Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

A Dog is a Chien is a Perro is a Hund

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File:RNA-codons.png

Photo courtesy of Wikipedia

In his “UB Sets It Out Step-By-Step” UprightBiped argued that the transfer of recorded information in the genome is like any other form of recorded information – i.e., it is an arbitrary relationship instantiated in matter.

After several months and over 1,400 combox comments, UB’s argument has withstood a barrage of attacks from our materialist friends.  This post is a response to one such attack.

UB’s opponents argue they cannot understand what he means by “arbitrary” in his argument.  Of course, UB has good responses to this objection, and I invite you to read them in the combox.  But as I was thinking about the matter this morning, it occurred to me that there is a very simple definition of “arbitrary” that, I think, makes the matter so clear that only the willfully obtuse could deny it.  Here it is:  An arrangement of signs is arbitrary when the identical purpose could be accomplished through a different arrangement of signs if the rules of the semiotic code were different.  [“Semiotics” is the study of how signs are used to represent things, such as how a word in a language represents a particular object.]

Here’s an example of an arbitrary arrangement of signs:  DOG.  This is the arrangement of signs English speakers use when they intend to represent Canis lupus familiaris. In precise semiotic parlance, the word “dog” is a “conventional sign” for Canis lupus familiaris among English speakers.  Here, “conventional” is used in the sense of a “convention” or an agreement.  In other words, English speakers in a sense “agree” that “dog” means Canis lupus familiaris.

Now, the point is that there is nothing inherent in a dog that requires it to be represented in the English language with the letters “D” followed by “O” followed by “G.”  If the rules of the semiotic code (i.e., the English language) were different, the identical purpose could be accomplished through a different arrangement of signs.  We know this because in other codes the same purpose is accomplished with vastly different signs.  In French the purpose is accomplished with the following arrangement of signs:  C H I E N.  In Spanish the purpose is accomplished with the following arrangement of signs:  P E R R O.  In German the purpose is accomplished with the following arrangement of signs:  H U N D.

In each of the semiotic codes the purpose of signifying an animal of the species Canis lupus familiaris is accomplished through an arbitrary set of signs.  If the rules of the code were different, a different set of signs would accomplish the identical purpose.  For example, if, for whatever reason, English speakers were collectively to agree that Canis lupus familiaris should be represented by “B L I M P,” then “blimp” would accomplish the purpose of representing Canis lupus familiaris just as well as “dog.”

How does this apply to the DNA code?  The arrangement of signs constituting a particular instruction in the DNA code is arbitrary in the same way that the arrangement of signs for representing Canis lupus familiaris is arbitrary.  For example, suppose in a particular strand of DNA the arrangement “AGC” means “add amino acid X.”  There is nothing about amino acid X that requires the instruction “add amino acid  X” to be represented by  “AGC.”  If the rules of the code were different the same purpose (i.e, instructing the cell to “add amino acid  X”) could be accomplished using “UAG” or any other combination.  Thus, the sign AGC is “arbitrary” in the sense UB was using the word.

Why is all of this important to ID?  It is important because it shows that the DNA code is not analogous to a semiotic code.  It is isometric with a semiotic code.  In other words, the digital code embedded in DNA is not “like” a semiotic code, it “is” a semiotic code.  This in turn is important because there is only one known source for a semiotic code:  intelligent agency.  Therefore, the presence of a semiotic code embedded within the cells of every living thing is powerful evidence of design, and the burden is on those who would deny design to demonstrate how a semiotic code could be developed though blind chance or mechanical law or both.

Comments
Wow. Kantian Naturalist just provided reason and proof that I can ignore his/her comments from now on without fear of missing anything important.Mapou
February 11, 2013
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KN writes: “(1) Languages are not codes.” Of course they are. What an absurd statement. The word “dog” is not a dog. It is code for dog. “(2) The genetic code is a code in a metaphorical sense, not a literal one. (The genetic code is not a code in the sense that Morse code is a code.)” Nonsense. The genetic code is an actual code for precisely the reason I explained in the last two paragraphs. You make an assertion (not an argument) to the contrary. Why should anyone heed your assertion when you do not deign to support it with any argument? “(3) There is a causal relation between genes and proteins, because the specific molecular commonalities between triplets and amino acids. This is not obviously the case between the word “cat” and the little critters themselves.” No again. You again make a bald unsupported assertion in place of an argument. You assert that there is some physical relationship between the arrangement of the codons and the amino acids they represent. NO, THERE IS NOT. KN, you are entitled to your own opinions. You are not entitled to your own facts. “(4) There are insurmountable problems with what Ryle called “the ‘Fido’-Fido account” of language . . .” Another bald unsupported assertion. This is a literature bluff. I call your bluff. No, Ryle does not do what you say he does. “(5) Languages are not the products of intelligent agency . . .” Unbelievable. This statement is absurd on its face and requires no rebuttal. “(6) Design, chance, and necessity is a false trichotomy.” OK; I’ll bite. If you are the first one since Aristotle to discover a new causal pathway (a quartum quid) do tell. I’m all ears.Barry Arrington
February 11, 2013
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There are some serious problems here. (1) Languages are not codes. (2) The genetic code is a code in a metaphorical sense, not a literal one. (The genetic code is not a code in the sense that Morse code is a code.) (3) There is a causal relation between genes and proteins, because the specific molecular commonalities between triplets and amino acids. This is not obviously the case between the word "cat" and the little critters themselves. (4) There are insurmountable problems with what Ryle called "the 'Fido'-Fido account" of language, whereas something like that account works perfectly well for explaining the molecular affinities between nucleotides and amino acids. (5) Languages are not the products of intelligent agency, although intelligent agents can deliberately create new languages (Elvish, Klingon, etc.), create codes (e.g. Morse code, Navaho code), and create formal languages (e.g. computing languages). But no one sat down to create Greek, Latin, French, Chinese, or English. So while languaging is something that intelligent agents do, it is not something that they deliberately create, and I would say that no one could create a new language if she didn't already possess one learned at her parents' knees. (6) Design, chance, and necessity is a false trichotomy.Kantian Naturalist
February 11, 2013
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Orlando:
Sorry, but a symbol is not a sign.
It certainly can be.
A symbol cannot be changed without changing its representation (what it represents);
There can be more than one symbol for any given thing. Heck Valentine's Day is coming and there are many symbols of affection.
a sign can be arbitrarily changed independently of what it means.
So "Eat at Joe's" can be changed to "No Parking" and the meaning remains the same? A symbol is something that represents an idea, a process, or a physical entity. A sign is a representation of an object that implies a connection between itself and its object. Signs contain symbols and symbols are a sign of communication.Joe
February 11, 2013
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Orlando Braga brings out an excellent point. Without prior knowledge or a Rosetta stone, it is impossible to extract useful information from signs (arbitrary codes). However, it is possible to extract information from symbols (metaphors, really) through careful analysis. UD: Thread diversion deleted.Mapou
February 11, 2013
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Barry, The semiotic, ie genetic, code refers to the codons (triplets) of RNA that represent an amino acid or STOP (START is represented by an amino acid (met) coding codon). Represent is key because there isn't any physical connection, meaning the codon does not become an amino via some chemical reaction(s). And that means there isn't any law that determines which codon represents what amino acid. There isn't even any law that requires a codon, ie a triplet, to do the job. So that is also arbitrary. What isn't arbitrary is the number of different codons we can get given 4 different nucleotides. That is set at 64- determined by law. And all 64 are spoken for, which could be arbitrary, ie determined by something other than law-> design efficiency perhaps.Joe
February 11, 2013
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Great post, WJM!Optimus
February 11, 2013
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Sorry, but a symbol is not a sign. A symbol cannot be changed without changing its representation (what it represents); a sign can be arbitrarily changed independently of what it means. The symbol has a content in which a determined representation is meant; but the signs are chosen arbitrarily. The symbol, besides the cultural significance which the sign can also have, has a spiritual significance — related to a subjective human experience that acquires an intersubjective meaning — that the sign does not possess. A sign would only be transformed in a symbol when it possesses a content in relation to a representation. A symbol cannot be changed without the disappearance or elimination of its meaning (for example, the Christian Cross); a sign can be changed without loosing its meaning (for example, a traffic sign). UD Editors: The OP has been adjusted to reflect the distinction to which Orlando alludes.Orlando Braga
February 11, 2013
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