I keep having to remind myself that science is self-correcting …

_{Denyse O'Leary
May 20, 2009

Ethics

2}_{Categories
Ethics}

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I have often been wearied by legends in their own lunchroom huffing that science differs from other endeavours because it is “self-correcting.”

To which I reply: Aw come off it, fellas. Any system that does not go extinct is self-correcting – after it collapses on its hind end. This is true of governments, businesses, churches, and not-for-profit organizations. I’ve seen enough of life to know.

Here’s a classic: At The Scientist’s NewsBlog, Bob Grant reveals (May 7, 2009) that

Scientific publishing giant Elsevier put out a total of six publications between 2000 and 2005 that were sponsored by unnamed pharmaceutical companies and looked like peer reviewed medical journals, but did not disclose sponsorship, the company has admitted.

Elsevier is conducting an “internal review” of its publishing practices after allegations came to light that the company produced a pharmaceutical company-funded publication in the early 2000s without disclosing that the “journal” was corporate sponsored

[ … ]

The allegations involve the Australasian Journal of Bone and Joint Medicine, a publication paid for by pharmaceutical company Merck that amounted to a compendium of reprinted scientific articles and one-source reviews, most of which presented data favorable to Merck’s products. The Scientist obtained two 2003 issues of the journal — which bore the imprint of Elsevier’s Excerpta Medica — neither of which carried a statement obviating Merck’s sponsorship of the publication.

The linked related stories and comments are most illuminating, and bear out my critique of “peer review” here. Let’s just say that peer review started out as a good idea, but …

(Note: There is no paywall, but you may need to register to view the story, .)

Also, today at Colliding Universes

Neutrinos: Sudbury Neutrino Observatory does the sun’s bookkeeping

Origin of life: The live cat vs. the dead cat

Cosmology: Wow. It takes guts to wage war with Stephen Hawking … he appeared in Star Trek

Universe: Arguments against flatness (plus exposing sloppy science writing)

Origin of life: Latest scenario gives RNA world a boost

Colliding Universes is my blog on competing theories about our universe.

Comments

StephenB:
To assert as dogma that there should be no dogmas is self refuting. To assert as absolute truth that there is no absolute truth is self refuting.
On the other hand, To assert as dogma that there should be dogmas is arbitrary. To assert as absolute truth that there is absolute truth is self-referentially incoherent.Adel DiBagno_{May 23, 2009
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Oh, Adel, you beat me to the post by a minute. Of course, negation is only one part of ID but I'm glad to see it be recognized as legitimate :-)tribune7_{May 23, 2009
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If an argument is wrong, it’s wrong. It doesn’t matter whether the person who refutes it offers an alternative. . . LOL. I think we should carve this one in granite. . . .Sure, why not? I think we should. That way the next time an evo demands that ID spell out an alternative explanation for bio-diversity we can point to it, right?tribune7_{May 23, 2009
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Note that ID supporters here have taken beelzebub and others to task for negative argumentation against theism in a blog devoted to negative argumentation - against evolutionary science.Adel DiBagno_{May 23, 2009
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tribune7 writes:
LOL. I think we should carve this one in granite.
Sure, why not? In the extremely unlikely event that a counterexample arises, we can always take a chisel to it. Would you object to seeing the Pythagorean theorem carved in granite?beelzebub_{May 23, 2009
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----Diffaxial: But Beelz’ is asserting a belief about beliefs about the world, which is an assertion at a different logical level than the assertion of a belief about the world. Beliefs about belief serve a different purpose than beliefs about the world and are justified in different ways. Specifically, beliefs about the world are inductive and subject to empirical test (and there therefore always provisional), while beliefs about belief occur at a higher level of abstraction, have a different logical and conceptual basis, and serve a different purpose." Once one makes a categorical statement about anything, induction has left the building. To assert as dogma that there should be no dogmas is self refuting. To assert as absolute truth that there is no absolute truth is self refuting. To assert that truth, which by definition is unchamging, is "provisional," is self refuting. There is no way around that. Also, you are making a lot of assumptions that not everyone here can accept, such as the notion that "beliefs about the world are inductive and subject to empirical test (and there therefore always provisional)...." You seems to be relying on an empiricist account of knowledge, which reduces knowledge to sense impressions. Not all of us are prepared to accept that account. Indeed, some would argue on behalf of realism, a theory of knowledge in which both mind and sense work together as complementary organs of knowledge, rejecting rationalism [mind only] and empricism [sense only] as extremes. If your comments are based on an epistemology grounded in the latter extreme [radical empiricism], as they appear to be, your account about logic, its limits, and its applications will be duly influenced.StephenB_{May 23, 2009
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If an argument is wrong, it’s wrong. It doesn’t matter whether the person who refutes it offers an alternative. LOL. I think we should carve this one in granite :-)tribune7_{May 23, 2009
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StephenB writes:
The theist tries to explain existence and the atheist simply denounces the explanation without offering an alternative.
Stephen, If an argument is wrong, it's wrong. It doesn't matter whether the person who refutes it offers an alternative. If I demonstrate that 3 is not equal to 2, then 3 is not equal to 2 even if I don't provide a new theorem to compensate. Isn't this obvious to you?beelzebub_{May 23, 2009
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----beelzebub: "Arguing against theism is the same thing as arguing for atheism, Stephen." No, it isn't. Atheism is not an argument for anything, it is an argument against something. The theist tries to explain existence and the atheist simply denounces the explanation without offering an alternative. How hard can that be? ---beelzebub: "If you truly think that we have no arguments, then your capacity for self-deception is vaster than I ever imagined." You have no argument on behalf of any positive principle. Explain the beginning of the universe and the origins of life. Tell us what happened without attacking someone else's argument. Go for it.StephenB_{May 23, 2009
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that you understand the paradox. I don't really believe in paradoxes :-) If contradicting things seem true there is a problem with the presumption or observation.tribune7_{May 23, 2009
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hazel:
Other beliefs are about values and choices, which are a very different kind of thing...I don’t know whether Russell dealt with that possibility or not.
An approach that is very similar to mine above.Diffaxial_{May 23, 2009
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If it is held provisionally, then you’re lying about changing your beliefs. Again, self-referential incoherence.
If I may (and having first read the bulk of this thread): Some remarks concerning Clive's assertion that Beelzebub's system of belief of necessity collapses into irrationality due to self-referential paradox. It seems to me that elements of this discussion are running afoul of apparent contradictions that result from the failure to acknowledge that many levels of logical of description are possible. The failure to acknowledge such levels is typically what generates apparent loops of self-reference and self-referential paradox. Specifically, "beliefs about the world" and "beliefs about beliefs" (meta-beliefs) occupy different levels of logical description and therefore may be both applied and justified in different ways (think of logical types as described by Russell, Whitehead, Gregory Bateson, etc.). Clive thinks he finds paralyzing self-referential paradox in Beelz' assertion that beliefs are provisional because that is itself a belief, therefore must also be provisional. He therefore asserts that Beelz's position collapses into irrationality and incoherence. But Beelz' is asserting a belief about beliefs about the world, which is an assertion at a different logical level than the assertion of a belief about the world. Beliefs about belief serve a different purpose than beliefs about the world and are justified in different ways. Specifically, beliefs about the world are inductive and subject to empirical test (and there therefore always provisional), while beliefs about belief occur at a higher level of abstraction, have a different logical and conceptual basis, and serve a different purpose. While each level has implications for the other, assertions about the lower logical level, such as "beliefs about the world are provisional due to their empirical and deductive nature" may not be appropriate when applied to the higher level (beliefs about beliefs, which may have inductive components). It is the placement of "beliefs about beliefs" into the class of "beliefs about the world" that results in the self-referential paradox. Clive's assertion that Beelz' beliefs collapse into incoherence fails to recognize these distinct levels of belief, application, and justification. Beelz' defense can be made more secure by doing so. An extension of this basic notion into Beelzebub's exchange with StephenB is also likely to be clarifying, as it is obvious that "belief" in the context of scientific assertion and "belief" in the context of religious systems clearly have different referents, different systems and norms of justification, operate at different levels of description, and serve different purposes. While it may appear that they are discussing commensurate phenomena (beliefs - scientific on one hand, religious on the other ), they are not.Diffaxial_{May 23, 2009
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I don't know whether Russell dealt with that possibility or not. :) Although I think one could argue that the question "Who cuts the barber's hair" implies that he has hair. I assume, your remark about baldness notwithstanding, that you understand the paradox.hazel_{May 23, 2009
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The barber in a town cuts the hair of everyone who doesn’t cut their own hair. Who cuts the barber’s hair? Someone accepting that as an unsolvable paradox would never learn that the barber is bald.tribune7_{May 23, 2009
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Stephen, can you point me to a reference, preferably a website, that discusses these 459 fulfilled prophecies, or even some of them?hazel_{May 23, 2009
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Clive, your argument about whether one can provisionally hold that all beliefs are provisional reminds me of Bertrand Russell's logical paradox about the barber:
The barber in a town cuts the hair of everyone who doesn't cut their own hair. Who cuts the barber's hair?
Beezlebub and I believe in provisionally held beliefs. I think you are playing word games rather than trying to understand. People have different kinds of beliefs. Some are factual and almost certainly without doubt within a certain level of accuracy: e.g., the earth is approximately a sphere with a diameter of about 8000 miles. In theory I hold this belief provisionally but from a practical point of view I think the chance that this is wrong is infinitesimally small. Other beliefs are about values and choices, which are a very different kind of thing: I believe that one should treat others as we would like to be treated is a moral belief which cannot be investigated empirically like the fact about the earth, but rather a value judgment that in part is a matter of choice on my part. My belief that all beliefs should be held provisionally is a belief of the latter sort, and I hold it provisionally. I am aware that I could at some time become convinced otherwise. I see no contradiction in believing this. Human beings are fallible and limited in scope. Even those things that I am most certain about are certain only from a human perspective - there are ways that different types of beings might see the world that are utterly beyond my comprehension but might be true from their perspective. Of course we all have a practical understanding of this - we don’t expect people to start every statement with a disclaimer that they are only sure of what they are saying to a certain extent, that extend being in part related to what kind of belief is being stated. So I think your protestations about the provisional nature of the belief that all beliefs are provisional is counter-productive and misses the mark. It seems like it would be better to try to understand and to explore the nuances of the nature of belief rather than play around with word puzzles like Russell’s barber problem.hazel_{May 23, 2009
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In comment 58 Khan mentions the alleged evolution of feathers. So tell us Khan what gene, genes or DNA sequence(s) were modified in order to get feathers from the feather-less? How can we scientifically test such a premise?Joseph_{May 23, 2009
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PPS: re BZ just above: A statement of intent, if genuine, so directly rests on a belief that it is tantamount to it. [WHY do you intend that X? Well, because I believe a certain state of affairs in the world, B, and value V as a binding goal; an ought. both the state of affairs and the ought are beliefs.]kairosfocus_{May 23, 2009
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Beelzebub --So in 300 years, science has gone from complete disagreement to a consensus. . . .Yes, science is self-correcting. That’s my point. I'm glad to see that you now understand that your claim that science was in complete disagreement 300 years ago is a logical error :-) With regard to today’s scientific consensus you will find scientifically accomplished and credentialed people who believe in a young Earth. . . .Only a tiny number. Only a tiny number 300 years ago rejected aether. And if you believe in a multi-verse, you believe in a perpetual motion machine. . ..Only if you define “perpetual motion machine” rather loosely. I mean literally. If you believe in the multi-verse you believe in something that violates the laws of physics. Are you saying we must never embrace dogma or do you accept that it is appropriate to do so at times? . . .If the neutrino flux of the universe should ever shift so that all dogmatic statements become perfectly true and reliable from that point forward, then I will amend my stance. Why would a shift in the neutrino flux have anything to do with the reasonableness of a particular statement of dogma? What if your belief is true? Should it continue to be provisional? As an imperfect human, you can never be absolutely certain that a particular belief is true. IOW, faith is necessary for everybody. Unless, of course, you are perfect. If you were prefect could you be certain your belief is true?tribune7_{May 23, 2009
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d] Re BZ, 78: Some beliefs are fixed because they are universally recognized as true. Others are fixed because they have been fossilized as dogma. Universal recognition is not a valid criterion of warrant. And, many warranted and in fact true beliefs are rejected not because they are "fossilised" [i.e. failed to "progress . . ." ] but because they do not fit in with with the preferences of those who reject them; preferences that may well not stand up to comparative difficulties as well as what is being rejected. (A classic example is the law of non-contradiction, which is being dismissed today by many of the most learned, but which lands such in a morass of the most patently self-referential absurdities.) In context, the implied rhetorical appeal is: well, the Christian gospel is not the consensus of my preferred reference group, so I dismiss it without fair consideration on the merits. This is of course an instance of the classic fallacy of the improper appeal to modesty in the face of alleged (here, collective) authority. The issue, then, is not whether one adheres to a "dogma," but whose. For excellent reason, I reject the dogmas of Lewontinian a priori materialism; having not only examined the evidences and reasoning, but more importantly having met God in the face of Christ and had my life miraculously transformed thereby [including witnessing and/or experiencing the odd miracle of physical healing or two through prayer in the name of Jesus under Isaiah 53, BTW], I have every confidence that the core creedal summary of the historic, Apostolic C1 NT Christian faith is correct and that I have no reason to expect hat the core matters will be corrected; though my degree of understanding and experience on many points has grown over time, i.e. there is room for renewal and reformation. And, there are and have been many millions over the past 2,000 years in the same boat. e] we ultimately depend on our own imperfect minds to decide what is true and what is false. We have no power "to decide what is true or what is false." We do have a power to recognise or to examine whether things as true or false; to a relevant degree of warrant. We have a duty to accept what is well-warranted as credibly true. We have a <i.duty to reject what is credibly an error. But, these are very different things. f] Wouldn’t you agree that [a claim is] more likely to be true in that [consensus of the educated] case than if every intelligent, educated person you’re aware of disagrees with you? In the latter case, the odds are that you are mistaken, and you had better figure out why nobody agrees with you. First, in the case of the core Christian faith, many thousands of highly educated people -- including a significant number of the leading minds in our civilisation's intellectual history -- do agree with me, now and across time, so, immediately the notion that "nobody agrees with you . . ." is simply false. So, this is effectively an appeal to the now all too common slander that Christians are ignorant, dogmatic, violently oppressive bigots; a point that underscores the force of my rebuke to BZ's ascription of violent persecution of dissent to the church as an existing reality. (And BTW, BZ, FYI, I am not a Roman Catholic, but fair is fair.) And, of course, his specific argument reats on a repetition of the fallacy of false, prejudicial appeal to the consensus of the reference group. Perhaps, amplified by the "No true Scotsman" fallacy: i.e one rather suspects that despite abundant evidence that I and others like me are in fact by any objective measure intelligent, educated and informed people on the subject, in the minds of BZ and his ilk, simply the fact that we happen to be Christians is enough to get us read out of the communion of those who are "intelligent, educated person[s]." Worse, we are approaching the end of no 78 and have yet to see a summary of the actual core case made by Christians, and a serious addressing of the matter on the merits; much less, one that warrants the rejection of the core claim I and millions have made across 2,000 years: we have met and so have come to personally know God in the face of the prophesied, crucified and risen Christ, our Lord and Saviour. g] we should examine religious questions with the same critical scrutiny that we would apply to scientific questions or questions in any other area of life. Religion doesn’t get a pass. Now, of course, this relies on quietly skipping over a little inconvenient fact from 47:
I strongly recommend that we examine our worldviews based on comparative difficulties based on comparative factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power. [Cf a "primer" here. Onlookers, please notice the specific context: the linked is part of a course reader for Christians studying at College level, and is part of a compulsory course presented at the invitation of the school's leadership. So much for the blanket stereotype of closed-minded dogmatism.
Let us see if BZ is able or willing to step up to the plate of comparative difficulties and articulate the live options, then identify core warranting arguments, and apply the test of comparative difficulties effectively to say Judaeo-Christian theism and his evident Scientism multiplied by ultra-modern relativist thought. (He certainly has failed to do so so far. If you want to see why I have reason to believe that evolutionary materialism is fatally incoherent and unable to address the credible facts on the origins of a fine-tuned, information rich world in which life forms are based on informational macromolecule nanomachine implemented digital information processing systems, cf the always linked; including Appendix 8.) Or, to apply what BZ said to what seems to be his own position: ~~Religion~~ [ultra-modern, relativistic evolutionary materialism in the name of science] doesn’t get a pass GEM of TKI PS: And, of course, BZ insists on using a site that is manifestly prone to strawman misrepresentations of what it opposes, to the point where it has little or no credibility. (I have already linked rebuttals at 30 above -- cf. here and here -- that tell a bit of the balancing side of the story on the notorious site TalkOrigins.)kairosfocus_{May 23, 2009
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Folks: Quite an onward exchange, especially thanks to SB's intervention. (Nice job, Steve!) A few footnotes. Let's start with truth claim no 1, courtesy Josiah Royce: "Error exists." Let's call it E, for short. This happens to be an undeniably true claim, as, to try to deny it ends up implicitly affirming it. (Not-E means that E is false, i.e. E would be an error. But, that would instantiate an example of just what E affirms. So, (a) truth exists (as what we may be in error about), and (b) it is in some cases knowable beyond reasonable dispute. Similarly, the core principles of right reason are undeniably true on pain of reduction to self-referential absurdities. So also, for instance, while our knowledge of many truths is indeed provisional, we may only embark on the voyage of knowledge and reasoned communication about knowledge by implicitly accepting such core principles as firm and unalterable guiding stars. (For instance to attempt to deny or dismiss the principle of non-contradiction -- even by reference to Mr Schroedinger's poor cat -- requires us to affirm that certain things are so, implying that their opposites are NOT so. So, one is int he position of having to implicitly assume what one explicitly seeks to deny. Selective hyperskepticism, reduced to absurdity.) And, while we are at it, it is important to reiterate a couple of key points that were suppressed in the lamentably strawmannish summary presented by BZ -- who BTW, has not admitted that he has seriously overstepped the bounds of basic civility above:
1] Truth: that which says of what is, that it is; and, of what is not, that it is not. (Paraphrased from Aristotle's Metaphysics 1011b, 2300 years ago. Often objected to, but never bettered. As a direct result, TRUTH is never provisional, though of course our degree of knowledge of it may be . . . ) 2] Knowledge: Classically, justified, true belief. In the aftermath of Gettier counter-examples on the difference between subjective justification and objective warrant (etc.), and in light of the fact that our knowledge is often imperfect, we apply Plantinga's terminology and distinguish two relevant senses: (i) well-warranted, credibly true belief [what we study in bodies of knowledge], and (ii) warranted, true belief. (A third sense, (iii) knowledge of persons, is by encounter, interaction, observation, reflection and relationship.) The first two senses must be distinguished in any case, and we rely on known truth in sense (ii) to identify and correct errors that crop up in bodies of knowledge in sense (i). For instance, to accept the undeniable reality of error is a premise on which we build any recognition of the provisionality of our bodies of knowledge. So is the acceptance in practice of the principle of non-contradiction. And, of course, sense (iii) is as legitimately a kind of knowledge and provides as effective a process of warrant as any other.
With these in hand, let us now deconstruct an error or two, with particular reference to no 78 above; bearing in mind that "boiling down" a step by step argument too often ends up constructing and knocking over strawman misrepresentations: a] how do we know when we have reached the truth and that no further modification is necessary This hinges on not properly and consistently recognising the distinction between truth and knowledge, as has just been underscored. And, the answer is that we have criteria of warrant that are beyond reasonable dispute, and there are some truths that are knowable to that degree of warrant. Indeed, were there no such truths, we would be unable to correct bodies of knowledge that are prone to error. However, let us also notice what BZ is forced to acknowledge as "True" -- yes! TRUE . . . -- namely: Fixed beliefs don’t necessarily indicate error or closed-mindedness. Beliefs may be fixed because they are true and in no further need of modification. This is a somewhat strawmannish over-simplification of what I actually said at 32 and 47, but even so, it directly entails the point that the appeal to progress as a criterion of epistemological superiority is a fallacy. Also, to fix the strawman, it is worth noting what was actually said at 32:
the reason why one “progresses” is because there is an end-point: the truth, and we are not there yet, so on discovering how, we may make progress towards the truth. Therefore, just because a particular point or claim has not “progressed” in recent years does not entail that it is in error or is a manifestation of closed-mindedness.
So, the proper forcus for inquiry is what we do not see in 78: what is being claimed to be true, and how it may be (or may fail to be) adequately warranted. This also leads back to a key aspect of Mrs O'Leary's point: too often, among those claiming the prestigious label "sceince" for their opinions, we see improper, and often unacknowledged dogmatism. (Lewontin's a priori materialism is a classic case in point; though of course he actually admits to it, even while erroneously imagining that his materialism has cornered the market on discovery of the truth.) As to the issue of whether INSTITUTIONS or SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT are self-correcting, I would think that her point -- "Any system that does not go extinct is self-correcting - after it collapses on its hind end. This is true of governments, businesses, churches, and not-for-profit organizations" -- is also well warranted. For instance, there have been many reformations and renewal movements in and around the Christian faith, and quite often the most important corrections are by way of calling back to first principles and first commitments that are ever so easily forgotten or self-servingly perverted. Genuine corrective progress by going back to the sound roots and pruning away what has got cut off from the roots (and is withering as a result), or removing that which has come in from without and has become parasitic on the tree. Often, that's the best kind of progress, too. (In science, revolutions historically have required precisely that kind of going back to the roots. Consider the revolutionary impact of Einstein's thought experiment reflections on what it means for two events to be simultaneous. In our day, what is revolutionary is to ask, based on what we know about the origin of information-based complex functional systems, whether there are empirically reliable signs of intelligence.) b] We’re never absolutely sure, which is why we should always continue to question our beliefs, even the most fundamental ones. Observe the self-referential absurdity on knowledge: We’re NEVER absolutely sure. Also, note the assertion of a claimed duty that is held to be without exception: we SHOULD always continue to question our beliefs, even the most fundamental ones In short, we here see a classic illustration of how selective hyperskepticism ends in self-referential inconsistencies and absurdity. Also, how relativist schemes of thought rely on implicit adherence to the concept of universally binding obligations. In short, so soon as BZ begins to be articulate his views explicitly, self-referential incoherences begin to crop up. That is, the underlying system of thought -- it seems, some variety of ultra-modern, relativist evolutionary materialism -- self-destructs. c] We can convince almost any intelligent, educated person of the truth of the Pythagorean theorem. Not so of the existence of the Christian God. This "rebuttal" depends on the strawmanisation imposed by the "summary." For, what I actually pointed out in 47 above was:
. . . the relevant epistemological issue is not (i) whether or not a subject has a body of claims that are stable across time, but instead: (ii) whether the relevant claims are well-warranted . . . . science itself [the "progressive standard" that Christian thought is accused of failing to meet . . . ] rests on a cluster of other disciplines that in many key respects do not “progress,” i.e. they have more or less definitive findings: mathematics and logic being two key cases in point . . . . It also rests on many issues in philosophy and associated worldviews options where one may only select one’s position in light of comparative difficulties across alternative major views, and so there are underlying issues of schools of thought that are subject to serious objection and commitment in the face of unresolved difficulties. (Indeed, Mr Lewontin exhibits a — poorly instructed — case in point, in his a priori commitment to materialism.) . . . . once we move from Lakatos’ protective belt of models and findings to the worldviews-tinged core of scientific research programmes and associated paradigms, Science takes on many of the characteristics of worldviews, including theistic ones . . . . warranted correctness of a claim is utterly distinct from the question of agreement or disagreement or consensus about it. That is: (i) consensus may exist on error (or worse on Plato’s Cave style power games that manipulate and frankly deceive a relevant community), and (ii) evident and well-warranted truth may be rejected because one accepts worldview level commitments or opinions that make the actual truth seem absurd . . . . Worse, false beliefs (and associated habits of thought and investigation or argument) may distort one’s ability or willingness to objectively assess evidence and reason. That is why, for instance, we sometimes speak of what we know or SHOULD know. (And also, that is why I strongly recommend that we examine our worldviews based on comparative difficulties based on comparative factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power . . . )
In short, I gave detailed reasons why we should not expect consensus among "educated" people on the Christian World view and its core claims. For, consensus or willingness to accept a claim is not a reasonable test of truth or even of reasonableness, especially on worldviews. Reasons that are ignored at our peril. [ . . . ]kairosfocus_{May 23, 2009
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Clive writes:
Your very declaration “If you provide sufficient evidence, I will revise them [beliefs].” is a belief that is not held provisionally.
It's a statement of intent, not a belief, so your objection makes no sense. However, let's suppose for the sake of argument that I say the following:
I believe that if you provide sufficient evidence, I will revise my beliefs.
Further suppose that you do provide sufficient evidence but that I do not revise my beliefs in response. What does that show? That my belief was wrong. Since I hold it provisionally, I can revise it in the face of this new evidence. No contradiction. No self-referential incoherence. Clive, your desperation is showing. Why not concede gracefully or at least think things through before posting again? Meanwhile, it's bedtime in California. Good night.beelzebub_{May 23, 2009
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beelzebub, Your very declaration "If you provide sufficient evidence, I will revise them [beliefs]." is a belief that is not held provisionally. If it is held provisionally, then you're lying about changing your beliefs. Again, self-referential incoherence.Clive Hayden_{May 23, 2009
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Do you get it now?beelzebub_{May 23, 2009
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beelzebub, Wow.Clive Hayden_{May 23, 2009
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Clive writes:
I’d be willing to bet that you also believe firmly that you’re a human. You also believe firmly that there is some “you” to be convinced or not convinced. You also hold the belief firmly that evidence and convincing a real things. I could go on and on.
Again: for a belief to be held provisionally does not mean that it isn't held confidently. I am confident of all of the beliefs that you listed, but I still hold them provisionally. If you provide sufficient evidence, I will revise them. Think about it.beelzebub_{May 23, 2009
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12:23 AM
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Clive writes:
But you won’t revise your belief which guides you that you should revise your other beliefs if necessary.
Sure I will. If the evidence warrants a revision, then I will revise it. In that respect, it is no different from any other belief. I hold them all provisionally, and there is no contradiction in doing so.
This is your guiding belief, and it dictates how you should handle all other beliefs, excepting, of course, itself.
No, it applies to itself as well as to other beliefs. Take some time and think this through.beelzebub_{May 23, 2009
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12:16 AM
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beelzebub, And I'm really not sure that adequate evidence will convince you, you seem to not even understand that logic is, itself, evident, but you seem to disregard it. You hold the belief that you should hold beliefs provisionally. This is a contradiction. What you're saying is that you're absolutely sure that you shouldn't be absolutely sure. And, you hold your belief firmly that your position should be held. You hold your belief firmly that what you're even claiming makes sense. There are a lot of things that you have to believe in firmly, and not provisionally, even to get started on what criteria you hold to be counter evidence. I'd be willing to bet that you also believe firmly that you're a human. You also believe firmly that there is some "you" to be convinced or not convinced. You also hold the belief firmly that "evidence", and the act of "convincing", are real things. You also believe firmly that they should determine other beliefs. I could go on and on.....Clive Hayden_{May 23, 2009
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beelzebub, But you won't revise your belief which guides you that you should revise your other beliefs if necessary. This is your guiding belief, and it dictates how you should handle all other beliefs, excepting, of course, itself.Clive Hayden_{May 23, 2009
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Clive, For a belief to be held provisionally does not mean that it isn't held confidently. I'm quite sure that Barack Obama is the president, but I still hold the belief provisionally. If you provide adequate evidence to the contrary, I will revise my belief.beelzebub_{May 22, 2009
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