Uncommon Descent Contest 19: Spot the mistakes in the following baffflegab explanation of intelligent design theory

_{Denyse O'Leary

December 26, 2009

Contests}

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In a review in First Things by David B. Hart, of Richard Dawkins’s The Greatest Show on Earth, we are informed – on the mag’s cover – that Dawkins “gets a gold star” for his book of that name (January 2010 Number 199).

Indeed, he does get the gold star from reviewer Hart. Hart is full of praise for Dawkins, though daintily demurs at his hardline atheism. But he is a total, unwavering convert to the greatest scam ever conceived in the history of biology, that Darwinism – a conservative aspect of wild nature that trims out life forms unsuited to an ecology – actually has vast creative powers.

I can’t yet seem to find the review on line, but that was not for lack of trying.

Now the contest: Here’s what Hart has to say about design in nature:

The best argument against ID theory, when all is said and done, is that it rests on a premise – irreducible complexity” – that may seem compelling at the purely intuitive level but that can never logically be demonstrated. At the end of the day, it is – as Francis Collins rightly remarks – an argument from personal incredulity. While it is true that very suggestive metaphysical arguments can be drawn from the reality of form, the intelligibility of the universe, consciousness, the laws of physics, or (most importantly) ontological contingency, the mere biological complexity of this or that organism can never amount to an irrefutable proof of anything other than the incalculable complexity of that organism’s phylogenic antecedents.

Commenters, for a free copy of Expelled, can you spot the mistakes in the quoted passage above? I mean, actual mistakes, as opposed to “He isn’t making any sense.” There is enough of the former, but you will find plenty of the latter too, I am afraid.

Here are the contest rules. Most important: No more than 400 words.

Also: If you won a previous contest quite recently and your prize is late, it is most likely because our post office here has four days off at this time of year, and I can’t do a thing about that. If you won a long time ago and never got your prize, write me at oleary@sympatico.ca

Note: This contest has been judged. Go here for more.

Comments

Zachriel: If the balls had characteristics outside the realm of physical laws, then the ape creatures wouldn’t be able to make them. Upright Biped Perhaps you could have missed the point by a wider margin, but I am not sure how. So I’ll ask again: What characteristics of a red plastic ball exist outside the realm of physical laws?
If the balls had characteristics outside the realm of physical laws, then the ape creatures (Hominoidea) wouldn’t be able to make them. The answer was clearly none.Zachriel_{January 1, 2010
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Paul Giem, Your post at #111 is excellent. Your analogy to the change in plea by the villian is perfectly placed.Upright BiPed_{January 1, 2010
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Zach: "A lot of red balls are made by a peculiar species of terrestrial ape creatures for their juveniles." Perhaps you could have missed the point by a wider margin, but I am not sure how. So I'll ask again: What characteristics of a red plastic ball exist outside the realm of physical laws?Upright BiPed_{January 1, 2010
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Mustela, The following link explains what I'm talking about. It is David Chalmer's "hard problem of consciousness." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness Here are some quotes that get at the problem. Gottfried Leibniz wrote: Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.[3] Isaac Newton wrote in a letter to Henry Oldenburg: to determine by what modes or actions light produceth in our minds the phantasm of colour is not so easie.[4] T.H. Huxley remarked: how it is that any thing so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as the result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp"Collin_{January 1, 2010
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Zachriel:
A lot of red balls are made by a peculiar species of terrestrial ape creatures for their juveniles.
No ape has ever been observed to make red balls. Only humans do that and only people who want to be related to apes say that we are related. Ya see there still isn't any scientific data which demonstrates that the transformations required are even possible. But I understand that you have to put the cart before the horse. And BTW natural laws alone did not create those red balls. But thank you for once again proving that you cannot follow along.Joseph_{January 1, 2010
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Zachriel:
Methodological Naturalism is just that, a methodology. It means not proposing vaguely defined, unevidenced and extraneous entities to explain events, such as what have often been considered supernatural forces (gods, spirits, ghosts, demons, magic).
1- ID does not require the supernatural 2- There is evidence for design. That you refuse to see it does not mean anything to us. 3- If you could support your claims then ID would go away.
Science rules out vaguely defined, unevidenced and extraneous entities.
It is quite clear that the ONLY evidence you will accept is a meeting with the designer(s). IOW Zachriel is NOT interested in science. And by Zach's "logic" the theopry of evolution should have been ruled out long ago. ToE is vaguely defined. There isn't any evidence that the transformations required are even possible. It relies on Father Time, Mother Nature and magical mystery mutations.Joseph_{January 1, 2010
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Whoops: The last paragraph should have the words "is obtained" omitted.Paul Giem_{December 31, 2009
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To come back to the point of this post, we were asked to critique the comment,
The best argument against ID theory, when all is said and done, is that it rests on a premise – irreducible complexity” – that may seem compelling at the purely intuitive level but that can never logically be demonstrated. At the end of the day, it is – as Francis Collins rightly remarks – an argument from personal incredulity. While it is true that very suggestive metaphysical arguments can be drawn from the reality of form, the intelligibility of the universe, consciousness, the laws of physics, or (most importantly) ontological contingency, the mere biological complexity of this or that organism can never amount to an irrefutable proof of anything other than the incalculable complexity of that organism’s phylogenic antecedents.
My reply: There are several problems with this paragraph. For example, there is the idea that ID rests on the premise of irreducible complexity. In fact, the origin of life is a far stronger foundation for ID (see Signature in the Cell), and the Privileged Planet hypothesis does not need irreducible complexity. Another problem is the difficulty with the last sentence. If the "biological complexity" of an organism is "an irrefutable proof" of the "incalculable complexity" of its progeniters, and their progenitors had it, and so forth, did the incalculable complexity come from an originally "Incalculably complex" organism which arose spontaneously, or was the "irrefutable proof" somehow violated somewhere, or multiple times? Or does the concession constitute a proof of ID, in spite of the author's protestations? But the part of the argument that stands out as the worst is the assertion that irreducible complexity "may seem compelling at the purely intuitive level but that can never logically be demonstrated." At this point I feel like I'm watching a movie, where the villain has been tracked down by the detectives who have put the clues together, and suddenly switches from pretending innocence to saying, "You can't prove a thing!" He has now lost the audience (including any remaining doubt in the detectives). All that remains is the power play and the legal maneuvering. We now know the truth of his villainy to a moral certainty. Science has never been about proof, and those who expect to attack ID because it can't be proved have committed a category error. The fact that they have to resort to this kind of argument suggests a fundamental weakness in their position. Nor is the appeal to the supposed fallacy of "personal incredulity" helpful. What is the opposite? "Personal credulity?" If the contest is between faith and skepticism, it would seem that the proper scientific attitude would be skepticism. There are other mistakes, but this belief that ID must be wrong until it can "logically be demonstrated" is obtained is the worst. If that's the "best argument against ID theory", then ID has it made.Paul Giem_{December 31, 2009
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Zachriel: “Methodological Naturalism presumes the non-existence of supernatural causes” Upright BiPed: This is odd. Just yesterday on another thread (you were invovled in) we were told by your side that science “denies nothing”. Of course, you are not responsible for other’s comments, but given the stickler you are for statements of truth in these matters, I might have expected a correction coming from you. Perhaps you are scientific and selectively vigilant at the same time.
Zachriel's "side?" Do you mean those whose comments are unnecessarily delayed with cryptic messages about being moderated? Please read the comments preceding this for clarification about the distinction between natural and supernatural.Zachriel_{December 31, 2009
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Upright Biped: What characteristics of a red plastic ball exist outside the realm of physical laws?
A lot of red balls are made by a peculiar species of terrestrial ape creatures for their juveniles. They do so by harnessing physical laws, including work and energy. If the balls had characteristics outside the realm of physical laws, then the ape creatures wouldn't be able to make them.Zachriel_{December 31, 2009
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StephenB: Methodological naturalism does more than presume the non-existence of supernatural causes, which, of course, are undefined and therefore, irrelevant, it also falsely characterizes the design inference as an invocation to that very same supernatural element that they left undefined.
Methodological Naturalism is just that, a methodology. It means not proposing vaguely defined, unevidenced and extraneous entities to explain events, such as what have often been considered supernatural forces (gods, spirits, ghosts, demons, magic).
StephenB: If demons and other supernatural elements are irrelevant to the scientific process, why do Darwinists keep injecting the subject into the dicsussion. ID methodology does not address the issue one way or another.
Science has historically been defined in terms of casting off vaguely defined, unevidenced and extraneous entities. Demons were once thought to cause disease, for instance, and are commonly used as an example of a vaguely defined, unevidenced and extraneous entity.
StephenB: Why should science rule out demons, or Gods, or anything else.
Science rules out vaguely defined, unevidenced and extraneous entities.Zachriel_{December 31, 2009
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Mustela Nivalis (#81) Thank you for your post, and sorry for my delay in responding to you. I shall now endeavor to address your key points. In response to my earlier question as to whether critiques of, and debates about, the scientific method, could be understood within the framework of the scientific method, you wrote:
The essence of the scientific method is testability. To the extent that critiques of anything are testable, either against logic or objective, empirical evidence, they are subject to the scientific method.
Three points in reply: 1. Testability alone does not and cannot define the scientific method. It's too vague. At any given point in history, the scientific method is defined in terms of a particular set of recognized procedures that are considered appropriate for testing hypotheses. Over the course of time, scientists (and philosophers of science) may need to subject these procedures to further criticism and refinement. When they do so, they are stepping outside the scientific method as it is defined at that point in time. 2. Insofar as one can speak of appropriate procedures for critiquing a method for testing hypotheses, it should be clear that what counts as an appropriate procedure for critiquing a method for testing hypotheses is not the same as what counts as an appropriate procedure for testing a hypothesis. The former is one level "up" from the latter. That's what I meant when I wrote that meta-science could not be explained within the framework of science. 3. If I read you aright, you seem to be suggesting that the notion of a test is an "uber-concept" that serves as a yardstick for judging the validity of all other concepts. However, I do not think that this approach to science could possibly work. For in order to answer the question of what constitutes a good test, you would first need to know something about the world in which you were performing your tests - i.e. the framework of reality, or structure of the world. In other words, questions about what makes a good test presuppose at least a rudimentary grasp of metaphysics. That has to come first. Scientists need to explore the world and try to understand it before they can think of a good way of testing hypotheses about events occurring in it. You also wrote:
Humans can certainly come up with all kinds of wild ideas that have nothing to do with reality. The process by which they come up with them, though, is (as far as anyone has been able to tell) constrained by chemistry and physics in a physical brain.
I agree with you that the process whereby we come up with ideas (or concepts) is constrained by our brains. "Constrain" is not the same thing as "determine," however. A necessary condition is not a sufficient one. I accept that the brain's role in formulating concepts is not merely a negative one, which is why I think the "radio tuner" analogy for the brain, which is popular with interactionist dualists, does not do the brain justice. The brain does play a real part in the creation of our concepts. However, I also think that the materialist view that the brain originates concepts is mistaken. What I am suggesting is that the brain serves as a storehouse for schemata - physical constructs which help us to think about various kinds of things, using very simple spatial, kinetic and temporal imagery. The Scholastics referred to these schemata as phantasms. Schemata or phantasms are kept in the brain in some fashion, but the critical process of creating and reviewing these schemata (e.g. when I update my concepts in the light of new scientific knowledge) is not a physical one. Why not? Well, concepts are not just generalizations from our observations; they are normative. They serve as rules for thinking about various kinds of objects in the world. If we wish to think aright, we will endeavor to conform our concepts to the reality which is out there. The act of endeavoring to be faithful to reality is a formal one, which reflects an underlying attitude that reality is somehow normative and that our mental concepts must fit it. No material object or process can be identical with a normative rule. That would be a category mistake. Finally, you asked (#100)
What characteristics of your bodily movements act outside the realm of physical laws?
None. My point was that laws operate something like the rules of a chess game: they limit but do not determine the moves. I see no reason - scientific or otherwise - to believe that determinism is true, so I stand by my assertion that my decision to lift a pen is not explained by the laws of physics. Perhaps one might be tempted to think so in a Newtonian clockwork universe, but we know that this is not the universe in which we actually live.vjtorley_{December 31, 2009
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Zachriel: “Methodological Naturalism presumes the non-existence of supernatural causes" This is odd. Just yesterday on another thread (you were invovled in) we were told by your side that science "denies nothing". Of course, you are not responsible for other's comments, but given the stickler you are for statements of truth in these matters, I might have expected a correction coming from you. Perhaps you are scientific and selectively vigilant at the same time. But not to worry, we all knew it was BS.Upright BiPed_{December 31, 2009
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@103 should read: Methodological naturalism does more than presume the non-existence of supernatural causes, which, of course, are undefined and therefore, irrelevant, it also falsely characterizes the design inference as an invocation to that very same supernatural element that they it left undefined. That is irrational.StephenB_{December 31, 2009
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vjt: "Very briefly: the laws of physics constrain but do not determine my bodily movements. They prevent me from moving the pen in certain ways, but they do not determine the way in which I actually move it. Hence they do not explain the lifting of a pen as such." mv: "Why not? What characteristics of your bodily movements act outside the realm of physical laws?" - - - - - May I ask a question? A red plastic ball does not exist outside the physical laws that govern the carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and sulfur that make up its constituent matter. But neither does that matter explain its existence. Not only is the material itself a synthesized compound (requiring many indpendent steps to create it) but there is nothing in its physical atomic properties that would cause it to form a sphere and dye itself red. Clearly, something "else" has been instantiated into the matter of its existence, which itself follows the physical laws that govern it. Something determined it beyond the laws that describe the materials it is made of. What characteristics of a red plastic ball exist outside the realm of physical laws?Upright BiPed_{December 31, 2009
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----Zackriel: "Methodological Naturalism presumes the non-existence of supernatural causes, and so concerns questions of how to define the supernatural. Joseph’s statement is therefore incorrect." Methodological naturalism does more than presume the non-existence of supernatural causes, which, of course, are undefined and therefore, irrelevant, it also falsely characterizes the design inference as an invocation to that very same supernatural element that they left undefined. That is irrational. ----"But ultimately, science hinges on the interplay between proposing hypotheses and testing their entailed empirical consequences. Most demons, in our experience, leave no fingerprints or other empirical vestiges, so they cannot form the basis of a valid scientific hypothesis." If demons and other supernatural elements are irrelevant to the scientific process, why do Darwinists keep injecting the subject into the dicsussion. ID methodology does not address the issue one way or another. - ----"Sign on Door leading to Science Lab: Absolutely *NO* Demons Beyond This Point." Why should science rule out demons, or Gods, or anything else. Science uses data, analysis, and intrepretaion to pursue of the truth about reality, however reality may present itself. Anti-science Darwinists, on the other hand, don't care about reality at all, which is why they interpret evidence only in ways that harmonize with what they already believe.StephenB_{December 31, 2009
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“Only the ignorant think this debate is about the natural vs the supernatural.” Zachriel:
Methodological Naturalism presumes the non-existence of supernatural causes, and so concerns questions of how to define the supernatural. Joseph’s statement is therefore incorrect.
Yet Intelligent Design does not require the supernatural. Therefor my statement is quite correct. Sorry Zachriel but your ignorance has been exposed- again.Joseph_{December 31, 2009
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Mark Frank (#88) You write:
If a path is established then this is evidence for the hypothesis (although not conclusive), if there are repeated failures to establish such a path then this is evidence against it (although not conclusive).
I now see that you were simply making a point about testability in your earlier post (#73). Fair enough. Happy New Year.vjtorley_{December 31, 2009
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vjtorley at 96, Very briefly: the laws of physics constrain but do not determine my bodily movements. They prevent me from moving the pen in certain ways, but they do not determine the way in which I actually move it. Hence they do not explain the lifting of a pen as such. Why not? What characteristics of your bodily movements act outside the realm of physical laws? By the way, happy New Year. And to you!Mustela Nivalis_{December 31, 2009
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Collin at 94, Here’s a better way of putting it. If I were a to prove to you I was conscious and that I actually experience pleasure, pain, colors, joy, sorrow etc, how would I do it? By laughing? Crying? Reacting to a pin prick on my arm? A machine could be made to do the same. Indeed, I am such a machine. But how does any of that evidence show that I actually experience the pleasure, pain or color? How does an MRI show that I actually experience that? Because I claim that it does? A machine could do the same. A machine can react to pain, a machine can detect color (but “see” it?) a machine can emit laughter, but does it experience it? A machine has correlating mental states to all of this. But it may or may not actually experience it. What does "experience" mean if not "transition through the associated brain states"?Mustela Nivalis_{December 31, 2009
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Collin at 93, I did not mean to assert that consciousness is not related to physical brain states. I meant to define consciousness as the quality of experience. As David Chalmers puts it, the “what its like to…” experience. However, so far as we can demonstrate empirically, the only mechanism for consciousness is a physical brain in a particular (set of) states. The only thing experiencing anything is the physical brain. In other words, the brain is related to consciousness, but consciousness does not = brain states. What evidence do you have that this is the case? I don’t know what it is. But when I view an MRI scan, I do not feel the pain of the person experiencing pain, or see the red that they are seeing. I merely take it on faith that they are seeing it when they say, “I see red.” I think that scientists do the same, but they don’t call it faith. I don’t know why. There is no faith involved. The subject reports seeing red and the researchers note the associated brain states. I actually delurked here to discuss CSI, but this is a fascinating tangent. Thank you and happy new year.Mustela Nivalis_{December 31, 2009
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Joseph: “Only the ignorant think this debate is about the natural vs the supernatural.” StephenB: That is correct. The debate is really about the unwarranted intrusion of methodological naturalism vs. the reasoned-based methods of science, as you are obviously aware.
Methodological Naturalism presumes the non-existence of supernatural causes, and so concerns questions of how to define the supernatural. Joseph's statement is therefore incorrect. The distinction between natural and supernatural is not well-defined. It can be a useful heuristic. But ultimately, science hinges on the interplay between proposing hypotheses and testing their entailed empirical consequences. Most demons, in our experience, leave no fingerprints or other empirical vestiges, so they cannot form the basis of a valid scientific hypothesis. - Sign on Door leading to Science Lab: Absolutely *NO* Demons Beyond This Point.Zachriel_{December 31, 2009
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Mustela Nivalis (#82) Thank you for your post. Citing my assertion that the act of lifting a pen, while not in violation of the laws of physics, is not reducible to those laws either, you ask:
What do you mean by "reducible" here? It is certainly possible to measure the forces acting on the muscles and bones within a hand, and the chemical and electrical potential changes in the nerves, to explain the lifting of a pen according to physics.
Very briefly: the laws of physics constrain but do not determine my bodily movements. They prevent me from moving the pen in certain ways, but they do not determine the way in which I actually move it. Hence they do not explain the lifting of a pen as such. I'll respond to your earlier post (#81) in a few hours. By the way, happy New Year.vjtorley_{December 31, 2009
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---Joseph: "Only the ignorant think this debate is about the natural vs the supernatural." That is correct. The debate is really about the unwarranted intrusion of methodological naturalism vs. the reasoned-based methods of science, as you are obviously aware.StephenB_{December 30, 2009
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Here's a better way of putting it. If I were a to prove to you I was conscious and that I actually experience pleasure, pain, colors, joy, sorrow etc, how would I do it? By laughing? Crying? Reacting to a pin prick on my arm? A machine could be made to do the same. Indeed, I am such a machine. But how does any of that evidence show that I actually experience the pleasure, pain or color? How does an MRI show that I actually experience that? Because I claim that it does? A machine could do the same. A machine can react to pain, a machine can detect color (but "see" it?) a machine can emit laughter, but does it experience it? A machine has correlating mental states to all of this. But it may or may not actually experience it.Collin_{December 30, 2009
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Mustela, I did not mean to assert that consciousness is not related to physical brain states. I meant to define consciousness as the quality of experience. As David Chalmers puts it, the "what its like to..." experience. In other words, the brain is related to consciousness, but consciousness does not = brain states. I don't know what it is. But when I view an MRI scan, I do not feel the pain of the person experiencing pain, or see the red that they are seeing. I merely take it on faith that they are seeing it when they say, "I see red." I think that scientists do the same, but they don't call it faith. I don't know why.Collin_{December 30, 2009
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---vjtorley @79: "I agree with you [cabal] that lifting a pen does not violate any of the laws of physics. But neither is it reducible to the laws of physics." Exactly right.StephenB_{December 30, 2009
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Collin at 87, None of that is consciousness. Read my link. Consciousness is the quality of experience. Not the correlates of experience. Tell me what red looks like or what pain feels like and then I’ll concede that it is scientifically understandable. Let me be clear though, I don’t say that consciousness is unnatural, only that it cannot be understood through science. Why do you assert that the experience of consciousness is not related to a physical brain state?Mustela Nivalis_{December 30, 2009
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Zachriel chimes in:
The distinction between natural and supernatural is not well-defined.
Only the ignorant think this debate is about the natural vs the supernatural.
It can be a useful heuristic in that we don’t invoke a demon to explain why the solution turned blue.
But we do invoke agency involvement when there is evidence for it.
But ultimately, science hinges on the interplay between proposing hypotheses and testing their entailed empirical consequences.
There isn't any testable hypothesis for the accumulation of genetic accidents nor genetic drift. Endosymbiosis makes some vague predictions of similarity.Joseph_{December 30, 2009
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Mark FRank, If the non-peer reviewed article by Miller is the best you have then I can safely say that the premise is untestable except for in one's imagination.Joseph_{December 30, 2009
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