theory) seriously, _as if_ it were true in reality, and that all observations should conform to it, _for the purpose of criticism_. If superman existed, there would be necessary consequences of that being true. The person in the hospital would be a man. And the person shouldn't have injuries due to conventional weapons. Those observations conflict with that theory. This goes back to the idea of knowledge as justified, true, belief.
“The gods did not reveal, from the beginning, All things to us, but in the course of time Through seeking we may learn and know things better. But as for certain truth, no man has known it, Nor shall he know it, neither of the gods Nor yet of all the things of which I speak. For even if by chance he were to utter The final truth, he would himself not know it: For all is but a woven web of guesses” - Xenophanes
01. We start out with a problem. Some new observation or idea seems to conflict with some theory we have tentatively adopted. 02. We conjecture explanatory theories about how the world works, in reality, for the explicit purpose of solving that problem 03. We take those theories seriously, for the purpose of criticism, as if it was true in reality, and that all observations should conform to it, in the hope of finding errors It contains. 04. Goto 01. That's it. Everything is held open with the possibility of criticism. Again, going back to a previous misrepresentation, previously addressed....
When fallibilism starts to seem paradoxical, the mistakes begin. We are inclined to seek foundations—solid ground in the vast quicksand of human opinion—on which one can try to base everything else. Throughout the ages, the false authority of experience and the false reassurance of probability have been mistaken for such foundations: “No, we’re not always right,” your parents tell you, “just usually.” They have been on earth longer and think they have seen this situation before. But since that is an argument for “therefore you should always do as we say,” it is functionally a claim of infallibility after all. Moreover, look more closely: It claims literal infallibility too. Can anyone be infallibly right about the probability that they are right?
IOW, you seems incapable of taking fallibilism seriously long enough to make it though to the next comment, then bringing up the same misconceptions.critical rationalist_{March 8, 2023
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PM1 @
We can take logic in the very broad sense to mean the rules of good reasoning — avoiding informal and formal fallacies, and so on. Would a fallibilist need to say that even the rules of good reasoning are fallible? Perhaps, but even so, what does that mean?
It would mean that reasoning ends. There would be nothing left to say. It seems that fallibilists do not realize that. They want to go on talking about varying criticisms or whatever. And when you ask what their continued talk is based on, since they have destroyed the foundation of reasoning not only for others but also for themselves, they look at you as if it's your fault. The larger point is perhaps that, in line with Slagle, there is no outside of the circle. You cannot draw a circle around logic, step outside that circle, and proceed with making all sorts of arguments.Origenes_{March 7, 2023
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@104
Suppose that an attempt at correcting by “rational thought”, would imply stating that something is illogical, then it would be based on logic.
We can take logic in the very broad sense to mean the rules of good reasoning -- avoiding informal and formal fallacies, and so on. Would a fallibilist need to say that even the rules of good reasoning are fallible? Perhaps, but even so, what does that mean? Fallible does not mean unreliable or untrustworthy -- it means that they have broken down, stopped working, in some specific context. For example, we usually regard eyewitness testimony as reliable -- but we also know that it's far from perfect. If I tell you that I saw a gorgeous hummingbird yesterday, you'll be inclined to believe me -- unless it turns out that some other factor is intervening (it was far away, I wasn't wearing my glasses, I don't know what hummingbirds look like, my neighbor was playing with a new drone, etc.). So eyewitness testimony is reliable and also fallible. Likewise, we could take the rules of good reasoning as reliable guides -- unless we had some specific reason, in some specific context, to think that they had ceased to function. (In this context, I find it salutary to reflect on both why quantum logic failed and whether it could have succeeded.)
What do you make of post #65?
It's an interesting exercise about what we might say about a world in which experience does not conform to the a priori truth "2+2=4", which is different from denying that "2+2=4" is an a priori truth of arithmetic. I quite agree that it's difficult to imagine what it would take to show that the axioms of arithmetic are so blatantly inconsistent that "2+2=4" makes no sense. (Deutsch mentions "Dark Integers" by Egan. A more humorous take is "bistromathics" in Life, the Universe, and Everything by Douglas Adams.)PyrrhoManiac1_{March 7, 2023
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PM1
I am not clear at all on what you are asking for: what would it mean to say that “substantive criticism”, “error correction” and “rational thought” must be based on something in order to be valid?
Suppose that an attempt at correcting by "rational thought", would imply stating that something is illogical, then it would be based on logic.
Does he deny that 2+2=4?
What do you make of post #65?Origenes_{March 7, 2023
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The correcting is done, according to CR, by “substantive criticism”, “error correction” and “rational thought.” I have asked him what they are based on, and what makes them valid. His answer is that they are not justified in the sense that I “seem to be implying.”
I am not clear at all on what you are asking for: what would it mean to say that “substantive criticism”, “error correction” and “rational thought" must be based on something in order to be valid?
Meanwhile, one has to wonder what “rational thought” means for someone who does not accept that 2+2=4.
Does he deny that 2+2=4?PyrrhoManiac1_{March 7, 2023
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PM1 @101
To conceive of knowledge as an error-driven self-correcting feedback system (which is perhaps not Popper) is to reject the assumption that knowledge must be based on axioms.
The correcting is done, according to CR, by “substantive criticism”, “error correction” and “rational thought.” I have asked him what they are based on, and what makes them valid. His answer is that they are not justified in the sense that I "seem to be implying." Meanwhile, one has to wonder what "rational thought" means for someone who does not accept that 2+2=4.Origenes_{March 7, 2023
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@100
Every position toward knowledge has to be based on axioms. They have to pay the notice like everyone else.
I don't understand this, perhaps because I don't quite understand what you mean by "pay the notice". A deductive system that is based on axioms is a system that takes those axioms as given. They are not themselves justified, because they are the basis for all justification in that system. In mathematics and logic, we usually do not worry about what grounds or justifies the axioms themselves. The Peano axioms of arithmetic or Euclid's axioms in geometry are simply given -- assumptions that must be granted in order to prove anything else in those systems. To conceive of knowledge as an error-driven self-correcting feedback system (which is perhaps more Peirce than Popper?) is to reject the assumption that knowledge must be based on axioms.PyrrhoManiac1_{March 7, 2023
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PM1 @ My larger argument against fallibilism is expressed by Kairosfocus in #96. Every position toward knowledge has to be based on axioms. They have to pay the notice like everyone else. Hyper-skepticism wants to burn every other position down to the ground and remain unscathed. Although this is doubtlessly inspired by the noblest of intentions, it cannot be done. "The beliefs of others are all nonsense, but mine is not because mine is a 'metacontext'" is simply not acceptable.Origenes_{March 7, 2023
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98
If so, then the empirical survey must be flawless in order to flawlessly observe “that none of them are completely error-free.” IOW the empirical survey must be an “error-free source of justification.”
Well, suppose you're right: suppose that the observation and induction used in this survey were themselves flawed. That allows for the possibility that there really is an error-free source of justification, but one that the fallibilist has simply failed to notice. In that case, I think the fallibilist response would be to say, "ok, show it to me!"PyrrhoManiac1_{March 7, 2023
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PM1 @97
You would be right if the claim “there are no error-free sources of justification” itself presupposed an error-free source of justification. But it does not. Rather, it is based on empirical survey of actually existing sources of justification and observing that none of them are completely error-free.
If so, then the empirical survey must be flawless in order to flawlessly observe "that none of them are completely error-free." IOW the empirical survey must be an "error-free source of justification."Origenes_{March 7, 2023
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@95 You would be right if the claim "there are no error-free sources of justification" itself presupposed an error-free source of justification. But it does not. Rather, it is based on empirical survey of actually existing sources of justification and observing that none of them are completely error-free. Now, you might be in better shape, arguing against Critical Rationalist's Popperianism, if you were to point out that if fallibilism is based upon induction across actually existing epistemic resources, that would be in tension with Popper's own avowed rejection of induction with regard to the methodology of science, since his falsificationism comes out of his belief that Hume's "problem of induction" cannot be solved and therefore we must rationally reconstruct scientific reasoning on deductivist terms. This is, incidentally, why my philosophy of science is basically that of Peirce and Dewey -- especially with regard to Peirce's insight that scientific reasoning requires the feedback and feed-forward loops between abductive, inductive, and deductive reasoning. Each makes its own unique contribution; we cannot hope to understand science on the basis of only one or even two of them.PyrrhoManiac1_{March 7, 2023
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Origenes, self referentiality will get you every time. They need to pay it notice. KFkairosfocus_{March 7, 2023
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CR
Ori: This does not anticipate or address the issue that “no position can be positively justified” is a self-defeating statement.
CR: Can you walk me through that? IOW, I’m suggesting that, at some point, you’ll make an assumption that reflects a false dilemma.
Here is my argument again. Tell me which premise is addressed by the text you quoted. 1.) No position can be positively justified 2.) “No position can be positively justified” is a position. From 1.) and 2.) 3.) It cannot be positively justified that “no position can be positively justified.”
CR: Popper, from the essay on fallibilism… “I propose to assume, instead, that no such ideal sources exist—no more than ideal rulers …”
Let’s examine: 1.) “No ideal sources of knowledge exist.” 2.) A universal and affirmative claim requires an ideal source of knowledge. 3.) “No ideal sources of knowledge exist” is a universal and affirmative claim. Therefore 4.) If (1.) is true, then Ideal sources of knowledge exist. Thus self-defeating. Here is Nicholas Dykes on Popper:
More pointedly, the proposition “all knowledge remains conjectural” is a contradiction in terms. The objection gathers strength when one notices that Popper’s proposition is itself not conjectural. Universal and affirmative, it states that “All knowledge remains conjectural” – which is a claim to knowledge. The proposition thus asserts what it denies and is self-contradictory on a second count. [Nicholas Dykes, ‘Debunking Popper: A. Critique of Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism’.]

CR: Criticism is itself fallible.
Then you have nothing to criticize from.
CR: That process is itself a metacontext which is part of the best explanation for how knowledge grows.
Out of nowhere, there is a holy “metacontext” that, unlike everything else, is beyond criticism. And suddenly there is also a “best explanation” for how knowledge grows. What are they based on? Where does certainty, this access to truth, come from?Origenes_{March 7, 2023
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This does not anticipate or address the issue that “no position can be positively justified” is a self-defeating statement.
Can you walk me through that? IOW, I'm suggesting that, at some point, you'll make an assumption that reflects a false dilemma. Popper, from the essay on fallibilism...
The question about the sources of our knowledge . . . has always been asked in the spirit of: ‘What are the best sources of our knowledge—the most reliable ones, those which will not lead us into error, and those to which we can and must turn, in case of doubt, as the last court of appeal?’ I propose to assume, instead, that no such ideal sources exist—no more than ideal rulers—and that all ‘sources’ are liable to lead us into error at times. And I propose to replace, therefore, the question of the sources of our knowledge by the entirely different question: ‘How can we hope to detect and eliminate error?’
Criticism is itself fallible. We lack infallible access to every criticisms that could be applied to find possible errors in an idea. Errors could go undetected for months, years, decades or even never. This includes the idea that knowledge grows via conjecture and criticism. That process is itself a metacontext which is part of the best explanation for how knowledge grows. For example, your criticism regarding the justification of x would be applicable equally to all ideas, so it's unclear how it can be used in a critical way. How can God justify or provide a firm foundation for something unless he too is justified by something else? This is a problem of infinite regress. So, you've simply decided to stop seeking justification at some arbitrary point.critical rationalist_{March 7, 2023
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CR @92
Ori: What is “substantive criticism”, “error correction” and “rational thought” based on? What makes it valid?
CR: You’ll have to be more specific. It’s sounds like you’re asking how are they justified. To which I would reply, they are not in the sense you seem to be implying.
Then tell me, in what sense are they valid? Based on what?
Ori: “No position can be positively justified” is a position.
CR: It is? But that was anticipated and addressed in the quote. You seemed to have missed it.
I‘ve read it, there is nothing there. But let’s have a second look anyway:
First, the stance of critical preference is not a position, it is a metacontext ...
"Metacontext" is a nonsense term, invented as an attempt to escape the unavoidable self-referentiality.
… and as such it is not directed at solving the kind of problems that are solved by adopting a position on some issue or other.
Here it is assumed that something is only a “position” when it is directed at solving problems. Where does this holy truth come from? Clearly “no position can be positively justified” is a position on positions. The position, the stance, on positions is that none of them can be positively justified.
Ori: It cannot be positively justified that “no position can be positively justified.” Yet another self-defeating proposition by Deutsch.
CR: Again, anticipated and addressed… “Second, Bartley does provide guidance on adopting positions; we may adopt the position that to this moment has stood up to criticism most effectively.”
This does not anticipate or address the issue that “no position can be positively justified” is a self-defeating statement.
Origenes_{March 7, 2023
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What is “substantive criticism”, “error correction” and “rational thought” based on? What makes it valid?
You’ll have to be more specific. It’s sounds like you’re asking how are they justified. To which I would reply, they are not in the sense you seem to be implying.
2.) “No position can be positively justified” is a position.
It is? But that was anticipated and addressed in the quote. You seemed to have missed it.
This type of rationality holds all its positions and propositions open to criticism and a standard objection to this stance is that it is empty; just holding our positions open to criticism provides no guidance as to what position we should adopt in any particular situation. This criticism misses its mark for two reasons. First, the stance of critical preference is not a position, it is a metacontext and as such it is not directed at solving the kind of problems that are solved by adopting a position on some issue or other. It is concerned with the way that such positions are adopted, criticised, defended and relinquished.

It cannot be positively justified that “no position can be positively justified.” Yet another self-defeating proposition by Deutsch.
Again, anticipated and addressed…

Second, Bartley does provide guidance on adopting positions; we may adopt the position that to this moment has stood up to criticism most effectively. Of course this is no help for dogmatists who seek stronger reasons for belief, but that is a problem for them, not for exponents of critical preference.

So, this is problematic for you. You’re projecting your problem on me. Again, this is a false dilemma. Also, did you actually read the essay? Here’s a hint. That was not Deutsch.critical rationalist_{March 6, 2023
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CR
Deutsch: Which is why they both abhor institutions of substantive criticism and error correction, and denigrate rational thought as useless or fraudulent.
What is “substantive criticism”, “error correction” and “rational thought” based on? What makes it valid? - - -
Deutsch: According to the stance of critical preference no position can be positively justified
Let's see: 1.) No position can be positively justified 2.) “No position can be positively justified” is a position. From 1.) and 2.) 3.) It cannot be positively justified that “no position can be positively justified.” Yet another self-defeating proposition by Deutsch. - - - - - - -
CR: I’m not the disappointed dogmatist you seem to painting me as.
Perhaps not, but you are a self-defeating hyper-skeptic.Origenes_{March 6, 2023
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So, as a fallibilist, you have reason to doubt fallibilism, that is, you have nothing.
That's a false dichotomy. From the article...
The theory of knowledge is a tightrope that is the only path from A to B, with a long, hard drop for anyone who steps off on one side into “knowledge is impossible, progress is an illusion” or on the other side into “I must be right, or at least probably right.” Indeed, infallibilism and nihilism are twins. Both fail to understand that mistakes are not only inevitable, they are correctable (fallibly). Which is why they both abhor institutions of substantive criticism and error correction, and denigrate rational thought as useless or fraudulent. They both justify the same tyrannies. They both justify each other.
From this essay....
In the light of Bartley's ideas we can discern a number of possible attitudes towards positions, notably those of relativism, dogmatism (called “fideism” in the scholarly literature) and critical preference (or in Bartley's unfortunately clumsy language, “pancritical rationalism”.) Relativists tend to be disappointed dogmatists who realise that positive confirmation cannot be achieved. From this correct premise they proceed to the false conclusion that all positions are pretty much the same and none can really claim to be better than any other. There is no such thing as the truth, no way to get nearer to the truth and there is no such thing as a rational position. Fideists are people who believe that knowledge is based on an act of faith. Consequently they embrace whatever they want to regard as the truth. If they stop to think about it they may accept that there is no logical way to establish a positive justification for their beliefs or any others, so they insist that we make our choice regardless of reason: ”Here I stand!”. Most forms of rationalism up to date have, at rock bottom, shared this attitude with the irrationalists and other fundamentalists because they share the same 'true belief' structure of thought. According to the stance of critical preference no position can be positively justified but it is quite likely that one, (or some) will turn out to be better than others are in the light of critical discussion and tests. This type of rationality holds all its positions and propositions open to criticism and a standard objection to this stance is that it is empty; just holding our positions open to criticism provides no guidance as to what position we should adopt in any particular situation. This criticism misses its mark for two reasons. First, the stance of critical preference is not a position, it is a metacontext and as such it is not directed at solving the kind of problems that are solved by adopting a position on some issue or other. It is concerned with the way that such positions are adopted, criticised, defended and relinquished. Second, Bartley does provide guidance on adopting positions; we may adopt the position that to this moment has stood up to criticism most effectively. Of course this is no help for dogmatists who seek stronger reasons for belief, but that is a problem for them, not for exponents of critical preference.
I'm not the disappointed dogmatist you seem to painting me as.critical rationalist_{March 6, 2023
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Whatever CR, gobbledygook is NOT empirical science.
That's incredibly vague, BA. And so is your appeal to "empirical science", as you seem to be confused about what the role of what empirical observations plays. Anyone can merely call anything gobbledygook. That's applicable to all ideas, so it's unclear how it can be used in a critical way. I can do it to.... "Your comment is gobbledygook, BA. so I'm going to ignore it." See how that works? Or should I say, how it doesn't work? Again, your claim makes a prediction. That paper should contain "gobbledygook" and be "useless". At a minimum it predicts that the biological replication cannot be be reformulated in constructor theory (which tasks are possible, which tasks are impossible, and why) So, why not put your money where your mouth is? That would be a necessary consequence of your claim. You take your own claim seriously, right? First, we can start with my question: If the design of biological replicators do not need to be present in the laws of physics, at the outset, then why would they need to be present in some designer, at the outset?
And believing you are endlessly splitting into a veritable infinity of new David Deutschs every time an electron and/or photon is simply measured is insane. That you try to defend such insanity says more about you than it does about the science.
What's insane about it BA? We've been over this. Many worlds is just taking Schrödinger's wave function of quantum mechanics seriously. That's it. To avoid it, you need to add something to the theory that proposes / explains why observers do not evolve according to the wave function like everything else. IOW, collapse cannot happen unless observers do not evolve according to the wave function, so they can, well, observe the transition. So, by all means, fill in the gap that must exist in quantum mechanics. If not according to Schrödinger's wave function, then how do observers evolve? What the BA "observer function"? Why does it only apply to observers and not everything else? Explain it to us. To use a different perspective, you've appealed to "empirical science." Ok, let's go there. Empirically speaking, the wave function is incredibly accurate at predicting how systems will evolve. So, empirically speaking, why do you think it would be wildly and abruptly inaccurate in regards to observers? That's just what the MWI does. It says the predictions of the wave function extremely accurate in regards to observers as well. We become entangled with the rest of the multiverse. Empirically speaking, predictions of what we observe in regards to the many worlds, vs other interpretations, are empirically indistinguishable. From our perspective, what we would observe would be identical. IOW, in the MWI, breaking the wave function into pieces that appear to us as what we consider individual worlds is merely a convenience for us. There is just the wave function. See this video, which answers many of the questions and confusion about many worlds.critical rationalist_{March 6, 2023
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Deutsch is a fool:
Deitsch: Paradoxes seem to appear when one considers the implications of one’s own fallibility: A fallibilist cannot claim to be infallible even about fallibilism itself. And so, one is forced to doubt that fallibilism is universally true.
So, as a fallibilist, you have reason to doubt fallibilism, that is, you have nothing.
For instance, can it be true that absolutely anything that you think is true, no matter how certain you are, might be false?
No, that cannot be true Deutsch. The statement is incoherent and self-defeating, which shows that fallibilism, like all hyper-skeptical positions, is self-defeating. If the statement is true, then it is not the case that absolutely everything is false. So, if the statement is true, then it is false.Origenes_{March 6, 2023
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Whatever CR, gobbledygook is NOT empirical science. And believing you are endlessly splitting into a veritable infinity of new David Deutschs every time an electron and/or photon is simply measured is insane. That you try to defend such insanity says more about you than it does about the science. This is my last post on the subject. I've got much better things to do today than exchange comments with someone who refuses to be at least semi-rational.bornagain77_{March 6, 2023
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@BA77
Whatever CR,
Yes. Whatever indeed. You seem unwilling to put your money where your mouth is. If what you're saying is true, that would have implications regarding the question I asked, the paper I referenced, etc. Yet, you still haven't addressed it. What gives?
(And he believes this insanity simply to avoid the inference to God!)
Why couldn't God have decided to create the multiverse? This doesn't follow. Of course, this isn't just limited to BA. I wouldn't want to exclude anyone else from joining in on the "fun."critical rationalist_{March 6, 2023
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PM1 at 83, Theories need testing. Math needs testing in actual use. In real life, we see particles accelerated to near the speed of light but not getting heavier along the way. "The Large Hadron Collider is the most powerful accelerator in the world. ... Accelerated to a speed close to that of light, they collide with other protons." Protons have mass.relatd_{March 6, 2023
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I stand corrected. Cosmic ray photons have no intrinsic mass. Other components of cosmic rays do have mass. This still doesn't reflect actually traveling faster than Einstein's speed limit as indicated by PyrrhoManiac1. But, again, that's irrelevant to my point. "Observations" of neutrinos traveling faster than the speed of light did not falsify Einstein's speed limit. Mere observations negating a theory do not reflect a replacement theory. Any replacement would need to need to explain everything the current theory does, in addition to explaining why neutrinos would travel faster than light in the OPERA experiment, but not every other experiment. No such theory was presented. As such it did not replace the existing theory.critical rationalist_{March 6, 2023
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Einstein did math but could conduct no experiments.
Yet his mathematics entailed predictions which were experimentally confirmed, such as stellar parallax.
So, you are saying high energy particles from space actually speed up when striking Earth’s atmosphere?
Of course I'm not saying that -- I'm saying that the light slows down as it passes through atmosphere, which is why the speed of cosmic rays is faster than that of light that is passing through atmosphere.
The more energy it uses the more equivalent mass it has. Again, I don’t think so.
So you're denying that energy is equal to mass times the square of the speed of light?PyrrhoManiac1_{March 6, 2023
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Whatever CR, until you have empirical evidence, you've got nothing but gobbledygook from a delusional man who believes he is endlessly splitting into a veritable infinity of new David Deutschs every time an electron and/or photon is simply measured. (And he believes this insanity simply to avoid the inference to God!) If this is the man who you want to hang your scientific hat on, then, by all means, go for it. But I am, nor is anyone else, obligated to follow you two guys into insanity.bornagain77_{March 6, 2023
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PM1, Another one. Einstein did math but could conduct no experiments. So, you are saying high energy particles from space actually speed up when striking Earth's atmosphere? I don't think so. The more energy it uses the more equivalent mass it has. Again, I don't think so.relatd_{March 6, 2023
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@75
Then explain Cosmic Rays traveling faster than light.
Cosmic rays travel faster than the speed of light in Earth's atmosphere. Passing through air, water, or any other medium slows down how fast light travels. That's consistent with the assumption that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light in a vacuum, which is what Einstein actually said. More specifically, general relativity says that no object with mass can accelerate up to the speed of light in a vacuum -- because the more energy it uses, the more equivalence in mass that it has, which requires more energy, etc. In fact, I think this entails that given infinite energy, any body with mass that was accelerating up to the speed of light in a vacuum would turn into a black hole.PyrrhoManiac1_{March 6, 2023
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Who are you trying to kid? "These high-energy particles arriving from outer space are mainly (89%) protons – nuclei of hydrogen, the lightest and most common element in the universe – but they also include nuclei of helium (10%) and heavier nuclei (1%), all the way up to uranium."relatd_{March 6, 2023
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