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From IAI News: How infinity threatens cosmology

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Peter Cameron, Emeritus Professor Mathematics at Queen Mary, University of London, writes:

There are many approaches to infinity through the twin pillars of science and religion, but I will just restrict my attention here to the views of mathematicians and physicists.

22 09 23.infinity2.ata
IAI News

Aristotle was one of the most influential Greek philosophers. He believed that we could consider “potential infinity” (we can count objects without knowing how many more are coming) but that a “completed infinity” is taboo. For mathematicians, infinity was off-limits for two millennia after Aristotle’s ban. Galileo tried to tackle the problem, noting that an infinite set could be matched up with a part of itself, but in the end drew back. It was left to Cantor in the nineteenth century to show us the way to think about infinity, which is accepted by most mathematicians now. There are infinitely many counting numbers; any number you write down is a negligible step along the way to infinity. So Cantor’s idea was to imagine we have a package containing all these numbers; put a label on it saying “The natural numbers”, and treat the package as a single entity. If you want to study individual numbers, you can break open the package and take them out to look at them.  Now you can take any collection of these packages, and bundle them up to form another single entity. Thus, set theory is born. Cantor investigated ways of measuring these sets, and today set theory is the commonest foundation for mathematics, though other foundations have been proposed. 

One of Cantor’s discoveries is that there is no largest infinite set: given any set you can always find a larger one. The smallest infinite set is the set of natural numbers. What comes next is a puzzle which can’t be resolved at present. It may be the real (decimal) numbers, or maybe not. Our current foundations are not strong enough, and building larger telescopes will not help with this question. Perhaps in the future we will adopt new foundations for mathematics which will resolve the question.

These questions keep set theorists awake at night; but most mathematicians work near the bottom of this dizzying hierarchy, with small infinities. For example, Euclid proved that the prime numbers “go on for ever”. (Aristotle would say, “Whatever prime you find, I can find a larger one.”

While Kronecker (a fierce opponent of Cantor’s ideas) thought in the nineteenth century that “God created the natural numbers; the rest is the work of man”, we can now build the natural numbers using the tools of set theory, starting from nothing (more precisely the empty set).

Mathematicians know, however, that there is a huge gap between the finite and the infinite. If you toss a coin 100 times, it is not impossible (just very unlikely) that it will come down tails each time. But, if you could imagine tossing a coin infinitely often, then the chance of not getting heads and tails equally often is zero. Of course, you could never actually perform this experiment; but mathematics is a conceptual science, and we are happy to accept this statement on the basis of a rigorous proof.

Infinity in physics and cosmology has not been resolved so satisfactorily. The two great twentieth-century theories of physics, general relativity (the theory of the very large) and quantum mechanics (the theory of the very small) have resisted attempts to unite them. The one thing most physicists can agree on is that the universe came into being a finite time ago (about 13.7 billion years) — large, but not infinite. 

The James Webb Space Telescope has just begun showing us unprecedented details in the universe. As well as nearby objects, it sees the furthest objects ever observed. Because light travels at a finite speed, these are also the oldest objects observed, having been formed close to the beginning of the Universe. The finite speed of light also puts limits on what we can see; if an object is so far away that its light could not reach us if it travelled for the whole age of the universe, then we are unaware of its existence. So Malunkyaputta’s question about whether the universe is finite or infinite is moot. But is it eternal or not? That is a real question, and is so far undecided.

Attempts to reconcile relativity and quantum theory have been made. The ones currently most promising adopt a very radical attitude to infinity. They deny that the infinitely small can exist in the universe, but prescribe a minimum possible scale, essentially the so-called Planck scale.

Such a solution would put an end to Zeno’s paradox. Zeno denied the possibility of motion, since to move from A to B you first have to move to a point C halfway to B, and before that to a point D halfway from A to C, and so on to infinity. If space is not infinitely divisible, then this infinite regress cannot occur. (This solution was already grasped by Democritus and the early Greek atomists.)

Of course, this leaves us with a conceptual problem similar to the one raised by the possibility that the university is finite. In that case, the obvious question is “If the universe has an edge, what is beyond it?” In the case of the Planck length, the question would be “Given any length, however small, why can’t I just take half of it?”

Perhaps because we have been conditioned by Zeno’s paradox, we tend to think of the points on a line to be, like the real numbers, infinitely divisible: between any two we can find another. But current thinking is that the universe is not built this way.

More important to physics, the atomist hypothesis also gets rid of another annoying occurrence of infinity in physics. Black holes in general relativity are points of spacetime where the density of matter becomes infinite and the laws of physics break down. These have been a thorn in the flesh of cosmologists since their existence was first predicted, since by definition we cannot understand what happens there. If space is discrete, we cannot put infinitely many things infinitely close together, and the paradox is avoided. We can still have extremely high density; the black hole recently observed and photographed at the centre of our own galaxy is (on this theory) just a point of such high density that light cannot escape, but does not defy our ability to understand it.

Time, however, remains a problem; current theories cannot decide the ultimate fate of the universe. Does it end with heat death, a cold dark universe where nothing happens? Does the mysterious “dark energy” become so strong that it rips the universe to shreds? Or does the expansion from the Big Bang go into reverse, so that the universe ends in a Big Crunch?

None of this matters to us individually. The sun will expand and swallow the earth long before the universe reaches its end.

Full article at IAI News.

Although this article glosses over some concepts in physics and cosmology, it raises interesting points to ponder.

Comments
re 567 to Q: 1. After I wrote a paragraph in the difference between “old materialism”, in which little bits of matter actually exist and are the foundation of reality, and “new materialism”, where a quantum world is the foundation of reality, and matter is something which arises in our experience at the macro level, you wrote, Yes, I do. There seems to be a schism between theoretical physicists on materialism, the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and the nature of information.> But you didn’t explain that schism, and you didn’t say whether you agree with me the all modern physicist are “new materialists” and not “old materialists” in respect to the physical world, even if they are non-materialists in other regards. 2. Instead you directed me to Dr. Sabine Hossenfelder’s YouTube channel to you, which is really not helpful, for various reasons, one main one of which is you can’t read, carefully analyze, and quote from a video, as I have explained before. I’m also more interested in the general issues than I am the positions of individual physicists. Sabine is a very good popularizer, and she does a good job of describing issues, but her position is not necessarily the one held by all. So you write, “In some of the videos, you’ll notice that she staunchly defends the “old” materialism.” Obviously I can’t “notice” that without watching these undefined videos. I did watch a few minutes of a short one on measurement. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Be3HlA_9968. She starts by saying “QM tells us that matter is not made of particles, but of elementary constituents that are often called particles that are described by wave functions.” (It took me quite a few minutes to transcribe that one sentence! I’m not doing that again.) She goes on to explain that they manifest as particles once they are measured This is not the position of someone who is defending “old materialism”. Can you provide, in writing (not a video) a statement that “staunchly defends the “old” materialism.”? Either you mean something different than I do by “old materialism,” which we should get clear about, or you are wrong about Hossenfelder. 3. You then say, “As a result of her ideological prejudice,...,” and lLater in discussing Smolin calling himself a realist, you say, “I meant it only as an example of an admitted presupposition, the direct and honest confession of an a priori philosophical commitment. Why do these two people have “prejudices” and “a priori philosophical commitment” and non-materialists don’t. It seems to me there are competing views, and there are people who have different positions from which they approach the issues. It seems to be that you are working from your own “prejudices and a priori philosophical commitment” in declaring they are ones doing that. So I don’t think labeling people withwhich we have disagreements as prejudiced and biased is helpful: We should just try to articulate our views as best we can and let others consider them. 4. We are in agreement about being non-materialists. However, you write, “Whatever consciousness and free will are, a materialist must show some materialistic property at quantum levels that can eventually be expressed at macro scales as consciousness.” I don’t think a materialist “must show” that any more than I “must show” how an immaterial mind can interact with the physical world the way that it does. These are mysteries which may or may not be solved some day, but right now they are metaphysical assumptions held by parties on both sides of the issue, 5. We agree that the probabilistic nature of QM precludes determinism. Can you explain the argument of those that don’t? In respect to Smolin, can you point to things he has said that make him both a determinist and a materialist of the old sort. It’s not Smolin himself that I care much about, it’s the details of what you are referring to when you mention “deterministic materialists.” Obviously, such people are not non-materialists, but I’d like to see more about whether you are accurately describing their positions.Viola Lee
October 10, 2022
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Again, looking at Origene's idea that we can steer our own thoughts and beliefs, like we are the driver and the thoughts and beliefs are the car. So if we control the car, what controls us? Well, we do of course! But don't we need our thoughts and beliefs in order to control ourselves? Yes. But we just said the thoughts and beliefs were the car, not the driver. So the car steers the driver, and the driver steers the car? Wait, that can't be it. We use the car to control ourselves while we steer the car? That doesn't sound right. Origenes, can you perhaps come up with a more clear metaphor for how all this works?dogdoc
October 10, 2022
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Origenes,
For me to be rational, for me to be able to think and understand, I need to be in control of my thoughts. If I lack the ability to steer my thoughts, if my thoughts have their own life, if they ignore me, if they go their own way independent from me, then by what metric can I call them “my thoughts”?
See @577
Why do have to argue these things? Why is it not completely obvious? It baffles me that someone can say “I do not agree with this at all” and “I still don’t understand it”
My feeling exactly :-)dogdoc
October 10, 2022
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Dogdoc @
But I still don’t understand why you would say rationality requires ultimate “control” (by what?) over our thoughts and beliefs.
For me to be rational, for me to be able to think and understand, I need to be in control of my thoughts. If I lack the ability to steer my thoughts, if my thoughts have their own life, if they ignore me, if they go their own way independent from me, then by what metric can I call them "my thoughts"? What horror! In order for me to engage in rational behavior I need to be in control of my thinking, I have to sit behind the steering wheel. -- - - Why do have to argue these things? Why is it not completely obvious? It baffles me that someone can say "I do not agree with this at all" and "I still don't understand it"Origenes
October 10, 2022
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Origenes,
In defense of Plantinga: 1) Your argument is that if naturalism (or materialism etc) is true, then we have no reason to believe our minds are reliable (in Plantinga’s sense). 2) Either our minds are reliable or they are not, by the excluded middle. Hmm … Why can minds not be partly reliable?
Plantinga explains what he means by "reliable", I don't have the reference handy, but I mean whatever he means.
For example, why can it not be the case that our minds are reliable WRT to religion, but unreliable WRT politics; or vice versa?
Well sure, that is quite true, actually - cognitive science has revealed a whole lot of different cognitive biases and bugs that appear in specific sorts of contexts.
3) If our minds are reliable, then they are reliable no matter what else is true (e.g. whether or not naturalism is true), and your argument fails in this case. Plantiga’s argument is, if I understand it correctly, that, under materialism and Darwinian evolution, our minds are probably unreliable.
He says the reliability is "either of low probability or inscrutable" I believe.
Given Darwinism, our beliefs are, like everything else, selected by survival success, not by truth. And since our beliefs are not selected by truth, Plantiga concludes that it is more probable than not that our minds are unreliable.
Again, he just says "either of low probability or inscrutable".
4) If our minds are not reliable, then they are not reliable to assess any truth or argument, including this one, so your argument fails in this case as well. Haha. Nonsense.
Huh? That is actually exactly what Plantinga means! An unreliable mind cannot be trusted to understand anything.
If, under materialism/evolution, our minds are (most probably) unreliable, then evolutionism fails, not Plantinga’s argument.
No, they both do of course! You seem to be trying to argue this: 1) If materialism is true then our minds are (likely) unreliable 2) Our minds can't be unreliable 3) Therefore materialism must not be true (modus tollens) However your (2) is not correct - our minds could be unreliable, and if that were the case, we would not be able to know it!dogdoc
October 10, 2022
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Origenes says we must control our thoughts and beliefs. So let's get this straight. There is a person (call it a self, a soul, a mind, an entity, whatever), and you think this person controls their thoughts and beliefs. This must mean that these thoughts and beliefs are external to the person. The person is the controller, and the thoughts and beliefs are what is being controlled. But obviously the person needs their thoughts and beliefs in order to decide how to control their thoughts and beliefs. As KF would say, this is self-referential incoherence.dogdoc
October 10, 2022
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Dogdoc @564 In defense of Plantinga:
1) Your argument is that if naturalism (or materialism etc) is true, then we have no reason to believe our minds are reliable (in Plantinga’s sense). 2) Either our minds are reliable or they are not, by the excluded middle.
Hmm ... Why can minds not be partly reliable? For example, why can it not be the case that our minds are reliable WRT to religion, but unreliable WRT politics; or vice versa?
3) If our minds are reliable, then they are reliable no matter what else is true (e.g. whether or not naturalism is true), and your argument fails in this case.
Plantiga’s argument is, if I understand it correctly, that, under materialism and Darwinian evolution, our minds are probably unreliable. Given Darwinism, our beliefs are, like everything else, selected by survival success, not by truth. And since our beliefs are not selected by truth, Plantiga concludes that it is more probable than not that our minds are unreliable.
4) If our minds are not reliable, then they are not reliable to assess any truth or argument, including this one, so your argument fails in this case as well.
Haha. Nonsense. If, under materialism/evolution, our minds are (most probably) unreliable, then evolutionism fails, not Plantinga’s argument.
5) In either case your argument against naturalism fails.
Only in your wildest dreams it does.Origenes
October 10, 2022
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"inconceivable!" https://youtu.be/D9MS2y2YU_o?t=120 -QQuerius
October 10, 2022
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re 572: I agree. Conceivable is in the eye of the beholder, and usually entails all sorts of other assumptions (some equally inconceivable to some) to create coherency.Viola Lee
October 10, 2022
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Origenes,
My argument is: 1) If materialism is true, then everything (including our thoughts & beliefs) results from laws of nature & events long before we were born.
I'll accept that by your definition (without saying I believe in that, which I don't).
2) We control neither laws of nature nor events long before we were born.
Agreed.
3) It follows that we do not control our thoughts & beliefs.
Agreed in some sense, but there are compatibilist senses of "control" under which you could still assign control (a proximate control) to the chooser. Like when the four ball hits the eight ball in the pocket, it was because of the four ball, but also because of the cue ball, then the stick, then the pool player, and so on.
Therefor, assuming that rationality requires control over one’s thoughts & beliefs, 4) Under materialism we are not rational.
I do not agree with this at all. Again, I'm not arguing for determinism or materialism - my argument is not based on those concepts in any way. But I still don't understand why you would say rationality requires ultimate "control" (by what?) over our thoughts and beliefs. For one thing, obviously I could program a deterministic system that would choose rational behaviors, like deep-space probes that diagnose themselves and take appropriate repair actions, so that would appear to be something deterministic that acts rationally. For another thing, I have argued here many times that we are not able to simply choose our own beliefs (try it!).dogdoc
October 10, 2022
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Viola
Libertarian free will, where we can truly exercise uncaused free will – we are capable of being little first causes – is a conceivable coherent metaphysical speculation.
I personally can't conceive of something that functions as a choice-maker where that function does not proceed by either cause->effect or randomness->effect. But that could be just a limit to my imagination.
I don’t think it makes defensible sense, and I certainly don’t think we could ever establish that it is the true case. But I think people can make up “conceivable coherent metaphysical speculation[s]” for just about any position they want to.
Fair enough, as long as you don't insist that they should be conceivable to everyone else :-)dogdoc
October 10, 2022
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Dogdoc @564
1) Your argument is that if naturalism (or materialism etc) is true, then we have no reason to believe our minds are reliable (in Plantinga’s sense).
No. My argument is: 1) If materialism is true, then everything (including our thoughts & beliefs) results from laws of nature & events long before we were born. 2) We control neither laws of nature nor events long before we were born. 3) It follows that we do not control our thoughts & beliefs. Therefor, assuming that rationality requires control over one’s thoughts & beliefs, 4) Under materialism we are not rational. - - - - - Perhaps you wish to discuss indeterminism. I got that covered; see Van Inwagen #355.Origenes
October 10, 2022
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re 567: glad you responded, Q. Again, I can't guarantee when my reply will appear, because there is lots to respond to, but assuming life goes as planned (and sometimes it doesn't), my intention is to follow through with a reply.Viola Lee
October 10, 2022
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at 566, DD writes, “ [I'm] just a bit more certain that there is no conceivable, coherent metaphysical speculation that could possibly restore the sort of freedom most of us intuitively feel we have.” Libertarian free will, where we can truly exercise uncaused free will - we are capable of being little first causes - is a conceivable coherent metaphysical speculation. I don't think it makes defensible sense, and I certainly don't think we could ever establish that it is the true case. But I think people can make up "conceivable coherent metaphysical speculation[s]” for just about any position they want to. :-)Viola Lee
October 10, 2022
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DD, I will comment on points: >>Let’s say you make a choice C for reason R.>> 1 - Thus, you have freedom to reason, or even to refuse to reason, then there are the facts, premises, axioms, first truths, etc that one may be aware or ignorant of, or may reject etc. >> As you say, you are not causally determined by R to choose C,>> 2 - Yes, see the sketched out matrix of alternatives. >>you could have chosen to discount reason R and chosen C’ instead. >> 3 - a key aspect of freedom. >>However, in order to make choice C’, you would either need to make it for no reason at all, >> 4 - Which one can and sadly many do, acting on impulse or the like not reason. >>or you would need another reason R’ upon which C’ was based.>> 5 - You are trying to get an infinite regress (or alternatively, a q-begging circle) but one is not locked up to such. 6 - As noted, there are things which, more or less legitimately, are first plausibles, finitely remote start points for onward reasoning. As has been pointed out several times and side stepped. 7 - Have you for example done, say Euclidean Geometry as a simple example of such a pattern? >>And so on.>> 8 - Only because you have again ignored first steps that are actually a commonplace of real world reasoning. 9 - Fail, again. KFkairosfocus
October 10, 2022
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Viola Lee @493,
Darn it, Q, I was going to do some other things this evening, but I’ve decided to respond to ou instead, cause now this stuff is on my mind!
Your decision is appreciated. :-)
The old idea of materialism is that there really is a definite, solid (in some sense), substance we call matter. We have known for a long time that such a substance doesn’t exist, and that the old view of materialism based on “matter and energy” of this sort is not adequate. Quantum mechanics has shown us that everything, such as light, electrons, more fundamental particles, etc. are “something else”, although what that something else is is the subject of much discussion. But we know the mathematics of QM works, and we known that results completely foreign to out intuition, such as those for which the Nobel prize was recently given. So, “new materialism” sees the new world as founded on a world of QM events rather than “stuff” like matter. So I assume modern physicists are new materialists, not old ones. Do you have thoughts about this distinction?
Yes, I do. There seems to be a schism between theoretical physicists on materialism, the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and the nature of information. For example, I deeply respect Dr. Sabine Hossenfelder’s observations and arguments, and I’d strongly recommend her YouTube channel to you: https://www.youtube.com/c/SabineHossenfelder/videos She has several videos on the topics of the Big Bang, free will, is infinity real, and others in which you’ve expressed an interest. In some of the videos, you’ll notice that she staunchly defends the “old” materialism and is at odds with Wigner, Vedral, and several other theoretical physicists. As a result of her ideological prejudice, she struggles to find materialistic explanations for many quantum enigmas that seem to point to consciousness, free will, the measurement problem, etc. Even with that in mind, I’d still recommend watching her excellent videos. Personally, I have no problem of our consciousness living in a probabilistic, chaotic universe and I embrace the idea that, contrary to Einstein, God delights playing with dice. I also take issue with her take on information loss in a black hole as being “unsolved and unsolvable.” My argument goes like this: “Just because information crossing the event horizon is no longer accessible to us, it doesn’t mean it’s destroyed. Similarly, information that we send out as coded pulses of light are also inaccessible to us, but are not destroyed and might eventually be received by an observer on Pluto, for example.”
2. You write, “This includes thoughts, emotions . . . and your will.” The question of our mind and consciousness is what separates materialists from non-materialists. Simply put, I think, a new materialist (I am not one) would think that whatever the mind and consciousness are, they also arise somehow from the same quantum foundations as the physical world does. Non-materialists believe that mind and consciousness are a different kind of something that is not a product of the QM foundation, but nevertheless can interact with it. (This latter is obvious because our mind and our body interact with each other.)
I agree with the “non materialists.” Whatever consciousness and free will are, a materialist must show some materialistic property at quantum levels that can eventually be expressed at macro scales as consciousness. This has never been done, and if it ever can be done, then cosmic humanists, pantheists, and astrologers will all rejoice! Have you ever read this? https://www.mit.edu/people/dpolicar/writing/prose/text/thinkingMeat.html
3. “The deterministic part of it is the idea that all events, including human choices and actions, are completely predetermined from previous states.” Yes, that is the definition of determinism. But QM tells us that probability is a true phenomena, not just a result of our ignorance. My understanding is that you look at an atom of a radioactive substance with a half-life of one day, there is a 50% probability it will decay today, but there is no cause – no reason – for whether it does or not. That event is undetermined and does not depend on the previous state of anything. (Feynman’s little book QED talks about the more sophisticated example of light partially passes through and partially reflects through a pane of glass.)
Yes, exactly. And that’s what I believe as well, but not everyone does. For example, Dr. Hossenfelder chooses not to believe it. What’s curious is that constant observation/measurement actually seems to prevent spontaneous fission from occurring. This is called the Quantum Zeno Effect. Naturally, materialists claim they’ve “debunked” it—or maybe blame it on Russian disinformation. LOL
So I would think a new, QM-based materialist would recognize that at any moment a only probable event could happen and set such causal chain on a new course.
Yep. If I throw a fair die randomly, each of its six faces has a 1/6th chance of appearing. I believe that which face is probabilistic, but the choices are determined to be only the integers 1-6. The domino-effect events you're describing are called a “von Neumann chain.”
4. You write, “Lee Smolin in his latest book (2019), describes himself as a “realist,” meaning that objects exist and have properties independent of our measurements,” and you then offer a long quote which I’ll partially respond to, although Smolin is not here – you are, so that complicates the discussion.
I meant it only as an example of an admitted presupposition, the direct and honest confession of an a piori philosophical commitment.
I think these remarks address Smolin’s comments.
Agreed. -QQuerius
October 10, 2022
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Viola,
Paxx, that’s what I think. DD called this “proximate freedom” at one point, which is a term I liked. We have that, and thinking about what else we do or do not have seems to me takes us into inaccessible metaphysics.
I'm happy with that view too, just a bit more certain that there is no conceivable, coherent metaphysical speculation that could possibly restore the sort of freedom most of us intuitively feel we have.dogdoc
October 10, 2022
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Paxx @561
5) In order for P to have freely chosen R, P must have reason(s) R’ for that choice. I take this to mean that for a choice to be possible, there must be more than one set of reasons from which to make the choice. Is that right?
No, that is not what this means. It means simply that for any choice, there must be some reason, or else the choice is made for no reason whatsoever (and is thus not a valuable form of free will).
6) In order for R’ to be freely chosen, there must be reason(s) R”, and so on in an infinite regress. I take this to mean that unused reasons, from step 5, has yet another alternate set of reasons that are not the first set of reasons. Is that right? If so, why must such a regress exist?
No, it doesn't matter what the reason is, and you could make multiple different choices based on the same reason.
It seems to me the simpler and better way to look at it is that whenever a chooser makes a choice, it considers all context variables that it is interested in then renders the choice.
Yes, that is exactly how I look at it, except I call them "reasons" instead of "context variables". The reason I say free choice is impossible is because you cannot possibly choose what the reasons - or context variables - are.
Why does it have to be more complicated than that?
It isn't!!!!!
Also, whether or not the chooser is “truly free” in some transcendent sense seems impossible to know.
I'm not using any transcendent sense, and I say exactly in what sense free choices (those made for reasons) are impossible.
The chooser is essentially a black box. I don’t see how your logic steps reveals the nature of the chooser.
Total black box, my argument has nothing to do with how the chooser deliberates over their reasons, only that they make choices for some reason(s) rather than for no reason at all.dogdoc
October 10, 2022
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Origenes, Your argument - or Haldane's argument, like Plantinga's argument - against naturalism, is unsound: 1) Your argument is that if naturalism (or materialism etc) is true, then we have no reason to believe our minds are reliable (in Plantinga's sense). 2) Either our minds are reliable or they are not, by the excluded middle. 3) If our minds are reliable, then they are reliable no matter what else is true (e.g. whether or not naturalism is true), and your argument fails in this case. 4) If our minds are not reliable, then they are not reliable to assess any truth or argument, including this one, so your argument fails in this case as well. 5) In either case your argument against naturalism fails.dogdoc
October 10, 2022
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Viola Lee: inaccessible metaphysics. At least at this point. Maybe one day researchers will be able to conduct some tests that will reveal consisistency, patterns, or randomness in the chooser. But until then...Paxx
October 10, 2022
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Paxx, that's what I think. DD called this "proximate freedom" at one point, which is a term I liked. We have that, and thinking about what else we do or do not have seems to me takes us into inaccessible metaphysics.Viola Lee
October 10, 2022
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DogDoc, having more carefully considered your logic...
5) In order for P to have freely chosen R, P must have reason(s) R’ for that choice.
I take this to mean that for a choice to be possible, there must be more than one set of reasons from which to make the choice. Is that right?
6) In order for R’ to be freely chosen, there must be reason(s) R”, and so on in an infinite regress.
I take this to mean that unused reasons, from step 5, has yet another alternate set of reasons that are not the first set of reasons. Is that right? If so, why must such a regress exist? It seems to me the simpler and better way to look at it is that whenever a chooser makes a choice, it considers all context variables that it is interested in then renders the choice. Why does it have to be more complicated than that? Also, whether or not the chooser is "truly free" in some transcendent sense seems impossible to know. The chooser is essentially a black box. I don't see how your logic steps reveals the nature of the chooser.Paxx
October 10, 2022
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KF,
DD, a reason is inherently a reflection of freedom, it is not a blindly mechanical or stochastic link in a chain; if it were it would be worthless instantly.
Sure, that's fine, a reason is not a deterministic cause, nor a stochastic cause, no problem. Still you have not evaded the problem: Let's say you make a choice C for reason R. As you say, you are not causally determined by R to choose C, you could have chosen to discount reason R and chosen C' instead. However, in order to make choice C', you would either need to make it for no reason at all, or you would need another reason R' upon which C' was based. And so on.dogdoc
October 10, 2022
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KF @ 551
[ THEN] [q:] I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true.
I do think that Haldane's follow-up is way too mild. Things are actually far worse. He should have said something like this: [THEN] It is utterly inconsequential whether or not ‘my’ beliefs are true, because I cannot act on them, since … I do not control ‘my’ thoughts and suppositions, something beyond my control does. I do not control ‘my’ beliefs, something beyond my control does. I do not control ‘my’ behavior, something beyond my control does. I do not understand anything; nothing does. I do not control anything, I do not exist as a causative factor, the entire show is produced by fermions and bosons. There are no ‘my beliefs’, no ‘my thoughts’, no ‘my suppositions’, no ‘my behavior’. None of it can be said to be mine. Besides, terms like “beliefs”, “thoughts” and so on are just inaccurate placeholders for rigourous physical descriptions. If, under materialism, I exist at all, then, at best, I am a hallucinating unthinking powerless epiphenomenon.Origenes
October 10, 2022
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DD, have you forgotten your 487 above?
4) Therefore, in order for C to be a free choice, P must have freely chosen R. 5) In order for P to have freely chosen R, P must have reason(s) R’ for that choice. [--> a reason is not a compulsion] 6) In order for R’ to be freely chosen, there must be reason(s) R”, and so on in an infinite regress. [--> we have premises [Any Logic 101 textbook?], we have observed and reliably reported facts, we have axioms [Euclid?], we have self evident first truths, we have first plausibles we accept, all of which are at the finitely remote start of a chain of reasoning] 7) It is impossible that at any point in this regress that P can make a choice based on reasons that P has freely chosen. [--> just exposed as utterly, outrageously false] 8) Therefore, free choice is impossible. [--> denial, but ill founded]
That denial and its utter want of foundation then unwillingness to heed correction, tell us worlds. This is what our civilisation has come to, this is how reasonably educated people feel free to argue in public and how others then jump on the band wagon. We are in trouble. KFkairosfocus
October 10, 2022
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DD, a reason is inherently a reflection of freedom, it is not a blindly mechanical or stochastic link in a chain; if it were it would be worthless instantly. I have already highlighted self-moved, reflexively acting agency as a first cause [cf Plato above] and the role of self evident first principles and more broadly first plausibles. Then, your imaginary robot is not a responsibly, rationally free agent, in effect it expresses the canned reasoning of its programmers. The robot cannot argue, it can only issue a canned playback of the reasoning of its programmers. A bit more sophisticated than a book but the principle is the same. KFkairosfocus
October 10, 2022
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Well, I dunno Dogdoc, I think I know how Odysseus must have felt, tied to his mast, listening to the seductive sirens’ song. I feel, if only I could wrest myself from my mast of emotional commitment to my own belief in constrained choice, I could leap into the sea and join you.
Ah Alan, take the leap! It will make you.... free! hahahaha
I help run The Skeptical Zone. It’s a bit quiet there but I know one or two others are interested in broadening the discussion. Would you be interested in contributing there or, failing that, mind me citing you?
Sure I'll pop by there. Been there before, took a few years off :-)dogdoc
October 10, 2022
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Well, I dunno Dogdoc, I think I know how Odysseus must have felt, tied to his mast, listening to the seductive sirens' song. I feel, if only I could wrest myself from my mast of emotional commitment to my own belief in constrained choice, I could leap into the sea and join you. I help run The Skeptical Zone. It's a bit quiet there but I know one or two others are interested in broadening the discussion. Would you be interested in contributing there or, failing that, mind me citing you?Alan Fox
October 10, 2022
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KF,
DD, you explicitly denied freedom, I simply pointed out the self referential incoherence of such a view; thus, self falsification. Logic now seems to be a problem for today’s objector.
Just like I said - you refuse to debate anyone who disagrees with you about free will. The reason you won't engage the argument is not because you've shown I've made a logical error, it is because you've discovered this gotcha that you think is clever, calling things self-referential and incoherent. Just pretend I'm a completely deterministic robot, programmed to spew out logic puzzles. I have provided you with a logic puzzle - see if you can solve it and tell me what step is invalid: 1) In order for a choice to be free, it must not be (a) determined by antecedent cause, and (b) not be random, arbitrary, or made for no reason at all. 2) Therefore, free choices must be made for some reason(s). 3) In order for person P to make a free choice C, the reason(s) R upon which C is based must not be chosen by anyone or anything but P. 4) Therefore, in order for C to be a free choice, P must have freely chosen R. 5) In order for P to have freely chosen R, P must have reason(s) R’ for that choice. 6) In order for R’ to be freely chosen, there must be reason(s) R”, and so on in an infinite regress. 7) It is impossible that at any point in this regress that P can make a choice based on reasons that P has freely chosen. 8) Therefore, free choice is impossible.dogdoc
October 10, 2022
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WJM,
Perhaps I wasn’t clear in how I wrote it. What I’m saying is that you are arguing against a form of free will you think other people claim to have; that their free will exists independent of reasons.
No, that's not what I'm arguing. Rather, I'm arguing that any choice that is an exercise of the sort of free will worth wanting is done for some reason. If a choice is made for no reason at all, then that may be free, but that is not worthy of praise or blame. Most people actually do believe in this sort of freedom I would say.
I don’t think anyone here would argue that will exists independent of reasons. I also don’t think anyone here would argue that we are free to pick our own ultimate, fundamental reason/reasons. Most here believe that we have moral duties and obligations, and “first duties” sewn into the fabric of our being and inherent in every decision that cannot be avoided even if we try.
Those moral duties and obligations are just more examples of the reasons that I have talked about. See @244 where I say "Duty is just another reason that we factor into our choices, along with our preferences, beliefs, desires, values, priorities, commitments, hopes, fears, and so on. Not sure why that is hard for you to understand.".
As you have agreed, reasons are not causal. We all agree on this.
Actually I simply don't engage the question of reasons vs. causes.
IOW, you have constructed a straw man argument against something nobody else is actually claiming.
Again I must disagree. I think my opposition here believes that human beings (and not even other animals) have a special power given by God that enables them to make moral decisions - to donate to charity instead of buying the candy bar in my example - and be ultimately responsible for that choice, and to praise those who have the "will power" to do the right thing and blame others for lacking "will power", and hold that they and they alone are responsible for having or lacking that will power in the first place.
Your argument appears to be that whatever “free” refers to doesn’t exist because inherent reasons exist.
Not my argument. I say what free refers to (being the ultimate author of, or chooser of, the reasons for one's choice). I show it's impossible for one to be that.
You have not shown a causal connection between “reasons” and whatever it is that “free” refers to in the term “free will – IOW, what supposedly makes will free. You have just assumed that “free” refers to being “free from reasons.”
No, I say that if a decision is free from reasons then it is in fact a free choice, but it is not the sort of freedom that confers moral responsibility because it is arbitrary. Theists believe that God bestowed free will on humans, and that this gift was of great importance - so important that many think it is worth all of the evil and suffering in the world that God could get rid of if He wanted to, but doesn't because he'd rather have people make free choices. But God would not have been so intent on giving people freedom if all that meant was they could make arbitrary, random decisions. He wanted them to earn their place in heave by freely choosing to do what He wants them to.
You might have asked what “free” means in the term “free will” to the people you wished to debate with before trying to make an argument against what you imagined they meant.
First, I have heard about free will from theists my entire life, and read volumes about the sort of free will that philosophers of all schools of thought have argued throughout history. Second, if theists here felt that I have assumed something wrong about the sort of free will they believe they have, they could argue that.
On my part, the “free” in “free will” doesn’t mean being free from physical limitations or psychological influences, reasons, etc.
I agree, that is not what it means. It means (1) that it is not arbitrary or random (and so instead done for some reason rather than for no reason at all), and (2) that the chooser was responsible for choosing those reasons. I think that is just what many people think freedom is, and that my argument points out that it is impossible.dogdoc
October 10, 2022
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