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From IAI News: How infinity threatens cosmology

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Peter Cameron, Emeritus Professor Mathematics at Queen Mary, University of London, writes:

There are many approaches to infinity through the twin pillars of science and religion, but I will just restrict my attention here to the views of mathematicians and physicists.

22 09 23.infinity2.ata
IAI News

Aristotle was one of the most influential Greek philosophers. He believed that we could consider “potential infinity” (we can count objects without knowing how many more are coming) but that a “completed infinity” is taboo. For mathematicians, infinity was off-limits for two millennia after Aristotle’s ban. Galileo tried to tackle the problem, noting that an infinite set could be matched up with a part of itself, but in the end drew back. It was left to Cantor in the nineteenth century to show us the way to think about infinity, which is accepted by most mathematicians now. There are infinitely many counting numbers; any number you write down is a negligible step along the way to infinity. So Cantor’s idea was to imagine we have a package containing all these numbers; put a label on it saying “The natural numbers”, and treat the package as a single entity. If you want to study individual numbers, you can break open the package and take them out to look at them.  Now you can take any collection of these packages, and bundle them up to form another single entity. Thus, set theory is born. Cantor investigated ways of measuring these sets, and today set theory is the commonest foundation for mathematics, though other foundations have been proposed. 

One of Cantor’s discoveries is that there is no largest infinite set: given any set you can always find a larger one. The smallest infinite set is the set of natural numbers. What comes next is a puzzle which can’t be resolved at present. It may be the real (decimal) numbers, or maybe not. Our current foundations are not strong enough, and building larger telescopes will not help with this question. Perhaps in the future we will adopt new foundations for mathematics which will resolve the question.

These questions keep set theorists awake at night; but most mathematicians work near the bottom of this dizzying hierarchy, with small infinities. For example, Euclid proved that the prime numbers “go on for ever”. (Aristotle would say, “Whatever prime you find, I can find a larger one.”

While Kronecker (a fierce opponent of Cantor’s ideas) thought in the nineteenth century that “God created the natural numbers; the rest is the work of man”, we can now build the natural numbers using the tools of set theory, starting from nothing (more precisely the empty set).

Mathematicians know, however, that there is a huge gap between the finite and the infinite. If you toss a coin 100 times, it is not impossible (just very unlikely) that it will come down tails each time. But, if you could imagine tossing a coin infinitely often, then the chance of not getting heads and tails equally often is zero. Of course, you could never actually perform this experiment; but mathematics is a conceptual science, and we are happy to accept this statement on the basis of a rigorous proof.

Infinity in physics and cosmology has not been resolved so satisfactorily. The two great twentieth-century theories of physics, general relativity (the theory of the very large) and quantum mechanics (the theory of the very small) have resisted attempts to unite them. The one thing most physicists can agree on is that the universe came into being a finite time ago (about 13.7 billion years) — large, but not infinite. 

The James Webb Space Telescope has just begun showing us unprecedented details in the universe. As well as nearby objects, it sees the furthest objects ever observed. Because light travels at a finite speed, these are also the oldest objects observed, having been formed close to the beginning of the Universe. The finite speed of light also puts limits on what we can see; if an object is so far away that its light could not reach us if it travelled for the whole age of the universe, then we are unaware of its existence. So Malunkyaputta’s question about whether the universe is finite or infinite is moot. But is it eternal or not? That is a real question, and is so far undecided.

Attempts to reconcile relativity and quantum theory have been made. The ones currently most promising adopt a very radical attitude to infinity. They deny that the infinitely small can exist in the universe, but prescribe a minimum possible scale, essentially the so-called Planck scale.

Such a solution would put an end to Zeno’s paradox. Zeno denied the possibility of motion, since to move from A to B you first have to move to a point C halfway to B, and before that to a point D halfway from A to C, and so on to infinity. If space is not infinitely divisible, then this infinite regress cannot occur. (This solution was already grasped by Democritus and the early Greek atomists.)

Of course, this leaves us with a conceptual problem similar to the one raised by the possibility that the university is finite. In that case, the obvious question is “If the universe has an edge, what is beyond it?” In the case of the Planck length, the question would be “Given any length, however small, why can’t I just take half of it?”

Perhaps because we have been conditioned by Zeno’s paradox, we tend to think of the points on a line to be, like the real numbers, infinitely divisible: between any two we can find another. But current thinking is that the universe is not built this way.

More important to physics, the atomist hypothesis also gets rid of another annoying occurrence of infinity in physics. Black holes in general relativity are points of spacetime where the density of matter becomes infinite and the laws of physics break down. These have been a thorn in the flesh of cosmologists since their existence was first predicted, since by definition we cannot understand what happens there. If space is discrete, we cannot put infinitely many things infinitely close together, and the paradox is avoided. We can still have extremely high density; the black hole recently observed and photographed at the centre of our own galaxy is (on this theory) just a point of such high density that light cannot escape, but does not defy our ability to understand it.

Time, however, remains a problem; current theories cannot decide the ultimate fate of the universe. Does it end with heat death, a cold dark universe where nothing happens? Does the mysterious “dark energy” become so strong that it rips the universe to shreds? Or does the expansion from the Big Bang go into reverse, so that the universe ends in a Big Crunch?

None of this matters to us individually. The sun will expand and swallow the earth long before the universe reaches its end.

Full article at IAI News.

Although this article glosses over some concepts in physics and cosmology, it raises interesting points to ponder.

Comments
PaV,
Some people see someone and immediately fall in love. They know next to nothing about them. Why? Is this a trivial choice?
If one makes a choice for no reason then sure, it can be "free" in the sense I'm talking about. Yet is this really the sort of free will that people are so adamant about having? The "free will defense" is the most common response I see to the "problem of evil". It argues that God so wanted humans to have free will that He allows evil and suffering to take place just so people can exercise their free will. So God values free will very highly indeed. It seems to me He wouldn't care so much about free will if all that meant was that we can impulsively act without deliberation.
I was angry because I didn’t think it was fair or just. But I didn’t really know at the time what the concepts–the verbal domains, of fairness and justice were. I was too young.
Either your anger was impulsive or it was based on reasons. It sounds like you you were too young to deliberate on your reasons. Again, I don't think God would think that sort of immature response was so vitally important that He would allow human suffering just so we could be angry without knowing why.
The mistake you’re making–and you are definitely making a mistake, is that you’ve mistaken “causation” with “correlation.”
I'm not talking about either of those things. I never mentioned causation, because my argument is based on reasons, not causes. And I never mentioned correlation, because it is completely irrelevant.
Despite some ‘reason, belief, desire” being attached to a choice, there is a decider–you, me, whoever is making a choice, and determiner is not constrained by the reason, belief, desire, etc, but simply guided by them.
This is really the crux of my argument. Once you've thought about your beliefs, desires, priorities, and so on, you are free to ignore them and choose whatever you want. But whatever choice you make at that point will either be based on reasons, or it won't. In neither case will you have made the sort of ultimately free choice that people (and God) find so very valuable.
The will comes from God and is ordered to God, the Supreme Good. We choose the good. But, we’re not “forced” to choose the good.
Why would someone not choose the good? Either for some reason, or not..
The human person, through exercise of his human will, can choose that which is bad for him/her. Evil people choose what is evil. It’s a choice. It is freely made.
Evil people choose what is evil, ok. Did they choose to be evil in the first place? For what reason?dogdoc
October 24, 2022
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Dogdoc:
I think you’re confused about this still. Again, I had many good reasons for marrying my wife, it was not a random choice. But I obviously never consciously chose to desire the qualities that I find so attractive. Nor could I simply choose not to care about those things. So, while I based my choice on good reasons, I could not freely choose the reasons that I based my decision upon. And so my choice was never free.
Some people see someone and immediately fall in love. They know next to nothing about them. Why? Is this a trivial choice?
You speak of the will in the third person, as if it is something inside you that makes your choices for you. What exactly is the relationship between you and your will? Why do you let your will make the choices? Why not make them yourself?
Yes, because I'm speaking of human will, found in all humans. My will chooses it. But it is a faculty that is mine, just like the capacity for beauty is mine--and a given, something NOT based on 'reason.' It is "my" will that chooses. It is my will that is free--as it is in all humans.
In that case, you must have had reasons for choosing to be angry (unless you became angry for no reason at all). What were your reasons for choosing to be angry? And why did you choose to have those reasons?
I was angry because I didn't think it was fair or just. But I didn't really know at the time what the concepts--the verbal domains, of fairness and justice were. I was too young. If you want to jump at this and say that, "Aha! You did have a reason," I would ask you since when is a concept a reason? It's a concept. We were both agreed that morality is intuited, which, to me at least, means that it is found within the human person. It has an existence there all of its own, like free will. I didn't ask for the concept of justice. Now, if you want to rebut this and say that, "See, you were not "free" to be angry since this sense of justice guided your choice and it is something that is yours and that you haven't 'freely chosen.'" But the fact that I could have not felt grieved, the fact that I could have decided that my brother must have had reasons for taking them, were all options that I could have likewise taken faced with the same sense of justice and the same circumstances. And this is what free will is: the presence of alternative choices. To "whittle down" those choices to one particular choice is the work of understanding, as I have previously stated, which informs the will, which then chooses--and, yes, it's me choosing, my person, that spiritual person that I am, which is something that separates me from all other living things. I've looked through the remainder of your response. It's clear that your position is that any individual choice a person makes is based on some sort of motivation--a reasons, belief, desire, etc. The mistake you're making--and you are definitely making a mistake, is that you've mistaken "causation" with "correlation." Despite some 'reason, belief, desire" being attached to a choice, there is a decider--you, me, whoever is making a choice, and determiner is not constrained by the reason, belief, desire, etc, but simply guided by them. The will comes from God and is ordered to God, the Supreme Good. We choose the good. But, we're not "forced" to choose the good. The human person, through exercise of his human will, can choose that which is bad for him/her. Evil people choose what is evil. It's a choice. It is freely made. Your logic seems to you impeccable. To me, your logic is wrong. We will simply have to agree to disagree.PaV
October 24, 2022
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PaV,
If you say, “choices based on our reason is indeed the only sort of free choice that is worth wanting,” this seems to suggest that “free will” exists, but in varying degrees. So, to me anyway, this changes your argument some.
My argument is unchanged. Once again, you act as though it is some sort of discovery about the world that "free will" exists in varying degrees. No. Again, it is merely a matter of defining what you're talking about. Most discussions about free will are utterly useless because people are talking about different things.
Second, let me ask you: are you married?
As a matter of fact, I am.
Did you marry your wife because it was a reasonable choice to do so?
I certainly wouldn't marry someone for no reason at all! What sort of person would marry without having any reasons why they think it's a good decision? Maybe you're just a different sort of person, but I deliberated before I proposed to my wife - it was not just a random idea that popped into my head. Some of the reasons I chose my wife were that she has many of the qualities I value and admire in a person: she is kind, empathetic, funny, smart, wise, and very beautiful.
And, if not, if it wasn’t chosen only because of reason, then are you saying–would you tell your wife, you made a “free choice that is [not] worth wanting?
I think you're confused about this still. Again, I had many good reasons for marrying my wife, it was not a random choice. But I obviously never consciously chose to desire the qualities that I find so attractive. Nor could I simply choose not to care about those things. So, while I based my choice on good reasons, I could not freely choose the reasons that I based my decision upon. And so my choice was never free.
You’re defining (is the word ‘assertion’ not too distant from this?) the will as completely dependent on reason.
I've tried to clarify this several times now, but you apparently can't understand the difference between stating a definition and making an assertion. These are two very different things. A definition deals with the meaning of a word, and an assertion is a claim about some aspect of the world.
Now, which is the most reasonable thing to do?
My argument is not about being "reasonable" or "rational" or "correct". Rather, it is about basing choices on reasons of any type at all.
And wasn’t human freedom exercised?
No, because you can't choose the reasons upon which you base your choices.
My position is that the will is free. It chooses.
You speak of the will in the third person, as if it is something inside you that makes your choices for you. What exactly is the relationship between you and your will? Why do you let your will make the choices? Why not make them yourself?
Reason can “evaluate” the choices that are before me, and even present to me more choices (that I hadn’t thought of yet). But from all these options, I nevertheless choose.
Wait, now you're saying that you choose. I thought it was your will! I think this is all very confused.
No, I didn’t freely choose to know about counting.
Ah, exactly!
But I freely chose to be angry with my brother, who had stolen some of my marbles–the whole cause of the incident.
In that case, you must have had reasons for choosing to be angry (unless you became angry for no reason at all). What were your reasons for choosing to be angry? And why did you choose to have those reasons?
No, I had no choice in whether I had a moral compass or not.
Ah, exactly!
But it was there outside the working of reason. And I was just as free to follow it as to not follow it.
If you chose not to follow your moral compass, then you would have had to have reasons for that choice (unless it was a completely random and arbitrary decision). For what reason would you choose not to follow your moral compass? And did you freely choose to have that reason? (hint: no).
Isn’t Dr. Spock, from Star Trek fame, always “reasonable”? Is this what we should aspire to? Is he really the most free person we can imagine? Just some thoughts/questions.
You continue to confuse being "reasonable" with "choosing for some reason(s)". My argument talks about making decisions based on reasons, not "being reasonable" in the sense of being logical, rational, or right.
Edwin Heisenberg was in Copenhagen working under Neils Bohr and alongside Max Born and others.
His name was Werner Heisenberg.
Now, where did this insight come from? Did this insight “freely” come to him; or was it completely the product of reason?
That is a false dichotomy.
IOW, are we “boxed in” by reason?
You are talking about "reason" as in "our ability to reason correctly". This has nothing to do with my argument. My argument is about basing choices on beliefs and desires, and how we cannot freely choose our beliefs and desires. Anyway, honestly PaV, you really do not understand my argument. If you can read through my posts and understand why I say that ultimately one can't freely choose the reasons behind one's choices, then perhaps we can discuss it. Otherwise, let's just agree to disagree.dogdoc
October 22, 2022
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Dogdoc: Some thoughts. @ 818:
Again, you have misunderstood. I’m not asserting what a free choice is, I’m stating a particular definition of free choice and showing that sort of free choice is impossible. I also happen to think that choices based on our reason is indeed the only sort of free choice that is worth wanting, and I think most people agree, but that is not part of my argument.
If you say, "choices based on our reason is indeed the only sort of free choice that is worth wanting," this seems to suggest that "free will" exists, but in varying degrees. So, to me anyway, this changes your argument some. Second, let me ask you: are you married? Did you marry your wife because it was a reasonable choice to do so? And, if not, if it wasn't chosen only because of reason, then are you saying--would you tell your wife, you made a "free choice that is [not] worth wanting?
Since an ultimately free choice must be based on reasons (by my definition), and those reasons must themselves be freely chosen (otherwise you wouldn’t be responsible for the bases of your choice), a regress begins that can only be escaped by having reasons you did not choose.
The problem here--and we've been down this road, you and I, is where "freedom" is located. Is the will 'free,' in and of itself? Yes, or no. You're defining (is the word 'assertion' not too distant from this?) the will as completely dependent on reason. So, you've started out already limiting freedom as you begin to describe how freedom is "logically impossible" in "choices that are worth wanting." Example: my next door neighbor, despite my asking him a thousand times, still starts moving his lawn at 7:00 AM on Saturday mornings--waking me up! Now, I have choices. I can once again ask him to not do so. I can, in the very strongest of terms, tell him never to do this again. I can confront him on his front lawn and punch him in his face, with the intent of bloodying his nose. And, I can take out my Smith & Wesson and go and shoot him. Now, which is the most reasonable thing to do? If my decision doesn't involve reason, and I kill him and spend the rest of my life in prison, should we say that the decision I made, since it was not based on reason, but passion, was completely not worth having or wanting? It sure seems rather consequential, eh? I'm sure you see my point here. And wasn't human freedom exercised? My position is that the will is free. It chooses. Reason can "evaluate" the choices that are before me, and even present to me more choices (that I hadn't thought of yet). But from all these options, I nevertheless choose.
Did you freely choose to know about counting? Did you think to yourself, “Hmm, I wonder if I should know how to count. Well, I think it might be a good thing to know, so I will freely choose to be born with that knowledge.”?
No, I didn't freely choose to know about counting. But I freely chose to be angry with my brother, who had stolen some of my marbles--the whole cause of the incident. Nevertheless, is the "cause" of knowing about "counting" dependent on reason "informing" me? If someone had taught me how to count, then one could say that reason was involved; but, it wasn't involved. Instead, an inner capacity was present. This inner aptitude is similar, in some respects, to "free will," since it, too, is a faculty that is simply given to us, as "counting" was simply "given" to me. Again, the will was operating without the input from reason. I was angry, because what had happened was "unjust". How did I know that? Reason? Or, again, was it an inner aptitude?
Either you made that choice for some reason(s), or you made it for no reason at all. If you had your reasons (beliefs and desires) then those reasons were ultimately unchosen. And if you chose for no reason at all, then I argue that is not an exercise of a type of free will worth wanting.
Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that there was a reason. Where did that reason come from?
You did not choose to receive your moral compass – you had no choice in the matter.
No, I had no choice in whether I had a moral compass or not. But it was there outside the working of reason. And I was just as free to follow it as to not follow it. Now, perhaps here is the best way of getting into this discussion--which I'm really not interested in having; nonetheless, our ability to reason is meant to lead us into what is good. Reason evaluates the goodness of our possible choices. And our will is ordered to choosing the greatest good. But that doesn't stop me, or anyone else, from choosing the lesser good. We call that 'evil'. God is our greatest good; yet people choose to go to Hell. That is, you might say, an exercise in infinite freedom since these persons are able to refuse the choice of being with God, who is Infinite and, thusly, have chosen an infinite evil. We are made in the image of God, the Supreme Good. All our faculties, then, are ordered to the 'good.'
Here’s my question then: did P “choose” the reason freely or not freely? How do you answer this question? This choice on the part of P now dangles separate and free from the various reasons that are out there and free, hence, of the lack of choice you argue for when it comes to the presence of “reasons” within us.
Sorry, I can’t make sense of this. Any free choice (per my definition) that P makes must be made for a reason of P’s own free choosing.
This whole enterprise, it appears to me, revolves around this conditional you insert regarding free will: that is, a free will that is "not the sort of free will worth having." Isn't Dr. Spock, from Star Trek fame, always "reasonable"? Is this what we should aspire to? Is he really the most free person we can imagine? Just some thoughts/questions.
ID argues that “natural, unguided processes” are incapable of producion complex form and function, while “intelligent sources” can. Why? What is the fundamental aspect of “intelligent agents” that allows them to design? Libertarian free will. If you read Meyer or Dembski, they explicitly acknowledge this – ID assumes the truth of metaphysical dualism and libertarian free will (though ID proponents would argue that they are not assuming these things, but rather proving them true).
You've argued that free will--if it is worth having, must be conformed to reasons, and that reasons are ours in a way that obviates our freedom, thus rendering us not free. Let's look at this notion of reasons and how it comes to us. Edwin Heisenberg was in Copenhagen working under Neils Bohr and alongside Max Born and others. They were struggling to understand quantum mechanics. While they were getting the some answers, they couldn't understand the physics involved. Heisenberg, reeling from an asthma attack, went to an island for several days (weeks?) and there mulled this all over. All of a sudden it hit him. Rather than trying to find the theoretical underpinnings that would describe QM, instead, all that was needed was to use the "observables" that they measured and find a relationship among these variables that would allow them to correctly predict the outcomes of experiments. Now, where did this insight come from? Did this insight "freely" come to him; or was it completely the product of reason? IOW, are we "boxed in" by reason? If so, then how can we move beyond what rational minds presently know? Now, if a step forward is made, where does it happen? In the human mind, who, through the powers of imagination, can explore worlds that we don't directly experience. But it is the human mind, an insight, that provides the way forward. Evolutionary algorithms can't tell us how to unify gravity to the realm of Quantum Field theory.
Really? Well, when the environment changes (abruptly or otherwise) then what constitutes the fittest traits changes also.
IOW, there is no completely objective scale for the fitness of organisms.
Differential reproduction rates of course.
Now you're not going to like this, but................ Is this what we're left with? A: What are the fittest species? B: Those that reproduce the most. A: Why are they able to reproduce so well? B: Because they are so fit. I'm afraid that every model of how evolution might work, and I've looked at almost everyone, if not all, limps when it comes to providing answers as to the actual evolution seen in the fossil record. If you want to say randomness is capable of "adapting" organisms to their environments, yes, of course, an argument can be made for that (though I feel reasonably sure that when all is said and done, and all is known, this, too, will turn out to not be correct). But that's as far as "evolution," that is, "progressive evolution," can carry you. Just as with Heisenberg, leaps forward are the function of mind. Finally, I don't know if any advance has been made. Further discussion, I suspect, will not move any of this forward. In sum, your definition of "free will" actually acknowledges that "free will" exists; you simply "argue" that "free will" exercised outside of the use of reason is "not worth wanting." But I'd advise not telling your wife that! :) P.S. I've chosen to ignore your "Freudian slip." Anyway I have no interest in arguing about evolution and ID here, just like to finish up with my argument that shows that the only sort of free will that is worth wanting is logically possible. :)PaV
October 22, 2022
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PaV,
Here is your argument: the human will can only choose if it has a reason to choose and our reasons for choosing are not freely ours.
Close, yes. I am defining a free choice as a choice that is made for some reason(s), which must also be freely chosen.
The point I was making is that you’ve conflated two realities into one. Perhaps this isn’t the most precise way of stating it; nevertheless, you’ve “chosen” to make free choice a servant of reason.
Not a servant, in the sense that reasons do not somehow control the person. What I'm saying is that if one's choice does not follow from reasons - if the choice is made for no reason at all - then it really isn't the sort of free choice that people value.
I see no reason for this. If an argument is made demonstrating why this is the case, then we could discuss it–though this is not my cup of tea.
This is a definition, not a fact claim. I'm not saying that I have somehow determined that free choices depend on reasons. Rather, I am just saying that those are the type of choices I'm talking about - those that are made for specific reasons. If you think that choices made for no reason are also valid examples of free will - a free will worth wanting - then we can just disagree about that.
Nonetheless, as I stated earlier, you’re making only a partial argument; the main point of the view you’re promoting, as I see it, is that of making an assertion rather than making an argument.
Again, you have misunderstood. I'm not asserting what a free choice is, I'm stating a particular definition of free choice and showing that sort of free choice is impossible. I also happen to think that choices based on our reason is indeed the only sort of free choice that is worth wanting, and I think most people agree, but that is not part of my argument.
You “argue” that anything “found” in ‘reason’ was not “freely chosen.” We could argue this point. I take the position that it is also wrong. Why? Because eventually the whole enterprise becomes an infinite regress regarding the source of all reasons: turtles all the way down. But, let’s leave that aside since this is an actual ‘argument’ and highly nuanced.
This is actually what I'm arguing. It's not nuanced, it's completely straightforward. Since an ultimately free choice must be based on reasons (by my definition), and those reasons must themselves be freely chosen (otherwise you wouldn't be responsible for the bases of your choice), a regress begins that can only be escaped by having reasons you did not choose.
What I do strongly disagree with, however, is your assertion that “free will” is limited in its exercise by our power of reason.
If free will makes choices that are not based on reasons, upon what are they based?
I KNEW how to count, even though I didn’t know numbers. I had a capacity, therefore, for number counting without being taught anything–that is, without knowledge coming from the outside.
Sure, all animals are born knowing things, including people. You don't choose to have that knowledge, but you get it anyway.
But this is fundamental to your “argument.” When it comes to our power to reason: you take the position that everything that constitutes a reason has come to us from outside of ourselves without any choice involved in this on our part.
Did you freely choose to know about counting? Did you think to yourself, "Hmm, I wonder if I should know how to count. Well, I think it might be a good thing to know, so I will freely choose to be born with that knowledge."?
Likewise, when I had to make a moral choice–life itself was forcing me to make this choice, I had no rational basis for making this moral choice: I had neither reached the ‘age of reason,’ nor had I any inkling that such choices are the stuff of life. Yet, I was able to ‘choose’ because I had free will;
Either you made that choice for some reason(s), or you made it for no reason at all. If you had your reasons (beliefs and desires) then those reasons were ultimately unchosen. And if you chose for no reason at all, then I argue that is not an exercise of a type of free will worth wanting.
I was able to make a good moral choice because within us is placed a moral compass.
You did not choose to receive your moral compass - you had no choice in the matter.
Here’s my question then: did P “choose” the reason freely or not freely? How do you answer this question? This choice on the part of P now dangles separate and free from the various reasons that are out there and free, hence, of the lack of choice you argue for when it comes to the presence of “reasons” within us.
Sorry, I can't make sense of this. Any free choice (per my definition) that P makes must be made for a reason of P's own free choosing.
We now go back to the critical observation I made in the prior post; that is, this “choice” can either be “freely” made or “not freely” made. It has nothing to do with the “reason.” IOW, does P, or does he/she not, have freedom in choosing? You tell me.
If you think that free will merely allows choices to be made for no reason at all, then we can just disagree about that without further discussion.
But, whatever decision you finally make about this, it remains independent of the “reasons” that our understanding present to the ‘will’ as ‘options.’ These two realities–humankind’s rational faculties and human free will, while operating in tandem with one another, nevertheless remain independent of each another.
Again, if human free will is not rational and does not rely on one's beliefs and desires, then I say it is not the sort of free will worth having. I guess we disagree about that.
What about this? What if I choose to do nothing?
To choose to do nothing is to make a choice, like all other choices. If it is a free choice, then (per my definition) it would be based on reasons, but those reasons would ultimately be unchosen. And if you decided for no reason at all to do nothing, then it's not the sort of free choice worth wanting.
Now, what are your motivations for being here and arguing against free will? You say that it is because “[f]ree will is at the very heart of the arguments for ‘Intelligent Design’.” I’m completely mystified that you would think such a thing.
I won't argue this here but I'll outline it for you. ID argues that "natural, unguided processes" are incapable of producion complex form and function, while "intelligent sources" can. Why? What is the fundamental aspect of "intelligent agents" that allows them to design? Libertarian free will. If you read Meyer or Dembski, they explicitly acknowledge this - ID assumes the truth of metaphysical dualism and libertarian free will (though ID proponents would argue that they are not assuming these things, but rather proving them true).
As to the ‘tautology,’ you end your restatement of the argument with this: A: How do you know what traits increase fitness? B: The higher reproduction rates correlate with those traits. . . . But what if the environment were to change abruptly; then what would the “fittest” be?
Really? Well, when the environment changes (abruptly or otherwise) then what constitutes the fittest traits changes also.
IOW, there is no completely objective scale for the fitness of organisms.
Differential reproduction rates of course. Anyway I have no interest in arguing about evolution and ID here, just like to finish up with my argument that shows that the only sort of free will that is worth wanting is logically possible.dogdoc
October 22, 2022
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Dogdoc: My apologies for not responding any sooner. There are a number of reasons why I haven't, among them being on vacation, traveling and dealing with someone in the hospital. The iron is no longer 'hot,' nevertheless, I'd like to respond. You've said elsewhere that I've misunderstood your argument. I don't think that's the case. When I wrote this:
Person A: “I am not free because I can’t ‘freely’ choose the motivations (reasons, beliefs, desires, etc.) for the choices I make.” Person B: “Why can’t you ‘freely’ choose your motivations?” Person A: “Because I’m not free.”
..............you took exception to it and said that it was but a "cartoon" of your argument. Please note that I prefaced this above schema by saying:
I find it noteworthy that you bring this argument to this website. And I say that because your Catch-22 statement, it strikes me, can be somewhat fairly viewed as this discourse:
What I wrote had to do with your motivation for being here at UD. More on this later. I did not say this was your argument, per se. Here is your argument: the human will can only choose if it has a reason to choose and our reasons for choosing are not freely ours. I disagree with this. And I pointed out why. WJM, in responding to my post, understood the point I was making. The point I was making is that you've conflated two realities into one. Perhaps this isn't the most precise way of stating it; nevertheless, you've "chosen" to make free choice a servant of reason. I see no reason for this. If an argument is made demonstrating why this is the case, then we could discuss it--though this is not my cup of tea. Nonetheless, as I stated earlier, you're making only a partial argument; the main point of the view you're promoting, as I see it, is that of making an assertion rather than making an argument. You "argue" that anything "found" in 'reason' was not "freely chosen." We could argue this point. I take the position that it is also wrong. Why? Because eventually the whole enterprise becomes an infinite regress regarding the source of all reasons: turtles all the way down. But, let's leave that aside since this is an actual 'argument' and highly nuanced. What I do strongly disagree with, however, is your assertion that "free will" is limited in its exercise by our power of reason. That's just not so. You want "reasons" for my disagreement; but I give you something better than reason--I give you my experience. Knowledge is provisional, whereas experience is downright real and unchanging. This was the whole point of talking about the moral choice I had to make when a child of 4 or 5, which I then coupled to the story of counting marbles. I don't think you've thought this through enough. I KNEW how to count, even though I didn't know numbers. I had a capacity, therefore, for number counting without being taught anything--that is, without knowledge coming from the outside. But this is fundamental to your "argument." When it comes to our power to reason: you take the position that everything that constitutes a reason has come to us from outside of ourselves without any choice involved in this on our part. But, in the case of marbles, the concept was there, but not the words signifying numbers, which have to be given to you by others. I spoke Italian when I was young. So, did I have cuatro or sete marbles, or did I have four or seven marbles. The concept was within me. (The words I had to learn later--and, of course, they are words relative to the culture you've grown up in.) Likewise, when I had to make a moral choice--life itself was forcing me to make this choice, I had no rational basis for making this moral choice: I had neither reached the 'age of reason,' nor had I any inkling that such choices are the stuff of life. Yet, I was able to 'choose' because I had free will; I was able to make a good moral choice because within us is placed a moral compass. But I can say this only looking back on what happened. And it did happen. And it gave me an understanding of how free will operates. Shall I renounce this experience? Should I lie and say it never happened? This gets us back to what I stated in my earlier post: free will is free precisely because it is FREE to make a choice. Otherwise, it cannot be called free will. Getting back to your "argument," you responded to my post in part by saying that I should look at your post at 554 to understand your argument in greater detail. I've done this. Having done so, here, in my view, is where and how your argument fails:
. . . 3) In order for person P to make a free choice C, the reason(s) R upon which C is based must not be chosen by anyone or anything but P.
Now let me point out your own words to you. This phrase you use, " . . . the reason(s) R upon which C is based must not be chosen by anyone or anything but P," implies that P MUST choose. That is, If no one else can "choose," then, obviously, it is P who "chooses." Here's my question then: did P "choose" the reason freely or not freely? How do you answer this question? This choice on the part of P now dangles separate and free from the various reasons that are out there and free, hence, of the lack of choice you argue for when it comes to the presence of "reasons" within us. We now go back to the critical observation I made in the prior post; that is, this "choice" can either be "freely" made or "not freely" made. It has nothing to do with the "reason." IOW, does P, or does he/she not, have freedom in choosing? You tell me. But, whatever decision you finally make about this, it remains independent of the "reasons" that our understanding present to the 'will' as 'options.' These two realities--humankind's rational faculties and human free will, while operating in tandem with one another, nevertheless remain independent of each another. In your response at 619, you baldly state that:
I am showing that free will, as I have defined it, is logically impossible.
As you understood it, this is impossible. But, in my view, you've baked in an assumption that you has neither been argued for nor demonstrated by you; and that is: that human will, when choosing, is confined to, limited by, only that which reason presents to it. What about this? What if I choose to do nothing? To say, as I imagine would be your instinct to say, that this is no more than a trivial example of freedom is to misunderstand freedom; because it is precisely this ability to move in between what reason offers the will that characterizes what we recognize as the will's freedom. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%&&&&&&&&&& Now, what are your motivations for being here and arguing against free will? You say that it is because "[f]ree will is at the very heart of the arguments for 'Intelligent Design'." I'm completely mystified that you would think such a thing. ID is nothing more than a rational argument based on what experience reveals to us and knowledge allows us to understand; simply stated, it is: the complexity we find in biological beings is something that cannot be explained by invoking random mechanisms. Simple as that. As to the tautology that is the "survival of the fittest," it wasn't this website or people connected with ID that pointed out this problem. You can argue with those who first observed this tautology. I was simply drawing something of a parallel between that tautology and your view of human will. Below the surface was the suggestion that If you're willing to accept the tautology of the "survival of the fittest," then you might also be given to what is--to certain degree, a similar problem in identifying free will with the reasons upon which it might base those choices. Obviously, this didn't impress you much. That's fine. But others saw the problem I was getting at. As to the 'tautology,' you end your restatement of the argument with this:
A: How do you know what traits increase fitness? B: The higher reproduction rates correlate with those traits. . . .
But what if the environment were to change abruptly; then what would the "fittest" be? IOW, there is no completely objective scale for the fitness of organisms. It's all relative. So, saying something is 'fit' tells you no more than telling you it 'survived.' How do you build a theory on this? R.A. Fischer tried. Others have tried. But none have succeeded. Enter ID!PaV
October 21, 2022
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I'll take Inane Comments for a 1000 Alex.relatd
October 19, 2022
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I beginning to believe the no free will thing. How does one explain over 800 comments and probably most are useless, either obvious or nonsense. Let's go for a 1000.jerry
October 19, 2022
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Origenes,
If one’s belief is ultimately based on chemical process A, then, in order to do a thorough evaluation of one’s belief, one should evaluate chemical process A.
This doesn't make sense. It's like saying in order for one to flex their bicep, they need to understand how actomyocin works. You didn't respond to my point, so I'll say it again: At the risk of being obvious, we do not say, for example, “Well, since my serotonin level in my cingulate gyrus is low, then this belief must be false”. Rather, we say, for example, “Well, since Trump built the wall, and that was my top priority, then he deserves my vote.”
DD: But I am not proposing a “theory on beliefs” …. O: Yes you do, your theory is that beliefs are “… ultimately based on things outside of our control.”
No, that is not a theory, not an explanation of how we evaluate beliefs. Rather, it takes for granted that we do, somehow, evaluate beliefs (you agreed on that point), and the purely logical observation that if we choose the reasons for our own choices, that leads to a regress that can only be grounded by beliefs that were not freely chosen.
Ok, let’s say that we have identified chemical process A in the frontal lobe...Now, tell me, how do we come to trust this source of your theory on beliefs?
Rather than addressing my responses, you are just repeating what you wrote before. Your argument is grasping at this one remaining straw; let me take another route to wrest that away. I have explained multiple times that I propose no theory for how minds work - how, that is, we go about evaluating our beliefs. You ignore this, and pretend that I am advancing a physicalist view of minds. So let's look at what my argument says for people who have other ideas about how minds work. Let's, for example, say that brains are not responsible for our ability to think; rather, our minds are immaterial substances (res cogitans) that somehow interact with our bodies, and perhaps our brains, per Aristotle, generally function to cool the blood. Further, let us say that a transcendent God endows each baby with a soul, and perhaps some built-in knowledge of morality. Feel free to specify whatever ideas you might have about how this all works. Using these assumptions, what does my argument look like? It looks exactly the same, of course. You didn't freely choose to have God design you, or your mind, and you didn't freely choose to have God implant any beliefs in your mind, and logically, you still can't freely choose your beliefs for reasons of your own choosing. Now, since under this view it was God who designed people, including their minds, then you presumably don't worry about whether our beliefs can be trusted (I don't understand why, but there you go). So you can no longer try to say my argument entails that our beliefs can't be trusted.dogdoc
October 19, 2022
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AF, right reason includes right inductive [modern sense] arguments. That is, arguments of support not entailment. These include the inferences to best current, empirically anchored explanation you have seen in the context of the design inference for over a decade. So, either you have paid scant attention to the substance and knocked over a strawman, or you are willfully, mischievously falsifying the case. Neither is a good place to be in. KFkairosfocus
October 19, 2022
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Dogdoc @ Suppose that belief X is ultimately based on a thing outside of our control, let’s say chemical process A in the frontal lobe. Given that, my question would be: do we have the ability to truly evaluate belief X, which would include an evaluation of chemical process A?
You are saying that we might “evaluate a chemical process” in our brain. What are you talking about? Indeed. I do not “evaluate chemical processes” when I deliberate over beliefs, I evaluate my beliefs.
If one’s belief is ultimately based on chemical process A, then, in order to do a thorough evaluation of one’s belief, one should evaluate chemical process A. I am asking you if it would be possible for us to do so, if, per your theory on beliefs, our beliefs are ultimately based on things outside of our control; such as chemical process A.
But I am not proposing a “theory on beliefs” ….
Yes you do, your theory is that beliefs are “… ultimately based on things outside of our control.” I put it to you, that, under your theory on beliefs, true evaluation of our beliefs would be impossible.
Again, I have proposed no epistemic theory at all.
Yes, you did. According to you the beliefs we choose are based on an external origin. As you stated: “(…) choice is always based on reasons that ultimately originate externally.”
I have never said anything here about whether or not our beliefs are true.
Yes you did. You have touted your belief about beliefs as being true, e.g. here:
“The truth of my argument doesn’t change the point of our thinking, it shows that we are not ultimately responsible for our choices.”
Your theory/belief references itself like this: I am not responsible for my belief that I am not responsible for my belief. If you are not responsible for your belief, who or what is? And if some unknown external source is responsible for your belief, then what is its worth?
Unknown source? No, I’m actually saying that as far as I can see there is no unknown external source involved.
You are being inconsistent with your own theory on beliefs, which states that every belief is based on an external source. Why would you, or anyone else, trust this unknown external source of your belief?
I don’t know what “unknown external source” you might be thinking of.
Ok, let’s say that we have identified chemical process A in the frontal lobe as the source of your theory on beliefs. Now, in theory, this chemical process A can be traced back to prior chemical events in the universe —— ultimately to the Big Bang. Now, tell me, how do we come to trust this source of your theory on beliefs?Origenes
October 19, 2022
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is not drawn to empiricism, I suspect
Right reason is all about empirical results (science) and logic. A perfect description of ID - the use of empirical results with logic. That’s why         ID is science+ jerry
October 19, 2022
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And indeed, repeated experimentation, ever since it was first set forth by Francis Bacon in his inductive methodology, has been the cornerstone of the scientific method. And has indeed been very, very, fruitful for man in gaining accurate knowledge of the universe in that repeated experiments lead to more “exacting, and illuminating”, conclusions than is possible with the quote-unquote, “educated guesses” that follow from the ‘top-down’ deductive form of reasoning that had been the dominant form of reasoning up to that time.
Francis Bacon, 1561–1626 Excerpt: Called the father of empiricism, Sir Francis Bacon is credited with establishing and popularizing the “scientific method” of inquiry into natural phenomena. In stark contrast to deductive reasoning, which had dominated science since the days of Aristotle, Bacon introduced inductive methodology—testing and refining hypotheses by observing, measuring, and experimenting. An Aristotelian might logically deduce that water is necessary for life by arguing that its lack causes death. Aren’t deserts arid and lifeless? But that is really an educated guess, limited to the subjective experience of the observer and not based on any objective facts gathered about the observed. A Baconian would want to test the hypothesis by experimenting with water deprivation under different conditions, using various forms of life. The results of those experiments would lead to more exacting, and illuminating, conclusions about life’s dependency on water. https://lib-dbserver.princeton.edu/visual_materials/maps/websites/thematic-maps/bacon/bacon.html
So thus DD, for you to hold that the major premises of your argument, i.e. your metaphysics, is beyond any possible empirical reproach is, basically, for you to adopt the strictly deductive form of reasoning of the ancient Greeks, and is for you to shun the inductive form of reasoning that has been so fruitful for man in regards to gaining accurate knowledge of the world. In other words, for you to put your metaphysics beyond any empirical reproach it is for you to take a major step backwards philosophically speaking, Of supplemental note, (and not surprisingly for anyone who has debated Darwinists who ignore any and all empirical evidence that falsifies the major premises of Darwinian evolution), it turns out that Darwinian evolution itself is not based on Bacon’s Inductive form of reasoning, (which is too say that Darwin’s theory itself is not based on the scientific method), but Darwin’s theory is instead based, in large measure, on the Deductive form of reasoning that Bacon had specifically shunned because of the fallibleness of man’s fallen sinful nature. As Dr. Richard Nelson noted in his book ‘Darwin, Then and Now’, Charles Darwin, in his book ‘Origin of Species’, “selected the deductive method of reasoning – and abandoned the inductive method of reasoning.”
Darwin Dilemma by Dr. Richard William Nelson The theory of biological evolution Charles Darwin argued for in the Origin of Species now presents a litany of problems for twenty-first-century evolution scientists – known as the Darwin Dilemma. The dilemma stems from the method of reasoning Darwin selected. Dilemma Origins: For investigating the laws of nature, Charles Darwin selected the deductive method of reasoning – and abandoned the inductive method of reasoning. The method of reasoning is critical when investigating the secrets of nature. Unlike deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning minimizes the dogma and bias of the investigator. Inductive reasoning is the defining element of what has become known as the scientific method. Details of Darwin’s reasoning method are discussed in Darwin, Then and Now. https://www.darwinthenandnow.com/darwin-dilemma/
As Darwin himself confessed, “What you hint at generally is very very true, that my work will be grievously hypothetical & large parts by no means worthy of being called inductive; my commonest error being probably induction from too few facts.”
Charles Darwin to Asa Gray – 29 November 1857 My dear Gray, ,,, What you hint at generally is very very true, that my work will be grievously hypothetical & large parts by no means worthy of being called inductive; my commonest error being probably induction from too few facts. https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/DCP-LETT-2176.xml
So thus in conclusion, DD may hold that his metaphysical, and/or philosophical, argument does not have to conform to the principle of empirical verification, and/or, more importantly, the principle of empirical falsification, but that is for him to adopt an overarching 'deductive' form of reasoning where ones major premises are beyond empirical reproach. A defective form of reasoning that held sway for a few thousand years and which prevented the rise of modern science. Indeed, is for him to hold a 'defective' form of reasoning which still lays at the basis of much of modern Darwinian ideology and which, apparently, is still preventing Darwinian evolution's overturning by empirical evidence as a viable scientific theory.
Evolutionists’ Certainty Comes from Metaphysics, Not Science Cornelius Hunter - April 13, 2017 Excerpt: If the evolutionist’s premises are correct, then evolution is a no-brainer. We must be evolutionists — regardless of the scientific evidence. The species arising from random causes, such as mutations, makes no sense scientifically, but would be a must. As usual the (Darwinist's unquestioned) religion and philosophy steer (the Darwinist's interpretation of) the science. https://evolutionnews.org/2017/04/the-evolutionists-certainty-comes-from-metaphysics-not-science/ 1 Thessalonians 5:21 Test all things; hold fast what is good.
bornagain77
October 19, 2022
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DD, you read wiki quite differently than I did. To repeat the last statement on wiki
, "In 1977, Ayer had noted, “The verification principle is seldom mentioned and when it is mentioned it is usually scorned; it continues, however, to be put to work. The attitude of many philosophers reminds me of the relationship between Pip and Magwitch in Dickens’s Great Expectations. They have lived on the money, but are ashamed to acknowledge its source”.[2] In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the general concept of verification criteria—in forms that differed from those of the logical positivists—was defended by Bas van Fraassen, Michael Dummett, Crispin Wright, Christopher Peacocke, David Wiggins, Richard Rorty, and others.[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verificationism#Legacy
As I read it, the strict verificationism of logical positivists (i.e. of atheistic materialists), where all immaterial and/or abstract statements about metaphysics were held to be “cognitively meaningless”, was soundly, and rightly, rejected, and "the (revised) general concept of verification criteria—in forms that differed from those of the logical positivists" has been rightly adopted, and/or at least ably defended. This is quite different from your present scornful tone that the principle of verification is dead and buried. And indeed DD, your claim that your philosophical, and/or metaphysical, argument does not have to conform to any verifiable outside empirical evidence whatsoever simply makes no sense. Again, by putting your idea/argument completely beyond any possible empirical critique, you might as well be arguing about "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?", and/or for the reality of "Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs." Contrary to what you are holding, I hold that your abstract philosophical ideas, i.e. your metaphysics, must conform to reality in some way, shape, or form, in order for them to be meaningful and/or scientifically useful. This much is, or at least should be, obvious. In fact, by putting your abstract philosophical argument, i.e. your metaphysics, completely beyond any possible empirical reproach, it very much seems to me that you have fallen into the 'deductive logic' trap of the ancient Greeks and of modern day Neo-Darwinists. Which is to say that you have fallen into the trap of putting the major premises of your argument beyond any possible feedback, and/or critique, from empirical observation. In fact, modern science owes a large part of its very existence to Francis Bacon shunning the deductive logic of the ancient Greeks, a form of logic where they, (like you are currently doing in your argument), "pronounced on how the world should behave, with insufficient attention to how the world in fact did behave.”,,
“The emergence of modern science was associated with a disdain for the rationalism of Greek philosophers who pronounced on how the world should behave, with insufficient attention to how the world in fact did behave.” – Henry F. Schaefer III – Making Sense of Faith and Science – 23:30 minute mark https://youtu.be/C7Py_qeFW4s?t=1415
,, and science owes its existence to Francis Bacon instead championing 'inductive logic' over and above deductive logic. A form of logic where one's metaphysical premises are held only provisionally, and are subject to verification, and/or, more importantly, subject to falsification by empirical observation. Bacon’s inductive methodology, which he introduced as a check and balance against humanity’s fallen sinful nature,,,
Bacon’s “Enchanted Glass” – Emily Morales – December 2019 Excerpt: It was the rather low regard for the fallen human mind, besieged as it were by sin, that drove Francis Bacon, the “Father” of the Scientific Method, to formulate a new epistemology in his Great Instauration. In this brilliant man of faith’s view, the Adamic fall left an indelible mark on the human intellect, such that in its total depravity and persistent infirmity it could not be trusted to generate knowledge that was in any way free from bias, wrong presuppositions, or contradictions.,,, Recognizing then, the limitations of the human mind for revealing truth by mere logic and deductive reasoning, Bacon posited an altogether different means for knowledge acquisition: experimentation3—repeated experimentation—within the context of a scientific community (natural philosophers in his day). Bacon’s inductive methodology facilitated an explosion in knowledge of the natural world and accompanying technological advancement: https://salvomag.com/post/bacons-enchanted-glass The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science Description: Peter Harrison provides an account of the religious foundations of scientific knowledge. He shows how the approaches to the study of nature that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were directly informed by theological discussions about the Fall of Man and the extent to which the mind and the senses had been damaged by that primeval event. Scientific methods, he suggests, were originally devised as techniques for ameliorating the cognitive damage wrought by human sin. At its inception, modern science was conceptualized as a means of recapturing the knowledge of nature that Adam had once possessed. Contrary to a widespread view that sees science emerging in conflict with religion, Harrison argues that theological considerations were of vital importance in the framing of the scientific method. https://www.amazon.com/Fall-Man-Foundations-Science/dp/0521117291 *Peter Harrison is a former Andreas Idreos Professor of Science and Religion at the University of Oxford and is presently Research Professor and Director of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of Queensland. He was the 2011 Gifford Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh and holds a Senior Research Fellowship in the Ian Ramsey Centre at Oxford
,,, Bacon’s inductive methodology, which he introduced as a check and balance against humanity’s fallen sinful nature, was a radically different form of ‘bottom up’ reasoning that was, practically speaking, a completely different form of reasoning than the ‘top down’ deductive reasoning of the ancient Greeks which had preceded it.
Inductive reasoning Excerpt: Inductive reasoning is distinct from deductive reasoning. While, if the premises are correct, the conclusion of a deductive argument is certain, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument is probable, based upon the evidence given.[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning Deductive vs. Inductive reasoning – top-down vs. bottom-up – graph https://i2.wp.com/images.slideplayer.com/28/9351128/slides/slide_2.jpg
This new form of ‘bottom up’ inductive reasoning, which lays at the basis of the scientific method itself, was championed by Francis Bacon over and above the deductive reasoning of the ancient Greeks in 1620 in his book that was entitled ‘Novum Organum’. Which is translated as ‘New Method’. In the title of that book, Bacon is specifically referencing Aristotle’s work ‘Organon’, which was, basically, Aristotle’s treatise on logic and syllogism.
The Organon and the logic perspective of computation – 2016 Excerpt: The works of Aristotle on logic are collectively known as the Organon, that is, the ” instrument ” or ” tool ” of thought. In the ” Prior Analytics “, Aristotle introduced a list of inference rules that concern with the relation of premises to conclusion in arguments (syllogisms). His aim was to determine which kinds of arguments are valid. The validity of an argument is characterized and inferred based on its logical form (deduction) and for this reason Aristotle is considered as the father of formal logic. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303407444_The_Organon_and_the_logic_perspective_of_computation
And thus in his book “Novum Organum”, Bacon was specifically and directly championing a entirely new method of ‘bottom-up’ inductive reasoning, (where repeated experimentation played a central role in one’s reasoning to a general truth), over and above Aristotle’s ‘top-down’ deductive form of reasoning, (where one’s apriori assumption of a general truth, (i.e. your major premises), played a central role in one’s reasoning), which had been the dominate form of reasoning that had been around for 2000 years at that time.
Deductive and Inductive Reasoning (Bacon vs Aristotle – Scientific Revolution) – video Excerpt: Deductive reasoning, which uses general premises to arrive at a certain conclusion, has been around since Aristotle. In his book Novum Organum (1620, translated ‘new method’), Sir Francis Bacon advanced a new way of philosophical inquiry known as inductive reasoning, in which the inquirer comes to a probable conclusion based on several specific observations. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WAdpPABoTzE
bornagain77
October 19, 2022
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Truth from right reason. KF is not drawn to empiricism, I suspect.Alan Fox
October 19, 2022
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Well, I dunno, I think logical positivism has had a bad press. Empiricism still rules and what is empiricism but another title for the same approach.Alan Fox
October 19, 2022
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DD, let's start with a general logical problem. Arguments that refer to themselves or that include the arguer in their circle of reference, are particularly prone to logical trouble. For, on one hand they can easily be question-begging and on the other, self-referential, incoherent and thus self-falsifying. Arguments that try to undermine or refute responsible, rational, self-moved freedom are in this class. So, if they "win," they lose -- as, they discredit the capability to actually reason at all. This is in part because, to reason, our chain of propositions must not be connected merely though [presumably unconscious] programming or chance links, they must be freely, reasonably acknowledged on meaning and truth or at least possible truth. Nor are such chains forced to be infinite regresses once we have first plausibles of various sorts. First plausibles, once comparative difficulties on factual adequacy, coherence and balance of explanatory power are addressed, need not be question begging or hopelessly subjective. One is, of course, free to reject reasonable, responsible argument, but that will rightly be regarded as self-discrediting, in extreme cases revealing irrationality. (And, from experience, it is all but impossible to try to reason with those caught up in webs of irrationality, such as the mentally ill or those indoctrinated into hyperskepticism or the like.) At this point, I am simply noting for record. Reppert's point suggests that those determined to reject what mind (and I freely add, morally governed mind) points to as root of freedom and capacity to attain truth through right reason, may be willing to surrender rationality - - - at least as a rhetorical matter - - - rather than go where they are determined not to go. KFkairosfocus
October 19, 2022
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BA77, Thank you for copying a bunch of stuff from Wiki and pasting it here, that was awesome. Now you know something about verificationism and why it's fallen out of favor, and why you really don't want to say things like "Without any outside way to empirically verify or falsify your philosophical claims, you have an easy game of it and you can always just sit back and claim that whomever has not refuted your argument." Philosophical arguments are in fact supported by or refuted by agreed-upon principles of formal and informal logic - that is exactly how verificationism itself was refuted. So it's not that my argument can't be refuted without empirical data - it is that you haven't yet proposed any refutation at all, nor even given the least indication that you understand what my argument is about. Again, my argument against free will is not based on brain function, or quantum measurements, or even causality, or anything else that might be examined by experiment. You suggest:
In fact, I tried to put a little empirical meat on the bones of your argument, like seeing what apriori beliefs about God a child may be born with
I literally can't imagine how any result of that research could possibly have anything at all to do with the argument I made, which had nothing whatsoever to do with belief in God (whatever you might mean by that).dogdoc
October 18, 2022
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The last statement from wiki is informative,
In 1977, Ayer had noted, "The verification principle is seldom mentioned and when it is mentioned it is usually scorned; it continues, however, to be put to work. The attitude of many philosophers reminds me of the relationship between Pip and Magwitch in Dickens's Great Expectations. They have lived on the money, but are ashamed to acknowledge its source".[2] In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the general concept of verification criteria—in forms that differed from those of the logical positivists—was defended by Bas van Fraassen, Michael Dummett, Crispin Wright, Christopher Peacocke, David Wiggins, Richard Rorty, and others.[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verificationism#Legacy (And I also note that wiki is, by and large, hostile to Intelligent Design, so this statement comes from a source that is not sympathetic to my overarching point of view.)
bornagain77
October 18, 2022
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DD, I did not say "that all claims must be subject to empirical verification in order to be useful, or believed." That would lead me to be among atheists who denied everything that was not physical and/or material. per wiki "only statements that are empirically verifiable (i.e. verifiable through the senses) are cognitively meaningful,,, Verificationism thus rejects statements related to metaphysics, as well as fields such as theology, ethics and aesthetics, as "cognitively meaningless". You idea must correspond to reality somehow I would be much more properly classified as a 'revisionist' under the Popper variety, rather than a strict adherent to verificationism as you are trying to portray, i.e. your idea must at least be 'falsifiable' in order to be considered scientific. Shoot, being an ID proponent, I am completely wedded to inference from observed facts to support ones ideas about metaphysics, I am hardly a strict adherent to logical positivism, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verificationism#Revisions
"In so far as a scientific statement speaks about reality, it must be falsifiable; and in so far as it is not falsifiable, it does not speak about reality." - Karl Popper
bornagain77
October 18, 2022
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Vivid,
Can a person without any prior, reason, disposition or inclination even make a choice? If I have no prior reason , disposition or inclination my will is neutral it is inclined neither to the right or to the left.It appears that the argument you have put forth eliminates not only free choice but any choice.
So you are making a distinction between a free choice (as I've defined it, one that is not causally determined and one that is made for some reason(s)) and other choices. What is it you think characterizes "any choice"?
There can be no free choice if there are prior reasons yet on the other hand if there are no prior reasons, disposition or inclination there can be no choice made.
I'd avoid explaining choices based on dispositions or inclinations; those seem perfectly circular (Why did you make choice C? I was disposed to make that choice. How do you know you were disposed to that? Because I made choice C). So for me a free choice is one that is based on reasons which actually account for the choice (I freely chose to bring a raincoat because I thought it might rain and I don't like getting wet). I suppose that if one has no beliefs and desires upon which to base a choice, then they may simply choose (for that reason) to avoid making the choice, or they may "flip a mental coin" or just arbitrarily say the first thing that pops into their head.
I should modify this because you are not making the argument that there are no choices
Absolutely, I say that people do make choices all the time. But I would say that autonomous robots also make choices. In neither case are those choices ultimately freely chosen.dogdoc
October 18, 2022
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BA77,
DD poo poos having his idea subject to empirical verification. In other news, Snow White and the seven Dwarfs also look down on anyone doubting their existence because they are not subject to empirical testing.
You seem disinterested in discovering what's wrong with your view; a quick perusal of "problems with verificationism" would have done the trick, but I suppose you just can't be bothered. Fine. You claim that all claims must be subject to empirical verification in order to be useful, or believed. Please provide the empirical verification for your claim.dogdoc
October 18, 2022
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“It appears that the argument you have put forth eliminates not only free choice but any choice” I should modify this because you are not making the argument that there are no choices Vividvividbleau
October 18, 2022
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DD Can a person without any prior, reason, disposition or inclination even make a choice? If I have no prior reason , disposition or inclination my will is neutral it is inclined neither to the right or to the left. It appears that the argument you have put forth eliminates not only free choice but any choice. There can be no free choice if there are prior reasons yet on the other hand if there are no prior reasons, disposition or inclination there can be no choice made. Vividvividbleau
October 18, 2022
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DD poo poos having his idea subject to empirical verification. In other news, Snow White and the seven Dwarfs also look down on anyone doubting their existence because they are not subject to empirical testing.bornagain77
October 18, 2022
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Origenes,
Suppose that belief X is ultimately based on a thing outside of our control, let’s say chemical process A in the frontal lobe. Given that, my question would be: do we have the ability to truly evaluate belief X, which would include an evaluation of chemical process A?
You are saying that we might "evaluate a chemical process" in our brain. What are you talking about? I do not "evaluate chemical processes" when I deliberate over beliefs, I evaluate my beliefs. At the risk of being obvious, we do not say, for example, "Well, since my serotonin level in my cingulate gyrus is low, then this belief must be false". Rather, we say, for example, "Well, since Trump built the wall, and that was my top priority, then he deserves my vote."
I am not asking you if we evaluate beliefs or not.
Ok, we agree that we evaluate beliefs!
I am asking you if it would be possible for us to do so, if, per your theory on beliefs, our beliefs are ultimately based on things outside of our control; such as chemical process A.
But I am not proposing a "theory on beliefs", beyond the simple claim that we evaluate our beliefs based on reasons. You keep talking about chemical processes, but I don't see the relevance at all.
I put it to you, that, under your theory, true evaluation of our beliefs would be impossible.
Again, I have proposed no epistemic theory at all. What I've said is simply this: 1) We evaluate our beliefs (I think you agree with this), and 2) We evaluate our beliefs based on reasons (this seems tautologically true, based on what it means to evaluate beliefs)
Your counter (paraphrasing) “but we truly evaluate our beliefs” is an argument against your theory on beliefs. It shows that reality is incompatible with your theory.
I have never said anything here about whether or not our beliefs are true. One can absolutely base choices on false beliefs - it happens all the time.
I don’t understand this. Obviously we do – we consciously (and, often, unconsciously) deliberate over things and decide whether or not we believe them. Indeed we do,
Ok, good we agree on that.
... but the question is, are we (also) able to deliberate over our reasons and beliefs in any meaningful way if your theory on reasons and beliefs is true.
I don't have a "theory on reasons". I'm not proposing any theories here. A theory is an explanation, and I'm not trying to explain how we evaluate our beliefs.
You really don’t get it, do you?
No. The best I can guess is that you're trying to argue that if our physical brains determine our beliefs, then we have no good reason to think our beliefs are true. But obviously I'm not arguing anything about our physical brains determining our beliefs, and I'm also not arguing anything about the truth of our beliefs, so I can't understand how you think you're arguing against my position here.
Our discussion goes like this (comparison): DD: According to my theory, we all drink at least 4 liter of Vodka each day. O: IF THAT WERE TRUE, would anyone be able to walk? DD: Why do ask? It is obvious that most people are able to walk. O: ….
Nope, it's like this: DD: I observe that we all drink at least 4 liter of Vodka each day. O: IF THAT WERE TRUE, would anyone be able to walk? DD: I have no opinion on how vodka impairs walking! Maybe if you are accustomed to vodka you could still walk after 4 liters, or maybe you can't walk after a single shot, or whatever, but this has nothing to do with my observation that everyone drinks 4 liters a day! (The bolded section might be the easiest way to see your error)
The truth of my argument doesn’t change the point of our thinking, it shows that we are not ultimately responsible for our choices. Self-referentially incoherent.
No, it's not. You ought to show where my illustration missed the mark - the part you left out was "The point of you evaluating whether I’m 19 feet tall is to find out if I’m lying, or if I can fit in your Uber car, or whatever." Nothing self-referential, nothing incoherent, just reasoning over beliefs and desires.
Your theory/belief references itself like this: I am not responsible for my belief that I am not responsible for my belief.
I would add the word "ultimately" in front of "responsible", but yes that's right.
If you are not responsible for your belief, who or what is?
That's a different question. I personally don't see evidence that there is a person (a "who") that implants your beliefs, and as for "what", well that would be the totality of your experience with the world.
And if some unknown external source is responsible for your belief, then what is its worth?
Unknown source? No, I'm actually saying that as far as I can see there is no unknown external source involved. It's just a combination of your innate faculties combined with everything you have perceived and experienced in your environment. Where did your belief come from that no human is 19' tall? Probably just an inductive inference based on your experience of how tall people can be.
Why would you, or anyone else, trust this unknown external source of your belief?
I don't know what "unknown external source" you might be thinking of. Why do you believe that people can't be 19' tall, or that 2+2=4? Did you freely choose to believe it? (no, you did not). Could you freely choose to disbelieve it if you wanted to (no, you could not). Was that belief implanted in you by some unknown external source? (no, I don't think so).dogdoc
October 18, 2022
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BA77, Your idea that anything not empirically verifiable is not knowable is called "verificationism", proposed by the logical positivists. If you'd like to stick to that school of philosophy then you ought to learn something about it, including the fact that it has been thoroughly discredited and abandoned, even within science itself. Among other problems is that verificationism cannot be shown to be true according to verificationism, and that inductive inferences cannot be justified. But if you wish to hold to that position then that's fine, happy to agree to disagree.dogdoc
October 18, 2022
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Vivid,
I would like to explore briefly point 5 at the moment “5) In order for P to have freely chosen R, P must have reason(s) R’ for that choice.” Correct me if I am wrong. This sorta jives with Edwards which I quoted upstream somewhere, “the will does not determine itself, it is not the “determiner determiner at the same time and same relationship”
Yes I think he is saying the same thing.
Circling back to 5 ( which sorta is giving me a charlie horse between the ears) I understand you to say P must have a reason to make a free choice . In order to have that particular reason (pr1)there must be a reason for that particular reason (pr2 ) Pr2 precedes (pr1) and thus this (pr2) was not chosen by P therefore free choice is impossible.
Yes. But since choices require reasons and reasons require choices, the clearest way to present the regress alternates between reasons and choices: 1) P makes choice C1 for reason R1 2) P must have made choice C2 to have reason R1 3) P must have had reason R2 to make choice C2 4) P must have made choice C3 to have reason R2 5) P must have had reason R3 to make choice C3 and so on, until the reason is unchosen (you are unable to choose otherwise)dogdoc
October 18, 2022
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DogDoc @ Suppose that belief X is ultimately based on a thing outside of our control, let’s say chemical process A in the frontal lobe. Given that, my question would be: do we have the ability to truly evaluate belief X, which would include an evaluation of chemical process A?
(...) it makes no difference to the argument I’m making. We don’t know how minds work – maybe it’s all chemistry and physics ... No matter how we think, we know that we do think, and that includes evaluating new beliefs.
I am not asking you if we evaluate beliefs or not. I am asking you if it would be possible for us to do so, if, per your theory on beliefs, our beliefs are ultimately based on things outside of our control; such as chemical process A. I put it to you, that, under your theory, true evaluation of our beliefs would be impossible. Your counter (paraphrasing) “but we truly evaluate our beliefs” is an argument against your theory on beliefs. It shows that reality is incompatible with your theory.
I don’t understand this. Obviously we do – we consciously (and, often, unconsciously) deliberate over things and decide whether or not we believe them.
Indeed we do, but the question is, are we (also) able to deliberate over our reasons and beliefs in any meaningful way if your theory on reasons and beliefs is true.
Yes of course we deliberate over our reasons and beliefs …
You really don’t get it, do you? Our discussion goes like this (comparison): DD: According to my theory, we all drink at least 4 liter of Vodka each day. O: IF THAT WERE TRUE, would anyone be able to walk? DD: Why do ask? It is obvious that most people are able to walk. O: ….
The truth of my argument doesn’t change the point of our thinking, it shows that we are not ultimately responsible for our choices.
Self-referentially incoherent. Your theory/belief references itself like this: I am not responsible for my belief that I am not responsible for my belief. If you are not responsible for your belief, who or what is? And if some unknown external source is responsible for your belief, then what is its worth? Why would you, or anyone else, trust this unknown external source of your belief? Why would your belief be true?Origenes
October 18, 2022
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VL, sensitive dependence on initial conditions can indeed take time for divergence but this only means noise induced unpredictably in the large (noise being inevitable), not the same as responsible rational freedom. KFkairosfocus
October 18, 2022
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