Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

A reasonable man

Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

I would like to commend Thomas Cudworth for his latest attempt to engage ID critic Professor Edward Feser in dialogue. Over the past few weeks, I have been greatly heartened by Professor Feser’s clarifications of his position vis-a-vis Intelligent Design. For instance, in a recent post on his blog site, he wrote:

The dispute between Thomism on the one hand and Paley (and ID theory) on the other is not over whether God is in some sense the “designer” of the universe and of living things – both sides agree that He is – but rather over what exactly it means to say that He is, and in particular over the metaphysics of life and of creation.

Moreover, in an email sent to me last month, Professor Feser wrote:

I have never accused any ID defender of heresy, and would never do so. To say to a theological opponent “Your views have implications you may not like, including ones that I believe are hard to reconcile with what we both agree to be definitive of orthodoxy” is simply not the same thing as saying “You are a heretic!” Rather, it’s what theologians do all the time in debate with their fellow orthodox believers.

I welcome Professor Feser’s statements that he regards the Intelligent Design movement as theologically orthodox, and that he believes God is the designer of living things.

In his latest post, Thomas Cudworth put a question to Professor Feser. He asked Professor Feser whether, in his view, God could have possibly planned to create a universe in which intelligent beings could infer His existence from studying nature – in particular, from observing clues such as cosmic fine-tuning and irreducible complexity, which would show that the evolutionary process must have been intelligently planned. I know that Professor Feser is a very busy man with a lot of work on his hands, so I’d like to attempt a reply on his behalf.

Recently, I’ve been closely studying Professor Feser’s books, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism. Aquinas. One thing that Feser makes abundantly clear in his books is that he thinks the existence of God can be proved with certainty. So in response to Thomas Cudworth’s question, Professor Feser would never say: “No, I know that God would never have hatched such a plan, would never have wanted human beings to have the ability to infer his existence in this way, and would never have created a universe in which such inferences from nature are possible.”

Instead, the answer which Professor Feser would give is:

“God did in fact create a universe in which intelligent beings could infer His existence from studying nature. But we don’t need cosmic fine-tuning and irreducible complexity to make that inference. Any old law of nature would be enough – even a simple one like ‘Protons and electrons tend to be attracted to one another.’ What’s more, the laws of nature allow us to deduce that the Creator of the universe is the God of classical theism.”

How can I be sure that Professor Feser would respond in this way? In his book, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism, Professor Feser describes Aquinas’ Fifth Way as “a strict and airtight metaphysical demonstration of the existence of God” (p. 112) and adds:

Even if the universe consisted of nothing but an electron orbiting a nucleus, that would suffice for the Fifth Way… All that matters is that there are various causes here and now which are directed to certain ends, and the argument is that these couldn’t possibly exist at all if there were not a Supreme Intellect here and now ordering them to those ends… Nor is this a matter of “probability,” but of conceptual necessity: it is not just unlikely, but conceptually impossible that there could be genuine final causation without a sustaining intellect. (p. 116)

Could such a Supreme Intelligence possibly be anything less than God? It could not. For whatever ultimately orders things to their ends must also be the ultimate cause of those things: To have an end is just part of having a certain nature or essence; for that nature or essence to be the nature or essence of something real, it must be conjoined with existence; and thus whatever determines that these things exist with a certain end is the same as what conjoins their essence and existence. But as we have seen, the ultimate or First Cause of things must be Being Itself. Hence the Supreme Intelligence cannot fail to be identical with the First Cause and thus with the Unmoved Mover, with all the divine attributes. The arguments all converge on one and the same point: God, as conceived of in the monotheistic religions.

There can be no doubt, then, that the Supreme Intelligence which orders things to their ends cannot fail to be Pure Being and therefore cannot fail to be absolutely simple. (p. 116)
(Emphasis mine – VJT.)

It is evident from the foregoing quotes that Professor Feser has great confidence in Aquinas’ Fifth Way, and that he believes it leads straight to the God of classical theism. Where he and I differ is that he thinks that Intelligent Design detracts from the Fifth Way (which is why he regards ID as a theological distraction), whereas I think that Intelligent Design actually reinforces the Fifth Way, making Aquinas’ argument much stronger, and much easier to defend from the attacks of modern skeptics. But that will be the subject of a future post.

Comments
Right, so here’s why this stuff mattered to Plato and Aristotle—or to Augustine (Calvin) and Thomas. It was not, for them, some kind of abstract debate over what sort of belief system is correct. The belief systems they proposed—or rather the ontological methods—were personal. The God you are all talking about—the God of the philosophers and philosopher-theologians—is intellect in his essence. By a set of curious chances, this conception of God can be made to fit like a glove to two very different kinds of personalities. One is what Hegel called the “unhappy consciousness.” These are the Idealists, whose natural, personal unrest leads them down the path of negation. Why is this personal unhappiness of theirs relevant to philosophy and its conception of God? For the simple reason that the resistance they feel to present being is analogous to the capacity for resistance (to matter) found in intellect. That is, they are naturally inclined to equate their own resistance—their unhappiness—with God and his “holiness.” Since resistance is a nugatory power, equating it with God leads to pure negation. It leads to the idea, made most famous by Plato, that embodied existence, supposedly some sort of combination of intellect and matter, is utterly depraved and without intrinsic value, and must be annihilated in order to obtain the ideal of pure intellect. So speaks the soul that is restless in the extreme. Opposition comes from those who are more conservative by nature. For whatever reason, they do not feel as unhappy and alienated from present being as the idealists, the radicals and lovers of negation. To put this in Christian terms, they believe that nature is “very good’; that it has intrinsic value and can be used to give substance to abstractions about the good. They are rather attached to present being, feel it has value, and want to preserve that value against what they view as the dangerous radicalism of the idealists. As it happens, intellect furnishes them with a means of expressing their conservatism—the notion of pure action. They (Aristotle) claim to have overcome the annihilating effects of Idealism by conceiving of being as a ratio of intellectual and material causes. Intellect is not a force of pure negation or resistance to embodied existence, in their view, but somehow initiates and willingly enters into a ratio of itself and matter—which they call “pure act.” Of course the limitation of this view is that it has the effect of drawing God into being and depriving him of his holiness. Nature, in effect, becomes God. Nothing has changed, as this thread demonstrates. Idealists are still drawn to negation, and there is a troubling strain of this in ID, for example in the kind of theology that equates the fall with the loss of all goodness and value in nature. Meanwhile those of a more conservative mindset are still drawn to the notion of pure action. They see Aristotle’s solution as an adequate and necessary response to Idealism. They still feel the need, like Uzzah perhaps, to defend the honor of nature against the depredations of dualism, which defensiveness can be seen in some of the “neo-Thomists,” as noted here. All of this bitterness comes from philosophy and its equation of God with intellect. It cannot be overcome because intellect itself is divided in its notions of “the good” between pure negation and pure action, and this dividedness fits the radical and conservative mindsets perfectly. Of course there is another way…allanius
April 26, 2011
April
04
Apr
26
26
2011
05:10 AM
5
05
10
AM
PDT
nullasalus @ 37: The Thomists don't have to explicitly charge heresy. It's implied in virtually everything they write about ID. ID people have a wrong view of nature and a wrong view of creation and a wrong view of God. Catholic Thomists have the right view of nature and the right view of creation and the right view of God. The meaning is plain. I agree that the Thomists have the motive that you attribute to them in your last two paragraphs. Yes, they think that ID arguments imply (whether ID people know it or not) a dangerous and ultimately non-orthodox idea of God. And yes, that explains their desire to criticize ID. The communications difficulty is this: when ID people, even moderate, careful, polite ID people like Vincent Torley and Jay Richards, try to explain why ID arguments don't imply an un-Christian idea of God, they are met with (a) condescension -- Feser regularly writes as if he is a professor teaching a particularly thick group of students with no natural talent for metaphysics (even though both Richards and Torley have Ph.D.s in philosophy that are just as good as his own); (b) the demand that the playing field for the debate must be the Thomist-Aristotelian one; no other conception of philosophy and no other conception of theology is taken seriously; this is of course narrow, doctrinaire, dogmatic, and programmatic. Most ID proponents are Protestant and simply do not accept Catholic assumptions about Christianity, which they often find un-Biblical, and they find the quasi-religious reverence of Thomas Aquinas spiritually repugnant. Also, philosophically, many ID proponents are Platonists rather than Aristotelians, and there are very good reasons why a person might be a Platonist rather than an Aristotelian. Feser and Beckwith need to learn how to conduct a dialogue with those who do not take for granted what they take for granted, without giving the very clear impression that they think their debating partners are intellectual primitives who weren't taught philosophy very well. If you read some of the comments that Beckwith has posted here, and many of the comments Feser puts on his site, you will see that the condescension is unmistakable. So I think that a lot of the friction has to do as much with bedside manner as with philosophical and theological contents. If Beckwith and Feser would occasionally give the impression that they are still learning things about philosophy and theology and the doctrine of creation, and are interested in hearing other perspectives on these subjects, from people who have read different books and have had different teachers, rather than portraying themselves as the Suarez and Bellarmine of modern-day Catholicism, upholding the true doctrine against error, it would help a great deal. Their didactic stance rubs ID people the wrong way, because ID people are generally more Socratic in temperament, skeptical and open, and dislike being pushed into accepting any argument, whether Darwinian, TE, or Thomist, on the basis of authority, grand tradition, or the tacit claim that so-and-so must be incapable of error on any subject on which he has published a book. T.Timaeus
April 26, 2011
April
04
Apr
26
26
2011
04:08 AM
4
04
08
AM
PDT
Nullasalus (36): Thanks for your post. You say: "My understanding of Aquinas and Aristotle, both from their own writings and from Feser’s view of them, is that the regularities of nature – that natural things, living and non-living, are directed towards predictable, reliable patterns and behaviors and causes and effects – is teleology itself. It’s not so much that things which have these things “must have a final cause”, but that this largely is what is meant by final cause to begin with." Here is my comment and question: I have studied a fair bit of Aristotle and Aquinas. I'm not an expert on either of them, and I wish I knew a lot more about both of them. But I have studied a fair bit of them, and in particular I have worked on Aristotle's understanding of nature, especially his *Physics*, parts of which I have read in Greek. My impression is that what you are saying about Aristotle and Aquinas here is incorrect. I do not believe that "the regularities of nature" are "teleology itself" in either Aristotle or Aquinas. I do not believe that "the regularity of nature" is "what is meant by final cause to begin with." I do not find such equations in Aristotle's *Physics*, and I have not found such expressions in the *Summa Theologiae*, or in any of the standard reference works on Aristotle and Aquinas which I own, or in any of the detailed studies I have read concerning the history of the notions of teleology and final causation. However, I am not an expert, and could be wrong. So I would appreciate it if you would provide passages from Aristotle and Aquinas, with your commentary added, to show me where you are getting these equations. You also say: "The philosophy was not welded to the science." I have heard this claim from Feser and Beckwith. I think they are both wrong. I think that it is impossible to separate Aristotelian philosophy from Aristotelian science. Completely, that is. Individual bits of the science (e.g., Aristotle's erroneous view of comets) can be subtracted without damaging Aristotle's overall philosophy. But a complete separation of the science from the philosophy? I don't believe it can be done. Take the "four causes"? Is that science, or metaphysics? In Aristotle (for whom the terms "science" and "metaphysics" as we use them would make no sense), it's both. Aristotle's understanding of change in nature was, in modern terms, both physical and metaphysical at once, both scientific and philosophical at once. And ironically, the separation of "science" from "metaphysics" or "philosophy" -- a separation under which, e.g., Ken Miller's work on cell walls has absolutely nothing to do with Henri Bergson's discussion of life as an expression of the elan vital -- is a *modern* distinction, characteristic of *modern* philosophy, precisely the modern philosophy that Beckwith and Feser are always complaining about. So in trying to strictly divorce Aristotelian science from Aristotelian metaphysics, they are being moderns, and not true to Aristotle at all. (But of course they *must* attempt the divorce, because Aristotle's science, outside of his observational biology, is wholly discredited, and they want to keep essential aspects of what they call his philosophy.) You also say: "I don’t think it’s fair to call Feser on the carpet for not talking about Christianity enough." I didn't do that. I noted that Feser doesn't talk about *the Bible* very much. And I have been reading Thomists for a long, long time, and I notice that they all seem much more interested in the Aristotelian aspects of Thomas than they are in the Biblical aspects of Thomas. And the glowing endorsements of "classic theism" in Beckwith and Feser seem to have little to do with the Bible. Why are Genesis 1, Psalm 19, Isaiah 45, the Flood story, the verses in Exodus about God's hardening the heart of Pharaoh, the story about Elijah and the bears, the story of the parting of the waters, and so many others, rarely or never brought into the picture of God that they count as "classic theism"? Is the simplicity, unicity, ubiquity, etc. of God more important to Beckwith and Feser than God's active involvement, his harsh judgments, his humanlike responses (grief, anger, repentance, jealousy, in some cases apparent learning from observation rather than knowing all in advance), his seeming overridings of human free will, etc.? Why is so much Biblical data simply left out of their account? Does the picture of God in the Bible fall below their standard of "classic theism"? It seems to me that what they call "classic theism" represents a form of Christian belief that has been pruned of a good deal of Hebraic thinking, and is highly Hellenized. If Feser and Beckwith want to be Catholics and Thomists, I say, more power to them. I have great respect both for Rome and for Thomas. But to judge whether or not Paley or ID or anyone else is theologically adequate on the grounds of a form of theism which shortchanges Hebraism in the name of a very Hellenizing rationality? That's presumptuous, to say the least. I revere the Greeks, probably more than Feser or Beckwith or anyone here, but I would still go so far as to say that Christianity has a vital, central Hebraic component, and that this component has often been wrongly minimized in the history of Christian thought, by Christians of all denominations. And Thomists have often been among the leading minimizers.Thomas Cudworth
April 26, 2011
April
04
Apr
26
26
2011
02:15 AM
2
02
15
AM
PDT
T, The difference, however, is this: ID people don’t say that Thomistic arguments for the existence of God lead to inferior or heretical Christian theology, or are advocated by thinkers who are the unwitting dupes of the erroneous, mechanistic early modern philosophers. Beckwith and Feser do say that about ID arguments, and about Paley’s arguments. I'm not so sure of that. First, Feser - if I recall right - explicitly denies calling ID proponents heretical. Yes, he thinks ID absolutely requires a certain flawed view of nature to even get off the ground. They may not be 'unwitting dupes' - they may well willingly subscribe to a mechanistic view of nature. At the same time, I do get the impression that some ID proponents do dump on Thomistic arguments, almost in a tit for tat way. It's starting to seem like the attitude is "Well, if thomists won't endorse ID, then we're going to denounce thomism in retaliation". So by what right do Beckwith and Feser complain about the Paley/ID arguments for God, when the God of the Five Ways is at least as far away from the Biblically revealed God as Paley’s God is? To put it in an extremely crude way, the problem is this. What if someone came up with a way to identify design in nature, and it was assumed for practical purposes that the designer was corporeal and physical? Not "it's possible they do", but "for this identification to work, this is a necessary assumption". Would it be at all encouraging for many Christians to try and use this method to provide evidence for God's existence? Even if a proponent said, "Well, hey now, this is only part of the story. A fuller theology would fill in the missing pieces about this designer, and would or could in the end be identified as the God of Christianity!"? Well, clearly not, because any such "designer" identified by this method would be fundamentally corporeal, and thus be at odds with what I think is clearly the orthodox Christian view of God as immaterial. It doesn't matter what more is said about this God, once that commitment is part of the bargain. Likewise, Feser and Beckwith seem to be saying that there's something about the fundamental assumption necessary for ID to get off the ground that requires a commitment that just cannot be squared with a particular (and in their eyes, extremely important) view of God. Whether they are right or wrong about this, that's the reasoning to keep in mind. It's not that the identification does not go far enough, but that it goes in what they consider a bad direction, period.nullasalus
April 25, 2011
April
04
Apr
25
25
2011
11:34 PM
11
11
34
PM
PDT
Thomas Cudworth, You are arguing that because objects tend to be attracted to each other, there must be final causes; you are arguing that because electrons behave the way they do, there must be final causes. But this is only true with a vacuous definition of final causation. While I look forward to Green's response on this matter, I don't think this reply is on target. My understanding of Aquinas and Aristotle, both from their own writings and from Feser's view of them, is that the regularities of nature - that natural things, living and non-living, are directed towards predictable, reliable patterns and behaviors and causes and effects - is teleology itself. It's not so much that things which have these things "must have a final cause", but that this largely is what is meant by final cause to begin with. And honestly, the teleology, guidance, and really, 'design' evident in the more mundane operations of the natural world is at least one area where the Thomists come out ahead of ID proponents. (And I say this as someone who repeatedly praises ID proponents for taking seriously the question of design in nature, as opposed to many TEs who are all talk, little substance.) The design and mind evident in the natural workings of the world is important to recognize, and gets taken for granted too often, or conceded entirely to naturalists who - frankly - have little warrant to claim it other than flawed ideas of 'methodological naturalism'. The short of it is, yes, those four causes were applied in the context of a now-outdated scientific picture of the world. The question is whether they can be applied within the current scientific picture of the world - and the answer there seems to be "yes", a thousand times over. The philosophy was not welded to the science. (I'm sure Feser may even make a stronger claim, and argue science is impossible on a certain level without presupposing these sorts of categories. Just as Plantinga may argue that naturalism not only is not more intellectually grounded than theism, but is via the EAAN downright self-defeating.) Nor does Feser "hate" or "deplore" the advances of late-medieval philosophers, and he certainly admits that the science of Aristotle and Aquinas was flawed. (It means nothing to their philosophy that their science was flawed.) Granted, by treating Aristotle as the last word on all things natural, people were holding back progress - but said progress would have been held back if Einstein or Newton were treated as the last word as well. That says more about the dangers of being too beholden to any individual when it comes to science, than about Aristotle in particular. Finally, I don't think it's fair to call Feser on the carpet for not talking about Christianity enough. Anymore than one should criticize William Lane Craig for making tremendous hay about the Kalam cosmological argument and arguments about God in the abstract. Further, Feser operates from a Catholic perspective where the church theology has a deep relation to the fundamental ideas he deals with. Everyone has their focus.nullasalus
April 25, 2011
April
04
Apr
25
25
2011
11:19 PM
11
11
19
PM
PDT
Mr. Green: About gravity and Aristotle. Some of what you say is quite true. However, you are making two errors, one of detail and one of broader principle. First, Aristotle did not speak only of the downward motion of heavy bodies. He spoke of the natural place of all the elements -- earth, air, fire and water. What he says about earth can be made to fit in with your adjustment of attraction so that it is toward the center of bodies rather than "down", but what he says about air, fire and water cannot. You are also leaving out the fact that Aristotle and other ancients blundered in presupposing a "natural circular motion" of the heavenly bodies. In short, you are trying to excuse bad physics, trying to rescue it by desperate measures. The fact is that Aristotle's physics was deeply erroneous, and his authority had a negative effect on the development of modern science. Modern science came to be, in effect, over Aristotle's dead body. Anyone who pretends otherwise either has not read the relevant primary and secondary sources in the history of science, or is delusional. Second, you are cheating in your definition of "final cause." You are making the notion of "final cause" much broader than either Aristotle or Aquinas understood it to be, in order to preserve it; and the result is nearly tautological. You are arguing that because objects tend to be attracted to each other, there must be final causes; you are arguing that because electrons behave the way they do, there must be final causes. But this is only true with a vacuous definition of final causation. If final causation can explain everything, it can explain nothing. Why do electrons behave the way that they do? Modern physics would explain that in terms of phenomena such as "charge." Does the existence of "charge" prove the existence of final cause as Aristotle and Aquinas understood it? How so? Do explain. And explain not by citing the authority of Feser, but by citing passages of Aristotle and Aquinas, and providing a competent academic exegesis of them. Modern science (I'll bracket out the most recent developments, e.g., quantum theory, for the sake of historical simplicity) achieved its success through the notion of "natural laws." The origin of the notion of "natural laws" has been well researched by historians of science. Aristotle and Aquinas knew nothing or almost nothing of "natural laws". If you want to know the history of the notion of natural laws, read the writings of Oakley and Osler and other first-rate historians of science. The notion of natural laws sprang out of late medieval theology and philosophy, and was developed through the Renaissance and Reformation periods until the modern notion emerged. It represented a different way of looking at nature from that employed by Aristotle and Aquinas. And, unlike the mode employed by Aristotle and Aquinas, it was a fruitful way. It worked. It could explain a myriad of things in nature which remained a complete mystery to Aristotle and Aquinas. The natural science of Aquinas and Aristotle was, for most purposes, useless. That is because the misunderstood what nature was, how it operated. There is a reason for this. Aristotle did not grasp the meaning of the doctrine of creation, and even Aquinas did not grasp it fully, because his admiration for Aristotle handicapped him. It was the hated late-medieval philosophers, whom Beckwith and Feser so deplore, who actually brought out the full meaning of the doctrine of creation, who understood the meaning of the contingency of God's will; and early modern philosophy of science picked up on this and realized that only an observational and experimental science, not a rationalist science like that of Aquinas, would ever do justice to a created nature. Read the writings of Collingwood, Duhem, Oakley, Davis, etc. As for your point about Feser on ID, I am perfectly aware that he has not challenged ID on the scientific plane. I have not criticized him on that score. Nor have I asked him to surrender his point that the Fifth Way is different from Paley's line of argument. Nor have I asked him to endorse ID. I have asked him, and Beckwith, to stop taking shots at ID's allegedly bad or heretical theology. And I have given reasons for my view that ID "theology" (which is an odd conception, since ID as such has no theology), or, if you like, Paley's theology, is no more "un-Christian" than Thomas's Five Ways. Thomas's Five Ways don't get one anywhere near the Biblical God. They get one to the God of the philosophers, not the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. So if Beckwith and Feser are going to bash Paley's God for being too much like a mechanic, they had better reread the Five Ways, because the God presented there is a metaphysical abstraction, a First Cause, etc., not something that Jews or Christians have ever related to with any emotional depth. Even if (as I deny) Paley's God is too anthropomorphic to be the Biblical God, the God of the Five Ways is too abstract to be the Biblical God. The point is that neither watchmaker analogies (like Paley's) nor abstract metaphysical arguments (like Aquinas's) can adequately express the reality of the Biblical God. In any case, the deeper issue remains. What ought Christians to be beholden to: a notion called "classical theism" (where Beckwith and Feser get to define the notion, and surprise, surprise, it looks more like their version of Thomism than like any other form of theism in the history of the West), or the teachings of the Bible? When I read Beckwith and Feser I hear 90% Aristotelian metaphysics and 10% Bible. Unlike their master Aquinas, they hardly discuss the Bible at all. I'd like to see some rebalancing, before they take any more shots at Paley or at ID for not being adequately Christian in their theology. Any form of Christian thought that is not deeply immersed in the Bible, more immersed in the Bible than in any systematic philosophy, will be theologically defective. Even at their best, Thomists after Aquinas have rarely seen this.Thomas Cudworth
April 25, 2011
April
04
Apr
25
25
2011
10:26 PM
10
10
26
PM
PDT
Nullasalus @ 27: Context, please!Ilion
April 25, 2011
April
04
Apr
25
25
2011
08:19 PM
8
08
19
PM
PDT
Timaeus @ 30: Exactly. Moreover, ID is explicitly not about finding the revealed Living God of the Bible. Feser faults the IDists for failing to do what they are not even trying to do (and are quite up-front about not trying to do) -- *and* contrary to his denials of it, he is calling them heretics for failing to do what they do not set out to do. And, as you rightly point out, the bloodless "classical theistic God" Feser is forever banging on about is at least as far from the Living God as is the picture of the divine drawn with an ID-brush. ID is an act of intellectual jujutsu against materialism/atheism. It uses the language and methodologies that the materialists imagine have made their God-denial safe from rational evaluation and criticism, which they vainly imagine allows them to proclaim victory over Christ, to knock them off their high-horses and onto their asses.Ilion
April 25, 2011
April
04
Apr
25
25
2011
08:17 PM
8
08
17
PM
PDT
Mr. Green, Thomas Cudworth, Mung, Timaeus, mullasalus and Ilion, Thank you all for your comments on Professor Feser and on Aquinas and his Fifth Way. I'll be putting up a post on Aquinas' Fifth Way in the next few days. I hope it will be a profitable talking point, as it is intended to help people with very different mindsets to understand one another's ways of thinking about God, and to show what the Fifth Way does and does not establish. For the time being, I will simply say that Mr. Green's characterization of Aquinas' Fifth Way is an accurate one, and I would urge readers to have a look at Professor Feser's posts on the Fifth Way, as I will be referring to these and to his books in my next post.vjtorley
April 25, 2011
April
04
Apr
25
25
2011
03:05 PM
3
03
05
PM
PDT
Thomas Cudworth: This is not an adequate answer. All that the regularity of the electron shows is that it is governed by some sort of rule or law. That can be understood entirely in terms of efficient cause. There is no need at all to posit some “end” which keeps the electron where it is. This is as wrong-headed as the erroneous physical conclusion (endorsed by Aristotle and Aquinas alike, but curiously not by Feser and Beckwith), that heavy objects fall because they have a natural “telos” or “end” to downward motion. Since the dawn of modern physics that sort of thinking has been rejected.
Um... this is really off-track, I'm afraid. Perhaps it's worth pointing out that Ed Feser has explained this particular issue many, many times — he literally wrote the book on it (well, "a" book, since there are dozens or hundreds more that explain the basics of Aristotelian or Thomistic metaphysics), not to mention many posts at his site. So consider how it must appear from Feser's point of view: to be "challenged" on a point which you have explained over and over again must legitimately be quite frustrating, no? So comments like this last paragraph come off sounding dangerously close to, "I may be asking the wrong question, but I'm gonna keep on asking it until I get the answer I want!" The problem is that you have wholly misconstrued what "final causes" are all about. The point is precisely that the regularity of the electron cannot be understood in terms of efficient causality (unless you are using a radically non-Aristotelian definition of "efficient cause"). It is right and wrong to say that modern physics rejects such thinking — right insofar as the modern attempt to create a non-Aristotelian philosophy of science claims to reject final causes; but wrong insofar as such concepts are still smuggled in, only without using the actual name "final cause". After all, the fact is that modern physics (actual science, if not philosophical interpretations of it), does indeed rely on heavy objects falling because they have an end to downward motion — "downward" towards any mass, that is. Aristotle's mistake was in concluding that the motion was only towards the centre of the earth instead of towards the centre of any mass (but of course the earth was the only thing exerting an obvious gravitational pull in Aristotle's observations, so his mistake is understandable). Nonetheless, the fact that objects tend to move in a certain way [which, with refined observations we know is towards any other mass] IS a natural telos. If you think that gravity is not representative of a final cause, then you have misunderstood what a final cause is. You don't need a "telos" to "keep" the electron doing what it does — the fact that there is anything that an electron does is the very definition of a final cause in the first place. As to whether you need to subscribe to Thomist metaphysics first... well, Feser has said — repeatedly — that he has no argument with any actual scientific claims ID can make, qua science. He is only responding to attempts to present a Thomistic interpretation of ID, which obviously does require arguing from a Thomistic perspective. (His arguments against mechanistic-ID apply no more and no less than against mechanistic-gravity or mechanistic anything else.)Mr. Green
April 25, 2011
April
04
Apr
25
25
2011
01:41 PM
1
01
41
PM
PDT
nullasalus (29): I'd like to cut in on your discussion with Thomas Cudworth, if you don't mind, and offer my somewhat less civilized and more polemical take on the matter. You wrote: "Granted. But as far as that goes, Feser and ID are in the same boat. No one becomes a Christian, Jew, or Muslim by being convinced that this or that aspect of nature required an intelligent cause." Nolo contendere. The difference, however, is this: ID people don't say that Thomistic arguments for the existence of God lead to inferior or heretical Christian theology, or are advocated by thinkers who are the unwitting dupes of the erroneous, mechanistic early modern philosophers. Beckwith and Feser do say that about ID arguments, and about Paley's arguments. The fact of the matter is that that Aquinas's Five Ways don't lead to the specifically Christian idea of God at all. They lead to a generic, philosophical God who is so devoid of affective characteristics as to be unsuited to human worship. They lead to a God for the lecture room, not for the chapel (or the foxhole). So by what right do Beckwith and Feser complain about the Paley/ID arguments for God, when the God of the Five Ways is at least as far away from the Biblically revealed God as Paley's God is? Presumably they would answer: "Thomas's Five Ways are not meant to give a full picture of God, but only an argument for his bare existence that is as valid for the Gentile as for the Christian. Their theological inadequacy is thus entirely beside the point." Exactly the same answer can be fairly given by Paley and the ID people. They would say: "Of course God is much more than a mere designer. In no way are our arguments meant as a statement of an adequate Christian theology." But Beckwith and Feser will not allow this answer from the Paley/ID people. They are determined to tell the world not just that ID is inadequate as theology (which ID people are the first to admit), but that ID is bad theology. In other words, to put it crudely, it is Beckwith and Feser who started this food fight, not the ID people. T.Timaeus
April 25, 2011
April
04
Apr
25
25
2011
03:16 AM
3
03
16
AM
PDT
Thomas, no one becomes a Christian, Jew, or Muslim by being convinced of the existence of a First Cause. Granted. But as far as that goes, Feser and ID are in the same boat. No one becomes a Christian, Jew, or Muslim by being convinced that this or that aspect of nature required an intelligent cause. (That Francis Crick is a minor poster boy for ID should drive that much home.)nullasalus
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
11:55 PM
11
11
55
PM
PDT
Mung: Thanks for your reply. You've given a summary of Aquinas's Five Ways rather than his full exposition, but the full text is found at the link you provided. Yes, Aquinas proceeds from observation -- but observation of the general character of all things, not of the specific properties or arrangements of particular things. By specific properties and arrangements I mean things like the bacterial flagellum and the bat's sonar system and winged flight in birds and the properties of carbon and so on. Since you say you read ID literature you should know what I am talking about here. None of Aquinas's arguments rest on details of this nature, not even such details as were available to him from the science of the 13th century. He argues from general features of the world, its most colorless and abstract properties. Paley argued from specific arrangements. Feser applauds Aquinas's arguments, and rejects Paley's. He thinks (a) that Aquinas's arguments are demonstratively certain, whereas Paley's are only probablistic, and therefore inferior; (b) that Paley's arguments are implicitly unorthodox in their notion of God. I disagree with him about (b) -- and this goes back to a difference between us about the relative place of philosophical systematics and Biblical teaching within Christian orthodoxy. Regarding (a), I am not sure that Thomas's arguments are demonstrative, but even if they are, they are demonstrative only for a certain philosophical notion of God, not for the God of religious believers; no one becomes a Christian, Jew, or Muslim by being convinced of the existence of a First Cause. The identity of the God whose existence Aquinas proves with the Biblical God requires a separate argument. Thomists tend not to notice this.Thomas Cudworth
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
11:45 PM
11
11
45
PM
PDT
I deem Feser as having the best chance of reaching next to no-one, for he refuses to speak in language that is meaningful in *this* society. I agree that the approach Feser is taking will not really sink in for many people - but then, neither will ID's. You say "next to no one", but what are you asking for? A single approach to the question of God that will work on the widest number of people? Christianity doesn't need one supreme apologist. It needs an army of them. Feser's part of that army, and the arguments he highlights does seem to really reach a number of people. Even if it's mostly people who are interested in philosophy - not very numerous, sure. ON THE OTHER HAND, in his example of “the universe” comprised of a single electron orbiting a single atomic nucleus, Feser appears to be making a claim of physical necessity, and on that basis making a claim of metaphysical necessity. Actually, I think that's backwards, isn't it? Feser argues that first principles are absolutely vital, so the metaphysics comes first, though the physical observation plays a role. The "single electron orbiting a single atomic nucleus" is sufficient to prove what it does, by Feser's reasoning, due to what is established in advance by metaphysical reasoning. The biggest problem I have in these disputes is the apparent insistence some ID proponents have that everyone get onboard with their project. Feser isn't sitting there demanding ID people give up ID for Thomism. Honestly, when he's not be hounded to accept ID, he has precious little to say about it, and he's admitted that ID is often maligned unjustly. I can understand it when ID proponents gun for those TEs who hardly even seem sincere in their belief that nature is designed. But it's not the case with Feser.nullasalus
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
11:28 PM
11
11
28
PM
PDT
Ilíon: "So, one has observed that atom for all of time?" Mung: "No. Does one have to observe the output of one of your functions for all of time to conclude that it always, or almost always, does the same thing?" A function is a logical construct. And thus, given the same set of inputs, it *always* generates/returns the same outputs; there is no "almost always" about it. This is a matter of logical necessity. Now, of course, we do not live in a "Platonic" world of logical constructs, but rather in a physical world of matter. So, if we mean to make use of a logical function, we must find some way of instantiating it in physical form -- we must find some way to use meaningless matter-states to represent the meaningful logical constructs we wish to use. We do this with computers and computer programs. It is well known that the proper execution of a computer program depends upon the proper design and functioning of the computer on which is runs. Thus, if the physical computer is improperly designed (as with the infamous math co-processor error of some of the early Pentium CPUs) or is malfunctioning, then a program or function may well return erratic results. But, one should not confuse the physical representation of a logical function for the logical function itself. It is logically impossible, meaning utterly impossible, for a logical function to do other than it does. One knows this via reason, by reasoning properly -- just as one knows that 1+1=2 always, without deviation -- not by empirical observation of all possible executions of all possible physical implementations/representations of the logical function. That a logical function always returns the same output, given the same input, is a matter of logical necessity: it cannot be otherwise (however often the DarwinDefenders claim and cavil to the contrary). ON THE OTHER HAND, in his example of "the universe" comprised of a single electron orbiting a single atomic nucleus, Feser appears to be making a claim of physical necessity, and on that basis making a claim of metaphysical necessity. Yet (to the limited extent that I understand it), according to modern chemistry and the underlying physics, the claim of physical necessity Feser seems to be invoking is not really there. For instance, according to modern physics, molecules are formed when two or more atoms "share" electrons between them. Further, modern physics claims that matter and energy are inter-convertible. Thus, if modern physics is essentially correct, we have at least two reasons to reject the claim is physical necessity Feser seems to be asserting. Furthermore -- and this was the actual point of my questions -- even were there a physical necessity such as Feser seems to be invoking/claiming, and even if one *were* to observe that that lone atom of "the universe" for all of time, so long as one is a finite being, specifically, so long as one does not possess "infinite" knowledge, then one can never make the claim of physical necessity with the surety that one has not made a false assumption. The strongest empirical statement one is logically justified in making is that one has never, in all of time, observed the electron to do other than it is doing now. If one wishes to be rationally justified in making claims of necessity, then one cannot invoke assumptions, rather, one must invoke self-evident axioms. Mung: "We’re talking about what it always, or almost always, is observed to do." Are we now? Well, that's a very different thing from necessity ... and, in the quote, Feser certainly appears to be making a claim of necessity. Ilíon: "[O]ne know[s] that [the electron's] “proper” end or role in “the universe” is to “orbit” that nucleus?" Mung: "Proper? Is that a value judgment? I only care about what I observe, not about what whether what I observe is “proper” or not." But Feser's entire "A-T" schtick is about what is assertedly the "proper end" of this or that ... while allowing and asserting all sorts of seemingly arbitrary exceptions. Mung: "But that does raise an interesting point. How do we determine that certain cells are not behaving “properly”?" That's why I sometimes, only half joking, refer to Aristotle's metaphysics (or, at any rate, my sketchy grasp of them) as "Unintended Intensions." Ilíon: "One knows this, as opposed to knowing that that simply happens to be what the electron is doing while one is observing it?" Mung: "The same way that we know anything else. We don’t make inferences based on a sample size of 1." One cannot logically justify *any* claim of necessity on the basis of an inference. One must have a deduction which follows from self-evident axioms.Ilion
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
10:49 PM
10
10
49
PM
PDT
Feser repudiates that sort of argument, as leading straight to bad theology. Do you agree with him?
No, I would not agree. IIRC, Paley structured his argument in such a way as to arrive at the Christian God.Mung
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
09:32 PM
9
09
32
PM
PDT
Hi Thomas, You present some interesting questions and I shall want to think a bit on them (and pray that someone else will come to my rescue!). :) First let me say that I think the Five Ways are of the nature of metaphysical demonstrations and as such are quite foreign to our modern way of thinking. But it is very hard for me to accept that none of the Five Ways refer to observations of the way things appear to be. I answer that it can be proved in five ways that God exists. Medieval Sourcebook: Aquinas: Proof of the Existence of God
The first and plainest is the method that proceeds from the point of view of motion. It is certain and in accord with experience, that things on earth undergo change.
The second proof is from the nature of the efficient cause. We find in our experience that there is a chain of causes: nor is it found possible for anything to be the efficient cause of itself, since it would have to exist before itself, which is impossible.
The third proof is taken from the natures of the merely possible and necessary. We find that certain things either may or may not exist, since they are found to come into being and be destroyed, and in consequence potentially, either existent or non-existent.
The fourth proof arises from the degrees that are found in things.
The fifth proof arises from the ordering of things for we see that some things which lack reason, such as natural bodies, are operated in accordance with a plan.
The way I see it, every single one of the Five Ways proceeds from observation of the way things are or appear to be. And if you think that Beckwith and Feser see things otherwise, I would indeed be interested to know why. More later.Mung
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
09:22 PM
9
09
22
PM
PDT
Mung: "After reading Feser’s TLS, I came away asking, ok, so teach me how to think that way." That would be a good way of putting my own reaction (and, if I recall correctly, you read in on my recommendation). I had indended to read it again ... but, I also know myself well enough to know that that becomes a more remote possibility as I no longer respect the man intellectually. Ilíon: "One must do one’s best to speak to one’s audience in its own language." Mung: "Is that why so few understood the real meaning behind the words of Jesus? Is that why he had to take his disciples aside and explain to them what he meant? . So I disagree with the premise ..." Do you, indeed? It seems to me you've but shown an example of the very principle. Mung: "But if you were Feser, who would you approach first? Who does he have a better chance of reaching? (Leaving aside any questions of the approach taken, lol.)" I deem Feser as having the best chance of reaching next to no-one, for he refuses to speak in language that is meaningful in *this* society. Rather than simply acknowledging and working with the fact that *everyone* sees the world in mechanistic terms -- and that this is the natural and inevitable result of Judeo-Christian rationalism -- Feser would rather say, "Meh! You're all just a bunch of materialists!" and, sotto voce he says, "You're also heretics, making false claims and spreading false conceptions about God" But, of course, we are neither.Ilion
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
08:42 PM
8
08
42
PM
PDT
Mung: "But do you really want to fight such an important battle on the ground selected by the enemy? You want to abide by his rules?" All battlefields belong to Christ already, do they not? If we fear a particular battlefield, is it not due either to our own timidity or to unfamiliarity with the lay of the ground (which seems to me a result of timidity)? When the philosophes managed to convince most of Western society (*) that Christianity was irrational and that rationality was to be found in atheism, was the proper Christian response to retreat into pietism? Hell, no -- we *taught* the world to be rational! Yet, to one degree or another, that *is* what most of Christendom did do (**). It is only within your and my lifetime that Christians (as a society) are coming out of that foolish detour -- probably, in part, because the "mainline" and "elite" Christians have mostly completed the logical trajectory their intellectual forebearers set them on a couple of centuries ago and now clearly are outside Christianity, being no more than "useful idiots" for atheism/materialism. Since ID is about overturning Darwinism, rather than atheism (***) directly, I'll use Darwinists as my example. When a DarwinDenier, whether an IDist or a creationist, shows a DarwinDefender that some aspect of Darwinism, or Darwinism as a whole, is self-contradictory, and thus seen to be false, how does the Darwinist almost invariably respond? In one way or another, he will almost always say, "Unless you can provide me a new 'theory of evolution' (one that I will accept), then I am rationally and scientifically justified to continue asserting Darwinism." To put it more bluntly, he is saying, "Unless you can show me how to make Darwinism true, then I refuse to admit that Darwinism is false." God-deniers almost always respond in the same way with respect to God-denial, when logically shown that God-denial is illogical, and thus false. Both (I say "both" to the extent that there is a difference between the two -isms) DarwinDefenders and God-deniers -- who vociferously proclaim that *they* are the rational and logical ones, that they *own* Logic, Reason and Rationality -- will always retreat into illogic and irrationality when pressed; for, that is, in truth, the only ground they hold or can ever hold, and it is no ground at all. Feser's approach to this behavior is not to continue to press them and thus make obvious to all that their claim to own Reason is just meaningless noise, but rather to let them off the hook, both in their own eyes and in those of the wider culture. Feser says to them, "Well, look, if you make this and this and this assumptions, then you can clearly see that you have been wrong all along!" To which they reply, "And why should I make those assumptions?" And everyone forgets that they've just been thoroughly routed from the Field of Reason, and they creep back and replant their flags. (*) Perhaps I should have put "society" in quote marks, for I don't mean everyone, but rather those elites and elite-wannabes, those who see themselves as "the sophisticates" in contrast to and over and above mere hoi polloi, those who set the general tone of society. (**) It is "the little people," the "backwoods" and "unsophisticated" Christians, who remained true to Christ and continued to believe and teach that Christianity is both reasonable and rational, while their "betters" trimmed and trimmed and trimmed, so as to fit in with with the right crowds, until they had nothing of Christ or Christianity left but the word. They trimmed all the wax off their candles and can't fathom why the wick-alone sheds no light. (***) The main reason most Darwinist are God-deniers, and most (westernized) God-deniers are Dawrinists isn't so much that Darwinism is the only available "theory of evolution," but rather that both systems of thought, to the extend that there is a sytem to them, are based on the same mode of illogical and irrational "reasoning." Marxism and Freudianism, likewise.Ilion
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
08:16 PM
8
08
16
PM
PDT
Mung: Thanks for your response. I have a couple of questions. 1. I had written: "But Feser prefers arguments from the general characteristics of existence, characteristics so general that they have very little tether in the empirical plane at all." To which you replied: "I don’t believe this is accurate. I think he would say, as with Aristotle, so with Aquinas, from the particular to the universal." I don't disagree with you about Aristotle and Aquinas reasoning from the particular to the universal. But that's not what I'm getting at. Let me rephrase: Please have a look at Aquinas's Five Ways. In which, if any, of the Five Ways, does Aquinas argue to the existence of God *from the character of particular arrangements* within nature? Not general facts of nature, such as the existence of things, or the existence of causes, or the existence of order, but particular facts about nature? I had always thought that only the Fifth Way involved such an argument, but if Beckwith and Feser are right (and they may well be), then even the Fifth Way does not constitute such an argument. This would mean that Aquinas's proofs are all based on general characteristics of existing things, not on particularities. Do you deny this? Now take Paley's arguments. They are based on particular characteristics of existing things, e.g., the complexity of the eye. Modern forms of this type of argument would be arguments from particular "irreducibly complex" structures in living things, or from the fine-tuning of physical constants. Feser repudiates that sort of argument, as leading straight to bad theology. Do you agree with him? 2. I had written: "How would Feser know, in the situation described, that the electron’s “orbiting” the nucleus demonstrates any causes *directed to certain ends*?" To which you replied: "Because it’s not off doing something else, of all the other possible things it could be doing." This is not an adequate answer. All that the regularity of the electron shows is that it is governed by some sort of rule or law. That can be understood entirely in terms of efficient cause. There is no need at all to posit some "end" which keeps the electron where it is. This is as wrong-headed as the erroneous physical conclusion (endorsed by Aristotle and Aquinas alike, but curiously not by Feser and Beckwith), that heavy objects fall because they have a natural "telos" or "end" to downward motion. Since the dawn of modern physics that sort of thinking has been rejected. Of course, one can postulate, in addition to the efficient causes recognized by modern physics, some "final cause" which keeps electrons where they are in relation to the nuclei of atoms. But it's gratuitous -- unless one already assumes the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics/physics which is precisely what is being challenged. How can anyone know -- without the aid of revelation -- that there are final causes in the universe at all? (Other than those introduced by human and animal agents, I mean.) Of course, if by "final cause" all that one means is that acorns grow into oak trees, then of course there is final causation in the universe. But from the ancient Epicurean point of view, all such final causation can be explained away by reference to efficient causes which give the illusion of final causes. And I would be very interested if you could find me any head of any physics department in the world who would explain the adhesion of the electron to its atom in terms of final causes. Such explanations have no cognitive value in physics, and if you are Dawkins, they have zero cognitive value in biology. The pedagogical question for the Thomists is: is it necessary to first convert people to the "Aristotelian-Thomistic" philosophy of nature, before people will count any appeal to final causes as legitimate? If so, then your argument about the electron (and all kindred arguments that Feser alludes to) will be judged of no validity by the majority of educated people who are not Aristotelian or Thomist. If not, if there is a universal human reasoning about these matters that should be satisfactory to Thomist and non-Thomist alike, then show me how we get to a final-cause explanation for the behavior of the electron without invoking the authority of Aristotle or Thomas. Tell me how we can know that any "telos" is keeping that electron where it is, when we already have a sufficient explanation in the laws of physics uncovered by non-Aristotelian science.Thomas Cudworth
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
07:30 PM
7
07
30
PM
PDT
…one know that its “proper” end or role in “the universe” is to “orbit” that nucleus?
So you apparently know what it means to speak of proper function and malfunction. That's final causation at it's core.Mung
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
04:49 PM
4
04
49
PM
PDT
Hi Ilion. I think you make some valid points. After reading Feser's TLS, I came away asking, ok, so teach me how to think that way. I'm still waiting for the "For Dummies" or "For Idiots" version to come out. I agree that it's a different way of looking at things and indeed even a different way of thinking about things. But do you really want to fight such an important battle on the ground selected by the enemy? You want to abide by his rules? I'm not claiming this is true of you, just so we're clear.
One must do one’s best to speak to one’s audience in its own language.
Is that why so few understood the real meaning behind the words of Jesus? Is that why he had to take his disciples aside and explain to them what he meant? So I disagree with the premise, even though it sounds great. If I weren't in such a disagreeable mood I might even agree with it. But if you were Feser, who would you approach first? Who does he have a better chance of reaching? (Leaving aside any questions of the approach taken, lol.) I'm not a Catholic. (Who knows, maybe one day...) I'm not an apologist for Feser. I bought his book TLS because of the current debate over the new atheists. He made some points that intrigued me. Made me want to learn more. For that I am thankful. I'm just trying to understand where he might be coming from.
So, one has observed that atom for all of time?
No. Does one have to observe the output of one of your functions for all of time to conclude that it always, or almost always, does the same thing?
One knows that the electon cannot but “orbit the nucleus”?
No. We go by what we observe, not by what we don't observe. Sure, some magical Pixie might come along and change things, but we've never seen it happen. The earth revolves around the sun. Perhaps an occasional nudge is needed to keep it on the right track. We're talking about what it always, or almost always, is observed to do.
...one know that its “proper” end or role in “the universe” is to “orbit” that nucleus?
Proper? Is that a value judgment? I only care about what I observe, not about what whether what I observe is "proper" or not. But that does raise an interesting point. How do we determine that certain cells are not behaving "properly"?
One knows this, as opposed to knowing that that simply happens to be what the electron is doing while one is observing it?
The same way that we know anything else. We don't make inferences based on a sample size of 1. Dude.
Mung
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
04:45 PM
4
04
45
PM
PDT
"Because it’s not off doing something else, of all the other possible things it could be doing." So, one has observed that atom for all of time? One knows that the electon cannot but "orbit the nucleus"? one know that its "proper" end or role in "the universe" is to "orbit" that nucleus? One knows this, as opposed to knowing that that simply happens to be what the electron is doing while one is observing it? Look, Feser's constant banging on about "A-T" this and "A-T" that generally smells like question-begging to me ... and I'm a Christian, meaning that I am in overall agreement with the statements Feser asserts are conclusions. If his argumentation frequently seems like question-begging to those who agree with where he wishes to go, what must it all sound like to vigorously resist giving assent to the truth-claims of Christianity. One must do one's best to speak to one's audience in its own language. "A-T," even if it is true and non-question-begging is not the language with which to address most moderns, and certainly not materialists: they don't even begin to listen to it. Trying to reach materialsts in that language is a pointless as telling him he "must be washed in the blood" -- while the statement is true, it is meaningless to him, for it's not in his language. Feser adamantly refuses to understand the point.Ilion
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
04:00 PM
4
04
00
PM
PDT
Mung, But of course. Everyone who really is a Christian is a convert, for God has no grandchildren. And everyone has been an ass at least once and likely will be again. But, not everyone is intellectually dishonest; and, sadly, one must conclude that (at least on certain topics (*) ) Feser chooses to be. (*) But, once one realizes that, one can't really respect him on other topics.Ilion
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
03:44 PM
3
03
44
PM
PDT
Thomas Cudworth: Thank you for your very interesting post. I'll respond at further length later today, but for now I'll just say that Mung's comment in #14 above is accurate, and I'd like to add that Aristotle (unlike Aquinas) was definitely not a classical theist. None of the ancient Greeks were. Classical theism can be defined as the belief in a God who is transcendent, perfect, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent, immutable, eternal and incapable of being decomposed into parts (i.e simple). Some Biblical passages are rather anthropomorphic - e.g. God walking in the Garden of Eden - so Thomists are very careful when interpreting them. Professor Feser states several times in his posts that Aristotle's view of final causes is not the same as Aquinas's. Of course, Feser agrees with Aquinas's view, which forms the basis of the Fifth Way. That's all for now. I'll be back later.vjtorley
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
02:35 PM
2
02
35
PM
PDT
p.s. In the above, note the observational aspect. We're not reasoning from some "first principle,' but are rather looking at particular instances of what is actually happening, and reasoning from that.Mung
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
02:10 PM
2
02
10
PM
PDT
But Feser prefers arguments from the general characteristics of existence, characteristics so general that they have very little tether in the empirical plane at all.
I don't believe this is accurate. I think he would say, as with Aristotle, so with Aquinas, from the particular to the universal. But then, what do I know, I'm just a converted ass :)
How would Feser know, in the situation described, that the electron’s “orbiting” the nucleus demonstrates any causes *directed to certain ends*?
Because it's not off doing something else, of all the other possible things it could be doing.Mung
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
02:08 PM
2
02
08
PM
PDT
Well, you know the old saying: "Converts are frequently the most fervent of Christians ... and sometimes they're right asses."Ilion
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
01:42 PM
1
01
42
PM
PDT
Vincent Torley: Thanks for this follow up. Regarding the word “heretic” or “heretical,” I think that Feser’s use or non-use of the actual charge is a matter of rhetoric rather than substance. Feser may not be aggressive enough to say “You Iders are all heretics,” but his argument plainly indicates that he believes that ID implies an unorthodox view of God. But let us move to a more central point, because I have some questions for you. Feser keeps referring to "classic theism." He also keeps on speaking of "Aristotelianism-Thomism" as a sort of unified position. But as he certainly knows, and as you and I know, there are major differences between Aristotle and Thomas on a number of things, including the nature and activity of God. This raises the question whether Aristotle, taken on his own, without the modifications introduced by Aquinas, would count as a representative of "classic theism." I suspect that he would not. Is there anywhere where Feser says something like: “Aristotle believed X about God, and Aquinas believed Y about God, and Aristotle was wrong and Aquinas was right, because Y rather than X is true about God”? On another point, I don’t understand how Feser can argue that any old natural law will do. You quote him as saying: “Even if the universe consisted of nothing but an electron orbiting a nucleus, that would suffice for the Fifth Way… All that matters is that there are various causes here and now which are directed to certain ends, and the argument is that these couldn’t possibly exist at all if there were not a Supreme Intellect here and now ordering them to those ends…” How would Feser know, in the situation described, that the electron’s “orbiting” the nucleus (we’ll overlook Feser’s outdated-by-80-years Bohr model of the atom, as it’s irrelevant to the argument) demonstrates any causes *directed to certain ends*? There’s nothing about the motion of the electron in itself that indicates any “end” at all. It may be just the mathematical expression of a physical necessity. By what right would Feser infer that any “end” is being served? He seems to be presupposing the very Aristotelian analysis of causation that is at issue. More generally, I don’t see how the existence of natural laws logically implicates the God of classic theism. Someone like Dawkins could always argue that the existence of the natural laws is just a blunt fact of the universe, without explanation; it’s just the way the world is, and we’re just lucky that such laws happen to be able to facilitate evolution, so that we can exist. But even if we grant (as I do) that the existence of natural laws indicates the existence of *some* sort of God, why the God of “classic theism”? Why not just a God who loves calculus and algebra, and who loves making things? Why read more into the natural laws than that? I’m not here opposing the God of “classic theism,” but merely being cautious, as philosophers should: why assert more about God than the evidence warrants? The evidence warrants that there is a designer who is into mathematics in a big way. Anything beyond that is debatable. I actually think that the argument from “the general fact of law” is a *weaker* argument for the existence of God (as God is understood in the Bible, anyway) than design-type arguments. In design-type arguments, not the mere existence of laws as such, but the particular character of those laws (e.g., their fine-tuning), is the basis of the argument, just as not the mere existence of orderly configurations (as e.g. in a crystal) but the existence of certain kinds of orderly configurations (as e.g. in an organism) is the basis of the argument. In other words, in design-type arguments reason works from *the particular character* of the created universe, and is to that extent grounded in empiricism. But Feser prefers arguments from the general characteristics of existence, characteristics so general that they have very little tether in the empirical plane at all. I’m not sure that such arguments can prove anything about God at all, without surreptitiously slipping in exactly what it is meant to prove (e.g., as Feser slips in “ends” above); but even if they *can* prove the existence of some sort of God, it appears to me that the God whose existence they prove is the God of the philosophers (an abstraction of simplicity, being, etc.), not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who is not an aloof, simple, pure being, but very much a doer, interactive with the world of his creation. Thus, while “God as mechanic” or “God as engineer” is an inadequate image to fully capture Christian truth, it certain captures some aspects of Biblical truth – God as planner, God as dynamic – aspects of God which are much harder to think of when God is conceived of as “simple” or “pure Being” or the like. But for some reason, the Thomists appear to have a distaste for the Biblical (as opposed to the philosophical) way of speaking about God. I think that this last point, as much as any alleged philosophical problems with ID arguments, explains much of the friction between Feser/Beckwith and ID. For Feser/Beckwith, “classic theism” is not negotiable; they are so committed to “classic theism” that the Bible is interpreted within its boundaries. For the Christian ID proponent, however, this is putting the cart before the horse. Most ID proponents are Protestants (which is not to belittle the contribution of Catholics such as Michael Behe or Vincent Torley), and for Protestants the one non-negotiable in Christianity is not “classic theism”; it is the Bible. And the language of the Bible is certainly compatible with an ID interpretation. In any case, I await Professor Feser’s answer to the question in my original column. If he runs true to form, i.e., if he speaks to me the way that he normally speaks to me and to others who do not share his perspective, he will spend most of his answer explaining how I am asking the wrong question because I do not understand metaphysics or because I am a prisoner of the erroneous categories of thinking initiated by Descartes, etc. But I am prepared to be pleasantly surprised and receive a straight answer from him, in the very clear terms in which I posed the question.Thomas Cudworth
April 24, 2011
April
04
Apr
24
24
2011
12:50 PM
12
12
50
PM
PDT
ack. here's the link: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1587315017Mung
April 22, 2011
April
04
Apr
22
22
2011
06:24 PM
6
06
24
PM
PDT
1 2 3 4

Leave a Reply