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Q: “What does the design theory debate have to do with the law of non-contradiction (LNC)?” A: “A lot!”

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The latest flare-ups in the debates over design theory in and around UD have pivoted on the Law of non-contradiction; one of the most debated classical principles of logic.

Why on earth is that so?

The simple short answer is: if we are to make progress in debates and discussions, we must be at minimum agreed on being reasonable and rational.

In more details, LNC is one of a cluster of first principles of right reason that are pivotal to core rationality, and for years now, debates over design theory issues have often tracked back to a peculiar characteristic of the evolutionary materialist worldview: it tends strongly to reject the key laws of thought, especially, identity, excluded middle and non-contradiction, with the principle of sufficient reason (the root of the principle of causality) coming up close behind.

What is sadly ironic about all of this, is that hose who would overthrow such first principles of right reason do not see that they are sawing off the branch on which we must all sit, if we are to be rational.

Why do I say this?

Let me first excerpt a discussion on building worldviews, as I recently appended to a discussion on quantum mechanics used to try to dismiss the law of non-contradiction:

____________

>>. . . though it is quite unfashionable to seriously say such nowadays (an indictment of our times . . .), to try to deny the classic three basic principles of right reason — the law of identity, that of non-contradiction, and that of the excluded middle — inevitably ends up in absurdity.

For, to think at all, we must be able to distinguish things (or else all would be confusion and chaos), and these laws immediately follow from that first act of thought.

A diagram showing the world split into two distinct labelled parts, A and NOT-A, will help us see how naturally this happens:

Laws of logic in action as glorified common-sense first principles of right reason

If at a given moment we distinctly identify and label some thing, A — say, a bright red ball on a table — we mark a mental border-line and also necessarily identify NOT-A as “the rest of the World.” We thus have a definite separation of the World into two parts, and it immediately and undeniably holds that:

(a) the part labelled A will be A (symbolically, [A => A] = 1),
(b) A will not be the same as NOT-A ( [A AND NOT-A] = 0); and
(c) there is no third option to being A or NOT-A ( [A OR NOT-A] = 1).

So, we see how naturally the laws of (a) identity, (b) non-contradiction (or, non-confusion!), and (c) the excluded middle swing into action. This naturalness also extends to the world of statements that assert that something is true or false, as we may see from Aristotle’s classic remark in his Metaphysics 1011b (loading the 1933 English translation):

. . .   if it is impossible at the same time to affirm and deny a thing truly, it is also impossible for contraries to apply to a thing at the same time; either both must apply in a modified sense, or one in a modified sense and the other absolutely.

Nor indeed can there be any intermediate between contrary statements, but of one thing we must either assert or deny one thing, whatever it may be. This will be plain if we first define truth and falsehood. To say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is false; but to say that what is is, and what is not is not, is true; and therefore also he who says that a thing is or is not will say either what is true or what is false. [Emphases added]

So, we can state the laws in more or less traditional terms:

[a] A thing, A, is what it is (the law of identity);
[b] A thing, A, cannot at once be and not-be (the law of non-contradiction);
[c] A thing, A, is or it is not, but not both or neither (the law of the excluded middle).

In short, the diagram helps take the “mystery” out of the laws, showing us why they make sense. [Cf. responses to objections  here.]  In 1011b, too, Ari gives us a bonus, by aptly defining truth:  to say that what is is, and what is not is not, is true.(As a note for logicians: we are here specifically speaking with reference to the experienced world of credibly real things, so extensions to empty-set contexts in which questions over contrasted empty sets — that is, quite literally: no-thing –  arise, are irrelevant for the moment. That is, we deal here with the classic square of opposition. Then, once we see what follows from dealing with a world of real categories with at least one member each, we may then extend to the case of empty sets and see how much of a difference this possibility makes.)A fourth key law of sound thought is the principle of sufficient reason , which enfolds  the principle of cause and effect. Schopenhauer in his Manuscript Remains, Vol. 4, notes that: Of everything that is, it can be found why it is.”The fire tetrahedron (an extension of the classic fire triangle) is a helpful case to study briefly:

The fire tetrahedron as a model of cause, with a cluster of four necessary, and jointly sufficient causal factors

For a fire to begin or to continue, we need (1) fuel, (2) heat, (3) an oxidiser [usually oxygen] and (4) an un- interfered- with heat-generating chain reaction mechanism. (For, Halon fire extinguishers work by breaking up the chain reaction.) Each of the four factors is necessary for, and the set of four are jointly sufficient to begin and sustain a fire. We thus see four contributory factors, each of which is necessary [knock it out and you block or kill the fire], and together they are sufficient for the fire.

We thus see the principle of cause and effect. That is,

[d] if something has a beginning or may cease from being — i.e. it is contingent — it has a cause.

Common-sense rationality, decision-making and science alike are founded on this principle of right reason: if an event happens, why — and, how? If something begins or ceases to exist, why and how? If something is sustained in existence, what factors contribute to, promote or constrain that effect or process, how? The answers to these questions are causes.

Without the reality behind the concept of cause the very idea of laws of nature would make no sense: events would happen anywhere, anytime, with no intelligible reason or constraint.
As a direct result, neither rationality nor responsibility would be possible; all would be a confused, unintelligible, unpredictable, uncontrollable chaos. Also, since it often comes up, yes: a necessary causal factor is a causal factor — if there is no fuel, the car cannot go because there is no energy source for the engine. Similarly, without an unstable nucleus or particle, there can be no radioactive decay and without a photon of sufficient energy, there can be no photo-electric emission of electrons: that is, contrary to a common error, quantum mechanical events or effects, strictly speaking, are not cause-less.
(By the way, the concept of a miracle — something out of the ordinary that is a sign that points to a cause beyond the natural order — in fact depends on there being such a general order in the world. In an unintelligible chaos, there can be no extra-ordinary signposts, as nothing will be ordinary or regular!)

However, there is a subtle facet to this, one that brings out the other side of  the principle of sufficient reason. Namely, that there is a possible class of being that does not have a beginning, and cannot go out of existence; such are self-sufficient, have no external necessary causal factors, and as such cannot be blocked from existing. And it is commonly held that once there is a serious candidate to be such a necessary being, if the candidate is not contradictory in itself [i.e. if it is not impossible], it will be actual.

Or, we could arrive at effectively the same point another way, one which brings out what it means to be a serious candidate to be a necessary being:

If a thing does not exist it is either that it could, but just doesn’t happen to exist, or that it cannot exist because it is a conceptual contradiction, such as square circles, or round triangles and so on. Therefore, if it does exist, it is either that it exists contingently or that it is not contingent but exists necessarily (that is it could not fail to exist without contradiction). [–> The truth reported in “2 + 3 = 5” is a simple case in point; it could not fail without self-contradiction.] These are the four most basic modes of being and cannot be denied . . . the four modes are the basic logical deductions about the nature of existence.

That is, since there is no external necessary causal factor, such a being — if it is so — will exist without a beginning, and cannot cease from existing as one cannot “switch off” a sustaining external factor. Another possibility of course is that such a being is impossible: it cannot be so as there is the sort of contradiction involved in being a proposed square circle. So, we have candidates to be necessary beings that may not be possible on pain of contradiction, or else that may not be impossible, equally on pain of contradiction.

In addition, since matter as we know it is contingent, such a being will not be material. The likely candidates are: abstract, necessarily true propositions and an eternal mind, often brought together by suggesting that such truths are held in such a mind.

Strange thoughts, perhaps, but not absurd ones.

So also, if we live in a cosmos that (as the cosmologists tell us) seems — on the cumulative balance of evidence — to have had a beginning, then it too is credibly caused. The sheer undeniable actuality of our cosmos then points to the principle that from a genuine nothing — not matter, not energy, not space, not time, not mind etc. — nothing will come. So then, if we can see things that credibly have had a beginning or may come to an end; in a cosmos of like character, we reasonably and even confidently infer that a necessary being is the ultimate, root-cause of our world; even through suggestions such as a multiverse (which would simply multiply the contingent beings) . . . >>

____________

[Added, Feb 21:] Let us boil this down to a summary list of six first principles of right reason in a form we could write out on the back of the proverbial envelope, with a little help from SB:

{{Consider the world:

|| . . . ||

Identify some definite A in it:

|| . . . (A) . . . NOT-A (the rest of the world) . . . ||

Now, let us analyse:

[1] A thing, A, is what it is (the law of identity);

[2] A thing, A, cannot at once be and not-be (the law of non-contradiction). It is worth clipping Wiki’s cites against known interest from Aristotle in Metaphysics, as SB has done above:

1. ontological*: “It is impossible that the same thing belong and not belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect.” (1005b19-20)

[*NB: Ontology, per Am HD etc, is “The branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being,” and the ontological form of the claim is talking about that which really exists or may really exist. Truth is the bridge between the world of thoughts and perceptions and that of external reality: truth says that what is is, and what is not is not.]

2. psychological: “No one can believe that the same thing can (at the same time) be and not be.” (1005b23-24)

3. logical: “The most certain of all basic principles is that contradictory propositions are not true simultaneously.” (1011b13-14)

[3] A thing, A, is or it is not, but not both or neither (the law of the excluded middle).

[4] “to say that what is is, and what is not is not, is true.” (Aristotle, on what truth is)

[5] “Of everything that is, it can be found why it is.” (Principle of sufficient Reason, per Schopenhauer.)

[6] If something has a beginning or may cease from being — i.e. it is contingent — it has a cause.* (Principle of causality, a direct derivative of 5)
_________

*F/N: Principles 5 & 6 point to the possibility of necessary, non contingent beings, e.g. the truth in 2 + 3 = 5 did not have a beginning, cannot come to an end, and is not the product of a cause, it is an eternal reality. The most significant candidate necessary being is an eternal Mind. Indeed, down this road lies a path to inferring and arguably warranting the existence of God as architect, designer and maker — thus, creator — of the cosmos. (Cf Plato’s early argument along such lines, here.)}}

It would seem that the matter is obvious at this point.

Indeed, as UD’s blog owner cited yesterday from Wikipedia, testifying against known predominant ideological interest:

The law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are not separate laws per se, but correlates of the law of identity. That is to say, they are two interdependent and complementary principles that inhere naturally (implicitly) within the law of identity, as its essential nature. To understand how these supplementary laws relate to the law of identity, one must recognize the dichotomizing nature of the law of identity. By this I mean that whenever we ‘identify’ a thing as belonging to a certain class or instance of a class, we intellectually set that thing apart from all the other things in existence which are ‘not’ of that same class or instance of a class. In other words, the proposition, “A is A and A is not ~A” (law of identity) intellectually partitions a universe of discourse (the domain of all things) into exactly two subsets, A and ~A, and thus gives rise to a dichotomy. As with all dichotomies, A and ~A must then be ‘mutually exclusive’ and ‘jointly exhaustive’ with respect to that universe of discourse. In other words, ‘no one thing can simultaneously be a member of both A and ~A’ (law of non-contradiction), whilst ‘every single thing must be a member of either A or ~A’ (law of excluded middle).

The article (which seems to have been around since about 2004) goes on to say:

What’s more, since we cannot think without that we make use of some form of language (symbolic communication), for thinking entails the manipulation and amalgamation of simpler concepts in order to form more complex ones, and therefore, we must have a means of distinguishing these different concepts. It follows then that the first principle of language (law of identity) is also rightfully called the first principle of thought, and by extension, the first principle reason (rational thought).

Schopenhauer sums up aptly:

The laws of thought can be most intelligibly expressed thus:

  1. Everything that is, exists.
  2. Nothing can simultaneously be and not be.
  3. Each and every thing either is or is not.
  4. Of everything that is, it can be found why it is.

There would then have to be added only the fact that once for all in logic the question is about what is thought and hence about concepts and not about real things.  [Manuscript Remains, Vol. 4, “Pandectae II,” §163. NB: Of course, the bridge from the world of thought to the world of experienced reality is that we do live in a real world that we can think truly about. Going further, there are things about that world that are self-evidently true, starting with Josiah Royce’s “Error exists.”]

And again:

Through a reflection, which I might call a self-examination of the faculty of reason, we know that these judgments are the expression of the conditions of all thought and therefore have these as their ground. Thus by making vain attempts to think in opposition to these laws, the faculty of reason recognizes them as the conditions of the possibility of all thought. We then find that it is just as impossible to think in opposition to them as it is to move our limbs in a direction contrary to their joints. If the subject could know itself, we should know those laws immediately, and not first through experiments on objects, that is, representations (mental images). [On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, §33.]

Similarly, Lord Russell states:

1. Law of identity: “Whatever is, is.”

2. Law of noncontradiction: “Nothing can both be and not be.”

3. Law of excluded middle: “Everything must either be or not be.”

(The Problems of Philosophy, p. 72)

The matter should be clear enough, and simple enough.

Sadly, it is not. There are some who would now say, of course you can define a logical world in which this is an axiom and by definition be true but that has nothing to do with reality.

That is why I had to further respond this morning:

____________

>>Let us start with a basic point, as can be seen in the discussion here on in context: the first step in serious thinking about anything, is to make relevant distinctions, so for each such case we divide the world into A and not-A.

(Notice the example of a bright red ball on a table. Or, you can take: Me and not-Me, etc etc. It helps to start with the concrete and obvious so keep that nice red ball you got when you were say 6 months old in mind.)

Once there is a clear distinction, the relevant laws of thought follow directly, let’s illustrate:

World: || . . . ||

On identifying a distinct thing, (A), we distinguish:

|| (A) . . . NOT-A . . . ||

From this seemingly simple and commonsensical act of marking a distinction with a sharp border so to speak, the following follows, once A is indeed identifiably distinct at a given time and place under given circumstances:

(a) the part labelled A will be A (symbolically, [A => A] = 1),

(b) A will not be the same as NOT-A ( [A AND NOT-A] = 0); and

(c) there is no third option to being A or NOT-A ( [A OR NOT-A] = 1).

Or, in broader terms:

[a] A thing, A, is what it is (the law of identity);

[b] A thing, A, cannot at once be and not-be (the law of non-contradiction);

[c] A thing, A, is or it is not, but not both or neither (the law of the excluded middle).

And since there is a tendency to use classical quotes, let me cite one, from Paul of Tarsus, on the significance of all this, even for the very act of speech, the basis for reasoned, verbalised thought:

1 Cor 14:6 Now, brothers, if I come to you and speak in tongues, what good will I be to you, unless I bring you some revelation or knowledge or prophecy or word of instruction? 7 Even in the case of lifeless things that make sounds, such as the flute or harp, how will anyone know what tune is being played unless there is a distinction in the notes? 8 Again, if the trumpet does not sound a clear call, who will get ready for battle? 9 So it is with you. Unless you speak intelligible words with your tongue, how will anyone know what you are saying? You will just be speaking into the air. 10 Undoubtedly there are all sorts of languages in the world, yet none of them is without meaning. 11 If then I do not grasp the meaning of what someone is saying, I am a foreigner to the speaker, and he is a foreigner to me. 12 So it is with you. Since you are eager to have spiritual gifts, try to excel in gifts that build up the church . . .

In short, the very act of intelligible communication pivots on precisely the ability to mark relevant distinctions. Indeed, the ASCII code we use for text tells us one English language alphanumeric character encodes answers to seven yes/no questions, why it takes up seven bits. (The eighth is a check-sum, useful to say reasonably confident that this is accurately transmitted, but that is secondary.)

So, let us get it deep into our bones: so soon as we are communicating or calculating using symbols, textual or aural, we are relying on the oh so often spoken against laws of thought. This BTW, is why I have repeatedly pointed out how when theoretical physicists make the traditional scratches on the proverbial chalk board, these principles are deeply embedded in the whole process.

These are not arbitrary mathematical conventions that can be made into axioms as we please, they are foundational to the very act of communication involved in writing or speaking about such things.

Beyond that all the attempts to wander over this and that result of science in a desperate attempt to deny or dismiss actually rely on what they would dismiss. They refute themselves through self-referential incoherence.

For instance, just now, someone has trotted out virtual particles.

Is this a distinct concept? Can something be and not be a virtual particle under the same circumstances?

If so, the suggested concept is simply confused (try, a square circle or a triangle with six corners); back to the drawing-board.

(But of course there are effects that are traced to their action, so they seem to have reality as entities acting in our world below the Einstein energy-time threshold of uncertainty. The process that leads us to that conclusion is riddled with the need to mark distinctions, and to recognise that distinctions mark distinct things.)

And, BTW, we can extend to the next level. The number represented by the numeral, 2, is real, but it is not itself a physical entity; it just constrains physical entities such that something with twoness in it can be split exactly by the half into equal piles.

Similarly, the truth asserted in the symbolised statement: 2 + 3 = 5 constrains physical reality, but is not itself a material reality built up of atoms or the like. All the way on to 1 + e^pi*i = 0, etc; thence the “unreasonable: effectiveness of ever so much of mathematics in understanding how the physical world works. That is, we have a real, abstract world that can even specify mathematical laws that specify what happens and what will not happen. Even, reliably.

All of this pivots on the significance of marking distinctions.

So, those who seek so desperately to dismiss the first principles of right reason, saw off the branch on which they must sit.

It is a sad reflection on our times, that we so often find it hard to see this.

I know, I know: “But, that’s DIFFERENT!” (I am quoting someone caught up in a cultic system, in response to correcting a logical error.)

No. It is NOT actually different, but if we are enmeshed in systems that make us think errors are true, the truth will — to us — seem to be wrong.

Which is part of why en-darkening errors are ever so entangling.

It takes time and effort for a critical mass of corrections to reach breaking point and suddenly we see things another way. In that process, empirical cases are crucial.

But, there is another relevant saying: experience is a very good teacher, but his fees are very dear. Alas for fools, they will learn from no other.

Sadly, there are yet worse fools who will not even learn from experience, no matter how painful.

But then; it is ever so for those bewitched by clever, but unsound, schemes.

I hope that a light is beginning to dawn.>>

____________

Now, it will come as no surprise to see that I come down on the therapeutic side not the litmus test side of the issue of using the LNC as a test of rationality and fitness to discuss matters.

That is, I hold that this particular confusion is so commonplace that the key issue is to help those enmeshed, recognising that this is going to take time and effort. In that context, it is the specifically, persistently and willfully disruptive, disrespectful, deceitful and uncivil who should face disciplinary action for cause; in defence of a civil forum where important ideas can be discussed civilly. For contrasts on why that is necessary, cf YouTube and the penumbra of anti-ID sites.

Having said that, what is on the table now is rationality itself.

That is how bad things are with our civilisation at the hands of its own intellectual elites.

Do you see why I speak of a civilisation facing mortal danger and all but fatally confused in the face of such peril?

And of course the weapon of choice for the willful confus-ers is to get us to swallow an absurdity. That guarantees loss of ability to discern true from false, sound from unsound, right from wrong. Then, also, when we are told the truth, because we have been led to believe a lie, we will often resist the truth for it will seem to be obviously false.

No wonder, the prophet Isaiah thundered out, nigh on 2800 years ago:

Isa 5:20 Woe to those who call evil good
and good evil,
who put darkness for light
and light for darkness,
who put bitter for sweet
and sweet for bitter.

 21 Woe to those who are wise in their own eyes
and clever in their own sight . . .

We would do well to heed these grim words of warning, before it is too late for our civilisation. END

F/N: For those puzzling over issues raised in the name of quantum theory or the like, I suggest you go here for a first examination.

Comments
I've been reading some discussions about this topic elsewhere, and they have been useful, and in some cases enlightening - I get into these discussions to learn, both from others and from my own attempts to express my thoughts, and so I learn new ways of thinking about things from what others have to say. So here are some further thoughts. Your very questions assumes that there is a absolute link between classical logic and reality, and I've been arguing that that is not the case: there are ways in which classical logic is a very powerful tool, and there are ways where its use hinders our understanding, because of the necessity to dichotomize that it entails. Furthermore, as someone remarked elsewhere, Aristotle's logic presupposes a particular metaphysics in which "things" and "properties" and "existence" are assumed. Modern physics perhaps challenges that metaphysics. Also, as someone else, a different someone else, remarked elsewhere, "it strikes me as a startling hubris to insist a priori that a system of logic devised by Aristotle must be capable of expressing every possible true state of affairs, and that phenomena that are inexpressible within that system therefore cannot exist." In my first post I talked about the difference between a Platonic view and what I called there (surely inaccurately) an Aristotelian view. You are a Platonist in that you believe that logic comes first, and imprints itself upon the world in an incontrovertible way: that logic somehow imposes itself on reality. I believe reality came first, and that logic has been developed to help talk about, and thus understand, that reality - logic has been abstracted out of the nature of the world based on our experiences. If we discover some aspect of reality that doesn't fit a logic built upon ancient metaphysics based on objects and their properties, then so be it. Reality wins, and our logical tools must be amended to help us understand that reality. Again, as I have repeatedly said (and I am absolutely sure there is really no use in saying it again) , it is not the LNC itself that is in question, but rather our use of it in relationship to propositions about the world. You don't even think such a dichotomy exists: for you, if logic says it, reality must follow, but I think there is a difference between logic and its use. If we are willing to look at the world in a way that is compatible with classical logic (which we do virtually all the time), then if we form our propositions carefully, we can use logic to build models of understanding about the world - this process has been highly successful. But modern physics has shown us situations where reality just does not behave "logically", in which case it may be better to adopt a different logical language rather than force our understanding of reality into what is, at the quantum level, an outdated metaphysics.Aleta
February 19, 2012
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--Aleta: "And Stephen, I have answered your definitive questions. See post 58." You did not answer my question. At 58 you finally conceded, with no small amount of prompting, that neither the moon nor Mount Everest nor an ocean can exist and not exist at the same time. That answer will not do since other things exist other than those three. The question is whether the law of non-contradiction pertains to ALL INSTANCES OF THINGS EXISTING IN THE REAL WORLD–(moons, mountains, oceans and EVERYTHING ELSE). Yes or no.StephenB
February 19, 2012
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Another great post by kairosfocus, casting the relentless, cold light of reason into the dim, vague fog of materialist, post-modern thinking.William J Murray
February 19, 2012
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kairosfocus: F/N 1.12: Thereby we know that Islam is correct in all particulars and everything is as Allah (pbuh) will it. If the global plurality or majority (argumentum ad populum) is not sufficient as 'reasonable and responsible' then a definition is needed for which select minority (argumentum my populum) it is that this refers to. F/N 2: Observation of effects that could be caused by something that may or may not exist beyond its pedagogical use as analogous explanans is not the same as observing the cause itself. There's no more pedagogical problem with virtual photons than there is with the Bohr model or Newton's notions. But they are all wrong and known so. As to particle physics it need only be noted that the decay products are outside the statistical bounds entailed by the theory. And thus, if we follow antiquated notions like Michelson and Morely, the theory is false and right where it hurts for this point on photons hanging with Morpheus in the Matrix. If we follow Plato down the rabbit hole in Meno and Theatetus there's a sound point to be made that knowledge proper is a logical account and a demonstration. Without the logical account you may not have knowledge, but you still have a demonstration. Without demonstration you have the Philosophistry at Stanford. With neither you've Dialetheism, which is the running sore in these Laws of Thought posts. F/N 3: We have to ask nothing, we have to show. Which is the point I'm after about Theatetus: If there's no show, then there's no tell. If it is true that there is no Creator God then it is simply true that there is not. If it is true that there is a Creator God then it is simply true that there is. None of the consequents can affirm any absinthe-fueled antecedent that can be dreamed in the reaching minds of men. The cut here is that there is nothing at all the matter with holding any belief, about anything, you like until you start making claims about patent medicine, technological artifacts, economics, law and governance. If you've got something to sell, or something you're forcing Catholics to buy, then it's show n' tell time. Otherwise, keep your conscience as you like. It's noteworthy, perhaps, that I'm doing little more here than bemoaning the same thing that Bacon did in his own day in the Novum Organon. Whether that's just a constant churn in the human experience or a strictly constant feature I wouldn't dare say.Maus
February 19, 2012
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F/N 3: laying out the list of six laws like the above should make the connexion to debates over design theory clear enough. First, that a necessary being credibly lies aback of a contingent cosmos points to the question of what would be a causally sufficient explanation of the credibly contingent and finely tuned for C -chemistry, aqueous medium life we inhabit (and this holds even in the face of multiverse speculations). Second, we have to ask, what is a causally reasonable and adequate explanation of the observed functionally specific, complex organisation and associated information (including digitally coded algorithmic information) in cell based life, on the gamut of our observed cosmos. That something comes from nothing -- non-being -- is not a reasonable explanation. So, explanations that boil down to such, are not credible. In short, at multiple levels, there is no free lunch. KFkairosfocus
February 19, 2012
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F/N 2: Similarly, it seems the question of the reality of virtual particles is on the table. I therefore suggest that we should first consider that exchange forces to create force effects are seen as being due to virtual particles, and that something like the Casimir effect [which has apparently been observed] point to the reality of such particles, even though we may not directly observe them. I should note, too, that the whole province of origins sciences studies the remote and unobserved past, and is seen as scientific. Observability is not to be confused with reality or knowability, though of course it is accompanied by a weaker degree of warrant. Let us clip Sci Am on the Casimir Effect:
To understand the Casimir Effect, one first has to understand something about a vacuum in space as it is viewed in quantum field theory. Far from being empty, modern physics assumes that a vacuum is full of fluctuating electromagnetic waves [which are of course quantised, i.e. photons] that can never be completely eliminated, like an ocean with waves that are always present and can never be stopped. These waves come in all possible wavelengths, and their presence implies that empty space contains a certain amount of energy--an energy that we can't tap, but that is always there. Now, if mirrors are placed facing each other in a vacuum, some of the waves will fit between them, bouncing back and forth, while others will not. As the two mirrors move closer to each other, the longer waves will no longer fit--the result being that the total amount of energy in the vacuum between the plates will be a bit less than the amount elsewhere in the vacuum. Thus, the mirrors will attract each other, just as two objects held together by a stretched spring will move together as the energy stored in the spring decreases. This effect, that two mirrors in a vacuum will be attracted to each other, is the Casimir Effect. It was first predicted in 1948 by Dutch physicist Hendrick Casimir. Steve K. Lamoreaux, now at Los Alamos National Laboratory, initially measured the tiny force in 1996. It is generally true that the amount of energy in a piece of vacuum can be altered by material around it, and the term "Casimir Effect" is also used in this broader context. If the mirrors move rapidly, some of the vacuum waves can become real waves. Julian Schwinger and many others have suggested that this "dynamical Casimir effect" may be responsible for the mysterious phenomenon known as sonoluminescence . . .
And again, the same source, in a second article, argues:
Virtual particles are indeed real particles. Quantum theory predicts that every particle spends some time as a combination of other particles in all possible ways. These predictions are very well understood and tested. Quantum mechanics allows, and indeed requires, temporary violations of conservation of energy, so one particle can become a pair of heavier particles (the so-called virtual particles), which quickly rejoin into the original particle as if they had never been there. If that were all that occurred we would still be confident that it was a real effect because it is an intrinsic part of quantum mechanics, which is extremely well tested, and is a complete and tightly woven theory--if any part of it were wrong the whole structure would collapse. But while the virtual particles are briefly part of our world they can interact with other particles, and that leads to a number of tests of the quantum-mechanical predictions about virtual particles. The first test was understood in the late 1940s. In a hydrogen atom an electron and a proton are bound together by photons (the quanta of the electromagnetic field). Every photon will spend some time as a virtual electron plus its antiparticle, the virtual positron, since this is allowed by quantum mechanics as described above. The hydrogen atom has two energy levels that coincidentally seem to have the same energy. But when the atom is in one of those levels it interacts differently with the virtual electron and positron than when it is in the other, so their energies are shifted a tiny bit because of those interactions. That shift was measured by Willis Lamb and the Lamb shift was born, for which a Nobel Prize was eventually awarded. Quarks are particles much like electrons, but different in that they also interact via the strong force. Two of the lighter quarks, the so-called "up" and "down" quarks, bind together to make up protons and neutrons. The "top" quark is the heaviest of the six types of quarks. In the early 1990s it had been predicted to exist but had not been directly seen in any experiment. At the LEP collider at the European particle physics laboratory CERN, millions of Z bosons--the particles that mediate neutral weak interactions--were produced and their mass was very accurately measured. The Standard Model of particle physics predicts the mass of the Z boson, but the measured value differed a little. This small difference could be explained in terms of the time the Z spent as a virtual top quark if such a top quark had a certain mass. When the top quark mass was directly measured a few years later at the Tevatron collider at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory near Chicago, the value agreed with that obtained from the virtual particle analysis, providing a dramatic test of our understanding of virtual particles . . .
Now what that is saying is in effect that we have warrant for claiming to know that such virtual particles exist and have observable effects. There are of course the usual debates back and forth on warrant and alternative views, but we can see that the evidence is generally held to point to a reality. But in fact even that debate is simply to confirm that the claim virtual particles exists is a potential truth bearer and to show that on balance, physicists assign to it the epistemological value: credibly true, per empirical warrant. Even before we can do such, the very fact that such a thing is a potential reality, means that the relevant laws of thought apply, were used in analysis and were used in evaluating the evidence that warranted the belief that this is real. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
February 19, 2012
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F/N: It seems one of the roots of confusion we must uproot is the difference between what is (or, what was) and what we may or do know about it, how confidently. So, let's note: 1 --> What is or was is a matter of reality. 2 --> To accurately describe reality is to speak the truth -- saying of what is/was that it is/was, and of what is/was not that it is/was not. 3 --> A proposition (in the logical sense) is the implied truth claim in a statement, which may require some appreciation of context and clarification etc. 4 --> A proposition may or may not be accurate to reality, so it would be accordingly true or false. (And of course we may make compound propositions by chaining such together with various connectives.) 5 --> By contrast the state of our knowledge of what is true or false, and the degree of warrant that can or does attach to that knowledge, is a matter of epistemology, not truth proper. That is, for instance, it is possible for something to be true and not known to be true, or for something to be false and not known to be false. 6 --> So, we may properly distinguish -- that dichotomising chop again! -- the question true/false, from the question known/unknown, and the further question, with what degree of warrant. 7 --> The laws of thought in view relate to truth and falsehood, not our degree of knowledge of what is true or false, much less the confidence we have on that. 8 --> And very properly so, for we must be clear that truth and falsity exist before we can ask and seriously answer to what extent do we apprehend such, on what warrant. And indeed the process of warranting is strongly premised on confidence in reality and truth as being accurate to reality. 9 --> So, whether a proposition is true or false has nothing to do with whether we know that it is so, to what degree of confidence. 10 --> And once we know a statement to be a potential truth-bearer, then it will be either true or false, but not both nor neither. 11 --> Going further, we know (as was discussed above yesterday) that propositions, as potentially true assertions about reality, point beyond the world of thought to the world of existence. Indeed a true proposition is one that accurately refers to what is/was etc. 12 --> And, a warranted, credibly true proposition -- something that we can reasonably claim to know, like 2 + 3 = 5, or that water is made up of H2O molecules, or that angular momentum is conserved under relevant circumstances, or that bad money will normally drive good money out of circulation, or that Napoleon was once Emperor of France, or that there was once a figure living among us known as Jesus of Nazareth, who proverbially "suffered under Pontius Pilate" -- is one that a responsible and reasonable person will acknowledge as referring to reality, not just a vapour of thought. 13 --> So also, once we see that labels may be properly and recognisably attached to things that do exist [here we simply choose the label A for convenience], we can see the six key laws of thought attaching to the world of such things by way of accurate reference:
Consider the world: || . . . || Identify some definite A in it: || . . . (A) . . . NOT-A (the rest of the world) . . . || Now, let us analyse: [1] A thing, A, is what it is (the law of identity); [2] A thing, A, cannot at once be and not-be (the law of non-contradiction); [3] A thing, A, is or it is not, but not both or neither (the law of the excluded middle). [4] "to say that what is is, and what is not is not, is true." (Ari, on what truth is) [5] "Of everything that is, it can be found why it is." (Principle of sufficient Reason, per Schopenhauer.) [6] If something has a beginning or may cease from being -- i.e. it is contingent -- it has a cause. (Principle of causality, a direct derivative of 5, which points to the possibility of necessary, non contingent beings, e.g. the truth in 2 + 3 = 5 did not have a beginning, cannot come to an end, and is not the product of a cause, it is an eternal reality. The most significant candidate necessary being is an eternal Mind. Indeed, down this road lies a path to inferring and arguably warranting the existence of God as architect, designer and maker -- thus, creator -- of the cosmos. Cf Plato's early argument along such lines, here.)
14 --> Of course, Schroedinger's poor cat (or the like) may be trotted out to try to make it seem that something can be and not be in the same sense at the same time. But in fact if we were to put an IR camera in the box to record the course of events in that dark chamber [i.e. a passive sensor], at no time would we ever record a ghostly superposition of a living and a dead cat, it would be alive, and if unlucky, once the RA source triggers the hammer to break the vial of prussic acid, we may see it collapse and die. That we, external observers do not know, does not mean that the reality is of an imagined superposition of possibilities; superpositions are real [and as familiar as the stretched, vibrating string with nodes and antinodes], but they are not superpositions of existence and non-existence. (For more on quantum issues, cf here.) ___________ What is or what is not, is different from what we know or may observe about it. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
February 19, 2012
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Dang it! I guess I should clarify "how". Sometimes people take "how" to mean "whether". So, "how" means does it affirm a statement as non-contradictory, or contradictory.Brent
February 18, 2012
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Simple and clear: It is never a question of whether the LNC applies, but only, in some cases, how it applies.Brent
February 18, 2012
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Meaningless schmeaningless! The LNC, I would say, does apply to meaningless statements. That is, either a statement is, or is not, meaningless; not both. If there is disagreement about the meaning, or lack of it, in a statement, it isn't that the LNC doesn't apply, just that we need to make sure the statement is clear. The problem isn't with the LNC applying to a meaningless statement at all. The problem is only in clarifying the statement so that we can see HOW the LNC applies to it; i.e. is it a contradiction in itself, in relation to another statement, or to other truths or facts. Again, as I said in post #19, all Aleta has said is that ambiguous statements are ambiguous statements.Brent
February 18, 2012
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Aleta:
To say that “virtual particles exist” is false would, it seems to me, imply that virtual particles were the kind of thing that potentially could exist, and potentially might not, but to say that “virtual particles exist” is meaningless would imply that existence was just not a property that even potentially is applicable to virtual particles.
"Aleta is a child molester." According to you this claim is not wrong, just meaningless. But if we agree that this claim is wrong, then it is 'false', that it would imply that you were possibly a child molester anyways. So if we say that it is 'false' that you are a child molester then you, by your argument, claim that you are both a child molester and not a child molester. Repudiating the LNC. And if we say that it is 'meaningless', since you are quite obviously not a child molester, then your argument is that the LNC doesn't apply because you are not a child molester. In which case it must be the, LEM by inference, and so you are a child molester. Once again repudiating the LNC. Therefore I accept your argument that you claim you are a child molester. And you accept mine that you are not. And no contradictions were harmed in the typing of this post. Which slightly mischaracterizes your argument. As you will properly note that it only implied that it was 'possible' for you to be a child molester. But if it implies that it is possible, then it also implies that it is possible that you are not. In which case you are neither a child molester nor not a child molester but the superposition of the possibility. Thus, you are and and are not still. Once again repudiating the LNC. Of course an utterance that makes no claim is not a proposition in the first place. While I maintain that a claim is made by putting forth "Aleta is a child molester." your statement is that no claim was made at all. And thereby you have made no claims in this entire thread and will make no claims going forward.
Within logic itself, as opposed to applying logic to the world, the LNC does apply to meaningless statements.
Oops. So much for that then. Therefore, your claim here implies the possibility that the LNC does not apply to meaningless statements. Before we get onto to unclaiming what is unpossible in unlogic we really ought first square away just what you think 'true', 'false' and 'meaningless' are once your equivocations are stripped away.Maus
February 18, 2012
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And Stephen, I have answered your definitive questions. See post 58.Aleta
February 18, 2012
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At the (fairly certain) risk of incurring more of your wrath, maus, there would be, in my layperson's mind, a difference between saying "virtual particles exist" is false and "virtual particles exist" is meaningless. To say that "virtual particles exist" is false would, it seems to me, imply that virtual particles were the kind of thing that potentially could exist, and potentially might not, but to say that "virtual particles exist" is meaningless would imply that existence was just not a property that even potentially is applicable to virtual particles. Also, here's a second point in response to Stephen's remark that "everyone knows that the law of non-contradiction cannot be applied to meaningless statements." Within logic itself, as opposed to applying logic to the world, the LNC does apply to meaningless statements. In fact, within logic itself, the meaning of a proposition is irrelevant. The statements (the moon exists and the moon does not exist) and (fuddledoms are beeble and fuddledoms are not beeble) are entirely equivalent statements within logic itself: they are just examples of (A and~A) in which if A is true, ~A is false, and vice versa, without any concern for whether A is something that, in the real world, could even have a truth value attached to it.Aleta
February 18, 2012
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Aleta, I notice that you continue to avoid my definitive question, which I have asked, or alluded to, at least five times, comfirming your unwillingness to dialogue in good faith. You have proven by your evasive silence that you do not accept the Law of Non-Contradiction, in spite of your rhetorical claims to the contrary. I had no trouble penetrating your linguistic fog.StephenB
February 18, 2012
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Aleta:
So if it were decided that “virtual particles exist” were a meaningless proposition – that existence as we understand it for all other objects just didn’t apply, then the statement “virtual particles exist and virtual particles don’t exist” would be meaningless, not false: that is, the LNC wouldn’t apply to the statement.
If it was decided that 'exist' as we understand it for all other objects did not apply to virtual particles then it is not true that 'virtual particles exist'. It's not a meaningless statement, it is simply false.[1] And you are once again denying the LNC out one side of your neck while claiming you don't on the other. Which is no problem since that's merely a dialetheia and thus it is proven that the LNC doesn't hold, eh? So far you've demonstrated that you are ignorant of Aristote, ignorant of the underpinning of Frege's work with First-Order logic, and have yet to demonstrate that you even have a passing familiarity with Hilbert deductions bolted on top of Frege's baby. What you have demonstrated is repudiation of the LNC, ignoratio elenchi, fallacies of change of subject and many question. So it's well past the time that you be continually treated as honest but misguided. So since you have such a happy hook on empiricism and evidence then it is time for you to prove that you are not thoroughly mendacious: Put or up or shut up, produce a valid example, a single witness or piece of evidence, to support your claims. [1] Post script here is that you're equivocating, also a fallacy.Maus
February 18, 2012
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Stepehn writes, "Oh for crying out loud people, everyone knows that the law of non-contradiction cannot be applied to meaningless statements." So if it were decided that "virtual particles exist" were a meaningless proposition - that existence as we understand it for all other objects just didn't apply, then the statement "virtual particles exist and virtual particles don't exist" would be meaningless, not false: that is, the LNC wouldn't apply to the statement. Is that a correct conclusion based on what you wrote, Stephen?Aleta
February 18, 2012
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Thanks Stephen, appreciated. No worries, I didn't take your comment that way. I understood you to be commenting specifically on meaningless statements' applicability to the LNC. m.i.material.infantacy
February 18, 2012
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I should point out that the exasperation I expressed at 77 was not, in any way, directed at material.infantacy. On the contrary, my post just happened to follow his. On the contrary, his remarks were relevant, well written, and spot on.StephenB
February 18, 2012
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Aleta:
But what if A is meaningless: what if A is a proposition that has no truth value in respect to the real world? What can we say then?
That the proposition: "A is a proposition" is false. And that the alternate proposition "It is not the case that A is a proposition." is true.
The same thoughts apply to propositions about the real world that may be true, or may not: they may be incomplete, ambiguous, possibly true but unverified yet, etc.
There is no possibly true, incompletely true, or ambiguously true. If it is correct in all its particulars then it is true. If not then it is false. And a separate discussion can be had about all the myriad ways it could be false.
As long as they don’t have a truth value, they can’t be incontrovertibly represented by a logical formalism included the LNC.
LP, K3 and other ternary logics that include a 'z' state for "indeterminate/malformed/unknown" still obey the LNC. You're again inventing problems long solved and making appeal to the impossibility of the existence of solutions despite those solutions existing. Not that these are necessary unless you attempt to assign truth-values to things that aren't truth-bearers in the first place. A necessary problem for databases only.
This is what I’ve meant by building models of the real world: we built up a set of propositions that we have evidence to believe are true, both because of empirical evidence and because that when they are treated as true, they “hang together” logically with other evidence and other propositions that we believe are true.
We believe, each of us individually, what we believe because we believe it. There is at no time a need for empiricism, "evidence", peer pressure or cohesiveness. It is also nowhere near factual -- that is empirical or evidentiary as you like -- that human beings avoid contradictory beliefs. Your argument in this thread is evidence for that if you demand it for yourself.Maus
February 18, 2012
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"pertains" above = pertainStephenB
February 18, 2012
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Scott Andrews 2, Kuartus The issue of ambiguity and imprecise meaning with respect to the LNC has been dealt with elsewhere. Here is an example from another thread: --David: --“Is ID essentially religious?” StephenB :You are not effectively using the language to express your meaning, possibly because you don’t know very much about ID. If you mean ID science, the answer is no. Also, the word “essentially” is ambiguous. It leaves too much room for interpretation, which does not lend itself to deductive analysis. --”This question LOOKS like a straightforward yes or no question, but it’s far from one. What do we mean by “essentially” or by “religious”? These questions matter. To paraphrase one Supreme Court justice, reasonable, intelligent and knowledgeable people can legitimately disagree about the meaning of all but the most trivial statements. And what’s discussed here is certainly not trivial.” StephenB: The question was not properly crafted. No would could possibly discern its (your) meaning. If you are asking, “Does ID methodology assume, presuppose, or depend on religious faith in any way,” then the answer is no. That question can be tested for logical validity. ID methodology either presupposes religious faith or it doesn’t. There is no excluded middle ground. If you could show, for example, how ID methodology does presuppose, or depend on, or assume religious faith, you would prove conclusively that my claim is false. --“In the case of Jupiter, this is very true. But instead of Jupiter, let’s substitute things like “justice” or “God” or “the greatest good for the greatest number.” There is without question considerable ambiguity as to whether such things “exist” in any absolute sense.” StephenB: Again, one must know something about the subjects being discussed. I would have no difficulty applying the law of non-contradiction to any of them. Examples: Plato wrote about Justice in the “Republic.” Either he did or he didn’t. It can’t be both. According to Christian tradition, a Divine God took on a human nature. Either He did or he didn’t. It can’t be both. Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism. That statement is either true or false. It cannot be both true and false. So the issue of meaningless or ambiguous statements has been dealt with elsewhere. The question on the table, which is the question for Aleta is this: Does the law of non-contradiction pertains to ALL INSTANCES OF THINGS EXISTING IN THE REAL WORLD–WITHOUT EXCEPTION. Yes or no. After all this time, I think I deserve an answer.StephenB
February 18, 2012
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Oh for crying out loud people, everyone knows that the law of non-contradiction cannot be applied to meaningless statements. I have made that point many times on other threads. It is a distraction and an obfuscation. There is nothing at all subtle about that point. The question is whether the law of non-contradiction pertains to ALL INSTANCES OF THINGS EXISTING IN THE REAL WORLD--WITHOUT EXCEPTION. All Aleta has to do is say "yes," and the matter will be settled. She refuses to acknowledge the point.StephenB
February 18, 2012
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"...I just don’t get the problem."
Scott, my take is, one cannot reason without the LNC. So when exceptions to the law are invoked, it seems quickly forgotten that one cannot reason about exceptions to the law without making use of the law. It's not a matter of whether one can apply an objective standard of "true" and "false" to every situation without error or inaccuracy. It's a question about whether any perception of an aspect of reality can sidestep analysis and evaluation which relies on the LNC in order to occur. I believe the problem here, is that one cannot "choose" whether or not to apply the LNC. It is assumed in our reasoning; and any observation about anything, anywhere, is based on reasoning. When it comes to making observations, there are not two domains, the logical and the actual. Every observation we make about reality must pass through perception; and perception itself relies upon the laws of reason. If one reasons that the LNC does not apply in some cases, because reality is different from our perception of it, one has committed two errors. The first is assuming that any observation of reality can be made independent of perception. The second is assuming that by making use of reasoning one can rationally choose whether or not to apply the LNC. I'm fairly new to this subject, so I may have missed the mark. However since "true = true", and "true != false", and "false = false" cannot be proved, it must be taken as axiom (rational) or disregarded altogether (irrational). It cannot be selectively applied, because attempting to do so invokes the very axiom being toyed with. The LNC is not merely a tool that we can make use of in order to aid our reasoning -- it is the very foundation of that reasoning. The LNC does not proceed from our ability to reason. Our ability to reason proceeds from the wisdom embodied in the LNC. Either the laws of reason have dominion over all perception and observation, or we cannot trust perception in the slightest. There exists truth, and there exists falsehood. If one believes such, then reason, hence the LNC, precedes perception / observation / evaluation every time, without equivocation. There is no way to trust perception -- or assign any truth value to an observation -- without assuming the laws of reason. Once we attempt to evaluate anything we observe, the LNC has already spoken. It cannot be denied.material.infantacy
February 18, 2012
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I may as well sum up this problem: Aleta, the problem is that, at some point, you bought into the epistemological skepticism that teachers in the secular academy inculcate into their students. Unfortunately and decisively, they persuaded you that the “map” is not a reliable indicator of the “territory.” Granted, the map is not a “perfect” indicator, but that is another matter. You are confusing reliability with perfection. In fact, our minds provide us with a reliable image of the essence of the physical entities we experience through our senses. If think you are looking at a tree, that is because you are looking at a tree, not just a organic pile of wood standing tall. Your knowledge of that tree may not be perfect, but it is reliable in the sense that you rightly perceive that you are looking at a tree. To know that the Law of non-contradiction pertains to every instance in the real world, one needs only to possess a reliable map, not a perfect map. You have been trained to believe that the mind, or your mental map, is unreliable-- that if forms arbitrary images of “whatever kind of thing may be out there.” For that reason, you perceive an unduly wide gap between the map and the territory.StephenB
February 18, 2012
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@Aleta, Your last comment sounds reasonable. Its like the statement, "This sentence is false." The sentence itself is not referring to a class of thing which can be true or false. It has no content about the world. It makes about as much sense as saying, " this coffee mug is false." The only sense i can make of it if it indeed does have real content,would be that it means," This sentence is not real" in which case it would be false and would not lead to any paradox. As it is usually formulated, "this sentence is false" is meaningless since there is nothing in the sentence which can be verified to be true or false and therefore saying it is one or the other is nonsense. I note that some philosophers have tried to use the liar paradox as well as the ambiguity of language as a means to dispense with the LNC. Just take a look at the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy page on dialetheism. They fail in my opinion. If what you were trying to say all along was that you cant meaningfully apply the lnc to meaningless statements, then I agree and I do believe this debate was unnecessary.kuartus
February 18, 2012
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I had thought I was done with this discussion, but someone elsewhere made a comment about the topic that gave me a new thought, and perhaps a better way of making one of the points I was trying to make. So giving that I will be archiving this thread to preserve my thoughts and the arguments of others, for the record here is an additional point: In logic, the LNC can be stated as (A and ~A) = false. Let's look at this from a truth table point of view. The LNC is a conjunction: two statements connected by "and." As we all know, the truth table for a conjunction is "T and T = T", and all other combinations (TF, FT, and FF) = F. Further more, the truth table for negation is "A = T ==> ~A = F" and vice versa. Therefore, the LNC can be seen as a combination of the rules for a conjunction and for negation: if A is true, the LNC is (T and F), which is F, and if A is false, the LNC is (F and T), which is also F. This is pure symbolic logic, and I don't think there are any problems or uncertainties about it. Now let us apply this to the real world, where A is a proposition about the real world. Of course, the same reasoning applies: if A is true, ~A is false, and the LNC holds, and vice versa is A is false. But what if A is meaningless: what if A is a proposition that has no truth value in respect to the real world? What can we say then? All we can say, I think, is that if we knew that A was true or false, then the LNC would hold, but as long as A is meaningless, it is meaningless to even apply the LNC. Only statements which can be assigned a truth value can be represented within the logical framework described above. If A is meaningless, so is ~A, and (A = meaningless and ~A = meaningless) is meaningless, not false. The same thoughts apply to propositions about the real world that may be true, or may not: they may be incomplete, ambiguous, possibly true but unverified yet, etc. As long as they don't have a truth value, they can't be incontrovertibly represented by a logical formalism included the LNC. That is, and this is a point I made earlier, with additional clarity (to me) in light of this discussion. 1. Within the world of logic, the LNC is absolutely and always true, because in that world, A is a proposition that is either true or false. 2. In the application of logic to real-world, the LNC can apply only if proposition A can be meaningfully said to be true or false. This is in fact how we use logic to investigate the real world. We create a hypothesis about something we think might be true. We then consider it as true, and thus make it subject to the laws of logic, which are only about propositions which are true or false. Then we manipulate the logic to reach new conclusions. Then we go out in the world and test those conclusions. If they also appear to be true, or in fact seem very certainly to be true, then we have evidence that our original proposition is true. The more certain we are about the truth value of our propositions, the more they properly they come under the domain of logic. This is what I've meant by building models of the real world: we built up a set of propositions that we have evidence to believe are true, both because of empirical evidence and because that when they are treated as true, they "hang together" logically with other evidence and other propositions that we believe are true. Thanks to the person who stimulated these thoughts.Aleta
February 18, 2012
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Oh sure. It’s just a coincidence that everyone here formed the wrong impression and that you were simply misunderstood at every step all along the way.
Who is "everyone?" Aleta seems to be making some very, very finely hair-splitting point, while repeating acceptance of the LNC over and over. And that point doesn't seem to have any direct bearing on matters related to design, evolution, or origins. Granted, I can be really slow to catch on, but I just don't get the problem.ScottAndrews2
February 18, 2012
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Aleta: So I think I pretty clearly, “early on”, stated --"a) my support for the LNC, and --b) my interest in another question concerning the difference about logical rules about propositions and the nature of the propositions themselves in respect to the real world." Yes, I know. [b] was meant to cancel out [a] so that you could try to have it both ways. You accept the Law of NonContradiction as a non-negotiable rule for the "map", but not for the "territory" That is why you made the distinction in the first place. When pressed for an example of how the territory confounds the map, you introduced the "mountain" as an example--an exception to the LNC in the real world. But when you were called on it, you reversed your position and admitted that it does, indeed, conform to the rule after all, claiming to have been misunderstood all along. What nonsense. I provided you with the opportunity to clear things up when I said this: "To put this thing behind us, all you have to do is say that the LNC is universally applicable, meaning that it applies to every instance in the real world–no exceptions." An intellectually honest person would have responded to that request because it is a requirement for the LNC. As we know, though, you reject the point, but you will not be forthcoming and say so. Clearly, you believe that there are exceptions, but strategically you feel compelled to remain silent about your convictions on the matter. Rhetorically, you say that you accept the LNC, but in reality you reject its universal application. Everything else you write is calculated to obfuscate. Naturally, faded glory agrees with you and defends you. Why wouldn't he? He is in the same camp and is the last person that would call you out.StephenB
February 18, 2012
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to faded glory Thanks for the feedback and support. I agree with almost all of your post: the main topic for me is the way in which our maps, or models, of the universe, which depend on creating categories which have sharp boundaries in accordance with the nature of logic, are or are not adequate representations of reality, with an emphasis on the ways in which this makes it hard for us to talk about and understand things which have fuzzy boundaries, or which exist over a continuous spectrum in respect to some quality. (Long sentence, I know, but this is a recap before I get out of here.) However, I don't agree that I was trying to argue that virtual particles were somehow exempt from the LNC. The original arguments that happened before I starting posting on Thursday had been about applying the LNC to statements about existence, and previous posters (apparently - I didn't read any of those previous posts) had mentioned quantum states. This summer I read a lot about this topic: Feynman's "QED", "Shrodinger's Cat" and Schrodinger's Kittens" by Gribbin, "The Hunting of the Quark" by Riordan, and "Dreams of a Final Theory" by Weinberg. All of these people, deeply familiar with the topic, had interesting things to say about how QM raises issues about what is reality at the quantum level and what is the nature of our knowledge about that reality. So when I was discussing virtual particles here, I was not questioning the logical validity of "virtual particles exist and do not exist" - that is logically impossible. Rather I was discussing the real world meaning of "exist" and wondering whether it is a concept that we can cleanly apply to virtual particles. In my first post back on Thursday, I wrote,
In this case, then, if one were to ask if it possible to say "that a virtual particle can exist and not exist at the same time", I would say this: within the world of logic where A = "a virtual particle exists", the proposition is logically impossible, but as a statement about the real world that statement is problematic and uncertain, not because the logic is faulty (the LNC can't be wrong), but because the model we have between our logical constructs and the real world is inadequate.
So note, I was not even here saying there was a problem with the LNC - I was saying that the proposition A = "a virtual particle exists" might have fuzzy boundaries, not clearcut ones, in a way unlike anything in the macro world. So, again, fg, nice seeing the virtual you here on the internet, and thanks for your comments.Aleta
February 18, 2012
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Stephen writes, "On the other hand, if, as you say, your concerns were of a “different nature,” then you should have emphasized the fact early on" I did. The second line of my first long post on the subject was "I’d like to provide what is perhaps a broader perspective on the subject, or one that at least adds a few more elements to the discussion." Major sentences in the ensuing post were things like
"The LNC is a truth about propositions in the abstract, as elements of a logical system, as opposed to the truth or meaningfulness of the propositions themselves as they relate to the world."
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"So the point is not whether logic is true or not (there is no doubt about the logical validity of the LNC),but rather what is the relationship between logic and the world, and/or what is the nature of our use of logic as we investigate the world."
So I think I pretty clearly, "early on", stated a) my support for the LNC, and b) my interest in another question concerning the difference about logical rules about propositions and the nature of the propositions themselves in respect to the real world. I won't summarize the rest of the post, but I will repeat that you have been consistent in not getting, for whatever reason (I won't repeat the possibilities for those, either) the distinctions I wanted to discuss, being focused as you have been on thinking I was attacking something I was not. I will agree with you that further discussion is a waste of time, though - I need to move on with my life.Aleta
February 18, 2012
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