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Eigenstate: The Facts Are Inconsistent With My Metaphysics? Well, so Much the Worse For the Facts.

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David Bentley Hart calls subjective self-awareness the “primordial datum.” It is a fact that cannot not be known. It follows that everyone knows it to be a fact. Denying that it is a fact immediately descends into absurdity. Consider “I deny that I am subjectively self-aware.” Here is a chart of the chemicals that make up the human body:

201_Elements_of_the_Human_Body-01

A group of oxygen atoms do not have the capacity to deny a truth claim. I am sure you would agree that the sentence “the oxygen atoms denied truth claim X” is absurd, no matter what X is. What is true for oxygen is also true for the atoms of the other elements of the body, i.e., carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, calcium, phosphorus, etc.

Suppose one gathers together all of the various elements that compose a human body (i.e., oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, etc.) and mixes those chemicals up in exactly the same quantities and proportions that are found in a human body and puts it all in a bag. Does that bag of chemicals have any more capacity to deny a truth claim that a rock? Of course not.

A materialist must say that the human body is nothing but a bag of chemicals. At the basic levels of ontological analysis, the bag of chemicals that we call “human body” is, for the materialist, not in principle different from any other bag of chemicals in terms of its capacity to deny truth claims. Therefore, a materialist must agree with everyone else that the sentence “this bag of chemicals denies that it is really subjectively self-aware,” is absurd.

But all the time materialists say the sense we have that we are subjectively self-aware is an illusion. This, of course, is equivalent to saying “I deny that I am really subjectively self-aware.” And, for the materialist, this sentence is equivalent to the sentence “this bag of chemicals denies that it is really subjectively self-aware,” which, as we have just seen, is absurd.

Summary: Subjective self-awareness is a fact. Indeed, in a sense, it is “the ultimate fact,” from which all other facts can be perceived. It is a fact everyone knows. It is literally undeniable. Any attempt to deny it is incoherent, absurd and false.

In light of this, let us examine another one of eigenstate claims in my “driving a stake” thread:

Something similar is at work with “folk psychology”. There is no “disembodied I”, in the dualist/supernatural/superstitious sense. But such a conclusion based on scientific analysis does not “remove the ‘I’”. Our understanding is just upgraded to something that is consonant with the data and knowledge available about how brains operate. Just like there’s no “impetus”, but motion, acceleration, and gravity remain (and are more clearly and fully understood), there’s no “dualist ‘I’” that is needed or adds any value to our understanding of consciousness, perception, meta-representation, etc.

All of which is to say, Barry, that your “sky-is-falling” dramatics are much too broad in their concerns. The science available is deeply problematic for many of your particular intuitions, but what’s at stake is just a refinement and re-organizing of the models we may use to understand brains and their activities. Beliefs as “disembodied top-down convictions of a ghost-like homunculus” are judged to be misconceptions, or “illusions” for you, if you suppose this is a kind of fundamental perception you have. But beliefs as physical phenomena, discrete characteristics of the brain that map to very complex, but nevertheless concrete states and patterns of brain activity, remain, and not only remain, but are illuminated by the science.

Eigenstate claims that truth claims such as “I am subjectively self-aware” are true and false depending on the sense in which one uses the phrase. To avoid confusion, let us very carefully describe the two senses.

Sense A: The phrase “subjectively self-aware” in the everyday meaning of the phrase speaks of an “agent that perceives his own awareness.” The everyday understanding of the phrase is infused with philosophical “intentionality,” which means the phrase is a mental state that is “about” or “directed at” something. Intentionality is inherently agent-object oriented. In this case, the agent “I” perceives an object “self-awareness.”

Sense B: Eigenstate claims the eliminative materialist believes the phenomenon “subjectively self-aware” is a complex, but nevertheless concrete state and pattern of brain activity, the kind of phenomenon you could observe and measure with an fMRI, or some more advanced instrument yet to be developed.

Eigenstate claims that the sentence “I am subjectively self-aware” is false if the phrase “subjectively self-aware” is used in Sense A and true if the phrase “subjectively self-aware” is used in Sense B.

And how does eigenstate know this? Why, he says that science has demonstrated it.

Lunacy. Sheer lunacy. Science has demonstrated no such thing. I hereby call eigenstate’s bluff. Kindly point to the scientific experience that solved the hard problem of consciousness.

Let me save us some time. No such experiment exists. Materialist do not rule out Sense A subjective self-awareness based upon the findings of science (though they say or imply that incessantly). They rule out Sense A subjective self-awareness because ruling it out is absolutely required by their metaphysics.

But we have just demonstrated that Sense A subjective self-awareness is a fact. It is more than a fact. It is “the fact.” We have even demonstrated that any attempt to deny Sense A subjective self-awareness is absurd.

Yet materialist deny it anyway. Why? Richard Lewontin tells us why:

[W]e have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.

For purposes of our discussion today, set aside that last phrase about the Divine Foot. Dualism does not necessarily entail a divinity, and in this post I want to focus on whether materialism is coherent, not on whether theism is a coherent replacement (I believe it is; but that is a topic for another day).

The key to the passage is, of course, the unwavering a priori commitment to materialism. For materialists it is always “materialism first; facts second.” This means that they must absolutely affirm incoherent and absurd statements like “Sense A subjective self-awareness is false.”

In other words, for a materialist, if the facts don’t fit with materialism, so much the worse for the facts.

If I were wearing metaphysical blinders that required me to deny undeniable facts and affirm incoherent and absurd statements, I hope I would reexamine my metaphysics. Otherwise, I am afraid I would be like this guy:

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Comments
Box: However nowhere do I claim that emergentism states that consciousness is disembodied. You made reference to a trick that "we are in control". That seems to imply that you see the "we" as distinct from corporal existence, or at least that people experience consciousness in this fashion. Not everyone does. The illusion seems more related to belief than to actual experience.Zachriel
April 23, 2015
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Zach:
Under materialism, the “we are in control” is the neural net itself.
Yet materialism cannot explain the neural net. You lose, again, as usual.Joe
April 23, 2015
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Zach#54, True. However nowhere do I claim that emergentism states that consciousness is disembodied. edit: if you are arguing that emergentism doesn't distinguish between consciousness and neural networks you are mistaken. For instance, Eigenstate refers to Libet and Soon et al (see #51), where a clear distinction between the two—relevant to emergentism—is being made.Box
April 23, 2015
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Box: However emergentism is the topic under discussion, which postulates an (emergent) consciousness. Yes, but that doesn't make consciousness something disembodied from the neural net, any more than wet is disembodied from H2O.Zachriel
April 23, 2015
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Zach: Under materialism, the “we are in control” is the neural net itself.
True. However emergentism is the topic under discussion, which postulates an (emergent) consciousness.Box
April 23, 2015
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Box: According to emergentism, neural networks—from here on NN—trick us into believing that we are in control—as illustrated by the old “folk psychology”. Under materialism, the "we are in control" is the neural net itself.Zachriel
April 23, 2015
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Eigenstate: Some experiments in past years have pushed back the “mind reading” time on some choices back as far as 10 seconds (Soon, et al, 2008, is one example that comes to mind).
The conclusions by Libet and Soon et al have been debunked in several articles, for example "Mental Causation after Libet And Soon: Reclaiming Conscious Agency", by Alexander Batthyany. In: Batthyany, Alexander & Elitzur, Avshalom C. 2009. Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Heidelberg: Universitatsverlag Winter. An excerpt from the conclusion:
Contrary to the reductionist interpretations of the findings of Libet and Soon et al., it is no objection to conscious causation that it does not entail causing urges or desires. For urges or desires are passive experiences rather than actively and consciously chosen mental events; both empirical psychology and our everyday experience tell us that much, and so do Libet’s subjects when they report that they did not consciously bring about their urges to move, but that the urges came “out of nowhere”. Importantly, non-reductionist agency theories, too, predict that desires and urges are not consciously chosen and brought about. I therefore conclude that neither Libet’s original experiment, nor the follow-up study by Soon et al. can be legitimately interpreted to provide empirical evidence in favour of agency reductionism. More generally, the lesson we can draw is that it is highly problematic to study conscious causation in cases where the subjects themselves state that they did not consciously cause the act in question.
In this post VJTorley presents multiple links to scientific articles suggesting evidence of free will.Box
April 23, 2015
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// Emergentism // (1) Consciousness is a mere onlooker: According to emergentism, neural networks—from here on NN—trick us into believing that we are in control—as illustrated by the old “folk psychology”. In fact we are not the ones doing the choosing and the thinking, something other than us is in charge. We merely “discover” what has been thought and what has been chosen. Here consciousness is an utterly passive bystander of the “mental” activities of the brain, deplete of any power to intervene—like being forced to watch a movie. By means of presenting the theory of emergentism to us, NN reveal themselves, as the real master-controllers. Meanwhile NN also keep tricking us into believing that we are in control—an incoherent signal. It follows that NN cannot be trusted. (2) Without understanding (or any rational capacity): If I’m a passive onlooker, do I, at least, understand anything? Do I understand the “movie” I’m watching? If I’m unthinking how can I possibly understand the “choices” and “thoughts” forced upon me by NN? Am I a rational being? The answer must be a resounding “NO”. NN tricks me into believing that I understand—that I ground—choices that are not actually mine. My thoughts, choices, beliefs and my understanding of them are—in fact—not mine. (3) Rationality cannot be grounded on NN. It has already been shown that NN cannot be trusted (see (1) above). Moreover emergentism shares all the problems that eliminative materialism has. One of those problems has been pointed out by Reppert:
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as [C S] Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
(4) Conclusion: emergentism does not provide a basis for rationality and is incoherent. Therfor emergentism must be rejected.Box
April 23, 2015
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Eigenstate, "Emergentism is not inherently materialist or monist. Dualist forms of emergentism are not hard to find. On materialist flavors of emergentism, material interactions are the only extant forms of interaction." If a dualist version is the only defensible version of emergentism, then I think my argument succeeded for what it was intended. When you say regarding materialist versions, that "material interactions are the only extant forms of interaction", you've basically conceded the premise. "No. Emergent properties of the brain like conscious don’t “interact with the brain”, they are the activity of the brain. That is, conscious is not something the brain “interacts with”. Consciousness is the brain function as a brain!" If the brain doesn't interact with something materially, it cannot observe it, I see no reason for it to matter if it is "brain function" itself. Even brain function has to interact materially with the rest of the brain for us to be aware of it. So whatever this subjectiveness is, must also interact materially. "If 1 and 2 were true premisses, the logic is valid. 2 sinks the argument as unsound, though." I'm glad we can agree that far, but I think you haven't quite refuted premise 2. "Consciousness *is* awareness. As being that are capable of meta-representational thought, and thus introspection, we can be “aware of our awareness”. This is still the brain perform the activities of the brain, though. There’s no “something separate” to interact with." So what is this thing that you call an illusion?Yarrgonaut
April 22, 2015
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e,"Think about it: “I chose to” as the final terminus on being asked what caused “Fold” vs. “Check” is to announce that you are a random number generator." Of course this is not true and could only be true on materialism (what does that say about materialism?), as it completely either distorts or ignores final causes. I really don't have the time or patience for your condescending comments. Thanks, anyway, but I am quite comfortable with what has been posted thus far.Tim
April 22, 2015
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eigenstate says. you say, The reason I point this out is because this is classical, orthodox Christian theology, and it explicitly distinguishes our guilt from “actively chosen” sins. I say, There are individual sins and there are corporate sins both are worthy of punishment. You say, Your choice cannot be both “federal through Adam” and “actively chose[n]” by you. I say, just a moments reflection shows this to be false. I am libel for debts that my wife makes because we are in covenant. We are in covenant because of my actions. I vote for president and I share the blame for the decisions he makes in office. The same goes for Adam and the natural man. Your bristling at the blame for the fall just shows that you are just like Adam and proves that you are in covenant with him and have been punished justly. Adam's sin is imputed to us precisely because we are guilty. Your guilt is not a legal fiction but a corporate reality. you say, You never actively chose to sin through or for Adam. You weren’t alive and past the age of moral accountabliity. I say, God is not a temporal Being. By definition there is no time when your sin is future in the mind of the Father. You were there when Adam ate the fruit and you were there when the crowd cried crucify him. you say, A choice is either a) deterministically arrived at, or b) “non-deterministically arrived at”. I say. On that we can agree. The question is is the choice determined by us or by something else. You are not really arguing about freewill verses determinism. I'm a compatableist and your view has no relation to mine. You are arguing that there is no "us" to determine our choices. That is the heart of the materialistic challenge to free will. And frankly it's self defeating and incoherent peacefifthmonarchyman
April 22, 2015
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@Yarrgonaut,
Premise 1. Emergentism requires a brain cannot be “aware” of anything that doesn’t interact materially with it.
Emergentism is not inherently materialist or monist. Dualist forms of emergentism are not hard to find. On materialist flavors of emergentism, material interactions are the only extant forms of interaction.
Premise 2. Emergentism also holds that consciousness does not materially interact with the brain.
No. Emergent properties of the brain like conscious don't "interact with the brain", they are the activity of the brain. That is, conscious is not something the brain "interacts with". Consciousness is the brain function as a brain!
Premise 3. Therefore if Emergentism were true, we would not be aware of consciousness.
If 1 and 2 were true premisses, the logic is valid. 2 sinks the argument as unsound, though.
Premise 4. We are aware of consciousness, and intimately so.
Consciousness *is* awareness. As being that are capable of meta-representational thought, and thus introspection, we can be "aware of our awareness". This is still the brain perform the activities of the brain, though. There's no "something separate" to interact with.eigenstate
April 22, 2015
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@fifthmonarchyman,
I say, I’m sorry but this is not the Christian position. I am not a passive recipient of the punishment due Adam. The Christian position is that mankind actively chose to sin in the person of our federal head Adam.
Your choice cannot be both "federal through Adam" and "actively chose[n]" by you. Never mind that you did not exist as a human when Adam made his choice, and thus are not possibly culpable for any human choices made at that time. "Federal" means you are assigned culpabilty vicariously, brought into a class action by God for your association to Adam as his progeny. This is what why this is referred to as the "Imputation of Adam". Original Sin, different from the Imputation of Adam's sin, changed human nature after Adam's sin to a "fallen nature". The guilt - distinct from our fallen nature -- is imputed to us through Adam's sin: we are all condemned. We are regarded by God as having all sinned through Adam. The reason I point this out is because this is classical, orthodox Christian theology, and it explicitly distinguishes our guilt from "actively chosen" sins. That is, there is no sin to impute to you or me if we "actively chose". The sin is directly ours. There is nothing to "federate", or include us in vicariously through Adam, if we "actively chose". You never actively chose to sin through or for Adam. You weren't alive and past the age of moral accountabliity. It's imputed to you, but that's a term used to implicate you when you had no active choice in the matter.
When you bristle at the injustice of the punishment or externalize the blame you demonstrate that you would have done exactly the same the same thing as Adam given the chance.
Never mind the anti-human moral dicta from God, here. I'm just pointing out that your sins are demonstrably derived from factors you were born with, factors that are both decisive and totally beyond your choosing and control. On Christianity's own terms, free will is hopelessly confused and self-contradictory as a concept. On orthodox Christian theology, man is born with a fallen nature, and is destined to sin, to make choices that go against the will of God. That is, on Christian belief, man in his "born nature" is determined to sin, inevitably and unavoidably. Correct? Salvation through grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit doesn't help, either. Now, man is regenerated, but is now only able to choose the right, to please God, through the influence of the Holy Spirit. In terms of free will, man is "damned if your damned, and damned if your saved". That is to Christianity's credit, though. It avoids the "folk ontology" that is so prevalent in humans in general and Christian believers in general. "Free will" is self-defeating concept. It inevitably regresses infinitely, or it terminates in external or random determining influences. There's no logical path even available that is not "determined" or "random". That is not surprising since "determined" and "random" exhaust all available options. Put more clearly. A choice is either a) deterministically arrived at, or b) "non-deterministically arrived at". If you agree that a) and b) exhaust all the available options, then "free will" (in the vulgar sense) can't work. If a) then it's not "free" according to popular intuitions because it happens for reasons at least partially eternal to us, and if b), then it's a random choice. If there is a purpose, pattern or plan behind why we choose, that is what determines our choice (by definition). If not, the absence of purpose, pattern or plan is how we define "random".eigenstate
April 22, 2015
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Box, Thank you for the explanation, although I'm already aware of what emergentism is. Maybe my argument would be clearer as a syllogism. Premise 1. Emergentism requires a brain cannot be "aware" of anything that doesn't interact materially with it. Premise 2. Emergentism also holds that consciousness does not materially interact with the brain. Premise 3. Therefore if Emergentism were true, we would not be aware of consciousness. Premise 4. We are aware of consciousness, and intimately so. Conclusion: Therefore Emergentism is false. Do you (or anyone else for that matter) take issue with any of my premises?Yarrgonaut
April 22, 2015
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@Box,
No, what I’m “complaining” about is that, under emergentism, there is no powerful “I” who is in control. And you are being somewhat ambiguous on this subject.
It's hard to be clear when talking about the supernatural. If by "powerful" you mean supernatural, then I can't be more clear than to say I understand your complaints, but on materialism, you are right there is no such "I".
Again, by “control” I mean the presence of an powerful “I”, who is able to make choices—consistent with how we experience our “I”’s. You keep bringing it up, but at this point I’m not arguing for ‘disembodied’ control.
Ok, I thought I understood, but apparently not. This forces me to ask: what do you mean by "powerful"? How would your meaning of "powerful" be distinguished from "effective" as in "has effective control", is able to effect change according to one's capabilities, if at all?
I don’t understand what’s being said here. The control by the “I” is either real or not, irrespective if the “I” is made of particles in motion or ‘spooky’ stuff.
That the human in question is making the choice -- somehow -- is not controversial or in question here. So under materialism or dualism, if I as the subject human in question am playing poker, there's no controversy over whether "I" am real or whether "I" am choosing to "Fold" or "Check" or "Bet $20". What is at issue is where the locus of control for selecting from these options obtains. On materialism, that selection obtains wholly through natural processes, and the eventual selection can only be influenced by dynamics that, reduced to fundamentals are "just physics". That's not the dualist position, as I understand it, and in the dualist way of thinking, the actual choosing happens "somewhere else", or in some entity that is not "the natural brain processing information naturally".
Okay, so now there is an “I” who makes choices—instead of discovering them, as you stated in post #25? Do you wish to recant the following statement: “My choice was firmly determined before I “discovered” my choice, so I’m not choosing in any dualist or superstitious sense.”?
No, not all. Upthread I point out the Soon, et al, experiment, which is a good example of instrumented detection of mental choices seconds before the subject is conscious aware of the choice. The subject still makes the choice, and it is their and no one else's, but here they demonstrably "discover" what choice they are going to make, after it is already made subconsciously. Even without the fancy instrumentation, we discover our choices we make them, meaning that when my pocket sixes are dealt to me, I'm still undecided as to what my initial move will be when it's my turn. I don't know until I decide, and so thereby "discover" my choice as make the selection. No matter what kind of subconscious determinism is at work in any given choice, it is any case me making the choice. There's no conflict in discovering the choice I will make. I both discover the selection and make the choice. Materialists understand something that should not be difficult to grasp for anyone, including dualists, given the knowledge we have available: we have subconscious factors that not only influence our decisions, but which may also be decisive in selection, meaning we 'discover' our choice in the conscious sense *after* our subconscious mind has already coalesced on that selection. Perhaps on dualism, one might suggest that the "spiritual I" is actually doing the deciding, off in the ether nowhere, and somehow (don't ask how!) is influencing our subconscious in such a way as to "decide", and that mediation by the "spiritual I" on the subconscious brain is only later discovered by our conscious mentation. That would at least be dualism making some nominal effort to accommodate the available science...
So now you exercise control over your neurons instead of the other way around?
No, the neurons would be at the top of the control chain for the human. The brain is influenced, unavoidably and unendingly, by the stimuli it is constantly receiving and processing, but as an executive process (in coming to some decision to act), the brain exerts control over parts of body that enable not only manipulation of the body (obviously) but also by that, manipulation of one's surroundings. That means, if we take an inventory of all the determining influences on my brain that are decisive toward "take and eat the cookie", once that becomes a decision to act, the brain has the executive functions to coordinate my bodily movements to make that happen. The decision may be "fully determined", even in some fatalistic sense, but that in no way compromises the brain's ability to effect an action once that becomes an imperative to action.
Wait a minute, now you are saying the opposite. And what do you mean by “*may* be wholly determined”? Are you no longer sure?
No, I was accommodating dualism, as well there. On monism or dualism, I am manifestly able to take executive action from the brain, and do things with my body that affect changes in my body and its surroundings. I was taking care to distinguish this from being particular to monism. On materialism, there is no way in principle these choices obtain immaterially, or outside of natural processes. My point here just wasn't applicable only to materialism.
One could hold, as you do, that the brain is part of the self, but it is not part of the “I” as we experience it. We do not have an experience of consciousness as neuronal patterns.
Maybe this is picking nits, but the brain is only "part of the self" in the sense that it is "part of the human body". The self == the brain and the body it is attached to. As for the "'I' as we experience it": I can see no basis for distinguishing the "I" from the "self" (Body/brain). I say we DO have the experience of consciousness as neuronal activity -- this is precisely what our experience of consciousness is; to experience consciousness IS to experience neuronal activity in the brain such that we are aware of our surroundings. If you think that's not the case, why? What do you suppose "experiencing neuronal activity" would be like if it's not just what we call "consciousness"?
Hmm the “self” …, but again, it’s not the “I” that is responsible. The self is not the “I”. A crucial distinction! And the “I” is what we are discussing here.
That appears to be a distinction without a difference. What essentially distinguishes the "self" from the "I", in your view?
You can only say that it is “your choice” based on your belief that your body is you (or is part of you). If you lose that toenail is there any less of you?
Much better to simply say "my body IS me", as the body includes the brain and its functions. "My brain" is not the same as "me", as without my body and all its sensory inputs and outputs, my brain is not functional in any human sense, if it's functional at all (and I don't think it could be).
Anyway, you seem to agree that “choices” are made by dynamics over which your “I” has no control. Let’s also agree that blind forces don’t make choices and drop the use of the term “choice” wrt emergentism.
I'm not religious about what terms we use, but we do need a word that points to the process of selection of one (or some required minimum) available option(s) from some greater number of options. "Choice" seems perfectly suited for that role -- we just abandon the old folk intuitions about "choice" and adopt the scientifically-informed semantics of the term. Why not? Nothing wrong with saying "I selected to Fold", I guess, but it sounds awkward...
BTW I can assure you that you are mistaken.
You can assure me, eh? Hmmm.eigenstate
April 22, 2015
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@Tim,
No. You are mistaken. Causa sui does not merely “locate” dynamics. “Self-caused” means not only from within, but also of. You wrote an awful lot based on a flawed conception of causa sui. The rabbit trail of “whys” need not be taken. “I chose to” is the answer to the initial question, “why did you curse your neighbor?”
That's a worst-case scenario. That's the kind of disastrous situation the most hardcore eliminativist does not have to confront, what you have proposed here. Think about it: "I chose to" as the final terminus on being asked what caused "Fold" vs. "Check" is to announce that you are a random number generator. And I'm not using that comparison as an exercise in hyperbole or anything like that; your "I", as you have it, the "I" that chooses, is an utterly alien, unknowable black box, and is not more "You" than hooking your brain up to a RNG box and claiming that its results are the basis for you "I chose to" as a matter of your "free will". This has to be one of the most devastatingly damning posts for dualistic free will I've encountered. And I've read a good number now.
Of course it is not the only cause, but (and this is very important) it is not dependent on the other causes.
This is trivially self-contradictory. If there *are* other causes, then your decision is NECESSARILY dependent on them, by definition. If your choice WASN'T dependent on them, they would not be causal factors at all!
You either believe this or you don’t.
Either way, it's disastrous for your claims. If you believe what you say, there is no "you" at all, there is no "free will" to be associated with you, because you've just reduced your choosing to an externalized, impenetrable black box that you have no more familiarity or intimacy than a random number generator as your "choosing I". If you don't believe it, then there is still hope for understanding choice as a selection process among alternatives, but "Tim's theology" or "Tim's metaphysics" are hopelessly confused and if anything establish cartoonish exaggerations of the kinds of problems with free will that dualists suppose a materialist must confront. I can't think of more "devoid of any free will" scenario than what you've proposed, here. The materialist model is rich with agency and autonomy by comparison, even as it is fully deteministic (ultimately) and natural.
You wrote that “Intentionality is not a unique characteristic” and gave an example of a pump. You wrote: “An intravenous pump has intentionality – it is directed at maintaining a consistent even flow of liquids pumping into the patient.” I would hope that everyone can see that you are mistaken. The pump intends nothing. We superintend such meaning to the pump in its design.
You seem to be confused about what "intentionality" means in this discussion. Intentionality here does not concern "intention" -- as in goals or plans -- but is rather a term used to point to something you might also call "aboutness", or "directedness toward an object". I'm not mistaken about the intentionality of an IV pump, you are just not aware (apparently) of the term's meaning in this context -- see hereeigenstate
April 22, 2015
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eigenstate says, To be clear, that breakdown I’m pointing to is a breakdown of causal factors in any choice we are looking at. The “why” behind the choice, and for those factors the “why” behind those factors (see my hypothetical dialog in my post). I say, It's pretty simple The "why" behind my choice is my desire. My desire is bound up in my consciousness. If IIT is correct my consciousness can not be be broken down into constituent parts. therefore your argument fails Peacefifthmonarchyman
April 22, 2015
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eigenstate says, Q: Did you choose your nature? A: No, I am created by God, created to have the nature God intended. I have a sin nature because of Adam’s sin. I say, I'm sorry but this is not the Christian position. I am not a passive recipient of the punishment due Adam. The Christian position is that mankind actively chose to sin in the person of our federal head Adam. When you bristle at the injustice of the punishment or externalize the blame you demonstrate that you would have done exactly the same the same thing as Adam given the chance. peacefifthmonarchyman
April 22, 2015
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eigenstate:
Causa sui just locates the dynamics for the decision. It’s not a causal dynamic itself, but a term that indicates (in this context) that the choose “comes from within the self”. So saying ‘I decided” as a means of locating the choice “in the self” is fine, but does not speak to what caused you to choose to what you chose.
No. You are mistaken. Causa sui does not merely "locate" dynamics. "Self-caused" means not only from within, but also of. You wrote an awful lot based on a flawed conception of causa sui. The rabbit trail of "whys" need not be taken. "I chose to" is the answer to the initial question, "why did you curse your neighbor?" Of course it is not the only cause, but (and this is very important) it is not dependent on the other causes. You either believe this or you don't. You wrote that "Intentionality is not a unique characteristic" and gave an example of a pump. You wrote: "An intravenous pump has intentionality – it is directed at maintaining a consistent even flow of liquids pumping into the patient." I would hope that everyone can see that you are mistaken. The pump intends nothing. We superintend such meaning to the pump in its design.Tim
April 22, 2015
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Eigenstate: You seem to be complaining that on materialism, there’s no spooky stuff doing the choosing.
No, what I’m “complaining” about is that, under emergentism, there is no powerful “I” who is in control. And you are being somewhat ambiguous on this subject.
Box: Emergentism informs us that our sense of being in control is just an illusion. IOW, while sitting here watching this post being typed, I’m having the illusion that I’m doing the typing—that I am the one in control—, but in fact an underlying reality of unthinking neural networks is making all the decisions for me.
Eigenstate: That’s true if by “control” you mean “disembodied control”, or “control by some immaterial agent paired with our brain”.
Again, by “control” I mean the presence of an powerful “I”, who is able to make choices—consistent with how we experience our “I”'s. You keep bringing it up, but at this point I'm not arguing for ‘disembodied’ control.
Eigenstate: But in a monist sense, the control is real, and not illusory.
I don’t understand what’s being said here. The control by the “I” is either real or not, irrespective if the “I” is made of particles in motion or 'spooky' stuff.
Eigenstate: Our cognition, including our choosing processes are naturally evolved, “from the bottom up”, so to speak. But that in no way conflicts with our exerting top-down control and manipulation over our surroundings.
Okay, so now there is an “I” who makes choices—instead of discovering them, as you stated in post #25? Do you wish to recant the following statement: "My choice was firmly determined before I “discovered” my choice, so I’m not choosing in any dualist or superstitious sense."?
Eigenstate: If I see a cookie on a plate just given to me, I am thoroughly capable, on monist terms of exercising control over my actions to take the cookie and eat it.
So now you exercise control over your neurons instead of the other way around?
Eigenstate: My choice to do so may be wholly determined by natural factors I ultimately do not control,
Wait a minute, now you are saying the opposite. And what do you mean by “*may* be wholly determined”? Are you no longer sure?
Box: No, you don’t make choices—not even under materialism. You discover “choices”, which are made by neuronal patterns in your brain over which you have no control.
Eigenstate: On materialism, my brain, its neuronal patterns, connected to the rest of my body, *is* me. That *is* the self.
One could hold, as you do, that the brain is part of the self, but it is not part of the “I” as we experience it. We do not have an experience of consciousness as neuronal patterns.
Eigenstate: So to say my neuronal patterns and responsible for the choice — whether that choice is determined by external factors or no — *is* to say that the “self” is responsible for the choice.
Hmm the “self” ..., but again, it’s not the “I” that is responsible. The self is not the “I”. A crucial distinction! And the “I” is what we are discussing here.
Box: You discover “choices” in the same sense that you discover a discoloration of a toenail. This case in point clarifies that “you” are not in CONTROL, but something else than you is—something distinct from you. You were not consulted when the choice was made nor when discoloration set in.
Eigenstate: Yes, but just like it is *my* discolored toenail, it is *my* choice. I may not have had any control over how I got a badly bruised toe and discolored toenail. But it is still my toenail. By the same token, if we stipulate that my decisions “happen to me” via dynamics over which I have no control, it’s still *my* choice.
You can only say that it is “your choice” based on your belief that your body is you (or is part of you). If you lose that toenail is there any less of you? Anyway, you seem to agree that “choices” are made by dynamics over which your “I” has no control. Let’s also agree that blind forces don’t make choices and drop the use of the term “choice” wrt emergentism.
Eigenstate: It belongs to me, and is inseparable from me (…).
BTW I can assure you that you are mistaken.Box
April 22, 2015
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@Box,
No, you don’t make choices—not even under materialism. You discover “choices”, which are made by neuronal patterns in your brain over which you have no control.
On materialism, my brain, its neuronal patterns, connected to the rest of my body , *is* me. That *is* the self. So to say my neuronal patterns and responsible for the choice -- whether that choice is determined by external factors or no -- *is* to say that the "self" is responsible for the choice. Remember that on materialism, there is no 'ghost in the machine': my mind is what my brain does, and I *am* my physical brain+body. You seem to be complaining that on materialism, there's no spooky stuff doing the choosing. That's mixing paradigms. There is no spooky stuff to do any choosing on materialism. So any choosing, and selection from available alternatives must obtain without that spooky stuff, necessarily.
You discover “choices” in the same sense that you discover a discoloration of a toenail. This case in point clarifies that “you” are not in CONTROL, but something else than you is—something distinct from you. You were not consulted when the choice was made nor when discoloration set in.
Yes, but just like it is *my* discolored toenail, it is *my* choice. I may not have had any control over how I got a badly bruised toe and discolored toenail. But it is still my toenail. By the same token, if we stipulate that my decisions "happen to me" via dynamics over which I have no control, it's still *my* choice. It belongs to me, and is inseparable from me as mine -- it is a state in my brain/mind and my brain/mind only, and governs my (future) actions and consequences.
Your emergent consciousness is just, as W J Murray puts it, “along for the ride”, and utterly powerless.
Again, the illusory nature of the self obtains in WJM's folk psychological sense of self, self as a dualist entity. That part is illusory, but like ancient intuitions that the sun goes around the earth, it's mistaken, but still point at something real. The earth goes round the sun it turns out, and the earth, sun and orbits are real phenomena, just not what that intuition supposed. I understand these intuitions are strong, visceral. I don't expect there's any science or evidence that be convincing to WJM -- he has "invicible intuitions" that leave him incorrigible in terms of science or inter-subjective knowledge. By his own admission, he doesn't adopt his beliefs, including statements like what you quoted, based on where the evidence leads, but instead, based on what is appealing to him to believe. That's his prerogative, as it is yours. But "dualist ideas about self" or "no self" are not the only options. We have the insight into human cognition to understand the human self with a model that its our empirical experiences and tests, and which is reach in meaning and practical use for communications, culture, day to day living.eigenstate
April 22, 2015
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@Box,
Eigenstate argues for emergentism—consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. The way that I understand it is that there is no interaction between the brain and its emergent property (consciousness)—most certainly not top-down. Here consciousness is just a powerless illusion (“internal hologram”), fully dependent on the brain, an expression of the brain, an impotent freak mistake that is along for the ride.
"Mistake" would not apply here. There is no preset design to be a "mistake" from. Furthermore, consciousness just means "awareness of one's surroundings". That's not unique to humans, and is essential to any cognition that seeks to model future states; awareness of one's operating environment is the basis for formulating this model of the future and choosing an action based on it. A hawk swooping down on a field mouse uses it's vision and some internal calculus to "swoop to where the mouse will be", rather than land where the mouse currently is, because it sees the mouse running. Consciousness is substrate that process rests on, the awareness of visual stimuli (among other things). There seems to be confusion over what materialism or just a scientific view of the brain supposes is illusory about consciousness. The phenomenon itself is not an illusion. The intuition that our consciousness is some "disembodied self", an 'awareness outside the brain', an 'immaterial homunculus' is the part that is asserted to be illusory. Consciousness qua consciousness -- awareness of one's surroundings, integrating stimuli into cognitive processes, is not an illusion but a basic component of animal cognition.
Emergentism informs us that our sense of being in control is just an illusion. IOW, while sitting here watching this post being typed, I’m having the illusion that I’m doing the typing—that I am the one in control—, but in fact an underlying reality of unthinking neural networks is making all the decisions for me.
That's true if by "control" you mean "disembodied control", or "control by some immaterial agent paired with our brain". But in a monist sense, the control is real, and not illusory. Our cognition, including our choosing processes are naturally evolved, "from the bottom up", so to speak. But that in no way conflicts with our exerting top-down control and manipulation over our surroundings. If I see a cookie on a plate just given to me, I am thoroughly capable, on monist terms of exercising control over my actions to take the cookie and eat it. My choice to do so may be wholly determined by natural factors I ultimately do not control, but as functional animal, I am able to act on that decision and affect top-down effects -- yum!
In it’s attack on consciousness, emergentism reminds me of eastern religion.
It denies the veridicality of traditional, dualist notions of consciousness, the idea that our consciousness is a manifestation of some kind of "ghost in the machine". So it's fair to say it's an attack on folk psychological intuitions about consciousness. Science affirms, extends and refines our understanding of consciousness, though, rather than denying its existence.eigenstate
April 22, 2015
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@Tim,
Of course, no such claim need be made. But if you are interested in the actual claim, you might consider this descriptor: Genesis 1:27 So God created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them. No, I do not mention it as a proof, just a note to let you know that many of us here following these posts of yours will not let you get away with your hyperbole.
Being created, whether in God's image or no, gives away the game, Tim. Now you are shaped and influenced by the imago dei imparted to you by God, and this drives your decisions, through no choosing of your own. You didn't choose your 'sin nature' (this is me adopting, for the sake of argument here, Christian theology), you were born with it, passed down from Adam, the result of God's curse placed on Adam for his original sin. And this drives your choices. When you sin, you don't sin because you are a causa sui. You are tempted in the first place because of your sin nature, and suffer from the noetic effects of the fall in your thinking and choosing. This is all external to you, environmental factors that contribute and influence your choices, putting the lie to claims that your choice is completely "of the self". My point about being an omnigod was specific to BEING an omnigod, not made (in any sense, that breaks the connection) by an omnigod. If an omnigod exists, and we concede that by "omnigod" we concede that this entails being a singleton uncaused being, then, and only then, do you have a causa sui. All other agents are necessarily products of their environment in their choosing process. This superstition about "choice" is a platitude Christians carry around uncritically. Raised a Christian, this always bothered me, and I was continually frustrated that no one could even make headway on my questions, whether I asked my pastor, or a famous theologian who spoke at our Sunday night service, or the church elders, or anyone else. I did receive answers like yours: We believe we can choose freely. No one could tell me what "freely" meant in practice, or even approach it, go beyond it just being a shallow platitude. "It's a mystery" I was told more than once, and "we'll find out when we get to Heaven". That's adding another platitude on the first, but in the here and now, it leaves "free choice" incoherent, meaningless, vacuous, on Christianity's own terms and understandings. Q: Why did you choose to sin, to curse your neighbor? A: Because I harbored hatred in my heart and disregarded God's commandment to 'love your neighbor as yourself' Q: Then why did you disregard God's commandment? A: Because I loved myself more than I loved God and feared Him. Q: And why did you love yourself more than God? A: Because that is what I chose to do? Q: Yes, but why did you choose that? A: I suppose because I have a sinful nature. Q: So your choice was due to something in your nature? A: Yes, but I still chose the wrong. Q: Fine, but to be clear, your choice was a result of your nature? A: Yes. Q: Did you choose your nature? A: No, I am created by God, created to have the nature God intended. I have a sin nature because of Adam's sin. Q: Then your choice to curse your neighbor was caused by factors external to you, beyond your control? A: No, I could have chosen not to sin. Q: Perhaps, but I'm asking why you actually did choose what you chose. Do you want to change your answer? A: No. Q: Then your actual choice, by your own explanation, implicates your human nature, which you did not choose and cannot change, as the motive force in your choice. Is that right? Please feel free to supply a competing/contrasting Q&A investigating why one might curse his neighbor and sin, where the reasons for choosing that sin are completely internal, and defined (not random, lacking purpose, pattern or plan).
Again, by the end of your post, you seem to be admitting that humankind (apart from all others) has intentionality. Doesn’t this rather unique characteristic endowed uniquely to us tell you something, anything?
Intentionality is not a unique characteristic. An intravenous pump has intentionality - it is directed at maintaining a consistent even flow of liquids pumping into the patient. Humans have consciousness and meta-representational cognitive abilities that enables them to be "meta-intentional"; I can focus on the "aboutness" of "aboutness", for example. That's a trick that an IV pump can't pull off (at least the models I'm familiar with). But that's not a distinction based on intentionality. Humans have cognitive abilities that are unique among all the other animals, but intentionality is not one of them.eigenstate
April 22, 2015
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@Tim
Do you really believe these are the only resources available on a dualistic view of human freedom?
No, I was listing examples for clarity, wasn't meant to be exhaustive, of course.
I am playing poker . . . and am dealt pocket sixes and check, hoping for some continuation later. I mentioned the factors (I stink at poker, but thought continuation on sixes was best against my arrayed opponents and etc . . .), and you seem to think we must be in some sort of regress already. But on dualism this is not the case. You are overlooking the causa sui itself in the words “I decided.”
Causa sui just locates the dynamics for the decision. It's not a causal dynamic itself, but a term that indicates (in this context) that the choose "comes from within the self". So saying 'I decided" as a means of locating the choice "in the self" is fine, but does not speak to what caused you to choose to what you chose. If you say "I don't know", then two large problems apply: 1) the actual dispositive factors in your choice may be external or just random, and you can't say otherwise, because you don't know, and 2) if you aren't aware of what actually selected "Fold" from "Check" and "Bet $20", then there's no "you" involved in the deciding. It may as well be a foreign/external deciding machine, a black box in your head that does your choosing for you. The other prong of this two-pronged trap is to say "Oh I know my reasons, and they are X, Y and Z". Giving your first order reasons is good in that it reifies the "you" in your decision making at that level, but it just pushes the problem down one level, and begins the regress chain. Now I want to know what were the factors for X, Y, and Z, respectively in making them what they were, your second order reasons for your decision. If you say they are XA, XB, XC, YA, YB, YC and so on, I will move to the next step, asking about your third order factors, the causal dynamics that made XA, for example a driver for X, which was a driver for choosing "Fold". This goes on until you run out of more fundamental causes for your choice. When this happens, you will either point to "I don't know", or "it's random", or "it was determined by external factors. None of these fit with your "I decided" where the "I" is autonomous and "freely choosing" based on something internal.
Suppose it were not me, but a computer playing poker. And for the sake of our example, the computer has sixes and checks. Nobody would say that the computer “chose” to check because it didn’t. But, I did.
But the computer *did* choose. You can go online right now and play against "pokerbots", software poker "players" who can play against you. High quality poker bots can be very challenging opponents, as they have decision trees that avail themselves of statistic and probability calculations that are easy for computers but difficult for humans. But pokerbot skill aside, the software is a choice-making algorithm; given a set of inputs (cards in hand, number of opponents, stack size, etc.) the software will choose, based on what input it is confronted with, what to do. It's not "free" to choose "Declare I have 'Bingo'", as that's not a feature of the software program. But it has all the options you do available for poker play, and must choose among them.
In your post you claimed that on materialism you indeed make choices, but you also wrote that on materialism you discover choices. This makes no sense whatsoever. Making and discovering are not commensurate in this context.
"Discover" just points to the fact that I'm not aware of what I'm going to choose before I actually choose. That is, when I get my cards dealt, and before I decide that "Check" is the best choice, my own choice is still unknown to me. I "discover" that choice when I make it. It's also a good word to use to point to the fact that I (like anyone else) am not fully aware of why I choose what I choose. I can enumerate the factors I'm consciously aware of, but (see my previous post), factors I'm not aware of consciously also affect my decision-making processes. So, I am making the choices, in that they are ultimately produced in my brain, no matter what causal factors shaped them, deterministically or otherwise, and I am the owner of any subsequent actions and consequences. But in a very real and practical sense, much of my choosing "happens to me". Again, see experiments where the eventual choice is sensed by brain instrumentation well before the subject is consciously aware of choosing. If machines monitoring your brain can detect "Tim will 'Check'" five seconds before you even signal you've reached a decision on what play to make, there are clearly subconscious dynamics at work that you are "discovering" after the fact.
Put another way, if there is no “ghost in the machine”, then we are just machines, but no machine can emote, or make a moral judgment, or any of the other fantastic claims you have made for machines.
We don't have human-made mechanical machines that do those things, but even so, there's no reason to think they cannot and will not at some point do all those things. But "human machines", humans understood in scientific terms can do all those things, as biological machines. One of the reasons robots and other platforms for AI do not emulate well these human functions is that the whole animal has to be replicated; emotions are not just "in the brain" -- the part we started with in AI -- but a function of the whole body (neuro-receptors in the guilt, sensory input from all over the body, etc.). We would have to make an "artificial human" in order to effect the kind of functions you list, and that is a fantastically difficult task, not something we can expect to do anytime in foreseeable future. But in principle, there's nothing magical going on, it's just very, very complex. Or put another way: if you could build an artificial human, and it was robust in the sense of having "neuroreceptors in the gut" and all the other analogs to human physiology, we would *expect* that machine to emote, to make moral judgments, etc.
This is why, in a crunch, I could always beat any of the top chess-playing computer programs on the market right now even though I am a rank patzer. I can cheat; they cannot. I can change the rules, add pieces to the board, hyperdrive my king to the underside of the board if I have to. Yes, I am a game changer. Why? Because of this, I can creatively select what I shall do:
Well, if you are cheating, then you aren't "playing chess" at all anymore, based on what "Chess" implies. Unless and until such time as some kind of human-class AI gets developed, you will be able to "change the game" or "jump up a level", as you have a wider scope of experience than any programs with more limited scope. But this is neither here nor there in terms of choosing. Whether it's you or a smart program or a dumb program, the choosing ultimately reduces to deterministic drivers, "programming".
But nobody must grant what you insist on!! First, the choice need not “arise”.
Whence the choice, then? If you chose "Fold" when it was your turn at the poker table, why "Fold" and not "Check"? If you don't or can't provide a reason, you have a much more severe problem than what you see as a problem for the materialist. Now, your choice to "Fold" isn't "you" at all in the choosing; the choice is yours in the sense I described above, in that you "own" it, just a like a materialist chooser does. But a materialist chooser can at least investigate and apprehend at some level what shapes and influences her decisions. You can not, in this case. "You" are an impassable 'black box' that is no more "you" than the desk across the room. It's not knowable, searchable, introspective. It's just a deterministic machine that you have zero influence over.
Second, the dualist contra the materialist simply does not subscribe to the notion that we are without purpose (better, intention, better still intellect, even better still, logos, just read through the etymologies!), so we are not cornered into that which is random.
It doesn't matter here what you subscribe to -- that can all be just so much caprice. What matters is what you can show. What were the reasons for the choice you made? What determined "Fold" vs. "Check". Saying "I just don't believe it was random" won't help you at all. If it's unknown to you, if it can be articulated, it is random by definition. "Random" is a negating word, not a positive one, which means it applies when there is no identifiable purpose, pattern or plan (to use a short but effective definition). If I ask what the reasons were for "Fold", and all you can do is shrug and say "I subscribe to the notion that I had reasons behind that", you've conceded the problem. You have a choosing process that is a black box for you, a random number generator. Just like a random number generator, there is no "looking inside" for contributing dynamics.
Theists, and Christians in particular (with all due respect to our uber-Calvinistic brethren), have not “added a supernatural element” to “help” because our metaphysics need no help in explaining what is obvious to all — our design includes the ability to choose, an ability not manifest in lesser beings of creation. I believe it was you, perhaps, who wrote of “hawk nature”, we could begin there and wend our way down until we encounter quartz or feldspar, objects of creation that have no freedom, but to be what they are.
Hawks choose, as people choose. Pokerbots choose, too. Choosing is selection from more than one alternative available. And fundamentally, there are either a) reasons that drive the selection, or b) there are no reasons that drive the selection. I believe a) and b) exhaust all the alternatives, here. b) is just random selection, by definition. No reasons for the selection. a) begins a causal chain regress, which as I said, either terminates in b) randomness, or some external-to-self dynamic. Try it. Seriously. Take a choice like "Fold" in a poker hand. Specify a reason (it doesn't have to be an exhaustive inventory of causal factors, but you can supply more if you like), and we'll go from there. If you take time to actually put your choice to the test, you will see the problem, it can be shown quite clearly right here in this thread, if you will just give it a try.eigenstate
April 22, 2015
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@fifthmonarchyman,
Integrated information theory is based on the notion that precisely what sets consciousness apart from other phenomena is it’s inability to be broken down into constituent parts. check it out http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I.....ion_theory Are you ruling out IIT A priori? That is certainly not a very scientific attitude
IIT is an idea that I think has a lot of promise as a model for consciousness in the scientific sense. It understands the coordinated nature of collaborating subsystems that together form the process we call 'consciousness'. But that kind of decomposition -- breaking down consciousness into it's various processing components (e.g. visual processing), isn't what I was referring to by "constituent parts". To be clear, that breakdown I'm pointing to is a breakdown of causal factors in any choice we are looking at. The "why" behind the choice, and for those factors the "why" behind those factors (see my hypothetical dialog in my post). So, IIT being 100% correct would not change my point. There is still an insuperable problem for anyone who doesn't think choices are externally determined: chase down the reasons for you any choice, and the reasons for those reasons, etc., and you end up at "it's a random selection made internally", or -- oops! -- determination by external dynamics (e.g. "This is just the way God made me"). This problem isn't aided or impeded by ITT.eigenstate
April 22, 2015
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Yarrgonaut, Eigenstate argues for emergentism—consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. The way that I understand it is that there is no interaction between the brain and its emergent property (consciousness)—most certainly not top-down. Here consciousness is just a powerless illusion ("internal hologram"), fully dependent on the brain, an expression of the brain, an impotent freak mistake that is along for the ride. Emergentism informs us that our sense of being in control is just an illusion. IOW, while sitting here watching this post being typed, I'm having the illusion that I'm doing the typing—that I am the one in control—, but in fact an underlying reality of unthinking neural networks is making all the decisions for me. In it's attack on consciousness, emergentism reminds me of eastern religion.Box
April 22, 2015
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If the subjective aspect of our minds wasn't real, or was unable to influence the physical world, how is it that we come to be aware of it? Brains can only process what they interact with physically.Yarrgonaut
April 22, 2015
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Eigenstate: My choice was firmly determined before I “discovered” my choice, so I’m not choosing in any dualist or superstitious sense. (…) the deterministic processes coalesce the neuronal patterns in my brain that are my choice.
Box: If YOU don’t make choices, (…)
Eigenstate: But i do make choices, (…), under materialism.
No, you don’t make choices—not even under materialism. You discover “choices”, which are made by neuronal patterns in your brain over which you have no control. You discover “choices” in the same sense that you discover a discoloration of a toenail. This case in point clarifies that “you” are not in CONTROL, but something else than you is—something distinct from you. You were not consulted when the choice was made nor when discoloration set in. Your emergent consciousness is just, as W J Murray puts it, “along for the ride”, and utterly powerless.
W J Murray: Under materialism, the self is nothing more than a set of illusory qualia entirely produced and directed by law and probability, existing as nothing more than a kind of happenstance-generated internal hologram that is along for the ride, so to speak, as the interacting matter (that is producing the local hologram of self) does whatever it does anyway.
IOW all the objections that can be raised against eliminative materialism are also relevant to your position. Your emergent consciousness adds nothing, is powerless and meaningless.Box
April 22, 2015
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eigenstate@27, I spent a short time reviewing your post, and I find your reasoning hopelessly confused and terribly foggy. Please clarify the following, you write:
For the dualist, there is either a) randomness, or b) external dynamics (determinism), just like there is for the monist!
Do you really believe these are the only resources available on a dualistic view of human freedom? I am playing poker . . . and am dealt pocket sixes and check, hoping for some continuation later. I mentioned the factors (I stink at poker, but thought continuation on sixes was best against my arrayed opponents and etc . . .), and you seem to think we must be in some sort of regress already. But on dualism this is not the case. You are overlooking the causa sui itself in the words "I decided." Suppose it were not me, but a computer playing poker. And for the sake of our example, the computer has sixes and checks. Nobody would say that the computer "chose" to check because it didn't. But, I did. In your post you claimed that on materialism you indeed make choices, but you also wrote that on materialism you discover choices. This makes no sense whatsoever. Making and discovering are not commensurate in this context. Put another way, if there is no "ghost in the machine", then we are just machines, but no machine can emote, or make a moral judgment, or any of the other fantastic claims you have made for machines. This is why, in a crunch, I could always beat any of the top chess-playing computer programs on the market right now even though I am a rank patzer. I can cheat; they cannot. I can change the rules, add pieces to the board, hyperdrive my king to the underside of the board if I have to. Yes, I am a game changer. Why? Because of this, I can creatively select what I shall do: again, you write:
unless, and only unless one finally grants that the choice arises without purpose, pattern or plan — randomly.
But nobody must grant what you insist on!! First, the choice need not "arise". Second, the dualist contra the materialist simply does not subscribe to the notion that we are without purpose (better, intention, better still intellect, even better still, logos, just read through the etymologies!), so we are not cornered into that which is random. Theists, and Christians in particular (with all due respect to our uber-Calvinistic brethren), have not "added a supernatural element" to "help" because our metaphysics need no help in explaining what is obvious to all -- our design includes the ability to choose, an ability not manifest in lesser beings of creation. I believe it was you, perhaps, who wrote of "hawk nature", we could begin there and wend our way down until we encounter quartz or feldspar, objects of creation that have no freedom, but to be what they are. Finally, you write:
unless that human claims to be an omnigod
Of course, no such claim need be made. But if you are interested in the actual claim, you might consider this descriptor: Genesis 1:27 So God created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them. No, I do not mention it as a proof, just a note to let you know that many of us here following these posts of yours will not let you get away with your hyperbole. Again, by the end of your post, you seem to be admitting that humankind (apart from all others) has intentionality. Doesn't this rather unique characteristic endowed uniquely to us tell you something, anything? Please, clarify.Tim
April 21, 2015
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eigenstate says, Because as soon as you can point to some purpose, pattern or plan, something non-random in your choice making, it begs to broken down into constituent parts. I say, Why?? Integrated information theory is based on the notion that precisely what sets consciousness apart from other phenomena is it's inability to be broken down into constituent parts. check it out http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory Are you ruling out IIT A priori? That is certainly not a very scientific attitude peacefifthmonarchyman
April 21, 2015
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