Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

A reasonable man

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I would like to commend Thomas Cudworth for his latest attempt to engage ID critic Professor Edward Feser in dialogue. Over the past few weeks, I have been greatly heartened by Professor Feser’s clarifications of his position vis-a-vis Intelligent Design. For instance, in a recent post on his blog site, he wrote:

The dispute between Thomism on the one hand and Paley (and ID theory) on the other is not over whether God is in some sense the “designer” of the universe and of living things – both sides agree that He is – but rather over what exactly it means to say that He is, and in particular over the metaphysics of life and of creation.

Moreover, in an email sent to me last month, Professor Feser wrote:

I have never accused any ID defender of heresy, and would never do so. To say to a theological opponent “Your views have implications you may not like, including ones that I believe are hard to reconcile with what we both agree to be definitive of orthodoxy” is simply not the same thing as saying “You are a heretic!” Rather, it’s what theologians do all the time in debate with their fellow orthodox believers.

I welcome Professor Feser’s statements that he regards the Intelligent Design movement as theologically orthodox, and that he believes God is the designer of living things.

In his latest post, Thomas Cudworth put a question to Professor Feser. He asked Professor Feser whether, in his view, God could have possibly planned to create a universe in which intelligent beings could infer His existence from studying nature – in particular, from observing clues such as cosmic fine-tuning and irreducible complexity, which would show that the evolutionary process must have been intelligently planned. I know that Professor Feser is a very busy man with a lot of work on his hands, so I’d like to attempt a reply on his behalf.

Recently, I’ve been closely studying Professor Feser’s books, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism. Aquinas. One thing that Feser makes abundantly clear in his books is that he thinks the existence of God can be proved with certainty. So in response to Thomas Cudworth’s question, Professor Feser would never say: “No, I know that God would never have hatched such a plan, would never have wanted human beings to have the ability to infer his existence in this way, and would never have created a universe in which such inferences from nature are possible.”

Instead, the answer which Professor Feser would give is:

“God did in fact create a universe in which intelligent beings could infer His existence from studying nature. But we don’t need cosmic fine-tuning and irreducible complexity to make that inference. Any old law of nature would be enough – even a simple one like ‘Protons and electrons tend to be attracted to one another.’ What’s more, the laws of nature allow us to deduce that the Creator of the universe is the God of classical theism.”

How can I be sure that Professor Feser would respond in this way? In his book, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism, Professor Feser describes Aquinas’ Fifth Way as “a strict and airtight metaphysical demonstration of the existence of God” (p. 112) and adds:

Even if the universe consisted of nothing but an electron orbiting a nucleus, that would suffice for the Fifth Way… All that matters is that there are various causes here and now which are directed to certain ends, and the argument is that these couldn’t possibly exist at all if there were not a Supreme Intellect here and now ordering them to those ends… Nor is this a matter of “probability,” but of conceptual necessity: it is not just unlikely, but conceptually impossible that there could be genuine final causation without a sustaining intellect. (p. 116)

Could such a Supreme Intelligence possibly be anything less than God? It could not. For whatever ultimately orders things to their ends must also be the ultimate cause of those things: To have an end is just part of having a certain nature or essence; for that nature or essence to be the nature or essence of something real, it must be conjoined with existence; and thus whatever determines that these things exist with a certain end is the same as what conjoins their essence and existence. But as we have seen, the ultimate or First Cause of things must be Being Itself. Hence the Supreme Intelligence cannot fail to be identical with the First Cause and thus with the Unmoved Mover, with all the divine attributes. The arguments all converge on one and the same point: God, as conceived of in the monotheistic religions.

There can be no doubt, then, that the Supreme Intelligence which orders things to their ends cannot fail to be Pure Being and therefore cannot fail to be absolutely simple. (p. 116)
(Emphasis mine – VJT.)

It is evident from the foregoing quotes that Professor Feser has great confidence in Aquinas’ Fifth Way, and that he believes it leads straight to the God of classical theism. Where he and I differ is that he thinks that Intelligent Design detracts from the Fifth Way (which is why he regards ID as a theological distraction), whereas I think that Intelligent Design actually reinforces the Fifth Way, making Aquinas’ argument much stronger, and much easier to defend from the attacks of modern skeptics. But that will be the subject of a future post.

Comments
I think that Feser's problem with ID is that it gives too much ground to the "mechanistic cum materialistic worldview." (his words, from his book The Last Superstition, one of the best books I've ever read) On a Thomistic view of the universe, God is actively enabling the universe to exist and change. God is Pure Actuality, the Prime Mover. Events that take place due to chance and physical law only take place because God enables them to. Every change in the universe can ultimately be traced back to God, not by a train of temporal cause and effect via the big bang singularity, but by an immediate hierarchy of causes, where each cause is simultaneous with its effect. On this view, the distinction between "Natural causes" and "Intelligent causes" is blurred. Intelligent Design theorists usually adopt a more modern version of philosophy, where the universe has a sort of "existential inertia," and where changes can go on without God's assistance. On Feser's view, this gives far too much ground to the atheists. And in my opinion, he's right. However, the problem can be easily resolved by using Aquinas's Five Ways to prove the existence of God (what they were meant to do), and using Intelligent Design as a scientific theory (what it is meant to do). If we were trying to prove the existence of God using the complexity of living things, Feser would be right. We're giving away too much ground. But Behe isn't Paley. Where Paley attempts to argue from science to metaphysics, from science to the existence of God, Behe argues from science to science, from science to the existence of an intelligent designer. Now, ID can be interpreted in terms of the Fifth Way, but ID and the Fifth Way have distinct objectives. If we let philosophical proofs be philosophical proofs, and let scientific hypotheses be scientific hypotheses, no problems arise.OmneVivumExVivo
May 1, 2012
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You, like Feser, appear to be overly intellectualizing a relatively simple matter.
I'm going to take that as a compliment :) I never thought I'd see the day when I was accused of over-intellectualizing.
So again, where do you stand? Where does Feser stand? Is the design of the bat real or only apparent?
It's certainly real.Mung
May 5, 2011
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In keeping with my last point, I also have to say that Feser seems to misunderstand the nature of science, which analyzes selective chunks of reality and brackets out other chunks of reality for the sake of rigor. When a chemist studies inorganic chemistry, he is not turning his back on the reality of organisms. When a neuroscientist studies brain activity, he is not necessarily denying that minds exist. When a doctor examines design patterns in his patient's blood sample, he is not dismissing the presence of an eternal soul that was made for God. When a researcher isolates variables in order to identify causes, he does not commit to the philosophy that nothing else is real except for those variables. In like fashion, when ID scientists observe that certain features in nature function like machines, such as a bacterial flagellum, or that other features operate like a factory, such as the inside of a human cell, they are not saying that nature is a machine or a factory and nothing else, much less are they saying that the organisms of which they are a part, have no intrinsic final causality.StephenB
May 5, 2011
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---Mr. Green: "Extrinsic or intrinsic causality are not means of creation, they are [part of] what is being created. The distinction is relevant not to “how” God creates something (creation proper is always ex nihilo), but to the kind of thing being created, or being generated according to some natural means. Whether Adam and Eve were created “directly” or in “finished form” tells us nothing per se about whether they are organic or mechanical, as Feser has explained many times." Feser's explanation is not informed by a proper understanding of Intelligent Design, an unfortunate fact that causes him to strain at gnats and swallow camels. To be sure, organic living things have inherent tendencies, and, to be sure, they are not mere mechanical things, but the decisive question for ID science is this: What was the origin of those inherent tendencies. Indeed, we can, in that same spirit, appeal to the Thomistic vocabulary, by inquiring about the origins of an organism's final causality, a quality which ID in no way disputes. The answer, to which Aquinas and ID would both agree is that a designer created the first life, complete with its final causality--an act that must come from the OUTSIDE of an organism and not from the INSIDE. Organisms possess final causality because they were designed that way from the outside. That is precisely what ID science addresses: the coming-to-be of the first living things. So all of this heavy handed talk about the unbridgable gap between organisms and artifacts is both unwise and irrelevant. Aquinas and ID are compatible because there is nothing in either world view that would contradict the other.StephenB
May 5, 2011
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Mung (94): Everything you say about airplanes and bats is true, and the distinctions you make are important in various contexts, but none of them affects my point. The point is that you would not hesitate for one second to infer than an airplane was an intelligently designed object. Would you hesitate to infer that a bat was intelligently designed? If so, why? And if not, I would wager that your inference follows ID lines, or at least Paleyan lines. So where are we disagreeing? If Feser and Thomas would both say "Yes, bats are intelligently designed to fly," then ID people would be quite happy to leave Feser and Thomas unmolested and to refrain from all attacks upon them. You, like Feser, appear to be overly intellectualizing a relatively simple matter. Dawkins says that the design of the bat's body is only apparent design; blind natural forces have simulated the effects of design. ID says that the design of the bat's body is real design; a real mind has determined that the bat should fly, and has arranged things so that it will have the right combination of working parts to do so. ID people believe that Thomas Aquinas agrees with them about this. They believe that Aquinas believed in real design, not apparent design. So again, where do you stand? Where does Feser stand? Is the design of the bat real or only apparent?Thomas Cudworth
May 4, 2011
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Mr. Green (91 and 92): Re your answer to StephenB in 91: I agree with you that we have to be careful not to mix up two different questions: 1. How God created things; 2. The natures of the various things that God created. Regarding the first point -- whether God created things directly out of nothing, or by adding parts in the fashion of a mechanic, or via a gradual evolutionary process, I think that perhaps what StephenB and others here are concerned about is that Aquinas is very clear that man and the higher animals were created directly, and not through any gradual evolutionary process, and that the Thomists who are criticizing ID and allowing for the possible truth of Darwinian evolution are evading this point. However, I agree with you that the second point is more fundamental from a philosophical point of view. And yes, organisms are different from machines. Nonetheless, both have parts arranged in a complex manner to perform definite ends. Therefore, it is appropriate to speak of both in terms of design. This conclusion is further reinforced when we compare an organism with, say, a stalactite. Does a stalactite exhibit design? No, because there is no arrangement of parts to serve a definite end; its shape is determined by geological forces, i.e., by necessity, not reason. The problem, then, is that in distinguishing between natural and artifical objects, as Feser and Beckwith rightly want to do, we run up against the very real empirical fact that organisms, which are natural objects, are in crucial ways more like mechanisms than they are like other natural objects. How can any philosophy of nature simply brush this important fact aside? Regarding 92, I'm not against Aristotle per se; rather, I'm critical of Aquinas's appropriation of Aristotle, and of Feser's appropriation of both. I think that "Aristotelianism-Thomism" is a very unstable amalgam comprising two very different views of nature and God. I think pure Aristotelianism has more inner coherence, though I do not exempt even pure Aristotelianism from criticism. Finally, I don't claim that ID insights are completely compatible with Aquinas or with Aristotle. My claim has never been more than that Aquinas has some important agreements over the fact of design in the universe and the source of the design in the mind of God. As for the claim that ID implies a mechanistic metaphysics that is incompatible with Thomism, I deny it, but even if it were true, it would not matter to me, as I do not regard Thomism as the standard of truth in either philosophy or theology. I respect Aquinas very highly, as one of the West's greatest theologians and thinkers and teachers; but in the final analysis, he is a theologian, not a prophet, and his opinions are all fallible. He could not read Greek and did not have anywhere near the historical grasp of Greek philosophical thinking that we have today. He could not read Hebrew and did not have anywhere near the grasp of Hebrew poetics and the historical background of the Bible that we have today. I think that Thomists have always done Aquinas a disservice by placing a halo of divine wisdom around every word he wrote. No theologian can bear the weight of reverence that they have loaded upon St. Thomas. He should be treated as one of many voices in the philosophical and theological conversations of the West. One of the wisest voices, to be sure, but not the gold standard by which all the other voices are to be judged.Thomas Cudworth
May 4, 2011
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To the common understanding, the “evident end” is in both cases the same, i.e., flight.
But to the end of whom? The airplane, clearly, does not have it's "evident end" in and of itself. We don't see airplanes out there flying themselves too often. Who, or what, is flying those bats around, and is that the reason they are capable of flying? Because someone wanted to create something they could fly in? To be honest, I didn't even like the way that came out. We speak of bats flying, not being flown. We speak of airplanes flying, but we don't mean it in the same way. Airplanes do not fly, they are flown. So their "evident end" is not so clearly the same. To me, the evident end of the airplane is "to be flown," or "to allow a person to simulate the activity of flying," which comes naturally to neither man nor plane.Mung
May 4, 2011
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St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica (On the Government of Things in General (q 103, article 1):
Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves: for ... the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle [Cleanthes].
That's the fine-tuning, ID argument. An anti-ID Catholic, Stephen Barr explains things this way (in his book Modern Physics, Ancient Faith):
the Latin Christian writer Minucius Felix near the beginning of the third century [states]: ”If upon entering some home you saw that everything there was well-tended, neat, and decorative, you would believe that some master was in charge of it, and that he himself was superior to those good things. So too in the home of this world, when you see providence, order, and law in the heavens and on earth, believe there is a Lord and Author of the universe, more beautiful than the stars themselves and the various parts of the whole world.” ... The old Argument from Design is based on the commonsense idea that if something is arranged then somebody arranged it. The reasonableness of this idea can be seen from an everyday example. If one were to enter a hall and find hundreds of folding chairs neatly set up in evenly spaced ranks and files, one would feel quite justified in inferring that someone had arranged the chairs that way.One can imagine, however, that a person might object to this obvious inference, and suggest instead that the chairs are merely obeying some Law of Chairs although often in a secret or hidden way. When we see situations that appear haphazard, or things that appear amorphous, automatically or spontaneously “arranging themselves” into orderly patterns, what we find in every case is that what appeared to be amorphous or haphazard actually had a great deal of order already built into it.
Oops! He's supposed to be arguing against ID and not giving examples that support it. :-) If one uses the "commonsense" approach to the "Old Argument from Design", it's clear that observations of the coordination, structure and complex-specified functionality found in nature reveal the presence of design and therefore intelligence. Thomist philospher, Fr. James A. McWilliams in his Catholic college textbook Cosmology (p. 16-17) explains it:
Teleology is order in activity, and is therefore called dynamic order. But there is also the order of structure. Structural order ; is the harmonious arrangement of diverse integral parts in one pattern or configuration ... It is true that structure is often suitable for useful activity, still it can be recognized without our knowing its utility. Hence, structural order, apart from dynamic order, furnishes independent evidence for intelligence.
Proponentist
May 4, 2011
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Thomas Cudworth — Thanks for your responses.
There is no *need* to interpret gravity, charge, etc. in terms of any intrinsic finality. They can be interpreted as external compulsions.
Well, there's only a "need" to the extent that one is trying to formulate an Aristotelian/Thomistic position. Maybe there is a different position that works as well, although I tend to suspect that any systems that genuinely work will be more or less the same thing in different words. In fact, "external compulsions" still sounds kinda like a paraphrase of "final cause" to me. Feser is certainly not Aristotelian in a "pure" original sense (which I'm happy to concede never really existed in the first place), but is an intellectual descendant — closer to Aristotle in many ways (not all) than modern competitors. But if even the updated offshoots of Aristotle are simply wrong, then all the more reason why ID must be incompatible. (Of course from my side, I get a bit of a sense of desperation to reject Aristotle!)
What ID people are saying to Feser is that both Aquinas and Paley/ID people believe that the coordination arose out of intelligent design, not out of blind chance alone, blind necessity alone, or any combination of the two. And since Feser does not appear to disagree that there is design in organisms and that God is responsible for the design, what are ID people and Feser fighting about?
Certainly, there is agreement in the broad sense that God is the "author" of life, that design requires intelligence, and so on. But ID is making claims more specific than that. It's not the general conclusions that are in the problem, but the principles invoked to reach them. Above, you also said, "It [thinking of nature as displaying intent] implies a form of extrinsic finality". Thomists don't accept that — so again, whichever side is wrong, it can't be compatible with the side that's right. Given the centrality of final causality to Thomism, rejecting it in any sense can have far-ranging implications — as in my quotation from Feser to Mung, a seemingly harmless equating of organism to machine ends up wreaking havoc with the human mind and morality. Now, is there is a possible interpretation of ID that would be acceptable to both sides? Something that adheres to Thomistic principles but bears a close enough family resemblance to still be called "ID"? Perhaps, but I don't think anybody's managed to formulate it that way yet.Mr. Green
May 4, 2011
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StephenB: By contrast, Aquinas taught that God DOES create as an artist [like a shipbuilder] as is evident in the fact that He created Adam and Eve directly in finished form, which means that He WAS using extrinsic causality, and was NOT using intrinsic causality which, according to Feser, is the ONLY way God creates.
Extrinsic or intrinsic causality are not means of creation, they are [part of] what is being created. The distinction is relevant not to "how" God creates something (creation proper is always ex nihilo), but to the kind of thing being created, or being generated according to some natural means. Whether Adam and Eve were created "directly" or in "finished form" tells us nothing per se about whether they are organic or mechanical, as Feser has explained many times.Mr. Green
May 4, 2011
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Mung (89): You wrote: "there is also in this exact same phenomenon a profound difference in what the evident end consists of and in this respect organisms and artifacts are not at all analogous." What is the profound difference you are speaking of? If one examines the anatomy of a bat, one sees an arrangement of parts which facilitates flight; if one examines the structure of an airplane, one sees an arrangement of parts which facilitates flight. To the common understanding, the "evident end" is in both cases the same, i.e., flight. We know in the case of the airplane that the arrangement of the parts is due to design. Is this also the case regarding the arrangement of parts of the bat? Darwin said no; Mayr, Dobzhansky, etc. said no; Gould said no; Ayala says no; Dawkins and his friends say no; ID says yes. And Aquinas says? And Feser says? And Mung says?Thomas Cudworth
May 3, 2011
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However, organisms and artifacts have something very striking in common: in both, well-coordinated parts function together to accomplish an evident end.
Yes, but there is also in this exact same phenomenon a profound difference in what the evident end consists of and in this respect organisms and artifacts are not at all analogous.Mung
May 3, 2011
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Mr. Green, you wrote: "Aquinas does sometimes compare God to a builder, but only indirectly, and not in this context. He certainly did not believe that God “built” Adam like a ship." Nor, to the best of my knowledge, did Paley; and nor, to the best of my knowledge, do most ID proponents. It seems to me that this discussion about the difference between organisms and artifacts is irrelevant in the context of comparing ID and Thomism. Nobody denies that there are crucial differences between organisms and artifacts. However, organisms and artifacts have something very striking in common: in both, well-coordinated parts function together to accomplish an evident end. From this similarity springs the question over which ID people differ from Dawkins & Co.: Does the coordination of the parts of organisms to accomplish an end -- like the coordination of the parts of an artifact to accomplish an end -- arise out of intelligent design? Or does it arise out of a combination of blind chance and blind necessity, which turned indifferent atoms into exquisitely complex and well-functioning organisms by a series of cosmic freaks? What ID people are saying to Feser is that both Aquinas and Paley/ID people believe that the coordination arose out of intelligent design, not out of blind chance alone, blind necessity alone, or any combination of the two. And since Feser does not appear to disagree that there is design in organisms and that God is responsible for the design, what are ID people and Feser fighting about?Thomas Cudworth
May 3, 2011
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---Mr. Green" ---"I don’t know where you got that idea. Aquinas does sometimes compare God to a builder, but only indirectly, and not in this context. He certainly did not believe that God “built” Adam like a ship." Aristotle's analogy of the shipbuilder is meant to differentiate the phenomenon of an artist at work from the phenomenon of nature at work. According to Feser, Aquinas taught that God does NOT create directly as an artist, that is, as a shipbuilder [using extrinsic causality] and DOES create by letting created nature do the work indirectly [using intrinsic causality]--and in no other way. By contrast, Aquinas taught that God DOES create as an artist [like a shipbuilder] as is evident in the fact that He created Adam and Eve directly in finished form, which means that He WAS using extrinsic causality, and was NOT using intrinsic causality which, according to Feser, is the ONLY way God creates.StephenB
May 2, 2011
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Mung: As such, how can ID be scientific unless one makes the case that science must once again admit formal and final causes?
Well, it can be scientific as long as you use the scientific method when you're doing it. I would argue that the scientific method implicitly entails formal and final causes, but doing science and what one thinks one is doing, or claims to be doing, is a different question.
Are we to God as computers are to us? Are we artifacts of His creation? […] Is this the point that Feser is trying to make? If so, I think it’s quite a valid issue to raise.
Yes, for Feser/Aquinas, living beings are different from artifacts not just in degree but in kind. (I was going to mention that you could in principle have an organism that was simpler than a machine, but Vincent Torley beat me to it). And certainly in Thomistic terms, the difference has important ramifications. From Feser's most recent post:
If natural objects are “artifacts,” then they have no immanent final causality or teleology.  And if they have no immanent final causality or teleology, then they are not compounds of act and potency (since potency presupposes immanent final causality), and there is no basis for arguing from their existence to God as their Purely Actual cause.  If they have no substantial forms, then the soul is not the substantial form of the body, and the interaction problem looms (along with its materialist sequel).  If natural objects have no substantial forms or immanent teleology, then human beings (who are natural objects) have no substantial forms or immanent teleology, and the metaphysical foundations of classical natural law theory are undermined.
Phew!Mr. Green
May 2, 2011
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VJ Torley: But this kind of argument only shows that material entities possessing a form require something to keep this form united to prime matter. It does not show that this “something” must be intelligent. This is the argumentative gap that ID attempts to plug.
Except for a Thomist, that something must be intelligent, because only God fits the bill. But even apart from that, wouldn't the origin of any form have to be a mind, unless the object existed forever?
But if the ends we find in Nature are not distant, future ends, but currently existing ones (as you yourself concede in the cases of gravity and electromagnetism) then the inference to an Intelligence is unwarranted.
I think I see what you mean: forms exist either in matter or in a mind; a future form does not exist in matter (yet!), so it must exist in a mind, an intelligence. But a currently existing form can just be there in matter. I'm not sure that that works for final causes, though, even when "presently" directed. Isn't the point of being "directed" that it points to something outside itself (even if not something in the future, exactly)? I'll have to think about that more.
Because Thomists define living things in purely finalistic terms, they imagine that a simple life-form is possible. What ID proponents are saying is that in this universe, at least, it’s not.
I think that's an interesting point. Of course, in some sense Thomists aren't interested in "this" universe, that is, they're interested not in our physics, but in metaphysics (which applies to all universes). Certainly that will affect the types of arguments on either side.Mr. Green
May 2, 2011
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StephenB: I think that Feser’s phrase “the way God creates” coupled with the phrase, “is not to be understood” can be safely interpreted to mean that God, as Creator, does not assume the role of an artistic shipbuilder. Thus, when St. Thomas indicates that God did create Adam and Eve in exactly that way, he is leaving a door open that Feser has closed in his name.
I don't know where you got that idea. Aquinas does sometimes compare God to a builder, but only indirectly, and not in this context. He certainly did not believe that God "built" Adam like a ship.Mr. Green
May 2, 2011
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The real difference between ID and Thomism isn’t over mechanism; it’s about form.
vjt, you've whetted my appetite for more! I love this sort of debate. I thank you and everyone else in this thread for their contribution. Would you say that neither the Thomist nor the ID theorist thinks that material and efficient causes provide a sufficient explanation of form? Can ID be expressed in those terms? Isn't it also the case that form is not restricted to "simple" forms or "complex" forms? Every form must be specified. So how can ID say that this simple form x does not provide any indication of ID, while this complex form y does? From what I have read, it seems to me that mechanism is vital to the differences between the two camps. Feser is obviously opposed to "the mechanical philosophy" and apparently thinks that ID buys into that same philosophy to make it's case. I know you've indicated an intention to address the "five ways", but I'd personally prefer to see them one at a time. (Small brain.)Mung
May 1, 2011
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Mung (#81) I entirely agree that the computer analogy for created things is inadequate. Let me add that Thomists are right to insist that an artifact (a collection of parts mechanically configured for a particular function) is qualitatively different from a living thing (a substance whose parts work in concert for the good of the whole). ID proponents don't claim that living things are like artifacts; rather, artifacts are a pale imitation of living things. "Then why invoke them at all, if they're so different?" one might ask. Because living things are fiendishly difficult to understand, being in a category of their own, and because artifacts are about the nearest analogy to living things - and a very poor analogy at that - that our feeble minds can actually grasp. What both artifacts and living things have in common, though, is that complexity is one of their defining features. Because Thomists define living things in purely finalistic terms, they imagine that a simple life-form is possible. What ID proponents are saying is that in this universe, at least, it's not. This brief post explains why: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/doug-axe-a-real-scientist-not-a-brain-dead-darwinist/ That's why we're so sure that no scientific discovery will ever falsify ID. Producing life forms is a difficult task, because the ratio of functional configurations to non-functional configurations is astronomically low, even with proteins. Hence, finding a path-way that leads to life is like searching for a needle in a haystack. https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/id-predictions-foundational-principles-underlying-the- predictions-proposed-by-jonathan-m-and-others/ May I suggest that the real point at issue between Thomism and ID is the relationship between form and finality, and whether life can be defined in purely finalistic terms. Thomists hold that final causes are logically primary, and determine all other causes (formal causes included): form follows function. ID proponents differ on this vital point; we consider that the complexity of a living thing's form cannot be boiled own or reduced to its final cause (as if one could, in principle, reverse-engineer the structure of a living thing simply be grasping its telos). Both form and finality are essential, irreducible and complementary features of a living thing. The real difference between ID and Thomism isn't over mechanism; it's about form.vjtorley
May 1, 2011
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Are we to God as computers are to us? Are we artifacts of His creation? I find an answer of "yes" to be repugnant and I also believe that having such a view of God (and nature) could indeed lead to serious theological issues, both in our understanding of nature and in our understanding of God. Is this the point that Feser is trying to make? If so, I think it's quite a valid issue to raise.Mung
May 1, 2011
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I'll say it again. I'm not an apologist for Feser. I'm just trying to understand the debate and I find that history and context can help in that regard. Maybe they misunderstand us, maybe we misunderstand them. Perhaps there are hidden sources of misunderstanding. Perhaps my conception of nature is wrong. Perhaps theirs is to. If theirs is wrong does it make mine right? Perhaps my conception of God is wrong. Perhaps theirs is to. If theirs is wrong does it make mine right? I try to keep an open mind.Mung
May 1, 2011
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Mung, I am not clear on how your latest entry ties in to the subject of Feser's misapplication of Thomism.StephenB
May 1, 2011
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For those of you who have a copy of The Nature of Nature, Ernan McMullin briefly discusses the Protestant/Catholic divide in Chapter 3, Section 2.
Can one find support for QMN1 [Qualified Methodological Naturalism: Version One] on the side of theology? Here one finds a significant difference between two great traditions in Christian theology, a difference that may help, to some small extent at least, to explain why ID finds so much more support on the side of evangelical Christians than on that of Catholics. In the Thomist tradition, which has done much to shape Catholic theology, a modified version of the Aristotelian notion of nature is fundamental to an understanding of the world around us. ...
In the tradition of Reformed theology, the Thomist conception of nature, with its Aristotelian antecedents, is suspect. Echoing the nominalist criticisms of the fourteenth century, that conception is held to compromise the freedom of the Creator. It imposes too strong a constraint on that freedom...
Hah. So it does all come down to theology. ;)Mung
April 30, 2011
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Mung (#74) Thank you for your post. Regarding the origin of forms, I would say that they need to be produced by an adequate efficient cause. Certainly for the complex forms found in the biological realm, the only adequate efficient cause is an intelligent being, acting for an end (i.e. a final cause). Thus both an efficient and a final cause are required. Regarding the relationship between final and efficient causes: when I wrote that only efficient causes make things happen, I meant that only efficient causes act on objects. That's what an efficient cause is. However, I would also agree that the regular patterns of action we observe in the natural world - i.e. the laws of nature - presuppose the existence of a Mind, acting for some end, or final cause.vjtorley
April 30, 2011
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---Mung: "But using ice to cool another substance is I think as close as you can come to an analogy. Both the ice and the substance are doing what comes naturally to them. I’m just taking advantage of that fact to accomplish my own ends." I like your analogy.StephenB
April 30, 2011
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---Mung: "It appears that Feser argues that God is not like the ice sculptor." Yes, that's right. ---"You seem to take the Genesis account literally, as if God created a sculpture out of clay and then breathed life into it." I am not discussing Genesis at all. The issue on the table is the compatibility of Aquinas and ID. Feser says that, according to Aquinas, God does NOT create as a sculptor and his philosophy of nature is, THEREFORE, incompatible with ID. He is wrong about that because Aquinas says that God CAN and DOES create as a sculptor. Therefore, Aquinas and ID cannot be characterized as being incompatible on that basis. CheersStephenB
April 30, 2011
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vjtorley @70 I pretty much agree with everything you wrote.
...when I speak of formal causes, I don’t mean that forms go round making things happen, as if they could push things around or something.
Sorry if I gave the impression that you did. :)
Only efficient causes make things happen.
I am very interested in the whole question of causation and explanation. Bought a bunch of books which now just take up space on my shelves (and in my Kindle). ;) What do you mean by the text I quoted? In what sense do final causes not make things happen? In order for a final cause to be actualized, there must be an efficient cause? Bring to mind the old means, motive, opportunity. The final cause is the motive (why), the efficient cause is the means (how). Science only cares about the how, as if you can even have a how without a why.
when I speak of formal causes, I don’t mean that forms go round making things happen
No, but something causes the form. Something is going around making forms happen. The IRS?Mung
April 30, 2011
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Hi StephenB, So following my analogy, however poor it may be, if we see an ice sculpture we infer the existence of a sculptor. An artist, an architect. Someone who has taken ice and formed it into something it would not otherwise appear as. And this is exactly the same sort of argument used by ID, is it not? It appears that Feser argues that God is not like the ice sculptor. You seem to take the Genesis account literally, as if God created a sculpture out of clay and then breathed life into it. I don't interpret the text that way, and I doubt Feser would either, so I don't see how talking about that would advance the discussion.
The point is rather that for A-T, the way God creates a natural substance is not to be understood on the model of a shipbuilder or sculptor who takes pre-existing bits of matter and rearranges them to serve an end they have no tendency otherwise to serve.
Now take the ice in drink part of my analogy. Here I have not given the ice a form it would not normally take. In both cases though, I have used it to my own ends (telos). This is, I think, Feser's point wrt God's creation of natural substances. Is the quote you provided from his blog? He tells us how God's activity is not to be understood, I'd like to see what he offers as the alternative. But using ice to cool another substance is I think as close as you can come to an analogy. Both the ice and the substance are doing what comes naturally to them. I'm just taking advantage of that fact to accomplish my own ends. Hope this in some small way helps. CheersMung
April 30, 2011
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Mung @69, if your point is that sculpting with ice is different from the phenomenon of ice melting I would certainly agree. However, I don't understand how that plays in to my comment.StephenB
April 29, 2011
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---Mung: "If you don’t understand or see any difference just say so. But don’t pretend like I didn’t address it." Your link didn't take, so, no, I still don't know what difference you are referring to. I am ready to give your point a fair hearing, but I cannot do that until I know what it is.StephenB
April 29, 2011
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