Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

L&FP, 64: The challenge of self-referentiality on hard questions (thus, of self-defeating arguments)

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One way to define Philosophy, is to note that it is that department of thought that addresses hard, core questions. Known to be hard as there are no easy answers.

Where, core topics include metaphysics [critical analysis of worldviews on what reality is, what exists etc], epistemology [core questions on “knowledge”], logic [what are the principles of right reason], ethics/morals [virtue, the good, evil, duty, justice etc], aesthetics [what is beauty], and of course meta issues emerging from other subjects such as politics, history, Mathematics, Theology/Religion, Science, Psychology, Medicine, Education etc. As we look at such a list, we can see that one reason why these are difficult is that it is very hard to avoid self-referentiality on such topics, opening up question-begging on one hand and self-referential, self-defeating incoherence on the other.

For striking example, in his 1994 The Astonishing Hypothesis, Nobel Laureate Sir Francis Crick [a co-discoverer on the structure and function of DNA], went on ill-advised record:

. . . that “You”, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll’s Alice might have phrased: “You’re nothing but a pack of neurons.” This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most people today that it can truly be called astonishing.

The late Philip Johnson, of course, aptly replied that Sir Francis should have therefore been willing to preface his works thusly: “I, Francis Crick, my opinions and my science, and even the thoughts expressed in this book, consist of nothing more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.” Johnson then tellingly commented: “[t]he plausibility of materialistic determinism requires that an implicit exception be made for the theorist.” [Reason in the Balance, 1995.]

This problem is fairly widespread, and a point that should be borne in mind when we try to argue on big questions. Regrettably, this seems harder to do than one might at first imagine.

However, Elton Trueblood, building on Josiah Royce, may have put a way forward on the table, though this turns on an irony. For, one of the points of consensus of debate is that error exists. For empirical evidence, kindly refer to primary school sums duly marked with the infamous big red X’s. (That’s why I went out of my way to use green as my marking colour . . . )

However, this is not just an empirical fact, it is an undeniably true and self-evident knowable truth. To see this, set E = error exists, and try to deny it ~E. But this means, E is . . . an error. Oops. So, we know the very attempt to deny E instantly produces patent absurdity, a self defeating self contradiction. But this simple result is not a readily dismissed triviality. No, apart from being a gentle reminder that we need to be careful, it shows that self evident, certainly knowable truth exists which instantly undercuts a wide swath of radical relativist views. Their name is Legion, in a post modern world.

We can widen the result, take any reasonably identifiable subject, G. Assign, that O is the claim that some x in G is an objective, i.e. warranted and credibly reliable truth. Try to deny it, ~O. Has o shifted away from G? No, it is still a claim on the subject matter G. So, it refutes itself. Once there is a reasonably identifiable subject, there are objective knowable truths about and in G. This is a first such truth. Of course on many topics, the second truth is, we know little more than the first truth. That is Mr Donald Rumsfeld’s known unknowns. Beyond lurk, the unknown unknowns.

BTW, Morality and History count as reasonably identifiable topics, as do Economics, Politics, etc. Controversy does not prevent us from knowing truths.

And, Dallas Willard et al (with slight adjustment) are right:

To have knowledge in the dispositional sense—where you know things you are not necessarily thinking about at the time—is to be able to represent something as it is on an adequate basis of thought or experience, not to exclude communications from qualified sources (“authority”). This is the “knowledge” of ordinary life, and it is what you expect of your electrician, auto mechanic, math teacher, and physician. Knowledge is not rare, and it is not esoteric . . . no satisfactory general description of “an adequate basis of thought or experience” has ever been achieved. We are nevertheless able to determine in many specific types of cases that such a basis is or is not present [p.19] . . . . Knowledge, but not mere belief or feeling, generally confers the right to act and to direct action, or even to form and supervise policy. [p. 20] In any area of human activity, knowledge brings certain advantages. Special considerations aside, knowledge authorizes one to act, to direct action, to develop and supervise policy, and to teach. It does so because, as everyone assumes, it enables us to deal more successfully with reality: with what we can count on, have to deal with, or are apt to have bruising encounters with. Knowledge involves assured

[–> warranted, credible] truth, and truth in our representations and beliefs is very like accuracy in the sighting mechanism on a gun. If the mechanism is accurately aligned—is “true,” it enables those who use it with care to hit an intended target. [p. 4, Dallas Willard & Literary Heirs, The Disappearance of Moral Knowledge, Routledge|Taylor& Francis Group, 2018. ]

Of course, that easily leads to the situation where false or tainted or materially incomplete knowledge claims can capture this prestige, so our knowledge institutions should be open to reform.

For this, an adapted JoHari window is helpful:

Coming back to focus, let us be on guard against making errors of self referentiality. END

Comments
When you mix red and blue, purple **emerges** Who could have predicted that? Who could have predicted water, when you only know H and O? So, .... maybe from a warm little pond ... life ** poof** and .... , maybe when you have a bunch of neurons ... consciousness **emerges ** Do you get the emergentists' vibe? Origenes
"Why are you denying that?" JVL, I'm not denying that stuff happens. Let's call it Stuff Happens instead of Emergence with the pretense that it means something. That would me slightly happier. Andrew asauber
Jerry Emergence is a nonsense idea.
To explain a nonsense idea like darwinism you need to use more nonsense ideas .*Poof* magic wand. Poor darwinists ! all the big events already happened and they have only randomness in their magic hat to explain everything including functional information , conscience,morality . *Poof* Sandy
Asauber: Still not an explanation… which is what science is supposed to be for. It's a category observation that has been labelled. Sometimes you get something you couldn't have predicted when physically combining some things together. That does happen, clearly. Why are you denying that? What is your explanation of why combining two poisons together yields a substance necessary for many forms of life? JVL
"you get something you didn’t predict" ...like a rabbit from a black top hat, a plastic wand, and some magic *POOFERY* in the air. Still not an explanation... which is what science is supposed to be for. Why are you advocating for Not Science? Andrew asauber
Asuaber: The point is that Emergence is not an explanation. It’s the whirl of a black cape and a *POOF* of smoke. The rabbit Emerged from the hat. It’s just a lame turn of phrase for the weak-minded. The point is that sometimes combining some things/elements/compounds/structures togethers gets you some new properties or effects that you could not have predicted just knowing the properties and effects of the constituents. This is clearly true. So, the term for properties and effects not predictable from the properties of the constituent parts is emergent. What is the problem? Sometimes, when you put stuff together, you get something you didn't predict. Duh. It is NOT the same a a rabbit coming out of a hat. JVL
Andrew at 146, I suspected the Jedi mind trick. Thanks for clarifying. relatd
Relatd: Salt, when chemically analyzed, consists of sodium and chloride. You are taking scientific facts and making them sound mysterious. I am saying that salt has properties that sodium and chloride do not have and those properties of salt are not predictable based on the properties of sodium and chloride. And why would human beings be designed to need salt? Planned and designed to need salt for life functions. Not the point. You clearly are just trying to waste my time. JVL
JVL, The point is that Emergence is not an explanation. It's the whirl of a black cape and a *POOF* of smoke. The rabbit Emerged from the hat. It's just a lame turn of phrase for the weak-minded. Andrew asauber
JVL at 144, You are taking the Darwinist, life just "emerges" position. Salt, when chemically analyzed, consists of sodium and chloride. You are taking scientific facts and making them sound mysterious. And why would human beings be designed to need salt? Planned and designed to need salt for life functions. relatd
Relatd: Sodium and chloride are always poisons and the combination always results in salt. Nothing unpredictable there. Again, you seem to be missing the point. Could you predict, before you knew the outcome, that mixing two poisons together would give you something essential for life? That property is emergent. I'm beginning to suspect you're arguing just to be belligerent. You seem to be missing the point intentionally. For what reason I know not. JVL
JVL at 142, This falls under the anarchist category, where things just 'happen' on their own. Sodium and chloride are always poisons and the combination always results in salt. Nothing unpredictable there. relatd
Relatd: Chemistry cannot be done, and industry could not function, if “… those changes are not predictable.” Some reactions are predictable; we're talking about the times when new properties arise which were not predictable. Which does happen. You could not predict the specific properties of water from the properties of hydrogen or oxygen. Take NaCl. Sodium and Chlorine are stupidly poisonous on their own. Together they form a simple compound used by all of us everyday in our food. Could you predict that based on the two constituents? It DOES happen that some compounds or combinations yield results which are unpredictable from the constituent parts. The properties of the compounds or combinations that cannot be foreseen are defined as emergent properties. They exist. You're running out of road. Look, if you don't get the point why not just stop arguing? JVL
Kf at 139, Energy storage? Who brought that up? I'm talking about something "emerging" in TOTALLY unpredictable ways. Yeah, right... relatd
JVL at 138, Chemistry cannot be done, and industry could not function, if "... those changes are not predictable." relatd
Relatd, the problem is, apart from nukes, the densest energy storage is diesel and gasoline. KF kairosfocus
Relatd: 100% fake. Nothing emerges from anything. Everything has properties and potentialities. Period. These are built-in and predetermined by the laws of atomic physics. Well, I'll leave it up to you to argue against the philosophers who have argued about the existence of emergent properties. Your attempt to create a fake “something from nothing” situation is fake. Nothing “emerges.” Period. At room temperature oxygen and hydrogen exist as gases. Water is a liquid. Combining things together sometimes introduces new properties, sometimes modifies existing properties. And those changes are not predictable. They 'emerge'. JVL
How dare you tell me to "chill out"? I will chill out when I'm good and ready... :) relatd
Relatd: What? Industry – with lots of money – could not afford to install scrubbers on their smoke-belching smokestacks. Why? Because their competitors wouldn’t do it either. Losing millions of peasants is OK. Don’t you get it? And plastic? Electric cars? Oil companies and oil companies. Electric cars were available in 1905 but oil barons could not get rich that way I just offered a minor opinion. Chill out. JVL
JVL at 134, 100% fake. Nothing emerges from anything. Everything has properties and potentialities. Period. These are built-in and predetermined by the laws of atomic physics. "Would you agree that water has properties not shared by hydrogen and oxygen?" Absolutely not. Water can exist as a solid, liquid and gas. Built-in, happens every time properties. Your attempt to create a fake "something from nothing" situation is fake. Nothing "emerges." Period. relatd
Relatd: Why do some metals combine to form alloys while some cannot? The alloy has properties of the combined metals. I think “emergent” is a fake idea. You're focusing on what can or cannot combine NOT what properties 'emerge' (sometimes) when combinations occur. That is the point: emergent properties are those which are not apparent or predictable when some combinations occur. Not all combinations. And it's not a statement about what can and what cannot combine. Would you agree that water has properties not shared by hydrogen and oxygen? I can't think of any metallic examples but I wouldn't be surprised if some exist. Anyway, the concept of emergence exists outside of chemistry and metallurgy. JVL
Origenes at 131, It's totally fake. The laws of physics apply. In my kids' chemistry set, I got two clear liquids that, when one is poured into the other, turn purple. I can't just pour ANY two clear liquids into each other and get a purple result. Clear? relatd
JVL at 130, What? Industry - with lots of money - could not afford to install scrubbers on their smoke-belching smokestacks. Why? Because their competitors wouldn't do it either. Losing millions of peasants is OK. Don't you get it? And plastic? Electric cars? Oil companies and oil companies. Electric cars were available in 1905 but oil barons could not get rich that way. https://archive.curbed.com/2017/9/22/16346892/electric-car-history-fritchle relatd
Relatd@
I think “emergent” is a fake idea.
When you mix 2 Blue and 1 Red, the color Purple *emerges*. Is that fake news? :) Origenes
Jerry: What happens to an ecology when a species is introduced that is superior to all the others in the ecology in terms of reproduction? Will that ecology survive? Most likely that will change the ecology so, strictly speaking, the previous ecology does not survive. IF the change happens slowly enough then adaptations will occur AND some marginal lifeforms may become winners while others may become losers. On could argue that what human are doing to the Earth's climate is such an example: there will be winners and losers and many humans will be losers but possibly not the species overall. Of course in the case of humans it's not just reproductive expertise that's causing the problem. On the other hand, if there were only 1 million humans over the whole planet those 1 million individuals could drive the largest gas-guzzling SUV available, use single-use plastics all the time, keep their thermostats set to 75 degrees, etc and not significantly affect the overall planet's climate. Too many humans + too much environmental degradation and overuse of some natural resources is a fairly toxic combination. JVL
JVL at 127, Why do some metals combine to form alloys while some cannot? The alloy has properties of the combined metals. I think "emergent" is a fake idea. relatd
Origenes: It makes sense to say that a statement about the system as a whole must come from a position outside the whole In mathematics there are many, basic, easy-to-prove within the system statements that apply to the whole system. There are infinitely many prime numbers is a good example; you can easily prove that within the axiomatic system. All prime numbers are within 1 of a multiple of 6 is another. JVL
Relatd: This is a subatomic/quantum effect. And not explainable as emergent anything. Well, I think water does exhibit properties not apparent or present from its constituent parts so it seems to me that those properties of water are emergent properties by the definition of emergent. The fact that things combine or not is not the emergent bit; it's the new properties that are present. Sometimes it is better to use terms as they are commonly used in the literature to ensure people know what you are talking about. It seems to me you are talking about something at a different level than simple emergence. JVL
I'm not sure we've latched onto the real notion of axiom, at least in mathematics. Again from Wikipedia:
An axiom, postulate, or assumption is a statement that is taken to be true, to serve as a premise or starting point for further reasoning and arguments. The word comes from the Ancient Greek word ?????? (axí?ma), meaning 'that which is thought worthy or fit' or 'that which commends itself as evident'
The precise definition varies across fields of study. In classic philosophy, an axiom is a statement that is so evident or well-established, that it is accepted without controversy or question. In modern logic, an axiom is a premise or starting point for reasoning. In mathematics, an axiom may be a "logical axiom" or a "non-logical axioms". Logical axioms are taken to be true within the system of logic they define and are often shown in symbolic form (e.g., (A and B) implies A), while non-logical axioms (e.g., a + b = b + a) are substantive assertions about the elements of the domain of a specific mathematical theory, such as arithmetic. Non-logical axioms may also be called "postulates" or "assumptions". In most cases, a non-logical axiom is simply a formal logical expression used in deduction to build a mathematical theory, and might or might not be self-evident in nature (e.g., the parallel postulate in Euclidean geometry). To axiomatize a system of knowledge is to show that its claims can be derived from a small, well-understood set of sentences (the axioms), and there are typically many ways to axiomatize a given mathematical domain. Any axiom is a statement that serves as a starting point from which other statements are logically derived. Whether it is meaningful (and, if so, what it means) for an axiom to be "true" is a subject of debate in the philosophy of mathematics.
So, I don't agree they are like syntax which has to do with an arbitrary structure governing expression NOT was is or is not 'true' in that axiomatic system. But, clearly, axioms cannot be 'proven' to be true since they are akin to assumptions or bases upon which the rest of the axiomatic system is built. JVL
JVL at 123, A little chemistry lesson. Hydrogen and oxygen combine to form water. If you take a tank with hydrogen gas and one with oxygen, and light a handheld torch on each, and combine the output, you get water. This is a subatomic/quantum effect. And not explainable as emergent anything. Another example: If a building fire gets hot enough, any water present within decomposes to hydrogen and oxygen and feeds the fire. Water turning into ice at a given temperature is another subatomic/quantum effect. The examples involve subatomic combinations under given conditions. I would never use the word emergent. It is a case of phase transition/combination. One last example. Some metals combine readily to form alloys, others cannot do this. relatd
PM1
What Gödel did was prove that, for a specific class of formal systems, there will be statements constructed in that system (consistent with its axioms) that cannot be proven within that system, precisely because they are statements about the system as a whole. These statements are not the axioms of the system.
It makes sense to say that a statement about the system as a whole must come from a position outside the whole (with the exception of consciousness). Origenes
Jerry: If anything actually emerged, it would destroy itself in a very short time. Nothing more has to be said. Doesn't water have properties and effects that neither of its constituent parts have? Isn't emergence just saying the sum is more than just the combination of its parts? From Wikipedia:
In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence occurs when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own, properties or behaviors that emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole.
This concept of emergence dates from at least the time of Aristotle. The many scientists and philosophers who have written on the concept include John Stuart Mill (Composition of Causes, 1843) and Julian Huxley (1887–1975). The philosopher G. H. Lewes coined the term "emergent" in 1875, distinguishing it from the merely "resultant":
Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum, when their directions are the same – their difference, when their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are homogeneous and commensurable. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference.
JVL
Jerry: It’s an old computer (Apple laptop) but with most recent system for it. Me too; two different Macs in fact with no editing problems. Could be your browser? Using Safari? JVL
Addition to my 118
The rules of a game tell you what is a legitimate move in the game. In axiomatized systems like logic, arithmetic, and geometry, the process of making moves in the game is the proving of theorems.
One could also think of the axioms of a system as being like the syntax of a computer language and theorems as executable programs within that language. Gödel is saying that if the syntax of a formal system has the property of capturing elementary number theory, then there will be true statements expressible within that formal system that cannot be proven using the axioms of that system. PyrrhoManiac1
"anti-physicalist"? Seriously? Elaborate arguments confuse the issue. There is no "emergent" anything. It is fiction. As in fiction. [said with a Brooklyn accent] Hey buddy! I got yer emergent right here! relatd
@116
If “strongly emergent” means “caused by the physical anyway even though it cannot be explained by it”, then the term is just an expression of Chalmer’s relentless desire for a materialistic explanation of consciousness.
That's not how Chalmers defines the term, and he is vehemently opposed to all materialistic explanations of consciousness. As he sees it, to say that consciousness is strongly emergent just is to say that consciousness cannot be deduced even in principle from the laws of physics. He is as passionately anti-physicalist as any one might hope for. In his recent work he has expressed some interest in panpsychism but he observes that there are problems with panpsychism that have not yet been solved. PyrrhoManiac1
@112
In my view, Gödel’s theorem makes clear that each system is necessarily based on axioms that cannot be proved within the system. That simple.
I'm sorry, but that simply cannot possibly be correct: every system is necessarily based on axioms that cannot be proved within the system. That was already perfectly understood when Euclid systematized ancient Greek geometry. Gödel was not needed for that. To see why, it might help to think of axioms as parameters of a system, or as rules of a game. The rules of a game tell you what is a legitimate move in the game. In axiomatized systems like logic, arithmetic, and geometry, the process of making moves in the game is the proving of theorems. What Gödel did was prove that, for a specific class of formal systems, there will be statements constructed in that system (consistent with its axioms) that cannot be proven within that system, precisely because they are statements about the system as a whole. These statements are not the axioms of the system. PyrrhoManiac1
Emergence is a nonsense idea. Yet thousands of comments are wasted on it. It is the least likely way for anything biologically to happen but because some inane commenter pushes it. more inane comments are generated. If anything actually emerged, it would destroy itself in a very short time. Nothing more has to be said. jerry
PM1 @111
In “Strong and weak emergence” Chalmers defines strong emergence as “not deducible even in principle from the laws of physics.” That is clearly not the same as “a brute fact with no explanation at all” (which is what a violation of the PSR would be).
Strong emergence is the claim that when X is “not deducible even in principle from the laws of physics”, it has a physical explanation nonetheless. This is in violation of PSR. Only if a non-physical cause (or new physical laws) is proposed for X, is PSR not violated.
Here’s how Chalmers characterizes strong emergence: Strong emergence has much more radical consequences than weak emergence. If there are phenomena that are strongly emergent with respect to the domain of physics, then our conception of nature needs to be expanded to accommodate them. That is, if there are phenomena whose existence is not deducible from the facts about the exact distribution of particles and fields throughout space and time (along with the laws of physics), then this suggests that new fundamental laws of nature are needed to explain these phenomena.
If X cannot be explained by known laws of nature, then a physical explanation cannot be provided. One’s intuition can be that there must be a physical explanation for X, so the search for new fundamental laws of nature ensues. In this case, we will wait for the discovery of those new fundamental laws of nature that explain freedom and rationality, but we won't hold our breath. What is the usefulness of the term ‘strong emergence’ here? It does not explain anything and adds nothing to our knowledge.
Chalmers: In particular, it remains plausible that in the actual world, the state of a person’s brain determines his or her state of consciousness (…)
No, physical determination is not at all a plausible explanation for a free rational person, Mr. Chalmers.
Chalmers: Consciousness counts as strongly emergent because psychophysical laws (the laws that correlate consciousness with neurobiological facts, etc.) cannot be derived from the laws of physics alone.
If “strongly emergent” means “caused by the physical anyway even though it cannot be explained by it”, then the term is just an expression of Chalmer’s relentless desire for a materialistic explanation of consciousness. Origenes
I will ask a question which no one seems to want to address: What happens to an ecology when a species is introduced that is superior to all the others in the ecology in terms of reproduction? Will that ecology survive? Remember that the time will be relatively short with little or no chance for the other species to adapt because that is how the world works. Now explain how emergentism, punctuated equilibrium and adaptation will not have the same effect unless adaptation is very limited. In other words the fossil record is what it is because in a short time a new species would destroy the ecology. Therefore the logical conclusion is that such species never developed unless guided. Or as the title of the OP says,"Self-Defeating Arguments." So yes, this site waste a lot of pixels on nonsense. It has nothing to do with the mindset of undesirable people. jerry
I have restarted the computer I am using and still no editing of comments. So a reset is not the answer Thank you for the suggestion. It just means that I have to be more careful with what I write and especially with the formatting used. No chance to edit it on the computer I am using. Will have to go back to room and get IPad to edit comments. It's an old computer (Apple laptop) but with most recent system for it. So this is not the issue. I only posted this in case others experience the same problem. jerry
we must understand the mindset we are dealing with
That is nonsense. The objective is lots of comments about irrelevant issues.. jerry
PM1
Ori: Can it be said of each axiom of a system that is not the case that both the “statement and its negation can be proved within the system”?
PM1: Maybe, but only because axioms are never proved at all within the system in which they are used.
Axioms are “accepted as having no justification possible within the system.” To me that is synonymous with it “is not the case that both the statement and its negation can be proved within the system.” You say … “maybe.” Here, as so often, I cannot understand your line of reasoning. You seem to argue that they may be synonymous, but the reason for this phenomenon isn’t correct. They are “only” synonymous “because axioms are never proved at all within the system in which they are used.” Is that supposed to be a good reason to ignore the issue? How does that compute in your mind?
Axioms are just the initial claims that are then used to prove all the theorems in that system.
Sure. In my view, Gödel’s theorem makes clear that each system is necessarily based on axioms that cannot be proved within the system. That simple.
PM1: The more interesting question, as I see it, is not whether or not the necessary being exists but whether the PSR is compatible with the existence of anything else besides the necessary being.
For each item in the system, except for the axiom/necessary being, a distinct cause/reason can be identified. This perfectly fits PSR, perfect compatibility with PSR. Perfect harmony. However, for you “the more interesting question” is “whether the PSR is compatible with the existence of anything else besides the necessary being.” How can this question possibly make sense?
Ori: Can you elaborate? I do not understand your question.
This is just my little hobby-horse; it’s not really relevant to any of the discussions in this thread.
Baffling. Origenes
@80 (and a few others) I don't think that strong emergence as Chalmers defines it entails a violation of the principle of sufficient reason. In "Strong and weak emergence" Chalmers defines strong emergence as "not deducible even in principle from the laws of physics." That is clearly not the same as "a brute fact with no explanation at all" (which is what a violation of the PSR would be). Here's how Chalmers characterizes strong emergence:
Strong emergence has much more radical consequences than weak emergence. If there are phenomena that are strongly emergent with respect to the domain of physics, then our conception of nature needs to be expanded to accommodate them. That is, if there are phenomena whose existence is not deducible from the facts about the exact distribution of particles and fields throughout space and time (along with the laws of physics), then this suggests that new fundamental laws of nature are needed to explain these phenomena.
In other words, strong emergence is defined relative to what physics alone would allow us to predict. That is different from being defined relative to what we know how to explain. There is, Chalmers thinks, at least one strongly emergent phenomenon: consciousness:
We have seen that strong emergence, if it exists, has radical consequences. The question that immediately arises, then, is: are there strongly emergent phenomena? My own view is that the answer to this question is yes. I think there is exactly one clear case of a strongly emergent phenomenon, and that is the phenomenon of consciousness. We can say that a system is conscious when there is something it is like to be that system; that is, when there is something it feels like from the system’s own perspective. It is a key fact about nature that it contains conscious systems; I am one such. And there is reason to believe that the facts about consciousness are not deducible from any number of physical facts. . . . even if consciousness is not deducible from physical facts, states of consciousness are still systematically correlated with physical states. In particular, it remains plausible that in the actual world, the state of a person’s brain determines his or her state of consciousness, in the sense that duplicating the brain state will cause the conscious state to be duplicated too. That is, consciousness still supervenes on the physical domain. But importantly, this supervenience holds only with the strength of laws of nature (in the philosophical jargon, it is natural or nomological supervenience). In our world, it seems to be a matter of law that duplicating physical states will duplicate consciousness; but in other worlds with different laws, a system physically identical to me might have no consciousness at all. This suggests that the lawful connection between physical processes and consciousness is not itself derivable from the laws of physics but is instead a further basic law or laws of its own. The laws that express the connection between physical processes and consciousness is not itself derivable from the laws of physics but is instead a further basic law or laws of its own. The laws that express the connection between physical processes and consciousness are what we might call fundamental psychophysical laws.
Consciousness counts as strongly emergent because psychophysical laws (the laws that correlate consciousness with neurobiological facts, etc.) cannot be derived from the laws of physics alone. This isn't a view I myself would defend, because (for reasons I've given above) I don't share Chalmers's intuitions about the metaphysical weirdness of consciousness. But more importantly, I'm not at all convinced that "not deducible even in principle from the laws of physics" is a coherent way of thinking about strong emergence. So while I agree with Chalmers and others that there is a distinction to be made here, I don't agree with Chalmers about how to make it. PyrrhoManiac1
Can it be said of each axiom of a system that is not the case that both the “statement and its negation can be proved within the system”?
Maybe, but only because axioms are never proved at all within the system in which they are used. Axioms are just the initial claims that are then used to prove all the theorems in that system. (For example, Euclid showed how all theorems of geometry can be proven from axioms and definitions. Peano established the axioms of arithmetic that are used to prove all the theorems in number theory.)
Can you elaborate? I do not understand your question.
This is just my little hobby-horse; it's not really relevant to any of the discussions in this thread. PyrrhoManiac1
PM1 @107
Ori: Is Gödel’s “proposition that can neither be proved nor disproved” identical to the axiom that is “accepted as having no justification possible within the system”?
PM1: No — Gödel’s proposition is the conclusion of a theorem, which is based on axioms. He proved that a certain class of formal systems (those sufficiently rich to express arithmetic) cannot be both complete and consistent: if it is not the case that both a statement and its negation can be proved within the system, then it must be the case that there exist true statements expressible in the system that cannot be proved within that system.
Can it be said of each axiom of a system that is not the case that both the “statement and its negation can be proved within the system”?
The more interesting question, as I see it, is not whether or not the necessary being exists but whether the PSR is compatible with the existence of anything else besides the necessary being.
Can you elaborate? I do not understand your question. Origenes
Origenes, actually, the Agrippa trilemma is solvable once we see there are self evident propositions, on the reasons side, and once we see that there are necessary beings -- especially a reality root -- on the causal side, starting from our existence in a going concern world. The Godel proof is about how axiomatic systems are inherently limited, we cannot compress the infinity of Arithmetic into a finite code of axioms and primitives, if we are consistent. But that does not prevent math facts from being observed or finding that math forks and our axiomatisedmodel worlds now face two neighbours depending on whether a proposed axiom A or its negation are chosen, etc. PSR is not about cause but reason, causes apply to contingent possible beings, necessary beings must be if a world is and obviously one is. Note too, I emphasise a weak form, we may ask and investigate, with hope. That draws out modes of being which then is itself a space of reasons for being and non being: impossible, possible, contingent, necessary. I contend, it is a good reason for core math that 2, 1, 0 thence NZQRCR* are necessary on there being a distinct possible world. KF PS, as for the weak inquiry form PSR it is self evidently the case that one may freely ask why and investigate with confidence, taking advantage of logic of being and possible worlds speak. A unicorn is possible and likely will be within this century as people would pay to own one. I need not advocate any strong form for my purposes. kairosfocus
@105
Is Gödel’s “proposition that can neither be proved nor disproved” identical to the axiom that is “accepted as having no justification possible within the system”?
No -- Gödel’s proposition is the conclusion of a theorem, which is based on axioms. He proved that a certain class of formal systems (those sufficiently rich to express arithmetic) cannot be both complete and consistent: if it is not the case that both a statement and its negation can be proved within the system, then it must be the case that there exist true statements expressible in the system that cannot be proved within that system. Interestingly, Terrence Deacon and Tyrone Cashman argue that strong emergence is entailed by interpreting Gödel’s incompleteness theorem as an ontological truth. (See their "Steps to a Metaphysics of Incompleteness".) I found that part of the argument quite perplexing, to say the least! Their article also has several responses by various theologians.
I note that the idea ‘everything has prior cause/reason’ necessarily leads to the absurdity of an infinite regress. So, if the PSR states that everything has a sufficient cause AND every cause/reason is external/prior to what it explains, it must be wrong.
The PSR avoids the infinite regress precisely by showing that there must be a necessary being whose existence is explained by itself. The more interesting question, as I see it, is not whether or not the necessary being exists but whether the PSR is compatible with the existence of anything else besides the necessary being. There is also the question of what (if anything) grounds or accounts for the principle of sufficient reason. If Peirce is right, then the PSR should be treated as a meta-induction over the history of successful inquiry. But that is not strong enough to give us the metaphysical conclusions that depend upon invoking the PSR in the first place. PyrrhoManiac1
KF @
... one has to lie to oneself to pretend that Jews, Slavs, Gypsies or Subsaharan africans are not human; our ability to freely interbreed is decisive proof enough.
Of course, I agree. However, we are not always mistaken in our harsh assessment. Serial killers are not considered 'people' and rightly so. We correctly suspend the golden rule: we deny them their freedom and, sometimes, even their right to live. Origenes
KF @101
It is an open question whether the principle of sufficient reason can be applied to axioms within a logic construction like a mathematical or a physical theory, because axioms are propositions accepted as having no justification possible within the system. The principle declares that all propositions considered to be true within a system should be deducible from the set axioms at the base of the construction. However, Gödel has shown that for every sufficiently expressive deductive system a proposition exists that can neither be proved nor disproved (see Gödel’s incompleteness theorems) . . . .
Is Gödel’s “proposition that can neither be proved nor disproved” identical to the axiom that is a proposition “accepted as having no justification possible within the system”? I note that the idea ‘everything has prior cause/reason’ necessarily leads to the absurdity of an infinite regress. So, if the PSR states that everything has a sufficient cause AND every cause/reason is external/prior to what it explains, it must be wrong. Case in point: “I do something, therefore, I exist”, is a truth about the person that is established by the person, as opposed to being established by something external to the person. Origenes
Origenes, one has to lie to oneself to pretend that Jews, Slavs, Gypsies or Subsaharan africans are not human; our ability to freely interbreed is decisive proof enough. IIRC, it has been said the genetic diversity across our race is less than that of a Baboon troop. That slaves could be property was an anomaly of property rights, and a good part of why that was stopped was that it was seen that it was abusive, one is one's own property and that is non transferable. However one's liberty may be forfeit on court sentence. KF kairosfocus
Sandy, KF @
KF: moral principles are built in and attested to by conscience.
Sandy: Only if you have the right frame of reference or worldview. If you freely choose the materialistic frame of reference you have a new type of morality of own ego. Our beliefs modify our perceptions.
KF: while it is true that harmful worldviews can damage our ability to think straight about right and wrong, there is still conscience and there is the nagging little question that when we find certain things to be wrong when we suffer harm, we should avoid doing such to other people.
Our worldview does indeed modify our perception. When certain people are no longer considered ‘people’ according to one’s worldview, the golden rule is not applicable and immorality necessarily follows. The Nazis didn’t consider Jews to be ‘people’, a certain religion does not consider ‘non-believers’ to be ‘people’, a ‘slave’ was considered personal property, and so on. Origenes
FP states,
Given the fact that it is well known that people with serious diseases or addictions, often “become” religious. Born again. No atheists in a fox hole. But it does turn out that the lack of religious belief is a risk factor for Parkinson’s.
Not to denigrate people with Parkinson's, but are you saying that atheism could be a disease of the brain? Of related note
Atheists embarrassed: study proves atheism uses less brain function – Oct 26, 2015 by Dr. Joel McDurmon Excerpt: This has to be embarrassing . . . if you’re an atheist. A new study performed at the University of York used targeted magnetism to shut down part of the brain. The result: belief in God disappeared among more than 30 percent of participants. That in itself may not seem so embarrassing, but consider that the specific part of the brain they frazzled was the posterior medial frontal cortex—the part associated with detecting and solving problems, i.e., reasoning and logic. In other words, when you shut down the part of the brain most associated with logic and reasoning, greater levels of atheism result. You’ve heard the phrase, “I don’t have enough faith to be an atheist”? Apparently we can now also say, “I have too many brains to be an atheist.” For a group that makes so much noise vaunting its superior prowess with logic and reasoning, this study has got to be quite a deflator. For a group that claims to be rooted primarily in logic and reason, and to exist for little reason other than that they have used logic and reason to free themselves from belief in God and, as they allege, superstition and fairy tales, this study is the equivalent of a public depanting­—i.e., the would-be emperor’s got no clothes. https://www.uglyhedgehog.com/t-518588-1.html Research on religion and serious mental illness Harold G. Koenig David B. Larson Andrew J. Weaver – 27 February 2006 According to this review, religion plays a largely positive role in mental health; future research on severe mental disorders should include religious factors more directly https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/yd.23319988010 “In the majority of studies, religious involvement is correlated with well-being, happiness and life satisfaction; hope and optimism; purpose and meaning in life; higher self-esteem; better adaptation to bereavement; greater social support and less loneliness; lower rates of depression and faster recovery from depression; lower rates of suicide and fewer positive attitudes towards suicide; less anxiety; less psychosis and fewer psychotic tendencies; lower rates of alcohol and drug use and abuse; less delinquency and criminal activity; greater marital stability and satisfaction… We concluded that for the vast majority of people the apparent benefits of devout belief and practice probably outweigh the risks.” – Professor Andrew Sims former President of the Royal College of Psychiatrists – Is Faith Delusion?: Why religion is good for your health – page 100
bornagain77
F/N: Wikipedia on PSR:
The principle has a variety of expressions, all of which are perhaps best summarized by the following: For every entity X, if X exists, then there is a sufficient explanation for why X exists. For every event E, if E occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation for why E occurs. For every proposition P, if P is true, then there is a sufficient explanation for why P is true. [for all] P [there exists some] Q ( Q --> P ) A sufficient explanation may be understood either in terms of reasons or causes, for like many philosophers of the period, Leibniz did not carefully distinguish between the two. The resulting principle is very different, however, depending on which interpretation is given (see Payne's summary of Schopenhauer's Fourfold Root). It is an open question whether the principle of sufficient reason can be applied to axioms within a logic construction like a mathematical or a physical theory, because axioms are propositions accepted as having no justification possible within the system. The principle declares that all propositions considered to be true within a system should be deducible from the set axioms at the base of the construction. However, Gödel has shown that for every sufficiently expressive deductive system a proposition exists that can neither be proved nor disproved (see Gödel's incompleteness theorems) . . . . According to Schopenhauer's On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, there are four distinct forms of the principle. First Form: The Principle of Sufficient Reason of Becoming (principium rationis sufficientis fiendi); appears as the law of causality in the understanding.[17] Second Form: The Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing (principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi); asserts that if a judgment is to express a piece of knowledge, it must have a sufficient ground or reason, in which case it receives the predicate true.[18] Third Form: The Principle of Sufficient Reason of Being (principium rationis sufficientis essendi); the law whereby the parts of space and time determine one another as regards those relations.[19] Example in arithmetic: Each number presupposes the preceding numbers as grounds or reasons of its being; "I can reach ten only by going through all the preceding numbers; and only by virtue of this insight into the ground of being, do I know that where there are ten, so are there eight, six, four."[20] "Now just as the subjective correlative to the first class of representations is the understanding, that to the second the faculty of reason, and that to the third pure sensibility, so is the subjective correlative to this fourth class found to be the inner sense, or generally self-consciousness."[21] Fourth Form: The Principle of Sufficient Reason of Acting (principium rationis sufficientis agendi); briefly known as the law of motivation.[22] "Any judgment that does not follow its previously existing ground or reason" or any state that cannot be explained away as falling under the three previous headings "must be produced by an act of will which has a motive." As his proposition in 43 states, "Motivation is causality seen from within."[23]
Now of course, these are strong form, and open up all sorts of controversies. We can start with a familiar case, a tossed die, which seems to take its value at random. If there is a cause why at random? To this, some might point out that a die is a chaotic system and while in principle outcomes are determined, mechanically, we cannot trace them and randomness is a useful fiction. This is also used in classical kinetic theory of gases, or the Galton Board or Quincunx. We can go to a quantum phenomenon such as radioactivity. Where, it seems each RA atom has a calculable likelihood of decaying per unit time. For that case, it seems, one can point to the order in the chaos and highlight a range of outcomes set up through underlying order. Which outcome per atom is not strictly predictable but a population shows the order, and we can argue that cause here is relevant to what sets up the underlying order. Is mind like that? Perhaps, sometimes, we may toss a coin to decide a path. This highlights agency, self moved behaviour on choice, as a causal factor; agency. Which, as we know, is critical to have credible reasoning. Then there are world models with arbitrary initial parameters, dynamics etc, or axioms that are not explained from within a scheme such as Geometry or Arithmetic, or we could set up some truly arbitrary framework. Obviously, acts of will. But, too, when we want axioms to be true, we infer them from experience or what seems reasonable. On the necessary being side, are we simply opening up a grab bag for what does not fit otherwise? No, for example twoness naturally emerges from there being a distinct possible world. Likewise, the logic is, that non being has no causal power. Nor is cause a mere statistical association, we think in terms of dynamics with principles and mechanisms. Heat, oxidiser and fuel for a fire that carries out a combustion chain reaction. We already see, that we can inquire and reason out circumstances. But what about a grand composite contingent fact: the world is, as it is, for no particular reason. Or that there are brute givens that just are, or an ultimate necessary entity that just is? These open up the weak form PSR, even if we have no current generally accepted answer, we may freely inquire and there is no good reason to abandon hope. but, something within the cosmos is part of its evident contingency, and on rejecting a world from non being, we may see that the world requires a reality root that always was. The ultimate necessary being, whose explanation is, necessity informed by a contingent world with contingent creatures capable of reason. That is, self referentiality demands coherence and here we find it. Were there not such, we would not be here to debate, so we have good reason to know of such. As to ontolgical character, necessary, on pain of absurd denial of there being a world. But as always, the debate goes on. KF KF kairosfocus
Sandy, while it is true that harmful worldviews can damage our ability to think straight about right and wrong, there is still conscience and there is the nagging little question that when we find certain things to be wrong when we suffer harm, we should avoid doing such to other people. Though of course our sense of empathy and our sense of conscience can be benumbed. As a capital case, Ms Maxwell seemed to have helped Mr Epstein procure underage girls. And more. KF kairosfocus
I am slowly working my way through the above mentioned video. At about the 30 minute mark he made the claim that people with Parkinson’s, a disease that affects the brain, are less religious. Given the fact that it is well known that people with serious diseases or addictions, often “become” religious. Born again. No atheists in a fox hole. But it does turn out that the lack of religious belief is a risk factor for Parkinson’s. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10943-022-01603-8 Ford Prefect
OT, but I think this might be of interest to some here. I lived with the guy being interviewed while doing the field work for my M.Sc. He is also the author of several sci-fi novels. His predictions in the first few minutes about pandemics is interesting, given that this was recorded a few years before COVID. https://youtu.be/g1_YZZ9V3WU Ford Prefect
Kairosfocus Sandy, moral principles are built in and attested to by conscience.
Only if you have the right frame of reference or worldview. If you freely choose the materialistic frame of reference you have a new type of morality of own ego. Our beliefs modify our perceptions. Sandy
F/N: it should be clear that the design inference is an inference to a key causal factor. As such, it points to intelligibility of the world, that effects require adequate causes. In turn cause points to sufficient reason. Which is actually built into the foundations of science, more than just common sense. KF kairosfocus
Sandy, moral principles are built in and attested to by conscience. We often feel them most directly when we have been wronged, our struggle is to then reciprocate to others. Unfortunately habits of life and breakdowns of the community can undermine such. KF kairosfocus
F/N: try restarting your PC, you may have entered an odd state. KF kairosfocus
Jerry, we must understand the mindset we are dealing with. The design inference on good signs is solid. That is not the issue. Here, we have an OP on a core logical problem tied to issues and it has surfaced an underlying proposed "mechanism" meant to subvert any design inference with, strong form emergence. That needs to be identified and shown for what it is, imposing a default in defence of an ideology; a principle not subject to any empirical test. How can you answer empirically to oh, it emerged in ways that cannot be deduced from prior circumstances and principles. You can only expose that this is present and what it is equivalent to, magick. KF kairosfocus
Ba77, As I'm sure you know, Darwinist ideas must be promoted at all costs or God gets back into science, which you have pointed out. They can't allow a Divine foot in the door. Also, if Evolution was not promoted, those looking for answers could default to ID, which could get into the schools and pulpits. Not a good idea - for certain people. relatd
the issue is not merits, rights, publications etc. It is, that we have determined lawless ideological oligarchs who have wormed their way into influence and power
While true to some extent, I have no idea what this has to do with what I said. I will continue to push focusing on ID. No one seems interested in that here. I have been reviewing comments from 17 years ago and finding interesting observations. I just found Giuseppe Puccio’s original comments. I can edit a comment on my IPad but not the computer I have. I am adding this now. Wondering what the difference is? jerry
ideological oligarchs who have wormed their way into influence and power who — lawless — are ruthless, vindictive and cruel. This of course includes the same academy now spouting absurdities across many domains and demanding that we bow before such rubbish presented under colour of knowledge
"I think there is no God because I want to be god. " I've heard in many debates (theists vs atheists ) theists saying BS like : "Of course you can be moral being atheist" . Never. Unbelievers are not moral people because to be moral requires an unbelievable struggle and focus and that 's is not enough you need God's direct help to become a moral person . Let's not confound interested behaviour and hypocrisy with morality. Sandy
KF @ 82, PM1 @83
KF: These poof magic emergentists reject the PSR.
Absolutely. That is their thing.
PM1: I don’t have any problems with weak emergence.
Other than the fact that is a completely superfluous term, I have no objection either. As Eric Anderson wrote:
EA: The problem is when the word emergence is used as an answer to how something came about or as a causal explanation. The only reason you know that water “emerges” from H and O is because you know that H and O will react to produce water. If you didn’t know the underlying cause, it would be illegitimate to claim that water emerges from them. You might suspect it. You might not know of another explanation. But you wouldn’t be able to say that H + O, on their own, produce water. (Further, as I’ve already mentioned, calling the process “emergence” doesn’t add anything to our knowledge or understanding. It is completely superfluous. If people want to run around using superfluous terminology, fine. But they shouldn’t expect anyone else to take them seriously.) Worse, when emergence itself is put forth as though it were a process or a cause, it is simply false. That is the problem with how the word is so often used, particularly in debates about evolution and consciousness.
So, the claim that consciousness, the free rational person, "emerges" from neuronal processes, just like water “emerges” from H + O (weak emergence), is as easily refutable as it always was. It can be treated just like the good old nonsensical materialistic claim.
My real qualms concern his use of “in principle” when it comes to strong emergence. That’s not to say that therefore strong emergence is a hopeless concept; I do think that Chalmers has correctly identified a need for a distinction here. I just don’t think that he’s correctly articulated that distinction.
Strong emergence, if the tortured concept makes any sense at all, is the only concept that pretends to offer an **explanation** (**POOF**) of consciousness, the free rational person, that differs from the utterly failed attempts of good old nonsensical materialism. Origenes
Interesting, I am finding the inability to edit a comment on the computer I have with me while away. Usually I can edit a comment to change typos or grammar or correct usage. I will have to see if my IPad has the same issue jerry
OT:
Mama Bear Apologetics: Empowering Your Kids to Challenge Cultural Lies by Hillary Morgan Ferrer https://www.amazon.com/Mama-Bear-Apologetics-Empowering-Challenge/dp/0736976159/ “I’m thrilled to see a book of this caliber written for moms! Mama Bear Apologetics is engaging and accessible without minimizing the seriousness of the subject matter. I’m particularly pleased by the inclusion of chapters on so-called progressive Christianity and postmodernism. Readers will gain effective tools for dismantling some of the more dangerous ideologies that pervade contemporary culture—and be able to equip their children to follow suit.” —Melissa Cain Travis, PhD, author of Science and the Mind of the Maker: What the Conversation Between Faith and Science Reveals About God Podcast: Mama Bear Apologetics Takes on Atheist Richard Dawkins https://idthefuture.com/1701/ Today’s ID the Future puts atheist Richard Dawkins’s book Outgrowing God under the microscope and reveals multiple ways his argument smashes up against contrary scientific evidence. Walking us through the critique are author and Mama Bear Apologetics founder Hillary Morgan Ferrer and her co-host, Amy Davison.
bornagain77
PM1, Chalmers has put his finger on the problem, there is a magickal ideology of poof, emergence and once the camel's nose is under the tent, the whole beast will follow unless it is solidly restrained by recognising some form or other of sufficient reason. Thus, logic of being. And from non being, nothing comes. KF kairosfocus
Jerry, the issue is not merits, rights, publications etc. It is, that we have determined lawless ideological oligarchs who have wormed their way into influence and power who -- lawless -- are ruthless, vindictive and cruel. This of course includes the same academy now spouting absurdities across many domains and demanding that we bow before such rubbish presented under colour of knowledge. If the craziness of US politics since 2015 did not convince us, the global mishandling of the pandemic and the surge in before time deaths should. To clench the nail over, someone paid 40+ billions to expose what was happening with Twitter and apart from a few outlets, it isn't hardly news much less the global, epochal scandal it should be. There will be no fair hearing, there will be no fair court cases, there will be no reasonable responses. The lawless oligarchs and their ideology will have to be exposed and broken, with a serious alternative in place through a David generation, trained in the College of Adullam's Cave. As an extension school of that College, let us remember the saying that a good newspaper is the people's college. Update it for our ICT era. This fight will take a generation or two, but let us remember what happened to the Iron Curtain in the end, the pity is, there being no viable successor for Russia, Putin's KGB mafia seized clearly criminal power and is now embarked on expansionism. I have long stressed that, historically, the default form of government is lawless oligarchy; since July 4, 1776 [the 1619 rubbish is blatant agit prop], the viable alternative is lawful, reform-minded constitutional, representative democracy and it matters not whether there is a president or a constitutional monarch. The equivalent of the late, great Queen Elizabeth II would have done the US much good. The ID issue is part of a civilisational crisis and the issue is to stand, not to make premature compromises with the lawless who only respect determined, superior force. Kindly, see Plato's parable of the ship of state. KF kairosfocus
That’s not to say that therefore strong emergence is a hopeless concept
Of course it's hopeless. It is self refuting just as every form of naturalized Evolution is self refuting. The greater the changes hypothesized, the more obvious the self refutation. jerry
David Chalmers is probably the living philosopher with whom I most enjoy disagreeing. He is utterly brilliant and I always learn something from figuring out why I disagree with him. The distinction between "weak emergence" and "strong emergence" is no exception. I don't have any problems with weak emergence. One feature of weak emergence that needs some consideration (which I'm sure Chalmers has done) is the relationship between retrospective explanation and predictability. I doubt that the basic principles of quantum mechanics -- the wave function and some definition of orbitals -- would allow one to predict the viscosity and conductivity of water. But one can use quantum mechanics to explain why water has the conductivity it has. Once you understand some ideas of subatomic structure, it's easy to see why a molecule with one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms would have one weak negative charge and two weak positive charges. From there it's easy to understand why some molecules will be hydrophobic or hydrophilic, depending on their distributions of electrical charge. Some basic knowledge of subatomic structure and some thermodynamics is sufficient to explain why phospholipids in water will spontaneously form a bilayer, even if a phospholipid bilayer were unexpected given the principles of subatomic structure alone. My real qualms concern his use of "in principle" when it comes to strong emergence. How do we determine what is and what is not "in principle" deducible? Surely not what is deducible by us. Then by whom? The Vulcan Science Academy? The Time Lords of Gallifrey? God? It's impossible to say. And that makes "not deducible even in principle" a vacuous concept. That's not to say that therefore strong emergence is a hopeless concept; I do think that Chalmers has correctly identified a need for a distinction here. I just don't think that he's correctly articulated that distinction. PyrrhoManiac1
Origenes
With emergentism, a new type of causation has been introduced: causation from insufficient causes. An obvious violation of the principle of sufficient reason.
These poof magic emergentists reject the PSR. Unsurprising, as much flows from it, it is an enormously powerful principle that is the root of the causal principle [contingent beings are caused, necessary ones are framework to worlds, impossible candidates have contradictory core characteristics and cannot exist] and is tied to logic of being; as was just outlined. Instead of getting into grand debates over strong form PSR, I simply pose a weak,freedom of inquiry form. We can ask why then explore per logic of being. Bring in possible worlds as sufficiently complete descriptions of how this world is/may be/was/might have been, or another world and away we go. Candidates C may be impossible of being, or possible, i.e. would be in at least one PW were it actualised. Of possibles, contingent ones are not in all worlds, necessary ones are in all. NBs are framework for any world. Compare a world W in which C is to a near neighbour W' without C and we identify a causal constraint on C. And more. So, we see that a weak form PSR is useful. KF kairosfocus
A comment from 17 years ago
I hope this will erase the complacency on this web site that ID is winning the war on the teaching of evolution in the US. If a state like Kansas cannot elect people that support the mild criteria that were part of their science standards, then ID is now losing the battle. We can tell ourselves all we want how the Darwinists are disassembling but I see nothing out “there” that confirms this. I know no one of my personal acquaintances except my wife who doesn’t think Darwin is the received view and is probably the correct view. This includes all my children and is a topic we do not discuss because they prefer not to. Now my children and my friends do not know very much about it but if you start discussing evolution you are looked upon as a loony and humored. The Darwinists are definitely winning the PR battle.
Until those who support ID, change their tactics this will remain true. If anything it has gotten worse for ID over the years. jerry
Sandy @74 ~The (strong) emergence concept stems from the extreme reductionist mindset.
Chalmers: We can say that a high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon are not deducible even in principle from truths in the low-level domain.
Let that sink in: B “arises from” A, but B is “not deducible even in principle from” A ... IOW emergentists say, if we encounter a high-level phenomenon that cannot be explained even in principle from the low-level domain (its parts), then we say that the high-level phenomenon is explained/arises from its parts anyway. In emergentism, if the lower-level domain suffers utter failure as a sufficient cause for the high-level phenomenon, the lower-level domain is **NONETHELESS** identified as the sole cause. It is called **EMERGENCE** (**POOF**). That is, WRT causes, emergentists are focused on the low-level domain only and beforehand exclude any other type of cause from consideration. And emergentists offer as a final explanation: the higher level **POOF** emerges from the lower level—end of the analysis. So, emergentists claim that an insufficient cause (the low-level domain) can, on its own, produce an effect, that it cannot explain. With emergentism, a new type of causation has been introduced: causation from insufficient causes. An obvious violation of the principle of sufficient reason. Suppose that it has been conclusively established that consciousness cannot be explained by neurons and their interactions. Could we then all agree that, given the fact that consciousness is not caused by neurons, materialism as an explanation for everything has failed, and that logic informs us that consciousness is therefore NOT a (high-level) phenomenon that arises from the (low-level) of neurons, and move on? Nooo! No, that would not happen, because the emergentists would step in with their insane claim that **BECAUSE** consciousness cannot be explained by neurons it must **EMERGE** (**POOF**) from neurons.
Sandy: Do you mean *Poof *POOF * poof?
Forgive me for being unclear. You are right, I meant three successive **POOFS** Origenes
HN42, excellent question. I find in the Chalmers corpus:
We can say that a high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon are not deducible even in principle from truths in the low-level domain. 1 Strong emergence is the notion of emergence that is most common in philosophical discussions of emergence, and is the notion invoked by the British emergentists of the 1920s. We can say that a high-level phenomenon is weakly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing the low-level domain. _____________ 1 In philosophers’ terms, we can say that strong emergence requires that high-level truths are not conceptually or metaphysically necessitated by low-level truths. Other notions in the main text can also be formulated in these modal terms, but I will mainly talk of deducibility to avoid technicality. The distinction between conceptual and metaphysical necessity will not be central here, but in principle one could formulate finer-grained notions of strong emergence that take this distinction into account. [Strong and Weak Emergence]
Yes, interactions of entities may yield unexpected results, which we may struggle to account for, a classic case being the discovery of chaos, leading to the famous case of a PhD based on dripping of a pipe. However, the not deducible in principle is worlds different from, unexpected. That is an opening to question begging ideological imposition, and to the problems of self reference where we are implicated. This comes out in evolutionary materialistic, scientistic accounts of origin of man, mind, morals, credible bodies of knowledge. That is precisely the issue with Darwin's horrid doubt. He projected the problem to critics of his . . . ah, ah, okay . . . theory. But, from the above it is clear that -- apart from the perceptions of those bound up in the commitments and convictions invited and cultivated by Darwinism -- doubts about the credibility of convictions of a monkey mind, are a case of a generally corrosive self referential acid. J B S Haldane saw it:
[JBSH, REFACTORED AS SKELETAL, AUGMENTED PROPOSITIONS:] "It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For
if [p:] my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain [–> taking in DNA, epigenetics and matters of computer organisation, programming and dynamic-stochastic processes; notice, "my brain," i.e. self referential] ______________________________ [ THEN] [q:] I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. [--> indeed, blindly mechanical computation is not in itself a rational process, the only rationality is the canned rationality of the programmer, where survival-filtered lucky noise is not a credible programmer, note the functionally specific, highly complex organised information rich code and algorithms in D/RNA, i.e. language and goal directed stepwise process . . . an observationally validated adequate source for such is _____ ?] [Corollary 1:] They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence [Corollary 2:] I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. [--> grand, self-referential delusion, utterly absurd self-falsifying incoherence] [Implied, Corollary 3: Reason and rationality collapse in a grand delusion, including of course general, philosophical, logical, ontological and moral knowledge; reductio ad absurdum, a FAILED, and FALSE, intellectually futile and bankrupt, ruinously absurd system of thought.]
In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” ["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209. Cf. here on (and esp here) on the self-refutation by self-falsifying self referential incoherence and on linked amorality.]
Materialistic reductionism has no recourse but to atoms and the like, which we know can be organised into a signal processing, computational substrate. We see analogue signal processing, digital and summing gate plus threshold networks [neural networks]. Each is dependent on functional organisation and is information rich. Each is GIGO-limited and each is a signal processing entity, not a freely, responsibly rational agent. What is hoped for -- or is outright asserted -- is that high complexity, memory elements, feedback loops, self modification [aka "learning"] etc -- will give rise to agency in some unexpected, unpredictable manner. Including of course information in copious quantities from success filtered lucky noise. This is why proponents are resistant to the manifest, fine tuned nature of such FSCO/I rich systems, i.e. islands of function in the midst of seas of non function in a configuration space of possibilities. Which is a reliable, readily observed characteristic. If you doubt such, take time to visit a hardware store and see how even humble nuts and bolts or gears must be precisely fitted together. Such is less visible in computers, electronics etc, but it is there. It is also there in biological systems, just ask a doctor. The end of the dominance of evolutionary materialistic scientism will not come overnight. It will come as bit by bit, ever more epicycles must be added to keep things going. Backed, by ever more blatant power politics to lock out alternatives. Such as, censorship and career busting. Which, as we know, are already happening. KF kairosfocus
PM1, it is precisely because of the slipperiness of "naturalism," that I draw out briefly, the focal form, evolutionary materialistic scientism. All are agreed that scientific methods, so called [they are legion, per Feyerabend] are often highly effective even though the sense of knowledge is a weak, defeasible form given the pessimistic induction. But, that is the general usage. Where, in particular, as scientific theories and models [as opposed to observations] are explanatory, predictive constructs, they may be reliable but cannot be deemed true as proved by observations; inferences to the best so far explanations are always just that -- so far. Science, too, lives by faith, similar to Mathematics, post Godel. However, crucially, science cannot monopolise or dominate or else it becomes a stalking horse for whatever ideology of the day prevails in relevant institutions; which is precisely what has been happening. Where, moreover, knowledge is inherently a philosophical topic, properly studied under epistemology and there is even a branch called philosophy of science. Further to such, mathematics, key to the hard sciences is inherently about issues of logic of being tied to patterns of structure and quantity and associated abstract logic model worlds. KF kairosfocus
Seversky at 71 pays lip service to valuing empirical evidence Sev: "You could say it (empirical evidence) has more practical value and is more reliable because it has been tested against observable reality.." Yet Seversky never puts his money where his mouth is. i.e. Seversky never allows the empirical evidence to falsify his apriori belief in Darwinian evolution. Here are a few empirical falsifications of Darwin's theory that the vast majority of Darwinists simply ignore as if they do not matter to the overall scientific validity of their theory.
1. Darwin’s theory holds mutations to the genome to be random. The vast majority of mutations to the genome are not random but are now found to be ‘directed’. 2. Darwin’s theory holds that Natural Selection is the ‘designer substitute’ that produces the ‘appearance’ and/or illusion of design. Natural Selection, especially for multicellular organisms, is found to be grossly inadequate as the ‘designer substitute. 3. Darwin’s theory holds that mutations to DNA will eventually change the basic biological form of any given species into a new form of a brand new species. Yet, biological form is found to be irreducible to mutations to DNA, nor is biological form reducible to any other material particulars in biology one may wish to invoke. 4. Darwin’s theory, (via Fisher’s Theorem in population genetics), assumed there to be an equal proportion of good and bad mutations to DNA which were, ultimately, responsible for all the diversity and complexity of life we see on earth. Yet, the ratio of detrimental to beneficial mutations is overwhelmingly detrimental. Detrimental to such a point that it is seriously questioned whether there are any truly beneficial, information building, mutations whatsoever. 5. Charles Darwin himself held that the gradual unfolding of life would (someday) be self-evident in the fossil record. Yet, from the Cambrian Explosion onward, the fossil record is consistently characterized by the sudden appearance of a group/kind in the fossil record, (i.e. disparity), then rapid diversity within the group/kind, and then long term stability and even deterioration of variety within the overall group/kind, and within the specific species of the kind, over long periods of time. Of the few dozen or so fossils claimed as transitional, not one is uncontested as a true example of transition between major animal forms out of millions of collected fossils. Moreover, Fossils are found in the “wrong place” all the time (either too early, or too late). 6. Darwin’s theory, due to the randomness postulate, holds that patterns will not repeat themselves in supposedly widely divergent species. Yet thousands of instances of what is ironically called ‘convergent evolution’, on both the morphological and genetic level, falsifies the Darwinian belief that patterns will not repeat themselves in widely divergent species. 7. Charles Darwin himself stated that “If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down.” Yet as Doug Axe pointed out, “Basically every gene and every new protein fold, there is nothing of significance that we can show that can be had in that gradualistic way. It’s all a mirage. None of it happens that way.” 8. Charles Darwin himself stated that “If it could be proved that any part of the structure of any one species had been formed for the exclusive good of another species, it would annihilate my theory, for such could not have been produced through natural selection.” Yet as Wolf-Ekkehard Lönnig pointed out, “in thousands of plant species often entirely new organs have been formed for the exclusive good of more than 132,930 other species, these ‘ugly facts’ have annihilated Darwin’s theory as well as modern versions of it.” 9. Charles Darwin himself stated that, ““The impossibility of conceiving that this grand and wondrous universe, with our conscious selves, arose through chance, seems to me the chief argument for the existence of God. Yet ‘our conscious selves’ are certainly not explainable by ‘chance’ (nor is consciousness explainable by any possible reductive materialistic explanation in general), i.e. ‘the hard problem of consciousness’. 10. Besides the mathematics of probability consistently showing that Darwinian evolution is impossible, the mathematics of population genetics itself has now shown Darwinian evolution to be impossible. Moreover, ‘immaterial’ mathematics itself, which undergirds all of science, engineering and technology, is held by most mathematicians to exist in some timeless, unchanging, immaterial, Platonic realm. Yet, the reductive materialism that Darwinian theory is based upon denies the existence of the immaterial realm that mathematics exists in. i.e. Darwinian evolution actually denies the objective reality of the one thing, i.e. mathematics, that it most needs in order to be considered scientific in the first place! 11. Donald Hoffman has, via population genetics, shown that if Darwin’s materialistic theory were true then all our observations of reality would be unreliable and/or illusory. Yet the scientific method itself is based on reliable observation. Moreover, Quantum Mechanics itself has now shown that conscious observation must come before material reality, i.e. falsification of ‘realism’ proves that our conscious observations are reliable!. 12. The reductive materialism that undergirds Darwinian thought holds that immaterial information is merely ’emergent’ from a material basis. Yet immaterial Information, via experimental realization of the “Maxwell’s Demon” thought experiment, is now found to be its own distinctive physical entity that, although it can interact in a ‘top down’ manner with matter and energy, is separate from matter and energy. 13. Darwinists hold that Darwin’s theory is true. Yet ‘Truth’ itself is an abstract property of an immaterial mind that is irreducible to the reductive materialistic explanations of Darwinian evolution. i.e. Assuming reductive materialism and/or Naturalism as the starting philosophical position of science actually precludes ‘the truth’ from ever being reached by science! 14. Darwinists, due to their underlying naturalistic philosophy, insist that teleology (i.e. goal directed purpose) does not exist. Yet it is impossible for Biologists to do biological research without constantly invoking words that directly imply teleology. i.e. The very words that Biologists themselves are forced to use when they are doing their research falsifies Darwinian evolution. Darwinism vs. Falsification - list and link to defense of each claim https://docs.google.com/document/d/1I6fT6ATY700Bsx2-JSFqL6l-rzXpMcZcZKZfYRS45h4/edit
Verse:
1 Thessalonians 5:21 but test all things. Hold fast to what is good.
bornagain77
Regarding strong emergence -- Is there any way to test for the difference between strong emergence and not having any explanation at all? I don't have a problem with weak emergence but that only represents a category of explanation rather than an explanatory principle in itself. With strong emergence, if it's permissible to define an explanatory principle purely in terms of its inability to explain, then the statement "Science explains everything." becomes a tautology. Something's wrong there. hnorman42
Whistler @64 and Bornagain77 @69, I've mentioned this before in other posts, but it bears repeating. The earliest example in history of an experiment using the complete scientific method can be found in . . . the Bible! Skeptical?
The First Recorded Scientific Experiment in History Jews and Christians have a rich legacy in scientific endeavors and discoveries. The first rigorous scientific experiment recorded in history is found in the writings of Daniel, a young Jewish captive of the Babylonian empire. Daniel and his friends did not want to eat the choice Babylonian food ordered for them by the king. As described in Daniel 1:11-16, Daniel’s experiment in nutrition included the essential components of the scientific method: • A hypothesis • A set period of time • More than one experimental subject • Both an experimental group and a control group • Well-defined parameters • A change in a single variable • An independent evaluator • Observation and analysis—subjective in the absence of blood tests • A written record • A grant This text is astonishing considering that Daniel’s experiment was conducted about 2,600 years ago! As a result, Daniel and his friends received a grant—they were allowed to maintain their vegetarian diet.
-Q Querius
Origenes Emergentism is the hypothesis that something that cannot be explained from its parts nonetheless follows(?) from its parts and therefore **MAGICALLY** emerges from its parts **POOF**.
Do you mean *Poof *POOF * poof? :) Sandy
Sev 71 So what? Vivid vividbleau
~ Eric Anderson on **emergence**
It is true that we can use words (like “instinct”) to describe things that are not well understood. It is also true that the word “emerge” is a perfectly legitimate word in the English language that can be used appropriately in many situations. This isn’t the problem. The problem is when the word emergence is used as an answer to how something came about or as a causal explanation. The only reason you know that water “emerges” from H and O is because you know that H and O will react to produce water. If you didn’t know the underlying cause, it would be illegitimate to claim that water emerges from them. You might suspect it. You might not know of another explanation. But you wouldn’t be able to say that H + O, on their own, produce water. (Further, as I’ve already mentioned, calling the process “emergence” doesn’t add anything to our knowledge or understanding. It is completely superfluous. If people want to run around using superfluous terminology, fine. But they shouldn’t expect anyone else to take them seriously.) Worse, when emergence itself is put forth as though it were a process or a cause, it is simply false. That is the problem with how the word is so often used, particularly in debates about evolution and consciousness. Consider the following examples: “A light emerged in the darkness.” or “A wolf emerged from the forest.” These are perfectly legitimate uses of the word “emerge”. In each case they tell us that something appeared that was not previously there – that we observed something new. Yet these statements are not attempting to be a causal explanation. No-one is claiming that the darkness somehow produced the light, or that the forest trees somehow produced the wolf.” So when we ask the question How?, it is a causal inquiry, and references to emergence are unhelpful, at best, and more often, misleading. If someone is claiming that a living organism emerged from the primordial soup or that consciousness emerged from electrical impulses between neurons, they are offering a causal explanation. And the idea of emergence doesn’t work in that capacity. It fails, both practically and logically. (....) If emergence is a class of explanations, then there must be examples of emergence that would fall into this “class or category”. One alleged example was discussed in the OP, namely the idea of the emergence of consciousness from physical properties and physical processes. CR gave another alleged example: the “universality of computation”. There are two fundamental problems with CR’s approach above: 1. We have been discussing concrete examples. His ongoing assertion that there is some kind of category error between the class and the specific examples doesn’t make any sense. It is irrational to say that “emergence” is unhelpful as a class of explanations, but helpful as a concrete explanation. This is very confused. I can certainly say that “Bob drives a car”, and that could be useful information, even if I don’t give the concrete make, model, and year of the car. The issue in this whole situation is not whether we are referring to a class or a specific member of the class. The issue is that the concept of “emergence” as an explanatory attempt to explain the origin of something is useless. It doesn’t make any difference whether we are talking about specific examples or the whole class. CR seems to have mistakenly latched onto what he perceives as some kind of category error, all the while missing the more fundamental point. 2. In none of the cases we have been discussing — consciousness or the universality of computation, for example — has the word “emergence” provided one iota of useful information. It has brought nothing to the table. Saying that it “emerged” doesn’t help us understand how it emerged or what physical characteristics caused it to emerge or even whether it did emerge. Contrary to CR’s claim, the fact that universality of computation resulsts from a specific repertoire of computations does not mean we have an “emergent explanation“. Putting that label on the results doesn’t explain anything. Thus, the OP is exactly correct to suggest that emergence really functions as “a confession of profound ignorance masquerading as an explanation.” —– As with so much in materialist thought, the explanations sound good as long as they remain vague and general. As soon as we start to ask about the details, the “explanation” crumbles. As I have often noted with evolutionary theory generally, the same principle can be applied to emergence: The perception of the explanatory power of emergence is inversely proportional to the specificity of the discussion.
Origenes
Vividbleau/66
As StephenB would say “Reason informs the evidence not the other way around”
Reason without data is vacuous. For example, borrowing from Lewis Carroll. All borogoves are mimsy, All mome raths are borogoves, Therefore, all mome raths are mimsy. A basic deductive argument but so what? On the other hand, a collection of facts without an explanatory framework into which they can be fitted and which makes sense of them, is no more than a collection of butterflies. Interesting, but so what?
Empirical knowledge is not the highest form of knowledge.
Depends on what you mean by "highest" You could say it has more practical value and is more reliable because it has been tested against observable reality..
This is the reason many atheists ( not all) hate philosophy, often times deny reason and logic all the while totally ignorant that their “empiricism” is itself a philosophical position. Go figure.
I think there are a few atheists/empiricists/naturalists/physicalists etc, who regard philosophy as a futile exercise in circumlocutory tergiversation but I'm not one of them. As for empiricism being a philosophical position, so what? Seversky
What is emergence? What does “emergent” mean? […] Emergent broadly speaking refers to novel types of behavior in systems with many interacting constituents. A good example is the “La ola” wave that you sometimes see in the audience of sporting events. It’s not something you can do alone. It only becomes possible because of the interaction between people and their neighbors. Indeed, something very similar happens in many condensed-matter systems, where the interactions between atomic constituents gives rise to certain types of collective behavior. These can be waves, like with la ola. The simplest example of this are sound waves. Sound waves are really just a simple, collective description for atoms in a gas that move periodically and so create a propagating mode. But we know that in quantum mechanics waves are also particles and the other way round. This is why in condensed matter systems one can have “quasi-particles” which behave like particles – with quantum properties and wave-behavior and all that – but are actually a collective that moves together. Quasi-particles are emergent from the interactions of many fundamental particles. And this is really the most relevant property of emergence. Something is emergent if it comes about from the collective behavior of many constituents of a system, be that people or atoms. If something is emergent, it does not even make sense to speak about it for individual elements of the system. There are a lot of quantities in physics which are emergent. Think for example of conductivity. Conductivity is the ability of a system to transport currents from one end to another. It’s a property of materials. But it does not make sense to speak of the conductivity of a single electron. It’s the same for viscosity, elasticity, even something as seemingly simple as the color of a material. Color is not a property you find if you take apart a painting into elementary particles. It comes from the band structure of molecules. It’s an emergent property. You will find that philosophers discuss two types of emergence, that is “strong emergence” and “weak emergence”. What I just talked about is “weak emergence”. Weak emergence means that the emergent property can be derived from the properties the system’s constituents and the interactions between the constituents. An electron or a quark may not have a conductivity, but in principle you can calculate how they form atoms, and molecules, and metals, and then the conductivity is a consequence of this. In physics the only type of emergence we have is weak emergence. With strong emergence philosophers refer to the hypothetical possibility that a system with many constituents displays a novel behavior which cannot be derived from the properties and the interactions of the constituents. While this is logically possible, there is not a single known example for this in the real world. The best analogy I can think of are photographic mosaics, that are photos made up of smaller photos. If I gave you all the individual photos and their properties you’d have no idea what the “emergent” picture will be. However, this example is hardly a natural phenomenon. To make a photographic mosaic, you start with the emergent image you want to get and then look for photos that will fit. In other words, the “strong emergence” which you have here works only thanks to an “intelligent designer” who had a masterplan. The problem with strong emergence is not only that we have no scientific theory for it, it’s worse. Strong emergence is incompatible with what we already know about the laws of nature. That’s because if you think that strong emergence can really happen, then this necessarily implies that there will be objects in this world whose behavior is in conflict with the standard model of particle physics. If that wasn’t so, then really it wouldn’t be strong emergence. […] Seversky
Whistler, modern science was born in Medieval Christian Europe out of three Judeo-Christian presuppositions, (1) Intelligibility, (2) The Contingency of Nature, and (3) The Fallibility of Human Reasoning.
New Book: For Kepler, Science Did Not Point to Atheism - Stephen C. Meyer - January 17, 2023 The Conflict Myth Unmade,,, As historian Ian Barbour says, “science in its modern form” arose “in Western civilization alone, among all the cultures of the world,” because only the Christian West had the necessary “intellectual presuppositions underlying the rise of science.”2 So, what were those presuppositions? We can identify three. As Melissa Cain Travis shows, (in her book: "Thinking God’s Thoughts: Johannes Kepler and the Miracle of Cosmic Comprehensibility"), all have their place in Kepler’s seminal works. More generally, all find their origin in the Judeo-Christian idea of a Creator God who fashioned human beings and an orderly universe. (1) Intelligibility First, the (Christian) founders of modern science assumed the intelligibility of nature. They believed that nature had been designed by the mind of a rational God, the same God who made the rational minds of human beings. These thinkers assumed that if they used their minds to carefully study nature, they could understand the order and design that God had placed in the world.,,, (2) The Contingency of Nature Second, early pioneers of science presupposed the contingency of nature. They believed that God had many choices about how to make an orderly world. Just as there are many ways to design a watch, there were many ways that God could have designed the universe. To discover how He did, scientists could not merely deduce the order of nature by assuming what seemed most logical to them; they couldn’t simply use reason alone to draw conclusions, as some of the Greek philosophers had done.,,, (3) The Fallibility of Human Reasoning Third, early scientists accepted a biblical understanding of the power and limits of the human mind. Even as these scientists saw human reason as the gift of a rational God, they also recognized the fallibility of humans and, therefore, the fallibility of human ideas about nature.,,, Such a nuanced view of human nature implied, on the one hand, that human beings could attain insight into the workings of the natural world, but that, on the other, they were vulnerable to self-deception, flights of fancy, and prematurely jumping to conclusions. This composite view of reason — one that affirmed both its capability and fallibility — inspired confidence that the design and order of nature could be understood if scientists carefully studied the natural world, but also engendered caution about trusting human intuition, conjectures, and hypotheses unless they were carefully tested by experiment and observation.11,,, https://evolutionnews.org/2023/01/new-book-for-kepler-science-did-not-point-to-atheism/ Stephen Meyer - Ph.D. in the philosophy of science from the University of Cambridge
And the 'scientific method', or more particularly, the 'bottom-up' inductive reasoning that lays behind the scientific method, was championed and popularized by Francis Bacon primarily because of his deeply held Christian belief in man's fallen sinful nature.
Bacon’s “Enchanted Glass” – Emily Morales – December 2019 Excerpt: It was the rather low regard for the fallen human mind, besieged as it were by sin, that drove Francis Bacon, the “Father” of the Scientific Method, to formulate a new epistemology in his Great Instauration. In this brilliant man of faith’s view, the Adamic fall left an indelible mark on the human intellect, such that in its total depravity and persistent infirmity it could not be trusted to generate knowledge that was in any way free from bias, wrong presuppositions, or contradictions.,,, Recognizing then, the limitations of the human mind for revealing truth by mere logic and deductive reasoning, Bacon posited an altogether different means for knowledge acquisition: experimentation3—repeated experimentation—within the context of a scientific community (natural philosophers in his day). Bacon’s inductive methodology facilitated an explosion in knowledge of the natural world and accompanying technological advancement: https://salvomag.com/post/bacons-enchanted-glass 3. Harrison, P. (2007). The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science. Cambridge University Press. The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science - Peter Harrison - 2007 Description: Peter Harrison provides an account of the religious foundations of scientific knowledge. He shows how the approaches to the study of nature that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were directly informed by theological discussions about the Fall of Man and the extent to which the mind and the senses had been damaged by that primeval event. Scientific methods, he suggests, were originally devised as techniques for ameliorating the cognitive damage wrought by human sin. At its inception, modern science was conceptualized as a means of recapturing the knowledge of nature that Adam had once possessed. Contrary to a widespread view that sees science emerging in conflict with religion, Harrison argues that theological considerations were of vital importance in the framing of the scientific method. https://www.amazon.com/Fall-Man-Foundations-Science/dp/0521117291 Peter Harrison is a former Andreas Idreos Professor of Science and Religion at the University of Oxford and is presently Research Professor and Director of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of Queensland. He was the 2011 Gifford Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh and holds a Senior Research Fellowship in the Ian Ramsey Centre at Oxford
Further notes
Bacon’s inductive methodology, which he introduced as a check and balance against humanity’s fallen sinful nature, was a radically different form of ‘bottom up’ reasoning that was completely different than the ‘top down’ deductive reasoning of the ancient Greeks which had preceded it. A form of ‘top-down’ reasoning in which people “pronounced on how the world should behave, with insufficient attention to how the world in fact did behave.” https://uncommondesc.wpengine.com/logic-and-first-principles-of-right-reason/at-reasons-org-i-think-therefore-it-must-be-true-part-1-the-science-of-belief/#comment-769074
Verse
1 Thessalonians 5:21 but test all things. Hold fast to what is good.
bornagain77
~ Why emergence is true **POOF** magic ~ 1.) If we know how the smaller or simpler entities give rise to the larger entity, then we can describe it perfectly well, thank you very much, without ever invoking this concept of “emergence”. That is why we talk about water forming from a certain number of molecules and through certain chemical bonds. We don’t talk of water “emerging” from hydrogen and oxygen. 2.) If we do know of a larger entity that cannot be explained by its parts (to date there is no known example of such), then we can’t really say, what the emergentist says, namely that the larger entity **nonetheless** emerged from the smaller entities. In fact, if we would ever be confronted with such an enigmatic thing, the logical conclusion would be, after it is established that the parts are not a sufficient cause, that the search for a sufficient cause must continue elsewhere and be directed away from the parts. Emergentism is the hypothesis that something that cannot be explained from its parts nonetheless follows(?) from its parts and therefore **MAGICALLY** emerges from its parts **POOF**. Origenes
The secret to the Evolution debate is ecology. Nothing can enter an ecology that would destroy the ecology. This eliminates Darwinian evolution, punctuated equilibrium, emergence or any other possible mechanism except intelligence in the development of life. Adaptation or Darwinian processes exist and are active in change of life but only in relatively minor ways. That’s why what is seen is genetics and only that. There is no major accumulation of changes to a species. It would destroy the ecology. Intelligence is absolutely necessary for major change to preclude harm to the ecology. It’s as simple as that. jerry
Whistler As StephenB would say “Reason informs the evidence not the other way around” Empirical knowledge is not the highest form of knowledge. This is the reason many atheists ( not all) hate philosophy, often times deny reason and logic all the while totally ignorant that their “empiricism” is itself a philosophical position. Go figure. Vivid vividbleau
PM1, Darwin knew enough to be very concerned about a process that if it worked would bring our thinking into deep discredit. That has not changed, and the reality is still that a computational substrate is inherently non rational, as say Haldane already realised. The resort to poof magic emergence etc is little more than a back handed admission of no good answer. We are seeing more and more reason to question what is being pushed in the name of science, education and progress by those who have entrenched themselves in key institutions. Reformation is needed but it will not come from within. KF kairosfocus
I consider myself a naturalist insofar as I hold that scientific methods are the best approach we have yet devised for describing and explaining the underlying structures of reality. That is, I am a scientific realist.
The "scientific" method is based on 3 ancient philosophies: The Realism, The Empiricism and The Skepticism . Philosophy is the base of science and as a consequence philosophy is more valuable than science but atheists for an obvious reason try to chop science( that is wrought by philosophy) from philosophy itself and make from science a kind of golden calf to be worshiped. An invented idol. This is somehow natural because atheists (after rejecting God) their own hierarchy of value it's turned upside down starting to whorship the matter as a god that needs to perform countless miracles(see darwinian evolution fairytale). whistler
But yes, most of the discussions on UD are nonsense.. jerry
the folly of thinking that there is an external, objective reality you can find “truth” in beyond the logical truths one could just as easily demonstrate within.
Is there an interstate in south central Texas where you live? Is that real? How do you get the food you eat and the water you drink? Is that a reality. The real question is whether the posts that someone who claims to live in south central Texas, is from a human being or a chatbot? jerry
@58
It’s pretty wild for you to assume that my assessment “completely unanswerable” is merely a description of you not answering them. That was not my intent at all.
Well, ok, fair enough. But then why the heck did you say that your questions were "completely unanswerable"? PyrrhoManiac1
I'm greatly enjoying the current pandemic of alternative narratives. IMO it is driving home the folly of thinking that there is an external, objective reality you can find "truth" in beyond the logical truths one could just as easily demonstrate within. No supposed external reference is necessary. "Self-reference" is all we have to work with or from. Everything we do and think is - ultimately - entirely self-referential. William J Murray
I think that in general it's a mistake to look for essential definitions for any wide-ranging "-ism" that has been defended (and attacked) by many different people, for many different reasons, across wide swaths of history. An "-ism" is a banner under which more than one army has marched. (I also like to bear in mind Nietzsche: "all concepts, in which an entire process has been semiotically congealed, elude their definitions; definiability is only for that which has no history" -- Genealogy of Morality II:13; trans. modified.) I won't get into the history of "naturalism" or "emergentism", fascinating as those topics are to me. I consider myself a naturalist insofar as I hold that scientific methods are the best approach we have yet devised for describing and explaining the underlying structures of reality. That is, I am a scientific realist. This does not mean that everything non-scientific must be jettisoned. On the contrary, I think we have good reasons for believing that epistemically virtuous science -- what Kitcher calls "well-ordered science" -- is extremely difficult to do, and hence many interesting and important issues cannot be resolved by any current or near-future foreseeable scientific practices. In other words, for any belief that p, one has a defeater for p if the best confirmed scientific theories of one's time indicate or entail ~p. (But since scientific practices are always fallible and corrigible, it is always possible that scientists will subsequently indicate or entail p.) What grounds my commitment to scientific realism lies in the methods of science. But I do not think that any specific science is privileged over the others. There are some questions for which statistical thermodynamics is a better approach than qualitative sociology, and other questions for which the reverse is the case. The idea of emergentism lies in the conjunction of two theses. The first is a commitment to the unity of science -- all the sciences are about the same world, so it should be possible to coordinate their findings into a single metaphysical picture of the world. The second is a commitment to anti-reductionism: inter-theoretic reduction, long seen as the Holy Grail in philosophy of science, is exceedingly difficult (see Beyond Reduction). I can see the prospects for giving up on the unity of science, as Dupre and Cartwright have done. But I don't see any hope for reviving reductionism. So as I see it, it's either making sense of emergentism or giving up on having any unified scientific metaphysics completely. PyrrhoManiac1
PM1
It’s pretty wild that you assume that your questions are “completely unanswerable” just because I happen to not answer them.
It’s pretty wild for you to assume that my assessment “completely unanswerable” is merely a description of you not answering them. That was not my intent at all. Origenes
@56
The most basic questions about it turn out to be completely unanswerable.
It's pretty wild that you assume that your questions are "completely unanswerable" just because I happen to not answer them. You know nothing about who I am, how I live, and what else I have going on in my life. And it's hard to keep track of conversations in threads where there are multiple conversations between many participants and bornagain77 tosses in a Gish gallop every few days. In the future, should I lose track of a conversation, please remind me that I haven't responded to something you've said, instead of attributing to me an inability to do so. PyrrhoManiac1
Let's stop pretending that emergent consciousness is a coherent concept that deserves serious consideration. It simply is not. The most basic questions about it turn out to be completely unanswerable. From the Galton board thread:
PM1: The global features of the brain aren’t a separate entity that controls the neurons: the whole constrains what the parts are able to do.
Ori: That does not seem to address my concerns. Because the whole must ‘constrain’ the parts in such a way, that they get involved in free choices, reasoning, world view, intentionality, typing sentences, and so on … So, that must be a very flexible and precise constraint. So, the same questions return. For instance, how does the whole ‘constrain’ neurons in such a way that they get involved in, let’s say, the issue of morality? Another concern of mine is the following. We are talking about top-down causation. The ‘whole’, you say, constrains the neurons, it steers the neurons rather than the neurons steering the whole. Top-down causation. Ok. But to have top-down causation, there must be a top level that exerts its power downwards onto the lower (chemical) levels of the brain. My question is: what level is exactly independent of the lower chemical levels of the brain? Is there a mental level independent from the brain chemistry (the ‘whole’ perhaps) where thoughts, feelings, and intentions are? A level that can be said to have top-down causation from a certain independence of chemistry? And if there is no such level, then what is doing the top-down causation? If there is no such thing as a person with all its attributes that is independent of the brain, then what is it that exerts top-down causation?
Like with 'naturalism', it is completely unclear what 'emergentism' actually pretends to propose. Origenes
@54
PM1, it is not my argument, it is Darwin’s admission.
I would not call it an 'admission': it is a concern that he raises, given what little was known about cognitive ethology in 1881. In 2023, we can be much more confident that large-brain social primates (such as monkeys) really do reliably track lots of complex causal and social relations (see How Monkeys See the World and Baboon Metaphysics). I also recommend Nature and Normativity by Mark Okrent. Okrent argues that baboons count as at least proto-rational animals. It's really fascinating!)
As to your emergence argument, at best it would lead to a computational substrate, inherently GIGO limited and utterly incapable of responsible, free reasoning.
This is not quite right. It is true that I emphasized computation as a function that brains perform, but computation is performed on representations. The GIGO problem would arise for me only if I did not have an account of causally efficacious semantic contents on which computations are performed.
That’s disregarding the problem of creating the complex functional organisation and information from filtered lucky noise.
I don't disregard that problem -- it's rather that I think that Deacon's account of teleodynamics emergent from thermodynamics does the basic conceptual work that's required (see here (PDF)). Of course that's not to say that his account has been empirically confirmed. And it would be a separate issue to defend emergentism as a metaphysical position as such (but I think that an excellent attempt at that is done here). PyrrhoManiac1
PM1, it is not my argument, it is Darwin's admission. As to your emergence argument, at best it would lead to a computational substrate, inherently GIGO limited and utterly incapable of responsible, free reasoning. That's disregarding the problem of creating the complex functional organisation and information from filtered lucky noise. KF kairosfocus
I'm not really interested in defending either determinism or indeterminism. I find all these debates are so unmoored from science that they become idle speculations. It's sufficient that agent causation can be grounded in thermodynamics (see here). PyrrhoManiac1
@51 Like determined physical events, undetermined physical events also do not allow for a person to be in control of his thoughts, per Van Inwagen:
“Let us look carefully at the consequences of supposing that human behavior is undetermined … Let us suppose that there is a certain current-pulse that is proceeding along one of the neural pathways in Jane’s brain and that it is about to come to a fork. And let us suppose that if it goes to the left, she will make her confession;, and that if it goes to the right, she will remain silent. And let us suppose that it is undetermined which way the pulse goes when it comes to the fork: even an omniscient being with a complete knowledge of the state of Jane’s brain and a complete knowledge of the laws of physics and unlimited powers of calculation could say no more than: ‘The laws and present state of her brain would allow the pulse to go either way; consequently, no prediction of what the pulse will do when it comes to the fork is possible; it might go to the left, and it might go to the right, and that’s all there is to be said.’ Now let us ask: does Jane have any choice about whether the pulse goes to the left or to the right? If we think about this question for a moment, we shall see that it is very hard to see how she could have any choice about that. …There is no way for her to make it go one way rather than the other. Or, at least, there is no way for her to make it go one way rather than the other and leave the ‘choice’ it makes an undetermined event.” [Van Inwagen]
Origenes
@50 If you were to replace "physicalism" with "determinism" I would have no objection to your argument. PyrrhoManiac1
Sandy @22
If one thought exists then naturalism is impossible. It's that simple.
Truth. Allow me to elaborate: If one thinks one thought, then physicalism* is impossible. Physicalism does not allow for a person who is in control of one single thought. Here follows the ironclad proof:
1. If physicalism is true, then all our actions and thoughts are consequences of events and laws of nature in the remote past before we were born. 2. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the remote past before we were born, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature. 3. If A causes B, and we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B. Therefore, 4. If physicalism is true, then we have no control over our own actions and thoughts.
- - - - - *) No longer will I argue against ‘naturalism’, because it is undefined. From now on when the term ‘naturalism’ pops up I will take it to mean physicalism. Origenes
JVL, context. We both know that I have never argued that core math is unattainable or absurd. The absurdity lies in refusing the same access to powerful logic for worldviews analysis and particularly for other aspects of the logic of being. Hence my comment on trying to have one's cake and eat it too. Darwin's horrid doubt points to the need for respecting the credibility of mind with sophisticated reasoning -- more precisely, logic, especially modal logic starting with S5 [which is algebraic] -- across the board. KF kairosfocus
@46
Not absurd to a mathematician. Some of that mathematics has turned out to be incredibly useful. I had an ex-student tell me that fast Fourier transforms are ubiquitous in some fields of engineering.
I believe you misunderstood KF's use of "absurd". He was not saying that mathematics is absurd. He was saying that if the human mind is the result of natural selection filtering out non-satisficing neurocognitive functions, then we have no reason to believe that any of our mental capacities are generally reliable, hence we must accept the absurd result of rejecting all of mathematics. A somewhat different way in which KF could have made his point is that if the human mind is the result of natural selection filtering out non-satisficing neurocognitive functions, then we have no reason to suppose that we have a capacity for apprehending Platonic abstracta. And that would be a problem if realism about universals was the only way (or even the best way) of understanding the nature of abstract thought, including mathematics but also metaphysical speculation and ethical deliberation. It would be a disaster if our best-confirmed theory of what the mind is and how it evolved had the implication that abstract concepts like DEMOCRACY or JUSTICE were beyond the scope of the mind to even become aware of, and that such words are meaningless, flatus vocis. I am untroubled by this argument for primarily two reasons: (1) I think that conceptualism about universals, rather than realism, is a far more plausible and coherent position; (2) there is no conceptual tension between cognitive neuroscience and conceptualism about universals; see Abstract Concepts and the Embodied Mind. PyrrhoManiac1
@42
Perhaps before you make such sweeping claims for the ‘designing prowess’ of Darwinian processes, you just might want to experimentally solve the ‘hard problem’ first? Or is such an experimental threshold of credibility for your claim(s) beneath your dignity as a philosopher?
The hard problem of consciousness, as articulated by David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind, has no possible empirical solution. I'm surprised you take it seriously. If I recall, you have shown some disdain for merely abstract metaphysical puzzles that have no testable, measurable solution. The hard problem of consciousness falls into that category. I don't take it seriously, and I'm surprised that you do. To appreciate the hard problem of consciousness, consider the following list of behavioral and psychological criteria for consciousness*: 1. Global activity and accessibility (making information available to a number of different cognitive processes) 2. Binding and unification (creation of a single integrated experience from a variety of perceptual and cognitive processes) 3. Selection, plasticity, learning and attention (ability to select between different neurons and pathways/processes and inhibit attention to unnecessary information) 4. Intentionality (aboutness—reference to states of the body or world) 5. Temporal ‘thickness’ (persistence of experiences through time) 6. Values, emotions and goals (the felt valence of experience and subsequent motivation) 7. Embodiment, agency and a notion of ‘self’ (a distinction between self and environment) All of these criteria can be operationalized in psychological and neurological experiments, observed in self and in others, etc. The hard problem of consciousness asks: can we conceive of something that satisfies all six criteria in every measurable and observable way, but which lacks qualia? If you think that question is meaningless, then you don't take the hard problem of consciousness seriously. Chalmers is also quite clear that, since qualia are precisely what cannot be conceptually reduced to any observable criteria, there cannot be a scientific solution to the hard problem of consciousness. In The Conscious Mind he concludes with an argument for panpsychism, though I do not know if that's still his view. * From The Evolution of the Sensitive Soul by Ginsburg and Jablonka. PyrrhoManiac1
Kairosfocus: Mathematics is riddled with similar abstracta. Start with the — the only — null set and use von Neumann’s construction to go transfinite then go hyperreals. Infinitesimals, limits, calculus and beyond. All has to go, too. And more. Utterly, patently absurd Not absurd to a mathematician. Some of that mathematics has turned out to be incredibly useful. I had an ex-student tell me that fast Fourier transforms are ubiquitous in some fields of engineering. JVL
Whistler, media shield in action, as is being exposed at Twitter, now up to 15 drops on what has been going on, including that the approved investigators were twisting the truth and projecting defamation, creating an agit prop narrative from 2016 on or thereabouts, complete with blacklists of the innocent. I see, there was YT censorship on PV exposing a Director of Pfizer letting the cat out of the bag on gain of function, man made mutations to viruses; on claims that this is not what the new magisterium approves. As in a live case of the cultural relativist, the reformer must be wrong absurdity. Meanwhile, there is serious concern over adverse reactions and a surge in deaths. Eventually, a critical mass of people are going to hold the lot of them ideology driven liars and shut them out. This specifically includes major media and even academic sources. KF kairosfocus
Talking about self-defeating something something :)) Project Veritas and a Pfizer Director: https://twitter.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1619001318294552576 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2SjtYsET8Tc https://www.bitchute.com/video/EqdKrgIN18AS UPDATE: https://rumble.com/v27f5xw-breaking-james-okeefe-gives-update-on-youtube-removing-critical-mass-direct.html whistler
PM1, epistemology is inextricably intertwined with metaphysical and logical issues as part of core philosophy. Mathematics studies the logic of structure and quantity, reflecting logic of being. That is ontology and wider metaphysics. But the basic point is, quite abstract, even abstruse, based on huge inferential infrastructure. If one cannot trust one's mind to handle logic and linked metaphysics, trust in Math is similarly undermined, and if we have cognitive-logical capacity for math, we have same for metaphysics too. It is obvious that some seek to have their cake and eat it. KF PS, to give a first stage: Start with the null set {} --> 0 {0} --> 1 {0,1} --> 2 . . . N = {0,1,2 . . .} --> w w the first transfinite ordinal for n in N, define n' + n --> 0, so Z for p, q in Z define p/q --> Q for R, numbers at limit of power series of rationals [think, decimals] ponder H as > any n we may count to, h = 1/H less than 1/n, so transfinite and infinitesimal hyperreals Compare, one doubts. One doubts even one's existence, but to doubt must exist. Which, is self referential. And so forth. kairosfocus
PM1: "an evolutionary approach to cognitive neuroscience does not entail that our cognitive faculties are generally unreliable. On the contrary, it explains how and why they are reliable, to the extent that they are." Perhaps before you make such sweeping claims for the 'designing prowess' of Darwinian processes, you just might want to experimentally solve the 'hard problem' first? Or is such an experimental threshold of credibility for your claim(s) beneath your dignity as a philosopher?
The Hardest Problem in Science? October 28, 2011 Excerpt: ‘But the hard problem of consciousness is so hard that I can’t even imagine what kind of empirical findings would satisfactorily solve it. In fact, I don’t even know what kind of discovery would get us to first base, not to mention a home run.’ – David Barash – Professor of Psychology emeritus at the University of Washington. https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/brainstorm/the-hardest-problem-in-science/40845
bornagain77
PM1, epistemology is already beyond the threshold.
Well, Humean epistemology is certainly not beyond 'the threshold,' since it's basically just introspectionist associationist psychology. (Whether that's adequate as epistemology is, of course, precisely the point of Kant's critique.)
Mathematics is riddled with similar abstracta. Start with the — the only — null set and use von Neumann’s construction to go transfinite then go hyperreals. Infinitesimals, limits, calculus and beyond.
This would depend entirely on what philosophy of mathematics one accepts. It's probably right to say that a Humean mind could not grasp Platonic abstracta. But Platonism is not the only game in town, when it comes to philosophy of mathematics. Intuitionism, for example, might be an option for the Humean. Regardless of that issue, I still don't see any argument for "Darwin's Doubt" need trouble anyone today -- an evolutionary approach to cognitive neuroscience does not entail that our cognitive faculties are generally unreliable. On the contrary, it explains how and why they are reliable, to the extent that they are. PyrrhoManiac1
BA77, not only near death but dying experiences that in this part of the world are sometimes called, travelling, often involving interactions with close others [sometimes utterly unexpected], and of course the dying visions you have noted, Ac 7 has one, and Ac 9 has a similar but non dying experience. There are too many for them to be delusional without consequences for general credibility of mind. Which brings us back to the self referentiality challenge. KF kairosfocus
In regards to,,,
Naturalism, according to Slagle:,,, 4. The mind is causally derivative from the physical.,,,
In regards to that claim, Sev responds,
"What we observe so far is that the mind/consciousness disappears irretrievably when the brain dies so that is a reasonable inference."
Over the years Sev has made that claim, and been corrected on that claim, at least 10 times now, perhaps even 20 or 30 times. And yet, he simply refuses to listen. As AD noted, "it must be hard to spend so much time here, with your fingers in your ears and having to incessantly yell LALALALALALALALALALALALALALA!" Not to mention that it must be extremely hard to type on your computer with your fingers planted firmly in your ears. :) But anyways, here goes again. We have far more 'observational', which is to say 'eye-witness', evidence for the fact that the immaterial mind/soul can exist apart from the material body than than we do for the Darwinian claim that unguided material processes can generate functional information.
Near-Death Experiences: Putting a Darwinist's Evidentiary Standards to the Test - Dr. Michael Egnor - October 15, 2012 Excerpt: Indeed, about 20 percent of NDE's are corroborated, which means that there are independent ways of checking about the veracity of the experience. The patients knew of things that they could not have known except by extraordinary perception -- such as describing details of surgery that they watched while their heart was stopped, etc. Additionally, many NDE's have a vividness and a sense of intense reality that one does not generally encounter in dreams or hallucinations.,,, The most "parsimonious" explanation -- the simplest scientific explanation -- is that the (Near Death) experience was real. Tens of millions of people have had such experiences. That is tens of millions of more times than we have observed the origin of species , (or the origin of life, or the origin of a protein/gene, or of a molecular machine), which is never.,,, The materialist reaction, in short, is unscientific and close-minded. NDE's show fellows like Coyne at their sneering unscientific irrational worst. Somebody finds a crushed fragment of a fossil and it's earth-shaking evidence. Tens of million of people have life-changing spiritual experiences and it's all a big yawn. Note: Dr. Egnor is professor and vice-chairman of neurosurgery at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. http://www.evolutionnews.org/2012/10/near_death_expe_1065301.html
Again, we have far more observational evidence for the reality of immaterial minds/souls than we do for the Darwinian claim that unguided material processes can generate functional information. Moreover, the transcendent nature of 'immaterial' information, which is the one thing that, (as every ID advocate intimately knows), unguided material processes cannot possibly explain the origin of, directly supports the transcendent nature, as well as the physical reality, of the immaterial mind/soul:
Oct. 2022 - So since Darwinian Atheists, as a foundational presupposition of their materialistic philosophy, (and not from any compelling scientific evidence mind you), deny the existence of souls, (and since the materialist’s denial of souls, (and God), has led (via atheistic tyrants) to so much catastrophic disaster on human societies in the 20th century), then it is VERY important to ‘scientifically’ establish the existence of these ‘souls’ that are of incalculable worth, and that are equal, before God. https://uncommondesc.wpengine.com/off-topic/what-must-we-do-when-the-foundations-are-being-destroyed/#comment-768496
Moreover, although Einstein himself did not believe in a personal God, nor in life after death, special relativity itself contradicts Einstein and offers rather stunning 'scientific' evidence that the NDE testimonies, (testimonies of going through a tunnel to a higher heavenly dimension), are in fact accurate 'physical' descriptions of what happens after death.
Dec. 2022 - That what we now know to be physically true from special relativity, (namely that it outlines a ‘timeless’, i.e. eternal, ‘dimension of light’ that exists above this temporal dimension), would fit hand and glove with the personal testimonies of people who have had a deep heavenly NDEs is, needless to say, powerful evidence that their testimonies are, in fact, true, and that they are accurately describing the physical ‘reality’ of a higher heavenly dimension, that they experienced first hand, that really does indeed physically exist above this temporal dimension. https://uncommondesc.wpengine.com/intelligent-design/at-mind-matters-news-are-extra-dimensions-of-the-universe-real-or-imaginary/#comment-772620
Darwinian materialists also like to claim that these millions of reported experiences of life after death are merely 'hallucinations' of the dying brain. But directly contrary to their 'hallucination hypothesis', it is now found that the 'memories of near-death experiences are recalled as ‘‘realer” than real events or imagined events.'
Characteristics of memories for near-death experiences - Lauren E. Moore, Bruce Greyson - March 2017 Abstract: Near-death experiences are vivid, life-changing experiences occurring to people who come close to death. Because some of their features, such as enhanced cognition despite compromised brain function, challenge our understanding of the mind-brain relationship, the question arises whether near-death experiences are imagined rather than real events. We administered the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire to 122 survivors of a close brush with death who reported near-death experiences. Participants completed Memory Characteristics Questionnaires for three different memories: that of their near-death experience, that of a real event around the same time, and that of an event they had imagined around the same time. The Memory Characteristics Questionnaire score was higher for the memory of the near-death experience than for that of the real event, which in turn was higher than that of the imagined event. These data suggest that memories of near-death experiences are recalled as ‘‘realer” than real events or imagined events. https://med.virginia.edu/perceptual-studies/wp-content/uploads/sites/360/2017/03/NDE-85-MCQ-ConCog.pdf
Exactly how is it remotely possible for a supposed 'hallucination' to be ‘‘realer” than real events or imagined events'? Moreover, as if all that was not bad enough for Darwinian materialists, their belief that material particles are the ultimate substratum from which all reality, and all life, flows is now falsified by the violation of Leggett's inequality which falsified what is termed "realism", (of note: "realism' is the notion that material reality exists independently of any measurement and/or observation of it) As the following article stated, “Leggett’s inequality is violated – thus stressing the quantum-mechanical assertion that reality does not exist when we’re not observing it.” and "“You would also have to give up certain intuitive features of realism.”
Quantum physics says goodbye to reality – Apr 20, 2007 Excerpt: Many realizations of the thought experiment have indeed verified the violation of Bell’s inequality. These have ruled out all hidden-variables theories based on joint assumptions of realism, meaning that reality exists when we are not observing it; and locality, meaning that separated events cannot influence one another instantaneously. But a violation of Bell’s inequality does not tell specifically which assumption – realism, locality or both – is discordant with quantum mechanics. Markus Aspelmeyer, Anton Zeilinger and colleagues from the University of Vienna, however, have now shown that realism is more of a problem than locality in the quantum world. They devised an experiment that violates a different inequality proposed by physicist Anthony Leggett in 2003 that relies only on realism, and relaxes the reliance on locality. To do this, rather than taking measurements along just one plane of polarization, the Austrian team took measurements in additional, perpendicular planes to check for elliptical polarization. They found that, just as in the realizations of Bell’s thought experiment, Leggett’s inequality is violated – thus stressing the quantum-mechanical assertion that reality does not exist when we’re not observing it. “Our study shows that ‘just’ giving up the concept of locality would not be enough to obtain a more complete description of quantum mechanics,” Aspelmeyer told Physics Web. “You would also have to give up certain intuitive features of realism.” http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/27640
In short, the violation of Leggett's inequality has, as far as empirical science is concerned, left the Darwinian materialist without any 'real' material foundation to stand on. So what is a Darwinian materialist to do when science itself is ripping his materialistic foundation out from under him? Might I be so bold as to suggest Christianity?
Matthew 7:24-27 (King James Version) Therefore whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock: And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not: for it was founded upon a rock. And every one that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the sand: And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell: and great was the fall of it.
bornagain77
PM1, epistemology is already beyond the threshold. Mathematics is riddled with similar abstracta. Start with the -- the only -- null set and use von Neumann's construction to go transfinite then go hyperreals. Infinitesimals, limits, calculus and beyond. All has to go, too. And more. Utterly, patently absurd. KF kairosfocus
@36
Mathematics is a highly abstract, conceptual discipline. If our minds are dubious for philosophy, they are perforce dubious for math. If they are good enough for math, they are good enough for phil. And of course the attempts to rule out one kind of knowledge while letting in favoured claims, is similarly based on highly abstract reasoning.
If one's epistemology were basically Humean, it would be relatively straightforward to argue that mathematics and science can be disentangled from metaphysical speculation. And I don't think it would be at all difficult to show that Darwinian processes can give rise to Humean minds. That said, I am more inclined to think that, with regard to epistemology, Kant's philosophy of mind is more promising than Hume's. But I also think that Darwinian processes can give rise to Kantian minds. (One of the first people to make this argument explicitly was the psychologist Konrad Lorenz.) PyrrhoManiac1
PM1, Mathematics is a highly abstract, conceptual discipline. If our minds are dubious for philosophy, they are perforce dubious for math. If they are good enough for math, they are good enough for phil. And of course the attempts to rule out one kind of knowledge while letting in favoured claims, is similarly based on highly abstract reasoning. Marxism 101 should be enough to alert one to what is obviously going on. Emergentism, of course is just as suspect, above and beyond being ill supported poof magick, at this stage, that stronger term is fair comment. Lewontin was exposing, inadvertently, ideological imposition and polarisation, aka bias trending bigotry. The horrid doubt is a relevant case. KF kairosfocus
Sev @23>There is no supernatural, only the unknown. That's the problem with the wish being the father of the assertion. It doesn't make it true. Dang it. To say something like that requires you to disregard all evidence of supernatural experiences had by humans, reported for thousands of years, and some are now peer reviewed scientific studies. BA has reported on this, extensively as well. Sev, it must be hard to spend so much time here, with your fingers in your ears and having to incessantly yell LALALALALALALALALALALALALALA! What a miserable existence. AnimatedDust
Seversky If consciousness and thoughts die when the physical brain dies
:) Consciousness and thoughts can't die because are immaterial. Brain is just a tool used by conscience to access and have an impact in the material world. There is not a shred of scientific evidence that matter can create information (so let's forget about intelligence and consciousness that are far more superior levels than information). Sandy
@32 1. Whether or not Darwin's "horrid doubt" undermines mathematics in addition to metaphysics depends on what one's account of mathematics is. I don't see how it would undermine mathematics if mathematics were (to use some jargon) "analytic", i.e. truths based on meaning alone. 2. Whether or not the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge entails the impossibility of all knowledge (including empirical knowledge) depends on whether or not one thinks that metaphysical knowledge is a "foundation" for empirical knowledge. Some philosophers (such as Descartes) have thought that it is. Others have disagreed. 3. The quote from Haldane was published before he became a Marxist. When he became a Marxist and a proponent of dialectical materialism, he realized that his own earlier objections to materialism no longer pertained, because he realized that he had been targeting reductive materialism. Haldane's dialectical materialism is explicitly and emphatically emergentist, just as Engels's was in Dialectics of Nature. 4. Lewontin's point is simply that we cannot do science without assuming the uniformity of nature, which means that we must assume that God will not interfere with the natural order whenever it suits His plan. His objection to Sagan is that we do not infer from science that there are no miracles; rather we must adopt a posture of methodological naturalism in order to do science in the first place. 5. Whether or not one needs to assume anything like classical theism in order to ground or justify methodological naturalism, that is a separate point from the point that Lewontin is making, which is that we must assume that God does not arbitrarily interfere with the natural world in order to science at all in the first place. We could not do science at all if God could change the results of experiments at any time because it suited His plans that are inscrutable to us. 6. While it is almost certainly true that Lewontin's Marxism influenced his commitment to methodological naturalism, it's probably also true that the influence runs in the other direction as well. Regardless, one can certainly appreciate Lewontin's objection to Sagan regardless of Lewontin's other philosophical-political commitments. 7. Regardless of what Darwin worried about, the question could still be asked: do contemporary cognitive sciences, evolutionary theory, and theoretical biology give us reason to believe that the evolved cognitive capacities of human and non-human animals are generally unreliable? As someone with a basic competence in those fields, I see no reason why would be the case. PyrrhoManiac1
F/N: One of the key test cases for Slagle's concern is Darwin himself, as we may see from the wider import of his July 3, 1881 letter to William Gray:
“With me the horrid doubt always arises, whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?”
Of course, of course, his apologists hasten to provide a context, that he was in fact targetting abstract metaphysical, theological and religious sentiment driven reasoning, not oh so well established simple empirical evidence that grounds, say, his theory. We only pause to say, that already has written off mathematics and any other complex discipline. But such is not the core. The core is, immediately, if we are so delusion prone and discredited, where do we suddenly get credibility from to warrant any knowledge of significance? As, there are no firewalls in our minds. From this, it is but a step to notice that the sort of distinction that is being made to try to shield the Evolutionary theory, is precisely a case of highly abstract, abstruse reasoning. It fails, fails by self referential absurdity. Going further, we now have right of fair comment to point out that the defence offered is manifestly special pleading to protect an establishment. As any graduate of Marxism 101 would have no problems identifying. Speaking of socialists, we now see the point J B S Haldane, a co founder of the Neo-Darwinian Synthesis, made. Here, I skeletonise and augment his famous remark:
[JBSH, REFACTORED AS SKELETAL, AUGMENTED PROPOSITIONS:] "It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For
if [p:] my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain [–> taking in DNA, epigenetics and matters of computer organisation, programming and dynamic-stochastic processes; notice, "my brain," i.e. self referential] ______________________________ [ THEN] [q:] I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. [--> indeed, blindly mechanical computation is not in itself a rational process, the only rationality is the canned rationality of the programmer, where survival-filtered lucky noise is not a credible programmer, note the functionally specific, highly complex organised information rich code and algorithms in D/RNA, i.e. language and goal directed stepwise process . . . an observationally validated adequate source for such is _____ ?] [Corollary 1:] They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence [Corollary 2:] I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. [--> grand, self-referential delusion, utterly absurd self-falsifying incoherence] [Implied, Corollary 3: Reason and rationality collapse in a grand delusion, including of course general, philosophical, logical, ontological and moral knowledge; reductio ad absurdum, a FAILED, and FALSE, intellectually futile and bankrupt, ruinously absurd system of thought.]
In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” ["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209. Cf. here on (and esp here) on the self-refutation by self-falsifying self referential incoherence and on linked amorality.]
Finding another socialist, Lewontin, too, needs to be heard [in annotated form to draw out the issues}:
[Lewontin lets the cat out of the bag:] . . . to put a correct [--> Just who here presume to cornering the market on truth and so demand authority to impose?] view of the universe into people's heads
[==> as in, "we" the radically secularist elites have cornered the market on truth, warrant and knowledge, making "our" "consensus" the yardstick of truth . . . where of course "view" is patently short for WORLDVIEW . . . and linked cultural agenda . . . ]
we must first get an incorrect view out [--> as in, if you disagree with "us" of the secularist elite you are wrong, irrational and so dangerous you must be stopped, even at the price of manipulative indoctrination of hoi polloi] . . . the problem is to get them [= hoi polloi] to reject irrational and supernatural explanations of the world [--> "explanations of the world" is yet another synonym for WORLDVIEWS; the despised "demon[ic]" "supernatural" being of course an index of animus towards ethical theism and particularly the Judaeo-Christian faith tradition], the demons that exist only in their imaginations,
[ --> as in, to think in terms of ethical theism is to be delusional, justifying "our" elitist and establishment-controlling interventions of power to "fix" the widespread mental disease]
and to accept a social and intellectual apparatus, Science, as the only begetter of truth
[--> NB: this is a knowledge claim about knowledge and its possible sources, i.e. it is a claim in philosophy not science; it is thus self-refuting]
. . . . To Sagan, as to all but a few other scientists [--> "we" are the dominant elites], it is self-evident
[--> actually, science and its knowledge claims are plainly not immediately and necessarily true on pain of absurdity, to one who understands them; this is another logical error, begging the question , confused for real self-evidence; whereby a claim shows itself not just true but true on pain of patent absurdity if one tries to deny it . . . and in fact it is evolutionary materialism that is readily shown to be self-refuting]
that the practices of science provide the surest method of putting us in contact with physical reality [--> = all of reality to the evolutionary materialist], and that, in contrast, the demon-haunted world rests on a set of beliefs and behaviors that fail every reasonable test [--> i.e. an assertion that tellingly reveals a hostile mindset, not a warranted claim] . . . . It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us [= the evo-mat establishment] to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes [--> another major begging of the question . . . ] to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute [--> i.e. here we see the fallacious, indoctrinated, ideological, closed mind . . . ], for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door . . . [--> irreconcilable hostility to ethical theism, already caricatured as believing delusionally in imaginary demons]. [Lewontin, Billions and billions of Demons, NYRB Jan 1997,cf. here. And, if you imagine this is "quote-mined" I invite you to read the fuller annotated citation here.]
So, it seems, the matter of self referentiality needs to be carefully pondered. KF kairosfocus
Origenes at 26, Naturalism is a worldview. Fer cryin' out loud, what do you think you're up against here? Nothing? The person who believes "the natural is all there is" REJECTS anything else. If he can't see it, touch it or look at it under a microscope - forget it. So he can go through life with a worship of men ONLY. Some great man wrote a book and he will meditate on it, maybe build his life around it. relatd
Seversky at 23, I would not encourage anyone to take your word for it. It seems some would rather expose themselves to hot lava than say a prayer to God. He's waiting for you. relatd
Strictly as an exercise for my own edification, here are some various specifications of (1)-(6). The first grouping consists of variations that I would reject, on the grounds that they go beyond what can be scientifically supported. The second grouping consist of variations that I would accept, on the grounds that they are more solidly based on what the sciences do and do not license one to justifiably assert. Any similarity between Group 1 and the worldview of Alex Rosenberg is strictly intentional. Group 1 1. Fundamental physics is the sole guarantor of ontological commitment 2. Causal closure of the fundamentally physical (anti-emergentism) 3. Nothing cannot be explained in terms of fundamental physic is ontologically permissible. 4. Mental states and processes can be exhaustively explained in terms of fundamental physics 5. The modern synthesis is necessary and sufficient for explaining biological diversity 6. There is no teleology, only teleonomy. Group 2 1. The methods of the social, biological, and physical sciences are more reliable indicators of ontological commitment than other forms of understanding. 2. The universe as a whole is a causally closed system. 3. No events, states, or processes within the universe can violate laws of fundamental physics 4. The biological function of cognition is to enable organisms to cope with environmental complexity. 5. Organism-centered accounts of evolution -- natural selection is not a causal factor but a higher-order effect of what tends to happen to populations of organisms over time. 6. Intrinsic purposiveness is real (PDF); organisms are natural purposes. PyrrhoManiac1
Seversky @27
1. The physical sciences are the touchstone of reality.
I’d say it’s a question of “so far, so good.” The physical sciences have been the most successful tools we have for probing the nature of physical reality and we would be foolish not to continue using them, all the while bearing in mind they may have their limits.
So, which is it? Is reality what physical sciences says it is? Or is the case that physical sciences "may have their limits"? What does that mean? Oh, I forgot the naturalist is resistant to "extreme reductionism." So, some things may not be reducible to what physical sciences are about. Or perhaps they are, but we should not really be so extreme. So, I guess we should (somewhat?) get rid of premise 1.
2. Causal closure of the physical.
In the broadest sense, yes.
Is that in the same broadest sense as the Tao should be understood, or rather cannot be understood? This is getting rediculous. Origenes
Origenes/15
1. The physical sciences are the touchstone of reality.
I'd say it's a question of "so far, so good." The physical sciences have been the most successful tools we have for probing the nature of physical reality and we would be foolish not to continue using them, all the while bearing in mind they may have their limits.
Causal closure of the physical.
In the broadest sense, yes.
Anti ‘supernatural’
Absolutely.
The mind is causally derivative from the physical.
What we observe so far is that the mind/consciousness disappears irretrievably when the brain dies so that is a reasonable inference.
Darwinian evolution.
Not just Darwinian.
At some level, the denial of teleology
We know that there are artefacts produced by intelligent agents because we designed them. The question is whether there are other such beings of much greater knowledge and power than ourselves elsewhere in this Universe. I would not be surprised to find there are. Whether they rise to the level of the Christian God is another question. Seversky
Let us stop pretending that 'naturalism' is a worldview/philosophy. It is an enumeration of sciency stuff without internal coherence, axioms are either lacking or endlessly malleable. It can neither be understood nor argued against. It is the western version of Tao. Origenes
Origenes/17
“we present teleology brought to you by purely blind natural processes!”
I think the word you're looking for is "teleonomy" Seversky
@15
Naturalism, according to Slagle: 1. The physical sciences are the touchstone of reality. 2. Causal closure of the physical. 3. Anti ‘supernatural’ 4. The mind is causally derivative from the physical. 5. Darwinian evolution. 6. At some level, the denial of teleology. PM1 was upset about 6.
I can easily imagine versions of (1)-(6) that I would accept, and versions of (1)-(6) that I would not accept. PyrrhoManiac1
If consciousness and thoughts die when the physical brain dies then naturalism/physicalism/materialism are the better explanation. There is no supernatural, only the unknown. Seversky
If one thought exists then naturalism is impossible. Is that simple. Sandy
. #19-20 It’s double-speak. It’s horse poo — “let us use words to succeed amongst ourselves where the evidence and reason fails us” And it is most certainly another unspoken admission that the inference to design in biology is both valid and inescapable. (something we’ve seen here time after time) Upright BiPed
Origenes, they are trying to subvert the compelling force of the evidence of design by begging questions on imposed a priori materialistic evolutionism per Lewontin. We can take it as a back handed admission that we have won the evidence of design issue so they are now trying to smuggle purpose in the back door without sound responsiveness on the source of complex design as observed. KF kairosfocus
PM1 @18, KF Let's read it together. According to you, this has to do with the "naturalization" of teleology. This is the abstract of one of the papers you linked to:
What makes biological organisation teleological? Matteo Mossio & Leonardo Bich Abstract This paper argues that biological organisation can be legitimately conceived of as an intrinsically teleological causal regime. The core of the argument consists in establishing a connection between organisation and teleology through the concept of self-determination: biological organisation determines itself in the sense that the effects of its activity contribute to determine its own conditions of existence. We suggest that not any kind of circular regime realises self-determination, which should be specifically understood as self-constraint: in biological systems, in particular, self-constraint takes the form of closure, i.e. a network of mutually dependent constitutive constraints. We then explore the occurrence of intrinsic teleology in the biological domain and beyond. On the one hand, the organisational account might possibly concede that supra-organismal biological systems (as symbioses or ecosystems) could realise closure, and hence be teleological. On the other hand, the realisation of closure beyond the biological realm appears to be highly unlikely. In turn, the occurrence of simpler forms of self-determination remains a controversial issue, in particular with respect to the case of self-organising dissipative systems.
Origenes
@17
In one of these papers they look at biological organization, I assume that they identify some goals of the organism, assume that an organism is just physical stuff produced by Darwinian evolution, and say: “we present teleology brought to you by purely blind natural processes!”
You can assume whatever you want without reading it. Or you can read it for yourself and then make up your mind. PyrrhoManiac1
KF@16, PM1 WRT teleology & naturalism. In the Galton board thread, PM1 links to papers where teleology is allegedly being "naturalized." In one of these papers they look at biological organization, I assume that they identify some goals of the organism, assume that an organism is just physical stuff produced by Darwinian evolution, and say: "we present teleology brought to you by purely blind natural processes!" I wonder what will stop them from "naturalizing" teleology by identifying the goals of, let's say, Professor James Tour? Origenes
Origenes, the first five directly expand the summary phrase, evolutionary materialistic scientism. The most plausible understanding of teleology is, from AmHD:
1. The philosophical interpretation of natural phenomena as exhibiting purpose or design. 2. The use of ultimate purpose or design as a means of explaining phenomena. 3. Belief in or the perception of purposeful development toward an end, as in history.
1 - 5 would naturally lead to 6, unless one wishes to infer design and purpose are built in to the world. Which is some form of pantheism or panentheism; which, of course, are not naturalistic views. I think we are seeing slippery definitions here, with meanings provided by self selective typically prestigious in-groups that run far counter to the normal usage. Of course, unannounced until there is enough power to openly impose. As, is being pushed on us regarding being male or female. It looks a lot like rationality is about to be redefined away from responsible freedom that [habitually] works in accord with first principles of logic to infer reliable, credibly true conclusions, as opposed to blind GIGO limited computationalism. That suggests subversion of language to herd us in a direction preferred by agendas backed by influence and reaching for naked power. I would say, for many things, ends or purposes or goals are naturally evident -- eyes TO see, ears TO hear, etc -- but that is not opposed to intelligent purpose expressed in the world. In that context FSCO/I, is a strong sign, especially things like coded information in the living cell. Notice, how hotly such . . . the manifest consensus . . . has been objected to. I get very wary when I see signs of in groups and such slipperiness. 1984, Animal Farm, doublethink and doubletalk come to mind. Do I need to add, Napoleon and Big Brother? But then, just maybe, we will be given a cogent, straightforward explanation. KF kairosfocus
KF @ Naturalism, according to Slagle: 1. The physical sciences are the touchstone of reality. 2. Causal closure of the physical. 3. Anti ‘supernatural’ 4. The mind is causally derivative from the physical. 5. Darwinian evolution. 6. At some level, the denial of teleology. PM1 was upset about 6. Origenes
PM1 @9 , Animateddust @12
Reasoning is a distinct kind of rule-governed behavior. It does not require violating the causal closure of the physical universe.
You seem to have mastered the art of misunderstanding. My point is: 1. Physical Causal closure states: everything has a sufficient physical cause. 2. Beliefs exists and have a cause. Therefore, from 1. and 2. 3. All beliefs have a physical cause. (If Dennett & co worldview is correct)
You want to say that naturalism cannot accommodate rationality as such because it does not accommodate your preferred theory of what rationality is.
Please stop with that repeated whining argument. My “preferred” theory of reasoning is that it is not shaped by chemical ‘reasons’. Na+ + OH- --> NaOH is not my “preferred” reason to hold any belief. - - - AnimatedDust Hear! Hear! Origenes
PM1, the incoherence of evolutionary materialistic scientism is a real issue, one that cannot be wished away. As for Marx, Slagle gave an explicit citation that is directly parallel to what I saw from live marxists. Crick, as cited above, speaks for himself and is indisputably eminent. However, my OP is not just about such, it speaks to other forms of determinism or materialistic reductionism. It is also far broader, the issue is that a key part of the difficulty of big core worldview questions is that in addressing such, we are going to be self referential, almost inescapably. So, we should be careful to avoid incoherence. KF PS, as to the solution to the linked hard problems of worldviews that are evolutionary materialistic and scientistic [the relevant description of naturalism], It would be interesting to see at least a substantial and cogent answer. This includes the hard problem of consciousness, for just one aspect. PPS, naturalism is a tad hard to pin down, per SEP:
The term “naturalism” has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. Its current usage derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century. The self-proclaimed “naturalists” from that period included John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook and Roy Wood Sellars. These philosophers aimed to ally philosophy more closely with science. They urged that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing “supernatural”, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the “human spirit” (Krikorian 1944, Kim 2003). So understood, “naturalism” is not a particularly informative term as applied to contemporary philosophers. The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily accept naturalism as just characterized—that is, they would both reject “supernatural” entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the “human spirit”.
Boiling down, we may turn to Merriam Webster:
: a theory denying that an event or object has a supernatural significance specifically : the doctrine that scientific laws are adequate to account for all phenomena
In short, in practice materialistic, evolutionary, and scientistic. kairosfocus
PM@ 11: It most certainly does. That you refuse to acknowledge that fact doesn't negate its truth in the slightest. And in your so doing, you merely reinforce your preference for falsehood as completely acceptable in your worldview, because your preferences drive your reality. AnimatedDust
@10
In other words, whatever they believe is fine. lol
My point was that naturalism does not suffer from the internal incoherence that Origenes believes it does. PyrrhoManiac1
"That their account differs from yours" In other words, whatever they believe is fine. lol Andrew asauber
These folks say that the physical is all that exists. They argue for causal closure of the physical—everything has a sufficient physical cause. If we then point out that physical reasons radically differ from rational reasons, and that their worldview implies that all beliefs are produced by non-rational (physical) forces, they, like you, pretend not to understand the argument.
Reasoning is a distinct kind of rule-governed behavior. It does not require violating the causal closure of the physical universe. You want to say that naturalism cannot accommodate rationality as such because it does not accommodate your preferred theory of what rationality is. This ignores the fact that naturalists have their own understanding of what rationality is. They have constructed, within the resources of their account of reality, an account of the cognitive operations whereby they know what reality is. That their account differs from yours does not mean that they are being incoherent or that they have any self-referentiality problem. PyrrhoManiac1
PM1 @7
I have no objection to this line of reasoning. But who exactly is the target here? Who is it who supposedly says “all beliefs are produced by non-rational forces”? I can tell you this much: the Churchlands do not say this. Dennett does not say this.
These folks say that the physical is all that exists. They argue for causal closure of the physical—everything has a sufficient physical cause. If we then point out that physical reasons radically differ from rational reasons, and that their worldview implies that all beliefs are produced by non-rational (physical) forces, they, like you, pretend not to understand the argument. Origenes
@3
if all beliefs are produced by nonrational forces and are thus nonveracious, then the belief that “all beliefs are produced by non-rational forces and are thus nonveracious” is itself produced by nonrational forces and is thus nonveracious.
I have no objection to this line of reasoning. But who exactly is the target here? Who is it who supposedly says “all beliefs are produced by non-rational forces”? I can tell you this much: the Churchlands do not say this. Dennett does not say this. (Neither do Dewey, Freud, or Marx say this, despite what Pearcey and Slagle insinuate.) PyrrhoManiac1
A divided, polarized civilization? No. Where does the average person get true statements? His teachers? Parents? The Media? I think most people are too busy living their lives to analyze any statements beyond assigning a level of credibility based on the source, followed by a rapid assessment of whether or not any statement is true based on basic logic and previous knowledge. For the average person, such assessments happen on an almost intuitive level. relatd
The problem of self-referential incoherence is baked in certain worldviews from the very outset. A free rational person who builds a worldview starting with the claim ‘X is all that exists’, while X does not allow for the existence of a free rational person, inevitably runs into self-referential incoherence. Such a person is unaware that “all that exists” necessarily also refers to him. The same profound lack of awareness plagues Rosenberg when he keeps writing stuff like “When consciousness convinces you that you, or your mind, or your brain has thoughts about things, it is wrong.” Somehow, Rosenberg is unable to acquire the awareness that such claims also refer to himself. For some reason, he cannot rid himself of the illusion that his position is independent of his claims about consciousness and rationality. So, we should be very careful when we make grand claims like “Information is all that exists”, “Physics is all that exists”, “Tao is all that exists”, or even “God is all that exists.” When we make such an “All that exists is X” claim, we should immediately follow up with the question: “Does the claim allow for my existence as a free rational person?” Origenes
As in, oopsie . . . kairosfocus
Jim Slagle on the self-referentiality problem for those who claim that beliefs are produced by non-rational forces (such as blind particles in the void):
More broadly, if all beliefs are produced by nonrational forces and are thus nonveracious, then the belief that “all beliefs are produced by non-rational forces and are thus nonveracious” is itself produced by nonrational forces and is thus nonveracious. This belief, and any position that leads to it, is therefore self-defeating: if it is true, we no longer have any reason for believing it to be true. It is hoist with its own petard.
With an almost painful accuracy, he goes on to describe the self-referentiality problem for skeptics of rationality:
To put this another way, those who claim that all beliefs, acts of reasoning, etc., are nonveracious are positing a closed circle in which no beliefs are produced by the proper methods by which beliefs can be said to be veracious or rational. Yet at the same time, they are arrogating to themselves a position outside of this circle by which they can judge the beliefs of others, a move they deny to their opponents. Since the raison d’être of their thesis is that there is no outside of the circle, they do not have the epistemic right to assume a position independent of it, and so their beliefs about the nonveracity of beliefs or reasoning are just as nonveracious as those they criticize. If all of the beliefs inside the circle are suspect, we cannot judge between truth and falsity, since any such judgment would be just as suspect as what it seeks to adjudicate. We would have to seek another argument, another chain of reasoning, another set of beliefs, by which we can judge the judgment—and a third set to judge the judgment of the judgment, ad infinitum. At no point can they step out of the circle to a transcendent standpoint that would allow them to reject some beliefs as tainted while remaining untainted themselves.
Origenes
You just give your judgement over to us, and we'll teach you to doubt yourselves. Doesn't that turn out great for you? You are totally emasculated. Lobotomized. Andrew asauber
The challenge of self-referentiality on hard questions (thus, of self-defeating arguments) kairosfocus

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